European defence

A proposal for a White Paper

Report of an independent Task Force

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The members of the Task Force

Chair: Nicole Gnesotto

Rapporteur: Jean-Yves Haine

André Dumoulin	Tomas Ries
Jan Foghelin	Lothar Rühl
François Heisbourg	Stefano Silvestri
William Hopkinson	Hans-Bernhard Weisserth
Marc Otte	Rob de Wijk

Institute for Security Studies
European Union
Paris

Director: Nicole Gnesotto

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Preface   Nicole Gnesotto

*D*uring the last five years, ESDP has become one of the most remarkable success stories of the Union 'at 15'. What was politically unthinkable at the time that the Amsterdam Treaty was being negotiated in 1998 has now become a reality: the EU has been involved in several military and police operations, in the Balkans and Africa; hundreds of military personnel are now working daily in the Council buildings in Brussels; the EU has set itself the goal of being able to call upon a 60,000-strong force that can execute various missions in implementation of ESDP; an 'Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments' will be operational at the end of 2004; last but not least, a European Security Strategy was approved by the 25 heads of state and government last December. These are just a few of the many achievements of ESDP since the Cologne Council in June 1999, when this new European policy was officially launched.

There are at least two reasons to believe that ESDP will continue to grow substantially in the years to come. The first is the deterioration of the international context: in the Balkans, Africa, the Caucasus and Moldova, but especially in Iraq and the Middle East, crises remain unresolved, wars are still going on and chaos could spread, while international terrorists have already proved that they are capable of striking everywhere and destabilising the traditional pattern of international security. Whether they like it or not, whether they are ready or not, Europeans will not be able to avoid this international disorder, at a time when security has become a major concern of European citizens. The second reason concerns the United States: whatever the divergences that may exist between Europe and the United States over the management of Iraq, it is now obvious that America will want its allies to do more, either on a bilateral basis with the American military, or within a UN or NATO framework, or even within a purely European framework on occasions when the US decides not to be involved. Even though it had reservations about the political dimension of ESDP, the United States has always been in favour of greater European capabilities. The large number of crises in the world, overstretch of US military forces and a common plea for a serious transatlantic partnership are thus, among others, good reasons why ESDP will continue to develop within the enlarged EU.

After the shock of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 on US territory, the Institute decided to set up an independent task force to address the issue of future European capabilities, in the light of two developments during the Belgian presidency in the second half of 2001: the 'Declaration on the operational capability of the common European security and defence policy' was approved by the European Council in Laeken on 15 December 2001, while the presidency report on ESDP, having paid special attention to improving the way public opinion is informed, stated that the Institute 'will work in particular on a publication on European Defence in the framework of the Petersberg tasks'. Made up of some of the most well-known academics experts on ESDP, this independent task force shared a basic assumption: even though the use of force is neither the first nor the only way to deal with regional or international crises, the EU must have at its disposal a certain level of forces at a certain state of readiness and operational efficiency, if only to widen its range of options when faced with a crisis and facilitate decision-making at the highest political level.

Rob de Wijk, André Dumoulin, Jan Foghelin, François Heisbourg, William Hopkinson, Tomas Ries, Lothar Rühl and Stefano Silvestri participated in the task force from the beginning. Marc Otte was also an active member before being appointed Javier Solana's special representative for the Middle East. He was then replaced by Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, both of them having participated, on a personal basis, in the ten meetings of the task force at the Institute. Jean-Yves Haine, from the Institute, had the difficult task of coordinating the different contributions and acting as rapporteur. The final report was widely discussed before being collectively endorsed by the task force. As chairman of the group, I have also to thank those advisers, outside the task force, who, on an ad hoc basis, agreed to provide the group with their comments and expertise on European defence.

The main task of the group was to select the most likely generic crisis scenarios that the EU could face in the decades to come, to assess the capabilities needed to deal with each of these contingencies, to identify the main current shortfalls within European forces and to propose remedies and options for adapting European capabilities, if the option of military intervention were to be chosen at the EU level. The group's mandate was not to address the institutional setting of security and defence policy, within the Treaty on European Union, nor to review the full range of political constraints that have shaped ESDP so far. Also, important questions such as the legitimacy of the use of force, the future of transatlantic relations, the EU-NATO 'Berlin-plus' agreement, the

decision-making process and the role of the Commission versus the Council and member states were obviously not ignored but were not addressed as such.

One of the main findings of this report is that there is a growing tension between two types of military requirements: on the one hand, the ability to provide very mobile, flexible and rapid forces for expeditionary intervention; on the other, the necessity to deploy and sustain for a very long period substantial peacekeeping forces for crisis management. Both are equally demanding and risky tasks, and could even be the two complementary phases of a single military operation, but they call for different types of forces, organisation, doctrine and training among European forces. The report does examine these two models of military operation but does not establish any order of priority nor does it attempt to choose between them: that will be a matter for EU political authorities and for member states, at a time when the new terrorist threats make the definition of agreed priorities even more difficult. In any case, as all European forces are today facing the same phenomenon of changing and increasing demands – while, in most European countries, increases in defence expenditures do not seem very likely – a degree of long-term, common European defence planning may become increasingly attractive. One of the most striking elements of today's world is indeed that external events outstrip strategies and political will.

Paris, May 2004

Introduction

The aim of this report is to assess European capabilities in the light of generic scenarios that the Union may face in the near future, to underline their deficiencies and to suggest the necessary reforms that the European Union should promote in order to enhance its capacity for autonomous action in the world arena. Based on strategic scenarios, this report points out military and security deficiencies in Europe's ability to respond to international challenges, threats and risks that are likely to arise in the coming years. It suggests that solutions in the field of defence to bridge current gaps can be found if members of the Union have the political and budgetary willingness to implement the necessary reforms. The costs of not doing so would be much greater in the long term than those of making the required adjustments in the short term.

Europe is at peace, but the world is not. The European Union represents a uniquely successful endeavour to overcome rivalries, disputes and wars among its members. With the obsolescence of force as an instrument for resolving disputes between its members, security in a situation of mutual vulnerability has become based on transparency, openness and interdependency.[1] The result of the half-century process of European integration is inescapable: member states of the European Union have never been so prosperous and free. They enjoy a level of peace and stability unprecedented in European history. The Union has become a model for the world and an attraction for the rest of Europe. Having begun with just six members, the Union now encompasses 25 countries representing more than 450 million people.

The international environment, however, does not share the same characteristics. In the era of globalisation, no sovereign entity is invulnerable to security risks and threats. What is happening in distant places has direct or indirect consequences for Europe and European interests. Since 11 September 2001, international terrorism has become the most prominent security

1. On this evolution, see Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations, Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century* (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), pp. 26-37.

threat. Combined with the risk of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), international terrorism represents a strategic threat to Europe. Attacks carried out in recent months include those in Spain, Turkey, Kenya, Morocco and Bali. European citizens have been among the victims of these aggressions. Most importantly, international terrorism attempts to destroy and disrupt the interests and values on which European societies are built. In addition, regional conflict, especially in the Middle East, the collapse of states, notably in Africa, regional instability in neighbouring countries of Europe like Belarus or Moldova, organised crime and cross-border trafficking constitute real and severe risks for the Union. All these security threats have complex roots. Among them, endemic inequalities, perceived injustice and failing governance demand active, comprehensive and lasting determination to address them.

The contrast between a peaceful Europe and an unstable international environment is not new, but the challenges it currently poses suggest that new objectives should be set. When in 1992 the Union decided to launch the euro and expressed its willingness to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the tragedy of the Balkans conflicts demonstrated the contrast between integration in the West and disintegration in the East. The Union has learned from its early failures; it is now implementing a successful stabilisation policy in the Balkans. When, at the European Convention, new ideas for more efficient defence and security policies were put forward, the Union was deeply divided over the Iraq conflict. It now has a security strategy framework first proposed at the Thessaloniki summit in June 2003, then endorsed at the Brussels summit in December 2003. Beyond that document, there is a genuine willingness to act in a more proactive and responsible way in world affairs. Operation *Artemis* and, more recently, the coordinated diplomacy vis-à-vis Iran, are telling illustrations of this new attitude.

The consequences of an enlarged Europe are also demanding, internally and externally. At 25, the Union is more diverse and the intergovernmental decision-making process in foreign policy is likely to become more difficult. Enlargement is one of the Union's most successful security strategies but, with borders stretching to Russia, hitherto remote problems will become immediate concerns. Instability in the Caucasus, stabilisation in the Balkans, environmental issues, organised crime and illegal trafficking represent a combination of old and new challenges for the Union.

There is a renewed awareness among member states of the need for a 'more active, a more capable and a more responsible' role for the Union. The European Security Strategy is the best illustration of this new disposition. The document is historic: for the first time in the history of the Union, member states have agreed to endorse a threat-driven document. The key threats identified are terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime:

> Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.[2]

The strategy is based on three pillars: first, responding to the global threats of terrorism, WMD proliferation and organised crime by recognising that the first line of defence now lies abroad; second, building security in Europe's neighbourhood by consolidating stabilisation in the Balkans and extending economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the South and East, and remaining engaged and committed to resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is a strategic priority; third, upholding and developing international law and strengthening the United Nations Charter, and building an international order based on effective multilateralism.

The Solana document is a major success: it is sufficiently broad to include varying strategic traditions but precise enough to become a motor of international action; it enhances the Union's credibility in the eyes of the major international actors, above all the United States; and it identifies the new threats without renouncing the Union's specific *acquis* and identity. The Security Strategy is by definition outward-looking. The homeland defence role of military forces is therefore not explicitly dwelt upon. The corresponding requirements need to be addressed, however, and they are taken into account in this report. The document is, in any case, demanding in terms of capabilities required.

The Union has a wide range of tools to enhance its role in world politics, from assistance programmes to police missions. Two of its members are permanent members of the UN Security Council and usually two others are members on a rotating basis. The Union provides 40 per cent of the UN's budget, and is the largest contributor of aid and economic assistance in the world. Forces

2. Javier Solana, 'A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy', document adopted at the European Council, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

from European members intervene to restore and maintain peace all over the world. In 2002, they were present in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Georgia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kosovo, Kuwait, Macedonia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan. In 2003, significant deployments were decided individually in Iraq, collectively in Democratic Republic of Congo. All in all, more than 100,000 European troops were deployed abroad. Yet, in a majority of cases, such deployments were dependent on external sources for transport, support and protection. The capacity for autonomous action remains severely constrained.

Since the St-Malo agreement over five years ago, the Union has set up its institutional structures in order to be able to act more effectively in defence and security. It has set itself an ambitious 'Headline Goal' – the ability to deploy up to an army corps to fulfil 'Petersberg missions'. Yet the target date of 2003 was not met. At the October 2003 informal meeting of EU defence ministers, Javier Solana implicitly acknowledged that the likely deadline would be 2010.[3] If members of the Union are clearly aware of Europe's deficiencies in terms of capabilities, the often dilatory process of correcting them is inadequate. It took nearly a decade to agree on such a fundamental programme as the A400M military cargo aircraft. While the Union's role cannot be reduced to its military component, it should not be forgotten that hard power is sometimes the best route to soft power. The stabilisation policy in the Balkans, which involves police forces and civilian officials, is a success, but without the enforcement of peace by military forces, such a policy would not have been possible. To be effective, an engagement must be backed by force. That was the chief lesson of Bosnia.

For budgetary and political reasons, redressing the imbalance between a civilian and a militarily responsible Europe is difficult. Over the last decade, defence budgets in the Union have been constantly reduced. With the exception of France and Britain, this trend has not been corrected despite the significant worsening of the international context. Moreover, opportunities to take advantage of obvious synergies and economies of scale have been missed. The current European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) has made some improvements but crucial deficiencies remain. In that respect, the European 'Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments'[4] should enhance cooperation among members.

3. 'Il nous faudra développer cet horizon ensemble en vue d'un objectif de moyen terme pour 2010. Cette dimension temporelle nous offre le plus de possibilités de coopération et de synergie entre les efforts des Etats membres et nous donne le plus de flexibilité budgétaire.' Remarks by Javier Solana, EU informal meeting of defence ministers, Rome, 3-4 October 2003 (official version available in French only).

4. This is the official name; for simplicity it is referred to hereafter as 'the Agency'.

The Security Strategy could be seen as a wake-up call for the Union's members. By recognising that the world is dangerous and complex, it calls for a Europe that is more capable in foreign affairs. Sharing more *global* responsibilities, enhancing an *effective* multilateralism, and taking on a *preventive* engagement strategy are ambitious goals that will stay unfulfilled if the current gap between ends and means persists. These goals call for rapidly deployable and long-term sustainable forces; they imply a better integration of civilian and military missions; they are based on the assumption of a more autonomous Union in defence matters inside and outside the 'Berlin-plus' agreement. The credibility of Europe's strategy will ultimately be based on its capacity to fulfil these ambitions.

Most importantly, the Union is a strategic actor with values and interests to protect and project. All EU members have vital interests, beginning with defence of the Union's territorial integrity, economic survival and its social and political security. The 'value interests' of the Union lie in the promotion of a stable and peaceful environment in its neighbourhood, and in the strengthening of a rule-based international order. These interests suggest several possible types of missions:

Vital interest	Mission
Integrity of member states	Homeland defence and consequence management
Economic survival	Projecting stability to protect trade routes and the free flow of raw materials
Social and political security	Combating organised crime and projecting stability to prevent a massive influx of refugees

Value interest	Mission
International peace and security	Projecting stability to protect and enforce the international rule of law
Universally accepted norms and values	Projecting stability to protect and enforce fundamental norms and freedoms; humanitarian aid; peacekeeping; peace building

The European Union is a community firmly based on values such as democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. What the Union stands for has never been better summarised than in the preamble to the European Union's 2003 draft Constitution:

> Conscious that Europe is a continent that has brought forth civilisation; that its inhabitants, arriving in successive waves from earliest times, have gradually developed the values underlying humanism: equality of persons, freedom, respect for reason,
>
> Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, the values of which, still present in its heritage, have embedded within the life of society the central role of the human person and his or her inviolable and inalienable rights, and respect for law,
>
> Believing that reunited Europe intends to continue along the path of civilisation, progress and prosperity, for the good of all its inhabitants, including the weakest and most deprived; that it wishes to remain a continent open to culture, learning and social progress; and that it wishes to deepen the democratic and transparent nature of its public life, and to strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world …[5]

The European post-modern order needs to be completed, but most importantly it needs to be secure and defended. The construction of the European political organisation, which by its very nature is inward-looking, must also endeavour to adapt to new international developments and contingencies. The scenarios identified in this report are illustrations of the challenges that may lie ahead for the Union.

5. Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe; available at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/constitution/preamble/index_en.htm.

The international context

1

The international system has witnessed fundamental changes since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Empire. This peaceful change opened an era of unprecedented globalisation that benefited liberal democracies politically and economically. The information technology revolution, and the so-called 'new economy' based on it, produced decade-long economic growth that helped the integration process. The creation of a single currency in turn boosted European economies and common market practices. By contrast, the political and social heritage of Soviet or Communist domination in Eastern Europe was far more difficult to overcome. In particular, social fragmentation and deficient governance plunged some countries into social unrest, hostile fragmentation and civil wars. In the case of Yugoslavia, the worst massacres since the Second World War and its immediate aftermath were committed. These presented major humanitarian challenges for Western liberal democracies. It took nearly a decade to recognise that diplomacy without a credible threat of force has a limited impact. With the tardy but decisive intervention of NATO, and therefore US power, these wars ended and lasting peace was achieved. With it also came the first recognition by the Union that coordination of foreign policies and modernisation of its military tools were necessary to address the difficult task of crisis prevention and management.

The end of bipolarity offered opportunities for the reunification of the European continent based on shared values and common interests. The Union represents a model for the entire continent, and indeed an example of peaceful integration for the world. This emerging 'post-modern' order is unique in the world. The Union seems ready to defend it by entering conflicts to uphold principles, as it did in Bosnia and Kosovo, albeit belatedly and reluctantly. But there are few, if any, problems of this kind that Europe can deal with on its own.

Globalisation creates wealth but it also carries global problems and risks. Environmental challenges such as global warming, worldwide diseases such as AIDS or epidemic such as SARS, or computer viruses, cannot be effectively tackled without the collective involvement of the international community. Globalisation also creates tensions and conflicts. Economic crises, failed governance, ethnic violence and religious antagonism are amplified by the gap between the haves and the have-nots. These dividing lines cross the old geopolitical system based on territories and sovereignty. The latter sources of conflicts are not new, and not more numerous or bloodier than before, but their impact today is quite different.

The new world

In the 1990s, security debates presented a paradoxical face. On the one hand, there were efforts to broaden the debate to include environment and soft power issues; on the other, violent signs of discontent, like the first attack on the World Trade Centre or the attempt to target the Eiffel Tower, went relatively ignored. With 11 September 2001, this ambiguity was over.

The rising threats: international terrorism and WMD proliferation

As stated in the European Security Strategy, 'international terrorism is a strategic threat'. While terror is not a new phenomenon, its current manifestation has thrown up an unprecedented combination of non-state actors and capabilities to inflict mass destruction or disruption. Naturally, the empowerment of these non-state actors does not exist in isolation: it interacts with strategies of state actors, and from the Taliban in Afghanistan to the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan.

If there was one phenomenon that members of the Union were, if not accustomed to then at least aware of, it was terrorism. However, hyper-terrorism is quite different from the classical terrorist groups, like ETA, IRA, Action Directe, the Red Brigades or the Red Army Faction, who were active in Europe. Because of their need to win over the population, these groups were restrained in their willingness to use unlimited violence. As one expert has argued, these terrorists wanted 'many people watching, but not many people

dead'.[6] As demonstrated by the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, with hyper-terrorism there is a readiness to resort to unrestricted violence and a willingness to inflict the widest possible damage. It comes from a conviction that the battle is absolute, even more so when it is waged in the name of a divine authority. Religious extremism reinforces a strictly Manichaean view in which the enemy is demonised and provides the justification for whatever level of violence is needed to destroy him. This radicalisation, along with the non-state nature of the threat, makes certain terrorist strategies basically non-deterrable.

Non-state actors attempting to wage mass destruction terrorism and suicide attacks cannot be countered by the same set of policies as those applying to antagonists controlling a state. The classic nuclear deterrence is irrelevant against such groups, all the more so as their operating bases and cells are often in the heart of the targeted country itself, as was the case with al-Qaeda in the United States or Aum Shinrikyo in Japan. A policy of containment through the deployment of military forces along sealed borders is equally ineffective. Balancing strategies against this kind of threat has virtually no meaning against non-state, cross-border terrorist groups. In the absence of such options, the tools available to policy-makers lie in the detection of potential and actual perpetrators through accurate intelligence and analysis; in preventive policies that address the root causes of hyper-terrorism through economic, political and ideological means; in pre-emptive operations, either by police or military forces, against a group and its network; in damage limitation through timely and effective hardening of the terrorists' objectives; in damage confinement and management after a terrorist attack through the identification of its source. These policies and strategies require significant departures from existing defence policies and current strategic cultures in Europe. Because the lines between internal and external security have become blurred, a new balance between homeland defence and operations abroad must be found. Because hyper-terrorism is a global threat, it must be countered by a comprehensive approach, ranging from political and diplomatic initiatives to military operations. In the latter case, transformation of existing European forces to enhance their deployability and effectiveness either for protection or for projection is a necessary condition.

The second rising threat, linked to the first, is the risks resulting from the failure of non-proliferation regimes. According to

6. Brian Jenkins 'International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare', RAND Corporation, June 1974, quoted by Harald Müller, 'Terrorism, proliferation: a European assessment', *Chaillot Paper* 58 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, March 2003), p. 22.

the European Security Strategy, proliferation of WMD is 'potentially the greatest threat to our security'. Non-proliferation policies and regimes have been relatively successful over the last decades. In 2003, the list of states actively seeking nuclear weapons was shorter than it was in 1975, with countries such as Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea and Taiwan having abandoned their programmes. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has become a quasi-universal norm, with only four states – India, Pakistan, Israel and recently North Korea – remaining outside. In the field of chemical weapons, existing stockpiles have been disarmed and partially destroyed, notably in Russia, India, South Korea and the United States. Ballistic proliferation has also decreased. During the 1970s and the 1980s, *Scud*, *Frog* and SS-21 missiles were exported by the USSR to more than 20 countries, from Algeria to Vietnam. China exported 2,500 km-range CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia. Missile proliferation on this scale is no longer occurring.[7]

However, notwithstanding this positive historical record, proliferation of WMD is becoming an increasingly serious security risk for Europe. If the case of North Korea does not represent a direct threat to Europe, some elements are none the less disturbing. There is first the possibility that Pyongyang could develop a 10,000 km-range ballistic missile that could hit Europe directly. Second, a failure of the NPT regime with North Korea could trigger an escalating arms race in Asia. Third, North Korea's policy of gaining hard currency through the transfer of missiles and missile technology, especially to such countries as Pakistan, is a destabilising factor in an already volatile region.

Most importantly, the combination of enhanced WMD proliferation and the aggravation of tensions in the 'Greater Middle East'[8] represents the most serious challenge to the Union. This is so for two mutually reinforcing reasons. First, the nuclear breakout of a long-standing NPT signatory such as Iran could lead to a chain reaction of similar endeavours by other Middle East states and beyond, notably in East Asia. In this respect, the web of cooperation between elements of Pakistan's nuclear military establishment and countries such as Iran and Libya, as well as North Korea, demonstrates that the material elements of such a chain reaction are already in place. Such a nuclearisation of the highly unstable Middle East would have direct consequences for Europe, over and above the general effects of the break-up of the international non-

7. Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt (eds.), 'Fighting proliferation – European perspectives', *Chaillot Paper* 66 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2003).

8. Although definitions vary, it is understood here as a geographical concept extending from Morocco to Afghanistan.

proliferation regime. Second, the consequences of WMD technologies spreading to radical groups committed to maximum destruction are lethal. Some may argue that these proliferation risks do not constitute a direct military threat to the Union proper, but as 50 per cent of Europe's energy needs come from this region, the threat is direct. Moreover, with the EU's potential admission of Turkey, the whole security situation in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf will become a primary concern for the Union, because the security of one its members will be directly at stake.

The Union has recently demonstrated that it does not intend to ignore nuclear proliferation. Following its strategy document and Action Plan of spring 2003 against proliferation of WMD, the Union has successfully engaged in constructive diplomatic dialogue with Iran. The IAEA has now secured better access to Iran's nuclear facilities. In the same vein, the diplomatic efforts of the United Kingdom and the United States have produced significant results vis-à-vis Libya.

International terrorism embodies the darkest side of globalisation. Terrorists can access technology for mass destruction or mass disruption against any target around the world. Thus, the nature of the threat has changed. From localised atrocity to the capability to commit mass murder, terrorist attacks, coupled with the worrying prospects of WMD like chemical weapons or bombs designed to disperse radioactive material, have significantly raised the level of fear and anxiety in the world. Indeed, since 11 September, innocuous means of travel like civilian aircraft can become missiles of destruction. This 'dark side of the global village'[9] has the potential to significantly disrupt and destruct the global village itself. Europe remains a primary target of such terrorist acts.

The traditional threats and their new consequences

With the expansion and consolidation of the democratic peace, classic interstate conflicts have receded but sources of instability and conflicts have not. As stated in the European Security Strategy, 'collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance and adds to regional instability.' Organised crime, cross-border trafficking and illegal immigration represent challenges for the rule of law and could

9. The expression is from Anatol Lieven, quoted by Christopher Coker, 'Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-First Century: NATO and the Management of Risks', *Adelphi Paper* 345, 2002, p. 40.

undermine the social order. Civil unrest, endemic anarchy or the breakdown of state structures in Africa or the Caucasus do not constitute direct threats to the Union or its members in the classical strategic sense. However, their by-products, such as drugs, disease and refugees, can seriously affect the daily life of European citizens. Because criminal activities in these pre-modern environments are often linked to legitimate economic activity in the Union, their impact is more direct and more damaging than their often remote locations seem to indicate. As the wars of Yugoslav succession have demonstrated, but also the collapse of Sierra Leone or the rising chaos in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the harmful consequences of failing states have a tendency to spread. Without effective control of borders, anarchy expands quickly. Without an effective monopoly of the legitimate use of force, terrorist activities proliferate.

Failing states could thus have negative consequences for the Union, but first and foremost, their effects on local populations are the most destructive. Even though calculations of interests may point to non-intervention, value judgments may demand intervention. The more peaceful the post-modern European order becomes, the less tolerant it becomes of violations of human rights and crimes against 'humanity'. Publics ask their governments to intervene in remote places where such violations occur. The war in Kosovo was an attempt to stop human suffering, while the non-intervention in Rwanda allowed a massive genocide. Interventions in the defence of values are demanding and difficult.

