Introduction
With Donald Trump returning to the White House, the world is bracing for what ‘Trump 2.0’ will mean for global stability against a backdrop of overlapping crises. In Europe, the reaction has been a mix of trepidation, angst—and even optimism as seen in Hungary. Regardless, this shift signals the need for Europe to reassess its policies across critical fronts – from Ukraine to trade and technology – as new interlocutors enter the policymaking sphere. A second Trump administration also raises pressing questions about the EU’s ambitions, not only in terms of its decision-making power on core interests but also its actual room for manoeuvre. In the case of Ukraine, where Europe remains heavily reliant on the US, a disengaged Oval Office – or one that diverges sharply from the NATO-aligned position – could have dire consequences.
However, in the Indo-Pacific, a new Trump term may offer an opportunity to advance the EU’s value proposition in an increasingly interest-driven global landscape. During the first Trump administration, Europe often found itself reacting to abrupt shifts in US policy, from climate disengagement to escalating trade tensions. Asian partners fared little better, facing erratic policy swings – grandstanding on North Korea and sidelining the Trans-Pacific Partnership, for instance. This volatility underscored the need for Europe to strengthen its own Indo-Pacific footprint – a goal articulated in the EU’s 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy. With the return of Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy, Europe may once again find itself compelled to act with greater independence in an economically and geopolitically critical region.
In the Indo-Pacific, a new Trump term may offer an opportunity to advance the EU’s value proposition in an increasingly interest-driven global landscape.
Crucially, Europe must avoid a ‘business-as-usual’ response by focusing on consolidating its regional partnerships and adopting a more nuanced diplomatic strategy. Strengthening ties with key partners in the region, for example by finalising the EU-ASEAN and EU-India Free Trade Agreements, both of which have essentially stalled for the past few years, would be significant achievements. As would shoring up sector-specific defence industrial synergies with South Korea and Japan. Taking such steps – no mean task – combined with a dose of needs-based transactional diplomacy, would align with the diverse realities of the Indo-Pacific and send a clear signal about Europe’s commitment to be a serious player in the region.
Planning amid shifting US policies
While Trump’s decisive victory may stabilise US domestic political dynamics, the same cannot be said of US foreign policy. For Europe, the changing US context presents challenges but also opportunities for more tailored engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Regional flashpoints – the South and East China Seas, the Taiwan Strait, and the Korean Peninsula – will require close attention, especially given ASEAN’s internal divisions and India’s cautious approach to security. While the likelihood of a full-blown military conflict remains low, it cannot be ruled out. Even with the numerous challenges facing Beijing – including managing the real limits of its no-limits partnership with Moscow – China’s creeping territorial expansionism highlights the need for vigilance. This is especially true if a more transactional Trump administration prioritises deal-making over international norms and procedures.
Supporting Indo-Pacific partners on specific issues – such as expanding maritime security exercises through the EU’s CRIMARIO programme and enhancing cybersecurity capacity-building, things which are already happening – would signal that the EU still has ‘skin in the game’. To make a stronger impact, the EU also needs to find a way to break out of its traditional policy silos and echo chambers.
To make a stronger impact, the EU also needs to find a way to break out of its traditional policy silos and echo chambers.
Too often the EU’s outreach has been too narrow, focusing primarily on policymakers and overlooking other sectors that could bring valuable perspectives to issues of critical importance. In a region as diverse as the Indo-Pacific, such a siloed approach risks diminishing the EU’s situational awareness and adaptability, especially if a Trump-led US administration deprioritises civil society and non-state actor engagement. The EU should seize the opportunity to connect with a broader range of actors, making inroads with local supply chain firms, environmental NGOs, and digital standard-setting bodies. Done right, this would greatly enhance the EU’s ability to calibrate its engagement to on-the-ground perspectives and local conditions.
More with less – focusing priorities
Europe has prioritised ‘deepening engagement with partners across the Indo-Pacific’, but given its resource constraints in such a diverse region a more focused approach is needed. An honest audit of the European Indo-Pacific Strategy as it enters its fourth year could help Europe refine this approach. Understanding the hits and wins and drawing on input from the EU’s country delegations – a precious resource in its arsenal – could make this exercise more concrete and enable focused and prioritised engagement. Some hard decisions, possibly even independent of the choices made in Washington, will need to be made; and this is where clear eyed vision will be critical.
For instance, on climate action and technology cooperation, Europe’s established credibility could be a significant asset. But the European Green Deal, introduced in 2020, has been a contentious issue in the Indo-Pacific, especially with the launch of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and the Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence. These policies are increasingly viewed as a new form of regulatory colonialism in much of the Indo-Pacific where local circumstances are far removed from the realities of the more affluent European continent. The lesson here is that the EU needs to shift gears towards a more genuine ‘listening mode’ that will take into consideration concerns about market access and the many costs of compliance. Partnership-building – say through local Chamber of Commerce chapters – could strengthen Europe’s credibility in this regard, while navigating sensitivities around sovereignty and economic competition.
A balanced recalibration
Regardless of who occupies the White House, it is clear that Europe needs to stay the course in the Indo-Pacific. A silver lining of the new political headwinds in Washington is that the EU may now become a more attractive partner – at least for some. But to capitalise on this momentum, the EU needs to be seen as a credible actor that offers a compelling value proposition. This requires not just rhetoric but concrete actions and trust-building efforts that balance limited resources with pragmatic flexibility. Such strategic realignments will be crucial for navigating a shift in US policy under a newly reinvigorated President Trump.
