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## Abbreviations

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<td>AI</td>
<td>Artificial Intelligence</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>African Peace Facility</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
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<td>AU</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>BRI</td>
<td>Belt and Road Initiative</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CARD</td>
<td>Coordinated Annual Review on Defence</td>
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<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
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<td>Capability Development Plan</td>
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<td>CELAC</td>
<td>Community of Latin American and Caribbean States</td>
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<td>CEPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>Directorate-General</td>
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<td>European Union Force</td>
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<td>European Union Global Strategy</td>
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<td>EUISS</td>
<td>European Union Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission</td>
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<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMM</td>
<td>European Union Monitoring Mission</td>
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<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>European Union Maritime Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<td>European Union Training Mission</td>
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<td>UN Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces</td>
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<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance</td>
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<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
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<td>JCPOA</td>
<td>Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</td>
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<td>JMC</td>
<td>Joint Ministerial Committee</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KSF</td>
<td>Kosovo Security Force</td>
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<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
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<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Macro-Financial Assistance</td>
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<td>MFC</td>
<td>Mission Force Commander</td>
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<td>MFF</td>
<td>Multiannual Financial Framework</td>
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<td>Multinational Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>Multinational Battalion</td>
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<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>Military Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NDICI</td>
<td>Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<td>National Implementation Plans</td>
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<td>ODIHR</td>
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<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operation Headquarters</td>
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<td>OPCW</td>
<td>Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PACE</td>
<td>Parallel and Coordinated Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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**Country codes**

- **AT**: Austria
- **BE**: Belgium
- **BG**: Bulgaria
- **CY**: Cyprus
- **CZ**: Czech Republic
- **DK**: Denmark
- **DE**: Germany
- **EE**: Estonia
- **EL**: Greece
- **ES**: Spain
- **FI**: Finland
- **FR**: France
- **HR**: Croatia
- **HU**: Hungary
- **IE**: Ireland
- **IT**: Italy
- **LV**: Latvia
- **LT**: Lithuania
- **LU**: Luxembourg
- **MT**: Malta
- **NL**: Netherlands
- **PL**: Poland
- **PT**: Portugal
- **RO**: Romania
- **SE**: Sweden
- **SI**: Slovenia
- **SK**: Slovakia
- **UK**: United Kingdom
Preface

by

FEDERICA MOGHERINI
High Representative for the Union’s Foreign and Security Policy
Vice-President of the European Commission

In 2018, the need for a strong and united Europe in global affairs became even clearer than before. Great power competition is now a leading trend in world politics. The foundations of the multilateral system have been challenged – concretely and consistently. We see the risk of a new ‘proliferation age’: international treaties for non-proliferation and disarmament have been openly violated, with the threat of new arms races and new conflicts in our very region.

We Europeans are now faced with a clear alternative. We can team up to defend our interests and our values, and by doing so, we can be a point of reference for everyone in the world who still believes that multilateralism is a better way. Or we can let others shape the new global disorder, impose the “law of the jungle” and make all of us more insecure.

In 2018, it became clear that many around the world look at Europe and expect us to be the point of reference the world needs. More and more, we feel the responsibility that rests with us. In these years, we have tried to live up to that responsibility in our daily work – from our engagement to save the nuclear deal with Iran, to climate action; from the new generations of trade deals that we struck, to our support to the United Nations and UN agencies. We have not been alone in that task: many of our partnerships are now stronger than they have ever been. Yet, today we have become an indispensable partner for anyone who wants to reverse the trend and seek a cooperative solution to our world’s crises.

Many of the ideas that shaped our Global Strategy for foreign and security policy have come to fruition. First of all, the concept of strategic autonomy. Both our partners and our citizens are asking us to take greater responsibility for our common security. Strategic autonomy is about fulfilling Europe’s vocation as a force for peace.

In 2018, with our member states we approved a new set of projects in the framework of our Permanent Structured Cooperation on defence – from drones to a European school of intelligence, from cyber-security to aerospace. These projects will build joint capacities that none of our member states could develop alone in order to face our complex security environment.

In 2018, we added a ‘civilian compact’ to our work on security and defence. Our civilian missions are already a European pride – and are essential to European security. We train policemen, we work with public prosecutors and we support security sector reform – making our partner countries more stable and more resilient. With the new civilian compact we will invest even more in this, with new capabilities and a shorter reaction time.
While we strengthened our capacity to act autonomously, we also made clear that cooperation is always Europe’s first choice. In these years we have invested like never before in our partnership with NATO, we have strengthened our cooperation with the UN and UN peacekeepers, we have supported African-led initiatives in the Sahel and against Boko Haram, we have expanded our work to train and equip the security forces of our partner countries. This is what we call ‘cooperative autonomy’.

Beyond security issues, all our foreign policy has been driven by the same approach, based on partnership and multilateralism: we have always joined forces with those who face the same challenges and share the same goals as us; and we have always tried to find win–win solutions with those who disagree with us.

Europe is a global power. But being a power does not mean that we can magically solve all the issues of our times, and do it all alone. No global power can do that. This partnership approach has, for instance, reshaped our relationship with Africa and with the African Union – towards a true partnership of equals.

Multilateralism has been at the centre of our work to preventing and solving conflicts – because this is the only way to find sustainable solutions to the problems of our times. We have put our convening power to the service of multilateralism, trying to bring together the relevant regional and global powers. This is how we achieved the nuclear deal with Iran. It was the original idea when we set up the International Syria Support Group, and later, with the three Brussels Conferences on Syria. It is why we invested so much in the Middle East Quartet. It is the concept behind the International Contact Group on Venezuela, the Quartet for Libya, and the regional gatherings that we organised on Afghanistan. In all these cases, we have always made clear that the United Nations is the ultimate framework, the centre of gravity for all multilateral work.

Yes, we have been swimming against the tide – because we believe this is in our interest and the right thing to do. We have tried to keep thinking strategically, instead of giving in to the mood of the moment. In fact, all these ideas had already emerged three years ago, during the Europe-wide conversation that led to the Global Strategy. The EUISS played a crucial part in that process, and today it is still providing an invaluable contribution to our foreign policy. The EUISS has helped us explore the different practical implications of a strategic concept, and analyse the latest trends in global politics. In a world where the unthinkable has very often turned into reality, the EUISS has kept scanning the horizon and thinking outside of the box. We are not fortune-tellers. Yet we have a duty to look beyond the day-to-day business, and to try and prevent the gloomiest scenarios from taking place. Three years ago the Global Strategy identified all the main challenges of our times. Three years on, it is clear that the answer to these challenges lies in a united Europe.
Introduction

Much like the year before, 2018 was testing for the European Union (EU). Tensions in the transatlantic relationship continued, with key figures from President Trump’s administration calling into question the very international order that had given life to the EU. In fact, in the same week that Federica Mogherini, High Representative/Vice President of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy (HR/VP), was speaking about preserving the multilateral system in the US’ her counterpart Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo was in Brussels extolling the virtues of the nation state and berating multilateral institutions such as the EU. Even though the EU and the US cooperated on cyber and hybrid threats in 2018, a number of worrying developments occurred throughout the year. For example, in October President Trump decided to begin the US’ withdrawal from the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). In June, the US imposed tariffs on EU steel and aluminium imports and, at the end of the year, the Trump administration even temporarily downgraded the status of the EU Delegation to the US in Washington, DC. Additionally, the US government announced its withdrawal from the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in a year when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights celebrated its 70th anniversary.

There was also disagreement between the US president and his European counterparts over alliance management within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European security more broadly. In addition to the destabilising effects of the US’ planned withdrawal from the INF treaty, President Trump used the NATO Brussels summit in July to berate Germany for pursuing the Nord Stream II pipeline project. He also called on NATO’s European members to not only meet their 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) defence spending pledge but to increase this target to 4% of GDP over time. This, combined with the ambiguous comments on the US’ commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty that the US president made in July, and his bilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on 16 July in Helsinki, Finland, raised concerns among many European allies and EU member states about a further deterioration in the transatlantic relationship. In mid-July, the American president also referred to...
the EU as a “foe” in relation to trade and economic policy. These and other actions by the US president served as the backdrop against which both the leaders of France and Germany re-ignited appeals for a “European army” and greater EU strategic autonomy in November. Backing up these calls, and with a view to forging a European strategic culture, a French-led ‘European Intervention Initiative’ (EI2) was launched on 25 June with initial support from nine other European countries.

Despite serious concerns about the transatlantic relationship, the EU persevered with multilateralism in key areas including the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for Iran’s nuclear activities. This was especially bold given the re-imposition of US sanctions and the need for the EU to eventually initiate a ‘Blocking Statute’ to mitigate the subsequent costs on EU companies doing business in Iran. In relation to key partners, the EU and Japan announced the full ratification of the newly negotiated economic partnership agreement in December, following a political agreement made in July during the EU-Japan Summit. In October, the EU and Singapore signed free trade and investment protection agreements and similar arrangements were reached with Mexico in April. The EU also worked closely with Canada in relation to the Canada–EU Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) in November and it announced the launch of trade talks with Australia in June.

Furthermore, in September the European Commission proposed an ‘Africa – Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs’ to assist with challenges such as development, trade and migration in Africa. The EU also took over the chairmanship of the Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds during the course of the year. With a view to enhancing its relationship with the UN, in September the Council of the EU endorsed the UN–EU Strategic Partnership on Peace Operations and Crisis Management for 2019–2021 with eight specific objectives related to Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Security Sector Reform (SSR) and crisis management capacity building. Finally, the EU fully supported the UN Climate Change Conference that took place in Katowice, Poland, in December.

Even with such efforts, however, the EU faced several crises in its neighbourhood and with regard to its internal security. Despite a historic peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea and improvements in Iraq in July, instability in the Sahel region, Yemen and Syria continued and the second EU–UN conference on the ‘Future of Syria and the Region’ in April highlighted the extent of the security challenges facing the Middle East. Libya continued to be a source of instability with attacks in Benghazi in January, escalating violence in Tripoli in September and a terror attack on the Libyan foreign ministry in December. Furthermore, in spite of successful EU measures to manage migration routes into Europe during 2018, migration continued to be a contentious policy issue. For example, the December intergovernmental Global Compact (GCM) for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in Marrakech, Morocco, highlighted international disagreements (including between several EU member states) over the matter.

In 2018, a number of EU member states were victims of terrorist, extremist and cyber-attacks. For example, there were terror-related attacks in Amsterdam...

(Netherlands); Brussels and Liège (Belgium); Cologne (Germany); Cornellà de Llobregat (Spain); Carcassonne, Paris, Strasbourg and Trèbes (France); Vienna (Austria) and London (United Kingdom). Attacks perpetrated by political extremists and anarchists took place in Athens and Thessaloniki (Greece); Berlin (Germany); Terrassa (Spain) and Macerata, Villorba and Roveré della Luna (Italy). Finally, several EU member states were subjected to cyber-attacks during 2018, which were suspected to originate from China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and other unknown sources. For example, in December it was reported that an attack using similar methods to China’s military had hacked the diplomatic communications of several EU institutions.9

2018 was a generally positive year for the Western Balkans. In April, the EU welcomed the steps taken by North Macedonia (then called the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and Albania to reform and the HR/VP subsequently recommended that the European Commission open accession negotiations with the two countries. The Sofia Declaration of 17 May gave further impetus to Western Balkan leaders to continue reforms and adhere to the principles of democracy and the rule of law.10 However, by the end of the year tensions escalated between Serbia and Kosovo11 following a decision by the Kosovo government to impose taxes on goods from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in November and the Kosovo parliament’s approval of a plan to create a 5,000-strong standing army.

Russia’s activities more generally – but specifically in Ukraine – raised serious concerns. On 4 March 2018, the EU expressed its shock at the use of a military-grade nerve agent in Salisbury, UK, and it agreed with the UK government’s assessment ‘that it is highly likely that the Russian Federation is responsible and that there is no plausible alternative explanation’ for the attack.12 In April, a cyber operation conducted by the Russian military intelligence service (GRU) on the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was disrupted by British and Dutch intelligence services.13 Findings made public in July by the Joint Investigation Team into the tragic downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 provided further evidence that the ‘Buk’ missile installation used to shoot down the flight four years earlier ‘belonged beyond doubt to the armed forces of the Russian Federation’.14 Finally, Russia yet again violated Ukraine’s sovereign territory by opening the Kerch bridge to the Crimean peninsula in May and blockading the Azov Sea and Kerch Strait in November, seizing Ukrainian naval vessels and personnel in the process.

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11 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
The process of the UK’s departure from the EU continued throughout 2018 with the agreement on the terms of the UK’s withdrawal signed on 25 November. Throughout the negotiations, the UK government stated that it would remain unconditionally committed to European security. Indeed, in a presentation published in May, the UK government made clear that it would like to develop cooperation with the EU on internal and external security matters after its departure from the Union. At a high-level conference organised by the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in May the HR/VP and the European Commission’s chief Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier, reciprocally made clear that the EU is committed to ensuring as close a cooperation as possible on security and defence post-2019. British Prime Minister Theresa May postponed a planned vote by the House of Commons on the Article 50 withdrawal agreement on 12 December 2018.

For all the EU’s challenges, however, 2018 saw continued progress on security and defence. Indeed, two years after the publication of the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) the EU ended 2018 having enhanced its civilian crisis management capacities under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); it reviewed its military command and control structures through the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC); it initiated numerous Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) defence projects; it started to synchronise defence planning through the first full trial run of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD); it boosted defence investment by funding defence research projects via the European Defence Fund (EDF); it revised its capability development priorities through the Capability Development Plan (CDP); it continued to work on easing military mobility; and it remained committed to EU–NATO cooperation by signing a second Joint Declaration in July. More specifically, in 2018 a total of 34 defence projects under PESCO were initiated with a first wave of 17 projects agreed in March and a second wave of a further 17 projects adopted in November.

Additionally, a new off-budget initiative called the European Peace Facility (EPF), designed to support military operations and military assistance, was unveiled by the HR/VP in June. The EU also enhanced its efforts on non-conventional security challenges with the release of an Action Plan on Disinformation in December, a Cyber Defence Policy Framework in November and a new strategy for technology domains such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) in April. Finally, ongoing discussions about the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027 were an important aspect of the work on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP during the year. On 2 May, the European Commission published its proposals for the MFF following the European Parliament’s own resolution on the MFF on 14 March. Under the Commission’s proposal for funding from 2021–2027, an amount of €89.2 billion is to be dedicated to the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), €21.3 billion for border management, €16 billion for the EU space programme, €13 billion for defence investments under the EDF, €11.3 billion for migration and asylum, €11 billion for humanitarian aid and €6.5 billion for military mobility.

These and other policy developments in 2018 formed part of the efforts of both the Bulgarian and Austrian six-month rotating Presidencies of the Council of the EU. Bulgaria started its Presidency in the first half of the year (January to June) under the slogan ‘United We Stand Strong’ and it focused on the Western Balkans and attaining agreement on an important preparatory aspect of the EDF, as well as pushing forward efforts on military mobility. When Austria took up the Presidency (July to December) it continued the work on the Western Balkans but it also focused on migration, asylum and border management. Under the slogan ‘A Europe that Protects’, Austria steered agreement on the second batch of PESCO projects and it worked to ensure agreement on future financing for the EDF post–2020.

Overall, therefore, major questions about the resilience of the multilateral international order under the Trump presidency continued to affect the EU in 2018. In combination with concerns over the rise of China and Russia’s actions, the current US diplomacy and strategic thinking has fuelled greater concern for strategic autonomy in the EU in areas such as external action, security and defence, space and even finance and trade. Despite some reservations in certain EU member states about the definition of strategic autonomy, 2018 saw a host of EU political leaders call for greater autonomy for the EU. For example, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker argued in his 2018 State of the Union speech that “the geopolitical situation makes this Europe’s hour: the time for European sovereignty has come”. The combination of global uncertainty and greater efforts in security and defence meant that strategic autonomy was undoubtedly the EU’s leitmotif in 2018.