In order to achieve humanitarian objectives, armed forces have to become rapidly and effectively deployable to far-away theatres. In parallel, public opinion is reluctant to tolerate national casualties and desires, no less understandably, the limitation of unnecessary damage to the societies in which forces operate. High-technology weapons could help produce such results. But this high-tech side of warfare is not by itself sufficient. Military operations have to lay the grounds for postwar reconstruction, so that when the violence stops lasting peace can be built. Peace-building efforts and a commitment to lasting stabilisation are indispensable if the sources of violence are to be effectively addressed.

The Union has developed a capacity to address these peace-building operations but has so far been less successful in the transformation of its armed forces into integrated, rapidly deployable, modern war-fighting units. However, since the creation of a Euro-

pean Security and Defence Policy a half decade ago, important improvements have been made. These are reviewed in the next chapter.

The new international context raises a fundamental question: can 'post-modernism in one region' really work? The European Security Strategy provides the first answer: 'As a Union of 25 states with over 450 million people generating a quarter of the world's Gross National Product, and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is *inevitably* a global player . . . Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.'[10]

The new Europe

The process of European political integration, begun more than half a century ago with the Coal and Steel Community, has endured many external as well as internal changes. The 'ever-closer union' formula pointed to the deepening of the Union, such as the completion of the single market, the launch of the euro and the Schengen agreement. In parallel with these successes, the ever-enlarging Union also became a reality. From its initial 6, the Union grew to 25 members in May 2004. This new dimension confers upon the Union even more legitimacy but also raises important concerns in terms of the new security environment and the heterogeneity of its members and the decision-making process that this implies. These issues have received provisional but promising answers, with debates at the Convention and with the European Security Strategy.

The enlarged Union and its environment

Over the past decades, the Union has pursued at least two distinct genuine security policies towards its immediate and extending neighbourhood: an approach aimed, first and foremost, at *stabilisation*, based mainly on fostering regional cooperation and broad partnerships; and an approach aimed at *integration* proper: bringing neighbouring countries directly into the EU through a bilateral process based on 'conditionality'. The more successful the first strategy of stabilisation has been, the greater has been the likelihood that it leads to the second strategy of integration.

10. Emphasis added.

The *stabilisation* approach was born with the first Stability Pact proposed by former French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur in 1993 for Central Europe, and has taken the form of a series of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements eventually leading to the current enlargement process. The stabilisation process is now aimed in three main directions: the Balkans, the East and the South.

Historically, the Balkans was the area where a European security policy began, albeit inadequately, to emerge. Indeed the Balkans wars were the crucial reason behind an autonomous and responsible ESDP.[11] With the pacification of the area, the Union has launched a Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) intended to foster peace, prosperity and democracy in the region. The Union has agreed to a 'contractual' relationship with the relevant states or entities: Albania, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia/FYROM, Serbia and Montenegro, plus Kosovo. The aim is to bridge the gap between 'simple' stabilisation and 'full' integration. But most importantly, this stabilisation policy has taken the form of major peacekeeping and police missions that underline the Union's approach to stability and nation-building. At the Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003, the Union reiterated its support for the 'European perspective' of the Western Balkan countries, which were due to 'become an integral part of the EU once they meet the established criteria'. Croatia filed a formal application for membership in February 2003, followed by Macedonia/FYROM in March 2004. The Union is understandably wary of being too hasty, given the record of violence in the region and because it is reluctant to be seen as rewarding such violence. This ambivalence, however, risks creating a dilemma: the commitment eventually to grant full membership cannot be honoured unless there is substantial progress on the rule of law and economic viability, yet these may not be achieved without that commitment.

The second direction of the stabilisation process is the East. The Eastern dimension has acquired a central character, owing in part to the round of enlargement. Ukraine, Belarus, and most importantly Russia, have become neighbours of the Union and as such they deserve particular attention. Enlargement will bring the EU some 2,400 km of borders with Ukraine and Belarus, to which Romanian membership will add 450 km on its border with Moldova. Compared with the original Treaty of Rome, the imme-

11. See Chapter 2.

diate environment of the Union has changed dramatically. This is particularly the case with Russia.

The Union has been slow to initiate a security dialogue with Russia, leaving that to the United Sates and NATO whose relations, after the crisis over Kosovo, have dramatically recovered to include an agreement on peacekeeping operations and crisis management. This is not to say that European countries do not cultivate special links with Moscow – Germany developing close trade ties, the Baltics keeping their distance and France recognising its particular status – but, as such, the Union has until now not taken a coordinated approach vis-à-vis Russia.[12] This is all the more important since the Union has expressed a renewed interest in neighbouring countries like Ukraine and Moldova which will represent new border challenges. In particular, Moldova has recently received special attention from the Union, owing to the conflict with Transnistria, Moldova's easternmost region that has declared independence, where so far a small OSCE mission has assumed the main burden. Since the Union has expressed its interest in exploring, together with the other international mediators, joint actions in Moldova, a genuine security dialogue with Russia has become necessary and urgent.

The third dimension is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, commonly referred to as the Barcelona process. Here, the results have been more mixed. Because of the diverse colonial heritage, the members of the Union have sometimes given priority to internal regime stability over the defence and promotion of democratic rights. However, with the potential connections between illegal immigration and terrorism, the preventive engagement strategy adopted by the Union will require a more coordinated approach as well as more targeted and specific instruments in keeping with the findings of the two UNDP reports on human development in the Arab world. With the American 'Greater Middle East' initiative arises the issue of policy coordination between the Union and the United States in the region.

The Union's stabilisation policy has been a success but the challenges ahead are demanding. Article I-56 of the draft Constitutional Treaty states: 'The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring states, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.' The European Commission President, Romano

12. See for example Dov Lynch, 'Russia faces Europe', *Chaillot Paper* 60 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, May 2003).

Prodi, has set out a vision of the EU offering its neighbours 'everything but institutions'. The aim is to promote the emergence of a 'ring of friends' around Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, bound together by shared values, open markets and borders, and enhanced cooperation in such areas as research, transport, energy, conflict prevention and law enforcement.[13] This ambition has now been translated into a coherent strategy of preventive engagement. As stated in the European Security Strategy,

> Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations . . . We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.

Building security in the Union's neighbourhood demands a comprehensive approach that employs a wide range of tools, including the military. In operational terms, implicit planning assumptions have envisaged a virtual geographical radius for EU military crisis management up to approximately 4,000 km from Brussels that roughly covers the present immediate neighbourhood, starting with the Balkans up to the former Soviet Union proper and south of the Mediterranean. This has serious implications in terms of projection and sustainability of forces. Some of the scenarios stress this point.

The second strategy of the Union, *enlargement*, is a more genuine European approach vis-à-vis its environment. The reunification of Europe and the integration of acceding states have increased the Union's security but also bring Europe closer to troubled areas. Enlarging the Union has been, and should remain, the most effective security policy. By extending the Union's norms, rules, opportunities and constraints to successive applicants, the Union has made instability and conflict on the continent ever less likely. The current enlargement, however, is nothing like the previous ones. It is fundamentally different in size, scope, and character: enlarging from an EU of 15 member states to one of 25-plus, as decided at the Copenhagen European Council of December 2002, has changed the character of the Union.

The accession of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia

13. 'Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours', Commission Communication COM(2003), 104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003.

as full members in May 2004 means an increase of population of 20 per cent but an added GDP of only a few percentage points, between 5 and 9. This enlargement increases the Union's diversity. In ESDP matters, different strategic traditions and orientation and size make common security more difficult. However, this enlargement will not fundamentally affect the Union's common foreign and security policy, whose principles the new members have endorsed and to which they have already contributed in actual operations. If the new members add relatively little in terms of capabilities, it should be stressed that some have over the years developed niche capabilities that are extremely valuable, and some are transforming their military forces in a fast and effective manner. In particular, some have successfully initiated functional specialisation that will contribute to the strength of the Headline Goal.

If the Union's enlargement process raises the difficult question of the ultimate frontier of the Union, for the immediate future its borders are now broadly defined.[14] This new Union will have new responsibilities that call for transformed capabilities.

The European Security Strategy

A defence and security policy, like every action in international relations, embodies values and interests. In their combination lies the true identity of an international actor. The Union has been build up on democratic values and human rights that it has projected and enlarged over the past decades. But this post-modern order contrasts starkly with a less regulated and more violent international context. The recognition of this not-so-benign environment has led the Union to formulate a truly European security strategy.

A strategic framework

The international context, as we have seen, has clearly become more unstable and uncertain since 11 September. In Europe, awareness of a deteriorating international environment has been less acute than in other parts of the world. With the advent of catastrophic terrorism, the Union cannot escape this increasing insecurity. Furthermore, after the crisis in Iraq, there has been a general and rapid acknowledgement that the Union, when divided, is powerless. These lessons have produced a new realism and a new activism in

14. Art. O (Title VII) of the Treaty on European Union says that 'any European state' can apply to become a member of the Union, provided that it meets the standards of the Union. For the moment, Croatia, Macedonia/FYROM and Albania are left outside. Bulgaria and Romania are in the process of negotiating their accession. Turkey has been recognised as a potential candidate.

the Union's security policy. Diplomacy cannot be conducted without the promotion of specific interests, nor can it be effective without taking into account international realities, threats and opportunities.

Drawing up a security concept has been an historic event for a post-modern organisation like the Union. Its aim was to reach an agreement sufficiently broad to include widely varying strategic traditions but precise enough to become a motor of international action; to maintain credibility in the eyes of other major international actors, above all the United States; and to address the new threats without renouncing the Union's particular *acquis* and identity. In this last objective, the Union has undertaken a clear shift, by balancing its 'soft' power tradition with new and more 'hard' power elements, by adding some sticks to its carrots.

First, it has recognised the reality and danger of international terrorism. It reminds the general public that Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorists, that al-Qaeda networks include links and cells in the territory of the Union, and that al-Qaeda has named, and indeed attacked, European countries. There is thus nothing to be complacent about. But it is also clear that the Union does not endorse only a military approach to terrorism; the solution to this complex issue must be global and political.

Next, there is the problem of proliferation of WMD. In that respect, even before the Security Strategy the Union had agreed common principles and actions. While relying on classic regime tools to contain proliferation, the Union has acknowledged that active measures, including the use of force, could sometimes be necessary:

> To address the new threats, a broad approach is needed. Political and diplomatic preventative measures (multilateral treaties and export control regimes) and resort to the competent international organizations (IAEA, OPCW, etc.) form the first line of defence. When these measures (including political dialogue and diplomatic pressure) have failed, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) could be envisioned. The UN Security Council should play a central role.[15]

Lastly, it has identified the problem of failed states, which feeds terrorism and proliferation, and sometimes both. In that respect, the Union has re-emphasised its traditional approach of stabilisa-

15. Available at http://ue.eu.int/ pressdata/EN/reports/76328. pdf. See also Antonio Missiroli (comp.), 'From Copenhagen to Brussels. European defence: core documents, Volume IV', *Chaillot Paper* 67 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2003), pp. 106-9.

tion and long-term commitment. While the Union recognises that bad governance is a major source of instability, it advocates the extension of good governance rather than regime change.

As the European Security Strategy concludes its section on the threats,

> Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruc- tion, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.

A multilateral identity

The Union's international actions are based on the defence and projection of its interests, but they also embody its specific values and principles. The values of the EU are defined in a wide range of legal and political instruments. The Union has a European Court of Human Rights and a Court of Justice, and was instrumental in the creation of the International Criminal Court. In its Articles 2 and 3.4, the draft Treaty delivered by the Convention states that:

> The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These values are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination … In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, secu- rity, the sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights and in particular chil- dren's rights, as well as to strict observance and development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.[16]

In promoting and defending these values abroad, this specific ethic takes several forms. First, because of Europe's twentieth century history of self-destructive wars, the Union relies, as a guiding principle, on peaceful means to negotiate and settle disputes. More broadly, the Union has been keen to use what some have called its 'soft' power rather than its 'hard' power. As seen above, the stabilisation and enlargement process has set clear criteria for contractual agreements and negotiations with third parties.

16. Article 2 of the draft Treaty.

Second, the Union has over the past decades cultivated and implemented a moral diplomacy. In this, European governments have been at the forefront of the international community in recognising and promoting a *droit d'ingérence humanitaire*. This has served as the basis of the 'Petersberg tasks', it led to a proactive commitment in Bosnia and Kosovo, and has constituted a core dimension of ESDP so far. Most importantly, it has been translated into specifically European types of peacekeeping and policing operations. This specific dimension is unique in the world.

Third, and most importantly, the Union has considered the UN Charter as a basis for international action. Clearly, there have been difficult issues of international legality, the limits of which were tested in the case of Kosovo, where NATO's intervention was clearly endorsed *ex post facto* by the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary-General. However, a UN framework remains a cornerstone of European action in the field of peace enforcement and peacekeeping. In the same vein, the Union rejects the unilateral use of force. As stated in the European Security Strategy,

> In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.

The Union now has a general framework in which to think strategically. European Security and Defence Policy therefore rests on firmer ground. However, this strategic concept does not specifically address the adequacy between ends and means. Clearly, it calls for a sustained effort in capabilities but remains vague on the crucial question of adapting the tools at the disposal of the Union to these new strategic tasks. The aim of the scenarios given in Chapter 3 is to provide the reader with specific examples of what is lacking and what is needed.

The post-modern order built inside the Union contrasts vividly with the disorder in much of the outside world. ESDP as a policy of the Union was launched after the trauma of Bosnia. The deteriorating international landscape demands adaptation and improvement so that the Union is able to act, and not simply react. It is its duty to defend and protect the Union against international threats; it would be an historical mistake to underestimate their likelihood and their potentially lethal effects. This obligation arises at a moment when the traditional partner of the Union, the

United States, following the tragedy of 11 September 2001, has initiated international actions and reactions whose direct and indirect consequences are significant for the Union.

The new America

US foreign policy has major effects on the European Union. In 2003, Washington's actions, supported in Afghanistan but contested in Iraq, had seriously divided the Union and significantly split NATO. Because American strategy after 11 September was variously appreciated within the Union, it created a risk of divergences inside the Union at a moment when its enlargement and the Convention called for cohesion and unity. Europe's situation was thus difficult: on the one hand, the threat of terrorism called for increased collective measures and consensus; on the other, US strategy provoked centrifugal tendencies and divisions.[17]

With the end of the Soviet empire and following the 1991 Gulf War the United States was obviously the only superpower in the world. In international security, its power was essential. Yet Washington often displayed great reluctance to use that power, and when it decided to do so, it was under strict conditions designed to minimise American casualties. Throughout the 1990s, the United States was a superpower with limited domestic support for a world role. Public opinion was reluctant to endorse foreign involvements, or duties and responsibilities beyond its borders.

The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were an historical moment, a period of 'tectonic shifts' as Condoleezza Rice put it, similar to the rise of the Soviet challenge at the end of the 1940s. This tragedy conferred on the Bush administration a new paradigm through which every problem in the world arena had to be assessed. America was at war and, taking advantage of its supremacy, it intended to wage it on its own terms, following its own agenda, defining friends and foes by the sole criterion of their stance in the war on terrorism, and proclaiming a sovereign right to attack and change any regime that harboured terrorists while naming countries in a supposed 'axis of evil' that was only remotely, if at all, linked to al-Qaeda.

The answer of the Bush administration to 11 September displayed permanent trends as well as specific new features of US foreign policy. Among the former, several old habits could be

17. See Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt (eds.), 'One year on: lessons from Iraq', *Chaillot Paper* 68 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, March 2004).

identified: a Manichean approach to the definition of the enemy, a global interpretation of the threat, an ideological perspective in framing the challenge, a missionary zeal in fulfilling its new-found mission with the usual premium on power, technology and warfare as solutions to the new security dilemmas raised by international terrorism. Among the latter features, several innovations stand out: a clear emphasis on unilateralism to achieve US objectives, a shift from institutional management to ad hoc coalition building and a new prominence for the preventive use of force. This combination represents a more assertive version of American exceptionalism in world affairs, a kind of 'Wilsonianism in boots', as Pierre Hassner has aptly put it.[18]

America's security strategy

Global in its essence, the war against terrorism reveals the new US role in the world as it was envisaged in the National Security Strategy of September 2002. The working assumption of the NSS document underlines America's indisputable hegemony around the world. But this unparalleled hegemonic position, once a source of questioning if not a motive for inaction, is now a reality that needs to be maintained to discourage other nations from challenging US power. It sets a clear objective of continuing American military superiority where no state is to be allowed to equal the United States. But this embracing of hegemony followed paradoxically from a sudden, unprecedented and now exposed vulnerability.

From this starting point, the US strategy identified threats in the combination of terrorism, tyranny and technology, i.e. weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The combination of these 'three Ts' makes the security environment more complex and dangerous. Thus, at its core, the NSS document calls for the United States to use its 'unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence' to establish 'a balance of power that favours human freedom'.[19] A combination of unparalleled supremacy that should stay unchallenged and a global perception of the new threats formed the basis of the Bush doctrine.

In the fight against terror, some officials in the Bush administration advanced the idea – promoted well before September 2001 – that the expansion of democratic regimes was the only definitive solution that would prevent other terrorist attacks. According to its advocates, regime change was ultimately the best guarantee

18. Pierre Hassner, 'The United States: the empire of force or the force of empire?', *Chaillot Paper* 54 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, September 2002), p. 43.

19. The phrase 'balance of power that promotes freedom' is repeated five times in the document. Its paternity belongs to Condoleezza Rice. At the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, in April 2002, she observed that 'an earthquake of the magnitude of 9/11 can shift the tectonic plates of international politics . . . this is a period not just of grave danger, but of enormous opportunity . . . a period akin to 1945 to 1947, when American leadership expanded the number of free and democratic states – Japan and Germany among the great powers – to create a new balance of power that favoured freedom.' Quoted by Frances Fitzgerald, 'Bush & the World', *The New York Review of Books*, 26 September 2002.

against terror. Their objective was to democratise the entire Middle East, even if it meant imposing democracy by force. By linking the type of regime with the source of proliferation and the threat of terrorism, the Bush administration basically endorsed an extended agenda of overthrowing failed and/or rogue states. This identification of the threat was therefore global, not confined to a particular group like al-Qaeda. It named countries in the 'axis of evil' more than it identified groups and networks. If international terrorism is a transnational phenomenon, the US answer was none the less based mainly on geopolitics and territories. This combination of hegemony and regime change made all the difference between a prudent, realist policy of adjustments and a preventive doctrine whereby US hegemony would be used to win, not to manage, the 'war on terror'.

The peculiarity of the National Security Strategy lay in the methods envisaged for achieving these goals. Among the strategies contemplated, pre-emption and ad hoc coalitions of the willing were relatively new in US strategic thinking and had potentially disturbing consequences for transatlantic relations and for the Union.[20] The first option, prevention and pre-emption, has received detailed treatment, even though one should not exaggerate its place in the document. It should be noted that the potential use of preventive and pre-emptive strikes as such is not entirely new to US foreign policy, even though previous notions of pre-emptive strikes have been typically associated with covert operations, and that some European countries have explicitly included such a concept in their national doctrines.[21] The NSS posits a policy of 'proactive counter-proliferation', whereby it 'will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by . . . identifying and destroying the threats before they reach our borders'. It does make clear that:

> today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends.[22]

The American strategy has indeed two distinctive and controversial features. First, the document assumed that containment and deterrence, the strategic pillars of the Cold War, were no longer applicable in a world where the threat of retaliation 'is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states'. Even if the argument only questions the rationality of the leaders of these specific states,

20. See Gustav Lindstrom (ed.), *Shift or rift. Assessing US-EU relations after Iraq* (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003).

21. See for example the French *Loi de Programmation militaire*.

22. The National Security Strategy of the United States; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html.

the assumption none the less shifted the emphasis from the weapons involved to the personality of leaders that may have them. Second, it rejected the classic international law definition of pre-emption based on imminent danger of an attack by proclaiming the right to 'anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack'. This 'right' constitutes a clear broadening of the *jus ad bellum* and represents a controversial extension of international law.[23] In any case, this pre-emptive doctrine put a heavy premium on intelligence and its reliability. If there is disagreement about the accuracy, the probability or the existence of an imminent danger, the diplomatic room for manoeuvre becomes extremely narrow and multilateral frameworks such as the UN or NATO rapidly become ineffective.

The second specific feature of the Bush administration was the 'coalition of the willing' mantra: the main vehicle for cooperation is likely to be coalitions of the willing rather than institutional frameworks.[24] It broke with an American tradition of promoting and practicing international multilateralism that goes back to 1945. NATO, the backbone of the transatlantic partnership, becomes merely a toolbox for an American agenda to which allies have to submit or run the risk of being ignored. The consensus and diffuse reciprocity that formed the principles of the Atlantic grand bargain for fifty years were dismissed in favour of unilateral and sovereign actions. Coupled with the Manichean view of 'being with us or against us', this disinclination confronts traditional allies with an impossible dilemma of choosing between blind submission and overt opposition.[25]

The combination of these two elements – preventive strategy and unilateral policy – did put the Union in a difficult position. The war launched against the Taliban in Afghanistan appeared to be an appropriate way to destroy bin Laden's networks and sanctuaries, but the US strategic and military focus shifted rapidly to Iraq, which had only remote if not non-existent links with al-Qaeda. This opened a rift in the transatlantic community and, most importantly, a divide within the Union.

Consequences for the Union

The preventive doctrine has had at least three consequences for Europe: the first, the principle one, is direct, the second indirect

23. Indeed, when Israel pre-emptively destroyed the Osiraq nuclear power plant in Iraq on 7 June 1981, the UN Security Council unanimously (including the United States) condemned the act as 'clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct'. See UN Security Council Resolution 487 dated 19 June 1981. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, the then US Ambassador to the UN, described it as 'shocking' and compared it to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

24. See Donald Rumsfeld, 'The Coalition and the Mission', *The Washington Post*, 21 October 2001.

25. On 20 September 2001, President Bush addressed the US Congress, declaring, 'either you are with us or you are with the terrorists'.

and strategic, and the third domestic and political. The first concerns differing interpretations of international public law regarding the crucial issue of the use of force. The divergence over the necessity of and the reality of 'an imminent danger' touched upon the right of self-defence in Article 51 of the UN Charter.[26] The disputed legality was part of a broader and more significant disagreement about legitimacy. In that respect, practical questions quickly became issues of principle, and room for diplomatic manoeuvre quickly disappeared. In the case of Iraq, this disagreement became unbridgeable. Precisely because Iraq was a war of choice rather than a conflict of necessity, the debate evolved rapidly from the particular case to general principles, from Saddam's disarmament to Washington's use of force, from the opportuneness of a second UN resolution to the relevance of the UN itself, from a specific demand for assistance to Turkey to NATO's *raison d'être*. In that respect, the period starting from agreement on Resolution 1441 until the first opening salvo against Iraq was certainly historical. The damage caused to transatlantic relations by the Iraq crisis was unprecedented and considerable. But beyond Iraq, the transatlantic community remains deeply split over the legitimate conditions for the use of force. This disagreement runs the risk of putting an alliance such as NATO that is based on collective defence in serious trouble. In the past Europe has endorsed a preventive/pre-emptive policy for human rights violations, as in the case of Kosovo, but such a strategy has been deemed too controversial to be applied to regime change.

The second consequence is strategic. Once the most powerful actor in the international system had changed the rules of the game, these rules became more fragile. Preventive strike may be an overwhelmingly tempting tactic for a superpower like the United States but, precisely because it is advocated and practiced by a great power, it sets a new standard of international rules of conduct and a clear precedent that could be copied by other powers. China could well decide to adopt a 'pre-emptive strategy' towards Taiwan, India could do the same with Pakistan, etc. In other words, it is *the idea itself* that is disturbing. If emulated by others, this doctrine will render the world far more uncertain and risky. Moreover, it could potentially lead other actors to acquire nuclear capabilities in order to deter preventive/pre-emptive strikes. The true meaning of international norms and rules lies in the definition of what is and what is not permissible in the international

26. This notion of imminent danger is not explicitly mentioned in Art. 51 of the UN Charter, but it is part of a customary right of anticipatory self-defence encapsulated in the 'inherent right' of self-defence stipulated by this article.

arena. Norms shape the expectations and calculations of states-men; they generate understandings among the units of the system and they influence public opinion. These understandings are always fragile, the temptation to bypass them always present. In that respect, initiatives by the great powers are especially crucial because above all they shape these norms, invite imitation and emulation, and sanction their respect. The Concert of Europe after 1815 and Roosevelt's Four Policemen after 1945 were attempts to organise world politics around understandings among great powers. The current UN Security Council is the latest embodiment of that principle. Its main duty lies in ensuring the application of two cornerstones of today's international relations: the sovereignty of its units and the legitimacy of collective action. Because the pre-emptive doctrine produces a unilateral assess-ment of security imperatives, it suggests that there is one law for the United States and other states of which it approves, and another law for the remainder. This contrasts significantly with the Union's principles of peaceful negotiation and consensus building, and leads to an international system that is more uncer-tain and less regulated than it was before.

