The chips are down: Trump 2.0, the EU and Ukraine

Much is at stake now for Ukraine and European security. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, US policy towards both is poised to change significantly. Europeans must not succumb to doom and gloom or place false hope in last-minute ‘Trump-proofing’ measures,  nor should they read too much into Putin’s wait-and see approach. They must get their act together, and fast.

The EU must demonstrate strong resolve in maintaining its military and diplomatic support to Ukraine. It is the only way to avoid the imposition of an unfavourable ‘peace’ settlement on Kyiv – a settlement that would only embolden the Kremlin, give it time to rebuild its forces, and further undermine European security.

Harsh realities

In the face of Trump’s historic success, EU decision-makers must contend with a number of harsh realities.

First, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Kyiv has heavily relied on Washington’s military and financial assistance to defend against the aggression. US military aid reached €66 billion as of August 2024, far surpassing assistance to any other country. The EU’s share of military assistance to Ukraine has grown over time, but Kyiv still depends on Washington for some categories such as heavy weapons ammunition. The future of this crucial lifeline is now deeply uncertain, given Trump’s record of rallying Congress Republicans to block the supplemental assistance package until April 2024, directly contributing to the Ukraine’s armed forces’ current predicament.

Heavy weapons allocations to Ukraine

Europe vs US, € billion

Data: Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Ukraine Support Tracker, 2024

Second, Trump has pledged to resolve the conflict by swiftly negotiating a ‘fair deal’.  Worryingly, elements of the deal the incoming administration envisions may entail recognition of Moscow’s sovereignty over the ‘new territories’ it currently occupies as well as lifting sanctions targeting Russia’s war economy. Imposing neutrality on Ukraine would further curtail Ukraine’s sovereignty.

While Trump may be genuinely committed to peace, Putin is not. 

Third, while Trump may be genuinely committed to peace, Putin is not. War has now become entrenched as an organising principle of Russia’s economy and society, serving as a cornerstone for the legitimacy of the regime now in power. Any concessions that Trump and others may view as sufficient to appease the Kremlin’s imperialist ambitions will, in reality, only fuel them further. And if Putin’s next targets were to be NATO member states, defending them would require the US to spend much more than it currently does in Ukraine. US support to Kyiv only amounted to 0.14% of GDP in 2023.

What to expect…

To confirm his credentials as a deal-maker, Trump may seek to seal the deal already during the transition stage. While the Kremlin has been careful not to give any impression of enthusiasm over the outcome of the election,  Putin may see an advantage in reaching out to Trump before the latter is fully briefed on Russia’s war on Ukraine and activities further afield. In one scenario, this could result in backdoor negotiations followed by a personal meeting where the two leaders strike a deal that bypasses both Ukrainians and Europeans, ultimately forcing them to accept the terms.

Given Trump’s unpredictability, the talks could also result in alternative outcomes. Failure to reach an agreement, for example if Trump came to believe (erroneously) that he could simply enforce a freeze on the fighting without further concessions, could result in him losing interest in the conflict, ending US support but not the fighting. More hypothetically, he could even double down on support for Ukraine, removing restrictions that Biden has so far imposed, as some of his advisors have argued.

The first two options pose major policy dilemmas for the EU. An attempt to bilaterally negotiate a deal would exacerbate internal divisions in the coalition supporting Ukraine. Some Member States would be emboldened to block or defect from common positions. If faced with a choice between continuing to back Kyiv and preserving US security guarantees for Europe, some could be tempted to sacrifice Ukraine for the sake of NATO’s survival. This would be a false dichotomy, given that Europe’s defence depends on a strong Ukraine as a bulwark against Moscow’s expansionism.

Europe’s defence depends on a strong Ukraine as a bulwark against Moscow’s expansionism.

Alternatively, Trump may be persuaded not to rush to bring the war to a swift conclusion during the transition period – or Putin may decline to show interest in meeting anytime soon. In that case, the new administration may include support for Ukraine in a budget proposal in March 2025. The new form of support could be conditional on Kyiv’s meeting a set of conditions, including agreeing to a ceasefire and direct negotiations. In that scenario, Ukraine’s position in such talks would depend on the format of negotiations, and on whatever credible commitments Zelensky would be able to secure from EU Member States. In other words, the EU must ensure that it stands firmly behind Ukraine. Diplomatic preparedness, as well as common, creative and courageous decisions to make up for the sharp decline in US support to Ukraine’s defence, will be key.

Scenarios for support to Ukraine in 2025

Estimated support based on 2024, € billion

Data: Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Ukraine Support Tracker, 2024

… and what to do

To pass the stress tests to come, the EU and Member States should concentrate their efforts on the following four areas.

First, they should commit to continue supplying the US-provided assets that are critical to Ukraine’s defences. They should do so together with international partners such as the UK and South Korea. They should also make the case to the Trump administration to continue to provide critical assets that cannot be swiftly replaced in the short-term, while developing plans to provide Ukraine with viable alternatives as soon as possible. Persuading the new administration will not be easy, but without a clear strategy for how the EU and the Member States will step in, it will be nothing short of impossible. The EU should highlight the interconnectedness between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres, emphasising how China continues to gain by supporting Russia: given Trump’s focus on Beijing, the argument is likely to resonate with the new administration. Moreover, the EU should try – as Zelensky did – to convince Trump to apply its ‘peace through strength’ message in dealing with Russia, given the latter’s increasing ties with China and Iran.

Second, they should substantially increase macrofinancial assistance to the Ukrainian economy. A possible path forward could be the establishment of a dedicated fund comprising frozen Russian assets, from which Kyiv would be allowed to draw for defence and reconstruction purposes as an advance on future reparations. Furthermore, they should immediately fund contracts for European defence industry and joint production ventures with Ukraine – for instance through defence bonds.

Third, they should confidentially discuss what positions to take vis-à-vis a potential ceasefire. Any arrangement that shuts down the possibility of a just peace and instead legitimises Russia’s territorial gains as faits accomplis must be avoided – it would violate international law and undermine European security. The EU must also insist that Ukraine is treated as an equal party in the negotiations and has as much support as possible through immediate deliveries and long-term commitments from the EU. It is also important that all Member States are represented at the negotiating table in the person of the HR/VP with a clear mandate. Any calls for a new ‘concert of great powers’ to ‘stabilise’ European security – almost certain to be made by Moscow – must be resisted.

Fourth, European decision-makers should immediately step up efforts to enhance Ukraine’s deterrence and defence capabilities. They should initiate security commitments similar to NATO’s Article 5 or the EU’s mutual assistance clause. West Germany during the Cold-War and Norway could serve as models for a sui generis approach to NATO integration. In parallel, the EU should speed up accession talks for Ukraine (and Moldova), ensuring a clear sense of direction and end in sight. Integration of Ukraine into the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and its participation in all common defence initiatives should be fast-tracked in view of its prospective membership.