The 2019 Yearbook

As per previous editions, the main task of the 2019 Yearbook of European Security is to provide an overview of events in 2018 that were significant for European security. In this respect, the Yearbook focuses on a range of security challenges and it traces the actions of the EU’s CFSP and CSDP during the course of 2018. This year’s edition of the Yearbook contains many of the novel features introduced last year including region- and issue-specific sections, content-centric timelines and key document sources, information boxes, key data and an index. In keeping with a structure set by last year’s edition of the Yearbook, data visuals are embedded in the body of the text and data tables and sources are listed in the Annex.

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The 2019 Yearbook is structured into two major parts. Part one focuses on the CFSP and the relevant sections are organised in terms of the geographical dimensions of EU external action in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods and the wider world. Part two concentrates on the CSDP with a special focus on CSDP missions and operations and policies such as the EDF, PESCO and EU–NATO relations. Information on EU financial instruments and restrictive measures have been integrated into each geographical and thematic section of the Yearbook. In this way, this year’s edition adopts an integrated approach to how it structures data and information.

As ever, this Yearbook has profited from the input of colleagues at the EUISS including Giovanni Faleg, Florence Gaub, Gustav Lindstrom, Eva Pejsova, Stanislav Secrieru, Marius Troost and Ard Vogelsang. Special thanks go to John-Joseph Wilkins for tirelessly editing the whole text and to Christian Dietrich for his creative work on the data visuals. Finally, Federica Fazio should be thanked for her data collection efforts and for her written contributions to key sections of the book.

Regarding data, the author thanks the Council of the EU, the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) (especially the EU Military Staff (EUMS)), the European Defence Agency (EDA), NATO and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The author also acknowledges the support of colleagues from fellow EU bodies and institutions for their advice and feedback. Finally, HR/VP Federica Mogherini and her cabinet should be thanked for their continued and consistent support, too. Of course, all faults lie with the author.
COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
Libya saw conflict throughout the year. On 23 January, 27 people (including civilians and military personnel) were killed in Benghazi following the detonation of twin car bombs. This incident was followed on 2 May by a terrorist attack in Tripoli launched by Daesh on the Libyan High National Electoral Commission, which is responsible for supporting the development of legitimate institutions in Libya: 12 people lost their lives and dozens more were injured following the assault with guns and explosive belts. Then on Christmas Day, three people were killed following a terrorist attack – claimed by Daesh – on the Libyan foreign ministry.

In view of the persisting political instability, on 21 March the Council of the EU decided to extend travel bans as well as assets and economic resources freezes in place against three individuals for a further period of six months, until 20 October 2018. A further extension of six months, until 2 April 2019, was agreed on 28 September. In addition, on 14 June, the Council transposed into EU law sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council (UNSC) Committee on 7 June, imposing travel bans and assets freezes against six human traffickers and smugglers operating in Libya.

In contravention of multiple UNSC Resolutions, certain actors in Libya began in June to call for exports of oil from eastern terminals outside of legally permissible methods. Under relevant UN Resolutions, oil in Libya can only be traded through the Libyan National Oil Corporation, the revenue of which is accrued by the central bank of Libya. In support of the internationally recognised government, the EU and the UN both condemned these reports. Indeed, one of EUNAVFOR Sophia’s mandated objectives is to survey and collect information on illegal exports and trafficking of oil from Libya. Additionally, since April 2017 the EU has provided Libya with €237 million through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (ETFA) to support basic services in the country.

On 21 December 2018, European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) Operation Sophia’s mandate was extended until March 2019 so that it could continue its mission of disrupting the business models of migrant smugglers and human traffickers in the southern central Mediterranean, as well as training the Libyan coastguard and navy and carrying out other maritime security tasks. This followed a decision on 14 May 2018 to create a crime information cell within the operation to improve coordination on law enforcement matters with EU Agencies such as Frontex and Europol. Following this decision, a joint visit of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC) to the operational headquarters (OHQ) of Operation Sophia on 2 July marked the third anniversary of the operation. On 13 September, Rear Admiral Stefano Turchetto took over the position of force commander from Rear Admiral Alberto Maffeis. The exchange of the force commander was not the only rotation during the operation: new operation flagships entered into action in February (the Italian ITS San Giusto replaced another Italian vessel, ITS Etna) and in August (ITS San Giusto was then replaced by the Italian vessel ITS San Marco).

Much hope was placed in the International Conference on Libya, held on 29 May in Paris, France (also known as the Paris Summit). The conference was hosted by France and it brought together four rival political and military leaders from Libya, as well as international partners such as the EU and the UN. The meeting aimed to ensure that local and international partners agreed to a common political roadmap that would end in UN-backed elections on 10 December. On 12–13 November, Italy then convened the Palermo Conference in a bid to reach an agreement on a political solution following continued fighting between rival factions and the internationally recognised government during the summer. The planned December elections were never held, however. Instead, on 8 November the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ghassan Salamé, presented a new action plan to the UNSC.5

Migration continued to be an issue for the EU in 2018, although the numbers of those travelling to Europe had greatly diminished: 150,000 people arrived in the EU in 2018 compared to the over 1 million that did so in 2015.6 2018 ended with a UN-negotiated non-legally binding Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) to ensure a minimum level of security for migrants and for the timely and reliable collection of data on migration levels and flows. The conference, held in Marrakech, Morocco, was supported by the EU institutions in its earliest stages. However, a number of EU member states decided not to attend the GCM conference on 10–11 December. With financial support from the EU, bodies such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

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managed to evacuate over 1,300 refugees from Libya and assist 15,000 migrants to voluntarily return to their homes from Libya.7

**EU financial support**

Since 2004, the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) has been applied to promote democracy and the progressive economic integration of EU partner countries. The ENI covers 16 countries including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to the east and Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine*, Syria (currently suspended) and Tunisia to the south. The ENI has a budget allocation of €15.43 billion for the period 2014–2020.

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) assists with the development and consolidation of democracy, rule of law and human rights across the world. Unlike many other EU financial instruments, the EIDHR covers civil society organisations and human rights defenders. Such organisations receive 90% of the funding whereas the remaining 10% goes to international organisations. For the period 2014–2020, the EIDHR is endowed with a €1.33 billion budget.

* This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a state of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the member states on this issue.

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Cooperation between the EU and Tunisia centred on elections, civil protection, disaster management and development. There were protests in Tunisia throughout 2018 and in some cases this led to violence (a woman blew herself up in central Tunis on 29 October, for example, in an incident which wounded around 80 people). Following an invitation by the Tunisian Independent High Authority for the Elections, the EU decided to deploy an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to the country for the municipal elections that took place on 6 May 2018, with 28 observers deployed from mid-April across Tunisia.

With regard to Egypt, the EU continued to reiterate its opposition to the deteriorating human rights situation in the country. During the course of 2018, a number of arrests of human rights defenders, activists and bloggers occurred and in mid-September a mass trial took place under which 75 death penalties were confirmed.8 The EU also expressed its concern about the manner in which presidential elections were held on 26–28 March 2018. Not only were the elections held during a state of emergency (a nationwide state of emergency had yet again been declared in April 2017), but it took place during a period which saw serious restrictions on freedom of expression. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was re-elected president with 97% of the vote despite a turnout of 41.5% (in 2014, the turnout was 47%).9 On 21 March 2018, the Council

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extended the sanctions regime in place against Egypt for another year, until 21 March 2019\(^{10}\). The sanctions were adopted on 21 March 2011 and include freezes of funds and economic resources against natural and legal persons, entities and bodies responsible for the misappropriation of Egyptian state funds.

**FIGURE 1 | EU action in North Africa**

* Figures for 2018  
** Figures to date  
*** Figures since 2014  
**** Figures for 2017-2020

Libya: Figure only for 2017 under the ‘Special Measure’ for Libya  
Note: does not include pan-regional projects

Data: Council of the EU, European External Action Service, European Commission, 2018/2019

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Middle East

There was continued violence in the Middle East during 2018: in March, a bomb attack which struck the convoy of Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah left seven people wounded. The day after Israel celebrated the anniversary of its Declaration of Independence, on 15 May there were Palestinian protests as part of the Nakba (catastrophe) Day, which led to a loss of life, including children. At the end of the month,

Palestinian militants from Gaza fired rockets and mortars towards Israel. Further such rocket fire was reported on 16 October (hitting the city of Be’er Sheva), which triggered a response by Israel that resulted in 20 targets being struck in Gaza. An intensification of exchanges of fire and violence occurred throughout October and November with multiple deaths and casualties registered.

On 18 September, the EU took the decision to appoint a new Special Representative for the Middle East. Susanna Terstal, a Dutch diplomat with many years of experience, was appointed until 29 February 2020 and is responsible for contributing to a solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict based on a two-state settlement. As part of the EU’s contribution to stability in the Middle East, the Union continued to support the Palestinian Authority with salary and social security payments. Despite the US decision to withdraw funding from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the EU dedicated €82 million to the Agency in 2018 to support Palestinian refugees.\footnote{Delegation of the EU to Lebanon, “The European Union Reaffirms its Support to UNRWA”, Beirut, September 13, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon%20en/50931/The%20European%20Union%20Reaffirms%20its%20Support%20to%20UNRWA.}

\textbf{EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah}

In the Palestinian territories, the Council decided to extend the mission mandates of both the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) COPPS and the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah at the beginning of July 2018. EUPOL COPPS is the EU’s police and rule of law mission that has been assisting the Palestinian Authority since January 2006. The Council extended the mission from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 and it allocated €12.667 million to aid the missions’ efforts. EUBAM Rafah is the EU’s border assistance mission at the Rafah Crossing Point and it has been active since November 2005. The mission was extended by the Council until 30 June 2019 and, to this end, its budget amounts to €2.04 million for this period.*


Obviously, there was a lot of attention paid to the Syrian crisis, too – a conflict that was in its eighth year in 2018. The year began with an EU announcement that further individuals from Syria had been added to the sanctions list. On 26 February, the Council of the EU added the minister of industry (Mohamed Mazen Ali Yousef) and the minister of information (Imad Abdullah Sara) of the Syrian government to the list – a total of 256 persons are on the list so far, and a further 67 entities have been targeted by an assets freeze.\footnote{Council of the EU, “Syria: EU Adds Two New Ministers to Sanctions List”, Brussels, February 26, 2018, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/02/26/syria-eu-adds-two-new-ministers-to-sanctions-list/; Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2018/284 of 26 February 2018 implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018D0284&qid=1551971184587&from=EN.}

Additionally, on 19 March the EU sanctioned three scientists and one high-ranking military officer for their role in the development and use of chemical weapons against the Syrian population.\footnote{Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2018/421 of 19 March 2018 implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018D0421&qid=1551971184587&from=EN.} Indeed, at the UN Human Rights Council in
March the EU spoke about the devastating humanitarian situation in Eastern Ghouta, Syria, where up to 3 million vulnerable people were trapped in the besieged region.\textsuperscript{14} Hundreds of women, children and civilians were being deliberately targeted (including with chemical weapons in April in Douma) by the Syrian army. In response to the use of chemical weapons and to prevent the further use of chemical substances by the Syrian regime, France, the UK and the US conducted airstrikes against facilities in the country in mid-April. Further sanctions followed on 28 May when the Council extended the sanctions regime in place against Syria for another year, until 1 June 2019.\textsuperscript{15} On 16 July, the Council added one more person to the list of EU-sanctioned persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Daesh.\textsuperscript{16}

On 24–25 April 2018, Brussels played host to the second EU–UN chaired Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region. The conference led to pledges worth €3.5 billion for 2018 and €2.7 billion for 2019–2020 by the 86 delegations that were present\textsuperscript{17} and some international financial institutions and donors announced loans worth €17.2 billion.\textsuperscript{18} On 29 June, the European Council announced an additional €3 billion in support of refugees based in Turkey.

**EU–League of Arab States (LAS) relations**

The EU continued to build its diplomatic relations with the LAS. The HR/VP was present for the 29th summit of the LAS on 15 April and called on members to assist the Union with resolving the crises in Syria and Israel–Palestine. During the summit, the HR/VP thanked the LAS for the dialogue over these and other crises such as in Libya. On 14 December 2018, President of the European Council Donald Tusk called for a meeting between the EU and the LAS in February 2019. The meeting was proposed to discuss the issues of migration and counter-terrorism, as well as developments in the region throughout the year: not only did the United Arab Emirates (UAE) decide to reopen their embassy in Syria in late December, there was also talk of re-admitting Syria to the LAS by some Arab states.


Given the presence of external actors such as Russia in Syria, there was disgruntlement when the Syrian regime decided to establish diplomatic relations with the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at the end of May. Turkey also caused concern at the end of the year, following reports that Ankara had undertaken military operations in northeast Syria in December (the EU pointed out that such actions could...
undermine the efforts of the Global Coalition against Daesh). Furthermore, on 17 September Russia and Turkey reached a bilateral agreement on creating a de-militarised buffer zone in the Idlib governorate.

One country that the EU cultivated closer relations with was Lebanon. The year began with support for Lebanon’s armed forces and internal security services: on 15 March in Rome, Italy, a ministerial meeting was held under the auspices of the International Support Group for Lebanon (ISG). Subsequently, the EU pledged €50 million to support security in Lebanon until 2020 and a further €3.5 million was given to improve security at the international airport in Beirut. Since 2006, the Union has provided some €85 million for security in Lebanon and European armed forces have taken part in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mission to the country. Furthermore, not only did the EU pledge more investment support for Lebanon following the Paris CEDRE (Conférence économique pour le développement, par les réformes et avec les entreprises) conference in April, but the Union assisted Lebanon with the country’s first parliamentary elections in nine years on 6 May. An EU EOM was deployed to the country on 27 March, and 130 EU observers were present on election day. Finally, Lebanon hosts over 1 million refugees from Syria and has been hit hard by the Syrian crisis given its geographical proximity to the conflict. To address this fact, since 2011 the EU has supported Lebanon with over €1.6 billion to alleviate the situation.

One of the EU’s newest missions, the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) to Iraq was extended on 15 October by the Council until 17 April 2020. Accordingly, the Council agreed a budget worth €64.8 million to cover the period 18 October 2018 to 17 April 2020. Furthermore, the mission’s mandate was expanded to include security sector reform tasks, as well as countering terrorism and organised crime and the looting of cultural heritage. On 22 November 2018, EUAM Iraq celebrated its first anniversary in Baghdad with EU senior officials and interlocutors from the Iraqi office of the national security adviser and the ministry of the interior present.

In Iraq, the EU continued to support stability in the country throughout 2018 with measures such as supporting the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to

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de-mine and to remove hazardous explosives and improvised explosive materials. The year began with a positive message in January following the news that Daesh had been defeated on Iraqi territory. The EU is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter Daesh and following this news, the Union confirmed its intention to support political stability in the country. In addition to the presence of EUAM Iraq, the EU adopted a new strategy for Iraq on 22 January with a view to supporting the country with its humanitarian, stabilisation, security and political reform agenda. Iraq is home to over 11 million people in need of humanitarian assistance and there are 3 million internally displaced persons in the country (including 246,000 refugees from Syria). Over the past three years, the EU has invested approximately €3.5 billion in Iraq for humanitarian assistance, development and stabilisation and in 2018, the Union pledged a further €400 million to support reconstruction. Despite the security context, the EU welcomed the formation of a new government and the election of a President Barham Salih and the appointment of Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi in October.

In Iran, the year began with the outbreak of demonstrations in the country which led to an uptick in violence and the loss of life. The EU urged the Iranian government to respect freedom of expression and fundamental rights and to refrain from the use of violence. In response to these human rights breaches, on 12 April 2018 the Council decided to extend the sanctions regime in place against Teheran for another year, until 13 April 2019. The measures were first adopted on 12 April 2011 and include travel bans and assets freezes against 82 individuals and one entity, as well as a ban on exports of equipment which might be used for purposes of internal repression or telecommunications monitoring.