The third consequence of US preventive doctrine is domestic and political. US pre-emptive strategy as applied in Iraq severely divided the European Union. At the very moment when the Union for the first time began the already difficult debate about its ESDP architecture at the Convention, major European countries – Ger-many, France, Spain, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom – adopted different positions vis-à-vis the Iraq crisis. Furthermore, these disagreements seem to have been exacerbated by the United States. There was a distinct US readiness to emphasise differences rather than encourage agreement. When such crucial divergences exist among the big players of the Union, Europe is paralysed. Recognition of this incapacity to act when divided and acknowl-edgement of strong public support for an active and coherent European foreign policy led to a quick political recovery at the June 2003 Thessaloniki summit when, for the first time, an ambi-tious draft of a European security strategy was unanimously endorsed. As in the past, the Union was able to transform a crisis into an opportunity for progress.

11 September and America's response to it significantly pulled the transatlantic framework in two different directions. On the one hand, the terrorist attacks had the salutary consequence that

Western democracies drew closer together through their enhanced cooperation on anti-terrorism. On that level, the capture and dismantling inside Europe of a significant number of terrorist cells bears witness to this successful cooperation. On the other hand, the methods on which the United States is relying to implement its security strategy have deeply divided the Atlantic community.

The main characteristic of this community today is the heterogeneity of its members. A lot has been written about the imbalance of power between Europe and the United States This is partially true, but hardly new.[27] The real divides lie elsewhere. First, there is a divergence about the scope of the global agenda set by Washington. The United States now views the world through the prism of the war on terror. It made connections between it and, for example, the Iraqi regime and others in the 'axis of evil', which is certainly not an axis, and whose members pose very varied kinds of security or political problems, most of which have little or nothing to do with hyperterrorism. While the Union recognises the threat posed by international terrorism and WMD proliferation, it does not endorse this American *revisionist* ambition in its entirety.[28] Second, even when there is a convergence of objectives, there is still deep disagreement about the means to achieve them. Effective multilateralism and UN legitimacy remain the Union's most favoured paths. For its part, because it is able to, and because it believes that it has a right to act alone when it deems it necessary, the Bush administration places a much higher value on acting on its own judgement and authority, and in particular on the use of military force. It also asserts, in Manichean vein, that whosoever is not with it is against it. Almost all European countries are unable to follow these US perceptions. The scope for transatlantic partnership in addressing common problems is therefore limited. If the United States were able to accept partners rather than subordinates, and modify or limit its insistence on having its own way despite potential partners' views and objectives, the scope for transatlantic collaboration would be greater than ever.

27. The most emblematic example is Robert Kagan, *Paradise & Power, America and Europe in the New World* (London: Atlantic Books, 2003).

28. The term is not used here in a pejorative sense; it merely portrays the relationship between an actor and the international system. This relation was first formulated in 1946 by Hans Morgenthau in *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).

ESDP so far

2

The EU integration process has been based largely on a common perception of the calamitous consequences of Europe's twentieth-century wars; the challenge ahead is a shared conception of its future. The wars in former Yugoslavia led to a realisation that, to be effective, diplomacy must be coordinated among the main European partners and backed by a credible ability to use force. This lesson remains even more valid today.

The antecedents of ESDP: the quest for responsibility, the failure in Bosnia

During the Cold War, Europe's military security remained a NATO monopoly, although that did not preclude differences of view between the two sides of the Atlantic, nor specific instances of intra-European cooperation. While the Western European Union was occasionally resorted to as a European forum for discussing security questions, its military significance and political role were marginal. After the failure to ratify the European Defence Community in August 1954, coordinated European defence was in practice taboo and remained so until the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The end of the Cold War undoubtedly opened up new possibilities. A latent division of labour emerged between the European Community, which was focused on economic integration, and the Atlantic Alliance, which was laying the foundations for new political relations with a liberated Central and Eastern Europe. The integration of the unified Germany within NATO, an option actively advocated by Washington and accepted, against all expectations, by Moscow, made it possible not only to maintain cohesion between the Germans and Americans but also to consolidate the NATO monopoly on European security issues. In a context that was both unexpected – the threat from the East had disappeared – and familiar – NATO was still in being in the West –

discussion of European security was still characterised by historically based divergences between major members of the Union, while at the same time the first moves towards a single currency were being made. This ambivalence was seen during the Maastricht summit. On the one hand, countries like Britain that were in favour of the Alliance's primacy, while acknowledging the need for greater coordination of foreign policy, were opposed to any transfer of competence in security matters to the Union. On the other hand, France, reasserting its desire to strengthen its relationship with Germany, had suggested raising its military collaboration with Bonn to a European level. Setting up the Eurocorps was a first step in relaunching the idea of European defence, but from the outset it encountered major political difficulties. The remainder of Europe remained divided along traditional lines, between 'Atlanticists' and 'Europeanists'. In the field of foreign policy, progress was more significant. The Maastricht summit saw the birth of the second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy which, after bitter negotiation, included 'which might in time lead to a common defence'.[29]

At the beginning of the 1990s, the European security landscape thus had a somewhat schizophrenic appearance. On the one hand, the Union as a political entity was taking its first steps on the international scene but without its own defence capability; on the other, NATO remained the essential military instrument in Europe but now had a new political vocation vis-à-vis its former enemies in the East. These changed circumstances prevented the renationalisation of defence instruments in Europe, safeguarded the essential part of the transatlantic relationship and preserved American influence in Europe, but it left unanswered several contradictions. On the European side, a European defence identity was somewhat at odds with the reduced budgets and peace dividend demanded by public opinion. Across the Atlantic, the end of the Cold War called for a redefinition of America's role in Europe and Europe's place in American strategy, and it involved a revision of NATO's mission and partnership.

The limitations of this hybrid architecture became evident with the first signs of tension in the Balkans, and the impact of those tremors was considerable. The wars in former Yugoslavia led to a new direction in the debate on European defence, Britain's new position on it, greater French flexibility and Germany's modernisation of its military. Above all, they showed that America's

29. Art. J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty. On these negotiations see, among others, Simon Duke, *The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).

involvement was no longer as spontaneous and natural as in the past, and that the Europeans did not have the means to question or really influence Washington's strategic decisions. In addition to these imbalances between the transatlantic partners in influence and ability to act, the Balkans conflicts were in particular dramatic blows for Europe's values, leaving deep scars on its common design.

The tragedy of Bosnia

With the first military confrontation in Slovenia in July 1991, the Europeans, anxious to put their infant common foreign policy into practice, dispatched their 'Troika' to negotiate a cease-fire. This 'diplomatic rapid reaction force', as it was called by the Italian Foreign Minister, Gianni de Michelis, was intended to demonstrate that the Balkans, unlike the Gulf, was Europe's responsibility.[30] The Slovenian crisis rapidly resolved itself but much greater difficulties arose over Bosnia. The Carrington mission, which met with some success, quickly handed the baton over to the UN's envoy Cyrus Vance, who managed to arrange a cease-fire that was essential for the deployment of UN 'blue helmet' peacekeepers. Disagreements over strategy led Europe to leave the management of the conflict to the international community, which of course largely reflected, in another forum, European disagreements and did not have the machinery to manage complex crises with demanding military tasks. The peacekeepers' mandate, which was minimal and ambiguous, was patently seen as inadequate so long as peace had not been re-established. It was impossible to keep a peace that did not exist or impose one without becoming involved in the conflict. This classic conundrum of collective security led to paralysis in international institutions, which restricted themselves to following the conflict without resolving it. The limits of international law in situations of civil war, the inadequacy of traditional peacekeeping instruments and the outbreak of real violence in Europe following 40 years of political but peaceful confrontation, all contributed to the Europeans' inability to judge the scale of the conflict and appreciate the size of the resulting problems. Yet Europe's inability to act had more deep-seated causes. Political divisions among the main European actors were especially wide, both on the nature of the conflict and on diplomatic and military solutions. Germany, for historical reasons, Britain

30. '…the EC was keen to exorcise the ghost of indecision and inaction during the Gulf conflict the previous year'. James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 48-50.

for fear of becoming 'bogged down' and France owing partly to the tyranny of 'short-termism', were unable to put an end to the conflict, even when the horror of ethnic cleansing and unacceptability of concentration camps gave the lie to the fundamental values of European construction.

Washington's support was a necessary condition for implementing a more interventionist policy and dealing with increasingly serious humanitarian emergencies. Yet America's position on this was unambiguous. The break-up of Yugoslavia seemed to it senseless and irresponsible, but the ethnic mix too complex for any intervention to be decisive. In the absence of clear strategic interests, Washington refused to become involved in the conflict.[31] After all, 'Europe's hour' had come. Whereas the Europeans were trying to work out a peace formula that could be implemented, Washington's rhetoric encouraged the Bosnians' hope for a military intervention that the United States was determined to avoid. In the grey area between American ambivalence and European impotence, Slobodan Milosevic pursued his destructive agenda with impunity.

The lessons of the tragedy of Bosnia were harsh for the international community as a whole, and in particular for Europe. The first of these was one of ethics: the return of barbarity to the European continent dealt a serious blow to the very essence of the European project, based as it was on democratic and liberal values that were flouted on its doorstep. Moreover, the UN's mandate as guarantor of international legitimacy put the Union in an awkward position. The delegation of crucial decisions, the overlaying of chains of command that were parallel but had different objectives and the possible interference of outside actors in the shape of a Russian veto or American diplomacy often went against European interests. The gap between UN logic and security imperatives on the ground, which was reflected in the limitations on UN troops' mandates, was to have dramatic consequences. That ambivalence led to the tragedy of Srebrenica.

The second lesson concerned the use of force, and here several factors should be stressed. The first of these was the evident inadequacy of defence institutions based on a system of territorial defence. Given the institutional handicaps or historical legacies that reduced the room for manoeuvre of certain member states, and going beyond the inertia produced by 40 years of deterrent confrontation, the requirement to be able to project mobile

31. As W. Zimmerman recalled: 'Nothing happened, even after the American Press discovered Serbian concentration camps in Bosnia. The Vietnam syndrome and the Powell doctrine proved to be powerful dampers on action by the Bush administration, particularly in an election year.' Warren Zimmerman, *Origins of a Catastrophe* (Times Books, 1999), p. 215.

operational units contrasted with the fact that most forces in Europe were tied to specific areas, and their numbers in reality reflected no more than their relative ineffectiveness. The very idea of European defence was affected by this. The reorganisation of military forces, begun in June 1992 by WEU and in December of the same year by NATO, to allow force projection and the management of far-off crises, was a slow business: the defining by WEU of 'Petersberg tasks' was a first expression of the new strategic environment. The second factor is specific – the need to have the means to carry out the peacemaking and peacekeeping tasks codified at Petersberg – but it is also more general: the requirement to acquire and develop a strategic culture and an organisation that can anticipate events. Without a credible threat to use force, there can be no effective collective security.[32] The Bosnian conflict marked the end of the illusion of a period of post-Cold War peace that those responsible for defence in Europe had been over-eager to anticipate, reducing their defence budgets accordingly. Furthermore, the risks entailed in the new type of operation implied the professionalisation of forces, a gradual and costly process. It called for a constitutional amendment in Germany to allow its forces to serve abroad and for institutional coordination between London and Paris, as effective collaboration on the ground had brought their respective military hierarchies closer together.

The third lesson was in a sense paradoxical. The reappearance of war in Europe demonstrated the gap between the reality of the effective power of a few large European countries and the European Community's collective decision-making framework. The unifying effect of the Soviet threat being no more, the security risks resulting from the disintegration of Yugoslavia were in reality largely value-oriented and opened the way for national responses that reflected disparities of power and therefore European divergences of interest. Whereas European security had been a matter of necessity during the Cold War, it now seemed a matter of choice. Taking account of that reality was to become a necessary condition for any common European defence policy, and at the same time it set its limits. What is more, the ultimate decision to use armed force and acceptance of the attendant risks is basically a national prerogative. This renewed importance of national sovereignty marked the limits of the institutional changes ratified at Maastricht. At the same time, no individual member state could hope to deal with this type of conflict alone: it called for a

32. See in particular Catherine Guicherd, 'L'Heure de l'Europe : Premières leçons du conflit yougoslave', *Les Cahiers du CREST*, mars 1993.

collective response. Efforts therefore had to be directed at cooperation on foreign policy while taking national prerogatives into account.

The final lesson had to do with the world beyond the Union. The conflict in Bosnia had underlined just how important, but also how fragile, the transatlantic relationship was. Without American involvement, and without NATO's intervention, Milosevic would never have signed the Dayton peace accord. Also, the late involvement of the United States in the conflict was a reflection of distinctly American political uncertainties but also of European misjudgements. Transatlantic discord was such that NATO itself was seriously weakened by it. Moreover, the division of labour in the eventual military intervention, whereby European ground forces ran the greater part of the risks and US aircraft operated from a safe height, was unfavourable and untenable to the Europeans.

This imbalance of risks and strategic divergence suggested a reform of the Atlantic Alliance that took into account this European specificity. The Clinton administration, both through its determination to keep operational involvement to a minimum in accordance with its 'zero casualties' doctrine and its support for European integration, backed the idea of a specific European defence identity, and this was confirmed at the NATO summit in January 1994. The proposed solution was centred on 'separable but not separate' forces and was to allow WEU to act independently while making use of NATO assets and capabilities. The concept of Combined Joint Task Forces offered an instrument by which WEU could become rapidly operational without having to duplicate headquarters and staffs.[33] The European identity within the Alliance was recognised; its effectiveness, however, depended on its acquiring much improved capabilities.

The main lesson for the Europeans may be summed up as follows: to be effective, diplomacy must be coordinated among the main European partners, and be based on a credible ability to use force. The crisis in Kosovo provided striking confirmation of this lesson.

The crisis of Kosovo

The Kosovo conflict confirmed Europe's military shortcomings and the ambiguities in America's international position.

33. In the military terminology, 'task forces' are temporary forces aimed at specific tasks; 'joint task forces' implies the collaboration of different services (air force, navy and army), 'combined joint task forces' include the participation of foreign countries. 'The stated aims of these forces were: to adapt NATO's forces structure to new missions; to project security and stability towards the East by giving partner states a way to join NATO in crisis response; and to support ESDI by offering the WEU a 'separable but not separate' military capability that would not be a costly duplication of NATO's structure.' Charles Barry, 'Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice', in Philip H. Gordon, *NATO's Transformation, The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance* (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), pp. 203-19.

Compared with Bosnia, what was new was the White House's great prudence concerning the use of force and the conduct of operations. President Clinton's decision, even before the beginning of the air campaign, to rule out any participation by US ground troops, presented the Europeans with a political *fait accompli* and a clear strategic constraint. Besides Madeleine Albright's conviction that human rights had to be defended, the credibility of the Atlantic Alliance, whose ultimatums could not remain indefinitely hollow, was the main issue in this crisis.[34]

While there had been no disagreement within the American administration over use of the Alliance to resolve the crisis, on the other hand, the choice of 'political' strikes to force Milosevic to negotiate had major consequences. That choice was essentially the result of American political imperatives but at the same time it represented the point of minimal agreement within the Alliance. Drawing largely on the Bosnian precedent, that strategy was none the less based on a major error of appreciation: military 'compellence', that is to say the use of force for political rather than military ends, has no chance of succeeding unless the adversary considers the issues in dispute to be secondary matters. Kosovo, however, was of vital importance to Milosevic.[35] This initial error in US appreciation of the situation was gradually rectified, but the consequences were important. Firstly, it is questionable whether the air strikes alone would in the end have made Milosevic capitulate: Serbia's precarious economic situation, Belgrade's political isolation, its inability to defeat the KLA forces, the presence of considerable numbers of Western troops in the region and the more or less overt threat of an invasion by land forces were all factors that combined to bring about the Serbs' defeat.[36] Next, the strategy of coercive diplomacy, which itself was interpreted in different ways once its initial failure had been seen, gave rise to major tensions within the Alliance by putting the Europeans in an ambiguous situation: on the one hand the technological inadequacy of their means made them dependent on the US effort if the campaign was to be waged by airpower without allied casualties; on the other, consensual political control within the Alliance gave them a *droit de regard* over the targets selected for the most part by the planners within the US European Command. Whereas the European allies carried out only about 40 per cent of the strikes, the latent crisis within the Alliance stemmed from the fact that while the Americans had great technological superiority in the air, political nego-

34. As Pierre Hassner put it, 'Parmi tous les motifs de l'intervention militaire du 24 mai 1999, le plus puissant et en tout cas le plus immédiat a été celui de sauver la crédibilité des gouvernements occidentaux après des mois et des mois de menaces jamais exécutées.' Pierre Hassner, 'De la demi-guerre à la demi-paix', *Le Monde*, 3 avril 2000.

35. On this point, see Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 208-10.

36. For a comprehensive report about the causes of Milosevic's retreat, see for instance Anthony Cordesman, 'The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo'. Report to the USAF Strategy Forum, 3 August 1999; available at www.csis.org/kosovo/Lessons.html.

tiations were necessary to obtain approval for most (807 out of 976) of the sorties carried out against targets in addition to those initially planned.[37] For the Europeans, there were two important lessons. If they did not make an effort to improve their military capabilities, their influence and responsibility would continue to be limited. Their wish to influence America's war strategy was all the more important since they had rightly realised that the subsequent reconstruction and peacekeeping would fall to them in the first instance. European autonomy therefore meant not alienation but responsibility. Yet NATO unity was a precondition for its success.[38] The crisis also confirmed both the relevance and the peculiar nature of the transatlantic relationship. An effort to improve Europe's military capability had become essential if the strategic decoupling of a Europe that was lagging behind technologically was to be avoided; yet doing so would raise fears of the political decoupling of a more autonomous Europe. In European eyes, the Kosovo crisis gave further justification for establishing an ESDP as conceived at St-Malo and approved at the Cologne European Council that was held during the closing days of the air campaign.

In the United States, the Kosovo issue was seen through a specific prism. Some in the Pentagon pointed to the needlessly paralysing effects of a democratic alliance and its need to seek consensus of which its European partners had, it was felt, taken undue advantage, given the ineffectiveness of their military means. Arguments over 'war by committee' – a term that implied excessive restrictions on American room for manoeuvre but was in fact entirely in line with the fundamentals of the Atlantic organisation – became widespread in the American media. To this controversy was added the dispute among the Administration, the Pentagon and Congress that had affected the conduct of the campaign, and manifestly overshadowed the ruling out of the use of ground forces by the President before hostilities began.[39]

More deeply, and even before 11 September, the new American administration had concluded that Europe was of lesser strategic importance, heralding more selective and restrictive external actions by the United States, which would now be decided on the obvious but reassuring assumption of American hegemony and focused on the main strategic balances in the world. This partial reading of the conflict, and the explicit exclusion of any future NATO operation like that in Kosovo, influenced Washington's

37. The figures are those of John E. Peters et al., *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force*, (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 25. To avoid the veto obstacle, a restricted committee composed of Italy, Germany, France, Britain and the United Sates was set up. Moreover, phase III of the bombing campaign was actually never presented as such to the NAC: it was authorised by the then Secretary-General, Javier Solana.

38. According to a former Serb official, 'We never thought NATO would stay united through 10 weeks of bombing and the killing of innocent civilians. We got it wrong.' Quoted by Stephen T. Hosmer, *The Conflict over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 41.

39. As General Clark wrote: 'There was much made in the press that this [Kosovo] was "war by committee" . . . But there was also a purely American committee at work in Washington . . .' Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat* (Oxford: PublicAffairs Ltd, 2001), pp. 454-64.

views on ESDP. After Kosovo, US misgivings over European inte-gration became more pronounced. More generally, by the time of the Kosovo campaign, more than 90 per cent of the US force struc-ture was not earmarked for assignments to NATO, reflecting the strategic realities after the end of the Cold War. In this context, the Pentagon was reluctant to delegate command responsibility to NATO.

Europe and transatlantic relations have thus been profoundly marked by the conflicts in the Balkans. Firstly, they revealed the great reluctance of European democracies to use force to stop even flagrant violations of the most basic values and human rights. At the same time, they highlighted the limitations inherent in collec-tive security when, in the eyes of major powers, vital interests are not involved. Secondly, the contrast between American power and Europeans' inability to resolve conflicts led to a collective realisa-tion of the need to rectify the imbalance between the reality of Europe as an economic power and its potential as a political power. Europe's ambition to be an international actor cannot be separated from the European project itself, but achieving that ambition will owe much to the trauma of Kosovo. Lastly, it became obvious that it is necessary to have a coordinated diplomatic effort based on a credible threat to use force, especially among major European actors.

That observation implied institutional changes that had in fact been in hand in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall. At the European level, the process of normalising German defence had to be finished, the habit of solidarity between Britain and France acquired on the ground in Bosnia confirmed and the transforma-tion of national armed forces into smaller, professional forma-tions coordinated. Begun at St-Malo and confirmed at Cologne and Helsinki, European security and defence policy made rapid progress.

From St-Malo to Copenhagen: the build-up of a European defence

Although the bases of ESDP were above all exogenous, its imple-mentation had essentially to respond to endogenous constraints connected with the specificity of the European project. From the beginning, the Maastricht provisions in the field of foreign policy

had taken account of the imperatives of national sovereignty within the Union. On defence matters, the setting up of a common security system was to depend much more on national realities from both the military and political points of view. The differing strategies of member countries – neutral, NATO-oriented or favouring the European framework – their disparity of military means and diverging views on the nature of threats, their national prerogatives on the use of force, were additional obstacles. The process was thus essentially voluntary and gradual. In addition, there were, and still are, severe constraints linked to defence spending. In the course of the last decade, military budgets have been constantly subject to restrictions, partly imposed by the single currency rules. Yet despite these recurring problems the progress made since St-Malo has been considerable.

Institutional setting

All the major European actors were affected by the Bosnian tragedy. France drew several lessons from the conflict. Firstly, in its view, there was a real risk that the United States would withdraw from European security at the very moment when there was an increased chance of armed conflict on the Continent. Next, close cooperation on the ground in Bosnia between British and French troops had cultivated a de facto solidarity between the military hierarchies. This led in 1995 to a noticeable rapprochement between France and the Alliance.[40] Begun at the June 1996 Berlin meeting but shaken by the question of the nationality of commanders in AFSOUTH, this rapprochement combined happily with the new British viewpoint.

Frustration vis-à-vis President Clinton's continuing hesitation over Bosnia and rapprochement with the French on the ground led London to reverse its opposition to an autonomous European defence capability, which had been one of the consequences of its special relationship with Washington for nearly half a century. If the search for influence was a recurring leitmotif in London, the choice of Europe as a way of attaining it was indeed a diplomatic revolution. On the basis of its July 1998 *Strategic Defence Review*, and noting the level of European participation in Bosnia, the Blair government was dismayed by the Europeans' operational powerlessness despite a European GDP that was greater than that of the United States. It concluded, even before the Kosovo crisis erupted,

40. On this, see Robert P. Grant, 'France's New Relationship with NATO', *Survival*, vol. 38, no. 1, Summer 1996, pp. 58-80 and Anand Menon, 'From Independence to cooperation: France, NATO and European Security', *International Affairs*, vol. 71, no.1, January 1995, pp. 19-34.

that, if this imbalance continued, it would imperil the very foundation of the Atlantic partnership. It was a matter of laying down a more balanced and therefore healthier basis for the relationship. The way to save the Alliance was via Europe. In the eyes of the British, European defence had acquired real added value. The language used at the St-Malo summit, referring to a 'capacity for autonomous action', represented a compromise between these two logics: the St-Malo declaration should be read as a turning point in London's approach to Europe as much as a French concession to Atlantic legitimacy.[41] Between the means and the end, between the autonomy asserted and the assured conformity with NATO, ESDP found a fragile but real area of *entente*. The core of the compromise lay in the effort to improve the Europeans' military capabilities and their intention to take on Petersberg missions.

