Since Brazil’s return to democracy in 1989, no presidential candidate has ever won the runoff election after losing in the first round of voting. But on 25 October, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva did just that, defeating Flávio Bolsonaro by a margin of more than four million votes.
The result has significant implications for Europe. The EU’s leadership has a good relationship with Lula – with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council António Costa being among the first to congratulate him on his victory. Europe and Brazil have enhanced cooperation in recent years, including by signing the EU-Mercosur trade deal. Ensuring its implementation will be a key priority. Europe must also take this opportunity to deepen security cooperation, promote industrial ties and foster greater regional cooperation across Latin America.
Brazil’s standing
Lula’s fourth term may prove his most challenging yet, particularly when it comes to implementing his domestic agenda, which is focused on reducing inequality, boosting domestic industry, and protecting the environment. While his victory has weakened Latin America’s rightward tilt, it has not halted it fully. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party (LP) won the parliamentary elections on 4 October, which also saw four members of the Bolsonaro family elected. Bolsonaro’s refusal to concede defeat may further exacerbate political polarisation and tensions. Other domestic challenges include corruption scandals, weak economic growth and limited fiscal space.
Internationally, Lula’s surprise electoral victory has altered expectations about Brazil’s future political trajectory. Brazil will likely continue to position itself as an ideological bulwark against the US in the region. Political and trade tensions with Washington could remain high. Relations with neighbouring countries may also remain strained. In July 2026, Brazil recalled its ambassador to Argentina after President Javier Milei publicly criticised Lula. This feud could disrupt regional cooperation.
By contrast, Lula will likely continue strengthening ties with China, with which he has signed several agreements since 2023. Brazil now trades more with China than with the US, and Beijing is a growing investor in Brazil’s mining sector, which accounts for 66.7% of global niobium reserves, a key component in steel production, as well as 24.5% of rare earths, 23.9% of natural graphite and 16.7% of manganese reserves.
Lula is also likely to maintain good relations with Russia, an important partner within BRICS+ as well as a key supplier of fertilisers and fossil fuels to Brazil. He has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but opposed Europe’s efforts to isolate Moscow and impose sanctions on Putin. However, the Lula administration has engaged with Ukraine on several occasions in 2026, including through his meeting with President Zelensky on the sidelines of the G7 in June.
Implications across the Atlantic
Brazil’s importance to Europe is hard to overstate. It is the EU’s second-largest trade partner in the Americas, with bilateral trade worth €87 billion in 2025. Economic ties encompass critical minerals, while defence cooperation is also a growing dimension of the relationship. Since 2019, Embraer has signed export contracts for 18 aircraft with European air forces including the Netherlands, Austria, Czechia and Portugal. This makes Brazil one of Europe’s most important partners for defence trade and supply chains.
Brazil and Europe also share significant security concerns. Since 2020, the country has been a major departure point for cocaine shipments destined for Europe. Cooperation between Brazil’s international cartel Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and European organised crime groups such as Italy’s ‘Ndrangheta is well documented.
Brazil played a key role in bringing the EU-Mercosur trade agreement to a successful conclusion. In September 2026, EU Council President Costa co-signed a letter with Lula, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Kenyan President William Ruto of Kenya reaffirming their commitment to multilateralism. Security cooperation has also increased, with the first EU-Brazil security dialogue, the third cyber dialogue, and the signature of the Europol-Federal Police administrative cooperation agreement. The EU–Brazil Investment Forum and Industrial Partnership Forum both took place in 2026. Individual Member States have also strengthened their bilateral ties with Brazil. Examples include the France-Brazil Strategic Partnership Action Plan in March 2024, and the Germany–Brazil Joint Declaration in April 2026.
Taking the partnership to the next level
Lula’s victory represents an opportunity to build on this track record of cooperation. The EU and Brazil share a common interest in tackling climate change and deforestation, supporting multilateralism and implementing the EU-Mercosur agreement. The two sides might also seek to revive the EU-Brazil Forum, a political summit which has not taken place since 2014.
While Lula is likely to maintain close ties with BRICS, Europe could renew its efforts to push Brazil away from Russia where possible. The EU and Ukraine should highlight the impact of Moscow’s attacks on fertiliser and food supplies in the Black Sea, on which Brazil and other emerging economies depend. Such engagement could, at a minimum, help counter Russia’s propaganda – which is widely disseminated in Latin America – and, at most, increase the political costs of the Kremlin’s actions.
Europeans should also press forward with practical cooperation, especially in tackling transnational organised crime. With Brasília likely to keep some distance from Washington, Brussels could become an increasingly relevant partner. Brazil’s law enforcement agencies remain highly fragmented, which hinders the fight against cartels and organised crime. The EU could build on the Europol-Federal Police agreement to foster closer cooperation among Brazil’s various law enforcement agencies, helping to overcome institutional fragmentation.
Industrial cooperation, especially in dual-use technologies such as unmanned systems, command and control, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, should also be strengthened. These will be essential in countering the growing power of cartels and their transnational networks. Europeans should also increase ties with Brazil’s critical mineral market, building secure supply chains that go beyond an extractive model and generate greater added value for the Brazilian economy.
Despite political differences between governments in Latin America, the EU should continue to promote international cooperation against transnational groups – including at the technical level if political tensions impede broader collaboration. The EU-Ecuador Intelligence Fusion Centre inaugurated in January 2026 could serve as a model for cooperation in the region, as well as technical assistance programmes such as El PAcCTO 2.0 and the Global Threats programme.
Finally, the EU should continue to support democracy, human rights and democratic institutions in Brazil. With challenges to the electoral results likely to persist, the EU should voice its support for the country’s democratic institutions and the rule of law. Brussels should also use the EU-Brazil security dialogue and other forums to promote respect for human rights and strengthen cooperation in the fight against corruption. Such engagement could cement the EU-Brazil relationship in the years ahead.
