The energy outlook for Europe heading into winter 2026 is the bleakest since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The EU should coordinate targeted energy price relief measures, ensuring that money is invested in long-term security and competitiveness while simultaneously responding to Russian hybrid aggression.
Gas storage is at its lowest level since 2022. Energy prices have skyrocketed. Oil is up 68%, diesel 45%, jet fuel 112% and gas 135% from a year ago. On 25 September, the European Commission called for demand reduction for gas and electricity, for the first time since February 2022.
The problem is compounded by the growing frequency of grey-zone attacks against EU energy infrastructure. In early September 2026, Germany suffered several simultaneous strikes affecting electricity substations and coal power plants. On 18 September, President Macron tasked France’s G7 presidency with developing a ‘protection plan’ against Russian attacks. This came amid warnings that Russia will ramp up its hybrid campaigns of sabotage, disruption and interference in Europe.
Energy remains a key point of pressure for the Kremlin as it tries to break European resolve.
Two outlooks for the winter ahead
One way in which the situation may evolve is without marked change for better or for worse.
The war in Iran shows no signs of ending. Threats to seaborne oil and LNG shipments through the Strait of Hormuz persist, as do threats to export infrastructure, including LNG facilities in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). At the same time, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and against pipelines remain a concern. Global oil trade thus looks likely to remain constricted until at least the new year, while global LNG supply is unlikely to increase significantly before late 2027. But the US remains a reliable global energy partner and continues to provide LNG and diesel globally.
On the hybrid warfare front, the threat to the EU remains constant. This equates to some significant cyberattacks and sporadic strikes on infrastructure, but no major incidents. For Ukraine it will be a different story, with Russia stepping up its attacks on energy and water infrastructure to try to force submission through terror.
But the situation for the EU could also get much worse.
To bring down domestic energy prices before the mid-term elections and to ward off growing voter discontent amid flagging poll numbers, the Trump administration could revisit a diesel export ban and potentially follow it with restrictions on gas exports. This would cause a ripple through global energy markets with Europe badly affected. An unseasonably cold winter, likelier under the El-Nino weather cycle, could lead to an increase in gas demand. European citizens and industries could also face mandatory reductions in energy consumption in the run-up to national elections.
In line with predictions from several European intelligence agencies, Russia could step up its attacks on European critical energy infrastructure, potentially triggering blackouts and causing widespread disruption.
Prepare or else
Both outlooks are bleak, requiring action now to avoid worse outcomes later.
A common thread in both outlooks is that the oil and gas market will remain tight until at least the end of 2026. This is especially problematic for gas, a key component in Europe’s energy system, used not only for heating but also in industrial processes and electricity generation. While American ‘freedom gas’ saved the EU in 2022, there is no similar white knight this time around. In the absence of supply-side support, there has to be a rapid demand-side response.
With budgets strained and debt levels high, EU Member States should avoid repeating the errors of 2022, when measures focused on cushioning the shock rather than resolving its underlying causes. Since March 2026, the EU has spent an additional €100 billion on oil and gas without securing a single extra molecule. Since 2022, the total extra costs have exceeded €900 billion, even while total demand has fallen, and without accounting for broader societal impacts 1. Financial support should thus target reducing demand for imported fuels, which will simultaneously strengthen Europe’s long-term security and enhance its competitiveness. It cannot simply take the form of another set of temporary demand-distorting measures that postpone the problem without solving it, while also exacerbating climate damage.
The clearest way to do this is through faster electrification of transport, industrial processes and domestic heating, much of which can be accomplished quickly. A YouGov poll in June 2026, showed that 58-68% of EU citizens are in favour of reducing dependence on imported fuels through electrification, with right-wing voters especially supportive of heat pumps and EVs. Batteries and other forms of energy storage also enable energy grids to absorb intermittent renewables, reducing the need for gas-peaker power plants, an effect already demonstrated in Southeastern Europe, California and Australia.
Russia’s hybrid attacks pose a simultaneous and serious threat. Energy infrastructure is one of the testing grounds for probing vulnerabilities in the broader security architecture of the continent. The scale of hybrid attacks has increased dramatically over the past two years, with a marked rise in 2026. Like the proverbial boiling frog, many European countries have looked on passively while Russia exploits their vulnerabilities, even while it destroys Ukraine’s energy grid.
Europe's response must be commensurate with the rising threat to European societies. The EU and Member States must broaden protection measures and institutionalise intelligence sharing. Police and, where appropriate, military protection should extend beyond major infrastructure installations to include energy distribution systems, smaller power plants and spare equipment depots. The EU could establish an energy system repair hub, modelled on its emergency response mechanisms, where expertise can be quickly transferred across national boundaries. For this to be most effective, in the medium term, there must be greater standardisation of grid technologies to enable common stockpiles and interoperability. Intelligence also needs to move much faster from system operators and utilities through to the competent national authorities, allowing them to flag attacks and strategies at speed. A single hub coordinated at EU or NATO level could serve to accomplish this.
1 Calculations based on the additional costs paid for oil and gas against a baseline of the same costs between 2015-2021.
