Introduction

For over four years, Ukraine has bravely resisted Russia’s imperialist aggression. Positive momentum has been building up. Ukraine has consolidated its defences and slowed, and in places reversed, Russia’s advances. Its defence-industrial production capacity is expanding rapidly, and its innovation ecosystem is becoming one of the country’s most valuable assets. Kyiv can rely on the EU’s support through the unprecedented €90 billion loan approved in April 2026, and has successfully mobilised international support through skilful wartime diplomacy. Even the Trump administration, known for its scepticism, now admits that Ukraine ‘has cards’. The country is also drawing closer to the EU as accession talks have finally begun. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s increasingly frequent long-range strikes deep inside Russia are steadily raising the costs of Moscow’s war of aggression.

The EU has welcomed this development as it points towards a future peace favourable to its interests. However, it should not become complacent. 

Russia, while under increasing strain, can still mobilise further resources in an effort to reverse the setbacks it has suffered. Ukraine’s successes have been uneven, and Kyiv will continue to face relentless attacks against its civilian infrastructure designed to break its resolve. These will add to the immense destruction already inflicted on the country. 

To defend itself and, ultimately, to rebuild, Ukraine will continue to rely on partners. Here is where this collection of proposals can offer a way forward, setting out innovative ideas to improve the ways in which the EU, foremost among those partners, can effectively empower Ukraine.

Authored by EUISS Analysts pooling their extensive regional and thematic expertise, these contributions look beyond the immediate challenges of the war. They propose new ways in which the EU can empower Ukraine, explain why these ideas could have a transformative impact, and show how they could be translated into policy by building on existing initiatives.

The collection covers a range of subjects: from building societal resilience to deepening defence-industrial cooperation to strengthen the foundations for defending and deterring Russia; from reconstruction and recovery to Ukraine’s gradual integration into the EU; and from reinforcing international support networks for Ukraine to dismantling Russian influence networks across Africa. 

In each case, the authors’ analysis of Ukraine’s current and future needs, together with an assessment of the EU’s response, paves the way for practical policy recommendations that build on existing opportunities, address systemic weaknesses, and overcome key obstacles.

When they look at the approximately five million Ukrainian citizens now residing in the EU, they see them not just as people who have found refuge from war, but also as a strategic constituency to be engaged to ensure Ukraine’s future resilience and recovery. Likewise when they look at the impressive rebirth of Ukraine’s defence industry, they see not just a sector that merits continued EU support, but also an opportunity to use joint ventures to build stronger and more enduring partnerships. 

Looking ahead, the authors propose practical solutions to the challenges of rebuilding Ukraine, including likely shortages of available funding. To ensure stakeholders’ confidence and trust as well as efficient and fair use of available funds, they advocate the swift completion of a ‘single collector pipeline’ that brings together parallel funding streams within one integrated and transparent digital platform. To complement public funding, they propose new incentives for external investors, combining domestic reforms with external derisking measures to attract more private capital. Safeguarding Ukraine’s long-term prosperity will also require governance reforms that strengthen the rule of law and improve the business environment, as well as modern infrastructure capable of powering up Ukraine’s future economic growth. This is why the authors recommend widening the focus beyond ensuring the continuity of essential energy services in the face of Russia’s sustained attacks to long-term investment in a distributed energy system that can serve as a model for European future energy networks. They also caution that this infrastructure must be protected by robust safeguards to ensure that the involvement of third countries, including China, does not create undesirable dependencies or vulnerabilities to sabotage and espionage. They stress that enhanced support to Ukraine must be accompanied not only by a credible accession perspective, but also by accelerated integration across the functional, political and societal domains ahead of formal accession, firmly anchoring Ukraine in Europe while delivering tangible benefits to its population.

Finally, the authors highlight the key role the EU can play in helping Ukraine to leverage international partnerships for defence and reconstitution. Mindful of the current state of the transatlantic relationship, they argue that the EU should seize the existing window of opportunity to convince the Trump administration to increase pressure on a weakened Russia, and to recognise the strategic and commercial benefits of a just and lasting peace. They point in particular to the scope for expanding defence-industrial cooperation by setting up more weapons production lines in Europe, including in Ukraine. Beyond political divergences that extend well beyond public rhetoric, the authors identify common interests in Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery. They therefore propose to create a compact to at least partially overcome collective action problems and avoid the costly consequences of a failed reconstruction effort. In addition to trying to keep the US invested, they also advocate for establishing a more robust and coherent network to prevent, expose and disrupt Russia’s deceptive recruitment schemes in Africa, thereby reducing the flow of recruits to the frontline, and undermining the Kremlin’s global influence.

The collection covers a wide range of issues, but it does not claim to be exhaustive. Its ambition is to inspire new policies, but also to encourage a more innovative way of thinking about how the EU can empower Ukraine that is firmly grounded in an understanding of where the EU’s key strategic interests lie.

It is mindful of the substantial support that the EU offers to Ukraine, but also of the challenges ahead. 

To date, the EU and its Member States have provided €211.3 billion overall in support (including €3.8 billion windfall revenues from immobilised Russian assets). 

The amount of the EU’s support exceeds that of any other international donor. The US comes a distant second, having provided an estimated €120 billion worth of support, according to the Kiel Institute Ukraine Support Tracker. 