Furthermore, the ongoing implementation of the JCPOA was coloured by decisions taken across the Atlantic during 2018. Despite the continued commitment of the EU, the E4 (France, Germany, Italy and the UK), China and Russia to the JCPOA and several confirmations by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran is honouring its commitments, on 8 May US President Donald Trump decided to withdraw the US from the JCPOA. A consequence of this decision was the re-imposition of US sanctions on Iran on 5 November, which not only affected some 700 economic operators of Iranian origin but also European firms operating in the country. In response, the EU and E4 amended the Blocking Statute on 7 August and began work on establishing a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The updated Blocking Statute safeguards the economic interests of EU operators by allowing these actors to recover damages arising from US extraterritorial sanctions — thereby nullifying the effect of US restrictive measures. Despite warnings by President Trump not to circumvent US sanctions, the SPV allows for legitimate trade between the EU and Iran by creating a euro-denominated ‘clearing house’ that bypasses both US sanctions and US financial markets.

The European Development Fund (FED) was created in 1957 and launched in 1959 and is the EU's main financial instrument for providing development aid to Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to overseas countries and territories (OCTs). For the period 2014–2020, the FED has a budget of €30.5 billion (the Fund is not part of the EU budget and has been created by an intergovernmental agreement). Part of the FED is dedicated to Africa through the African Peace Facility (APF). For the period 2017–2018, the APF has a budget line of €592 million and supports African-led peace support operations, the African peace and security architecture and the Africa early response mechanism. Furthermore, the Pan–African Programme (PAP) supports the joint EU–Africa strategy and is funded under the EU’s Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). The PAP was allocated €845 million for the period 2014–2020.

EU humanitarian aid aims to support the victims of natural or man-made disasters and the principles of humanitarianism. Humanitarian aid is managed by Directorate-General (DG) for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) of the European Commission. The budgetary allocation for the period 2014–2020 stands at €6.62 billion for the humanitarian aid instrument. The majority of EU humanitarian aid support goes to Africa (43% in 2018) and the Middle East (32%).

The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) is designed to assist EU efforts on crisis response, conflict prevention, peacebuilding and crisis preparedness. From 2014–2020, the IcSP had a budget allocation of €2.3 billion and it currently manages approximately 200 projects in over 75 countries.

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) was set up in 2015 to address the root causes of irregular migration and displacement. To date, the EUTF has supported 164 programmes in North Africa, the Sahel, the Lake Chad region and the Horn of Africa with a total financial envelope of €3.06 billion. In June 2018, a further €461 million was dedicated to the North Africa window for 19 specific programmes.

The European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) was set up in September 2017 as one of three pillars (financing, technical assistance and policy dialogue) under the EU’s External Investment Plan (EIP). The EFSD, as the financing pillar, works to enhance cooperation with third countries in Africa and the eastern and southern neighbourhoods as part of the European migration agenda. An EFSD guarantee fund of €1.5 billion blends with the Africa Investment Platform (AIP) and the Neighbourhood Investment Platform (NIP) – with the latter two amounting to €2.6 billion. On 11 July 2018, the European Commission announced that in 2017 the EFSD led to investments worth €1.3 billion for 52 blending projects (30 in sub-Saharan Africa and 22 in the EU neighbourhood), which leveraged a total €10.6 billion.
Finally, as part of the request for a future MFF for 2021-2027, the European Commission called for a NDICI in June 2018 with a proposed overall budget of €89.2 billion. €32 billion of this amount is foreseen for sub-Saharan Africa to tackle issues such as poverty, gender rights, economic growth, the rule of law, human rights, good governance, environment, migration, peace and stability and more.*****

* In order not to cause confusion with the European Defence Fund (EDF), we use the French acronym for the European Development Fund.


Gulf region

Saudi Arabia became an unfortunate focus of attention during 2018. The circumstances surrounding the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, on 2 October were a particular cause for consternation. In mid-October, the Council of the EU called for a full, credible and transparent investigation into Khashoggi’s disappearance and murder. Although authorities in Saudi Arabia started to issue driving licences to women in June, and despite the fact that the country was the victim of several missile attacks by Houthi rebels in March, the death of Khashoggi overshadowed EU–Saudi relations. An official announcement by the Saudi authorities on 15 November that a judicial process was underway looking into the murder did not answer the many questions posed by the EU and other international partners.

EU-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) relations

The GCC was negatively affected in 2018 by the blockade of Qatar by some of the Gulf states and other regional players since June 2017. The EU, the GCC’s largest trading partner in 2018, not only expressed hope that Kuwaiti-led mediation efforts would break the impasse, but it also opened bilateral Delegations in and signed cooperation agreements with several Gulf states, including Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. The 39th GCC summit was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 9 December 2018 but it did not achieve any major breakthrough on the regional crisis.
The EU cultivated closer relations with several Gulf states. At the end of January 2018, the EU signed a cooperation agreement with the UAE: not only will this foster closer diplomatic relations between the UAE ministry of foreign affairs and the EEAS on a range of strategic and security matters, but it could pave the way for greater trade relations and cooperation on research and innovation. With an additional focus on enhancing private sector investment, a similar agreement was signed with Qatar on 7 March 2018. Furthermore, the EU decided to open a new Delegation in Kuwait at the end of 2018 (Kuwait was also the first Gulf state to sign a cooperation agreement with the EU in 2016).
The war in Yemen continued to be a major cause for concern for the EU. Because of the conflict, approximately 18 million Yemenis were undernourished and more than 3 million had fled their homes. Furthermore, some 22.2 million people in Yemen – out of a total population of 28 million – were in need of humanitarian assistance. EU efforts in 2018 focused on improving food security and public health. Since 2015, the EU has provided Yemen with €244 million to boost resilience and to reduce vulnerabilities to food shortages.  

26 2018 ended with the positive news that a UN-brokered deal could lead to a ceasefire in Hodeidah on 13 December. The so-called ‘Stockholm Agreement’

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also led to prisoner exchanges and the development of positive diplomatic momentum heading into 2019.

**Sub-Saharan Africa**

2018 was a year with many interesting developments for EU-Africa relations. On 12 September, the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker used his State of the Union address to call for the creation of a new “Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs” between Europe and Africa. The aim, stated the president, was a continent-to-continent free trade agreement and economic partnership between equals. Following this announcement, in December high-level representatives from the EU and the African Union (AU) met in Vienna for a forum hosted by the Austrian Presidency of the Council of the EU. During the forum, the EU unveiled billions of euros worth of support and investment for the continent including €45 million to boost agri-business investments in Africa and €50 million in support of the creation of an African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The AfCFTA was launched on 21 March by the AU Assembly in Kigali, Rwanda, and in May the European Commission stressed its readiness to support the initiative.

**EU-AU relations**

Relations between the EU and the AU in 2018 continued in the context of the ten-year anniversary of the EU Delegation to the AU. On 28 January, the EU attended the 30th session of the AU Assembly where representatives learned about the efforts of the AU-EU-UN taskforce on Libya. On 23 May, the ninth Commission to Commission meeting between the EU and AU took place. On the occasion, the two organisations signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) reinforcing existing cooperation and €400 million was made available by the EU in support of continental and regional projects.


On 28 September talks on the post-Cotonou Agreement negotiations got underway, with the first round of technical negotiations beginning on 18 October in order to define

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a common set of values and interests between the EU and ACP countries. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement was signed in 2000 between the EU and 79 ACP countries but is due to expire on 29 February 2020 – the EU and ACP group are committed to forging a new partnership that will begin in 2020 for another 20-year period. As a sign of this commitment, and with a view to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting in Katowice, Poland, in December, on 1 June the ACP group and the EU released a joint declaration on climate change to reiterate their support for the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.

2018 also saw the EU take up the chairmanship of the Kimberley Process (81 countries representing 99% of global rough diamond production and trade are part of the certification scheme, which was launched in 2003). Over the period 2016–2018, the EU contributed close to €2 million to Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in support of the process. The EU chairmanship seeks to modernise the Kimberley Process by strengthening participation, certification and capacity building.30 To this end, in September the EU organised the first Artisanal Diamond Mining Forum in Livingstone, Zambia. The EU also hosted a second conference on 13 November, during which forum participants discussed the environmental impact of diamond mining.31

West Africa and the Sahel

The Sahel region was a major focal point for EU efforts in Africa. On 23 February, an international high-level conference on the Sahel was held in Brussels under the auspices of the EU, the UN, the AU and the G5 Sahel group of countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad) which brought together 32 heads of state and government. Following the meeting, €414 million was mobilised to support the G5 Sahel Joint Force and to enhance the coordination of sustainable efforts in the region. In particular, the EU doubled its financing for the Joint Force to €100 million – the Union and its member states contribute €176 million in total. It should also be recalled that the EU has pledged €8 billion in development for the G5 Sahel countries over the period 2014–2020.32 At the annual EU–G5 Sahel ministerial meeting on 18 June, the HR/VP reiterated the support of the EU for the G5 Sahel’s efforts: beyond financial support, the HR/VP highlighted the importance of CSDP missions and operations such as the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Mali, the European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali, which have worked in support of capacity building and stability since 2012. Finally, on 6 December the EU announced that it would provide an additional €125 million to support the G5 Sahel countries with better access to water and sanitation, agricultural resilience and conflict prevention.33


In Mali, throughout the year violence aimed to derail the peace and reconciliation process. On 28 April, suspected jihadists killed more than 40 people from the Tuareg ethnic group. When presidential elections were held on 29 July, the EU deployed an EOM to Mali and in general terms the vote was held in a positive, if challenging, environment with the re-election of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta with 67.16% of the vote. Throughout the year the EU supported resilience in Mali with a special focus on sustaining the role of local authorities, reinforcing civil society and education, countering terrorism and building security capacity. To this end, in 2018 the Stabilisation Action for Mali announced by the Council of the EU in August 2017 continued its work.\(^\text{34}\)

\(^{34}\) The Action had been authorised on 4 August 2017, when the Council adopted a Decision authorising a Stabilisation Action in the central regions in Mali (the Mopti and Segou governorates). The team consisted of 10 individuals with a budget of €3.25 million, and their task was to advise Malian authorities on governance issues and restoring basic services and civilian administration in the region. See: Council of the EU, “Mali: EU supports the Stabilisation in the Central Regions of Mopti and Segou”, August 4, 2017, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/08/04/mali-regions-mopti-segou/. 

* Figures for 2014–2020
** Figures to date
*** Figures since 2014

Data: Council of the EU, European External Action Service, European Commission, 2018/2019
Furthermore, on 30 March the EU announced €200 million worth of support for government reforms, inclusive schooling and civil society.35

**EUTM Mali**

On 14 May 2018, the Council extended the mandate of EUTM Mali for a further two years until 18 May 2020. The budget for EUTM Mali was also increased in line with the fact that the mission’s mandate was expanded to include the provision of training and support for the G5 Sahel Joint Force. The budget for the 2018–2020 period stands at €59.7 million, which is a sizeable increase on the €33.4 million allocated to the mission from 2016–2018. On 31 January, Brigadier General Enrique Millán Martínez took over as EUTM Mali mission force commander (MFC) in Bamako, Mali. Martínez replaced Brigadier General Bart Laurent in December 2018 and handed over MFC command to Brigadier General Peter Mirow.


Border management was also an important aspect of the EU’s engagement with Mali. On 13 April, EUCAP Sahel Mali and the Malian National Directorate of Frontiers held a joint meeting with ten governors from Mali in order to initiate border management pilot projects in the Kayes, Mopti and Ségué regions. EUCAP Sahel Mali already provides strategic advice and training to the Malian gendarmerie, police and the national guard and EUTM Mali helps with the restructuring of the Malian armed forces. In June, the EU extended its support of border management in the country by providing the Mopti and Gao regions with financial support derived from the EUTF – a total of €29 million has been allocated until March 2020.36 Finally, on 25 June the Council of the EU extended the mandate of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel, Ángel Losada Fernández, until 29 February 2020.

On 3 September, the EU also announced €138 million in humanitarian and development aid to countries in the Lake Chad region including Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria.37 This support is designed to counter violence, insecurity and environmental degradation. Terrorist groups like Boko Haram continued to pose a security threat for the region. The EU already supports the Multinational Joint Task Force (comprised of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) against the jihadist group politically and financially, but the focus specifically turned to Nigeria given the forthcoming elections in the country in February 2019. The EU also called on Cameroon to ensure inclusive

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Southern neighbourhood presidential elections on 7 October, with concerns that people in the northwest and southwest might be excluded based on differences such as language. Furthermore, the Gulf of Guinea continued to be an area of instability in 2018 in terms of piracy: 79 incidents were reported globally, which is twice as many as in 2017 and all 6 vessel hijackings and 13 of the 18 vessels fired upon were recorded in the region.38

### EUCAP Sahel Niger

On 2 May 2018, Frank Van der Mueren was appointed the new head of EUCAP Sahel Niger. Van der Mueren, a Belgian senior police official, replaced Kirsi Henriksson as head of mission. Henriksson held the post from July 2016 to March 2018. EUCAP Sahel Niger was extended until 30 September 2020 following a Council Decision on 18 September 2018. The mission assists authorities in Niger with the fight against terrorism and crime.

In Sierra Leone, the EU deployed an EOM for elections on 7 and 31 March. Following the polls, the EOM announced that the elections had taken place in a peaceful manner – a milestone for the country. Despite a period of legal uncertainty following the run-off election, the EOM reported that the national electoral commission had managed transparent and inclusive elections despite pressure from political parties and the state.39 On 29 October, the EU and the government of Sierra Leone met for the first political dialogue since the new government was formed on 1 May. Representatives discussed constitutional reform, human rights and sustainable economic growth. To this end, there was welcome news on 6 November when the EU announced that it would dedicate €108 million worth of projects in Sierra Leone to support macroeconomic stability, competitiveness and reforms.40

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In Liberia, the EU and Liberia reinforced political relations following a 12 July meeting that saw the two actors discuss visas, human rights, economic development, Brexit and other issues. On 3 May, the EU announced financial support of €24 million for Liberia in the areas of education and civil society over a six-year period.41 In support of democracy in Liberia, the EU deployed an EOM from 5–8 March in advance of senatorial elections in the country in August. Elsewhere, the EOM that was deployed to Uganda in 2017 for the presidential vote reported in late April that the elections were of a good standard.

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Finally, on 25 October 2018, the Council extended restrictive measures in place against the Republic of Guinea for another year, until 27 October 2019.\textsuperscript{42}

Central Africa

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 2018 was dominated by the tensions surrounding the long-delayed general elections. On 10 December, the Council decided to extend the existing sanctions regime until 12 December 2019.\textsuperscript{43} The restrictive measures had been adopted on 12 December 2016\textsuperscript{44} and 29 May 2017\textsuperscript{45} in response to the obstruction of the electoral process and related human rights violations in the DRC. These included asset freezes and bans from entering the EU for 14 individuals, including the ruling coalition’s candidate, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary. Matters were further complicated by the DRC’s decision to expel the EU Ambassador to the country, Bart Ouvry, ahead of the elections in the country on 30 December. Despite these diplomatic complications, the EU continued to support the people of the DRC with a further €77 million in emergency and development assistance in 2018.\textsuperscript{46}

\textbf{EUTM RCA}

On 30 July 2018, the Council decided to extend the mandate of the EUTM to the Central African Republic (CAR) for two more years, until 19 September 2020. The Council also expanded EUTM RCA’s mandate to allow the mission to provide strategic advice to the president’s cabinet, as well as the ministry of defence and armed forces in RCA. The Council allocated €25.4 million for EUTM RCA common costs from 20 September 2018 to 19 September 2020. This extension followed the news in January that Brigadier General Hermínio Maio was assuming command of EUTM RCA from Major General Fernando Garcia Blazquez.

\textsuperscript{42} The measures were adopted on 25 October 2010 and include an arms embargo as well as asset freezes and visa bans against a number of individuals involved in the massacre of 150 protesters and the rape of 100 women that took place in the capital city of Conakry on 28 September 2009. See: Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1611 of 25 October 2018 amending Decision 2010/638/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Republic of Guinea, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018D1611&from=EN.


East Africa

The year saw the positive development of a peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea that was signed on 16 September in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and ended more than 20 years of war between the two countries. At the same time, a peace accord was signed on 17 September between Djibouti and Eritrea, also ending more than two decades of war between the two nations. In November, the UN removed sanctions on Eritrea following the peace agreement.

