The year 2025 will provide the EU with a new opportunity to strengthen relations with partners in Latin America. In the last decade, under-investment and lack of attention from the EU and the US have created a space for states like China, Iran and Russia to expand their foothold in the region. Now, as the EU seeks to strengthen partners to support its green transition and uphold the international order, many Latin American countries view Brussels with scepticism. However, there are many states in the region that are eager to engage in increased cooperation with the EU and attract its attention. If their interests are ignored, their appetite for increased international engagement might be filled by other actors, and the EU would lose – perhaps for good – the opportunity to build stronger ties with the continent.
To address these issues, the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) organised a closed-door ‘Latin America Day’ to discuss revitalising EU-Latin America cooperation. The event brought together EU policymakers and regional experts in two roundtable discussions. These focused on analysing large-scale geopolitical shifts (namely, the effects of the US presidential elections on Latin America) as well as the involvement of women and communities in peacebuilding efforts in Colombia.
Roundtable 1 – Cross-regional ripple effects: EU-Latin America relations in the wake of the U.S. presidential election
During the 2024 US presidential election campaign, Latin America was often discussed in the context of illegal migration: the need to stop an ‘invasion’ at the Southern border was a key theme of Donald Trump’s campaign. He also spoke of curbing drug trafficking as well as imports of Chinese goods through the Southern border. His foreign policy plan pays more attention to the region than many previous administrations, with an emphasis on ‘migrants, trade and China’. Trump won on 5 November, and is now moving towards implementing this agenda. He has already named Tom Homan as so-called ‘border czar’ to deliver on his promise to deport hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants back to Mexico. Marco Rubio is the first Latino to be nominated as Secretary of State. The president-elect also said he would sign an executive order on Inauguration Day imposing a 25% tariff on all goods coming from Mexico and Canada.
The Trump 2.0 administration will create new challenges for Latin America. Mexico, which has been the number one trading partner of the US since 2023 and the largest source of US imports, has always negotiated trade agreements with Washington – including under the first Trump administration. Even though the relationship between Mexico and the US is likely to experience periods of tension and volatility in the short term, dialogue and negotiations could provide a foundation for long-term cooperation. In the case of Venezuela, two scenarios might be possible. Either the US imposes more sanctions (as during Trump’s first term), or Trump tries to reach a deal with the Latin American country that has been the main source of instability in the region. If the US disengages or does not tackle other issues that are of deep concern for Latin America, the vacuum will be filled by China and Russia, as well as by increasingly powerful non-state actors. Organised criminal groups have expanded their activities, from drugs trade to human trafficking and dealings with pharmaceuticals, and have become much more interconnected with each other, with businesses seeking to cut costs, and with corrupt politicians. The transnational character of organised crime groups requires a transnational approach. Without the US, it could be much more challenging for regional actors to confront these groups. For instance, Colombia –a traditional US ally in South America – could face a more difficult relationship with Washington.
The Trump 2.0 administration could also be an opportunity for the EU. Instead of framing Latin America as a challenge, problem or issue, the EU could take a much more nuanced look at it and perceive it as an opportunity. The EU should not compete with the US or China on their own terms. Instead, the EU should focus on building meaningful partnerships and sustainable relationships with Latin American and Caribbean (CELAC) countries, focusing on trade, investment, and tackling issues of mutual concern. Brussels could therefore present itself as a balancing alternative in an era of great power competition between Washington and Beijing. In doing so, the EU should broaden its security agenda to include the fight against organised crime, and provide solutions to safeguard democracy, institutions, the rule of law, civil society and global justice. It also needs to recognise the importance of engaging with Latin America to safeguard its own interests. Finally, in order to deal with the second Trump administration, the EU and Latin America should pursue three approaches: distinguish between rhetoric and actual policy, focus on what can be changed, and be clear-eyed about their interests.
Roundtable 2 – The role of women in enhancing peace and security in Colombia
While the 2016 peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was a significant milestone, the reality in many rural and remote regions is that conflict has continued due to the presence of dissident guerrilla groups, paramilitary forces, and drug trafficking. Implementation of the agreement is part of a long-term process towards peace and transitional justice, requiring the protection and fulfilment of commitments, alongside enhanced participation of civil society. This could also represent an opportunity for the EU to support the peace process through reinforced ‘peace laboratories’ that foster civil engagement for sustainable peace.
An increased presence of women in negotiations and decision-making could contribute to its success as women are disproportionately affected by the continued violence in some areas. Grassroots efforts illustrate how women are reshaping the security dynamics from the bottom up, in Colombia and other Latin American countries, especially those long affected by conflict. Yet, the drug trade and coca economy continue to flourish after the peace agreement, while security guarantees remain insufficient. In addition, initiatives such as ‘Seeking women’ demonstrate the efforts and struggle of women trying to reconnect with their husbands, brothers, sons and fathers who disappeared during the guerilla conflict. These women organise and demand accountability as well as justice. Initiatives led by Amassuru, a network of more than 700 members from over 20 countries working on Latin American topics, shed light on what women are doing to advance the peace process. By providing seminars and publishing articles as well as organising networking events, Amassuru aims at creating spaces for women in decision-making positions. Such initiatives also show the resilience and mobilisation of communities in addressing ongoing and evolving security challenges and their societal impact.
Concerns remain, however, regarding the implementation of the peace agreement. If women are included in the implementation process, a gender sensitive peace may positively affect human security as well as human rights. The concept of ‘non-repetition’ requires that human rights be protected in order to prevent violations in the future. It also implies that the construction of security does not only depend on security forces, but on a whole-of-society approach. Resources and funding are required to properly implement the peace agreement. While the engagement of local communities in the peace process contributes to better shared understanding, targeted channelling of the funds to reach grassroot organisations appears even more critical. Otherwise, unintended consequences emerging from interventions in illicit economies will hamper implementation efforts. Ahead of the CELAC Summit next year, the EU has an entry point to cooperate with NGOs as well as the Colombian government to help foster effective implementation of the peace agreement. The EU could also further generate a capacity to support initiatives on the ground and support the government’s efforts to implement the peace agreement.
