Persistent hybrid campaigns against the EU require a sustained response, mobilising strategic and deterrent measures. The new Joint Communication on the European Democracy Shield (EDS) is a necessary and welcome call for an enhanced coordinated response against internal and external pressures from hostile actors. The Shield’s core institutional innovation within the counter-FIMI ecosystem is the creation of a European Centre for Democratic Resilience, to be rolled out by 2027, alongside other initiatives.
Transforming defensive resilience into an operational democratic posture will require action across three principles: Coordination, Capacity and Credibility – a triad reflecting the underlying logic of the Democracy Shield. This ‘Triple C’ framework can guide the implementation of the Centre by scaling up coordination, deploying broader geostrategic tools and fostering credibility through compliance.
Strategic coordination of Member States and partners
The Centre’s key objective will be ‘to facilitate information sharing and support operational cooperation and capacity building to withstand evolving common threats.’ It must complement existing efforts and ensure strong linkages among actors addressing FIMI and disinformation in particular, as well as those tackling other hybrid threats. To effectively exchange information, leverage good practices and develop new joint approaches, it will require a clear structure and division of roles.
While Member States’ participation will be voluntary, it should be robust and cooperative. National bodies such as France’s Viginum (for vigilance and protection against foreign digital interference), the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency, Germany’s new Security Council coordinating interdepartmental action against Russia’s hybrid warfare, and the newly proposed Italian National Centre for Hybrid Warfare Response, could serve as valuable examples. The development of future national capacities would enhance proactive and skilled contributions under a European shield, potentially allowing for the integration of methodologies while adapting structures and tools to national contexts. Enhancing interoperability would in turn facilitate coordination at the European level. The same logic applies to national and regional centres of excellence or similar structures.
The EU is not alone in facing anti-democratic threats and should not act alone. Candidate countries and like-minded partners (Australia, Canada, Norway, the UK, and others) will bring valuable experience. However, the Centre could also help broaden the EU’s geostrategic impact and foster deeper cross-sectoral cooperation. Russian actors are increasingly hijacking media literacy and fact-checking programmes in the Plural South through sanctioned organisations such as ANO Dialogue or via entities within the Global Fact-Checking Network that maintain close ties to the Russian state, spreading pro-Kremlin narratives. Strengthening support to this increasingly targeted region will help safeguard the integrity of the interconnected information space.
Security and defence partnerships, such as the strengthened cooperation format between the EU and UK, can further raise costs for malign actors, including in the counter-FIMI domain. The experience of the now defunct US Foreign Malign Influence Center offers useful lessons in interagency coordination, such as tools for close collaboration with election officials, intelligence services, law enforcement agencies and its practice of issuing regular joint statements.
Boosting capacities linked to the information domain, but not limited to it
The Centre’s aim is to improve anticipatory capacity and early warning mechanisms for interference and manipulation, while enhancing detection, analysis and monitoring of hostile operations. Existing structures should also expand their ability to analyse and address the tactics, techniques and procedures of multiple threat actors, and swiftly notify key stakeholders, including the European public, contributing to the Centre’s efforts. This will require increased financial resources. The Kremlin annually spends about USD 1.5 billion on propaganda beyond its borders, a highly asymmetric volume compared with the EU and its allies’ defensive measures in the metastasizing ecosystem of foreign interference threats. The Democracy Shield should invest in both resisting and deterring adversaries across multiple related domains.
The EDS recognition that defence spending, among other funding proposals, ‘could also be regarded as a means to support democratic resilience’ may mark a major breakthrough for this initiative. Allocating an adequate portion of increased defence spending to democratic resilience could streamline funding. High on the budget list should be counter-FIMI measures linked to the protection of critical infrastructure against cyberattacks and digital dependencies, cognitive security, counter-espionage, and the tracking of illicit finance and political coercion. The Centre could boost such efforts across both its permanent structures and new project–based initiatives, supported by dedicated expert staff and a highly-resilient digital infrastructure.
The recent transnational collaboration between the United Kingdom, European Union and its Member States, NATO allies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on the UK’s sanctions against Russian Military Intelligence (GRU) cyber operations and hybrid threats illustrates how collective capacities can be mobilised, providing a model that could possibly be replicated in the future. Moreover, the strong support expressed by countries such as Australia signals opportunities to widen such coalitions.
Credibility through compliance to strengthen resolve
Implementation of regulatory measures such as the Digital Services Act (DSA), Digital Markets Act and AI Act, continues to lag, partly due to the complexity of the systems involved or the insufficient empowerment of national Digital Services Coordinators to carry out their tasks under the DSA. Furthermore, civil society groups warn that the Commission’s recent Digital Omnibus proposal could ‘weaken fundamental rights safeguards solely to cut compliance costs for businesses’.
For the European Democracy Shield to effectively protect citizens against FIMI and broader common threats, compliance must be tightened and ongoing investigations, particularly those involving major social media platforms, concluded. Only decisive and visible enforcement can establish credible deterrence.
The European Centre for Democratic Resilience could further reinforce credibility by facilitating systematic collaboration on compliance challenges with a broad range of relevant actors, such as independent researchers, civil society, law practitioners and media organisations, through its Stakeholder Platform. Ultimately Europe’s credibility hinges on new commitments and on the steadfast enforcement of the rules already in place.
While national contributions to the Centre are optional, acting with the strategic clarity that the Triple C principle provides will help focus efforts and achieve impactful outcomes. Real institutional agency will bolster the Shield’s deterrence and demonstrate Europe’s democratic resolve.
