Despite economic growth returning to Europe, defence budgets continued to fall in 2014. Given the worsening security situation in Europe’s neighbourhood, a renewed commitment to defence would represent an important demonstration of solidarity – both within the Union and to partners across the Atlantic.
In 2014 the world spent more on defence than ever before, with three players standing out as essential drivers of this trend: China, Saudi Arabia and Russia. Are their heavy investments in defence having an impact on their behaviour in their respective regional environments?
As the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) programme celebrates five years of successful flight operations, this Alert provides an overview of this multinational initiative which has provided even very small European countries with a strategic transport capability that they would not have been able to achieve on their own.
What steps is the US taking in order to ensure that it remains technologically superior to its rivals when it comes to defence matters? Is there still a role for Europe in the race to stay ahead of the game?
This Alert offers a preliminary sketch of what a Europe-wide security of supply regime could look like. Should such a regime follow an emphasis on maintaining open markets and ensuring competitiveness, or should it follow an insistence on greater protection and a ‘buy European’ ethos?
EU member states have long avoided applying EU law to defence by extensively relying – implicitly or explicitly – on Article 346. Using recent case law, this Brief shows how this is now becoming increasingly difficult.
This Brief examines the increasing importance of dual-use technologies and their impact on the structure of defence firms in Europe. How is this phenomenon now affecting the capabilities – and the governance – of European defence?
Exploring the effects of the high levels of military spending in the Arab world, this Alert seeks to underline the importance of the security-development nexus. What can military expenditure tell us about the likelihood of both intra- and inter-state conflict breaking out?
At present, the European defence market is fragmented and characterised by a plethora of national standards. But with the need for defence standardisation becoming increasingly critical in an era marked by declining defence expenditure, what steps can be taken to ensure success?
Although the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) will not directly cover to the defence sector, dual-use goods and technologies are increasingly blurring the lines between defence and civilian commercial realms. What impact will the TTIP have on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that operate in the European defence sector, and what of the future of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base?
Cooperative programmes do not have a very positive image in some EU Member States because they have often implied delays, unanticipated costs, and long rounds of negotiations between partnering nations. Participating in a multinational programme without a shared approach and common understanding is bound to lead to problems.
En mettant la priorité sur la prévention, l’Union européenne pourrait maximiser l’usage de ses ressources et le soutien des capacités des gouvernements et des sociétés pour lutter contre le fléau des armes légères, explique Damien Helly, chargé de recherche de l’IESUE sur l’Afrique, la prévention des conflits et de la gestion des crises.
The debate over missile defence in Europe is likely to remain on the political agenda for the foreseeable future as discussions evolve on both sides of the Atlantic. This policy brief provides basic background information on missile defence and highlights some of the principal political and security aspects associated with missile defence in Europe.
Since the end of the Cold War, the armaments sector in the Visegrad countries has gone through an important downsizing process. Shrinking home markets and the disruption of the Warsaw Pact cooperation mechanisms have put defence industries in the region under enormous pressure.
Up until now, EU member states have excluded armaments from the European integration process and have cooperated in this field outside the EU framework. However, there is a fair chance today that this will change: both the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe and the debate on the recent Commission Communication on a common defence equipment policy indicate a greater openness among national governments vis-à-vis possible EU involvement in armaments.
The work of the Convention on the Future of Europe and the final report of its working group on defence have illustrated that armaments might well become one of the key issues on the agenda of the next Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). The purpose of this Chaillot Paper is to provide practitioners, experts and policy-makers with necessary background information.
In Europe, arms and dual-use exports raise complex questions. They fall between two policy spheres that are organised in a distinctly contrasting manner. On the one hand, they are an intrinsic part of commercial policy that lies within the exclusive competence of the European Community (EC). On the other hand, they come under the aegis of security and defence policy, a jealously guarded area of responsibility of the EU member states.
With considerable delay in comparison to aerospace and defense electronics, a restructuring process is occurring in Europe’s land armaments sector. National consolidation in the big arms producing countries is paralleled by an increasing number of transnational link-ups.
A few months ago, the Institute published a Chaillot Paper by Burkard Schmitt dealing specifically with the new industrial integration strategies of the big European armaments groups (Chaillot Paper 40, ‘From cooperation to integration: defence and aerospace industries in Europe’, July 2000). This Chaillot Paper examines the prospects for transatlantic cooperation in this field, and also the constraints on it.
The first session focused on threat perceptions and threat assessments. The key question was whether a threat exists that justifies NMD deployment. Do the so-called ‘countries of concern’ really intent to threaten the US homeland and, even more importantly, do they have the financial and the technological means to scale up their existing arsenal to true intercontinental range?