The EU has been able to increase its assistance to offset the winding down of US assistance since 2025. In addition to this increasing financial aid, Europeans have been assisting Ukraine’s military training and civilian security sector reform by means of two CSDP missions – EUMAM (which, at the time of writing, has trained over 93,000 Ukrainian troops) and EUAM. Meanwhile, advancing defence-industrial cooperation and including Kyiv in initiatives such as SAFE and EDIP allows Ukraine – but increasingly also Europeans themselves – to benefit from the blending of capital finance, production capacity and innovation shared among partners in order to better cover their defence needs.

The EU is also looking to the future. It has earmarked €100 billion for further support to Ukraine under the next Multiannual Financial Framework. However, Europe’s fiscal space is shrinking as Member States increase spending on their own defence to deter the mounting threat from Russia, while the US recalibrates its security and defence priorities. The EU is therefore keeping open the option of using immobilised Russian assets in the future to repay the support loan and finance a new reparations loan for Ukraine. Assets immobilised in Member States amount to €209.2 billion, or 72.3 % of the global total.

The reality is that Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery needs will be several times greater than the amount the EU has earmarked for 2028-2034. Member States and other donors can still mobilise additional resources but they are being stretched thin.  Unlocking private capital can provide an important additional source of funding. However, the costs of rebuilding the country are staggering.

EU support will need to continue over a sustained period after a ceasefire is reached and until the now devasted Ukrainian economy is capable of generating sufficient revenue – and comes to resemble the government’s vision of a liberal ‘Economy of the Future’ with sustained growth, foreign direct investment (FDI) exceeding prewar levels and conditions conducive to the eventual return of at least three million Ukrainians from abroad to meet the country’s labour needs. Russia’s war has caused terrible human suffering and vast economic damage. The most recent Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5), undertaken by the European Commission together with the World Bank, the Ukrainian government and the UN and published in February 2026, estimates the country’s reconstruction and recovery needs over the next decade at € 515.3 billion, or three times Ukraine’s nominal GDP. Of this amount, up to 40 % (but no more than that) could be met by the private sector provided necessary governance reforms take place. Much of the damage is due to Russia’s deliberate targeting of Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, which has steadily intensified over time.

Meanwhile, the likelihood of a ceasefire agreement being reached in 2026 is slim. Russia may seek to exploit diplomatic negotiations as a way of achieving its war objectives – in other words, as a continuation of war by other means. However, it can no longer place hopes in the Trump administration as it once did. The conditions each side considers acceptable for a ceasefire continue to differ dramatically, while neither side has the military capacity to achieve a decisive breakthrough on the battlefield. Both Ukraine and Russia now have the capacity to inflict significant damage deep behind enemy lines, but both appear willing to bear the costs of a prolonged war. Ukraine’s ability to strike military infrastructure close to the frontline, as well as logistics hubs and oil refineries deep inside Rusia, has increased sharply, complicating the delivery of Russian supplies to the front, constraining Russia’s petroleum exports, and creating fuel shortages during the the peak summer demand season that extend beyond Moscow to nearly all regions in the country. Illegally occupied Crimea features prominently among the targeted territories. However, Russia maintains missile superiority, while Ukraine struggles to field sufficient air defences. 

The Kremlin may still believe that it can take the whole of Donbas and use it as a springboard for renewed pressure further inland. But neither side is likely to make significant advances on the ground. Both continue to believe, however, that they can improve their position through deep strikes: Ukraine by intensifying pressure on Russia’s fuel supply, and Russia by once again targeting Ukraine’s energy and heating infrastructure as Winter approaches.

This situation is not conducive to a ceasefire in the near future. But neither is it a stalemate. Ukraine is now in a much stronger relative position vis-à-vis Russia than at the beginning of 2026, while the latter’s vulnerabilities are becoming increasingly evident. Russia’s economy is now contracting for the first time since 2023. 

The windfall from the Hormuz crisis offered Moscow a welcome lifeline, but did little more than temporarily plug the holes in an increasingly leaky ship. Signs of war fatigue are becoming more and more visible in Russian society, while even within the elite there are occasional, if fleeting, expressions of discontent  over a war that has claimed the lives of 450 000 Russian soldiers.

This is the moment to increase pressure on the Kremlin and work to unpower it. But the prospect of a quick peace remains as elusive as ever. Defeating Putin’s imperialist project will require a sustained long-term effort, with empowering Ukraine remaining central to that strategy.

Steadfast support by the EU, Ukraine’s key partner, will be essential both to help Ukraine secure a favourable peace agreement, and to manage the aftermath. The post-war period is likely to be characterised by economic malaise, a persistent security deficit and a difficult transition from martial law to a new political ‘normal’. The Kremlin will spare no effort to foment internal instability and drive a wedge between Ukraine and the EU.

Russia-engineered FIMI campaigns will, as they already do at present, persistently and opportunistically exploit insecurities in both Ukraine and the EU, amplify perceptions of incompatible values, and seek to turn citizens against ‘elites’ portrayed as betraying their real interests. The Kremlin will seek both to undermine the enlargement process, and to use that process to undermine the EU and Ukraine.

To make sure it does not succeed, and to safeguard the accession process that anchors the vision of a free and democratic Ukraine in a united Europe, will require robust resilience on both sides.

Ensuring that an empowered Ukraine is on its side, and becomes a Member State down the road, is one of the EU’s core strategic interests in the face of Russia’s efforts to rebuild its empire. Externalising threats that by default are shared by the community of European states is not a realistic option. Empowering Ukraine – and, in doing so, strengthening Europe – is a major undertaking. It requires political resolve, a clear understanding of the challenges ahead and a readiness to confront them head-on, as well as forward-thinking about how this objective can be pursued more effectively and, where possible, at lower cost.