Boy walking in the street with a Venezuelan flag draped over his shoulders. Photo by Andrés Silva on Unsplash

On 3 January, US special forces entered Venezuelan airspace and captured President Nicolas Maduro, bringing him to the US to face drug charges. Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez has been sworn in as President ad interim in Caracas.

The ousting of Maduro has taken the Caribbean region into uncharted waters. For now, his regime maintains control over the country. However, there are a number of uncertainties, due to the risk of further US strikes, the role of transnational criminal groups, and the spillover of instability into neighbouring countries. Europe should be ready.

Nothing new under the sun?

Speaking at a news conference following the arrest, President Trump declared that the US would be ‘running’ Venezuela. He also argued, somewhat contradictorily, that Rodríguez is the new head of the country, and that the US will continue to work with the existing leadership as long as it does ‘what's right’ – that is, what the US wants. Trump has threatened new strikes if Caracas does not comply with US demands.

Although Maduro has been arrested, the bureaucratic and military apparatus on which he relied appears to remain in place. Rodríguez was Maduro’s second-in-command. Defence minister Vladimir Padrino has pledged the armed forces’ support for Rodríguez. Interior minister Diosdado Cabello, a hardliner, launched a wave of repression on 3 January, using paramilitary groups (colectivos) to patrol the streets and crush any celebrations.

This surprising outcome – the ousting of Maduro while his regime remains intact – reflects Trump’s desire to avoid another ‘endless war’ by stopping short of full-scale regime change. It may also reflect the administration’s loss of faith in opposition figures like María Corina Machado, and its prioritisation of stability and resource extraction over democratic transition. It also appears that Rodríguez had engaged in negotiations with the US in Qatar, presenting herself as a more pragmatic alternative to Maduro who would concede to US demands, saving Trump the costs of outright regime change. 

Beyond the regime

Although the regime may have found a way to endure despite the removal of its leader, there are many paths to instability in Venezuela. The US blockade of Venezuelan oil remains in place. Trump announced that the US will sell some of the sanctioned oil in the global market, but it is not clear whether Venezuelans will receive a share of the profits. If the blockade is not lifted, the government may forgo more than 70% of the country’s oil production in 2026, wiping out its main source of public revenue. This promises more economic hardship for the population and could trigger a humanitarian crisis.

Criminal groups could play an important role in this context. Venezuela hosts a large number of ‘megabandas’ (mega-gangs), heavily armed groups with at least 50 members who have increasingly engaged in drug trafficking, extortion, kidnappings and contract killings. Colombian organisations such as the FARC or the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) operate within Venezuela, and control a large share of cocaine flows to Europe. Immediately after Maduro’s arrest, the ELN issued a call to arms to confront US imperialism. And the presence of extra-regional actors such as Hezbollah is well documented.

While the removal of Maduro and additional US pressure could force the regime to crack down on these groups, their entrenched ties with the regime’s economic and security apparatus could prevail. A weakened or unstable regime could also enable criminal groups to expand their control in the region and carry out cross-border operations.

The impact of the events in Venezuela is unlikely to remain confined within the country’s borders. Several Latin American countries – Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay – have condemned the US operation. Others, like Argentina and Ecuador, have welcomed Maduro’s capture. This split reflects a wider regional divide between Trumpian allies and governments who are alarmed by Trump’s revival of the Monroe Doctrine

Colombia is bracing for instability along its border and for a wave of refugees. President Gustavo Petro, who like Maduro is under US sanctions, and who Trump has suggested could be the next to be toppled, is under intense pressure. Unlike Venezuela, Colombia is a major US non-NATO ally, and a key EU partner in the region. The EU has invested significantly in the Colombian peace process and is the country’s biggest foreign direct investment (FDI) provider. Bogotá is among Latin America’s most active contributors to CSDP missions and a key partner in countering transnational organised crime. Hence, instability in Colombia would significantly increase the stakes for the EU.

Beyond Colombia, other countries could be impacted. Cuba, which has traditionally provided military assistance and intelligence to Maduro, is feeling the pressure. Cuban American constituencies and Secretary Rubio have long advocated the removal of the leadership in Havana. The US could also extend strikes into the territorial waters of other Caribbean and Eastern Pacific countries, or even to inland targets such as coca plantations in Colombia, fentanyl labs in Mexico, or other hubs of organised criminal activity. 

Europe has a stake 

By once again referring to Greenland in his news conference, Trump reiterated threats against the territorial integrity of an EU Member State and a close NATO ally. But the EU has direct stakes in the Caribbean too. The region includes EU territories such as Aruba, Guadeloupe and French Guyana. Most of the cocaine flowing out of Colombia and Venezuela does not go to the US but to Europe.

Thus, Europe would be directly implicated if regional stability were to collapse. Moreover, the violation of norms such as sovereignty and territorial integrity contributes to the erosion of the international rules that the EU is seeking to uphold, in Ukraine, in the Taiwan Strait, and elsewhere. Europe and the Caribbean are more intimately connected than is often assumed. 

Hence, European countries should be ready for the possible fallout from the Venezuelan crisis. They should take concrete steps to protect EU territories as well as regional partners. 

As noted in a recent EUISS Brief, the EU has a number of tools, from the Global Gateway to the Coordinated Maritime Presence, that it can leverage to maintain regional stability, preventing possible spillovers and unintended consequences of the US intervention. This would allow the EU to assert itself as a credible and valuable actor in the region.