In Somalia, and in the face of a number of terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab on civilians and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) throughout the year, the EU continued to support reconciliation and stability in the country. From 16-17 July, the Somalia Partnership Forum took place in Brussels and was organised by the EU, Somalia and Sweden – 58 countries and six international organisations were present. At the Forum, and in the context of discussions about the drawdown of AMISOM, the EU devoted a further €200 million worth of support for stability and development in the country, as well as €114.2 million in support of the 21,500-strong force.\(^47\) In May, the EU announced the adoption of new programmes and projects worth €467 million for vulnerable migrants and refugees in places such as Somalia and Libya.\(^48\) In September, the EU approved a further €116 million in support of the Somalia government until 2021. Finally, on 25 June the EU extended the mandate of the EUSR for the Horn of Africa, Alexander Rondos, until 29 February 2020.

On 2 February, the EU added three individuals to the South Sudan sanctions list for serious human rights violations. In view of the deteriorating human rights situation in South Sudan, the EU not only transposed into EU law asset freezes and travel bans imposed by the UNSC against six individuals,\(^49\) but it even adopted autonomous sanctions against three individuals not sanctioned by the UN.\(^50\) In Sudan, the European Parliament agreed to a resolution on the situation of Noura Hussein Hammad – a 19 year-old female that was raped on multiple occasions by the husband that she was forced to marry at 16 and was imprisoned and sentenced to death for killing him. In June, the EU, the IOM and the government of Sudan launched an initiative to protect migrant populations in the Horn of Africa region with a budget of €25 million.\(^51\)

The EU and Kenya adopted a joint cooperation strategy in November for the period 2018-2022. In line with Kenya’s ‘Vision 2030’ strategy on economic growth, rule of law and democratic governance, the joint cooperation strategy will guide EU support for the country. The EU already provides Kenya with €200 million to deal with agricultural

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business, food security, resilience and climate shocks. The EU also supported Kenya in April with disaster relief following an influx of refugees into the country from Ethiopia, after military action against terrorists in the latter in March.

**EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Somalia**

On 30 July 2018, the Council extended the mandate of EUNAVFOR Somalia Operation Atalanta until 31 December 2020. This news emerged in the same year that the operation celebrated its ten-year anniversary, having first been deployed on 8 December 2008. As a major milestone for the CSDP, the operation has helped protect the delivery of 1.8 million tons of World Food Programme (WFP) food aid, detained 145 Somali pirates and helped build maritime capacity in the region. July also saw the EU’s continued adjustment to Brexit when the Council decided to replace the operation commander – Vice Admiral Antonio Martorell Lacave will replace Major General Charlie Stickland – and to relocate the OHQ from Northwood, UK, to Brest, France, and Rota, Spain, effective from 29 March 2019. The Council allocated €11.8 million to the operation in common costs from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2020.

From 6–8 June, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta was part of a major maritime exercise involving vessels from the US, Korea and Japan from the Multi-National Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). In October, Operation Atalanta was joined by its sister civilian mission EUCAP Somalia in order to coordinate efforts when communicating with local security actors. This was followed up in the same month by a technical agreement between EUCAP Somalia and EUTM Somalia in order to enhance coordination between the two EU missions. In October, EUNAVFOR Somalia conducted its first exercise with China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships based at China’s new overseas naval base in Djibouti. Finally, on 12 December the Council extended the mandate of EUCAP Somalia until 31 December 2020 and a budget of €66.1 million for the period 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2020 was agreed. **


Finally, following an invitation from the Malagasy authorities the EU decided to deploy an EOM to Madagascar to observe the presidential elections that took place on 7 November and 19 December. The first nine analysts arrived in Antananarivo on 22 September and these were joined by 40 observers shortly afterwards. On 27 December, Andry Rajoelina was elected president with 56% of the vote. The EU has already deployed four such EOMs to Madagascar over the years.

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FIGURE 6 | EU action in East Africa

Data: Council of the EU, European External Action Service, European Commission, 2018/2019

* Figures for 2014–2020
** Figures to date
*** Figures since 2014

Data: Council of the EU, European External Action Service, European Commission, 2018/2019
Southern Africa

On 15 November, the EU and South Africa held a summit in Brussels to discuss their strategic and economic partnership agreements. In advance of South Africa’s term as a UNSC member in 2019-2020, the two partners proclaimed their support for global governance and multilateralism.

The EU also supported the political transition underway in Zimbabwe in 2018. Council Conclusions on 22 January reiterated the EU’s support for elections, as well as economic reforms in the country. These Conclusions were followed up by a high-level visit by the European Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, Neven Mimica, to Zimbabwe on 9 April to meet with newly-elected President Emmerson Mnangagwa and his cabinet (the last such high-level visit by the EU took place in 2009). The Zimbabwean government officially invited the EU on 2 March to deploy an EOM to assist with credible, inclusive and transparent nationwide elections due on 30 July. The last EU EOM deployed to Zimbabwe was in 2002, but after a 16-year gap the EU deployed its mission on 6 June with approximately 140 observers under the guidance of a chief observer, Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Elmar Brok. 53

The elections took place in a generally peaceful atmosphere, although they were followed by instances of violence.

In addition, at the end of September the EU announced that it would provide humanitarian assistance following a severe outbreak of cholera that infected over 6,000 people in the country. 54 Nevertheless, the uncertainty related to the ongoing political transition in Zimbabwe led the Council of the EU to renew the sanctions regime in place on 15 February until 20 February 2019. 55

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Core Documents


FIGURE 7 | Africa key events

Data: Council of the EU, European External Action Service, European Commission, 2018/2019
Russia continued to be a security concern for the EU in 2018 both in the eastern neighbourhood and on EU territory. On 12 March, the EU prolonged sanctions for a further six months against 150 Russia individuals and 38 entities until 15 September.\footnote{Council of the EU, “EU prolongs sanctions over actions against Ukraine’s territorial integrity until 15 September 2018”, Brussels, March 12, 2018, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/03/12/eu-prolongs-sanctions-over-actions-against-ukraine-s-territorial-integrity-until-15-september-2018/} On 18 March, Russia held presidential elections and President Vladimir Putin was overwhelmingly elected for a fourth (and second-consecutive) term with 77% of the vote.\footnote{EEAS, “Statement on the presidential elections in the Russian Federation”, Brussels, March 19, 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/41606/Statement%20on%20the%20presidential%20elections%20in%20the%20Russian%20Federation.} The EOM run by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) stated that the ‘elections were conducted in an overly controlled legal and political environment, marked by continued pressure on critical voices’.\footnote{For more on this election see, Stanislav Secrieru and Vitali Shkliarov, “Putin’s Fourth Term: The Twilight Begins?”, EUISS Brief, no. 11, 2018, https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/putin%E2%80%99s-fourth-term-%E2%80%93-twilights?}. Local and regional elections in September were somewhat less successful for President Putin’s United Russia party. Following the March presidential elections, on 14 May the EU subjected five individuals to sanctions following the organisation of Russian presidential elections in the illegally annexed Crimea and Sevastopol. The individuals in question were found by the EU to have actively supported and implemented policies aimed at further undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.\footnote{Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/706 of 14 May 2018 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018D0706&qid=1550221336174&from=EN.}

On 22 March, the European Council condemned in the strongest possible terms the attack in Salisbury, UK, on 4 March that saw the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and Yulia Skripal with the Novichok nerve agent. The attack was attributed to the Russian GRU and the incident led to the expulsion of over 100 Russian diplomats by a number of EU countries.\footnote{“US, EU to expel more than 100 Russian diplomats over UK nerve agent attack”, Euractiv, March 26, 2018, https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/u-s-eu-to-expel-more-than-100-russian-diplomats-over-uk-nerve-attack/} Furthermore, in October the EU condemned the Russian cyber-attacks on the offices of the OPCW that were reported by Dutch authorities to have taken place in
The Hague, Netherlands, in April.64 The operation was disrupted by Dutch intelligence services in partnership with the UK and was again attributed to the GRU.

Following Russia’s attempt to disrupt the resolution of the name dispute between Greece and North Macedonia in mid-2018, and Greece’s subsequent expulsion of two Russian diplomats65, in June and July the EU continued to extend sanctions on Russia. On 18 June, the EU extended its embargo on trade in certain goods and EU investments and the provision of tourist services in the Crimean peninsula were forbidden until 23 June 2019.66 These sanctions were followed by the swift extension of economic sanctions targeting the financial, energy and defence sectors, including dual–use goods and technologies, first until 31 January 201967, and then later until 31 July 2019.68 On 5 July, economic sanctions were again extended until 31 January 2019 following the unsatisfactory implementation of the Minsk Agreements68 and on 30 July the EU added a further six entities to the sanctions list in response to the illegal construction of the Kerch bridge by Russia.67 Further sanctions on 155 persons and 44 entities were extended on 13 September until 15 March 2019.68

A tense situation emerged on 25 November when Ukrainian vessels sailing through the Kerch Strait were rammed and shot at by Russian forces. Following the incident, Russia impounded the Ukrainian vessels and captured 24 sailors, leading Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to impose a month–long period of martial law and the EU to demand the release of the captives.69 This call was made in light of President Emmanuel Macron’s and Chancellor Angela Merkel’s update at the European Council of 13–14 December about the lack of progress in the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. On 6 December, the HR/VP met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in the margins of the 25th OSCE Ministerial Council and she made known the EU’s concerns about the confrontation in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait.

EU-OSCE relations

Cooperation between the EU and the OSCE intensified in 2018. Following the OSCE Permanent Council’s decision to extend the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine until 31 March 2019, the European Commission announced that it would contribute an additional €6 million under the IcSP to assist the SSM with the analysis of satellite imagery. In addition, important steps were made to further enhance EU–OSCE cooperation at an operational level. On 22 June, a framework between the European Commission, the EEAS and the OSCE’s Secretariat was established to allow for regular consultations on issues of common interest. As a follow-up, on 12 December representatives from the two organisations gathered in Brussels for the first OSCE–EU annual high–level meeting where they discussed ways to put the framework into practice and improve inter-institutional cooperation, especially between the OSCE and the EEAS, on conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace-building.

Eastern partners

Anti-government protests occurred in Armenia in April following calls by opposition parliamentarian Nikol Pashinyan for Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan to step down. On 23 April, Sargsyan left office and Pashinyan was voted as acting prime minister on 8 May. On 21 June, the first partnership council meeting was held under the EU–Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA): the agreement came into provisional application on 1 June. During the meeting, the EU acknowledged the reforms that Armenia had implemented on human rights and education and underlined its readiness to support the political transition in the country. On 11 July, Prime Minister Pashinyan travelled to Brussels for a meeting with the HR/VP to discuss bilateral relations between Armenia and the EU. A snap election was held on 9 December and Pashinyan was voted as prime minister in a landslide victory.

In Azerbaijan, early presidential elections were called for 11 April and President Ilham Aliyev secured a fourth term in office. An OSCE/ODIHR EOM deployed to the country declared that the ‘election took place within a restrictive political environment and under laws that curtail fundamental rights and freedoms’. The EU–Azerbaijan Cooperation Council was held on 9 February, where issues such as democracy, rule of law and human rights were discussed and on 11 July the EU–Azerbaijan Partnership


Priorities were agreed with a focus on political and economic reforms. The partnership priorities will also guide financial cooperation over the period 2018–2020.\textsuperscript{73}

**FIGURE 8 | EU action in Eastern Europe**

Given continued concerns about democracy, human rights and the rule of law, on 23 February the Council renewed the sanctions regime against Belarus until 28 February 2019.\textsuperscript{74} Sanctions were initially adopted on 15 October 2012 and include an arms embargo, an export ban on goods which could be used for purposes of internal repression, as well as asset freezes and visa bans against four individuals connected with violence in 2010 and the unresolved disappearances of one businessman, one journalist and two politicians between 1999–2000. Additionally, the Council extended the derogation to sanctions in order to allow for the sale, supply, transfer or export of small-calibre sporting rifles, pistols and ammunition, exclusively intended for use in sports events.


and training in Belarus. The decision to export such items, however, is subject to a prior case-by-case authorisation by national competent authorities. Despite these restrictive measures, the EU continued to engage in diplomacy with Belarus through the EU–Belarus Coordination Group (which met twice in 2018) and it adopted a ‘Roadmap for EU Engagement with Society’ in Belarus on 11 September. Finally, from 30–31 October Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn made an official visit to the country.75

**EUMM Georgia**

1 October marked 10 years since the deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia. Since its deployment, EUMM Georgia has conducted over 65,000 patrols* and on 3 December the Council agreed to extend the mission until 14 December 2020 with a budget of €38.2 million from 15 December 2018 to 14 December 2020).**


On 5 February, the fourth meeting of the EU–Georgia Association Council took place in Brussels and the EU recognised the country’s significant progress in the implementation of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement. On 25 June, the Council extended the mandate of the EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, Toivo Klaar, until 29 February 2020. Presidential elections in Georgia on 28 October and 6 November passed in a ‘competitive and professionally administered’ manner despite some shortcomings.76 Salome Zurabishvili was elected with 59.52% of the vote and became Georgia’s first ever female president. On 21 November, Georgia and the EU held a high-level meeting in Brussels to discuss economic relations, justice and security and education. The EU provides Georgia with over €120 million annually in grant assistance and in 2018 the Union allocated €45 million in macro-financial assistance.77 A month later on 18 December, the EU formally launched its civil society roadmap for Georgia (the roadmap followed consultations with civil society in October) and in the same month the Commission confirmed that the country continued to satisfy the requirements of the visa suspension mechanism.78

In Moldova, the EU called for the strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and human rights throughout 2018, as well as calling for measures to tackle high-level

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corruption. A worrying situation emerged after the 3 June municipal elections in Chisinau when the results were invalidated in a non-transparent fashion. The opposition candidate, Andrei Nastase, had clearly won the elections but the result was declared void by the Moldovan Supreme Court of Justice on 25 June.\footnote{EEAS, “Statement by the HR/VP Mogherini and Commissioner Hahn on the invalidation of the mayoral elections in Chisinau”, Brussels, June 27, 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters–homepage/47472/statement-hrvp-mogherini–and–commissioner–hahn–invalidation–mayoral–elections–chisinau–en.} In response, the EU called on Moldova to respect democratic values and norms and it announced that it would freeze €100 million in macro-financial aid to the country. On 27 November, the EU confirmed the subsequent reduction of financial support to Moldova. The post-election situation only confirmed the EU’s observation in its April ‘2018 Association Implementation Report on Moldova’ that the country needs to continue to reform within the context of the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Following the 3 May EU–Moldova Association Council meeting in Brussels, the Union made clear its position on the need for judicial reform in Moldova – the case was further emphasised during the ninth EU–Moldova annual dialogue on human rights in Brussels on 19 June. On 25 October, the Council of the EU extended travel bans on individuals that were involved in the campaign against Latin-script schools in Transnistria (the sanctions were first adopted in September 2010 and are now extended until 31 October 2019).\footnote{Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1610 of 25 October 2018 amending Decision 2010/573/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018D1610&qid=155240016629&from=EN.} The year concluded on a relatively positive note when the European Commission confirmed on 19 December that Moldova continued to fulfil its visa liberalisation requirements.\footnote{European Commission, “Second Report under the Visa Suspension Mechanism”, COM(2018) 856 final, Brussels, December 19, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20181219_com–2018–856–report_en.pdf.}

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**EUAM Ukraine**

Following the extension of the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine in 2017, the mission continued to train officials and staff from the Ukrainian ministry of internal affairs, national police, security service, fiscal service, the border guard service and more. On 7 March, EUAM Ukraine opened a new regional office in Odessa with approximately 20 staff to aid local authorities and partners in the city.* In April, EUAM launched a nationwide integrity training initiative for the Ukrainian intelligence service (the initiative aimed to have trained over 200 Ukrainian officials by March 2019).**


Ukraine was marked by instability during 2018 and the OSCE registered that 312,554 ceasefire violations were recorded in the Donbas region alone.\(^82\) On 5 March, the EU extended asset freezes for a further year for 13 individuals for the misappropriation of state funds or abuse of office.\(^83\) On 12 March, the Council extended asset freezes and visa bans against 150 persons and 38 entities for menacing or undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine for a further period of six months until 15 September 2018.\(^84\) These measures were renewed again on 12 September for another six months, until 15 March 2019.\(^85\) On 9 July, the EU–Ukraine Summit in Brussels underlined the EU’s support for the country and it encouraged Kyiv’s ambitious reform agenda – it also led to the first joint statement in years.\(^86\) Leaders at the summit also hailed the introduction of visa-free travel for Ukrainian citizens (on 19 December, the Commission confirmed that Ukraine continued to fulfil the requirements of the visa suspension mechanism).\(^87\)

### EU financial support

The EU has a range of financial mechanisms designed to support economic and political stability in the eastern neighbourhood. Under the EU’s Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) programme, the Union provides loans to non-EU partner countries in order to help them remedy balance of payments crises while also insisting on reforms and respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The MFA currently benefits Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine (as well as Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia). In 2018, the MFA specifically supported Georgia (€45 million in loans and grants) and Ukraine (€1 billion in loans and grants).