The Kosovo conflict opened the way to a rapid Europeanisation of the St-Malo agreement. The German presidency worked on transforming this bilateral initiative into a European reality and changing the European defence *identity* into a European security and defence *policy*. At the June 1999 European Council in Cologne, member states stated their determination:

> that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence . . . the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.[42]

To achieve these goals, several institutional changes were made:

◗ the nomination of Javier Solana to the post of High Representative for CFSP, which had been agreed in principle at the June 1997 European Council in Amsterdam. The High Representative is also Secretary-General of the European Council.

◗ the creation of a Political and Security Committee (PSC, more often referred to by the French abbreviation COPS), consisting of ambassadors of each member state meeting twice a week in Brussels. Dealing with all aspects of the CFSP and ESDP, its function is to manage developing crises, carry out evaluation and planning and give political advice to the European Coun-

41. 'The European Union must have the capacity for *autonomous action,* backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises . . . In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while *acting in conformity* with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members.' St-Malo Declaration, 4 December 1998 (emphasis added).

42. European Council Declaration, Cologne, 3-4 June 1999.

cil. In the event of a deployment of military forces from the Union, it assumes political control of the day-to-day direction of military operations.

◗ the creation of a European Union Military Committee (EUMC), officially made up of chiefs of defence staff of member countries but in practice attended by their military delegates. It is responsible for giving advice and recommendations to the COPS and the European Council, and issuing military directives to the European Union Military Staff (see below). Its chairman attends sessions of the Council when decisions are to be taken by it that have defence implications. The EUMC is the Union's most senior military body and a forum for consultation and cooperation between member states.

◗ the creation of a European Union Military Staff (EUMS) providing expertise for the COPS, in particular in the conduct of any Union military crisis management operation. It is responsible for early warning, evaluating situations and strategic planning for Petersberg missions, including the earmarking of national and international European forces. It constitutes a source of technical expertise for the Union on all aspects of security and defence, and acts as an interface between political and military authorities within the Union. It gives military support to the EUMC during the strategic planning phase of crisis management situations, for the complete range of Petersberg missions, and develops working methods and operational concepts based on or compatible with those of NATO.

◗ the creation of a Situation Centre that gives relevant information to the EUMS in preparation of its tasks.

◗ the holding of regular sessions of the General Affairs Council, with the participation of defence ministers.

◗ the inclusion of those WEU functions necessary for the European Union concerning Petersberg missions. That integration, referred to since the Amsterdam European Council, signifies the accomplishment of WEU's mission but does not imply the end of the WEU treaty as such.

These institutional changes decided at Cologne, elaborated at Helsinki and finalised at Santa Maria da Feira, were agreed at the Nice meeting of the European Council in December 2000. Also decided at Nice was the creation of autonomous agencies that would incorporate within the EU the WEU structures dealing with ESDP, i.e. the Satellite Centre in Torrejon and the Institute for

Security Studies in Paris. These two agencies were officially created by European Council Joint Actions in July 2001.

Setting up institutions in support of a true defence *policy* in Europe posed no major problem at the European level. On the other hand, relationships between the Union and NATO – the Atlantic aspect of St-Malo – were beset by some problems. At Helsinki, the principle of full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO was affirmed, as was the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with non-EU European members of NATO. At Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000, the details of such consultation were spelt out. Outside periods of crisis, periodic meetings would be held between the Union's 15 and the 15 countries concerned, i.e. the non-EU European members of NATO and the candidates for membership, 'at' 15+15. Within this structure at least two meetings of the non-EU European NATO members at 15+6 were envisaged. Two phases were distinguished during periods of crisis: in the pre-operational phase, dialogue and consultation would be intensified at all levels, including ministerial, during the period preceding the Council's decision. If an option entailing the use of NATO assets and capabilities was being considered, particular attention was to be paid to consultation with the six non-EU European members of NATO. During the operational phase, the latter might participate in the operation if they wished, if it was one making use of NATO assets and capabilities. When those assets and capabilities were not involved they would be invited, on a Council decision, to participate. Confirmed at Nice, these provisions reaffirm EU control over ESDP while allowing for the participation of non-EU European NATO members.

The US administration attempted to attach conditions to the European effort, as expressed in Madeleine Albright's 'three Ds': no decoupling, no discrimination and no duplication. The first of these was a reference to Washington's concern that the 'separable but not separate' condition would be challenged by St-Malo. The second illustrated its worry vis-à-vis non-NATO members of the Union and the third its preoccupation that the Europeans might devote their limited resources to capabilities that already existed within the Alliance. To these three conditions had to be added a fourth, an implicit one, giving the Alliance the right of first refusal before the Union took over an operation.

After Nice, and notwithstanding Turkey's position, the first official meetings of the COPS and NAC were held. On the military side, consultation between the military staffs of the two organisations began the process of identifying NATO capabilities to be used 'where NATO as a whole is not engaged', in the words used at Helsinki, and began working on the mechanism for accessing planning and capabilities. At the May 2001 Atlantic summit in Budapest, considerable progress was noted, in particular on the operational level and on the role of DSACEUR. The constructive atmosphere between the two organisations was symbolised by the joint mission by Lord Robertson and Javier Solana to Macedonia. The reassurance given by Britain to Washington, in particular vis-à-vis the new Bush administration, bore fruit even if it stressed capabilities and included a restrictive interpretation of the Petersberg missions. Accepted with more reservations than enthusiasm, the idea of a European rapid reaction force only interested Washington in so far as it would make it possible to reduce US responsibilities in the Balkans without calling into question the Alliance's, and therefore America's, privileged role in Europe. Overall, relations between the two organisations were normalised, apart from the problem of Turkey.

Turkey remained a serious problem. In its view, the difficulty lay in the formulation chosen at Cologne, according to which the Union would take the measures necessary to guarantee that all participants in an EU-led operation would have equal rights in the conduct of the operation 'without prejudice to the principle of the EU's decision-making autonomy, notably the right of the Council to discuss and decide matters of principle and policy'. In plain language, all participants had the same rights, but they would only become participants following a Council decision. This was deemed unacceptable by Ankara. In so far as certain European governments wanted all European crisis management operations to be subject to a final agreement on 'Berlin-plus', ESDP was de facto dependent on the Turkish exception. On the principle that nothing is decided until everything has been decided, however, an overall agreement was not possible. Thus the constructive relationship between the two organisations was not put into practice. The final settlement on the 'Berlin-plus' framework had to wait until December 2002 (see below).

The progress made between St-Malo and Copenhagen was thus rapid, when one considers that it took three decades to estab-

lish the European single market and over ten years to introduce the single currency. It was also considerable, given the turbulent history or relations between certain EU member states and the Atlantic Alliance. Yet institutions represent only one aspect of the ESDP process, probably the most important for diplomats, but the real test lay in giving the Union the assets and capabilities that would enable it to assume an operational role in defence as envisaged at St-Malo. Here, progress was clearly less rapid, although substantial.

Operational development

In December 1999, just one year after St-Malo, the Helsinki summit set out the ESDP process's Headline Goal objectives. The aim was to put at the Union's disposal forces capable of carrying out all the Petersberg missions, including the most demanding, in operations up to army corps level, i.e. 50,000 to 60,000 troops. Member states undertook, by 2003, to deploy forces 'militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.'[43]

The missions assigned to this Rapid Reaction Force are those defined at Petersberg by WEU in 1992 and reiterated in Article 17.2 of the TEU, in other words, 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making'. However, there were a series of successive interpretations of this legal definition. At Cologne in June 1999 the Council had stated that these tasks included 'the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks'. At Helsinki, to fulfil these missions particular attention was paid to the means necessary for effective crisis management: deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility, mobility, survivability and command and control. At Laeken, where ESDP was proclaimed operational, it was emphasised that the development of means and capabilities would allow the Union 'progressively to take on more demanding operations'.

43. European Council, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions. R. Hatfield, who was the main initiator of the Rapid Reaction Force, had formatted it after the Bosnian precedent.

Following the events of 11 September, the extraordinary European Council of 21 September stated that it would fight terrorism in all its forms, and that 'the fight against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective of the European Union'. ESDP could not ignore this new strategic context. At the June 2002 European Council in Seville, it was decided to increase the Union's involvement in the fight against terrorism through a coordinated, interdisciplinary approach 'embracing all Union policies, including by developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and by making the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operational'. It was recalled that 'the CFSP, including the EDSP, can play an important role in countering this threat to our security.'[44] The way in which the Petersberg missions were interpreted thus evolved. They now covered nearly every hypothesis except collective self-defence, which remained a NATO prerogative.

ESDP does not come down to just military forces. In parallel, the Helsinki Council decided to set up a mechanism for civilian crisis management to coordinate and use more effectively the various civilian means and resources that the Union and its member states possess. This civilian part of ESDP is peculiar to the European approach to conflict prevention and crisis management. With the experience of Bosnia, particularly the civil administration of Mostar by WEU, the Multinational Protection Force (MPF) in Albania and the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) in Operation *Alba*, the Union acquired considerable expertise in civilian crisis management. It was therefore logical to incorporate and develop that experience in ESDP. The June 2000 Santa Maria da Feira European Council listed the four priority areas in which the Union intended to acquire practical capabilities: the police, strengthening the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection. The aim was to set up a police force up to 5,000 personnel.[45] Rapid progress was made and member countries' contributions were greater than the number requested. On 18 February 2002, the Union announced that it would be ready, as from 1 January 2003, to take over from the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This aspect of ESDP is now a reality but it remains limited. During the recent meeting of European Union Defence Ministers in Rome on 3 October 2003, France proposed the formation of a European Military Police Force. The idea, which is based on the success

44. European Council, Seville, 21-22 June 2002, Presidency Conclusions, Annex 5.

45. European Council, Santa Maria da Feira, 19-20 June 2000, Presidency Conclusions, Annex I.

achieved in the Balkans by the Multinational Specialised Units or MSUs, is to create a sort of European *Gendarmerie* to be employed on Peace Support Operations.

However, the core of ESDP was the development of military capabilities. The Helsinki Headline Goal was thus the point of reference for efforts to be made if Europe were not to lose its strategic relevance, not only compared with its American partner but above all with respect to its immediate geopolitical environment. The first initiative taken to identify Europe's lack of operational capability was launched in June 1998, even before Kosovo. NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) identified the well-known deficiencies in the areas of mobility, intelligence, headquarters infrastructure and deployment, air and/or sea projection. It pointed to the shortcomings of C4ISR, i.e. command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In some European countries, notably France and Germany, there was a feeling that the DCI was more an answer to American strategic needs than to European priorities, and that it reflected more the commercial concerns of American exporters than the real requirements of European forces. While all were agreed that greater interoperability between allied forces was desirable, it is nevertheless the case that the DCI produced little in the way of an effective transformation of European forces.

The strictly European effort sprang from a WEU study of November 1999 on European forces available for Petersberg missions. Although the numbers under arms prima facie permitted a wide range of missions to be executed, several shortfalls were identified, particularly air transport, precision-guided missiles, the deployment of headquarters to relatively near theatres of operation, mobility and intelligence. This purely quantitative exercise concluded that, for an operation requiring the deployment of two divisions to a theatre of operations several thousand kilometres distant, Europe had adequate ground forces but was incapable of deploying them, and that in that respect any operation of any size would have to depend on the infrastructure and forces of the Atlantic Alliance. For smaller, pre-emptive deployments nearer at hand, Europe had adequate means.[46] This inventory, seen in the light of the precedent of Bosnia, served as the basis for the definition of the Helsinki Headline Goal. In summer 2000, experts of the Headline Goal Task Force, created at Feira, had estimated that 80,000 ground troops, 350 aircraft and three or four naval task

46. See the report *WEU Council of Ministers Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations*, Luxembourg, 23 November 1999.

forces would be required to meet the Helsinki objectives.[47] In November 2000, the Capabilities Commitment Conference drew up a catalogue of forces that member countries intended to earmark to meet the overall objective. The EUMS concluded that, as from that date, the target number of troops had been met, but underlined the inadequacies in terms of air transport, C3I and others.

The next stage was to make up the shortfalls. In June 2001 the gap between what was required to meet the Headline Goal and forces actually committed by member states was identified in the Helsinki Process Catalogue (HPC). This served as a basis for discussion at the Union's Conference on EU Capability Improvement in November 2001, at which the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was launched.[48] The ECAP exercise, which began in February 2002, set up a series of panels headed by one or two member states responsible for coordinating work. Although this formula has the advantage of giving greater responsibilities to the countries in charge, at the same time it runs the risk that countries may take no interest in the panels in which they are not involved. The report of the ECAP was submitted in March 2003. The new panels set up in May 2003 are now focused on the way to make good particular deficiencies.

In addition to the effort on capabilities in the strict sense, the Union held a first crisis management exercise to test decision-making mechanisms and the interoperability of military infrastructures in the Union. This paper exercise, the scenario for which was ethnic conflict on an island in the Atlantic, was held in May 2002 in Brussels and involved all European capitals, and also the Council, the Commission and the High Representative Javier Solana, and made use of the Torrejón Satellite Centre.

Progress has been made on capabilities and infrastructure but the process is encountering structural obstacles. The first and best known concerns military expenditure. Only a few countries have actually raised their defence budgets. On average, European countries spend only about 2 per cent of their GDP on defence. Only the United Kingdom spends the same proportion as the United States on research, development and procurement. Beyond quantitative budgets, the real issue is spending better by reducing operating costs, which represent a European average of 60 per cent, and having more rational procurement with reductions in unit costs and through-life support.

47. These figures were discussed during the meeting of defence ministers at Ecouen (Paris), September 2000.

48. During this conference, confirmed voluntary commitments from member states reached 100,000 ground troops, 400 combat aircraft and 100 ships. This was well above the target set at Helsinki.

The second challenge lies in the transformation of European military forces. The 'revolution in military affairs' has dramatically changed the way American forces now operate. Such concepts as Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and Effects Based Operations (EBO) are the major factors behind force transformation and industry restructuring. As envisioned in Joint Vision 2020, information superiority on a global scale will allow US forces to move more quickly, to target harder and more precisely and to sustain operations longer. The effects of this transformation were obvious in the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Europe would not be able to match change on such a scale. The transformation of European forces from territorial defence to intervention and expeditionary warfare is none the less a precondition for an effective European Security Strategy. Some European countries have recognised the importance of this shift in doctrine. The United Kingdom in the New Chapter of the *Strategic Defence Review* published in July 2002 emphasised the relevance of Network Enabled Capability (NEC). Over the period 2002/3 to 2005/6, the defence budget has to rise by £3.5 billion, with a third of this increase dedicated to equipment and capabilities to respond to the challenges of the transformation towards lighter and mobile, deployable and sustainable forces. In addition, two large aircraft carriers are to be procured. France has announced a significant increase in defence spending for the period 2003-08 (more than €3 billion from the 2002 level). The priorities identified include intelligence, (the development of a new satellite communications network and two more reconnaissance satellites), strategic air- and sealift (a new additional aircraft carrier and the A400M aircraft) and defence against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Germany is still struggling with the legacy of its past. Conscription will not be abolished in the short term. None the less, the defence policy guidelines released in May 2003 by the German Defence Ministry recognised that traditional territorial defence no longer responded to present security policy requirements. Defence policy is now geared to the prevention and containment of crises and conflicts. The *Bundeswehr* will thus be optimised for force projection. The defence budget constraint, however, has significantly reduced the scope and the pace of force restructuring. Apart from the 'big three' members of the Union, several countries have already begun the restructuring of their forces. Most notably, in 1999 Sweden launched a New Defence

Programme that includes the systematic adoption of Network Centric Warfare techniques. The Netherlands and Belgium have already implemented some force integration.

The third obstacle is to do with the fact that it will take time to correct Europe's military deficiencies. Military equipment programmes sometimes spread over several decades, and as a result delays are inherent in the actual process of correcting shortfalls. The important A400M programme, which has been scaled down compared with the initial objectives but now finalised regarding its budget, is symbolic of this. That means that in the years to come Europe will continue to depend in part on American assistance for operations of any size.[49] In October 2003, EU defence ministers meeting in Rome recognised that 2010 constitutes a reasonable target date by which significant progress in fulfilling the current deficiencies identified in the ECAP exercise should be made.

The last handicap is more fundamental and concerns the very definition of the Headline Goal. Designed on the basis of the Bosnian experience, and therefore corresponding to a strategic imperative of the 1990s, the military tool aimed at seems at once over-ambitious if it is to be used essentially for crisis management in the Balkans, a region which is now more peaceful, and ill-tailored to cope with the rising strategic demands of the twenty-first century.[50] The European Security Strategy, however, has provided the Union with a new framework.

ESDP since 2003

It was a revealing characteristic of the Union in 2003 that, despite severe disagreements over the crisis in Iraq, efforts to improve ESDP institutional settings and operational developments did continue among its members. At the Convention and the Intergovernmental Conference, defence did not present the most difficult issues. Most importantly, the finalisation of the 'Berlin-plus' agreement in December 2002 opened the way for EU operations.

The 'Berlin-plus' agreement

Relations between the EU and NATO are now firmly established; they constitute a vital part of the Union's security and defence

49. 'For complex operations demanding a high operational tempo, reduced risks to EU forces and minimum collateral damage, Europe will, for the rest of the decade, still depend on US assets. Strategic sea and airlift, intelligence assets and all-weather precision-strike capabilities are further prerequisites for major high-tempo operations.' Hans-Christian Hagman, 'European Crisis Management and Defence: The Search for Capabilities', *Adelphi Paper* 353, 2002, pp. 12-106.

50. 'It is in the interpretation and the implementation of the Petersberg tasks that the absence of a common European strategic vision becomes all too apparent . . . Current EU language (the Petersberg Tasks) does not provide even the roughest guideline as to the vision of the world in which European forces could be called upon to operate.' François Heisbourg, 'Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity', *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, p. 8.

policy. To reach a final agreement in December 2002 was indeed difficult. As noted earlier, Turkey had so far rejected the 'Berlin-plus' agreement. Despite the reassurance and the possibility of future Union membership agreed at Helsinki, Ankara considered itself excluded from the decision-making process. At the NATO ministerial meeting on 14-15 December 2000, Turkey indicated that it would block 'Berlin-plus'. The British-inspired Ankara text of December 2001 was a further attempt to break the deadlock. Without specifically mentioning Turkey – at the request of Greece – that document confirmed that ESDP, irrespective of the type of crisis, would not be directed against an ally, and that it would respect Union member states' obligations regarding members of NATO. The reinforcement of consultations between the EU and the NATO 6 was to permit the latter to be 'associated' with decisions, to become 'permanent interlocutors' of the COPS and to appoint 'representatives' to the European Union Military Committee. The document specified, moreover, that concerning EU operations in which they were invited to participate, the committee of contributors would be the main forum for the conduct of operations, and that decisions would be taken by consensus even though the COPS maintained political control if necessary. Lastly, if crises were to arise in their 'geographic proximity' that could affect their 'national security', the European Council undertook to establish a dialogue and consultations and take their positions into account, while at the same time respecting the terms of Article 17 of the TEU.[51] This compromise proposed at Ankara was rejected by Turkey, whose military considered the concessions too limited.

The text was, however, to serve as the basis for the final compromise that was signed in December 2002. Following three long years of negotiation, the Copenhagen decision on enlargement, American pressure and above all the Tayyip Erdogan's party's electoral victory cleared the way for ratification of the Nice provisions regarding 'Berlin-plus'. The Brussels agreement of 16 December 2002 thus opened the way for a strategic partnership between the EU and NATO on crisis management. Completed on 11 March 2003, the implementation of permanent arrangements, notably the agreement on classified information, allowed the EU to take over Operation *Allied Harmony* in Macedonia on 31 March 2003. In this respect, the Union has indicated its willingness to take over SFOR in Bosnia in 2004.

51. On the Ankara text, see Antonio Missiroli, 'Turkey and EU-NATO Cooperation', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 33, no. 1, March 2002, pp. 9-26.

New developments

The year 2003 also witnessed some important developments in terms of capabilities. Some were agreed upon independently, others were linked to the draft Constitution that was rejected in December 2003. Despite this failure, they represent potential steps forward for ESDP in the coming years.

The *acquis* of 2003

First, the ECAP exercise led to the creation of project groups where EU members are by choice active participants or leaders. The areas covered by these groups are comprehensive, and include air-to-air refuelling, strategic airlift, combat search and rescue, ISTAR and ground surveillance. This new phase of the ECAP exercise will significantly address the most serious gaps in Europe's current defence capabilities.

Second, the Brussels Council meeting on 17 November 2003 agreed to the creation of an Agency that will be established in 2004. This intergovernmental agency 'will aim at developing defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, promoting and enhancing European armaments cooperation, strengthening the European defence industrial and technological base and creating a competitive European defence equipment market, as well as promoting, in liaison with the Community's research activities where appropriate, research aimed at leadership in strategic technologies for future defence and security capabilities.'[52] Among its tasks, the Agency will identify the EU's future defence capability requirements in quantitative and qualitative terms, for both forces and equipment, assess the capability commitments made by member states through the ECAP process, propose multilateral projects to meet the ESDP requirements, strive for coordination in programmes implemented by member states and for management of specific cooperation through OCCAR, with the aim of promoting cost-effective and efficient procurement. In liaison with the Commission, the Agency will furthermore help to identify and implement policies aimed at strengthening the European defence industrial and technological base.

Third, an agreement was reached on the politically sensitive issue of an EU headquarters. This idea was first launched in spring 2003, but the Tervuren initiative was controversial from the outset. The accord reached between Paris, London and Berlin at the Naples meeting at the end of November on this issue opened the

52. Council Meeting, External Relations, Brussels, 17 November 2003.

way for a common European position.[53] The solution followed a political rather than a military logic. Under the terms of the agreement, a small EU cell will be established at SHAPE to improve the preparation of EU operations having recourse to NATO assets under the 'Berlin-plus' arrangements. At the same time, NATO liaison arrangements with the EUMS will be defined so as to ensure transparency between the EU and NATO. In parallel, another cell, with a civil-military composition, will be set up within the EUMS in order to enhance the capacity of the latter to conduct early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning. An implicit division of labour seemed to have emerged between the two headquarters. Apart from the 'Berlin-plus' agreement, a regional criterion seemed to have been introduced, namely that operations in Africa would be the prime responsibility of the planners inside the EUMS. Institutionally, there are now three different ways in which Europeans can act. The first is as part of a NATO operation, the second under the 'Berlin-plus' agreement and the third an autonomous operation with either a lead-nation framework involving a national headquarters or a European headquarters. All these options are now offered and agreed.

Fourth, building on the success of Operation *Artemis* (see below), in February 2004 France, Germany and the United Kingdom presented the so-called 'battle group' concept with a view to improving the EU's capacity for rapid reaction. Two months later, EU defence ministers approved the trilateral proposal, transforming it into a European initiative. According to this concept, battle groups (or 'tactical groups') of 1,500 troops, including the appropriate support elements, are to be formed ready for deployment within 15 days. They should be capable of high-intensity operations, either as stand-alone forces or as initial-entry forces for operations on a larger scale. In order to be deployable within 15 days, battle groups will need to be fully manned, equipped and trained. At the same time, member states providing battle groups must also earmark sufficient strategic lift assets to ensure deployment within 15 days. In line with the European Security Strategy, these forces will be designed specifically but not exclusively for use in response to requests from the UN. The aim is to establish 2-3 such high-readiness battle groups by 2005, and 7-9 by 2007, providing the 'first-stop' option for EU rapid response, in particular for crisis management operations in failed or failing states. Battle groups could be formed by one nation

53. The agreement between France, Germany and the United Kingdom was endorsed by the European Council on 12 December 2003. See Antonio Missiroli (comp.), 'From Copenhagen to Brussels. European defence: core documents, Volume IV', *Chaillot Paper* 67 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2003), pp. 322-3.

alone, by a lead nation with other nations contributing niche capabilities, or as a multinational formation if individual countries are unable to contribute a complete battle group. As the concept is based on small force packages, it significantly increases the flexibility of the Union's armed forces, and as such constitutes an important step towards Headline Goal 2010.

Potentialities for the future

Some agreements have been reached but are still provisional, since the draft Constitution was not endorsed in December 2003. None the less, in this respect, two major initiatives stand out. First, member states have agreed to a solidarity clause. This clause was first proposed by the Barnier Group at the Convention, which intended to give more substance to the notion of solidarity and common security in the event of attacks within the Union's territory. The provisional Article 42 states that:

> The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:
>
> (a) prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack;
>
> (b) assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a disaster.

