'The Kremlin must be running out of champagne bottles to crack open,' an EU policymaker grimly remarked during one of the many recent seminars focused on upheavals in the global order. Over the past few weeks US President Donald Trump has managed to blame Ukraine for starting the war with Russia, suspend (and subsequently reinstate) military aid to Ukraine, and reportedly initiated a procedure to potentially lift sanctions on Russia. If this has not emboldened the Kremlin enough, it appears that its Middle Eastern policy may receive an unexpected boost as well. Russia is now coordinating with the US in response to the outbreak of sectarian violence in Syria last week. Both countries have jointly called for a closed-door meeting at the United Nations Security Council to discuss the issue. This development follows recent reports from Reuters indicating that the Israeli government has been trying to convince the US administration to allow Russia to maintain its military bases in Syria, including the Hmeimim airbase and the naval base in the port of Tartus.
According to Israeli officials, the continued Russian presence in Syria would provide a counterweight to growing Turkish influence and help to keep Syria 'weak and decentralized'. They fear that otherwise, under the new government formed by the HTS (a former Al-Qaida affiliate), Syria would pose a threat to Israel's security.
The recent outbreak of violence highlights the risks of continued Russian involvement in Syria.
The EU, in contrast, favours the opposite outcome – a strong and unified Syria. However, behind closed doors, some argue that balancing Türkiye's growing influence in Syria is in the EU's strategic interest – and that this can be achieved by continued, albeit limited, Russian presence in the country.
This logic is flawed on at least two counts.
First, at this stage, the continued presence of Russian troops on Syrian soil will not serve as a counterbalance to any actor, least of all to Türkiye. Instead, it will only undermine efforts to stabilise and centralise Syria (in this regard, the Israelis are correct). Second, contrary to Israel's assumptions, weakening Syria in the medium to long term will not enhance security – neither for Israel nor for any other state.
The recent outbreak of violence in the northwestern part of the country highlights the risks of continued Russian involvement in Syria. The clashes, sparked by an attack on government forces by militias loyal to the ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, erupted in a region predominantly inhabited by members of the Alawite sect, from which Assad hails. Many of those fleeing the sectarian violence reportedly sought refuge at the nearby Hmeimim military base, where Russian forces maintain a limited presence. While the Kremlin claims that sanctuary was offered on humanitarian grounds and that Russia was 'shocked' by the massacres, online discussions among Syrians have raised questions about Russia's true motives and its role in the clashes.
Russia has a long history of using protection of minorities – be it its own diaspora or religious minorities – to justify its presence or even intervention abroad. Those seeking refuge in the military base were reportedly asked to sign a petition calling for international intervention to ensure their protection, and a Russian military convoy was seen heading towards the Hmeimim military base. While for now Russia underlines its commitment to Syria's 'sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity', all this can be seen as a build-up for future intervention in support of any Alawite separatist ambitions, particularly in territories where former Russian military bases exist. One pro-Kremlin propaganda outlet has already floated this very idea.
The EU must use the diplomatic tools at its disposal to counter Russia's destabilising policies in its immediate neighbourhood.
From the EU's perspective, the best course of action would be for Russia's presence in Syria – and indeed in the Mediterranean region – to be reduced to an absolute minimum. This is particularly important given the current shift in US policy towards Russia and its near abandonment of Ukraine. Securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine is vital to the EU's own security, and Russia's strong presence in the Mediterranean presents a significant obstacle to that goal. Treating the Southern Mediterranean as a gateway to Africa, the Kremlin has been exploiting the region to fill its coffers and fund its war efforts. In Syria, Russia is believed to have used Hmeimim airbase to facilitate the smuggling of gold from Sudan, while the presence of the Wagner Group has allowed it to profit from the trade in drugs produced in the country.
The EU must capitalise on the still-recent fall of the Assad regime and use the diplomatic tools at its disposal to counter Russia’s destabilising policies in its immediate neighbourhood. However, this should be done without applying direct pressure on the new Syrian government – for example, by making further sanctions relief conditional on a complete severance of ties with the Kremlin.
A key part of this strategy is highlighting Russia's inherent unreliability as a partner, its inability to support Syria's transition financially, and its vested interest in exacerbating sectarian violence and divisions within the country. Taking immediate action to alleviate the daily hardships suffered by the Syrian population – such as increasing humanitarian aid, supporting the resumption of essential services, and rebuilding crucial infrastructure – will help stabilise the country and strengthen its resilience against Russian influence.
Equally important, the EU must maintain a firm stance on the necessity of adhering to the promised inclusive transition process, with respect for human rights and the protection of all Syrian citizens, regardless of religious affiliation. This is essential, not only to ensure the success of the transition but also to prevent Russia (and other actors) from exploiting the situation to undermine the process, which would be detrimental to both the Syrian people and the EU.