Additionally, the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II) is designed to support beneficiaries with adopting and implementing political, legal, social and economic reforms in line with the Union’s values, standards, rules and policies with a view to EU membership. The IPA II largely applies to Western Balkan countries but also Turkey and has a budget of €11.7 billion for the period 2014–2020.


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Furthermore, on 10 December the EU added nine people to the sanctions list for individuals involved with the organisation of ‘elections’ in the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ that took place illegally and illegitimately on 11 November 2018. Back on 31 August, the leader of the self-declared and illegal ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’, Alexander Zakharchenko, was killed in a bomb blast. On 10 November, the EU condemned the ‘elections’ as a breach of international law and an attempt to undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Ukraine. The 17 December EU–Ukraine Association Council underlined the EU’s support for Ukraine, especially in the context of the situation in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait and the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. In November, Russia blockaded the Kerch Strait and it shot at and seized Ukrainian vessels (Russia opened the Kerch bridge on 16 May without Ukraine’s consent and militarised the Sea of Azov).

Western Balkans

At the informal meeting of foreign ministers on 15–16 February in Sofia, Bulgaria, officials discussed the ‘Western Balkans Strategy’, which was presented by the European Commission on 6 February. Presented under the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the EU, the Strategy confirmed that the EU sees the Western Balkans as a part of Europe and it called for countries in the region to seize the ‘the historic window of opportunity to firmly and unequivocally bind their future to the EU’. This point was reiterated during the EU–Western Balkans Summit on 14 May in Sofia – the last such meeting was held in 2003. In the summit’s ‘Sofia Declaration’, leaders also agreed to enhance EU support for the region with improved energy, transport and digital connectivity and they promised to work closely on security challenges such as migration, terrorism, corruption and organised crime and human and narcotics trafficking.

In Albania, there was good news in April when the European Commission recommended that the EU open accession negotiations with the country. On 17 April, the ‘2018 Report on Albania’ highlighted that further progress is needed in areas such as judicial reform and economic policy, and it highlighted moderate progress on countering corruption and organised crime. The Commission noted that Albania will need to continue its reform with regard to the adoption and implementation of the EU acquis communautaire.

During 2018, the EU restated its commitment to BiH as a ‘single, united and sovereign country’. This statement came in the wake of the 7 October general elections in the country, which took place in a calm and orderly manner despite some notable shortcomings such as segmentation along ethnic lines. Overall, BiH’s progress towards EU membership continued with an EU report in April noting the political and economic progress made, but also stressing the importance of reforming the country’s electoral, constitutional, judicial and economic practices. A month earlier on 19 March, the Council of the EU extended sanctions against the country until 31 March 2019, including travel bans and asset freezes for persons undermining or threatening the sovereignty, security, territorial integrity of the country and the Dayton/Paris General Framework Agreement for Peace. On 25 June, the Council of the EU extended the mandate of Lars-Gunnar Wigemark as EUSR to BiH until 31 August 2019.

**EUFOR Althea**

2018 was a busy year for European Union Force (EUFOR) Operation Althea in BiH. On 13 February, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Lippert officially handed command of EUFOR’s Multinational Battalion (MNBN) to Lieutenant Colonel Markus Schwaiger. On 14 August, Schwaiger then handed command of the MNBN over to Lieutenant Colonel Oliver Pilles. In addition, on 28 March, Major General Anton Waldner passed on the position of force commander EUFOR to Major General Martin Dorfer (Operation Commander General Sir James Everard oversaw the handover ceremony). One month later in April, Brigadier General Gábor Horváth handed over the position of chief of staff of EUFOR to Brigadier General József Szpisják – the position is responsible for cooperating with the administration in BiH, as well as the country’s law enforcement bodies and armed forces. In addition to hosting the EUMC Chairman in October and the PSC in November, EUFOR began its ‘Quick Response 2018’ exercise on 3 September and the operation welcomed back France as a contributor nation on 14 November after an absence of three years.

After a prolonged parliamentary boycott by opposition parties in Montenegro during 2018, the Commission noted in its ‘Report for Montenegro 2018’ that the country needs to continue its economic and political reforms. The report also pointed to the need to consider reform of the electoral system. On 21 March, the EU congratulated Montenegro and Kosovo for ratifying a Border Demarcation Agreement. Signing the agreement was a precondition for Kosovo’s visa liberalisation agreement with the EU.

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and on 18 July the European Commission confirmed that Kosovo had also met the other condition – improving its track record of countering organised crime and corruption. On 17 April, however, the European Commission’s ‘Report on Kosovo’ noted that key reforms had not been enacted by the government in place since September 2017. In December, there was cause for concern when the Kosovo government decided to expand the 100% import tariffs it had imposed on products produced by BiH and Serbia. Furthermore, in the same month the Kosovo Assembly agreed to transform – counter to EU and NATO advice – the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) into a ‘professionalised’ military force or ‘army’ (the KSF had been initially tasked with domestic security).

**EULEX Kosovo**

At the beginning of the year the EU’s largest ever, decade-long, civilian CSDP mission organised training sessions for Kosovo police officers on the interviewing and handling of vulnerable victims that have been subjected to sexual and gender-based violence. At the end of the year, the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) Kosovo ran a TV spot in the country calling for action against gender-based violence and it also organised a joint exercise with the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission on police riot control. In June, the Council of the EU decided to refocus the mandate of EULEX Kosovo. First, the judicial executive part of the mission’s mandate was transferred to Kosovo. Second, from 14 June the mission would focus on monitoring select cases and trials in Kosovo, mentor and advise the Kosovo correctional service and continue to support EU-facilitated dialogue agreements for the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. In June, EULEX Kosovo was extended until 14 June 2020 with a budget of €169.8 million.98

There was good news in April when the European Commission recommended that the EU open accession negotiations with North Macedonia. 17 June saw a historic agreement between Greece and what was hitherto called the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which, following lengthy negotiations, was henceforth named North Macedonia. The agreement was signed at Lake Prespa – which is shared by Albania, Greece and North Macedonia – and it was presided over by Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and North Macedonia’s Prime Minister Zoran Zaev. The HR/VP and Johannes Hahn, European Commissioner of Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, were also in attendance.

Finally, in February the EU announced that it would grant Serbia €28 million to support the country with border control and management and a further €16 million

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would be provided to support (the mainly Syrian) refugees in the country.\textsuperscript{99} In April, the HR/VP visited Serbia where she noted the progress Belgrade had made on its EU integration path. The Commission’s ‘2018 Report on Serbia’ also made clear that Serbia was making good progress and the ninth meeting of the EU–Serbia accession conference in Brussels on 10 December noted that the country was working hard to align itself with the EU acquis communautaire.

\textbf{FIGURE 9 | Eastern neighbourhood key events}

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\caption{Eastern neighbourhood key events}
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\footnotesize{Data: Council of the EU, European External Action Service, European Commission, 2018/2019}

On 28 May, the Council of the EU adopted Conclusions on enhanced EU security cooperation in and with Asia as a whole. The Conclusions note that there is an opportunity to deepen EU security cooperation with partners such as China, India, Japan and South Korea and with regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states. The Council Conclusions identify conflict prevention, counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, hybrid threats, maritime security and the proliferation of CBRN threats as key areas for cooperation. The Conclusions emphasised the importance of ‘achieving tangible results’ and identified 15 priority areas of cooperation including the participation of Asian countries in EU CSDP missions and operations, capacity building for CBRN risk mitigation, an expansion of ‘military-to-military’ and staff-to-staff contacts, deeper cooperation on cybercrime and more.\(^{100}\)

East Asia

On 1 June, the HR/VP and State Councillor and Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China Wang Yi co-chaired the annual EU–China Strategic Dialogue in Brussels.\(^{101}\) World Trade Organisation (WTO) reform, Europe–Asia connectivity, the JCPOA and the situation in the Korean peninsula were among the issues raised during the meeting. On 16 July, the 20th EU–China Summit took place in Beijing and leaders discussed multilateralism and the international order, as well as the ongoing negotiations for an EU–China bilateral investment agreement.\(^{102}\) With projects under China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) continuing to become a reality\(^{103}\) (e.g. the Ethiopia–Djibouti railway line), President Juncker and President Tusk were keen to discuss the issue of connectivity between Europe and Asia: in the margins of the summit, the third meeting of the ‘EU-China Connectivity Platform’ took place with discussions focused on ways to increase synergies between the BRI and the EU’s Trans-European Transport Networks

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On 19 September, the EU not only appointed a new ambassador to China, Nicolas Chapuis, but it also published the building blocks of a possible future ‘EU Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia’, which highlights the importance of a ‘comprehensive, sustainable and rules-based’ connectivity as a basis for the EU’s external action on the continent.

Although the EU has adopted a neutral stance over Chinese claims in the South China Sea, Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the region and the escalation of tensions with the US at the beginning of the year again shone the spotlight on regional security in East Asia. In May, the EU embarked on a revision of its Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) Action Plan and the Council concluded that the EU will stress ‘the universal application of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (UNCLOS). Given the security situation in the region, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Security Dialogue in early June French Minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly and the then British Defence Minister Gavin Williamson announced that their countries would join the US in June in patrolling the South China Sea. In terms of cybersecurity, reports emerged at the end of the year linking China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with a cyber hack involving the EU’s diplomatic cables. Finally, China’s ambitions to expand its BRI initiative through investments in strategic economic sectors in Europe were scrutinised in 2018, especially as the EU reinforced its foreign direct investment (FDI) screening rules at the end of the year.

The EU’s relations with Japan continued to blossom during 2018. On 17 July, EU and Japanese leaders met in Tokyo for the 25th EU-Japan summit. At the event, two historic agreements were signed: an SPA and an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). The SPA will allow for deeper cooperation and consultation on a number of issues such as security and defence, climate change, research and innovation and energy. The EPA, the largest free trade agreement ever signed by the EU, will remove most of the tariffs on EU goods exported to Japan, currently amounting to around €1 billion annually. The

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agreements were endorsed by the European Parliament on 12 December112 and by the Council on 20 December113. The following day, the EU and Japan notified each other of the conclusion of their respective ratification procedures. During the summit, the EU and Japan also agreed to a mutual adequacy arrangement,114 recognising the equivalent level of data protection and allowing for an easier exchange of data between the two blocs.

The situation on the Korean peninsula continued to be a major cause for concern for the EU in 2018. Despite tensions and dangerous rhetoric between North Korea and the US earlier in the year, by April North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced that the country would suspend all missile tests and even shut down the nuclear test site in Punggye-ri. On 12 June, Kim Jong-un and US President Trump held a historic meeting in Singapore to discuss denuclearisation. The North Korean leader also met his South Korean counterpart Moon Jae-in in April and, following another meeting in May, the third meeting between the two leaders in September led to the signing of the ‘Panmunjom Declaration’, which pledges commitments to denuclearisation and the renunciation of war.115 2018 also marked the 55th anniversary of EU–South Korea relations and at the EU–South Korea summit on 19 October, representatives from both sides discussed ways to boost cooperation, in particular on security and defence, trade, climate research and innovation, and data protection, as well as denuclearisation. As for relations with North Korea, the EU kept sanctions in place but it also provided humanitarian assistance to the country. For example, following the large-scale flooding and landslides that killed over 70 people and affected 600,000 in North Korea’s Hwanghae province in August, the EU donated €100,000 to the International Federation of the Red Cross to assist the affected communities.116

South-East Asia

Throughout 2018, the EU and Indonesia continued negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the fourth (19–23 February), fifth (9–13 July) and sixth (15–19 October) round of negotiations taking place between Brussels and Indonesia. The two partners also discussed their security and defence partnership,
with the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and the Indonesia National Defence University organising the joint fourth EU–ASEAN seminar on security and defence from 26–28 November in Jakarta. In response to the consecutive earthquakes that struck the island of Lombok, Indonesia, in August the EU allocated €650,000 to assist local communities. A month later, when an earthquake and tsunami killed over 1,000 people on the island of Sulawesi, the EU provided €1.5 million in emergency aid and later signed a €10 million financing agreement to support ASEAN’s Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) based in Jakarta. In the aftermath of the Sunda Strait tsunami that killed over 400 people on the coastal areas of western Java and southern Sumatra on 22 December, the EU allocated €400,000 to provide immediate assistance and activated the EU’s Copernicus satellite system.

The EU congratulated the people of Malaysia for the general elections on 9 May. The elections saw the Barisan Nasional party ousted from office – the party had governed Malaysia for six decades and has been the only ruling party since independence in 1957, winning 13 general elections. The EU called for the results to be respected and for an orderly and smooth transfer of power.

Events in Myanmar/Burma were a cause of concern for the EU in 2018. The year started positively when on 13 February, with the EU as an international witness, two more political parties in the country signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with the government as part of the overall peace process in Myanmar/Burma. On 5 March, the EU and Myanmar/Burma held the fourth EU–Myanmar human rights dialogue and the discussions centred on the situation in Rakhine state and the plight of the Rohingya community. Following the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Myanmar/Burma signalled its intention to involve the UNHCR and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in the return process of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh to Rakhine state. Despite these assurances, and following a UN report that noted that human rights continued to deteriorate in the country (e.g. labour rights), the EU decided to send a monitoring mission to the country from 28 to 31 October.

The EU also expressed its concern at the prosecution of two Reuters journalists, Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, on 9 July under the country’s Official Secrets Act of

118 Ibid.
1923. The two journalists had been reporting on the situation in Rakhine state and on 3 September they were sentenced to seven years in prison, which the EU criticised as a breach of the freedom of the media. On 10 December, the Council of the EU expressed its deep concern about the gross human rights violations in Myanmar/Burma.

EU-ASEAN relations

On 30 January, the EU and ASEAN convened for the 25th Joint Cooperation Committee meeting where they discussed the further development of a dialogue on security and crisis management. The EU supported the work of ASEAN throughout the year: it provided training on cybercrime for magistrates, judges and prosecutors (in June) and conducted a border management training course for female law enforcers (in July). On 19 October, leaders from the EU and ASEAN met in Brussels to discuss common challenges such as climate change, cyber-security and terrorism. Throughout the meeting, the leaders committed to conclude a Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement (CATA), continue work on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and renew their commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In the margins of Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit, the EU announced a €10 million financing agreement in order to enhance ASEAN’s capacity to deal with humanitarian disasters. In early August, the HR/VP was in Singapore to co-chair the annual EU–ASEAN post–ministerial conference and represent the EU at the ASEAN Regional Forum. Finally, the EU and ASEAN also held dialogues on gender equality (22 October), business (10 November) and other issues.