Following the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid, the European Council declaration on combating terrorism reaffirmed 'the political commitment . . . to act jointly against terrorist acts, in the spirit of the Solidarity Clause contained in Article 42 of the draft Constitution for Europe.'[54]

Second, in 2003 permanent 'structured cooperation' was agreed to deepen defence relations among the Union's members. This way forward is open to all members according to objective criteria, such as the availability of rapidly deployable contingents, a certain level of military spending and a degree of harmonisation in defence. The decision to take part in structured cooperation will be decided by qualified majority by the European Council. As

54. European Council, 'Declaration on Combating Terrorism', Brussels, 25 March 2004.

envisaged in the draft Treaty, permanent structured cooperation could also have far-reaching consequences for European defence capabilities. As stated in the Protocol on structured cooperation implementing Article III-213 of the draft Treaty,

> Those Members which declare their willingness to go faster and further in developing the Union's capability to undertake crisis management actions and operations, including the most demanding of these tasks, shall establish structured cooperation among themselves . . . Member States participating in structured cooperation must undertake, on the date of entry into force of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, to:
> a) engage more intensively in the development of defence capabilities, including through the development of their national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes and in the activity of the Agency
> b) have the capacity to provide by 2007 at the latest, either at national level or as an essential part of multinational force packages, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as combat formations, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article III-210, within a period of 5 to 30 days, in particular to requests from the United Nations, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days be extended up to at least 120 days.

Moreover, it was agreed that the Agency could contribute to regular assessment of member states' contributions with regard to capabilities. This implicit system of European certification could open the way for major improvements in defence spending throughout Europe. Depending on political willingness, the level of rationalisation of European defence capabilities could be impressive, through some task specialisation, assets pooling and collective capabilities. Structured cooperation has the potential to do in defence what the euro has achieved in monetary affairs.

External developments

Significant developments have also taken place in the Atlantic framework. The NATO Response Force (NRF), first proposed at the NATO Prague summit, was envisaged as a force for the most challenging missions consisting of an air component capable of

carrying out 200 combat air sorties a day, a brigade-sized land force component and a maritime component up to the level of NATO's standing naval forces. The force could consist of up to 21,000 personnel drawn from the pool of European high-readiness forces. It would be capable of fighting together at 7-30 days' notice anywhere in the world. The NRF would draw its forces from the pool of European high-readiness forces. Since the original proposal, the plan actually envisaged is to have three response forces which would rotate and be at different states of readiness. Only the stand-by forces would be deployable. So, the NRF in fact requires a total of 63,000 troops, i.e. roughly the same number required to fulfil the Helsinki Headline Goal.

The NRF represents a precious opportunity to introduce new doctrinal concepts and techniques into European forces. However, since both it and the European Rapid Reaction Force draw from the same, limited pool of deployable forces, it is clear that most of the EU's most capable troops will be 'double-hatted'. Consequently, controversy about the organisation responsible for running an operation could arise. If one operation has priority over another, there would be a problem as to whether NATO or the EU was in charge of it. There is thus the political risk of a division within the Union over the respective priority of one organisation over the other. Moreover, if the stand-by forces were placed under the authority of a NATO joint force commander, this would deprive the Europeans of their most capable forces for independent actions.

ESDP in operations

The year 2003 will be remembered as the one when the Union actually conducted operations for the first time. The necessary institutional framework being in place with the final agreement on 'Berlin-plus', the Union was able to conduct its first military operation in Macedonia, as part of an increasing role in the Balkans.

First, there was the EU Police Mission in Bosnia, where a total of over 500 police officers, 80 per cent of them from EU member states, backed by 400 supporting staff, worked to establish local law enforcement capabilities. Based in Sarajevo, the Police Commissioner works with the EU Special Representative and UN envoy Lord Ashdown. The EUPM is based on a Council decision of March 2002, following a UN Security Council Resolution that

endorsed the EU engagement. In October 2003, the EU signed an agreement with the Bosnian authorities and received a mandate that runs until the end of 2005.

Second, in March 2003 Operation *Concordia* was launched in Macedonia. This EU operation made use of NATO assets and capabilities and fourteen non-EU countries also participated. The aim of the mission was to help enhance a stable and secure environment so as to allow implementation of the Ohrid Framework agreement by patrolling and monitoring Albanian-populated regions of Macedonia bordering Albania, Serbia and Kosovo. A total of 350 military personnel were engaged in the operation, all EU members except Ireland and Denmark contributing to this force in which France acted as framework nation. The operation, requested by FYROM and endorsed by UN Security Council resolution 1371, was expected to last six months and officially ended at the end of 2003. Before the end of this mandate, on 29 September 2003 the Union decided to establish a European Union Police Mission in the country, following an invitation from Prime Minister Crvenkovski. This police operation, called *Proxima*, is aimed at consolidating law and order, including the fight against organised crime, implementing the comprehensive reform of the Ministry of Interior, including the police, facilitating the operational transition towards and creation of a border police, as a part of the wider EU effort to promote integrated border management. This EU police force began its deployment in December 2003 for one year. Around 200 personnel, uniformed police personnel and civilian internationals, from EU member states and other countries, are taking part in this mission. Experts are drawn from different policing fields in order to offer a wide range of police expertise. Under the EU Special Representative in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and in partnership with the government authorities, EU police experts monitor, mentor and advise the country's police, thus helping to fight organised crime more effectively and consolidate public confidence in policing.

Third, a real turning point for the Union was Operation *Artemis* launched on 12 June 2003. This was the first fully autonomous crisis management operation, i.e. outside 'Berlin-plus', outside continental Europe. It took place within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1484 and the Council's Joint Action adopted on 5 June 2003. It consisted in the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia, in the Ituri

region of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The aim of the mission was to contribute to stabilisation of security conditions in Bunia and to the improvement of the humanitarian situation to ensure the protection of the airport, displaced persons and the civilian population. This force stayed until 1 September 2003 to allow the return of a reinforced MONUC. It was thus a bridging operation, limited in time and space.

None the less, this operation demonstrated the capacity of the Union to react quickly and effectively in an unsettled and remote theatre. President Jacques Chirac was first contacted by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and then the Union agreed to act, with France as framework nation. By early July, all elements of the operation were already in place. While the French forces represented a large majority of the military personnel involved in the operation, it is important to note that the planning of the operation and the rules of engagement were decided at 15. In a very brief space of time, Union members committed staff officers and troops to work with Paris. Apart from the French troops on the ground (90 per cent of the force), a special operations unit from Sweden, intelligence units from the United Kingdom and a medical team from Belgium were involved on the ground. The Operation Headquarters was based in Paris and included 80 officers drawn from all European countries. The Force Headquarters was set up in Entebbe, which served as a logistical hub to dispatch the necessary forces to Bunia.

In all respects, Operation *Artemis* was a success. First, the security situation in the region was restored, a large number of refugees returned and a significant disarmament of local militia took place. Politically, it led to renewed peace efforts between the DRC government and the armed groups. Second, it was a success for Europe. *Artemis* was proof that the Union could respond to an emergency situation in a very short period of time in an extremely demanding theatre of operations, notably in terms of logistics. The institutional framework put in place years before worked adequately. It also demonstrated the EU's willingness to take risks. Although the operation did not involve casualties on the European side, it should be stressed that such an eventuality was real enough when the operation was planned and conducted.

Apart from the military intervention by 1,800 troops, the EU decided on a three-pronged strategy for Ituri: first, to help disarm, demobilise and reintegrate armed groups, particularly children;

second, to prepare a socio-economic rehabilitation programme to back up the interim administration, including grass-roots reconciliation; and third, to give an immediate €200 million aid package from its European Development Fund (EDF) in order to set up an ethnically mixed police force. Operation *Artemis* was the first concrete step towards a more responsible, autonomous and proactive Europe. But it was only a step: not all operations would be as limited and as short as *Artemis*.

Finally, the EU has expressed its willingness to take over NATO's peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. This commitment will represent its largest operation so far. It will involve several thousand military personnel, and police forces for a longer period of time. This operation will certainly constitute a test of EU military and civilian capabilities. Even if it takes place under 'Berlin-plus', this operation could give ESDP its first real significance, and will reinforce the credibility of the Union as a strategic actor.

Strategic scenarios

3

The Union embodies the process of political integration, but it is also at the crossroads of globalisation and its consequences. But that integration does not guarantee shelter from the latter: the strategic environment is by nature uncertain. In this respect, the scenarios presented in this chapter serve four complementary purposes which, taken together, will assist the policy debate and defence planning. We have selected five scenarios in which the use of armed forces is crucial to the outcome. This does not mean that other tools – diplomatic, political, economic, and cultural – will be unimportant; nor does it mean that most major international contingencies will call primarily for the use of defence forces. International legal issues are not considered either. Simply, the scope of this analysis is by definition focused on defence as such, and by reference to its military manifestations, not to security policy more generally.

First, the scenarios serve as broad descriptions of potential missions, based on challenges or threats which European countries may have to face over a 10-20 year timeframe, a duration reflecting the time necessary to reshape, if need be, force structures and develop the corresponding weapons systems. These descriptions are generic in nature, given the fairly long period involved; thus, specific countries or adversaries are not named. As will be seen, the base-line scenarios presented here combine the type which figured in early post-Cold War defence white papers prepared by EU member states and contingencies which reflect the strategic change brought about by the 11 September attacks in the United States.

Second, the scenarios set forth assumptions as to the scope of the EU's aims vis-à-vis challenges or threats that have substantial implications on the shaping and sizing of European defence capabilities. In all cases, the aims described are collective in nature, in terms of both their definition and their fulfilment. Naturally, in practice, this may turn out not to be the case. Until 2003 the ambition to fulfil Petersberg tasks collectively as EU operations had not yet been translated into a major real-life military contingency,

notwithstanding the conduct, during this period, of operations that could be construed as Petersberg tasks. Therefore, even where a legally defined and politically asserted ambition exists, there is no guarantee that it will actually be realised. But by the same token, it is by no means obvious that the existence of a legally agreed EU provision is a prerequisite for the realisation of the aims laid out in the scenarios given here. This is particularly the case in scenarios IV and V (involving the threat of weapons of mass destruction by a terrorist organisation against the territory of the EU). A collective response may well occur as the result of the materialisation of threats similar to those described in the scenarios more directly than from the pre-existing interpretations of EU treaty language.

None the less, the assumption of a collective European ambition in the scenarios selected here has led us to exclude those that may otherwise have their place in strategic planning undertaken in other contexts, national or NATO. Such is the case for an attack on non-EU overseas territories placed under the sovereignty of an EU member. Thus, attacks against the Falklands, New Caledonia, Aruba or Greenland are not considered here as necessarily calling for an EU military response. The corresponding counter-actions will be assumed to be principally of a national nature. It should be borne in mind that such contingencies are not necessarily marginal in military terms: to recover the Falklands from the Argentine invasion, the British projected a division-sized amphibious force at a distance equal to that separating the United States from Afghanistan. There is of course some ambiguity as to where to draw the line between various sorts of overseas possessions. Some of them are indeed an integral part of the EU, most clearly the Portuguese or Spanish islands in the Atlantic. The French *Départements d'Outre-Mer*[55] are within the eurozone but outside Schengen and the EU customs area. In some cases European assets are located there, for instance the Kourou space centre in French Guyana.

Conversely, we have not avoided presenting scenarios in which the national nuclear forces of EU member states (France and the United Kingdom) may enter into the equation either explicitly or implicitly. This is not because of any assumptions about an as yet hypothetical 'European role' of these national nuclear arsenals. Indeed *dissuasion concertée*, along the lines tentatively suggested by France in 1994, was not a consensus item. Nor do we assume any

55. Guadeloupe, Guyane, Martinique, Réunion, St Pierre et Miquelon.

basic change vis-à-vis the contribution of these nuclear arsenals to NATO-wide deterrence.[56] Simply, in recent historical experience, in a conflict such as the 1991 Gulf War, in which EU members were involved, there was a nuclear aspect, as witnessed by US, French and British statements during the war concerning the prospective threat (or refusal of threat) of use of nuclear weapons if Iraq used its own weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In cases where an adversary has a WMD potential, the conflict will by definition have a WMD dimension.

Third, the scenarios are tools to help defence planners define capabilities to conduct operations.[57] The scenarios deal with defence planning, not with operational planning. The distinction is of great importance. Defence planning is concerned with turning assets into capabilities. Operational planning is concerned with the actual deployment of armed forces. On the one hand, the scenarios assume that no one can predict with any degree of certainty where exactly and in what precise circumstances a European force will be deployed. For this reason, flexibility through modularity, interoperability, sustainability, strategic mobility and firepower are necessarily key characteristics of such a force. On the other hand, generic contingencies can be usefully described and acted upon. That is what the scenarios set out to do.

Furthermore, to fulfil their defence planning role, these generic scenarios are spelt out in fairly precise terms, under the heading 'contingency' for each scenario. This gives the scenarios an air of reality, which is useful for determining the outer limits and the context of the force structures and capabilities required to meet a given threat and attain a given objective. However, this precision should not be allowed to mislead the reader into regarding the scenarios as accurate portrayals of a predetermined future. This would be a self-defeating pretension, since in reality no operation ever unfolds exactly as predicted. Scenarios are by definition imperfect tools for a force planning process, which can also by definition only be imperfect. But without such prior force planning the ability to respond in a timely and effective manner to real-world challenges will be severely hampered. The aim is to keep the imperfection within acceptable bounds.

Given this force planning role, the contingencies selected will tend to be at the outer limits of stress level which a given challenge and a given ambition may induce. This does not, however, lead us systematically into worst-case analysis, even if we are closer to the

56. As contained in the 1974 Ottawa Declaration.

57. The force packages presented are based on the current state of affairs but do not preclude changes.

most demanding case than to the least demanding. Hence, for instance, our focus in scenario I is on a large-scale EU-led peace support operation rather than on a small one. This does not mean that small ones are unlikely or unimportant. On the contrary, these are both likely and important, including conflict-prevention deployments such as have occurred in Macedonia. Simply, the ability to mount a large operation will tend to demonstrate the ability to fulfil smaller missions of a similar nature.

The scenarios take account of the requirements of military transformation flowing from the broadly based set of organisational, managerial, technological and operational changes known as the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA). Where appropriate, each scenario will indicate in cursory form the implications in terms of transformation and integration; the scenarios are not considered as static depictions, but as dynamic instruments.

Finally, the scenarios must naturally be credible. The scenarios cover the whole range of military missions. Except for relatively low-risk peacekeeping, scenarios deal with both conventional and unconventional war-fighting operations in low- and high-intensity environments. The scenarios also spell out the role of the individual services. An underlying assumption is that combined 'jointness', i.e. collaboration of different services and different countries, is a prerequisite for successful operations.

Furthermore the scenarios reflect agreement within the Union: they are in conformity with the Petersberg tasks or Treaty language concerning the objectives of both the CFSP and the ESDP. Planning assumptions have been taken from agreed European Union documents, including those on the Headline Goal, and other reports by high-level working groups, such as the UN report of the Brahimi committee on peacekeeping. Thus, assumptions on troop rotation, sustainability and readiness reflect broad international agreement.

Not too much should be read into the order of presentation of the scenarios, although there is a rough escalation from the challenges of peacekeeping to the threatened horrors of the use of weapons of mass destruction. The levels of stress and risk do not increase in a linear manner from scenario I to scenario V. Indeed, the conduct of large-scale operations such as *Allied Force*, the Kosovo air campaign, and *Enduring Freedom*, the post-9/11, US-led operations in and around Afghanistan – operations similar to scenarios III and IV – is not of a clearly higher order of risk or even

financial cost than so-called 'low-intensity' peace support deployments in Bosnia or Somalia, as in scenario I.

These scenarios are not exclusive of other contingencies. Indeed, reality is not likely to conform to any predetermined scenario. However, each of the five scenarios selected tends to have significant force dimensioning and force structuring aspects, setting, as it were, the outer limits of the envelope of EU capabilities.

Scenario I: a large-scale peace support operation

A. The challenge

Peace support operations (PSOs), ranging from modest and uncontroversial monitoring and truce supervision to large-scale multi-dimensional deployments of the IFOR and KFOR variety have been a constant of the post-Second World War security landscape. One is bound to be struck by the size and forceful nature of the UN's operations in Congo (ONUC) in 1960-64, with up to 20,000 peacekeepers involved using lethal force to quell the Katanga secession, 250 UN soldiers being killed in the process. In the early post-Cold War period, major peace support and nation-building operations were carried out around the globe, with varying degrees of success, as in Namibia, Cambodia and Mozambique, or failure, as in Somalia. In terms of troops mobilised, these were quite substantial. Indeed, in the peak years of 1993-94, the UN had more than 100,000 peacekeepers in the field. Overall, the Europeans contributed a majority of the forces involved.

In subsequent years, the focus of European participation in peacekeeping and other peace support operations has been firmly located in the Balkans, with the overwhelming majority of military forces not operating under the UN flag:

	Total	UN[58] (per cent)	NATO[59]	other[60]
Europeans (EU15) in PSOs (June 2003)	41,111	2,342 (5.7)	32,288 (81)	5,480 (13.3)
In the Balkans	28,797			

58. Peacekeeping and truce supervision operations.

59. KFOR, SFOR, ISAF.

60 *Concordia*, Multinational Force of Observers in Sinai, Iraq coalition peace support forces, excluding occupation forces which in the case of the United Kingdom amounted at the time to some 10,000. All figures derived from *The Military Balance*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003).

This is a result both of the waning role of the UN as the principal vehicle for PSOs after the failures in Somalia and in the Balkans, and of the spread of conflict to Kosovo and Macedonia. PSOs will emerge in the next 10-20 years as the consequence of the widespread collapse of states with the understanding that such state-failure entails higher penalties than hitherto in the form of cross-border criminal and terrorist activity.[61] Similarly, peace-keeping operations (PKOs) will be required for preventive deployments, such as occurred in Macedonia under the UN flag from 1992 to 2001. Such deployments will not tend to be of a greater scale or have more forceful rules of engagement than would be the case for PSOs of the Bosnia or Kosovo variety. Indeed, many conflict-prevention operations will tend to be smaller and less forceful. Therefore, they can be considered in practice to be a subset of scenario I. Finally, PSOs will be required to deal with the aftermath of regime change in countries targeted by the fight against global terrorism (as is already the case in Afghanistan, with the deployment of ISAF in Kabul). Therefore, there will be an even greater call than hitherto on European resources for participation in PSOs.

B. The aim

Europe's aim here is to be able to assemble and, if politically appropriate, to lead a multidimensional peace support operation in a complex environment, whether under chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter, without a priori restrictions in terms of geographical location. The precedents of East Timor (1999-2000), Cambodia (1992-93) and Namibia (1989) demonstrate that the corresponding capability should not and need not be geared to a deployment in the close-to-home Balkans. The objective corresponds to the existing Petersberg tasks, and should therefore not raise a priori issues of general principle. Given the nature of the operations (PSOs), legitimisation through the UN Security Council will tend to be both required and obtainable. The basic issue for the EU will tend to be of a pragmatic nature: which PSOs to enter into, in view of competing claims on European military, political and financial resources.

61. On this score, see the role of non-state territorial entities in Latin America ('FARCland'), Eastern Europe (Transnistria), the Caucasus, or Africa (Puntland, Somaliland, etc.).

C. The contingency

The EU agrees to take over both SFOR and KFOR on the condition that both operations will be integrated and will be led from one operational headquarters. The scenario involves a complex or multifaceted peacekeeping operation. The force will operate under a mandate of the UN Charter, based on Chapter VII. This means that troops deployed should be able to enforce the peace at the tactical level, and that force will be used in self-defence. However, coercive action at company level should not be ruled out. The objective is to maintain peace and stability and create favourable conditions for post-conflict peace building.

The ground forces will act in conformity with the Petersberg tasks, i.e. peacekeeping as stated in Title V, Article 17.2 of the TEU. Although this is not a particularly stressful scenario in terms of distance – the Balkans are close to home – the scale is greater than that of any extra-European PSO undertaken since the creation of the United Nations.

D. The capability

Planning assumptions

◗ The EU deploys a main force of 30,000 troops for peace support and stabilisation operations. The sustainability requirement is 3 years. In support of the ground operation, the EU deploys 40 combat aircraft, 6 surface combatant warships, 1 command ship and 6 maritime patrol aircraft for ground observation tasks and to enforce sanctions. Deployment is within 60 days; a mission headquarters is set up within 15 days. These requirements are well within the recommendations made by the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping. As stated in the Brahimi Report, recommendations are to '. . . develop the operations capabilities to fully deploy . . . complex peace-keeping operations within 90 days, and the mission headquarters should be fully installed and functioning within 15 days.'

◗ Troop rotation will take place after six months; units cannot be deployed more than twice during the three-year period.
◗ Distance from Brussels is 2,000 km.
◗ Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) with IGO and NGO is considered a critical factor for success.

Operational assumptions

◗ The mission requires light infantry, some special forces for dealing with war criminals, supported by air- and sealift. The following military operations will be carried out: observation, monitoring; interpositioning; military assistance; demobilisation; reconstruction.
◗ Reconstruction cannot include only military forces. This mission also requires a civil component. The following civil operations will be carried out as part of the peace support and stabilisation operation. A police force of 500 men will be deployed within 30 days and its sustainability is three years. Among the force should be the appropriate mix of police and justice and home affairs (JHA) officials to perform tasks of strengthening the rule of law, reinforcing civil administration and civil protection.

E. Implications

These numbers fall well within the scope of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), but with a significant nuance. PSOs of the sort described put a premium on staying power and on the multi-dimensional nature of the forces deployed rather than on speed of intervention or on the capability to 'knock doors open'. Neither Operation *Desert Storm*, nor *Enduring Freedom*, nor indeed the initial INTERFET deployment in East Timor, is the appropriate template here. Momentum and tempo are less important than durability (always) and (in some cases) sheer scale. Such forces do not therefore call for the full panoply of joint task force capabilities, whether in terms of dedicated strategic mobility or from the standpoint of C4ISR. However, they may call upon Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), with the European Union drawing on the corresponding NATO assets. Such operations will be all the more successful if they bring into play the EU's considerable soft power assets. Therefore

European involvement in large-scale PSOs will tend to be politically tempting.

The civil component of the operation is of utmost importance. PSOs cannot be successful without a significant civil contribution to reconstruction. One of the advantages of the European Union is that it possesses the appropriate institutions, infrastructure and experience for performing civil stabilisation operations.

Even if the numbers foreseen in this scenario fall within the scope of the EU Headline Goal, some remarks are in order.

❚ In the long run, PSO activity is far from risk-free. 204 military personnel were killed in UN PKOs in former Yugoslavia. The Beirut Multinational Security Force in 1982-84 lost 299 US and French servicemen killed in the 22 November 1983 bombings alone, i.e. more than all coalition losses in Operation *Desert Storm* (244 KIA).[62] In other words, PKOs in a hostile environment are demanding.

❚ In terms of duration, PSOs entail an often long and nearly always indeterminate deployment. Extreme cases are Cyprus (since 1964) and South Lebanon (since 1978). In other words, PSOs may fit into the EU Headline Goal force in terms of size, but may tend to go beyond its one-year timeframe. As EU force structures retract to levels in keeping with the new strategic context, with its emphasis on leaner expeditionary forces, entering long-lasting PSOs will increasingly reduce Europe's subsequent margin of strategic manoeuvre. Thus, UNPRO-FOR, IFOR/SFOR and KFOR have consistently mobilised between 20,000 and 40,000 European soldiers every year during the last decade. The effort, equivalent in scale to that of the United States forces stationed in South Korea, may have been worth it, but there are serious opportunity costs, all the more so since peacekeepers tend to be high quality soldiers, in view of the complexity and stress of the 'neither war nor peace' environment in which they have to operate. These soldiers are consequently not available for war-fighting operations in which Europe may be otherwise involved. The financial and operational opportunity costs thus turn out to be extremely high in the long run.

❚ Finally, precisely because PSOs do not call for top-end strategic mobility and C4ISR assets, a heavy investment in peace support may lead in the long run to under-investment in

62. Figures (March 2004) include UNPROFOR, UNMIBH, IPTF, UNPF and UNPREDEP military fatalities. The UN figures include fatalities from all causes, whereas Gulf War and Beirut security force fatalities mentioned here were all 'killed in action' (KIA).

the tools of the RMA that are all necessary to deal with other scenarios as well as, in the short run, to the pinning-down of forces required for contingencies that suddenly arise. There is thus a trade-off between the implementation of this kind of operation and the military requirements of other scenarios.

