The Democrats’ midterm victory marks the start of Trump’s ‘lame-duck’ term. Three different actors will shape the next two years: a Congress focused on domestic issues, an embattled president increasingly inclined to pursue an unpredictable foreign policy, and a broader US public beginning to debate the country’s future ahead of the 2028 presidential election. To improve transatlantic relations, Europe needs a strategy for each of them: build coalitions in the new Congress, manage Trump’s foreign policy unpredictability, and lay the groundwork for the relationship beyond 2028.
Engage with Congress, but know its limits
For the first time in either of Trump’s two terms, Democrats will control both chambers of Congress. They are likely to focus primarily on domestic issues. The House will investigate members of the administration and their allies and could withhold funding for the president’s priorities. The Senate will control the confirmation process for administration appointees and new Supreme Court justices.
On foreign policy, Congress has fewer means of constraining Trump. Some important legislation relevant to Europe, such as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), was passed in 2025. Congress may also face limits in using its control over spending to pressure the president: despite their opposition to the war against Iran, Democrats are unlikely to fully block military funding, to avoid leaving US forces without support in the middle of an armed conflict.
On tariffs, Congress is poised to reclaim some control from the executive. However, Democrats may disagree over whether to remove tariffs across the board. Although US voters recognise their impact on prices, only 37% of Democratic voters believe the next president should remove tariffs on the EU.
The new Congress could nevertheless offer Europe opportunities to influence US policy. Democrats are already challenging the president’s diesel deal with Russia, threatening legal action against companies transporting the fuel. They have also pledged to oppose troop withdrawals from Europe. Europe should support these efforts while using its increased defence investment and tougher stance on China to identify further opportunities for cooperation with Congress.
Europe must also broaden its engagement with different political constituencies. The makeup of the Democratic caucus will be more diverse than before, and Republicans may decide to distance themselves from the unpopular president. The new Congress will include members with little foreign policy experience or interest in Europe. Europeans will need to engage beyond their traditional foreign policy interlocutors and demonstrate Europe’s importance to the new members.
Greater unpredictability in US foreign policy
As Trump’s room for manoeuvre on domestic policy narrows, foreign policy could become his ‘escape valve’. Historically, lame-duck presidents have turned to international affairs to cement their legacy and divert attention from domestic difficulties: notable examples include Bush’s Iraq troop surge (2006-2008) and Obama’s normalisation of relations with Cuba and the Iran nuclear deal (2014-16). Trump is likely to follow this pattern, seeking to resolve longstanding foreign policy challenges that he believes only he can address.
This could make US foreign policy even more unpredictable. The war against Iran could enter a new phase of escalation. After agreeing to purchase Russian diesel, Trump is eyeing the APEC summit as an opportunity to meet Xi and Putin and advance the normalisation of relations with Russia. In Cuba, he could seek to engineer a controlled transition similar to that in Venezuela.
Europe is more likely to suffer collateral damage than to be the direct target of Trump’s foreign policy ambitions. Recent threats to suspend intelligence sharing with Ukraine and other proposals could undermine efforts to support Kyiv. The US could also pressure Europeans to cut deals with Putin, like resuming Russian fossil fuel imports. European gas prices, already up 140% since February, could rise further if the conflict in the Gulf escalates. Trump’s desire to divert attention from his midterm defeat could also affect the Pentagon’s Europe Force Posture Review, expected by the end of the year. He could use it to punish countries for their positions on US foreign policy.
To deal with the administration during the second half of Trump’s term, Europe will need a more flexible approach. It should be ready to resist renewed pressure, drawing on lessons from previous crises, including the confrontation over Greenland. At the same time, Europe must continue cooperating with the US where interests align. Agreements with Trump may not eliminate the underlying volatility, but they can buy Europe time to strengthen its capabilities and become less vulnerable to US pressure.
Start planning for 2028
The debate over the next presidential election will begin soon after the midterms. Within both parties, traditional foreign policy positions favouring an active US international role will compete with more restrained approaches calling for fewer resources to be devoted to foreign affairs. US voters and political elites are likely to place European security lower on their list of priorities. At the same time, voters are aware of the foreign policy costs of alienating allies, and favour a more positive approach to partnerships.
Europe should broaden its engagement across the US political spectrum, going beyond Washington D.C. and engaging with state legislatures, governors, businesses and local communities. It has more to offer than in previous years, thanks to increased defence spending, economic power and investments in US states. It should use these assets to shape Americans’ perceptions of Europe and challenge the notion that ignoring or confronting Europe serves US interests. This message could carry greater weight if delivered alongside partners such as Canada and Japan, which have also faced the fallout from unpredictable US foreign policies.
Such engagement should not be confused with naivety. Trump may leave office in two years, but neither US political party nor any future president is likely to restore the transatlantic relationship of the past. Europe must accept that the US will play a less prominent role in European security. Yet sustained engagement across the American political spectrum could help put transatlantic relations on a more stable footing.