The EU remained committed to ensuring a peaceful transition in the country. On 8 May, the EU announced €221 million in support for the education sector in Myanmar/Burma and on 31 May allocated €40 million in emergency aid to the Rohingya communities displaced in Bangladesh and across Rakhine state. On 10 July, the EU offered a

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€14 million grant to support democratic transition in the country\textsuperscript{130} and on 9 November allocated €12 million to support peacebuilding efforts and the over 130,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps in Kachin state and Shan state.\textsuperscript{131} There were over 900,000 IDPs across Myanmar/Burma not only as a result of conflicts but also recurrent natural disasters, such as the heavy monsoon rains and floods that battered the country in August. To address this situation, in 2018 the EU provided €11 million in humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{132}

EU-ASEM relations

On 18 and 19 October, leaders from Asian and European countries met for the twelfth ASEM summit in Brussels.\textsuperscript{*} The discussion touched upon a wide range of issues, including the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, the JCPOA, cybersecurity, climate change, migration, digitalisation and the need to boost connectivity. In September, MEPs and members of parliament from Asia met in Brussels for the tenth Asia–Europe Parliamentary Partnership Meeting – this meeting usually precedes the ASEM meeting.\textsuperscript{**}

Following the 29 July general election in Cambodia, the EU noted its concerns that the elections ‘took place in a highly restrictive political climate’ with authorities using the judicial system to restrict political opposition and dissent within civil society.\textsuperscript{133} On 14 March, the EU and Cambodia held their tenth joint committee meeting and, although the EU acknowledged Cambodia’s increasing economic development, the Union reiterated the Council Conclusions of 26 February which expressed serious concerns about democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the country.\textsuperscript{134} Human rights were also a concern with regard to Vietnam where the EU protested against the conviction and imprisonment of seven political activists on 5 April and Le Dinh Luong on 20 August for advocating the promotion and protection of human rights.\textsuperscript{135} In Thailand, the EU continued to support refugees from Myanmar/Burma living in the country – the Union has


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dedicated 1.4 million from 2016–2018 to assist with the situation.\(^\text{136}\) On 12 December, the EU expressed its support for the lifting of restrictions placed on political activities by the National Council for Peace and Order and called the move an ‘important step on the road to restoring democracy in Thailand.’\(^\text{137}\)

The EU also engaged with the Philippines during 2018. On 1 March, the PCA between the EU and the Philippines entered into force with the objective of promoting good governance, the rule of law and social and economic development. The EU continued to assist the Philippines during the year with support for electricity connections for households and, on 16 August, allocated €2 million in humanitarian aid to the conflict-prone southern province of Mindanao.\(^\text{138}\) In August, the European Commission allocated €150,000 to support the Philippine Red Cross in assisting local communities affected by the heavy monsoon floods.\(^\text{139}\) Following the devastation wrought by tropical cyclone ‘Mangkhut’, the European Commission mobilised a €2 million–worth emergency aid package to assist the roughly 1.5 million people affected.\(^\text{140}\) On 16 March, the EU stated that it regretted the Philippines’ decision to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC).

EU–Singapore relations advanced significantly during the year with three new agreements signed by the partners on 19 October on the margins of the ASEM summit: a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EUSPCA)\(^\text{141}\), a Free Trade Agreement (EUSFTA) and an Investment Protection Agreement (EUSIPA).\(^\text{142}\) The PCA will allow the EU and Singapore to enhance cooperation in a number of areas, including democracy and fundamental rights, security and justice, connectivity, climate, and social development, while the FTA the will remove all remaining tariffs on EU products and services and the IPA will encourage EU companies to invest more in Singapore, and vice-versa. It was the first time that the EU concluded a trade and investment agreement with a member of ASEAN.

More broadly in the South Pacific, the EU allocated €400,000 to Tonga in the aftermath of tropical cyclone ‘Gita’ and €110,000 after an earthquake and aftershocks in Papua New Guinea.\(^\text{143}\) In response to the eruption of the Ambae volcano on the Pacific
island of Vanuatu in May, the EU provided €120,000 to support the Vanuatu Red Cross Society in delivering immediate relief to 5,000 people.

**EU financial support**

The EU continues to support countries in Asia with regard to global challenges, markets and trade, academic cooperation and human rights and democracy. For example, the Partnership Instrument (PI) aims to globally project the ‘Europe 2020 Strategy’ by supporting partners with climate change strategies and environmental standards. The PI also seeks to improve market access for EU companies and it encourages academic and educational linkages between the EU and regions and countries around the world (including Russia, Central Asia, the Arctic, the Gulf states, Asia and the Pacific and the Americas). For the period 2014–2020, the PI budget stands at €954.8 million, with €108.8 million for 2018. The largest allocations from the PI are focused on the Asia–Pacific region and the Americas.

In addition, the DCI principally aims to reduce poverty by fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development but it also supports democracy, good governance, human rights, international law and the rule of law. The DCI covers approximately 47 countries in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Africa. The DCI is endowed with a €19.66 billion budget for the period 2014–2020. This includes €1.18 billion for geographic programmes, €7 billion for thematic programmes and €8.45 million for the pan–African programme.

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**Central and South Asia**

In its bilateral relations with Afghanistan during 2018, the EU stressed the importance of enhancing human rights and good governance, as well as raising issues such as migration. On 26 and 27 March, the HR/VP took part in the International Tashkent Conference on Afghanistan, which was held in Uzbekistan. The conference brought together representatives from Afghanistan, the five Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – and the UN to discuss peace efforts and regional development in the country. The parties met
again in July for the fifth EU–Central Asia high-level political and security dialogue in Turkmenistan, where they discussed opportunities for further cooperation between the EU and Central Asia and the possibility to extend such cooperation to Afghanistan.

FIGURE 10 | EU action in Central and South Asia

On 5 May, the EU and Afghanistan convened a special working group in Kabul. There, the two sides also further integrated human rights, good governance and migration

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with the EU–Afghanistan Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (CAPD). The EU also supported President Ashraf Ghani as he announced that he was prepared to enter negotiations with the Taliban for peace talks and a roadmap for peace and reconciliation in the country (the ‘Kabul Process’). On 27 March, the HR/VP declared that the EU welcomes a genuine peace process and it stands ready to provide its tools, economic support and technical expertise.146 In October, Afghanistan held parliamentary elections, albeit under challenging security circumstances. The EU regretted the loss of life in the run up to and during polling days but it congratulated the Afghan people for voting and called on authorities to operate with full respect of electoral laws and procedures.147 A month later, at the Geneva Ministerial Conference on Afghanistan, the EU announced that it would provide a €474 million package to support the country in its ongoing reform efforts.148

The EU also supported other Central Asian states during the year. On 25 June, the EU extended the mandate of the EUSR to Central Asia, Peter Burian, until 29 February 2020.149 Between 16 and 21 May, the European Commission mobilised €60,000 in emergency relief to assist the over 5,000 people afflicted by floods in the southern part of Tajikistan.150 On 26 October, the EU and Tajikistan held a human rights dialogue in Dushanbe and a month later on 22 November they held the seventh Cooperation Council – the sixth Cooperation Council meeting had been held in Brussels earlier in the year on 9 March. Following these meetings, on 19 December the EU and the government of Tajikistan announced the disbursement of €9.36 million in support of human development in the country.151 At the 14th EU–Central Asia Ministerial Meeting in November,152 the EU also started negotiations with Uzbekistan on a new Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and announced the opening of an EU Delegation in Turkmenistan on 23 November. The EU and Turkmenistan held their annual human rights dialogue on 21 June and in July the two actors held their annual high-level political and security dialogue in Ashgabat.

The EU and India further developed their strategic partnership in 2019. Not only did the EU continue to provide support for human development, counter-radicalisation, sustainable growth and climate change, but at the end of the year on 10 December the EU published the ‘EU Strategy on India’. Following a ‘Joint Communication on elements for an EU strategy on India on 20 November’, the Strategy covers a gamut of issues including climate change, sustainable development, terrorism, disarmament

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and non-proliferation, hybrid threats, cyber and maritime security. As an expression of the practical implementation of the Strategy, the EU and India held the fifth cyber dialogue in Brussels on 12 December to tackle issues such as cybercrime and data protection.\textsuperscript{156} Additionally, in response to intense floods in India in August, which caused the deaths of around 500 people and forced over 1.5 million to flee their homes, the EU announced the allocation of over €1 million in emergency support.\textsuperscript{157}

On 25 July, Pakistan held general elections and the EU deployed an EOM from 24 June to 23 August. The EOM reported that it ‘faced unprecedented delay in the deployment of the whole mission’ due to bureaucratic issues, with observers arriving in some cases one week before election day. The elections took place in an environment of violent attacks and threats and accusations of interference.\textsuperscript{158} During the year, the EU continued to support a range of development and humanitarian projects, especially educational projects, countering violence against women and supporting Afghan refugees based in Pakistan. In November, the EU and Pakistan held a number of high-level dialogues: on counter-terrorism on 2 November and on non-proliferation and disarmament on 28 November. Finally, on 19 November the Council adopted Conclusions on Pakistan in which the EU stated its willingness to engage with the new government in Islamabad, Pakistan, including by developing security and defence cooperation.\textsuperscript{159}


The EU’s relations with North America in 2018 were mixed: the Union continued to develop a positive relationship with Canada, but the EU-US partnership came under increasing strain. Tensions in the transatlantic relationship were evident throughout the year: during the 11–12 July NATO summit in Brussels, President Donald Trump continued his call for European governments to spend more on defence – at one point he called European NATO countries “delinquent” with regard to defence spending.⁶⁶ After demanding that Europeans meet the NATO “2% pledge” on defence spending, however, President Trump left the summit calling for the alliance to eventually move towards 4% of GDP on defence⁶¹ – an unrealistic target at present for Europeans (the US currently spends 3.4% on defence itself).⁶² The president also made negative comments during the summit about NATO’s Article 5 on mutual defence when he stated that he would not be prepared to protect NATO member Montenegro, should it “provoke” countries like Russia.

President Trump used the NATO summit to call Germany a “captive of Russia”⁶³ over its support for the Nord Stream II gas pipeline (the planned pipeline will link Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea). Before flying from the NATO summit to Helsinki, Finland, to meet with Russian President Putin, the American president called the EU a “foe”⁶⁴ with regard to trade. A month earlier, the US had started imposing steel and aluminium tariffs on the EU, to which Brussels retaliated in kind with tariffs on American goods. Tensions were only eased following a visit to Washington, DC, US, by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in July.⁶⁵ Following this visit, the EU and US agreed to start negotiations for an EU-US FTA. This lull in tensions did not last long, however, as the Trump administration decided to downgrade the EU mission to the US without any forewarning or notice in December (a decision reversed in January 2019).

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⁶³ Op.Cit., “Remarks by President Trump and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at Bilateral Breakfast”.


Another worrying issue emerged in October when the US announced its intention to withdraw from the INF treaty with Russia. As a justification for its withdrawal, the US accused Russia of developing a new missile system (the Novator 9M729 cruise missile) that is illegal under the treaty. NATO agreed with the US’ assessment of Russia’s violation, and it joined the US in giving Moscow an opportunity to return to ‘full and verifiable compliance’. The EU also issued a separate statement invoking the US and Russia to remain engaged with the treaty, even though it voiced serious concerns about Moscow’s compliance. For Europe, the demise of the INF treaty jeopardises one of the central pillars of the continent’s post–Cold War stability and it could potentially lead to nuclear proliferation between the US and Russia.

In May, President Donald Trump fulfilled his election campaign promise to withdraw the US from the JCPOA with Iran. President Trump first gave the US Congress and the JCPOA parties (the EU, the E4, China and Russia) 120 days to renegotiate the deal with more stringent conditions on Iran’s uranium enrichment programme. Despite this brief reprieve, President Trump officially withdrew the US from the JCPOA on 8 May. US sanctions were re-imposed on Iran between August and November 2018, despite numerous reports from the IAEA that Tehran was complying with its commitments under the JCPOA. The sanctions elicited protests by the EU/E3 (France, Germany and the UK) because they would affect European companies doing business with Iran.

The US position on global environmental governance and climate change was also an area of friction in EU–US relations in 2018. At the UN Climate Change Conference (COP24), the US, Kuwait, Russia and Saudi Arabia blocked the adoption of a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) on the need to ensure that the global temperature level stays below 1.5°C. President Trump went further by excoriating the use of fossil fuels and he even called into question the science behind the IPCC report. This approach sat in stark contrast to the EU’s climate change strategy: on 28 November the European Commission produced a plan to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. This target was endorsed by the European Council during its meeting on 14 December. Unfortunately, the US’ stance on climate change and the Paris Agreement was reflective of its growing mistrust of multilateral institutions and agreements. For example, in 2018 the Trump administration announced that it was leaving the UNHRC, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO),

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the Universal Postal Union, the Amity treaty with Iran and the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (this gives the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction over disputes under the 1961 Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations).

**EU-UN relations**

Following Council Conclusions on 18 September 2018, the EU and the UN agreed to a new set of eight priorities for cooperation on peace operations and crisis management from 2019 to 2021. The priorities include collaboration on WPS; cooperation between missions and operations in the field, particularly on security sector reform, policing and the rule of law; enhanced common training, exercises and capacity building; and further support to African-led peace operations and the AU. More specifically, the EU and UN joined forces in September to provide €50 million to end femicide in Latin America.* In the same month, the EU and the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) committed to continue their joint efforts on tackling rising hunger. To this end, the EU and the FAO signed a €77 million agreement to enhance food security and resilience.** Finally, in September the AU-EU-UN Taskforce established to address the migrant situation in Libya reported that close to 30,000 migrants had been voluntarily returned since the Taskforce’s creation in November 2017.***


Relations between the EU and Canada were constructive throughout the year. In September, Montréal hosted the first meeting of the Joint Committee of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The meeting assessed the status of CETA’s implementation: as of 14 December 2018, 174 ten EU member states had ratified the agreement. In November 2018, the HR/VP met with Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland in Montréal, Canada, for the second Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) in the context of the EU-Canada SPA. 175 In the Joint Declaration of the

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175 The SPA provisionally entered into force in April 2017, establishing an institutional framework for EU-Canada cooperation.
JMC,\textsuperscript{176} the EU and Canada committed to continue to work together to promote effective multilateralism and reiterated their strong support for multilateral organisations like the UN and the WTO, as well as for multilateral agreements like the JCPOA and the Paris Agreement. The JMC also received and approved its first annual report\textsuperscript{177} on the state of EU–Canada relations. The report clearly indicated security and defence as a key area of EU–Canada cooperation and showed how the SPA has allowed the EU and Canada to expand their cooperation to new areas such as hybrid threats, cybersecurity and strategic communications.

\textbf{FIGURE 12 | EU voting at the UN Security Council}

\begin{itemize}
  \item S/RES/2410(2018) on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH)
  \item S/RES/2414(2018) on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
  \item S/RES/2422(2018) on appointment of the Prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals with effect from 1 July 2018 until 30 June 2020
  \item S/RES/2440(2018) on extension of the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
  \item S/RES/2441(2018) on extension of the authorisations provided by and the measures imposed by Security Council resolution 2146 (2014)
  \item S/RES/2448(2018) on extension of the mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
  \item S/RES/2449(2018) on humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and renewal of authorisation of relief delivery and monitoring mechanism until 10 Jan. 2020
\end{itemize}

Data: UN, 2019


In 2018, the EU participated in the Canada-led Rapid Response Mechanism, launched at the G7 Summit in Charlevoix, Canada, to protect G7 democracies from foreign interference. On 30 October, Canada joined the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) located in Helsinki, Finland. In addition, 2018 marked the entry into force of the EU–Canada Security of Information Agreement (SIA). The agreement is expected to facilitate the exchange of classified information between the EU and Canada, allowing them to further enhance their cooperation on CSDP missions, counter-terrorism and cybersecurity.

South America

The EU took important steps forward in its relations with a number of Latin American Countries (LAC) in 2018. In May, representatives from Cuba travelled to Brussels for the first EU–Cuba Joint Council meeting under the new Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA). As a follow-up, to mark the 30th anniversary of their diplomatic relations the EU and Cuba committed to launching five new political dialogues on human rights, the fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the control of conventional weapons, unilateral coercive measures and the application of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The first of these dialogues, the EU–Cuba dialogue on human rights, took place on 9 October. Cuba also became the 55th signatory of the agreement establishing the EU–LAC Foundation as an international organisation. On 28 November, the EU Delegation in Cuba hosted the first Joint Consular Meeting between the EU and the Consular Group of Latin America and Caribbean countries (GRULAC), a recently created institution of 33 member countries that aims to reach agreement among its members on a number of topics that interest the region.

