You are here
What the EU should do for Ukraine now
Moscow continues to wreak terror on Ukraine’s civilian population as it relentlessly wages its brutal war of aggression. Meanwhile, Ukraine is endeavouring to generate a new momentum on the battlefield through its audacious campaign in Kursk. Kyiv’s successful deployment of ‘asymmetrical’ tactics has altered the narrative both domestically and internationally, dispelling the notion of a creeping but inevitable defeat. It has furthermore shaken the confidence of Putin’s regime in Moscow. On the domestic front, President Zelensky is seeking to consolidate his rule and shore up his government’s legitimacy in a major cabinet reshuffle.
Ukraine’s future success or failure in defending itself continues to hinge on Western support – which must increasingly come from Europe. Regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election and despite the challenges and deadlocks in EU decision-making, Europeans must continue to support Ukraine against all odds. This is the key strategic objective that should guide the external and defence policies of the new European Commission.
Europeans must continue to support Ukraine against all odds.
This requires not only improving current policies but also developing new, bold ideas. Politics is the art of the possible. But the line between the possible and the impossible is never fixed – it shifts in both directions.
Here are ten key items on the EU’s to-do list for supporting Ukraine:
First, Ukraine needs more immediate military support. This entails above all air defence systems, artillery ammunition and expanded training capacities. Even if the EU training mission (EUMAM) remains in its current location, it is feasible and necessary to expand the mission in size and ensure training efforts effectively address Ukrainians’ real needs.
Second, the EU must continue to use sanctions to erode Russia’s capacity to wage war. We cannot expect miracles from sanctions as a tool of economic warfare. While unprecedented in scope, they will not compel the Kremlin to end its aggressive behaviour or cripple Russia’s economy to the point where the regime is no longer able to wage industrial-scale wars. What sanctions do, and can do even more effectively in the future, is reduce oil revenues to Russia’s federal budget by smarter targeting of Sovkomflot’s ‘shadow fleet’ and closing loopholes in the current restrictions. In addition, policymakers must zone in on the ‘parallel imports’ of components like semiconductors and telecommunications equipment that are extensively used in Russia’s war machine. Much of this equipment, which continues to be of Western origin, reaches Russia through shadowy networks of profiteering intermediaries. China features prominently in the documented flows, but it is not the not the only one. Better mapping and regulation of these flows as well as banking restrictions and compliance are key.
Third, the EU should further support Ukraine’s defence industrial base to sustain its capacity to defend against Russia’s attempts to liquidate its sovereignty. Efforts should prioritise security and ongoing reform of the industry, which will help to attract greater direct investment to support the localisation of production and maintenance, including through more joint ventures. The EIB’s enhanced loan flexibility would facilitate and streamline the financing process. By investing in Ukraine’s defences the EU will also bolster its own defence industries and the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) – to which Kyiv should be integrated as closely as possible.
Fourth, the EU should ensure that Ukraine’s power supply remains secured during the coming winter. Ukraine’s power generation infrastructure has become one of the main targets of Russian air strikes. In addition to assistance in safeguarding its skies, Kyiv needs support for affordable energy imports – including appropriate infrastructure development – and for new, distributed power generation capacities. Power shortages this winter could lead to severe societal consequences, with the real risk of large-scale internal displacements as well as a potential new flow of migration to the EU. This makes the provision of such support a humanitarian endeavour.
Power shortages this winter could lead to severe societal consequences.
Fifth, Ukraine’s hands should be untied by easing restrictions on the use of Western-made missile systems inside Russia beyond the Kharkiv theatre of operations. The key decisions are for Washington: its European allies should prevail on it to rethink these restrictions as the brunt of supporting Ukraine militarily will shift towards Europe. This does not mean ignoring Russia’s capacities to inflict harm. But recklessness and indecision are equally likely to result in strategic disaster. Moreover, bluffing and intimidation are historically part of Moscow’s asymmetrical warfare arsenal. It is clear that the Kremlin will not participate in any peace talks – or even an armistice – unless Ukraine is able to inflict greater costs by military means to alter Moscow’s strategic calculus.
Ukraine’s hands should be untied by easing restrictions on the use of Western-made missile systems inside Russia.
Sixth, the EU and its Member States must improve their strategic communication to explain why support to Ukraine is essential for Europeans’ security and prosperity. The political consensus in the West is a particular target of Russia’s foreign information and manipulation interference, as the Kremlin believes it is the Achilles’ heel of pluralist and ‘hedonistic’ Western societies. The challenge is to maintain this consensus without undermining democratic debate or excluding constituencies that are particularly vulnerable to Russian propaganda. This can only be achieved by better understanding and connecting with these constituencies’ motivations.
Seventh, the EU and its Member States need to engage in more effective communication with key global audiences, particularly in the emerging world. This communication should focus on the importance of upholding the basic norms of international society that Russia is breaching. It should also highlight the harm that Moscow’s proxies (such as the infamous Wagner Group and its successors) are causing to local populations in Africa while also pillaging and shipping out local wealth. These efforts should furthermore expose Moscow’s hypocrisy in portraying itself as an anti-colonialist power and a leading advocate of ‘traditional values’.
Eighth, the EU must back Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts to promote a future peace based on the principles of sovereignty, non-interference and peaceful coexistence among nations, even as these efforts are frustrated by powers like China who notionally promote them in other settings.
Ninth, Russia’s frozen assets should be used to finance Ukraine’s defences and reconstruction. Using the windfall profits from frozen assets to fund the EU’s military support to Ukraine was a step in the right direction – but it will not be a game changer. Meanwhile, the G7 plan to use the windfalls to service a new shared debt to Ukraine hinges on uncertainty over whether the EU’s sanctions remain in place. Against this backdrop, policymakers must devise creative and transparent ways for Ukraine to access the immobilised assets as a downpayment for future reparations – without incurring adverse side effects like destabilising European financial markets.
Tenth, to better protect Ukraine’s air space, potential donors should explore ways to send more F-16s. Ukraine’s declared needs for F-16s now stand at double the current pledge by the Air Force Capability Coalition for Ukraine. Furthermore, supporters of Ukraine in the EU should explore the feasibility of delivering other systems such as JAS 39 Gripen fighters that might well serve Ukraine’s operational requirements. Sweden is the producer of the Gripen, which is also used by Czech and Hungarian air forces. The Czech Republic is currently negotiating to extend the lease of its Gripen fighters until 2035 – when they should be replaced by F-35s. It could be well placed to contribute to the training of Ukrainian pilots. Integrating multiple systems of similar complexity would pose a challenge for Ukraine. However, their use could also resolve supply problems and would be a means of hedging against shifting domestic politics in donor states.