Permanent Structured Cooperation, the so-called ‘sleeping beauty’ of EU defence, is awake. This Chaillot Paper looks at the historical evolution of PeSCo and its potential ramifications for EU operations and capability development.
This Alert explains the importance of the defence dimensions of Europe's cyber security efforts. In addition to exercises and training, the Union is now increasingly in a position to financiallyinvestin cyber defence.
Through carefully targeted financial incentives the European Commission hopes that the European Defence Fund can help change the rules of the game for European defence cooperation. But how might the Commission structure or modulate it?
Over the past decades, defence cooperation has helped European countries preserve their security. Defence cooperation in the second machine age may, however, need to evolve and move beyond traditional joint procurement programmes to pertain also to new domains.
The European Union ended 2016 having agreed to a number of fresh initiatives designed to articulate (and act on) a new level of ambition for security and defence. This Brief assesses Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSCo) as a potential game changer in the way EU member states cooperate on security and defence.
In this Alert, the EUISS Director looks at how the EU Global Strategy offers a new perspective for the EU Security and Defence Implementation Plan (SDIP). How can the Union best achieve its goal of making Europe and Europeans feel safer – Secure, Able, Forward-looking, Engaged and Responsive.
The forthcoming publication of the European Commission’s Defence Action Plan (EDAP) and the likely creation of a European Defence Research Programme (ERDP) make institutional streamlining and creative thinking in the field of defence vital. How can the EU best rationalise its defence policy?
This Chaillot Paper – a collective endeavour on which the five authors have collaborated – outlines five possible future scenarios for European defence. The aim is to develop plausible and coherent descriptions of what European defence might look like a decade or two from now in order to point out the choices and decisions that need to be made today.
Cooperative programmes do not have a very positive image in some EU Member States because they have often implied delays, unanticipated costs, and long rounds of negotiations between partnering nations. Participating in a multinational programme without a shared approach and common understanding is bound to lead to problems.
This Occasional Paper explores the issue of European armaments cooperation. Such cooperation between countries has often been difficult. Even so, European governments continue to collaborate on multinational equipment programmes for a number of reasons, and successful multinational programmes have manifold benefits.
Up until now, EU member states have excluded armaments from the European integration process and have cooperated in this field outside the EU framework. However, there is a fair chance today that this will change: both the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe and the debate on the recent Commission Communication on a common defence equipment policy indicate a greater openness among national governments vis-à-vis possible EU involvement in armaments.
Aiming to reach operational status in 2008, the Galileo satellite system is planned to offer positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services worldwide. It will join the ranks of the current GPS and GLONASS systems, allowing users to pinpoint their exact locations.
The work of the Convention on the Future of Europe and the final report of its working group on defence have illustrated that armaments might well become one of the key issues on the agenda of the next Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). The purpose of this Chaillot Paper is to provide practitioners, experts and policy-makers with necessary background information.
Daniel Keohane explores the changing context of Irish defence policy in light of the rapid development of the CESDP. He touches on policy considerations germane to all EU member-states with a tradition of neutrality who are having to adjust to a new role in a changing world. Keohane also uses defence policy as a metaphor for the changing internal debate at a time when a strong and polemical discourse is underway about Ireland’s role in the wider world.
The first session focused on threat perceptions and threat assessments. The key question was whether a threat exists that justifies NMD deployment. Do the so-called ‘countries of concern’ really intent to threaten the US homeland and, even more importantly, do they have the financial and the technological means to scale up their existing arsenal to true intercontinental range?
What was of particular interest in this seminar was that it combined both a discussion of the technical, immediate aspects of European defence and a more general reflection on developments in American policy and the direction being taken by European construction.
Over the last two years, two processes have considerably modified the European strategic landscape: the development of a common security and defence policy within the European Union on the one hand, and accelerated restructuring of defence industries on the other.