In January, the EU resumed political dialogue with Haiti after a four-year interruption due to the political and institutional instability in the country. Haiti was the largest beneficiary of EU aid in the region for 2018: in January, the Commission announced a €15 million aid package (€5 million was dedicated to disaster preparedness and €10 to resilience building). Political dialogues with Jamaica and the Dominican Republic were also held and the EU deployed two EOMs to observe the legislative and municipal...
The elections in El Salvador\(^{184}\) and the general elections in Paraguay\(^{185}\), held respectively on 4 March and 22 April. In April, the EU and Mexico reached a new trade agreement as part of a broader and modernised EU–Mexico Global Agreement, which will make all trade in goods between the EU and Mexico duty-free\(^{186}\). Following the violent eruption of Guatemala’s Fuego volcano in June 2018, the EU allocated €400,000 in emergency aid to the Guatemalan Red Cross\(^{187}\) and deployed a team of experts under the Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM).\(^{188}\) In September, the EU condemned the government of Guatemala for failing to renew the mandate of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) beyond 2019.\(^{189}\) Furthermore, in July 2018 the EU started financing a programme entitled ‘Housing Support to Barbuda after Hurricane Irma’.\(^{190}\) The programme aims to rebuild 150 houses in Barbuda, the first Caribbean island hit...
by the devastating force of Hurricane Irma in September 2017, and is funded from the emergency reserves of the FED.

On 17 July, representatives from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the EU met in Brussels for the second EU–CELAC Ministerial Meeting. The EU’s focus throughout 2018 was to support South American countries with technical support and social and economic development. For example, in February, the EU allocated €10.1 million to Peru’s development and social inclusion ministry to help close the poverty gap in the Amazonas, Junin, Loreto, San Martin, and Ucayali regions. The transfer constitutes the second disbursement under the so-called ‘National Strategy for Development and Social Inclusion Support Programme’, a €40 million-agreement for financial support signed in April 2016. In April, the EU launched a judicial cooperation initiative called ‘EL PacTO’ for 18 participating countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela), which has a total budget of €19 million over five years. Finally, in May the EU adopted its first Joint Strategy with Bolivia under which €530 million will be invested to create a common framework for EU development cooperation in the country.

**Union Civil Protection Mechanism**

The UCPM responds to natural and man-made disasters inside and outside Europe. The Mechanism is managed by the European Commission’s DG ECHO and all 28 EU member states (plus Iceland, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia and Turkey) participate by pooling civil protection capacities and capabilities. The UCPM has an overall financial allocation of €368.4 million for the period 2014–2020 – of which €223.7 million for response inside the EU and €144.6 million for external action. The UCPM budget in 2018 was €35.5 million – €29.8 million for within the Union and €5.7 million for third countries. In South America, the UCPM was activated three times (twice in Colombia and once in Guatemala) in 2018.


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**FIGURE 13 | EU action in South America**

Data: Council of the EU, European External Action Service, European Commission, 2018/2019

Finally, Venezuela was a particular source of instability in the region. Early presidential elections, as well as regional elections, were held on 20 May without an agreement with the opposition on a date and in circumstances that did not allow for equal participation of all political parties. The result was an election blatantly rigged in favour of President Nicolás Maduro, who was re-elected with 5.8 million votes. The worsening socio-economic crisis in Venezuela prompted the Commission to allocate €35 million in emergency relief and development assistance in June and an additional €20 million in 2019.

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192 EU Delegation to Guatemala, “18 países de Latinoamérica participarán en la presentación oficial del programa EL PacCTO”, Guatemala City, April 10, 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/guatemala/42701/8-pa%C3%ADses-de-latinoam%C3%A9rica-participar%C3%A1n-en-la-presentaci%C3%B3n-oficial-del-programa-el-paccto_en.

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in December. Following repeated unanswered calls by the EU for new presidential elections, on 6 November the Council decided to renew the sanctions regime in place since 13 November 2017 for another year.

**FIGURE 14 | Americas key events**

Data: Council of the EU, European External Action Service, European Commission, 2018/2019

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COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
Civilian and military CSDP

CSDP missions and operations

2018 was another active year for the CSDP. As of December 2018, the EU had 16 missions and operations deployed: six military missions and operations and ten civilian missions. CSDP operations and missions continued to undertake a range of security tasks such as counter-piracy, military training, police reform, border assistance, security sector reform, counter-terrorism, gender and international law training and even cultural heritage protection. During 2018, the EU continued to use CSDP missions and operations as part of its ‘integrated approach’ to crises. To this end, many of the missions and operations engaged in diplomacy with partners (e.g. EUNAVFOR Atalanta cooperated with China, India and Japan during exchange visits), dialogue with local and national authorities (e.g. EUAM Iraq conducted a number of in-country visits with regional authorities and non-governmental organisations) and some missions and operations even participated in exercises (e.g. EULEX Kosovo was part of the KFOR-led Silver Sabre 2018–2 exercise in October and a joint EULEX–KFOR police exercise on 7–8 November).

1 This figure does not include EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine because this mission is not managed by CSDP structures.
FIGURE 15 | CSDP missions and operations personnel as of 31 December 2018

Data: European External Action Service, 2018/2019
Core documents


Military Planning and Conduct Capability

In March 2018, EU defence ministers agreed that the MPCC had brought greater efficiency to the operational planning and conduct of the EU’s three non-executive EUTM to the CAR, Mali and Somalia. The Director of the MPCC, Lieutenant General Esa Pulkkinen, was in direct and regular contact with each mission and paid a number of visits to the EUTMs during 2018. The MPCC, the EU’s permanent command control structure for military missions, was formally established by the Council of the EU on 8 June 2017 with 25 staff. However, a Council Decision of some significance was agreed to on 19 November 2018 when ministers chose to further strengthen the role of the MPCC by 2020. The Council called for the MPCC to take charge of one executive military CSDP operation (the size of an EU Battlegroup) in addition to non-executive missions.²

Civilian CSDP Compact

Another significant development in November 2018 was an agreement on the so-called ‘Civilian CSDP Compact’. Ministers agreed to 22 political commitments designed to reinforce police and rule of law missions and facilitate the launch of a new civilian mission of up to 200 personnel in any area of operation within 30 days. Interestingly, in addition to traditional stabilisation and reconstruction tasks the Council Conclusions called for civilian CSDP missions to tackle broader security challenges such as irregular migration, hybrid threats, cybersecurity, terrorism, radicalisation, organised crime, border management, maritime security, violent extremism and damage to cultural heritage. Crucially, the Council also recognised that the EU needs to enhance its personnel and equipment contributions to civilian CSDP missions.³ In this respect, the Council called for a so-called ‘Strategic Warehouse’ of necessary civilian equipment to be fully operational by the spring of 2019. Finally, ministers agreed that the ‘Compact’ should be fully delivered by early summer 2023 at the latest.⁴

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² The EU deploys non-executive missions when the host country gives consent, and executive operations are deployed without host country consent but with a UNSC Resolution.


FIGURE 16 | EU Battlegroup roster
offers and commitments, 2018-2020

Data: EU Military Staff, European External Action Service, 2018/2019
European Peace Facility

On 13 March 2018, the HR/VP presented a new off-budget fund worth €10.5 billion called the EPF. The EPF is designed to provide financial support to the military and defence aspects of the CFSP/CSDP and will be created by combining existing mechanisms such as the Athena mechanism and the APF. The Athena mechanism has traditionally funded between 5–10% of common costs for CSDP military missions and operations, whereas the APF was established in 2004 under the FED in order to support peace and security in Africa. The EPF responds to two inter-related issues that have hindered the effectiveness of CSDP military action in the past: first, the common costs under Athena are minimal and a number of EU member states have been dissuaded from supporting CSDP missions and operations because they are expected to bear the brunt of costs on a national rather than EU level; second, because a number of CSDP missions such as the EUTMs are providing training to partner countries there is recognition that financial support may be required to provide basic equipment and/or facilities. Under the EU treaties (Article 41.2 Treaty on European Union), it is forbidden to finance military operations from the Union budget – the EPF therefore aims to ensure the effectiveness of CSDP military missions and operations beyond these limitations.5

CSDP Personnel

A number of CSDP personnel developments are worth noting. First, a new civilian operations commander – Lieutenant General Vincenzo Coppola – was nominated by the HR/VP in September: he subsequently took control of the ten civilian CSDP missions and simultaneously became director of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). Second, General Mikhail Kostarakos handed over the chairmanship of the EUMC to General Claudio Graziano on 25 October 2018. Finally, there was also sad news following the sudden passing of Lieutenant General Wolfgang Wosolsobe in September 2018. Wosolsobe served as the EU’s Director General of the EUMS from May 2013 to May 2016 and oversaw a number of important CSDP initiatives during his tenure.

2018 was also a year of progress for PESCO. On 6 March, the Council adopted a PESCO ‘roadmap’ that further detailed the way forward on governance and planning issues. On PESCO governance, ministers set out rules for the EDA and the EUMS/EEAS (the ‘PESCO Secretariat’) and the role of PESCO project members. In particular, the roadmap set out the mechanics for the annual PESCO review and the assessment process for the National Implementation Plans (NIPs). Meeting in the ‘PESCO format’ of ministers for the first time, on 6 March the Council formally endorsed the first wave of 17 PESCO projects that had been politically agreed to in December 2017 and on 2 May 2018, the PESCO Secretariat issued a call for a second wave of PESCO projects. In order to develop a common understanding between PESCO participating member states and to help exchange information and to attain agreement on the second wave of projects, the EDA organised an expert level workshop in Brussels on 20–21 September.

Responding to the call for proposals for this second wave, member states initially proposed 33 new projects (although this number was eventually reduced to 17).\(^6\)

Indeed, on 19 November the Council agreed to a second wave of 17 PESCO projects – taking the overall number to 34.\(^7\) The projects seek to fill a number of capability shortfalls for the EU across the full spectrum of military domains: land, sea, air, space and cyber. A range of strategic and joint enablers also form part of the PESCO project package. The project list includes the development of: a radio navigation solution using space assets; a military space surveillance awareness network; military mobility; an unmanned ground system; an autonomous maritime systems for mine countermeasures; the Eurodrone; an upgrade of the Tiger Mark III attack helicopter; cyber rapid response teams; a high atmosphere airship platform; an electronic warfare capability; a medical command; a counter CBRN surveillance system; and military co-basing, among others.\(^8\)

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FIGURE 18 | PESCO projects

number of PESCO projects member states share with each other bilaterally

Given the internal modulation of PESCO projects, all of the participating member states were involved in either leading or participating in a project.

**European Defence Fund**

2018 was the year in which the EDF became a reality. It began with positive news about the successful completion of two research projects – SPIDER and EuroSWARM – initially funded under a pilot project on defence research from the EU budget and upon the insistence of the European Parliament. The pilot project invested €1.4 million in three projects and was designed to serve as a test bed for the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR). The last of the three projects – TRAWA – is to be finalised at a later date and it seeks to develop a ‘detect and avoid’ system for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). The EuroSWARM project tested the feasibility of unmanned swarm systems and the SPIDER project studied the possibility of combining unmanned systems, sensors and data fusion to enhance battle capacities in an urban environment.\(^9\)

With regard to the PADR, the June 2017 call for proposals resulted in four defence research projects that began in April 2018. These included: 1) ‘Ocean2020’, a project involving some 42 partners from 15 EU member states and financed with €35.5 million in order to enhance the EU’s maritime surveillance capacities; 2) ‘ACAMSII’, involving seven partners from the same number of EU member states and awarded €2.6 million to develop adaptive camouflage for troops; 3) ‘Gossra’, again involving seven partners from seven EU countries and funded with €1.5 million to develop sensors and communication devices for soldiers; and 4) ‘Vestlife’, an initiative which was awarded funding of €2.4 million to develop ultralight body armour for soldiers and it involves six partners from six EU member states.\(^10\) As an example of the pace of project developments, the EDA facilitated a first meeting of the Ocean2020 consortium on 10–11 April with a view to planning for two live project demonstrations (in Italy in 2019 and the Baltic Sea in 2020).

Following these initial projects, on 9 March the Commission adopted the PADR work programme for 2018 with a budget of €40 million – the overall budget for the PADR over 2017–2019 is €90 million. On 15 March 2018, the EDA opened the call for proposals for this second tranche of projects in 2018 and each project focused on a high-performance defence system-on-a-chip, a high power laser effector and strategic technology foresight. The call for proposals ended on 28 June 2018.

Beyond defence research, however, the Commission also secured provisional agreement on its planned European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) on 22 May 2018 under the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the EU. Full agreement on the EDIDP was secured soon after and on 18 July 2018 a Regulation for the EDIDP was agreed between the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. The EDIDP is designed to provide €500 million over 2019–2020 for capability development.

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programmes in preparation for the fully-fledged EDF from 2021 onwards. It was announced that calls for EDIDP projects would be tendered in 2019.

On 13 June 2018, the European Commission presented its proposal for a Regulation on the EDF at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France. The EDF will build on both the PADR and EDIDP by streamlining and synthesising investments in defence research and capability development at the EU level. The proposal called for €13 billion worth of investment for defence research and capability development beyond the PADR and the EDIDP in the 2021–2027 period. Under the proposal, the European Commission announced its intention to invest €4.1 billion in defence research and €8.9 billion for capability development. The proposal also foresees a 5% (approximately €700 million over the 2021–2017 period) portion of the EDF allocated to investments in disruptive technologies. Negotiations over and examination of the EDF Regulation continued through July and the Council reached a general partial approach on the Regulation on 15 November 2018. Partial agreement with the European Parliament would be reached in 2019 under the Romanian Presidency of the Council of the EU, even though the requested financial envelope of €13 billion is still subject to negotiations under the MFF.¹¹

Defence planning and capabilities

At the EDA’s ministerial steering board on 20 November 2018, ministers recognised the importance of the CARD and its role in helping to coordinate and synchronise defence planning at the EU level. They called for the first full cycle of CARD to be launched in autumn 2019. One of the encouraging conclusions from the CARD trial run was that EU member states had increased defence spending. Although no agreement on the EDA’s general budget for the 2019–2021 could be reached at the Agency’s steering board meeting in November, member states learned from the CARD trial analysis that they needed to do more in common to enhance investments in defence research and development.¹²

On 28 June 2018, the EDA’s steering board of capability directors formally endorsed the 2018 revision of the CDP. The CDP is designed to provide a full spectrum picture of the defence capability shortfalls and future technological needs (out to 2035 and beyond). Unlike previous editions of the CDP, the 2018 revision was engineered to be more output oriented, something which was especially important given that the stakes for EU defence capability development are much higher now with the introduction of the EDF and PESCO. To ensure that the CDP is fully utilised by EU institutions and member states, the EDA spent the rest of 2018 developing ‘Strategic Context Cases’ (SCCs) in which member states would clearly be able to ascertain what capabilities and industrial needs were required in each of the 11 specific priority areas identified by the CDP.¹³ Furthermore, in order to compliment the CDP’s focus on capability development the

FIGURE 19 | Defence expenditure of EU member states

The data for this visualisation derive from the IISS and NATO. All data in this visualisation relates to current prices in the reporting years and figures are rounded. NATO data only extends to 22 EU member states. For the full data please consult the Yearbook Annex. US dollars are used as opposed to euros in order to maintain compatibility between IISS and NATO figures.
EDA developed the Overarching Strategic Research Agenda (OSRA), which is designed to guide future EU investments in defence research by providing an overview of technological needs and building blocks required skills and investments. Finally, there was positive news on 25 June when ministers endorsed the EU’s progress catalogue 2018 – the catalogue is a fundamental part of the CDP because it provides a military assessment of the capability shortfalls and it sets the High Impact Capability Goals (HICG).

Finally, in 2018 the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) called for greater rationalisation of EU defence in its annual report on the CSDP, which was published on 22 November 2018. Echoing past calls, the AFET Committee stated that an overarching EU Security and Defence White Book is needed to ensure coherence in current and future capability-building processes.

