The idea of a European Security Council (ESC) is back. Commissioner Andrius Kubilius has recently revived the proposal, arguing that the EU needs such a body to enable faster decisions on defence and security. French President Emmanuel Macron launched the debate during his election campaign in 2017, and the idea was later also taken up by Berlin.
As Russia's war on Ukraine grinds on and doubts over America’s commitment to European security mount, it is not surprising that the idea of an ESC has resurfaced. The rationale for an ESC is twofold. First, proponents argue that it could allow for faster coordination and political decision-making, generating swifter and more strategic European responses. Second, an ESC could help Europeans bridge institutional divides, bringing together in a structured manner EU Member States interested in deepening security coordination and key non-EU partners like the UK.
While the appeal of an ESC is clear, the debate has long been shaped by a lack of clarity over what such a body would actually look like.
While the appeal of an ESC is clear, the debate has long been shaped by a lack of clarity over what such a body would actually look like. In practice, at least four versions of an ESC are possible, depending on two variables: whether the ESC is linked to EU structures or operates in parallel to them, and whether it is established as a formal body or remains an informal forum.
Four possible ESC models — and their limits
One version of the ESC could see EU leaders meet in a dedicated security format — effectively creating an ESC through the European Council itself. This would reflect the reality that the European Council is already the EU’s ultimate crisis manager. In theory, non-EU actors like Ukraine or the UK could also be invited to attend specific sessions. Such a format could elevate security issues more systematically to leader level so that they were not only discussed during crises. More regular discussions of security at leaders’ level could also help improve strategic coordination across policy domains from defence-industrial policy and sanctions to energy security and resilience. However, the main added value of such a format would be strategic steering rather than faster decision-making, as decisions on key foreign and security policy issues would still require unanimity.
A second model for an ESC would be a formal EU Security Council as a new EU body with defined membership and competences. In theory, it could include both permanent and non-permanent members. Depending on decision-making rules, such a body could reshape EU decision-making. In practice, however, a treaty-based ESC would immediately raise questions about its relationship with existing EU structures like the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Council. If its membership were very broad, decision-making would not become significantly faster or smoother. But if membership were limited or the requirement for unanimity removed, the arrangement would be unacceptable to those excluded — especially if non-EU partners such as the UK or Ukraine were involved while many EU Member States were not.
A third model for the ESC would be for it to be a formal structure operating alongside the EU. This could resemble a ‘Western European Union 2.0’: a European security organisation designed to bring together key European actors in a structured and regular framework. This is essentially the model proposed by Kubilius, who argues that such an ESC should include permanent and rotational members, EU institutional leaders, and involve the UK when discussing broader issues. An ESC established outside the EU could offer greater flexibility on membership than EU-nested models and could facilitate faster political alignment and cooperation among key actors. However, decisions taken in such a forum would still need to be translated into EU processes where EU instruments were required, limiting the extent to which it could accelerate decisions in many fields. More broadly, creating a new organisation would require significant financial resources and substantial political effort.
The fourth model for the ESC would be for it to be an informal body outside the EU institutions. In practice, this already exists in formats such as the E3, E3+EU, E5 and E5+EU. The E3+EU grouping of France, Germany, the UK and the EU has long played a leading role in European diplomacy towards Iran. European leaders have been meeting in a range of formats since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and especially since the start of Donald Trump’s second presidency. The most prominent is the E5, made up of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK, often with the participation of the EU institutions or NATO. Informal frameworks such as the E5 allow fast and flexible coordination. However, they raise legitimacy concerns inside the EU and can create friction with countries that are left out. Moreover, decisions taken by informal groups still need to be channelled through EU institutions to engage EU instruments.
Building on what works
Many versions of an ESC — particularly those involving the creation of a new EU institution or a new organisation outside the EU — face significant political and practical constraints and may not deliver all the benefits that proponents anticipate. A more realistic option, therefore, is not to create a European Security Council from scratch, but to build on the structures that Europeans already have. Rather than seeking a single institutional solution, the priority should be to strengthen those formats that already deliver elements of what an ESC could achieve.
First, an ESC understood as a dedicated European Council format on security could elevate security more systematically to leader level, ensuring that security issues are discussed beyond moments of crisis and better connected to the EU’s overall toolkit. Second, something akin to an ESC already exists through informal steering groups like the E5+EU. These formats have become the most practical way for key European actors to consult quickly and align positions in fast-moving crises.
Something akin to an ESC already exists through informal steering groups like the E5+EU.
At the same time, the effectiveness and legitimacy of informal formats depends on how well they connect to the EU level. Strengthening the way such formats work and interact with the EU should be a priority. Small-group cooperation should be issue-based and as inclusive as reasonably possible, ideally involving all Member States with a direct stake in a given dossier. EU institutional actors should be involved as a matter of course, and informal groups should report back regularly to the Foreign Affairs Council and the European Council. Where Member States agree on policy substance but implementation is the main obstacle, the EU could explicitly endorse and support small-group initiatives, tasking them with delivery while providing funding and institutional backing.
If Europeans can make better use of dedicated European Council discussions on security, while improving how informal formats connect to EU decision-making and instruments, they may not create a European Security Council as such — but they will come closer to delivering what it is meant to provide in practice.
