Introduction
Leaders in the Western Balkans have wasted no time in offering congratulations to President-elect Donald Trump. President Vučić has pledged to work for 'stability, growth and peace'. Prime Minister Edi Rama has welcomed the 'great privilege of working' with the new administration, while Albin Kurti has emphasised the US as a 'key ally, friend and partner'. Milorad Dodik went so far as to hail Trump’s victory as pivotal for global politics, calling for a fairer approach that rejects foreign-imposed ideas. His words are particularly telling given his previous statement that a second Trump presidency might pave the way for Republika Srpska’s independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The new US administration will be laser-focused on the mounting competition with China. Even if Kamala Harris had taken office, this priority would have remained the same. For the Western Balkans this means staying on the geopolitical sidelines. Still, with the EU bracing for global shifts, anticipating Washington’s moves will be essential to securing the region’s place in the Euro-Atlantic fold.
The new US administration will be laser-focused on the mounting competition with China.
So as the Trump 2.0 administration takes shape, four critical risks are emerging: an economic policy driven by personal business interests; the strengthening of illiberal regimes; the return of the 'land swap' idea; and a diminishing US military presence overseas.
Why the US matters
America’s military assets and footprint in the Western Balkans makes it a credible actor, one that walks the talk. Just days after the Banjska attack in September 2023, the NSC Intelligence Directorate exposed Serbia’s military buildup, including tanks, advanced artillery, and mechanised infantry. The disclosure spurred European countries to join the US in applying diplomatic pressure. Within days, Serbian forces began withdrawing – a move that highlighted America’s critical crisis-management role.
This deep-rooted commitment explains why President Biden enjoys strong support in parts of the region: an 85% approval rating in Kosovo*, 64% in Albania, and 52% in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – compared to just 12% in Republika Srpska and in Serbia.
Beyond NATO’s strategic and military commitment, US engagement remains strong due to rising foreign influence in the region. Kremlin-backed war propaganda is spreading. Meanwhile, China’s asymmetric economic dependence is turning into a strategic liability. As long as foreign meddling persists, US involvement will likely continue – just as it did under the first Trump and Biden administrations. The real challenge lies in keeping US and European interests aligned.
What lies ahead with Trump 2.0?
As Europe grapples with the outcome of the US elections, it needs to maintain a realistic perspective. A Trump 2.0 presidency will likely revert to the familiar dynamics of Trump’s first administration – driven by business interests and marked by authoritarian leanings. It will fit with the broader trend of strategic disengagement from Europe.
Here are four potential risks to anticipate:
Transactional economic policy. An ever-growing emphasis on economic policy has emerged from President-elect Trump’s inner circle, even during the Biden years. Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner secured deals in Albania for a luxury complex worth $1 billion. More recently, Jared Kushner brokered an agreement with President Vučić to develop a luxury hotel in Belgrade, to be built on the former site of the old Yugoslav Ministry of Defence. The contract, valued at $500 million, includes a 99-year lease on the complex. Such lucrative business deals could compromise US interests, prioritising economic interests over political considerations, and potentially tipping the scales in favour of Serbia.
Emboldening strongmen and illiberal tendencies. Donald Trump’s Cabinet members could amplify nationalist rhetoric, particularly vis-à-vis the 13-page 'All-Serbian Declaration' adopted in June 2024 by Serbia and Republika Srpska. The document outlines an aggressive vision for regional dominance, including plans to undermine Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sovereignty and reclaim parts of Kosovo. A former Trump US envoy for the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, Richard Grenell, might again be the driving force behind US Western Balkans policy. As a 'friend of Serbia' and a recipient of the Order of the Serbian flag in 2023, he was also the one who dismissed US intelligence on Serbian troop movements near the Kosovo border in September 2023 as phony.
Return of the ‘land swap’ idea. Trump 2.0 will likely push for a quick deal to claim credit as a peacemaker, prioritising the optics of success over sustainable, long-term progress. This could bring the idea of a land swap between Serbia and Kosovo back to the table. Back in 2020, former White House National Security Adviser John Bolton stated that the US would not stand in the way if the two parties to the dispute reached a mutually satisfactory settlement. A new US administration might play into Serbia’s hands by pushing Albin Kurti to de-escalate tensions in northern Kosovo, potentially leading to more pressure for establishing an Association of Serb Majority Municipalities, which would align with Serbia’s interests.
Dwindling NATO and US military presence? Donald Trump’s criticism of NATO could lead to a diminished US military presence, particularly affecting the NATO-led KFOR mission, but also EUFOR Althea. Without coordinated American backing, key rule of law reforms, anti-corruption measures, and media freedom could stall, weakening European deterrence against Russian and Chinese influence.
The EU’s response playbook
Trump’s shifts in policy could spell trouble for the EU as it pushes for reforms aligned with membership standards. There is no magic wand that the EU can wave to fill the void left by genuine American disengagement.
Yet, it is the EU that the Western Balkans countries look to, each for their own reasons. And it is the EU that holds the keys to progress. It should therefore prepare and proactively deploy deterrence mechanisms.
Firstly, those EU governments ready to act should coordinate a unified response to pre-emptively condemn politicians emboldened by Trump 2.0’s nationalist rhetoric – the more, the merrier. This requires strategic communication and swift, public rebuttals, especially against moves like the ‘All-Serbian Declaration’.
Secondly, previous efforts to impose EU-wide sanctions have failed, often relying on US-led initiatives later backed by the UK and Germany in Republika Srpska. Member States should coordinate with allies to sanction destabilising actions, secessionist moves, or territorial violations, targeting key figures with asset freezes, travel bans, and other restrictions.
Thirdly, a reduced US military presence would create a security vacuum, testing the EU’s capacity to uphold stability. The EU should prepare now to respond swiftly once Donald Trump assumes office. This means deploying additional troops in KFOR and EUFOR Althea. Reinforcing its security presence would help the EU advance key reforms and shield the region from external manipulation, strengthening European stability.
Fourthly, the EU should build alliances beyond its borders, notably with the UK. After the Banjska attack, the UK increased its KFOR presence and has focused on countering foreign interference, fostering democracy, and strategic investments like the Morava Corridor Motorway in Serbia. Just recently, the country signed new agreements with Serbia, North Macedonia and Kosovo to combat people-smuggling and enhance border security, aligning with EU goals for regional stability.
*This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ opinion on Kosovo Declaration of Independence.
