The Ankara NATO summit is in the rearview mirror. Beyond the rhetoric on unity, new commitments to Ukraine and defence contract announcements, the summit has not altered the fundamental trajectory of European security: the US is incrementally withdrawing capabilities from the continent; European confidence in US commitments is falling; and Europeans must plan to deter Russia on their own.
Strengthening European military capabilities, not least by acquiring those enablers for which Europeans still rely on the US, is a crucial part of the puzzle. But the challenge goes beyond acquiring capabilities, and reflects the need to replace the US ‘backbone’ in European deterrence – that is, taking leadership in defence planning, force organisation and operational command. Europeans need to think about how they can plan and organise this transition, by giving more coherence to their efforts across various frameworks.
Rethinking planning and warfighting
Europeans need a realistic assessment of what they need to do to take the lead in deterring Russia, but current defence planning structures may be ill-suited to that task. The organisation of European defence is still centred around a US-led core, rather than being driven by European leadership. The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) remains the cornerstone of defence planning in Europe – as the EU has no comparable mechanism. The NDPP assigns capability targets to individual allies (and some collectively) on the basis of jointly agreed ‘political guidance’, which identifies the overall aims and objectives needed to ensure deterrence.
The next NDPP cycle, which will begin in 2027, risks being based on unrealistic assumptions regarding the US contribution to European security. At present the NDPP assumes that the US will still provide 30% of capability by 2032 – including critical command-and-control and force integration functions. This expectation is increasingly at odds with stated US intentions. Ignoring this risks directing European focus and resources towards non-priority areas while leaving potential deterrence gaps unaddressed. The unpredictable nature of US force posture changes – where withdrawals take place unannounced and are sometimes reversed – makes planning even harder.
Hence, to take ownership of deterrence, Europeans need to develop a more honest assessment of what the US is likely to contribute. If the NDPP cannot fully perform that role, Europeans will need a complementary mechanism – whether in NATO, in the EU or in parallel to both – that can identify priority areas and connect national contributions to larger European force packages.
A second challenge for Europeans is moving from capabilities to war-planning: building up the connective tissue to work together seamlessly in high-intensity operations. That starts with European officers taking up more positions in NATO’s command structure, both at senior command level and below. This 'Europeanisation’ should be complemented by developing stronger coalition command options, drawing on existing national and multinational headquarters, to allow Europeans to carry out operations in smaller groups if necessary.
Building Europe’s deterrence backbone also means seriously embracing the integration of European military forces into larger multinational formations that bring together national contributions. These should be tested through more frequent and demanding exercises, in which European forces hone their ability to operate together without the US, drawing on Ukraine’s battlefield experience. Beyond exercises, Europeans will also need to think about how to project credible deterrence as the US presence diminishes. A way to do so is through stronger forward deployments in frontline countries and larger pre-positioned stocks.
The political layer
Another challenge is that the process of Europeanising deterrence lacks a political centre. European efforts to take more ownership of their own defence are unfolding in a range of frameworks: NATO, the EU, bilateral partnerships, and minilateral formats. NATO remains central for defence planning and command and control. The EU is playing a key role in terms of industrial ramp-up and strengthening resilience – including in military mobility and critical infrastructure. At the same time, Europeans are building capabilities and deepening military integration in small groups. However, these efforts take place largely in parallel, and lack effective coordination.
One solution is to enhance coordination between the different frameworks through which Europe’s defence build-up is happening. A first step could be stronger European coordination within NATO. This existed in the 1970s and 1980s in the form of the Eurogroup, and the case for European coordination is even stronger now. A revived Eurogroup could help coordinate European efforts in the alliance and steer NATO’s defence planning in a more realistic direction.
The second element of European political ownership of deterrence should be closer involvement of non-EU European allies in EU defence discussions and initiatives. The EU has a key role to play in many elements of defence, with significant investment in resilience and defence industrial domains. But non-EU allies like Ukraine, the United Kingdom and Norway are also essential to European security and are integral to the effort of building up European defences. To improve synergies, the gap between EU and non-EU countries must be bridged. Setting up stronger and regular consultation mechanisms with allies, such as meetings with non-EU allies before European Council summits and regular invitations to European defence ministers to attend Foreign Affairs Council meetings in defence format would help ensure alignment of activities even when formal cooperation proves impossible.
Third, the E5 should be better connected to wider European defence efforts. This group brings together the continent’s largest defence spenders: France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK. It has become one of the most useful formats for giving political momentum to European defence. Its members lead efforts to fill key European capability gaps – most recently, they reaffirmed pledges to develop long-range strike systems. A key strength of the E5 is its ability to generate momentum and launch initiatives that other Europeans can later join. But the E5 would be stronger if its meetings happened on a regular basis, its efforts were tied more directly to EU and NATO-level frameworks and funding, and if it drew more systematically on the strengths of other European countries. The E5 could be expanded to include the EU leadership and the NATO Secretary General. Moreover, the E5 could regularly include Ukraine, as well as other countries on an ad-hoc basis depending on the issue at hand.
Don’t stop now
The Ankara summit has shown that Europeans are stepping up, but that is only part of the task. The challenge in the months ahead is to give momentum and coherence to Europe’s defence build-up. Europe has the means to deter Russia with much less US support, but it must now turn political commitment into genuine European leadership in defence.
