Diplomatic efforts to negotiate an end to the hostilities in Ukraine will start soon. The EU must be prepared. That means having a clear understanding of what constitutes a good deal and what constitutes a bad one.
First of all, the EU must be mindful of the Kremlin’s strategic objectives as well as its negotiating tactics, recognising that, for Moscow, negotiations will be a continuation of war by other means – through staged theatrics, cunning manipulation and artful deception. As for its objectives, the Kremlin is determined to liquidate Ukraine’s sovereignty. Demands for demilitarisation, neutralisation, and ‘denazification’ are clearly intended to achieve this outcome. Second, Russia pursues a strategy of pre-emptive security against the (imaginary) threat from the West. To that end, it will strive to expand the territory under its control or at least its influence as far as possible. The regime is not interested in peace – it does not believe in it. To hope that the conflict can be contained to Ukraine is naïve. Everything we know about Russia’s geopolitical strategy over the last three hundred years indicates otherwise.
... for Moscow, negotiations will be a continuation of war by other means
In view of these objectives, the EU’s and Kyiv's interests clearly converge on the need for a strong and independent Ukraine, which will contribute to maintaining a fragile stability in Europe. A bad deal for both would be one that accepts Russia’s stated demands, leaving Ukraine fractured and vulnerable to being absorbed by Moscow. It would also be a licence for another round of ‘Putinic wars’ elsewhere – not only in Europe but around the world – signalling that wars of conquest, rather than peace and cooperation, are rewarded in the international community.
A good deal, on the other hand, would be one that lays down the conditions for winning a just and sustainable peace. It would offer maximum security for the free, currently unoccupied Ukraine, recognising this as an indispensable condition for the country to rebuild its economy and strengthen its defences. A strong Ukraine on the path to EU membership will be a key bastion in containing Russia’s misguided pursuit of ‘pre-emptive security’.
The arrangement may entail the deployment of ‘tripwire forces’ by some EU Member States, along with other security commitments and assurances – short of NATO membership, which under current conditions is unfeasible. A strong international peacekeeping force, with contributions from France, Poland and other Member States, would be a significant asset, provided that political challenges are overcome and the necessary US support is forthcoming.
But the primary deterrent must be a modern, capable and reinvigorated Ukrainian military as well as a robust defence industrial capacity, in the development of which the EU should invest much more.
Defences should be further bolstered through measures such as mutual force deployment limitations, transparency and verification mechanisms to reduce risks.
In the talks, Russia will seek to cement its gains and to weaken the European security architecture through the imposition of formal treaty obligations. This would be a trap. Russia had violated all the key OSCE principles of European security even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Its legalistic machinations would be aimed solely at weakening and restraining the ‘collective West’, perceived by Moscow as both an enemy and a threat. The EU must recognise this, keep in mind Russia’s structural weaknesses and strategic failures (e.g. in Syria), and see through the Kremlin’s carefully orchestrated theatrics such as the recent experimental launch of the new hypersonic Oreshnik missile designed to stir anxiety in the West. Moscow likes to play on Europeans’ fears of nuclear war. By standing firm and rejecting Russia’s (inadmissible and illegal) nuclear blackmail, Europe can avert the real threat to its security: the gradual and insidious spread of the Kremlin’s power. The EU should finallymake sure that no definitive concessions are locked into the deal – whether on closing Ukraine’s doors to NATO or formally recognising Moscow’s sovereignty over any part of Ukrainian territory.
Within these parameters, a range of risk reduction measures can be considered which would serve the mutual interests of all parties. These measures might include a narrow demilitarised zone along the line of control, with the deployment of an international mission, and verifiable bans on military exercises and offensive systems (including both artillery and missiles) along with ceilings on other military capabilities within a wider zone established by the agreement. Maritime security and freedom of passage need to be ensured in the Black Sea, monitored by an international task force.
How can such a deal to be achieved?
For starters, the EU must be at the negotiating table – no one else will speak on its behalf. France and Germany must resist any push by Moscow to negotiate a deal in a ‘new concert’ setting where only a select group of ‘powers’ would be invited to participate. The EU’s position will be stronger if it benefits from the collective wisdom of all Member States. Russia knows this.
The EU must be at the negotiating table – no one else will speak on its behalf.
Maximum pressure must be exerted vis-à-vis Moscow ahead of the negotiations. Military support to Ukraine must not only continue but be scaled up – and there must be a declared readiness to continue to provide it over the long term should ceasefire talks fail. Sanctions must be tightened. Only in this way will Russia be compelled to accept terms short of its stated demands, and without the concessions it seeks to impose that would jeopardise the security of both Ukraine and the Member States.
A good ceasefire deal can only be achieved through strength. It must also be accompanied by a credible commitment to invest in European security.
First, the EU must present a plan to gradually replace a substantial portion of US military assistance, including through defence bonds, along with a clear roadmap on how to develop critical defence capabilities in the forthcoming new Defence White Paper. Trump will not be persuaded to continue to contribute to European security (including the security of a free Ukraine) unless such a clear commitment is put on the table.
Second, the EU needs to invest more in a comprehensive political strategy to ‘unpower’ Russia. For even after the guns in Ukraine have fallen silent, Moscow will undoubtedly persist in deploying hybrid tactics to erode the liberal-democratic foundations of Member States and undermine the EU’s interests worldwide.
