Africa has historically been absent from US electoral debates where domestic politics and other regions of the world tend to take centre stage. In the past few months, we have seen the same pattern unfold. However, US foreign policy does have an impact on Africa – as it does on other regions. But what the US and European debate traditionally fails to acknowledge is Africa’s importance in global politics.
Given rapid changes including demographic shifts, its vast natural resources and investment potential, as well as the fact that African countries account for about one quarter of the votes at the UN General Assembly, Africa is a continent that others neglect at their own peril. Many geostrategic competitors of the United States such as China and Russia, as well as middle powers such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Türkiye, have fully grasped this reality, while India and Brazil are increasingly engaging with African counterparts.
Africa does not always feature prominently in the foreign policies of the US and the EU – except in reaction to increased competition from rivals. Pressure from domestic audiences in both the US and the EU often pushes for a focus on internal issues rather than external engagement. However, considering the ongoing transformations in both Africa and Europe, their evolving interests and the likely shifts that will intervene in US foreign policy towards Africa, the EU and its African counterparts should seize the opportunity to develop more coordinated common policies.
Trump 2.0 and Africa
US policy toward Africa has generally followed bipartisan lines. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a key element of US-Africa relations, was introduced under Clinton and extended under Bush. In 2019, Trump launched the Prosper Africa initiative to boost US-Africa trade, which Biden continued. This continuity has maintained a US focus on trade, security via the US Africa Command (Africom), and infrastructure projects like the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, including the Lobito corridor, along with Vice President Harris’ pledge to expand internet access. Looking forward, it may be expected that a second Trump administration will sustain some of these policies, although implementation could shift significantly amid growing geopolitical competition. Priorities include securing access to critical raw materials, expanding opportunities for US companies and competing with China’s presence on the continent. US engagement under Trump 2.0 will likely feature minimal or non-existent development cooperation and limited democratic conditionality.
US policy toward Africa has generally followed bipartisan lines
The expiration of the AGOA in 2025 marks a pivotal moment for US-Africa policy. This act grants certain countries preferential trade access, provided they meet certain criteria like respect for the rule of law. While its renewal is far from certain, it could still serve as leverage for the US to maintain good relations with resource-rich countries such as South Africa. However, as Trump has historically deprioritised human rights and rule of law in favour of a more business-oriented approach to foreign policy, a renewal of the AGOA may reduce its conditionality. This could lead to an expanded list of eligible countries, such as Ethiopia, which has been excluded due to the Tigray conflict.
Meanwhile, heightened US-China competition and potential US tariffs could significantly affect Africa exports but, more notably, they could generate an oversupply of goods from other countries, notably China. In turn, this could trigger further protectionist measures on the continent that may also affect the exports of critical raw materials. Under Biden, partnerships were framed in the context of development assistance to soften competitive dynamics, focusing on states like Kenya and Angola that have strong ties to China. Under Trump, this rivalry may become even more pronounced, without development aid to balance it, as Republicans often dismiss such aid as ineffective, as stated in Project 2025. As a consequence, African countries will be inclined to maximise competition among partners to serve their own interests.
In the security field, Trump’s ‘America First’ stance could mean reduced US military involvement in Africa. However, strategic areas like the Red Sea and the Gulf of Guinea as well as counter-terrorism efforts will in all likelihood continue to be relevant for US Middle East policy, trade routes and preventive self-defence.
Trump’s ‘America First’ stance could mean reduced US military involvement in Africa.
Overall, Trump may contribute towards the further polarisation of conflict by taking sides. For instance, in the Horn of Africa, a US stance in favour of Ethiopia’s claims to sea access, recognition of Somaliland, or taking sides in the Sudan war coupled with a likely disengagement from Somalia may undermine peace prospects in the region or even exacerbate territorial disputes.
What’s next for Africa-EU relations?
Under a second Trump administration, shifts in US foreign policy will inevitably affect EU-Africa relations. Four effects are likely:
- US pressure on Europeans to share more of the burden for NATO and assistance to Ukraine may reduce EU resources and political focus on Africa.
- Intensified US-China rivalry could force the EU into difficult decisions about protecting its trade interests globally, meaning also in relation to Africa.
- With diminished US emphasis on the rule of law, human rights, and environmental standards, the EU may find itself alone in promoting these.
- Additionally, a shift toward US bilateralism could hinder Africa’s regional integration and aspirations for a more prominent role in multilateral organisations.
Despite these challenges, the changes may also open new opportunities for EU-Africa cooperation with Africa:
Climate action: Both Africa and the EU underline climate change as a priority. Africa is, and will continue to be, heavily affected by climate change, and persistently calls for action in this domain. This shared interest can drive collaboration but differences have emerged over what approach to take, with African countries advocating for their right to use fossil fuels for industrialisation. Without the US as ally on this issue, the EU could consider additional support to African industrialisation policies to increase their sustainability. Prioritising the creation of value chains within and with the continent, facilitating technology transfer, and promoting joint ventures for green transitions could offer common ground for advancing common interests, also regarding the EU’s de-risking from China.
Economic development: As global competition increases in Africa the EU must strengthen its appeal. It can best do so by supporting Africa's priorities – economic growth and job creation. The Global Gateway provides a framework, but its planning, implementation and communication need to be tailored to both local and EU needs. As the investment environment, business culture, infrastructure needs and information landscape may greatly vary across countries, tailor-made programming based on shared priorities, their feasibility and clearer communication are paramount for shared benefits.
Democracy and the rule of law: The EU may need to stand as a stronghold for democracy and rule of law – as the US under Trump deprioritises these values. However, it should proceed cautiously, as pushing too hard has sometimes backfired or been manipulated via disinformation campaigns, as shown for instance by the rising enactment of discriminatory laws against LGBTI people. Grassroots engagement with civil society may yield more sustainable and effective results in building resilience against disinformation and ultimately supporting Africans’ quest for more democracy.
Multilateralism: Both the EU and Africa, including the African Union, value multilateralism. The EU could counteract fragmentation by advocating for greater inclusion of Africa in global forums, as Africa often calls for reform of the system rather than its outright rejection.
