In nuclear matters more than in any other political area, perceptions have the force of law. The most concrete nuclear technology would count for little without the extremely sophisticated theories of uncertainty that form the basis of any nuclear deterrence strategy. Yet for the last few years both the technological and intellectual worlds of deterrence, as mankind has known it since 1945, have been in turmoil on all continents.
The Kosovo crisis marked a turning point in the development of the international system, not because the West was in any way improper in freeing itself from the constraints of realpolitik and UN legitimacy, but because it demonstrated the limits of those constraints.
In 1994-1995, one of the first joint actions by the European Union in the framework of the CFSP concerned the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. And it was successful: during the NPT Review Conference in April-May 1995, the member countries of the Union played an essential role in ensuring the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
This Chaillot Paper is innovative on more than one count. It is a multi-authored, multinational and centripetal analysis of a very specific issue, the complexity of which deserves a multifaceted, analytical approach of this type. For some, it may even constitute an exercise in political correctness.
Earlier this year Luisa Vierucci, then working at the University of Florence and currently at the University of Oxford, held one of these awards. While with us she produced this study on WEU's relationship with the United Nations. We felt it was of sufficient interest and quality to merit a wider audience and hope it will make a useful contribution to an important current debate.
The Institute has had a small study group working on problems of European defence industry over the last three years, under the direction of Juan de Luis.