Great optimism prevailed at the ceremony in Sharm el-Sheikh on Monday (13 October), where leaders – including European Council President António Costa – attended the signing of an agreement to end the devastating two-year war in Gaza. With a ceasefire now in place, all remaining Israeli hostages released (with the return of the deceased still pending), and hundreds of Palestinian prisoners freed, the agreement marks a major diplomatic achievement, one forged through what President Trump has repeatedly described as US ‘strength’. The next phase, however, will demand even greater resolve – and stamina – to keep the ceasefire intact and move towards reconstruction. As HR/VP Kaja Kallas has noted, ‘securing peace in Gaza will be extraordinarily complex’. Achieving regional stability via a two-state solution has been the EU’s long-standing objective. It has both the will and the means to help, but its influence over the past two years has been limited. Still, the EU wants – and should – play a role in the implementation phase, contributing funding, political weight, on-the-ground experience and its civilian missions to support security, governance, and reconstruction efforts.
Achieving regional stability via a two-state solution has been the EU’s long-standing objective.
Whether Washington fully welcomes EU involvement remains unclear (for now it appears that the EU has not been allocated a seat on the ‘Board of Peace’). Israel also seems reluctant – at least until the EU resumes all funding to Israel and withdraws its proposal to partially suspend the EU–Israel Association Agreement. But other guarantors of the agreement do support a stronger EU role. They want the EU to help build momentum behind shared goals – ending the West Bank occupation, achieving a two-state solution, restoring Palestinian self-governance, and anchoring the process in the UN framework. The turnout at President Macron’s meeting in Paris, held immediately after the conclusion of ceasefire talks, and attended by top diplomats from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan and Türkiye as well as from the EU, Spain, Italy and Germany, underscored this commitment. The challenge facing this group now is to avoid alienating Trump – whose support is pivotal and whose scepticism towards the UN is well-known – while still working through multilateral channels. Türkiye, Jordan and Egypt reportedly sought UNSC authorisation for an International Stabilization Force, but it was omitted from the plan; several states are willing to contribute troops, yet only with a UN mandate. For the broader ‘Global South’, UN involvement remains essential to the legitimacy of the process.
The EU can add the most value in a few targeted areas – even while acknowledging limited bandwidth, with Ukraine remaining the top priority, and the slower pace imposed by its institutional set-up. Funding is the clearest example. The EU is the largest donor for the Palestinian people, providing up to €1.36 billion for 2021-2024 and €1.6 billion for 2025-2027. Yet delivery mechanics matter as much as volumes. In her State of the Union address, President von der Leyen pledged to establish a Palestine Donor Group in October; that timeline has now slipped to ‘by the end of the year’. Others are moving faster: the UK convened a donor-style meeting on the very day of the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, bringing together MENA partners and EU Member States, while Egypt has announced a Gaza Reconstruction Conference in Cairo in November. The implication is straightforward – if the EU wants influence commensurate with its funding, it needs to lock in timelines.
If the EU wants influence commensurate with its funding, it needs to lock in timelines.
While not always swift, the EU has shown it can act when needed. The reactivation of its EUBAM Rafah civilian mission — delayed but now set to resume once conditions permit — should proceed without further hold-up to help stabilise border flows and support the fragile ceasefire. In parallel, EU Member States should move just as fast to define how EUPOL COPPS can interface with a prospective International Stabilization Force, including in areas such as planning, information-sharing, and immediate civilian policing support. The security situation in Gaza is perilous – to the point that President Trump signalled a temporary green light for Hamas to prevent a security vacuum and a takeover by armed clans and gangs. The EU should move swiftly, in coordination with Egypt and Jordan, to train, vet and equip professional Palestinian police forces, linking this effort to border operations so that security and service delivery mutually reinforce each other.
By contrast, restraint is warranted on restoring suspended EU-Israel bilateral funding or withdrawing proposals to suspend trade concessions. The EU has been slow to implement even these limited measures. But politically we are now in a new phase. To encourage a constructive stance by Israel in implementing the totality of the Trump plan, the EU must now link the enforcement of its sanctions proposals to compliance with the ceasefire, adherence to international law, and concrete steps in the West Bank, notably halting illegal settlement activity. If the two-state solution is to be more than rhetoric, policy must reflect that reality both in Gaza and the West Bank.
If the two-state solution is to be more than rhetoric, policy must reflect that reality both in Gaza and the West Bank.
The EU is also well placed to help draft and implement the Palestinian Authority’s reform programme. The Palestinian people badly need and deserve a well-functioning and legitimate political leadership, to counter and delegitimise Hamas. Here too, the EU needs to link its future stance and financial support to tangible progress on reforms. Its longstanding engagement with the PA is both a strength and a weakness – a strength because it knows the challenges first-hand and has a wealth of lessons learnt to draw on, a weakness because its record in pressing for meaningful reforms has been mixed (to say the least). Ensuring genuine involvement from Palestinian civil society will be essential – so Palestinians have a real say in shaping their own future.
Finally, the EU should consistently advocate a needs-based approach to Gaza’s recovery that prioritises core utilities, healthcare and education infrastructure over prestige projects. Rebuilding schools to accommodate students with reduced mobility is one clear example – Gaza now has the world’s largest number of child amputees, and accessibility must be integrated from the very start of reconstruction planning.
The bottom line
If Europe can match the speed it showed in restoring EUBAM Rafah with equal discipline on PA reform and inclusive governance, it can turn its chequebook into leverage – working alongside Arab partners and under a UN umbrella to drive effective implementation. Having a seat at this emerging ‘Board of Peace’ will matter – and partners who want sustained EU support should help make that case in Washington.
