Competing horizons

The EU remains an incumbent heavyweight, but it is largely holding its ground rather than gaining it. It is Africa’s largest trading partner and largest recorded FDI counterpart, as well as the most active source of high-level visits. Among the external actors tracked, the EU is also Africa’s largest provider of official finance, leading among around two-thirds of country-coded recipients, and ranks ahead of the United States in the Middle East. There, the EU also runs the largest goods surplus among the actors analysed, while its Member States are the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping missions. Yet this broad presence is not translating into greater relative weight. Trade shares are broadly flat, and European net ODA to Africa fell by almost a fifth. In infrastructure, European sponsor participation remains substantial, but Chinese-registered suppliers capture a much larger share of the value of foreign World Bank IPF awards associated with infrastructure projects in Africa. At the UN, African states align more often with the EU than with Russia on Ukraine, but most closely with China, India and Türkiye on decolonisation. On international tax governance, African positions are closer to those of China, India and Russia. Europe therefore retains unusually broad and deep-rooted relationships across both regions, while facing growing pressure in strategically important sectors from actors able to concentrate resources in particular markets and countries.

Other major actors are strongest in specific domains. The United States remains the dominant military presence and arms supplier in the Middle East and the Gulf and ranks second among the aid providers tracked in both regions. Its commercial footprint, however, is comparatively modest, and its role as an official bilateral creditor is largely a legacy of earlier lending. China combines broad diplomatic coverage in Africa with strong commercial and infrastructure positions. It is the largest goods-trade partner in the Middle East and the Gulf and the second-largest in Africa, while Chinese-registered suppliers receive most of the foreign World Bank infrastructure-award value analysed in Africa. Yet its financial role is also changing. China remains Africa’s largest official bilateral creditor, but average annual net flows turned negative in 2022–2024 as repayments exceeded new disbursements. Its development-finance model also differs markedly from conventional aid: most recorded commitments are OOF-like rather than ODA-like and are heavily concentrated in infrastructure.

Beyond the United States and China, several actors have carved out distinct niches. Japan stands out among the larger donors for substantially expanding aid in both regions, largely through loans, and became Iraq’s largest selected aid provider in 2022–2024. Gulf engagement is prominent but highly concentrated: the UAE accounts for around 85% of the Gulf’s recorded FDI position in Africa and is the main driver of the GCC’s position as the third-largest trading partner among the actors tracked, while individual Gulf donor profiles vary sharply across regions. Türkiye has the widest diplomatic network in the Middle East, India is the largest external contributor to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, and Russia’s security footprint is increasingly concentrated in private military deployments and a narrower set of arms relationships.

The following analysis traces these patterns across each dimension, asking where the EU’s weight translates into influence and where other actors are redefining the terms of partnership.