At a recent conference in Washington on transatlantic alignment over Ukraine, one attendee described the European strategy as follows: ‘They want to turn Trump into Biden, getting him to accept costs for punishing Russia. It’s doomed to fail.’ Against the backdrop of the 28-point peace plan, the Witkoff-Dmitriev-Ushakov exchanges, and Trump’s new emphasis on ending the war as soon as possible, this claim rings true. Europe’s approach may have avoided worse outcomes over the past year, but now it appears to be based on assumptions that are no longer valid.
A new paradigm is needed for engaging with Trump in 2026 – on Ukraine and on wider transatlantic issues. Europe should adopt a more transactional approach towards the US, connect issues such as trade relations to European security, and leverage the pressure points available within the US government ahead of the midterm elections.
Hopes crushed
By the summer this year, European leaders hoped to have reached a new equilibrium with the new Trump administration. The US agreed to keep supplying key weapons to Kyiv and to maintain intelligence sharing. European leaders pushed back against the worst elements of the Alaska summit, and a second Trump-Putin meeting planned to take place in Budapest did not materialise. Most importantly, the US agreed to impose new secondary sanctions on countries buying Russian oil, threatening a major source of the Kremlin’s revenue.
The last two weeks have revealed a much more complex picture. After the Alaska summit, Trump’s advisors continued to meet Russian counterparts. Steven Witkoff, who has the longest personal relationship with the president and shares his business background, reportedly advised Russian officials on how to approach the US president. This channel resulted in the 28-point peace plan.
As for the sanctions, some countries have already received exemptions, and Lukoil has been granted a reprieve until 13 December to find a buyer for its assets abroad (and until April for its refinery in Bulgaria). Moreover, Trump seems unwilling to pressure China to stop purchasing Russian fossil fuels, a step that would be essential to inflict serious economic damage on Putin.
These developments run counter to the claim that Trump was inching closer to applying costly pressure on Russia. Instead, he keeps pushing for a quick end to the war – which is crucial to his ambition to cast himself as the ‘peace’ president and a potential Nobel Prize winner. And with mounting demands to focus on domestic matters ahead of the midterms, his patience is running thin.
Business as usual or a paradigm shift?
In the past two weeks, a flurry of diplomatic activity has led to pushback against the 28-point plan. A new version of the plan apparently removes some of the most problematic concessions from the original draft, but at a meeting with Witkoff and Jared Kushner on 2 December, Russia appeared poised to reject it. Europeans might think that nothing has changed, and that the pre-November equilibrium still holds. But, in fact, European leaders should realise that they need to adapt to a new reality.
Ukraine’s position on the battlefield, while not catastrophic, remains perilous, as Russia adapts to drone warfare. Meanwhile, the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine support tracker shows that US weapons purchased for Ukraine through NATO’s PURL initiative are not enough to compensate for the end of direct US assistance: monthly military aid fell by 43% in July and August compared to the first half of the year.
European leaders should realise that they need to adapt to a new reality.
Second, as Europe continues to be sidelined by sudden US overtures to Russia, pushback against the 28-point plan has also emerged from within the Trump administration. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and several US Senators have called for Ukraine to be brought back into the conversation. It is possible that intelligence agencies may have leaked the conversations between Witkoff, Ushakov and Dmitriev – showing the extent to which Trump’s envoy wanted to accommodate Russian demands.
Unlike in August, there was no procession of European leaders travelling to Washington – not even Zelensky was allowed to meet Trump until a deal was near-certain. While pro-Ukrainian voices in Washington may yet consign the lopsided plan to the dustbin, Europe’s own contribution to this effort has been minimal.
Beyond that, Europeans are no closer to a clear plan for a post-war deterrence of Russian aggression, whether in Ukraine or elsewhere. And Europe’s leverage in the transatlantic relationship is getting weaker. All this suggests that a new approach will be needed in the new year.
Turning the page
While there are no easy fixes, Europeans should try some avenues that have been left unexplored so far.
One option would be to openly adopt Trump’s transactional approach. Last week, US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and Trade Representative Jamieson Greer provided a new demonstration of this transactional approach in Brussels. They tied the rollback of steel and aluminium tariffs to revisions of the EU’s digital rules, raising new questions about Washington’s willingness to implement the EU-US trade deal.
The EU should play a similar game: tying any new implementation of the trade deal to having a seat at the negotiating table, or to joint enforcement of sanctions on Russia. This is a language Trump understands well. It is worth learning to speak it.
Second, Europe should make better use of its allies and the pressure points that exist in the US. Congress is one such avenue. Both the Senate and the House versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (which sets maximum spending levels for the Department of War) indicate an expectation that the US will continue to support Ukraine as part of wider deterrence in Europe. Congress is also expected to push for more Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Europe. The continent remained the biggest recipient of FMS in 2025 (more than 30 million USD). Congress did succeed in putting pressure on the administration over the peace plan. Allying with Congress in pressuring the administration, in a year of midterms, could provide Europe with an additional source of leverage.
It goes without saying that none of the approaches above will work unless Europe mobilises sufficient resources – primarily through the frozen Russian assets and new investment in defence – and shows the willingness to use them.
But regardless, Europe’s relevance in transatlantic conversations over Ukraine and beyond is at serious risk of fading. If nothing changes, the US will continue to discuss terms without European input, and the security of the continent will be beyond Europe’s control. As the new year begins, it is time for Europe to rethink its assumptions and pursue a new approach.