F. Shortfalls

Analysis of this scenario does not reveal serious shortfalls. EU nations have sufficient capabilities to conduct a large-scale peacekeeping operation. The most pressing challenge is deployable and secure command, control and communications. However, as has been noted, an emphasis on PSOs can have high opportunity costs, which can have a substantial impact on the ability to perform satisfactorily in scenarios involving high-intensity force projection.

Scenario II: high-intensity humanitarian intervention

A. The challenge

Since the end of the Cold War, massive war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed in Europe, while one of the twentieth century's most intensive genocides occurred in Rwanda in spring 1994.[63] With the widespread collapse of states and the political exploitation of the human yearning to belong to set communities of identity, the probability of new instances of crimes against humanity and other humanitarian challenges is high and rising. These challenges also include a direct threat to sizeable communities of EU citizens in situations of state collapse and civil war.

In political terms, there is a built-in obstacle against timely action to counter such occurrences. As long as nothing serious has happened, intervention can hardly occur, and if crimes are already being committed it may be politically possible to intervene but by then it may be too late. This was the kind of quandary with which decision-makers were faced in the case of East Timor in 1999. They

63. With estimates ranging from 400,000 to 800,000 fatalities, the Rwanda genocide, perpetrated in the space of a few weeks, was of exceptional intensity.

acquitted themselves of their duties remarkably under these constraints. However, this dilemma is not what prevented timely intervention in Rwanda in 1994 or a timely change of rules of engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992-95. Without neglecting the real political difficulties of countering genocide, the fact remains that action to prevent crimes against humanity is militarily possible. Indeed, the availability of the appropriate military tools makes it more difficult to justify a political decision not to intervene. The same remarks apply to interventions relating to the urgent and large-scale evacuation of EU and other threatened foreign nationals in a context of direct aggression.

B. The aim

Europe's aim here is to field and, if politically appropriate, to lead a force capable of stopping an emerging genocide without too severe a limitation on geographical location, given the global range of precedents like Bosnia, Rwanda and East Timor. The force's objective is to prevent the *génocidaires* from operating effectively in the area where criminal activities occur. Therefore, this kind of intervention will tend to put the emphasis on speed and momentum, with follow-on forces exercising a de facto international protectorate in the framework of what will then become a PSO as in scenario I. Humanitarian operations are an explicit part of Petersberg tasks.

C. The contingency

A humanitarian disaster is under way in a land-locked country in central Africa. The threat is posed by small but deadly groups of insurgents who are terrorising the local population and are hostile to any intervening power. The killing of civilians has started and the threat of genocide is real. If nothing is done, some 200,000 civilians could be killed by approximately 4,000 insurgents, who operate in groups of 10-20 combatants.

The objective of the intervention is to restore peace, to prevent further humanitarian suffering and to enable a humanitarian relief operation by providing a secure environment for humanitarian aid and peace building efforts by intergovernmental organ-

isations (IGOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The operation may have as a corollary task the protection and/or evacuation of EU and other threatened foreign nationals. The ground forces will be deployed in conformity with the Petersberg tasks, i.e. '. . . tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.' (Title V, Article 17.2 of the TEU)

D. The capability

High-intensity humanitarian operations, notably anti-genocide actions, will put an extreme premium on speed of deployment and tempo of operations. This requires élite infantry, specialised and special forces. Depending on the location, they may include air manoeuvrable and/or marine assault units. The Australian-led INTERFET operations in East Timor give a reasonably idea of the capabilities involved, i.e. a brigade-sized force, landing in East Timor within days of a relevant and timely UNSC resolution.[64] Such time-lines and the scale of the force used are comparable to what could and should have been effectively used in Rwanda in April 1993. Such a force falls well within the ERRF's scope in terms of size but deployment times are radically shorter than the 60-day pace of the EU force, which admittedly applies to the full ERRF complement, with presumably shorter deployment times for smaller force packages.

Planning assumptions

The contingency assumes that during the deployment 10,000 men will be continuously employed in combat operations to enforce the peace. They should be trained to deal with terrorist attacks and guerrilla warfare in a *rural* environment. There will be no sustained fighting by other friendly forces, but they should take asymmetrical responses into account.

◗ The EU deploys up to 10,000 land forces including armed helicopters for a period of up to a year. The land force is supported by 105 aircraft, including 60 support aircraft, and a naval task force of 10 surface combatant warships, 4 amphibious transport ships, 1 command ship, 2 support ships and 10 maritime patrol aircraft for ground observation. Troop rotation will take place after six months; units cannot be deployed more than twice during the

64. Undertaken in September 1999 under a Chapter VII UNSC resolution, INTERFET, once the immediate forceful task of humanitarian intervention had been successfully completed, was replaced, within a few months, by traditional PKO/nation-building forces (UNTAET).

three-year period.
◗ Troops shall be deployed within 15 days; headquarters within 15 days.
◗ Distance from Brussels is 5,000 km, e.g. central Africa. The nearest available seaport is 300 km from the theatre of operations.
◗ After successful completion of the operation, an appropriate scenario I type of operation will be tasked.

Operational assumptions

The intervention requires special operations forces and specialised forces (SF), supported by tactical air forces (close air support, offensive air support) and air- and sealift. The following operations will be carried out:

counter-insurgency operations in a rural environment (cordon, search and destroy);
establishing and controlling safe areas;
denial and guarantee of movement;
hearts and minds operations (psychological warfare);
military assistance to IGOs and NGOs;
humanitarian relief.

E. Implications

The corresponding level of risk-taking will tend to be high but within an extremely compressed timeframe. Comparatively large humanitarian interventions undertaken by the Europeans and the Australians have tended to have fairly low casualty figures. France's combat airdrop of some 700 *Légionnaires* to save several hundred hostages in Kolwezi (Katanga) in 1978 resulted in 5 combat fatalities. INTERFET's brigade-scale operations in East Timor experienced no combat fatalities.

Given the extreme urgency for action, this type of scenario may call for a lead nation approach as was the case for Operation *Artemis* in Ituri. Given the major role played by special operations forces (SOFs) and specialised forces, a collective European capability for timely and effective humanitarian intervention will call for a dedicated effort at cooperation and coordination in an area where each country has tended to keep its own secrets. In many ways, this scenario will therefore call for efforts and foci similar to

those of the otherwise rather different scenario IV, involving counter-proliferation operations. Strategic and tactical mobility, effective mobile and long-range C4ISR capabilities will be of the essence in terms of technical abilities. High-speed, large-scale humanitarian intervention calls for the tools of the RMA.

F. Shortfalls

The most important shortfall is secure and deployable command, control and communications; theatre surveillance and reconnaissance; surveillance and target acquisition; and human intelligence (HUMINT). Although EU countries have limited sea- and airlift capabilities, these will be sufficient for a relatively limited deployment. Regarding combat power, EU nations could conduct most of the aspects of an INTERFET-scale operation, i.e. less than is posited in the scenario. But in the case envisaged by the scenario, they lack highly mobile forces for unconventional warfare and sufficient numbers of SOF, either for initial deployment or to sustain the operation. They also lack both support and attack helicopters. The shortfalls, while significant, could be corrected through the reallocation of funding and changes in organisational priorities, with limited impact on the overall level of defence spending.

Scenario III: regional warfare in the defence of strategic European interests

A. The challenge

Major wars have wreaked havoc on the Middle East on at least seven occasions during the last six decades.[65] India and Pakistan have fought each other in three large-scale wars, in 1948, 1965, and 1970-71, and in a number of smaller confrontations, most recently the Kargil conflict of 1999. In East Asia, conventional wars have occurred in the Indo-Chinese and Korean peninsulas, not to mention a host of lesser conflicts as well as 'wars of national liberation', foremost the French and American wars in Indo-China.[66] There may be some reasons to believe that the prevalence of conventional

65. The Arab-Israeli wars (1948-49, 1956, 1967, 1973), the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), the Gulf War (1990-91) and the war in Iraq that began in 2003.

66. But also the Chinese-Vietnamese war of 1979, and the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia (1979-89).

wars may be waning, either as a consequence of political change – democratisation in East Asia appears to have had a pacifying influence – or, more ominously, as a result of the nuclear factor entering into the power equation – major state-to-state wars have not occurred between Israel and the Arab states since 1973.[67]

However, even if major regional wars may have become less prevalent, they have not disappeared, as was demonstrated in the recent war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Indeed, they may exist with elements of mass destruction weaponry factored into them. This was the case of the Iran-Iraq war (with the widespread use of chemical weapons by Iraq, and subsequently and to a limited degree by Iran) and, in a different manner, with the Gulf War in 1991, in which Iraq's WMD capabilities and ambitions on the one hand, and the mass destruction potential of the West and Israel on the other hand, played at least a background role.

Future regional wars could affect European interests in two very important but rather different ways:

▌ by directly threatening European prosperity and security, for instance in the form of the interruption of oil supplies and/or massive increases in the cost of energy resources, the disruption of flows in goods and services – a larger share of EU exports goes to conflict-prone Asia than to North America – or the forced emigration of war-threatened populations towards Europe's shores. European interests are no less affected by conflicts which threaten the framework of international rules and laws. The Gulf War of 1990-91 was a typical example of a conflict in which all of the above were at stake, from the energy dimension to the attempted *fait accompli* of the forceful annexation of an internationally recognised state. The Middle East remains an obvious area of European concern in all of these respects, but it is worth pondering the consequences of a major regional war in East or South Asia for European economic interests. It is by no means obvious that Europe should automatically opt for a bystander position in such contingencies, in the expectation that the United States alone will do the fighting: as the Korean war of 1950-53 showed, European involvement should not be discarded out of hand.

▌ by affecting Europe's ties with the United States, European interests will not simply depend on the specifics of a given regional conflict, its 'merits' as it were; they will also depend on the consequences of such a conflict on the US-European

67. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel, and the two *intifadas* cannot be considered conventional wars in which regular forces are pitted against each other.

strategic relationship, the 'context'. Thus, there may exist all sorts of reasons not to participate or support a US war of invasion in Iraq but ultimately one of the most significant factors in shaping European policies towards such a war will be the future of the US-European relationship. What applies to the Iraq case has general validity, notably in the case of military tension between the United States and China in East Asia.

If one looks ahead 10 or 20 years, there are reasons for both reassurance and concern, with a possible majority of the latter. Areas which used to be war-torn appear to have entered a long period of pacified relations, notably in much of East Asia. Conversely, Europe's and the industrialised world's dependence on Middle Eastern oil gives no sign of lessening over the next 20 years. Half of the world's oil exports flow from the Middle East, mostly through the Straits of Hormuz, and two-thirds of known oil reserves are located there, of which 25 per cent in Saudi Arabia and 11 per cent in Iraq. In the comparatively short time span of 20 years, it is highly unlikely that alternate energy sources will have displaced this extraordinary dependence on a handful of oil-producing states in the world's politically most fractured region.

Thus, the reduction of the potential for regular wars affects regions which tend to be far from Europe, but the regions closest to us are both highly volatile and of key economic importance. In other words, Europe cannot build its defence policy on the assumption that there will not be a major military challenge in the Middle East of an order of magnitude at least equal to and possibly greater than that encountered at the time of the 1990-91 Gulf War. However, as was the case with that conflict, such a challenge would presumably not be specifically directed only at Europe; it might affect in at least equal measure the other industrialised countries, including the United States. This is notably the situation concerning energy dependence, with the United States relying on oil imports and all EU countries, including the United Kingdom, being net oil importers.

B. The aim

The EU should be able to field a force capable of providing militarily and politically significant support to an international coalition

in a major regional conflict. If one uses the 1990-91 Gulf War as a benchmark, the operation, in political terms, would be authorised by a UN Security Council resolution and would aim to re-establish the *status quo ante*. In effect, this would be a peace enforcement operation, albeit of a particularly muscular variety. Whether this could be construed as a Petersberg task is a matter of interpretation. In legal terms, there is nothing in the Amsterdam or Nice Treaties that would appear to preclude such an interpretation if it were considered politically desirable.

C. The contingency

In a state bordering the Indian Ocean, anti-Western elements in state *x* have seized power, and are using oil as a weapon, expelling Westerners and attacking Western interests. In addition, they have commenced an invasion of neighbouring country *y*, whose regime is pro-Western and plays a crucial role in the free flow of oil to the West, and are threatening more generally the unimpeded use of vital maritime bottlenecks. Country *y* asks the EU and the United States for help in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. The EU, together with the United States as the senior partner, intervene with a large combat force to assist country *y* and also protect their own interests. The intervention requires forces trained and equipped for conventional manoeuvre warfare. The military objective of the operation is to help liberate occupied territory and to obtain control over some of the oil installations, pipelines and harbours of country *x*. The adversary has some 250,000 troops deployed. The EU also imposes sanctions, including the blockade of country *x*.

This objective is in concurrence with the Treaty on the European Union, Title V, Article 11, i.e. 'to safeguard the fundamental interests and independence of the Union, in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter'. Needless to say, the operation is to take place in a high-intensity environment, under the threat of WMD. Unlike the situation at the time of the Gulf War in 1991, there are not four months in which to deploy and organise.

D. The capability

Using the 1990-91 Gulf War as an example in terms of war-fighting potential and firepower, a European force package would be within the outer quantitative limits of the Headline Goal. In that conflict, some 40,000 ground forces from Britain and France were engaged in Operations *Desert Shield*, *Desert Storm* and *Desert Tempest*. Around 100 combat aircraft were committed by Britain, France and Italy, along with a comparable number of support aircraft, notably in-flight refuelling aircraft. Naval ships from 8 maritime members of the EU 15 were involved. However, the forces committed by Britain, France and other EU members lacked political as well as military coherence. There obviously was no European-wide command structure answering to the US coalition commander; nor was there any theatre-wide integration of national British, French or other forces. Indeed, this lack of theatre-scale combined operating was one of the factors which led Britain and France subsequently to acquire mobile, theatre-wide command capabilities. Logistical assets, notably strategic airlift, were inadequate. The problem was tolerable only to the extent that there was plenty of time to deploy before the actual engagement of forces, allowing for substitute solutions, e.g. chartering commercial aircraft.[69] This time, according to the scenario, there would be an integrated European force. The scenario would also imply a faster deployment than was the case during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91.

Planning assumptions

◗ The EU makes a contribution of 10 brigades (60,000 troops). This land force is supported by 360 combat aircraft, support aircraft, and two maritime task forces, totalling 4 carriers, 16 amphibious ships, 12 submarines, 40 surface combatants, 2 command ships, 8 support ships and 20 maritime patrol aircraft. This contribution is within the Headline Goal. As stated at the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999, 'Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level (up to a corps) within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.' Moreover, this contribution is in the framework of the capabilities committed by member states: as stated in the Capabilities Commitment Confer-

69. Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The invasion of Iraq began on 17 January 1991 for the air forces, and on 24 February for the ground forces.

ence, Brussels, 20-21 November 2000, '. . . The contributions, set out in the "Force Catalogue", constitute a pool of more than 100,000 persons and approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels . . .'

◗ The sustainability requirement is one year.

◗ The force will not require the 60 days for deployment as allowed in the Headline Goal, but will deploy within 21 days. Headquarters will be deployed within 15 days.

◗ Distance from Brussels is 4,500 km, e.g. along the Western littoral of the Indian Ocean region.[70]

◗ The theatre of operations is 300 km from the nearest seaport.

◗ If required, after successful completion of the operation a scenario I operation will be mounted.

Operational assumptions

To achieve the objectives set, a large-scale, joint and combined, sustained combat operation with regular forces is required.

❚ Ground forces will carry out manoeuvre warfare, including air mechanised/airmobile operations.

❚ Air forces will support ground forces with strategic and tactical air campaigns (close air support, offensive air support, suppression of enemy air defences), air defence, theatre missile defence, and tactical air transport.

❚ Naval vessels will support land operations with strike missions, extended air defences, lift and support of sanctions.

E. Implications

In order to achieve the required capability, major improvements are in order, notably in the field of strategic mobility and of C4ISR. Similarly, organisational measures, such as the creation of an EU strategic mobility command as mooted at the Helsinki European Council, and the pooling of C4ISR assets,[71] would be essential if the EU and its members are to be substantial players in a US-led coalition.

Such initiatives would have significant budgetary implications, involving an increase of overall defence spending, and not simply internal reallocation of funding. Strategic mobility and C4ISR are not cheap, even if in other areas of the revolution in

70. By comparison, Operation *Desert Storm* took place some 3,500 km from Brussels.

71. Whether in terms of sharing theatre command assets or the pooling of strategic reconnaissance, e.g. the French-German agreement on sharing *Helios* II and SAR-Lupe data.

military affairs (such as precision-guided stand-off munitions) costs are coming down. Therefore, even if scenario III does not go beyond the quantitative bounds of a robust definition of the Headline Goal, it would in effect shape and dimension national force structures. In particular, it would presumably accelerate the downsizing of EU defence forces, in order to generate force projection punch at the expense of the size of the overall force structure. In 2003, EU military manpower, despite substantial reductions in recent years, was still at US levels, 1.4 million military personnel, while benefiting from substantially less than half of US spending levels. If scenario III is taken seriously, European force size has to continue to fall, while defence spending has to increase.

Unless there is a major increase in the relevant aspects of European defence spending (R&D, procurement, operation and maintenance) in the medium term (5-10 years), increasing problems of 'cooperability' will arise between the EU and the United States, with European forces being incapable of following the pace of US defence transformation. In 1997, the European members of NATO countries spent 28 and 65 per cent of US defence investment in R&D and procurement respectively. By 2001, these European percentages had dropped to 23 and 47.[72] This had been happening before the Bush administration's spending increases.

F. Shortfalls

Only the United States would be able to provide the framework for such an operation. There is a lack of deployable and secure C4ISTAR, including IMINT and SIGINT collection, and early warning and distant detection; tactical assets, including theatre surveillance and reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition and HUMINT. Regarding combat capabilities, EU countries lack carrier-based air power, precision-guided munitions, stand-off weaponry, attack helicopters and SOF. Regarding combat support, the EU nations do not have enough combat search and rescue, air-to-air refuelling, theatre ballistic missile defences, battle damage assessment, psychological warfare units, medical units and transport helicopters. Finally, EU members do not have sufficient logistical capabilities to sustain the operation. It is unlikely that the Union could sustain the operation for the required period.

72. NATO Europe R&D spending: $10.4 bn (1997), $9.1 bn (2001); US R&D spending: $37.9 bn (1997), $39.5 bn (2001); NATO Europe equipment spending: $29.0 bn (1997), $28.5 bn (2001); US equipment spending: $44.7 bn (1997), $59.9 bn (2001) (constant 1999 dollars). Source: *The Military Balance*, IISS, 2001-2002.

In view of these implications and shortfalls, it has not been deemed realistic to put forward a European-led variant of this scenario, since this would require defence spending increases far in excess of those already called for in the baseline scenario.

Scenario IV: prevention of an attack involving WMD

A. The challenge

Although proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not a recent concern, and despite substantial progress accomplished by the non-proliferation regime, WMD proliferation remains a serious concern for the Union. Some experts suspect that, notwithstanding their legal commitments, proliferating countries like North Korea or Iran are speeding up their efforts. The spillover effects of a nuclear North Korea could spread throughout Asia. In the most pessimistic scenario, non-proliferation as a policy principle could become increasingly unappealing for other Asian countries, and for Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia. North Korean or Pakistani scientists could put fissile material on the market or, as was revealed recently, they could try to initiate nuclear cooperation with other states. Moreover, biological weapons are the object of major technological breakthroughs, facilitating their effective military use and as a means of terror, while the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention of 1972 still lacks any credible verification mechanism.

Most ominously, the breakdown of state power, combined with the growing technical ease of acquisition of militarily significant chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities, opens up the prospect of the spread of WMD to non-state groups or to irregular groups whose affiliation with any given state is not admitted. Such groups, by definition, cannot be deterred in the way that states may be amenable to the nuclear deterrent of other states. Groups that have no power, population or territory at stake will not be swayed by threats aimed at such state-related assets. Thus, our countries may well, in a 10 to 20-year perspective, and quite possibly sooner, have to face the threat

of a dedicated mass destruction attack by a non-state actor against their centres of population and power. Such groups will have to be countered by means other than traditional manifestations of military or political power. As strategic options vis-à-vis this non-state threat, deterrence, containment and balancing are waning; pre-emption and repression are waxing.

B. The aim

Europe's aim is to field, and if need be to lead, a force capable of conducting a successful operation against a major non-state actor benefiting from the de facto impunity provided by its weak host state, whether this state is complicit, as was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, or simply incapable of extending its rule over its territory. The targeted group and its host state would be the object of such action in order to prevent the occurrence or the repetition of a mass destruction operation, such as in scenario V (homeland defence). Such was the aim of the US-led Operation *Enduring Freedom*, with its primary objective of preventing renewed mass destruction operations after the 11 September attacks. Although 9/11 was conducted with conventional, not CBRN, weapons, its effect was one of mass destruction.

Such an aim is in line with European statements at the highest levels following 11 September 2001. At the Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the EU and the President of the Commission in Ghent on 19 October 2001, it was affirmed that 'the European Council is determined to combat terrorism in every form, throughout the world'. In the same vein, at the European Council in Laeken in December 2001 it was recognised that 'through military and civil capabilities developed by the European Union for crisis management, the CFSP will become stronger and better contribute to preventing and controlling the terrorist threat for the benefit of the populations concerned.' Likewise, the Franco-German Defence and Security Meeting in Nantes in November 2001 stated that 'ESDP must also establish the wherewithal for combating international terrorism'. As noted in Chapter 2, the Solana document recognised the threat of WMD proliferation and explicitly mentioned the potentially devastating connection between non-state actors and these kinds of weapons.

Despite the failure of the IGC, potential developments agreed upon in Brussels in December 2003 could be taken into account. In that hypothesis, this objective will be in line with the definition of Petersberg tasks according to the draft Constitution: 'The task referred to in Article I-40 (1) . . . shall include joint disarmament operations . . . tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.'[73] As noted earlier, the Solidarity Clause (Article I-42) would require the Union 'to prevent a terrorist threat in Member States' territory, and . . . protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack.' This clause, reaffirmed in the European Council's 25 March 2004 Declaraton, includes the provision that a member state may request aid and assistance if it is '[the] victim of armed aggression on its territory'.

These references, although not yet incorporated in law, acknowledge the threat of terrorism to European society. From a broad perspective, if an act of mass destruction of a magnitude equal to, or greater than, the 9/11 attacks occurred in an EU country, it is fair to assume that this country would not be left to its own devices. One may also assume that there would be an EU-wide interest in preventing a recurrence of such mass destruction. We also know that NATO would not be the most likely vehicle with which to conduct such actions.

C. The contingency

Combating terrorism continues. The Americans and the EU agree that the EU should carry out a stand-alone operation in country x against groups associated with al-Qaeda. The EU sets up a mission in a remote part of Asia with SOF and SF. The mountainous and urban environment is high-risk, and the threat of WMD very acute. The adversary uses irregular tactics, such as terrorism and guerrilla warfare.

The EU forces are tasked to find and destroy the terrorist camps, command and control posts and facilities related to the production and use of WMD. The scenario involves extensive

73. Article III-210. See Antonio Missiroli (comp.), 'From Copenhagen to Brussels. European defence: core documents, Volume IV', *Chaillot Paper* 67 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2003), p. 412.

search missions and small-scale, high-intensity engagements with terrorists, gangs or irregular local fighters.

The objective of the operation is to reduce the threat of catastrophic terrorism to the West by eliminating terrorist cells and destroying WMD, their means of delivery and production facilities in the defence of interests in accordance with the Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article 11.

D. The capability

Planning assumptions

◗ The land forces amounts to 1,500 SOF for clandestine and covert actions, and a brigade of four battalions of SF, such as air manoeuvre forces, for covering operations in support of SOF. These forces will be supported by transport and combat helicopters. The air component is 60 combat aircraft and 40 support aircraft. The naval component is one carrier, 10 surface combatants, 1 command ship, 3 submarines and 2 support ships.
◗ The force will be deployed within 15 days, the mission headquarters within one week. The contribution is for a three-year period. Troops will be replaced after 6 months.
◗ Distance from Brussels is 5,000 km-plus e.g. in south-west Asia or beyond.
◗ If required, after successful completion of the operation an appropriate scenario I operation will be tasked.

Operational assumption

The mission requires SOF and SF, supported by tactical air forces (close air support, offensive air support) and air- and sealift. The following military operations will be executed:
∎   counter-insurgency operations in mountainous and urban terrain (cordon, search and destroy);
∎   control of airfields and lines of communication;
∎   hearts and minds: humanitarian aid, psychological operations.

