Europe and Latin America will arguably be the regions of the world most affected by Donald Trump’s re-election. While the former is concerned about US commitment towards traditional allies, the latter is focused on Trump’s view of the region through three main lenses: migrants, drugs and China.
Trump views the region through three main lenses: migrants, drugs and China
Both in 2016 and in 2024, Trump looked at Latin America through the lens of his central campaign message: mass illegal migration across the southern border of the US. After his victory on 5 November, Trump appointed Tom Homan as the so-called ‘border czar’, in charge of overseeing the deportation of hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants back to Mexico.
Trump also views Latin America through the lens of trade. During his election campaign he promised to address the bilateral trade imbalance with Mexico and other countries, as well as the entry of Chinese goods into the US via these countries. Furthermore, his campaign emphasised curbing the flow of drugs, especially fentanyl, which according to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reaches the US from China through Latin America.
His initial actions and appointments indicate that Trump 2.0’s foreign policy will pay more attention to the region than many previous administrations have done. Senator Marco Rubio, if confirmed, will be the first Latino to serve as Secretary of State, bringing his regional expertise to the role. On 26 November the president-elect posted that on Inauguration Day he would sign an executive order imposing a 25% tariff on all goods coming from Mexico (and Canada). This prompted an immediate response from Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum, followed by a phone call between the two leaders. The call likely set the stage for the upcoming renegotiation of the USMCA trade agreement.
However, the intense focus on Mexico might not be representative of the broader relationships between Washington and other Latin American capitals during Trump 2.0.
Some leaders who are ideologically aligned with Trump will celebrate. Argentinian President Javier Milei, for example, was the first foreign leader to travel to Mar-a-Lago to congratulate Trump, and to offer advice on slashing government bureaucracy to the Elon Musk-led Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). Trump’s victory could also inspire Jair Bolsonaro to make a comeback.
Rubio has been an outspoken advocate of tougher US action against dictatorships in Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua. His appointment could signify a more assertive policy towards these countries. However, Trump 2.0 could also embolden authoritarian leaders in the region. During the election campaign Trump praised Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro for his tight grip over Venezuelan society. Despite being the subject of significant sanctions under Trump 1.0, Maduro remarked after the election that he was ready for ‘a new start’ in relations with the US.
Finally, while Mexico and Central America seem to be on Trump’s radar, it is less certain whether he has a clearly defined policy towards South America. Much like in Europe, Washington could see rising tensions with traditional allies such as Colombia, whose president Gustavo Petro is ideologically opposed to US leadership and is strengthening ties with China.
Beijing’s economic presence in the region has grown significantly in the past decade. 22 countries in the region have joined the Belt and Road Initiative (Brazil has so far refused but could be next in line). In March 2024, Xi Jinping inaugurated the deep-water port of Chancay in Peru, which could be used by the People’s Liberation Army to dock naval vessels. It is not clear whether Trump’s strategy, laser-focused on Mexico, is sufficient to deal with China’s growing strategic footprint in Latin America.
It is not clear whether Trump’s strategy...is sufficient to deal with China’s growing strategic footprint in Latin America.
Ideas for a stronger EU-Latin America partnership
In the last decade, underinvestment and a lack of attention from the EU and the US has created a space for states like China to expand their foothold in Latin America and the Caribbean. Further neglect of the region could deprive the EU of key partners in the digital and green transition, as well as in navigating an age of great-power competition.
Trump’s re-election presents opportunities to revamp the strategic partnership between the EU and the region in 2025. Although many Latin American countries view Brussels with scepticism, the appetite for partnership has not gone away. A comprehensive EU partnership could offer regional actors a useful alternative to choosing sides in the US-China competition.
The 2025 EU-CELAC Summit in Colombia will provide an opportunity to send a message to the region that the EU is ready to strengthen these partnerships. But words alone will not be sufficient. The EU should put tangible resources on the table, leveraging major initiatives such as the Global Gateway and new trade agreements to ramp up investment in the region and outmatch China’s offer.
A strong partnership in a world of strategic competition cannot leave security and defence unaddressed. The last few years have seen growing ties between countries like Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua and global disruptors like Iran and Russia. But Latin America has also witnessed a dramatic increase in violence by non-state armed groups, including drug cartels and transnational organised crime. The two issues are interrelated, with criminal groups receiving support from extra-regional malign actors and coalescing to spread disruption and instability. The EU should advance security and defence partnerships with interested countries, focused on the nexus between organised crime and strategic competition, and on the links between European and Latin American security. Countries such as Colombia and Argentina (the former a NATO partner and the latter aspiring to become one) could be the most interested in strengthening security and defence ties with the EU.
At the same time, focusing on Latin America could also help stabilise the overall transatlantic relationship with the United States, which is currently being tested. On the one hand, countries like Mexico, who negotiated with Trump in his first term and will face another tough round of talks under the second term, could serve as a model for the EU’s approach to the US. On the other hand, Brussels should present itself as a useful partner for Washington in Latin America – for instance, in countering the growing presence of China, Russia and Iran in the region, or tackling transnational crime. This could strengthen the EU’s leverage in other areas of EU-US negotiation such as European defence and trade.
Under Trump 2.0, the demand for EU presence in Latin American countries will grow. If their interests are ignored, these countries may turn to other actors to satisfy their appetite for greater international engagement, causing the EU to lose – perhaps for good – a key group of potential allies.