Looking to the use of future technologies, the European Parliament’s Sub-committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) launched a public hearing on AI and security and defence on 10 October 2018. The hearing coincided with a number of initiatives on AI that were taken by the European Commission during 2018. Furthermore, at the EDA’s annual conference on 29 November 2018 in Brussels, speakers debated what more Europe has to do to catch up with global players in the field of autonomous systems and AI, as the continent is lagging behind in both areas.

Military mobility

On 28 March, the European Commission and the HR/VP published a Joint Action Plan on Military Mobility. The Action Plan set out the path forward on achieving military mobility in Europe and a high-level conference held under the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the EU in June 2018 called for swift action. First, the plan called for the rapid development and adoption of the military requirements for military mobility. On 29 October 2018, the EUMC agreed to the technical specifications on the transport infrastructure, vehicles and loads needed for military mobility in Europe and beyond and the PSC endorsed the requirements on 8 November 2018. Second, the European Commission announced that it would – for the first time ever – call for a €6.5 billion investment in military mobility under its proposals for the Connecting Europe Facility, to be negotiated as part of the next MFF 2021–2027.

Building on its diplomatic clearances efforts for air transport aircraft, the EDA launched a number of projects on customs and border crossing, as well as assisting with the military mobility project within PESCO. Finally, on 21 November the European Parliament’s AFET Committee released a report on military mobility urging the member

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18 Council of the EU, “ Annexes to the ‘Military Requirements for Military Mobility within and beyond the EU’”, 13674/18, Brussels, November 9, 2018.
states and EU institutions to move swiftly on investments and commitments, especially given that military mobility is subject to the binding commitments within PESCO.19

**EU – NATO relations**

On 6 March, EU defence ministers convened a discussion with NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller to take stock of the progress on the 74 proposals jointly agreed by the EU and NATO at the end of 2016. The June 2018 Council meeting also acknowledged the progress that had been achieved and the third EU–NATO progress report delivered on 31 May detailed areas of cooperation, including: 1) information exchange and exercises for hybrid threats; 2) logistical support and information exchange for maritime operations in the central Mediterranean; 3) staff exchanges and high-level dialogues on cybersecurity and defence; 4) political dialogues between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the PSC and discussions on defence industrial and capability development matters. An important symbol of EU–NATO cooperation in 2018 was the signing of a second joint declaration on 10 July. The declaration not only affirmed both organisations’ commitment to cooperation, but it also called for more progress in the areas of military mobility, counter-terrorism, resilience to CBRN risks and the WPS agenda.


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**Hybrid threats**

The area of hybrid threats was a major focal point for EU policymakers in 2018 and a number of significant developments took place.20 First, the EU published four relevant documents: 1) a Communication on tackling online disinformation (26 April); 2) a Report on the implementation of the joint framework on countering hybrid threats (13 June); 3) a Communication on increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to address hybrid threats (26 June); and 4) the Action Plan against disinformation (5 December). These publications focused on EU responses to hybrid threats and they introduced a number of new initiatives, including an enhanced role for the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell in the EEAS to cover counter-intelligence and CBRN in addition to detecting hybrid threats. Finally, the issue of disinformation seized the attention of the EU in 2018, especially given the impending European Parliament elections in May 2019 and a host of national ones, too.

During 2018, the EU organised a number of exercises designed to enhance the EU’s responsiveness to a crisis. At the beginning of the year on 30–31 January, the European

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Commission’s DG for Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE) organised an intersectoral table-top exercise on hybrid threats (Exercise Chimera) involving a health pandemic. This and other exercises were extremely timely given the 4 March poison attack on individuals in Salisbury, UK. In Conclusions published on 22 March, the European Council condemned the use of Novichok on UK soil and it called for a re-doubling of efforts to combat hybrid threats. Further exercises were organised during the year. On 5 November 2018, the EU began a major civil–military crisis management exercise called the EU Hybrid Exercise 19, 2018 (or EU-HEX-ML18). Held until 23 November, the exercise brought together numerous EU institutions and bodies for a crisis management scenario that linked together external and internal security issues such as hybrid attacks, energy, cyber, health, maritime, etc. The EU’s hybrid exercise ran parallel to NATO’s exercise under the rubric of the Parallel and Coordinated Exercise (PACE).

There were also a number of notable developments in cyber defence during 2018. At the beginning of the year on 6 February, EU member states agreed to establish an Education, Training, Exercise and Evaluation (ETEE) platform to coordinate cybersecurity and defence training and education across the Union. Working closely with the EEAS, European Commission and the EDA, the ETEE platform is managed by the ESDC. The platform was launched in November 2018 following the recruitment of seconded national experts. On 10 December 2018, the European Commission decided to enhance the Union’s cyber capacities by establishing the EU Agency for Cybersecurity.

On 23 May, an MoU was signed between the EU Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), the EDA, Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) and the Computer Emergency Response Team for EU institutions, agencies and bodies (CERT-EU). The MoU sets out a cooperative framework between the organisations by strengthening information sharing networks and promoting joint training and exercises. With a view to enhancing combined training and exercises on cyber defence, the Austrian ministry of defence, the EDA and NATO’s Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) organised a combined cyber defence course and exercise for staff and planners associated with CSDP missions and operations from 4–8 June. ‘Cyber Phalanx 2018’ took the form of a table-top exercise and it took place in Wals-Siezenheim, Austria.

Later in the month on 28 June, six EU member states (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany and Latvia) signed a MoU on pooling and sharing cyber range capabilities, which will lead to joint exercises and enhanced information exchange.

On 19 November 2018, the Council updated the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework (CDPF) that was initially adopted in November 2014. Whereas the original CDPF focused on developing cyber defence capabilities and the protection of EU CSDP communication and information networks, the updated framework grants greater importance to training and exercises, research and technology, civil–military cooperation and international cooperation. Given that the initial CDPF was adopted before initiatives such as the EUGS, PESCO, the EDF and the revised CDP, it was right and timely to update the CDPF.
The area of space, the EU took a number of important steps forward in 2018. The year marked the 20th anniversary of Copernicus and two years since Galileo’s initial services were made available. Galileo – the European Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) – can already be used from smartphone devices and as of today over 400 million users. On 25 July, four new Galileo satellites were launched which brought the overall Galileo satellite constellation to 26 satellites and on 12 October the satellites came online. In November, the Galileo programme received positive news when, following a request from the European Commission, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) granted a partial waiver so that devices in the US can access certain signals from the Galileo system. Copernicus saw its seventh satellite launched into orbit in April. Throughout the year, the Copernicus Emergency Mapping Service (EMS) was utilised across the world for different reasons in places such as the US (hurricanes), Mexico (cyclone), Uganda (mudslides), Honduras and Nicaragua (floods), as well as in countries in Europe such as France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Spain, Sweden and more.

At the end of the year on 19 December, the Council agreed on the draft Regulation for an EU space programme for the period 2021-2027 (the Commission had initially put forward the draft Regulation in June 2018). Although agreement on the final budget will be reached at the end of 2019 under the negotiations for the MFF, the Commission has asked for an overall budget of €16 billion: €9.7 billion is to be dedicated to Galileo and the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), €5.8 billion to Copernicus and €500 million to the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) programme and to government satellite communications (GOVSATCOM). The proposed Regulation should also help standardise and simplify the EU legal and security framework on space policy.
FIGURE 20 | CSDP timeline

Data: Council of the EU, European External Action Service, European Commission, 2018/2019
### Statistical annex

**TABLE 1 | EU regional instruments**

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*Figures since 2014: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/7350*

**Figures for 2014-2020: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/funding-instruments-programming/funding-instruments/european-development-fund_en*

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***Figures for 2014-2020: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/funding-instruments-programming/funding-instruments/development-cooperation-instrument-dci_en*

Note: does not include regional support
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* Figures to date: [https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region_en](https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region_en)

** Figures since 2014: [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/7350](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/7350)


**Sudan EDF-figure since 2010**

**Eastern neighbourhood**

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*** Figures since 2014: [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/7350](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/7350)

## Middle East

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## North Africa

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Notes

** Figures to date: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region_en
**** Figures since 2014: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/7350

Libya: Figure only for 2017 under the ‘Special Measure’ for Libya
Note: does not include pan-regional projects
### Sahel

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** Figures since 2014: [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/7350](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/7350)


### Sub-Saharan Africa

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** Figures since 2014: [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/7350](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/7350)


Sudan EDF–figure since 2010
TABLE 2 | EU delegations around the world
staff levels by contractual status, Dec 2018

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TABLE 3 | Athena mechanism
budget, 2015-2018, €

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Commitments: Maximum amounts that can be committed (legally engaged) in a given financial year.

Payments: Maximum amounts payable each financial year in respect of commitments made in the year in question or in previous years.
## Defence expenditure

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## Military expenditure (% of real GDP)**

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### TABLE 5 | EU voting at the UN Security Council

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<th>Resolution/Date</th>
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<th>Russia</th>
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<th>France</th>
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<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Cote d'Ivoire</th>
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<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Peru</th>
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<td>S/RES/2449(2018) on humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and renewal of authorisation of relief delivery and monitoring mechanism until 10 Jan. 2020</td>
<td>13-Dec-18</td>
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<td>a</td>
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<td>y</td>
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<td>S/RES/2448(2018) on extension of the mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) until 15 Nov. 2019</td>
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<td>S/RES/2441(2018) on extension of the authorisations provided by and the measures imposed by Security Council resolution 2146 (2014) and on extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts concerning Libya until 15 Feb. 2020</td>
<td>12/5/2018</td>
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<td>S/RES/2428(2018) on renewal of sanctions imposed by Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) and extension of the mandate of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan until 1 July 2019</td>
<td>7/13/2018</td>
<td>a</td>
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### TABLE 6 | PESCO projects
number of PESCO projects member states share with each other bilaterally

| Country | France | Italy | Spain | Greece | Germany | Belgium | Netherlands | Cyprus | Poland | Portugal | Romania | Croatia | Austria | Hungary | Sweden | Finland | Bulgaria | Estonia | Latvia | Slovenia | Ireland | Luxembourg |
|---------|--------|-------|-------|--------|---------|---------|-------------|--------|--------|----------|---------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|---------|----------|---------|--------|---------|---------|-----------|
| FR      | 12     | 15    | 4      | 12     | 9       | 8       | 6           | 4      | 5      | 4        | 5       | 4       | 4      | 4       | 4      | 3       | 2       | 3       | 1       | 2       | 2       |
| IT      | 12     | 13    | 9      | 9      | 6       | 5       | 5           | 5      | 4      | 6        | 4       | 5       | 4      | 3       | 1      | 3       | 2       | 2       | 1       | 2       | 1       |
| ES      | 15     | 13    | 5      | 11     | 8       | 8       | 6           | 5      | 5      | 4        | 5       | 4       | 4      | 4       | 3      | 4       | 3       | 3       | 2       | 2       | 2       |
| EL      | 4      | 9     | 5      | 3      | 3       | 3       | 1           | 6      | 4      | 4        | 3       | 4       | 3      | 3       | 1      | 1       | 5       | 1       | 2       | 1       | 1       |
| DE      | 12     | 9     | 11     | 3      | 6       | 6       | 6           | 3      | 3      | 4        | 4       | 3       | 2      | 2       | 2      | 3       | 2       | 2       | 1       | 1       | 1       |
| BE      | 9      | 6     | 8      | 3      | 6       | 7       | 4           | 3      | 5      | 4        | 3       | 2       | 2      | 2       | 3      | 2       | 3       | 2       | 3       | 1       | 1       |
| NL      | 8      | 5     | 8      | 3      | 6       | 7       | 5           | 2      | 6      | 4        | 5       | 3       | 3      | 2       | 3      | 3       | 3       | 2       | 3       | 2       | 1       |
| CZ      | 6      | 5     | 6      | 1      | 6       | 4       | 5           | 1      | 2      | 2        | 3       | 2       | 1      | 2       | 2      | 3       | 2       | 1       | 2       | 1       | 1       |
| CY      | 4      | 5     | 5      | 6      | 3       | 3       | 2           | 1      | 2      | 2        | 1       | 2       | 3      | 2       | 3      | 1       | 1       | 3       | 1       | 1       | 2       |
| PL      | 5      | 4     | 5      | 4      | 3       | 5       | 6           | 2      | 2      | 4        | 3       | 3       | 3      | 1       | 3      | 1       | 2       | 2       | 3       | 3      | 1       |
| PT      | 4      | 6     | 5      | 4      | 4       | 4       | 4           | 2      | 2      | 4        | 3       | 1       | 1      | 3       | 2       | 2       | 2       | 1       | 1       | 2       | 1       |
| RO      | 5      | 4     | 4      | 4      | 4       | 3       | 5           | 3      | 1      | 3        | 3       | 2       | 2       | 2       | 1      | 3       | 2       | 1       | 2       | 2       | 1       |
| SK      | 5      | 4     | 3      | 3      | 2       | 3       | 2           | 2      | 3      | 1        | 2       | 2       | 1      | 3       | 2       | 1       | 2       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       |
| HR      | 4      | 5     | 4      | 2      | 2       | 3       | 1           | 3      | 3      | 1        | 2       | 2       | 3       | 1       | 2      | 3       | 2       | 1       | 3       | 1       | 2       |
| AT      | 3      | 4     | 3      | 2      | 2       | 2       | 2           | 2      | 2      | 1        | 3       | 2       | 1      | 3       | 2       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 2       | 1       |
| HU      | 4      | 3     | 4      | 3      | 2       | 3       | 3           | 2      | 1       | 2        | 3       | 1       | 2      | 2       | 2      | 2       | 3       | 3       | 1       | 2       | 2       |
| SE      | 4      | 3     | 4      | 1      | 3       | 2       | 3           | 3      | 1      | 2        | 2       | 3       | 3      | 1       | 2      | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       |
| FI      | 4      | 2     | 4      | 1      | 2       | 3       | 3           | 3      | 2       | 1        | 2       | 2       | 2      | 1       | 2      | 1       | 2       | 1       | 3       | 2       | 1       |
| BG      | 4      | 3     | 3      | 5      | 2       | 2       | 2           | 1      | 3       | 2       | 1       | 1       | 2       | 3       | 1       | 2      | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       |
| EE      | 3      | 1     | 3      | 1      | 1       | 2       | 3           | 2       | 1       | 3       | 1       | 2       | 1      | 2       | 2      | 1      | 2       | 1       | 1       | 3       | 1       |
| LV      | 2      | 1     | 2      | 2      | 1       | 3       | 3           | 2       | 1       | 3       | 2       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 2       | 1       | 2       | 1       | 1       |
| SI      | 3      | 2     | 2      | 2      | 2       | 2       | 1           | 1      | 1       | 1       | 3       | 2       | 3       | 1       | 1      | 2       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       |
| IE      | 1      | 2     | 2      | 1      | 1       | 1       | 1           | 1      | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       |
| LT      | 2      | 1     | 2      | 1      | 1       | 1       | 2           | 1      | 2       | 1       | 2       | 1       | 2       | 1       | 1       | 2       | 1       | 2       | 1       | 1       | 1       |
| LU      | 2      | 2     | 2      | 1      | 1       | 1       | 1           | 2       | 2       | 1       | 2       | 1       | 2       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       | 1       |
### TABLE 7 | EU Battlegroup roster
offers and commitments, 2018-2020

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<td>UK</td>
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<td>Jul-Dec</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
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<td>Second</td>
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<td>FR</td>
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<td>FR</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Second</td>
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<td>2020</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>EL</td>
<td>EL</td>
<td>BG, CY, RO, Serbia, Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Jan-Jun</td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
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<td>2020</td>
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<td>DE</td>
<td>AT, CZ, FI, HR, IE, LV, NL, SE</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Jul-Dec</td>
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<td>IT*</td>
<td>EL, ES, PT*</td>
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* Pending a political decision
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‘Multilateralism has been at the centre of our work to preventing and solving conflicts – because this is the only way to find sustainable solutions to the problems of our times.’

FEDERICA MOGHERINI
High Representative for the Union’s Foreign and Security Policy
Vice-President of the European Commission

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