E. Implications

Operation *Enduring Freedom* was a combination of large-scale unconventional warfare and medium-scale, broad-spectrum naval and air operations in which, in autumn 2001, the United States deployed some 6,000 soldiers to Afghanistan, i.e. less than the British in the Falklands in 1982. These were supported by a CENT-COM force array in the broader theatre of operations of some 60,000 (no more than the ERRF). A European counter-proliferation force package would aim to achieve similar results to *Enduring Freedom* and would be broadly equivalent to CENTCOM's force package. Emulating what the United States achieved within and around Afghanistan in October-December 2001 is entirely within Europe's technical and operational capability, albeit with a higher level of risk-taking due to the specific nature of European air assets. It presupposes, however, that fairly low-cost procurement measures are conducted in the short term (2-4 years) and somewhat higher-cost structural measures are taken in the medium term (5-10 years).

Given Europe's continuing lack of intercontinental bombers, and its limited number of aircraft carriers, European in-flight refuelling capabilities will have to be increased, along with an upstream diplomatic emphasis on securing access to a broad array of foreign air bases, preferably with preparatory work on the facilities. The French-inspired network of largely unmanned but well-prepared air bases in the hinterland of a number of African countries is an example of such advance activity.[74]

European C4ISR capabilities will require improvement, with particular emphasis on medium- and long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). One of the reasons for the high tempo of US operations in Afghanistan was the exploitation of the RMA's potential in ensuring 'full battle situation awareness', i.e. near real-time intelligence and information gathering, exploitation and dissemination, resulting in the shortening of the 'sensor-to-shooter' sequence. As in scenario III, intra-EU intelligence sharing at the strategic, operational and tactical levels will be at a premium.

In the short run, Europeans must intensify their efforts to acquire cheap and effective precision-guidance packages for the

74. Notably Niamtougou in Togo, Bouaké in Ivory Coast and Abéché in Chad. Similar infrastructure has been set up by Australia in the more remote parts of that continent-sized country.

bombs and missiles used by the 'shooters', i.e. manned aircraft and, progressively, unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). At the time of *Enduring Freedom* – an operation in which more than 70 per cent of the air-launched munitions used were precision-guided, mostly in the form of GPS-guided bombs – no European air force had deployed GPS-guided bombs, although these are based on incredibly cheap, commercially available technology. At the higher end, no European air force had conventionally armed land-attack cruise missiles.[75]

The level of effort required by the Europeans to assemble an effective long-range counter-proliferation/counter-terrorism capability is not of an overall budget and force dimensioning nature.[76] However, it would imply a significant qualitative impact, by giving greater emphasis to the top end of the scale in both human and materiel terms, and by giving priority to special forces broadly defined on the one hand, and to state-of-the-art data gathering, processing and exploitation on the other hand. The challenge in the case of the former is to ensure a high degree of cooperation and compatibility between these forces, which tend to live separate lives as a result not only of the requirements of secrecy and concealment, but also because of the exceptionally strong *esprit de corps* of such units. The latter would imply substantial changes in procurement priorities and service culture, as has been demonstrated time and again in Afghanistan as well as in Kosovo, by the imbalance in European defence investment between manned platforms on the one hand and smart munitions and force multipliers (C4ISR) on the other.

For these reasons, as well as for reasons of preserving 'cooperability' with US forces (see scenario III), European defence budget structures would have to lay greater emphasis on technologies upstream and force readiness downstream. The widening gap between US and EU military R&D spending would have to be narrowed: the EU's expenditure in this field has stayed flat at some 10 bn during the last five years (representing less than 7 per cent of European defence spending) while US expenditure jumped from $38 bn in FY 1995 to more than $50 bn in FY 2003 (13 per cent of US defence spending). At a minimum, the share of European defence budgets devoted to military R&D should be similar to the US proportion (thus entailing R&D expenditure of €20 bn a year).

Although the comparison should not be taken too far, the feasibility of a European version of *Enduring Freedom* can be tested

75. The first European air-launched cruise missiles, the Franco-British *Storm Shadow/ SCALP*, were delivered to the British RAF in early 2003 and were used to good effect in the Iraq war.

76. One of the more substantial short-term budget costs would presumably involve an increase in in-flight refuelling capabilities.

against the reality of a similarly far-flung but much larger military operation, the British Falklands expedition. This was conducted 12,000 km from the home country, a distance comparable to that separating the US East Coast from Afghanistan, over a period of slightly more than two months (2 April 1982, Argentine landing in Port Stanley; 21 May, British landing in the Falklands; 14 June 1982, Argentine surrender in Port Stanley), comparable to the time span between 11 September 2001 and the fall of Kandahar in 13 December 2001. The British landed a force of some 28,000 in the Falklands supported by a large naval task force, albeit with limited air power from carrier-based aircraft and a handful of *Vulcan* strategic bombers. The United Kingdom benefited from US and other logistical and C4ISR support of the sort which an EU counter-proliferation operation could reasonably expect.

F. Shortfalls

EU countries have sufficient numbers of SOF and highly mobile forces for specialised missions, but they are unable to sustain such operations over a longer period. Moreover, it is unlikely that most of these forces would perform well in difficult terrain and under the threat of CBRN weapons. The former calls for an adaptation of doctrine and training, the latter NBC protection. Furthermore, the EU lacks the relevant strategic intelligence assets, attack helicopters, precision-guided munitions and stand-off weaponry for providing the necessary air support, which also suffers currently from the limited carrier-based assets. Hence the scenario's assumption is that the operation is conducted in coordination with the United States.

Scenario V: homeland defence

A. The challenge

In recent years, non-state actors have begun to use or threaten to use unconventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The sarin nerve gas attacks by the Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan

(12 fatalities), the ostentatious placing of a quantity of caesium-137 in Izmailovo Park in Moscow and the anthrax attacks in the United States leading to 5 fatalities demonstrate that the chemical, biological and radiological threats are already real rather than virtual. Eventually, a dedicated WMD attack could be conducted against a population target in Europe. This threat was recognised by the European Council in Seville in June 2002: 'Priority action for the European Union, including in the field of CFSP and ESDP, concerning the fight against terrorism, should focus on … strengthening arrangements for sharing intelligence and developing the production of situation assessments and early warning reports, drawing on the widest range of sources, and developing our common evaluation of the terrorist threat against the Member States or the forces deployed under ESDP outside the Union in crisis management operations, including the threat posed by terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction.'[77]

B. The aim

The aim is to provide a collective military contribution to the operations required:

❚   to protect facilities which intelligence sources consider to be targets of an impending terrorist attack;

❚   to limit the consequences of a terrorist attack which has either already occurred or is in progress (as an ongoing biological attack).

Neither of these contingencies is a Petersberg task. Nevertheless, we have seen that homeland defence is clearly covered by the draft Constitution in its solidarity clause. In light of recent EU decisions and declarations concerning the fight against terrorism in the EU, notably in the JHA context, it would not be unlikely that the political decision would be made to marshal assets collectively, rather than leave every member state to fend for itself.

77. Presidency Conclusions, Annexe V.

C. The contingency

Two different contingencies are foreseen in this scenario: protection prior to any terrorist attack, and palliatives and consequence-limitation after an attack.

C.1. Protection

The threat of catastrophic terrorism continues. Because of the scale of the threat, the distinction between internal and external security is blurred. There is no other possibility but to use military forces for homeland defence. Individual countries are likely to lack capabilities for extensive homeland defence efforts. For that reason, the EU has created a pool of assets. This contingency involves the protection of a number of critical facilities on EU territory, including power plants, harbours, airports and government buildings, against terrorist attacks.

Terrorists are expected to attack with unconventional means, possibly 'dirty bombs' and biological weapons, which they smuggle in or produce locally. They will use these as weapons of mass disruption and mass destruction. Moreover, further attacks with aircraft cannot be ruled out. The contingency also involves intensified controls of the EU's external borders.

C.2. Consequence-limitation

A biological weapons attack has occurred with a known but virulently infectious agent, for example smallpox, in two shopping centres in separate EU countries. The spread of the disease threatens wide-scale disruption, along lines similar to the US *Dark Winter* high-level exercise of summer 2001,[78] with the following differences: two areas are targeted rather than three; first respondents will have been vaccinated before the attack; advance stockpiling of vaccines at the national and EU levels has taken place; appropriate contingency planning, along with extensive exercising of the

78. *Dark Winter* was terminated within less than a month, since, under the conditions of the exercise, the United States had ceased to operate as a functioning society within that timeframe.

EURATOX variety has been carried out; the corresponding measures are implemented in an aggressive and timely manner.

D. The capability

D.1. Protection

Planning assumptions

◗ Given the available intelligence, the four largest airports, the two biggest harbours, the ten most critical power plants, the ten most critical chemical plants and all the capitals of EU member states, including the seat of the EU in Brussels, must be protected.

◗ The EU will provide light infantry as a back-up to national police forces, in order to help protect critical infrastructure and to assist member states to secure the external borders of the EU.

Operational assumptions

The mission requires the use of light infantry, SOF and (layered) air defences to assist national governments with:

- ◗ air defence against aircraft and UAVs;
- ◗ military assistance to civil authorities for the maintenance of law and order;
- ◗ surveillance, intelligence and observation.

D. 2. Consequence-limitation

◗ National armed forces of the countries affected or at risk of being affected assist civil authorities' actions in implementing measures including:

- ◗ support in the maintenance of law and order, as in the French emergency plan *Vigipirate Renforcé*;
- ◗ the control of external borders and points of entry, airports, ports, etc.;
- ◗ the effective quarantining of areas in which 'ring vaccination' is to be conducted, in order to treat all of the affected population without having to divert scarce resources to other

areas. Such a fatal dissipation of resources would occur if the epidemic were not contained.

❚   Such measures, while going beyond the use of the military in current counter-terrorism operations – such as the role of the French military in *Vigipirate Renforcé* or of the British Army in Northern Ireland operations – would be similar in their philosophy to WHO-inspired quarantining during the final eradication of naturally occurring smallpox in the Indian subcontinent during the 1970s. The scale of mobilisation would be contingent upon the virulence of the attack but could well involve a substantial portion of armed forces. General purpose forces would be involved no less than specialist forces.

◗ Collective EU police, civil defence and military (ERRF) assets could be dispatched in particular to those areas where national capabilities would be insufficient, i.e. notably in some of the smaller states but more generally to the most exposed areas in terms of points of entry and transit routes. In this respect, it may be useful to develop, alongside the standing ERRF capabilities, earmarked reserve assets, in effect an EU-style National Guard, or Territorial Army.

E. Implications

In both types of contingencies a premium would be put on both speed and mass. Therefore, large-scale advance simulation and exercising of potential contingencies would be necessary at all levels – political, operational and tactical – and would in certain cases involve the general public. Unlike other scenarios, exercising and contingency planning would have to integrate both civil authorities and military forces.

Similarly, and more broadly, military defence, civil defence and domestic security organisations will have to be brought together at the political and administrative levels, both in the member states of the EU and within the EU institutions. An example of such a trend is provided by the French decision to establish a presidential-level domestic Security Council (*Conseil de Sécurité intérieure*), alongside the long-standing presidential-level Defence Council (*Conseil de Défense*). At the EU level, decision-making between the existing second and third pillars (CFSP and JHA

respectively) will have to be integrated in some form.

Finally, civil authorities will have to involve not only the member states and the EU as such but also, and possibly even more importantly, the substate levels of action. In this respect, and notwithstanding the daunting set of challenges which have been listed under scenario V, the EU and its members are in a situation which is, in some regards, more favourable than that of the United States. In the latter, most of the key actors, public or private, come under a non-federal authority: the 50 states – the National Guard is organised at that level, with authority exercised by the elected Governor of each state; the 5,000-plus counties, involving most of the police forces; and countless municipalities, cities having their own police forces, e.g. New York Police Department, not to mention a mostly privatised, atomised, health care system.

Much like the United States, the EU should consider developing a homeland defence capability, bringing together the collective assets of the Council and the Commission, including a military component with a European equivalent of the recently created US Northern Command. Such a command would handle the military aspects of European-wide contingency planning and exercising against scenario V threats, and could be, if needed, entrusted with the implementation of the corresponding collective measures.

Member states will have to make choices on the allocation of scarce assets for homeland defence and other scenarios. Although such trade-offs also exist between the other scenarios, particularly between scenario I on the one hand and scenarios II, III and IV on the other, the trade-off is more acute with homeland defence.

F. Shortfalls

Civil protection is a member-state responsibility. In general, EU nations lack the means to deal with the consequences of attacks by weapons of mass destruction. Regarding the prevention of terrorist attacks, there is a lack of IMINT and SIGINT collection; tactical assets, including theatre surveillance and reconnaissance/target acquisition and HUMINT. To deal with catastrophic terrorism, there is a need for more SOF or counter-terror units. The potential use of air-breathing or ballistic missiles may also require greater extended air defence capabilities.

A capacity for autonomous action

4

As we have seen in the previous chapters, the deteriorating international context, the enlarged Union and the European Security Strategy underline the need for effective European capabilities, which are ultimately an essential part of a strong relationship between the United States and Europe.

This chapter firstly identifies the deficiencies in these capabilities, especially concerning the most demanding aspects of each scenario, and secondly suggests some ways to correct them. No attempt has been made to form a hierarchy between the various scenarios or to establish priorities between the different findings: such political judgements will be the responsibility of the EU.

EU deficiencies

As noted earlier, the Union is currently able to mount large-scale peacekeeping operations like those envisioned in scenario I. The fact that there is an overwhelming majority of European troops in NATO operations like ISAF and KFOR suggests that Europeans have developed a real capacity for peacekeeping and stabilisation, including a civilian component. This is no mean achievement. Moreover, as Operation *Artemis* demonstrated, the Union is able to deploy rapidly close to 2,000 soldiers to enforce and restore peace in an extremely remote and conflict-ridden environment.

However, its capacity to wage and win wars in a more demanding scenarios is very limited. In such cases the Union lacks capabilities for autonomous actions and must therefore rely heavily on external actors. Moreover, operations in hostile environments always carry the risk of casualties, and they demand capabilities that enhance soldiers' protection and decrease collateral damage. The Union does not have sufficient capabilities of these types. In the more demanding cases, this lack of capabilities decreases the chances of success while raising the costs to unacceptable levels.

Since risks are inherent in any war-fighting operation, the ability to reduce these risks would help military planners and civilian decision-makers to make a better cost-benefit calculation. Overall, there are serious shortfalls that preclude the EU carrying out large-scale, sustained, out-of-area combat operations.

FINDING 1 – DEPLOYABILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY

The Union cannot deploy land forces quickly and cannot sustain them, due to the shortage of committed, deployable, combat-ready forces.

Most European forces are still in-place forces. This explains why only 10 to 15 per cent of European forces are deployable. The 19 members of NATO, prior to the organisation's formal enlargement on 2 April 2004, collectively had 250 combat brigades, including 69 US brigades. Less than 80 of those, including 29 US brigades, are considered 'deployable'. Relief of deployed forces is required after six months; a new deployment of a unit is considered after one year. Two brigades in reserve are therefore required for each deployed brigade. Thus, only 15 to 17[79] European brigades can be deployed at any given moment. This makes a total of approximately 40,000 troops. Of course, for a one-time deployment for combat missions the number could be significantly higher.

The reason for the small percentage of forces that can be deployed in relation to the number in existence is related to the organisation of many of the armed forces in Europe, which are either still entirely reliant upon conscription or are in the process of transition. Improved readiness and availability imply having more all-volunteer, professional armed forces. Only 7 of the 15 EU member states have such armed forces;[80] the others have mixed forces with an emphasis on conscripts. For political reasons, conscripts in most countries can only be deployed for collective defence and less demanding, classical or first-generation peacekeeping operations. Other tasks require volunteers. Thus the number of active forces available for Petersberg tasks is substantially below EU member states' combined active strength.

The basic need for the Headline Goal is to be able to respond to the range of military activities covered by the Petersberg tasks. However, it is possible that other tasks will be added in the light of

79. (80-29) divided by 3.

80. Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom rely on volunteers. Italy has decided to abolish conscription.

11 September and the need to help deal with rising terrorist threats. In any case, the Petersberg tasks cover a wide range of engagements, with very different levels of military intensity and required speed of reaction. A classification of states of readiness derived from NATO's rather different tasks may not provide the best guide for the EU. It is necessary to consider what may need to be done by EU forces and, in the light of that, to devise realistic states of readiness, including for rapid response or reaction, to enable the EU to play a full and appropriate role in security affairs.

Certain missions, such as the evacuation of civilians, will call for a very high state of readiness, days rather than weeks. On the other hand, major peacekeeping deployments of the classic kind may allow for 90 days' notice or more, but require the investment of rather larger numbers over an extended and unpredictable period of time. In other peace support deployments, there may also be considerable notice, whilst there may be certain cases, as in stopping civil war or genocide, that require the early and speedy deployment of, at any rate, lead elements. The EU must therefore aim to have a choice of forces available for any deployment pattern. It needs to compile a table of readiness requirements, related to realistic scenarios. It will have to consider in particular the availability of deployable HQs, and the degree of interoperability necessary when forming effective joint formations.

For the less demanding Petersberg missions, only some elements of the ERRF would have to be deployed. For the most demanding large-scale, sustained combat missions, the full ERRF would have to be deployed. A force of 60,000 that includes logistics and combat support *cannot* carry out these kinds of missions. To be able to fulfil the most demanding tasks would require at least 60,000 *combat* forces and, given the ratio of combat to non-combat troops, this would imply a pool of 150,000-200,000 troops.

As far as sustainability is concerned, at Helsinki, the Union agreed that the force deployed should be sustained for at least one year. Given the nature of contemporary conflicts, it should be emphasised that a one-year sustainability period is too short. The international standard for sustainability requirement is three years, with troop rotation after six months and a gap of one year between periods of duty. Consequently, for each unit deployed two should be held in reserve. The present Helsinki catalogue does not provide for replacement forces.

◗ In conclusion, the need is to increase the number of deployable troops and the capabilities for moving and supplying them. It is also necessary to create small, rapidly deployable force packages for quick entry. The Helsinki Headline Goal requires the European Union to be able to sustain operations under the full range of Petersberg tasks 'for at least one year'. However, the present force catalogue is only 100,000, which indicates that sustainability is a major shortfall, especially when it comes to larger and longer operations. Only if member states adapt conscription can this shortfall be remedied.

Another step is to make the NATO Response Force (NRF), which is to be capable of rapid deployment at 7-30 days' notice, answerable to the Union. Since this is made up entirely of European troops, the fulfilment of the NRF requirements will enhance the ability of the Union to deploy rapidly.

FINDING 2 – FORCE PACKAGING

The Union has no agreed system for force packaging, which severely restricts deployability and sustainability.

A European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) would include land, air and sea components. For the conduct of operations, national units will be brought together in tailor-made force packages on an ad hoc basis. For planning purposes, the following force packages are thus proposed.

1) Land forces could be structured as a European Multinational Expeditionary Corps (EMEC) with 60,000 combat forces, from which European Multinational Expeditionary Task Forces (EMETF) could be formed. A rule of thumb suggests the following composition of armed forces *for the most demanding* scenario:
   ◗ one-third logistics (however, in the pre-deployment phase logistics could be as high as 50 per cent);
   ◗ one-third combat support forces;
   ◗ one-third manoeuvre or combat forces.

The current composition of the force catalogue puts severe constraints on rapid deployment. Most of the scenarios place a premium on rapid response. The Union could adopt a new system for forming force packages, so that forces could be deployed more quickly. The first step would be the creation of battle groups (of around 1,500 men), which will enhance the Union's

readiness and deployability. Smaller packages of forces will be necessary for more rapid deployments and quick entry forces.

2) So far as air components are concerned, the need is to assemble deployable packages, comprising effective combat and support elements, from national units. The ability to deliver precision guided munitions will be crucial, both for reducing sorties and for avoiding collateral damage. For planning purposes, the packages might be organised as European Multinational Air Wings (EMAW) that could consist of 2 or 3 squadrons. Depending on the mission, the EMAW should include support elements such as air defence fighters, tankers and surveillance aircraft. The right balance between combat and support aircraft is generally considered to be 3:2. The minimum requirement for the most demanding missions is 9 EMAW, i.e. 360 combat aircraft. For less demanding missions, up to 3 air wings could be deployed, with 6 in reserve. This is sufficient to sustain a mission for an indefinite period of time. The total number of aircraft required (combat plus support) would be about 600, and they would have to be sufficiently interoperable. At the Capabilities Commitment Conference of November 2001, only 400 aircraft were committed.

3) The composition of naval force packages calls for a slightly different approach. For planning purposes, a European Multinational Maritime Force (EMMF) could be the principal organisational structure. Again, the exact composition would depend on the mission. The most demanding task is power projection, consisting of a combination of strike, land attack and amphibious operations. This requires three broad modules: aircraft, land attack and strategic lift, all with their own support and escort forces. The most demanding scenario will require a force of 2 aircraft carriers, 8 amphibious ships with their organic helicopters, 6 submarines, 20 surface combatants, 1 command platform, 4 support ships and 10 maritime patrol aircraft.

4) As far as police missions are concerned, we have seen that each scenario, except the one for homeland defence, is followed by a civil-military stabilising campaign. The civil component is formed out of the EU police capabilities listed at the Göteborg and Feira summits. Along the lines of the French proposal for a European *gendarmerie*, a European Multinational Police Force (EMPF) could be formed out of the available police forces.

Although figures will depend on the operation in question, the most demanding scenario will require up to 1,000 police officers deployable within 30 days. The force would perform tasks of strengthening the rule of law and civil administration, and civil protection.

All these elements must work together efficiently. Therefore, combined 'jointness', i.e. the ability to bring together air, land and naval components is a prerequisite for a successful military operation. Moreover, doctrine and training require emphasis on jointness as well.

Lastly, there is the readiness requirement. Initial entry requirements, e.g. in the case of emergencies, demand high states of readiness for specific units. A battalion should be able to move at 48 hours' notice. Larger, brigade-sized units should be able to move within 21 days, a division-sized unit within 6 weeks and the full EMEC in 2 months. Regarding air forces, one EMAW should be kept on 48 hours' notice; 3 at 7 days' and 9 at 6 weeks' notice. Finally, one EMMF should be able to deploy at 7 days' notice, a second at 21 days' notice. Elements of an EMMF, such as submarines and maritime patrol aircraft, should be kept at very high states of readiness (hours, rather than days) for strategic intelligence collection.

◗ In conclusion, the ERRF's readiness requirements for the scenarios mentioned are:

Scenario	HQ	Force package			
		land	air	sea	police
Large-scale peacekeeping	Deployed within 15 days	30,000 troops deployed within 60 days	1 EMAW deployed within 30 days	Surface combatants and maritime patrol aircraft form one EMMF deployed within 30 days	1 EMPF
Humanitarian intervention	Deployed within 15 days	10,000 troops deployed within 15 days including one battle group for quick entry	3 EMAWs deployed within 15 days	1 EMMF and 1 MCM force deployed within 15 days	1 EMPF
Regional warfare	Deployed within 15 days	A full EMEC deployed within 21 days	9 EMAWs deployed within 15 days	2 EMMFs and 2 MCM forces deployed within 15 days	1 EMPF
Counter-terrorism	Deployed within 7 days	Battle group of 1,500 SOF deployed within 15 days	2 EMAWs deployed within 15 days	Surface combatants and maritime patrol aircraft form one EMMF deployed within 15 days	1 EMPF
Homeland defence	None				

FINDING 3 – RISKS OF CASUALTIES AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE

The Union is capable of conducting a wide range of operations, including high-intensity warfare. However, it runs a relatively high risk of casualties among engaged forces and collateral damage.

Compared with US forces, the EU relies too much on gravity, non-guided bombs, whilst precision-guided munitions and stand-off weaponry will reduce both collateral damage and the risks for aircrews. More importantly, smart weapons drastically reduce the number of missions and hence the number of aircraft required and their supporting elements. The Union has few additional combat-ready divisions, sea-based air power, and marine and air expeditionary forces available. Consequently, the Union lacks escalation dominance.

