Back with a vengeance? Trump, Brussels and the world

How did this happen?

US voters have spoken: Donald J. Trump will be the 47^th President of the United States. He is the first president since Grover Cleveland to serve non-consecutive terms. He is already sure to defeat Kamala Harris by winning at least 270 electoral votes and the key swing states of Georgia, North Carolina and Pennsylvania.

A key reason for Trump’s comeback is the Biden administration’s poor performance in the eyes of US voters. Trump’s campaign focused on criticism of the Democrats’ handling of the economy, especially the increase in the cost of living, as well as the surge in the number of illegal migrants crossing the southern border. He was able to pin responsibility for the wars in Ukraine and Gaza on Biden’s perceived weakness – and also tap into the alienation of many Arab Americans from the Democratic ticket. 

While maintaining a strong hold over white, non-college educated voters, Trump also made inroads among young male voters and minorities.  He has polled better among Black and Hispanic voters than any Republican presidential nominee since 1964. Trump also managed to win over many split-ticket votes: for instance, he claimed North Carolina despite the Democratic candidate for Governor winning the race by more than 10 points.

The Harris campaign also made significant mistakes. Harris was unable to turn the initial surge in enthusiasm following Biden’s withdrawal into a credible and appealing platform. She failed to distance herself from Biden’s unpopular policies and appeal to undecided voters.

What happens now? Foreign policy under Trump 2.0

As we explored in a recent EUISS commentary, Trump’s ‘America First’ vision frames foreign policy primarily as a tool to advance the well-being of US citizens (‘the American worker’) rather than to uphold the international order and support democracy. This approach questions the utility of international institutions and of traditional American alliances, especially in Europe. Trump will approach allies in a transactional way and will reconsider US commitment to European security if he thinks that will help him reduce free-riding or trade imbalances.

Unshakeable

EU exports to and imports from the US throughout past US presidencies, monthly € billion

Data: European Commission, Eurostat, Easy Comext, 2024

Trump will approach allies in a transactional way.

Second, Trump’s ‘Peace Through Strength’ approach will entail ending ‘forever wars’, by which he means the conflicts that broke out under Biden’s presidency, and focusing on the biggest threat to US economic dominance, which is China. Trump will likely seek a way to end the war in Ukraine, potentially by reaching out to Putin and laying the groundwork for a ceasefire – although it is unclear how he would achieve it. In the Middle East, Trump wants to end the wars in Gaza and Lebanon as soon as possible – which, in his view, means allowing Israel to ‘finish the job.’ He will intensify the US focus on China as the biggest threat to America’s reindustrialisation, likely to the detriment of the American commitment to Europe (but not necessarily reassuring US allies in the Indo-Pacific, who are also accused of free-riding).

While much of Trump’s foreign policy will mirror his first term, there will be notable differences. In 2017-21, Trump was constrained by traditional Republican advisors and by Washington’s foreign policy establishment. This time around, he is in firm control of his party, will be surrounded by loyalists, and will seek to remove any bureaucratic hurdles to accomplish his goals.

Moreover, if there is one feature that characterises Trump, it is unpredictability. Trump makes a lot of decisions based on his ‘businessman instinct’, and believes that his ebullient personality will push foreign leaders to reach agreements. His advisors, while loyal, also hold very different positions on certain issues – for instance, Vice-President-elect JD Vance openly opposes continued assistance to Ukraine, while former (and maybe future) Secretary of State Mike Pompeo claims that Trump would lift all restrictions on the type of weapons that Ukraine can use and on the targets it can strike within Russia. This only increases the uncertainty around what we can expect from Trump 2.0.

Arms imports from the US

Share of total imports, %, 2019-23

Data: SIPRI, 2024

What should the EU do?

Given Trump’s aversion to Brussels, his past record and threats to abandon Europe, transatlantic relations will be difficult to navigate. However, the EU faces existential challenges, and it cannot afford to alienate Washington. At the same time, Brussels should not simply cave in to Trump’s demands. It must show that, by continuing to work together, the EU and the US are safer and more prosperous.

If there is a time for Europe to act swiftly, it is now.

Here are five key steps that the EU should prioritise to deal with Trump 2.0:

1. Deliver on key goals: The EU must quickly advance work to accomplish the goals stated in Commission President von der Leyen’s political guidelines:  strengthening European competitiveness, bolstering the EU’s defence industrial base, integrating Ukraine within the Union, and accelerating the enlargement process. If there is a time for Europe to act swiftly, it is now. Implementing these workstrands will also make the EU stronger and a more appealing partner for Washington.

2. Prepare concrete responses: The EU should carefully map out the likely changes in US foreign policy, and the strategic dilemmas that these will pose to the EU, before they take place, so that it can take action swiftly. The fact that the Commission already has a plan to counter a renewed trade war is encouraging. But how about other areas? For instance, if Trump slashes aid to Ukraine, how will EU Member States make up for it? How will NATO and EU Member States ensure credible deterrence in Europe?

3. Proactive outreach: The EU should reach out to the Trump team already during the transition, proposing common approaches – rather than waiting for the new administration to carry out policy decisions unilaterally (such as moving assets from Europe to the Indo-Pacific). To develop a positive relationship with the new administration, the EU should come armed with concrete proposals for transatlantic cooperation, from trade to dealing with China or ensuring deterrence.

4. Rally partners: The EU is not alone in its concerns about a new Trump presidency. The US’s long-standing allies and partners must join ranks to minimise disruptions caused by the new presidency and adopt a unified approach towards Washington. The EU should closely coordinate with NATO, the UK, Norway and Canada to ensure a sustained American commitment to transatlantic security. The EU should also closely align with Indo-Pacific partners, such as Japan, Korea and Australia, on a common approach to China, trade and economic security. Brussels’ proposals to the US will carry greater weight if they are coordinated with other allies.

5. Bring the message beyond DC: Trump’s return to power reflects deeper shifts within the United States: growing isolationism, the re-shoring of strategic industries and a focus on China resonate across both Republican and Democratic electorates. These tendencies are more marked in US states beyond the traditionally pro-European East coast elites. If it wants to influence the future US trajectory, the EU needs to maintain contacts with both sides of the aisle in Congress, and in states that voted for either Trump or Harris. A more extensive outreach will help create allies in key constituencies in the US.