What consequences may the terrorist acts of 11 September have for EU enlargement? Will they facilitate it or make it more complicated? And what is likely to be their overall impact on pan-European security?
In nuclear matters more than in any other political area, perceptions have the force of law. The most concrete nuclear technology would count for little without the extremely sophisticated theories of uncertainty that form the basis of any nuclear deterrence strategy. Yet for the last few years both the technological and intellectual worlds of deterrence, as mankind has known it since 1945, have been in turmoil on all continents.
This paper deals with Belarus’s slide into authoritarianism, its foreign policy – especially its relations with Russia – and the European responses (or lack thereof). Whereas almost all the other states in the region have adopted Western orientations and market-driven reforms, Belarus has chosen to remain exclusively in the orbit of the Russian Federation.
This paper analyses how the Russian top leadership’s rhetoric on security and the West evolved during and after NATO’s Operation Allied Force against Serbia in 1999. By grasping the logic inherent in political rhetoric, one can arrive at a better understanding of the messages that a political actor is trying to convey.
A seminar entitled ‘Enlarging Europe: CFSP perspectives’, took place in Paris on 21 and 22 May 2001 (Antonio Missiroli). The aim of this seminar was to address issues which lie at the juncture between two policy processes that are still perceived, if not pursued, as separate and distinct, namely the enlargement of the European Union and the development of CFSP/ESDP. Such separation, or distinction, concerns especially the candidate countries, who still see the EU as a mainly economic organisation and its CFSP as a mainly declaratory policy, NATO remaining the main security provider on the continent. The discussion aimed precisely at filling this gap and focused on both the attitudes of current members and candidates vis-à-vis enlargement and CFSP/ESDP, and the possible interactions between the two enlargements. In fact, late next year, key decisions are expected on both fronts – at the North Atlantic Council in Prague and at the European Council in Copenhagen, respectively – and it proved interesting, during this seminar, to assess the state of affairs and the likely scenarios seen from the participants’ viewpoints.
In the two years between St-Malo and Nice, the character of the European Union changed. What was previously unthinkable ‘at Fifteen’ became an objective agreed by all member states: the inclusion in the Union’s legitimate competencies of a common security and defence policy, in other words its acquisition of strategic responsibility in post-Cold War crisis management.
Le Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) est à l’heure actuelle le seul dispositif politico-juridique international de lutte contre la prolifération des missiles. Il a été mis sur pied en 1987 par les 7 pays les plus industrialisés, et regroupe aujourd’hui 33 Etats.
This Occasional Paper stems from a series of meetings of an ISS Task Force on ‘The Coherence of CFSP’ held in Paris between October 2000 and April 2001. Task Forces are small groups of experts and officials from member States, international bodies and think tanks that convene periodically to discuss a given topic or policy area. They usually include a ‘core group’ of members and other participants that join in according to the specific focus of each meeting.
In Europe, arms and dual-use exports raise complex questions. They fall between two policy spheres that are organised in a distinctly contrasting manner. On the one hand, they are an intrinsic part of commercial policy that lies within the exclusive competence of the European Community (EC). On the other hand, they come under the aegis of security and defence policy, a jealously guarded area of responsibility of the EU member states.
Once again contradictory dynamics are upsetting the fragile balance in the southern Balkans. On one side is the democratisation of Croatia but above all that of Serbia; on the other, attempts by UCK extremists to destabilise Macedonia. Yesterday’s enemy, Serbia, is becoming today’s partner, whereas yesterday’s partner, the UCK, may become a real adversary in the endeavour to maintain stability in Kosovo and the region as a whole.