Essential Operational Capabilities (EOCs) provide a useful way of identifying specific shortfalls when creating expeditionary armed forces. The EOCs are: timely availability; validated intelligence; deployability and mobility; effective engagement; command and control; logistic support; survivability and force protection. Together, these seven EOCs form a 'military capability'. Analysis of the scenarios reveals the following shortfalls regarding the ERRF:

❚ *Timely availability*
  High-readiness, highly mobile, lethal forces, equipped and trained for missions in difficult terrain
  SOF, for covert and overt search and destroy operations
  SF, e.g. air manoeuvre brigades
❚ *Validated intelligence*
  Strategic reconnaissance (including satellites)
  Intelligence cooperation
  IMINT/SIGINT collection, and early warning and distant detection (ISTAR)
  Theatre surveillance and reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition and HUMINT
❚ *Deployability and (strategic) mobility*
  Strategic air- and sealift capabilities; with emphasis on wide-bodied aircraft and roll-on roll- off ships
  Air-to-air refuelling
❚ *Effective engagement*
  Precision-guided munitions and stand-off weaponry, including cruise missiles, and attack helicopters

- *Command and control*
  Secure, deployable C4
- *Logistic support*
  Tactical lift capabilities, notably transport helicopters
  Tracking and tracing systems
- *Survivability and force protection*
  Suppression of enemy air defences
  NBC protection and detection
  Combat search and rescue
  Medical support

The first priority is C4ISTAR, which is a critical enabler for any EU mission. The second priority is lift. A force can only be expeditionary if sufficient strategic air- and sealift is available. A tracing and tracking system is a prerequisite for effective logistics and reinforces the Union's rapid deployment capability. Conventional and counter-insurgency expeditionary warfare requires force projection capabilities, including precision-guided munitions, stand-off weaponry, air-to-air refuelling, and tactical lift. Counter-insurgency operations require an emphasis on SOF. The third priority, in the most demanding scenarios, is NBC protection and detection for force protection. These elements are minimum requirements in order to carry out peacekeeping operations and provide the framework for more demanding operations.

◗ In conclusion, in order to meet some of its global responsibilities, the Union needs expeditionary armed forces to conduct high-tempo, large-scale conventional and counter-insurgency combat operations far from Europe. These operations must be conducted with the minimum of risk and damage.

FINDING 4 – FORCE TRANSFORMATION
Out-of-area warfare and new roles and missions, such as counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, require a new doctrinal approach and new training methods. However, the Union has no conceptual approach to force transformation.

The need for intervention forces requires the Union to spend more on *force transformation*. Force transformation requires a doctrinal context that forms the basis for training and procurement.

Regarding doctrine, a fundamental shift must be taken into account, from traditional platform-centric warfare to network-centric warfare (NCW). Basically, NCW applies information superiority to the battlefield, permitting the extensive integration of different units. It is based on the idea that timely and relevant information sharing, in which geographically dispersed military units form an interconnected network, is the key to success. The results are increased combat power irrespective of weather conditions, increased speed of command, a higher tempo of operations, increased survivability and a degree of self-synchronisation. NCW relies on very advanced C4ISTAR, including satellites, manned and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft transferring data to units in the theatre.

The US-led Operations *Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom* demonstrated the various advantages of NCW. Land power reinforced air power, and vice versa. Logistical support was impressive. The United States not only managed to fight half way around the globe; it was able to move ammunition, fuel, rations and water to manoeuvre units deep inside the theatre of operations. The United States demonstrated its ability to sustain long advances by armoured and mechanised forces. At the strategic level, these operations illustrated that forces applying NCW concepts were able to achieve military success with remarkably low numbers of friendly casualties, although at the tactical level results were less impressive.

The Union's member states will have to take account of the lessons learned in these operations in their defence and operational planning. There are two ways of adapting European forces to NCW. One is to become fully interoperable with US forces, being trained and equipped following the same principles and similar doctrines. In the other, European forces can acquire a degree of 'cooperability' with US forces. In other words, Europeans could focus on those network-centric capabilities that enable them to operate with the United States, accepting differences in equipment, training and doctrine, but being able to 'plug in' to the network via highly interoperable C4ISTAR elements. This is the direction already being taken by some European countries, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom in particular. Given the defence spending gap between American and European forces, the second option is more realistic. In that respect, the NATO Response Force

(NRF) will constitute a testbed for European forces' transformation. As the NRF uses assets from the same pool as the ERRF, the definition of future European capabilities should take this revolution in warfare into account.

However, a note of caution must be sounded concerning network-centric warfare. Although the prospects offered by it look very promising and with significant progress in the art of war being made, NCW does not represent the ultimate panacea. Like all technological developments and concepts, this modern way of warfare is not perfect and there are shortfalls to be identified. Technology is a means to provide more flexibility and effectiveness but is not an end in itself.

◗ In conclusion, a conceptual approach to force transformation must take into account the advantages and limitations of this revolution in military affairs. As Europeans are unlikely to achieve full interoperability with the US, a *European* transformation concept should be based on network enabled rather than network-centric operations.

FINDING 5 (SCENARIOS I AND III) – OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
The European Union cannot provide the operational framework for large-scale operations. Although there are sufficient deployable headquarters to conduct military operations, there are technical shortfalls when it comes to operations in distant places.

As stated in the Solana document, 'In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand.'[81] This implies that the EU must be able to conduct and sustain operations in distant places.

The functioning of a modern HQ for the planning and conduct of operations is a resource-intensive, highly skilled business. Training and professionalism are important; so are relevant technical capabilities such as communications, computers and intelligence assets. Effective HQs cannot be established ad hoc. A major deployable HQ would take two years to set up. Given European countries' limited spending on defence, there is an obvious attraction in avoiding duplication. It would make good economic sense to use existing assets rather than create thinly resourced EU ones.

The existing HQs that are potentially available to the EU are those of member countries and those of NATO. The latter are in

81. Javier Solana, op. cit. in note 2.

principle capable of dealing with the whole range of military tasks, up to and including major war-fighting. At present, they tend to be over-large and not well suited to the tasks most likely to arise in European security. Most are not deployable. However, reforms are under way and, if they are successful, NATO HQs should, in principle, be able to meet any demand that the EU places on them. If wholehearted collaboration and cooperation could be assumed, it would make good sense for the EU to rely on the use of NATO HQs for anything that went beyond the capability of its individual members. The question is: will NATO assets be available on the day? Their provision could be frustrated by, say, a Turkish veto over some dispute with Greece or the EU in general; it could also be frustrated by the United States, either because it required the corresponding assets for its own needs or because it wished to constrain or control a given European course of action. Experience with the negotiations over 'Berlin-plus' and US insistence on having its own way over a range of security issues indicates that caution over the availability of NATO HQs would be in order.

The use of member nations' HQs is attractive in that they are more likely to be available, but there are problems. Firstly, the number of members who have suitable HQs is limited: only France and the United Kingdom, and probably Germany together with the Netherlands, could provide a joint HQ suitable for a corps-sized operation. If one or all were engaged elsewhere, their assets might not be available. Moreover, if the operation were prolonged, there could be difficulties in rotation if only two or three nations were able to provide a HQ. Secondly, whilst the provision of a national HQ would tend to provide a measure of coherence and unity of command, the converse of that might be concern that the providing nation could have too great a say in the conduct of the operation. In this case, contributing countries would have to rely on the lead nation's tactical options. On the other hand, giving appropriate political and military weight to all participants might be difficult for operational command and unity of action. Moreover, given that the HQs would have national roles, some delicate issues in multinational manning and interoperability could arise. Intelligence sharing might be a particularly difficult matter. A delicate balance must thus be found between the national and the European dimension.

In the longer term, if the EU is to be a serious military actor it will need assets of whose availability it can be assured. That will

mean either having its own or having a guaranteed right to use NATO HQs, shedding personnel from non-EU or non-participating countries for EU operations. Given that most operations in which it is likely to be engaged will be relatively modest regarding the size of the force engaged, the use of lead-nation assets may be the most reliable and economical way forward. A list of suitable national HQs and the modifications and augmentations necessary for EU operations should thus be drawn up.

EU-led operations could thus be organised in two ways. The first option would be to nominate a *framework nation*, as was the case with Operation *Artemis*. A framework nation could assume responsibility for mounting the operation in accordance with the Union's concepts. It would provide the framework for the operations other nations would 'plug in'. This is the preferred option for contingencies requiring a rapid response, e.g. 5–30 days. The second option would be a multinational EU operational headquarters that could conduct the operation. Politically, the contributing states would have similar rights and responsibilities, although the operation would be under the operational control of a senior commander. Moreover, having an EU operational headquarters would permit small countries to acquire or improve the expertise required at that level.

In conclusion, the EU must develop clear command and control arrangements together with the necessary capabilities to provide the framework for a combat operation. In the long run, an EU HQ must be capable of conducting an autonomous operation at corps level.

FINDING 6 (SCENARIOS II AND III) - INTEROPERABILITY
The military-technical gap between the United States and most of its European allies has grown considerably. This raises questions about interoperability. There are growing problems between the Europeans and the United States, and among Europeans themselves.

Despite various defence capability initiatives over the last decade, the military-technical gap between the United States and most of its European allies has grown considerably. As demonstrated in the scenarios, for the time being only the United States is capable of providing the backbone of large, sustained combat operations. Furthermore, given the different efforts of member states in the field of defence, there is also a growing military-technical gap

among the European member states themselves. This raises crucial questions about cooperability with the United States and interoperability among Europeans.

In general, interoperability means the ability of forces to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of missions and tasks. It is mainly related to command and control, equipment, structures and procedures, and it encompasses several dimensions: intraservice where different forces must operate in unison; between different services, where air, land and naval forces must be able to communicate effectively; and between different countries, where the same standards must apply.

With a view to the relevant scenarios, the synchronisation of all means and all efforts to reach an objective is unlikely, due to the lack of interoperability. As a result, a coalition force could lose the initiative and possibly fail. Unity of effort will be jeopardised if the EU rapid reaction forces lack technical, doctrinal, and organisational interoperability. Technical interoperability refers to critical items such as command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I), but also more basic elements such as the calibre of ammunition and logistics. The same holds true for regulations and procedures, which are elements of organisational interoperability. Due to differences in procurement systems, national industrial policies and national doctrinal preferences, only a limited degree of interoperability has been achieved so far. Consequently, harmonisation is an urgent requirement.

In the Union, work has been in hand on interoperability issues for some time, in particular in the context of the development of concepts (e.g. Command and Control Concept). An ECAP Project Group and the HTF are also dealing with aspects of interoperability. The objective of the most recent initiative to develop new capability goals by 2010 is a qualitative update of European military capabilities with a view to achieving full interoperability concerning human resources, doctrine and equipment. This objective will likely not be achieved before 2010.

Efforts within the NATO framework to enhance interoperability encompass the refinement of procedures and standardisation agreements (STANAGs), doctrine, concepts, procedures and equipment characteristics. Interoperability plays an important role in the transformation process of Alliance and European forces in particular. The NATO Response Force will be central to ensuring interoperability between Europeans and cooperability

with US forces. The practical adaptation of forces so that they are able to operate in a multinational environment will rely on NATO standards but will also have to take into account the characteristics of EU external action, especially its civil and military dimension.

There is another aspect which matters in this context. Limited resources have for a long time encouraged a certain degree of task-sharing among the military. Even the large European military powers have increasing difficulties in acquiring the entire range of capabilities needed to cover the whole spectrum of military tasks. This trend is likely to accelerate. Furthermore, in the context of European integration and a globalised world, the scope of purely national interests and the reasons to act alone militarily is reduced. Solidarity, efficiency and legitimacy are strong incentives for acting together. Such an evolution will translate into an intensified need to pool resources and come up with multinational capabilities, in a variety of areas. So far, progress on interoperability seems to be linked to the amount of political will and resources member states are prepared to commit in cooperation with others. The 'permanent structured cooperation' system will provide for a more suitable framework allowing groundbreaking initiatives and significant progress in the future. In this respect, the Agency could also provide useful guidelines for enhancing interoperability among European forces.

The Union may deploy a force as a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), but without sufficient interoperability the CJTF concept is meaningless. A CJTF operation demands a modular approach, which should be adapted to the operational requirements. Conventional warfare requires combined arms operations, i.e. the integrated use of armour, artillery, infantry, etc. with a high degree of doctrinal, organisational and technical interoperability among national divisions and brigades. Also, air campaigns require a high degree of doctrinal, organisational and technical interoperability. Counter-insurgency warfare and peacekeeping do not necessarily call for combined operations. Instead, small units, such as battalions, companies or even platoons conduct operations.

◗ In conclusion, since the Union's operations are likely to include different services and different countries, interoperability between European forces is crucial in order to act successfully. To achieve full interoperability in human resources, doctrine and equipments must be the long-term goal of European defence reforms.

FINDING 7 (SCENARIO V) – HOMELAND DEFENCE

Homeland defence presents new military tasks, mostly in support of civil authorities. These are national and local responsibilities, and there is little cooperation within the Union. Consequently, the Union contributes little to meeting this challenge.

As noted earlier, the Union's draft Constitution foresees the incorporation of prevention of terrorist attacks as a Petersberg task. 'All these [Petersberg] tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism . . . including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.'[82] In terms of solidarity with European member states, Article 15 states that 'the Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity . . .' Furthermore, Article 40 introduced the possibility of a member state requesting aid and assistance when 'victim of armed aggression on its territory'. Conflict prevention may also be considered as extending into the realm of homeland defence. The Solidarity Clause (Article I-42) is the most explicit in this field, requiring the Union to mobilise all instruments available to prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the member states, protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack, and to assist a member state in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack. Homeland defence is therefore clearly covered by the draft Constitution. Furthermore, since the European Council Declaration of 25 March 2004, this Solidarity Clause in the event of terrorist attacks has become a reality.

Prevention of terrorist attacks is considered under scenario V. A major shortfall in creating a credible response remains the unclear connection between internal and external security. This requires at the very least close coordination between the existing second (CFSP) and third (JHA) pillars, e.g. through a third-pillar representative in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and more desirably a form of integration between them, possibly including the creation of a 'European Security Council'. The key question is how to organise solidarity effectively.

Member states might benefit from a European pool of specialised civilian or military civil protection units undertaking joint training and intervention coordination programmes so as to facilitate more effective intervention in the event of disasters inside Union territory. This proposal, first presented by the Convention's

82. Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Article III-210.

Working Group on Defence, was further elaborated by former Commissioner Michel Barnier. He has proposed a 'Eurocorps', which would be a force made up of national and regional mobile units that are specialised in dealing with catastrophes, such as storms, earthquakes, flooding or fire. As the member states lack the capabilities to deal with large-scale disasters and the consequences of catastrophic terrorism, such a Eurocorps should be established quickly.

The Union should also envisage the creation of stocks of collective resources for dealing with emergencies such as wide-scale contamination from a chemical attack. Medical supplies such as stockpiles of the relevant vaccines could save many lives if they were available on time in sufficient quantities. Similarly, EU standards of interoperability should be set between the national and local networks involved in crisis management and consequence management, e.g. identification/detection networks, communications networks, response systems specifications.

Finally, the post of coordinator responsible for civil and homeland defence will enhance the necessary collaboration between the Union's members and relevant EU bodies. The already important activities of the Commission could be better coordinated with JHA officials. Most importantly, since responsibilities in this field are mostly subnational, the coordinator could play a crucial role in harmonising procedures, setting up common standards and enhancing interoperability of the above-mentioned civilian units. The aim is to achieve coherence among all the relevant actors in the field of homeland defence.

◗ In conclusion, homeland defence presents the Union with numerous challenges. Solidarity among member states calls for concrete measures to make this political commitment effective. Civilian units, commonly owned medical stockpiles and the post of coordinator for homeland defence are first steps towards enhancing the Union's ability to meet this challenge.

FINDING 8 (SCENARIO III) – STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT
The Union has limited capabilities for strategic decision-making and crisis management, partly due to the weakness of Europe's military space programme.

'As a Union of 25 members, spending some €160 billion on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously.'[83] The EU's ambition regarding security strategy is clear, but its ability to realise that ambition is severely restricted due to limited technical capabilities for strategic decision-making.

The use of force is a last resort, to be used when other means have either failed or are inoperative. But simply waiting until other options have failed could be counterproductive and preclude the timely and effective use of force, because the initiative could be lost. Thus, effective crisis management requires proactive strategic decision-making at the politico-military strategic level. For the Union, a major challenge is to get used to this new reality and try to make organisational and procedural changes where possible. Clearly, there is no ideal solution, in that any coalition warfare bears the risks of division and disagreements. However, strategic decision-making is a critical factor. A prerequisite for effective decision-making is clear and unambiguous command and control arrangements. Cumbersome arrangements will undermine unity of effort, credibility and flexibility, and will consequently result in loss of the initiative. For combat operations in particular, this is a serious challenge. The decision to appoint a High Representative for CFSP was of great significance: during a crisis requiring the use of military assets he would presumably provide the EU's military with political and strategic guidance. A major shortfall is the size of the staffs in support of the strategic decision-making. Both the PJC and the MC have limited staffs, which would severely restrict the Union's strategic decision-making capacity and coherence in challenging operations.

One of the most serious shortfalls is in strategic intelligence. The Union has no military intelligence satellites. It depends on national and commercial capabilities, but there is no assured access. Moreover, obtaining imagery is usually a lengthy process, whilst strategic decision-making could require near real-time intelligence. A neglected aspect of strategic decision-making, including the strategic command of operations, is space systems, i.e. satellites for command, control and communications; intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance; early warning; signals intelligence; positioning, navigation and timing, weather, oceanography and mapping; combat search and rescue, and space surveillance. Member states together spend

83. Op. cit. in note 2.

twelve times less than the United States does on security and defence-related uses of space (€1.4 bn versus $16.5 bn). There are a limited number of national space programmes, for observation, communication and intelligence. As these programmes are driven by national requirements, interoperability has never been an objective.

A future ESDP will need a reconnaissance and early warning satellite system, based on common requirements. Specific military systems for command, control and communications; intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, and signals intelligence are required. An immediate solution would be increased access by the EU Satellite Centre to existing commercial satellites and the pooling of information gathered by national military satellites. A longer-term solution would be the development by the Union of new-generation, collectively owned satellites. The recommendation in the STAR 21 Report that the defence staffs of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain define common operational military requirements for European observation satellites is endorsed.[84]

◗ In conclusion, the Union and its members will have to devote more resources to the generally underfunded security and defence-related space programmes. In particular, intelligence satellites will greatly enhance the coherence and ability of the current EU institutions to plan and carry out the most demanding operations.

Ways of correcting deficiencies

There are several ways of correcting the deficiencies in the EU's capabilities. Briefly put, the approach can be bottom-up or top-down. In the first case, the Union's members make the key decisions and keep sovereign control of management of their defence capabilities. This approach has so far characterised the process of developing capabilities inside ESDP. To be effective, it requires close coordination. For example, the ECAP process, launched at the Union's Capabilities Improvement Conference of November 2001, is based on voluntary national commitments to enhance capabilities, expressed in a coordinated manner by EU members, who remain responsible for the delivery of these military capabilities. It was established on the following assumptions. The defence

84. 'Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century' (STAR 21), presented by the European Advisory Group on Aerospace to the President of the European Commission, 16 July 2002.

apparatus of the various EU countries leave considerable room for rationalisation; therefore enhanced effectiveness and efficiency through increased cooperation can be achieved. The required capabilities can be acquired by combining efforts, by initiating national projects or by developing new projects and initiatives. Avoiding unnecessary duplication with NATO and among EU member states, by ensuring cooperation and transparency, will improve efficiency. Voluntary commitments do not represent difficulties if capabilities exist. But to fill gaps, and develop programmes, national willingness is not enough. It was therefore decided at the Union level that, without changing the bottom-up nature of the exercise, a 'road map' drafted by the EUMS could bridge the gap between the voluntary basis and the interests of the EU as whole.

In the top-down approach, at the opposite end of the spectrum, the Union's interests take precedence over national preferences. The reasoning in this case is that the Union is considered to be a defence entity to which member states contribute, taking into account the Union's interests decided either collectively or by a 'supranational' authority. Genuine role-specialisation requires a top-down approach, while other initiatives to achieve more efficient defence spending could be bottom-up. A top-down approach requires collective and/or supranational policies and a functioning defence planning mechanism. Given present political realities within the Union, it is assumed that member states will, at least for the foreseeable future, favour bottom-up initiatives to achieve greater efficiency.

However, both approaches require a common understanding on what the Union's ESDP should be aimed at. Remedying shortfalls can only be done if there is agreement on its political ambitions and a mechanism for defence planning. The former has now been well identified by the European Security Strategy; the latter requires an EU Capabilities Development Mechanism which should link military and non-military capabilities; formulate transformation goals; identify shortfalls and link lessons learned to planned needs.

Both approaches also require investment and adequate budgets. It is well known that Europe does not do very well in that respect. In some areas the Union's member states have collectively only 10–15 per cent of the assets of the United States, although they collectively spend some 40 per cent of what the Americans

spend on their armed forces. Nevertheless, correcting shortfalls is not beyond the Union's capabilities. Approximately €42 billion are needed to make the necessary acquisitions. This is not beyond the Union's reach since, collectively, the member states spend €160 billion on defence, even though this last figure also includes running and personnel costs.

Given limited budgets, the aim is to optimise output. As an example, the following table sums up the priority acquisitions:

Shortfall	Number of systems	Acquisition costs in € bn
Strategic transport (air)	225 A400M	19
Air-to-air refuelling	20-30	5-7.5
Suppression of enemy air defences	20-40	2-4
Electronic warfare	8-12	1.6-2.4
Air-to-ground surveillance	4-8	1.4-2.8
All-weather strategic theatre surveillance capabilities	12 x 4 (*Predator*) 13 x 4 (*Global Hawk*)	0.3 0.45-0.75
Combat search and rescue	12-24 (helicopters)	0.6-1.2
Electronic intelligence/signals intelligence	4-8	2-4

Whether or not EU member states' defence spending increases over the coming years, it is necessary to reduce deficiencies. The rest of this chapter outlines ways to address them.

a. Bottom-up specialisation

Each EU member state has a unique historical heritage and geographical position that heavily influences its strategic choices and defence posture. For example, it is understandable that Finland should be more influenced by territorial defence thinking than the United Kingdom is. In this context, and depending on its political ambitions and budgetary constraints, each member state could unilaterally specialise in a specific type of force. Linked to the Union's capability for autonomous action, the following options could be chosen. [85]

85. This list is not exhaustive; it merely serves as an indication.

Type of force	Military assets
Stabilisation and reconstruction force: contributes to low-end, classical peacekeeping operations	Light infantry, air- and sealift
Defensive expeditionary force Contributes with defensive means to an international coalition	The aforementioned assets, plus reconnaissance aircraft, minehunters, air defence, ballistic missile defences
Offensive expeditionary force Contributes with combat power to an international coalition, for all peace support operations, and conventional warfare. These are likely to be 'follow-on forces'	The aforementioned assets, plus surface combatant warships, fighters, submarines, mechanised and infantry units, etc.
Full spectrum expeditionary force. Contributes to all peace support operations, conventional and unconventional warfare, including counter-terror and consequence management both at home and abroad. These are likely to be 'initial entry forces'	The aforementioned assets, plus air manoeuvre units, special operations forces, marines, etc.

For political and budgetary reasons a member state could have a narrow interpretation of role specialisation, i.e. unilateral specialisation on a specific type of force. For example, a member state could unilaterally decide to specialise on peacekeeping, thereby abandoning scarce assets that could have been used in more demanding operations. These unilateral measures could be damaging if not coordinated with other member states.

b. Niche capabilities

Another example of unilateral role specialisation is the focus on niche capabilities. For example, the Czech Republic has developed greatly appreciated know-how in chemical warfare. Smaller member states could thus contribute to a small but important part of the spectrum of expeditionary warfare. Some assets, such as special operations forces and mountain units, are scarce assets. The following is a list of identified niche capabilities:

❙ specialised forces;
❙ special operations forces;
❙ high-readiness, highly mobile, lethal forces;
❙ human intelligence (HUMINT) for military purposes;
❙ theatre surveillance and reconnaissance;
❙ medical support ;
❙ tactical and strategic lift capabilities;
❙ suppression of enemy air defences;
❙ NBC protection and detection;
❙ combat search and rescue (CSAR).

By developing one or several of these niche capabilities, a member state could make a significantly greater contribution to the Union's autonomy than its intrinsic size would suggest. Clearly, however, these initiatives also need to be highly coordinated in order to fulfil the widest possible range of needs at the European level.

c. Co-financing of national capabilities

A creative way to achieve greater efficiency is by co-financing national capabilities. For example, one member state could co-finance the procurement of transport aircraft by another. In return it would receive drawing rights. This type of cooperation is especially promising if member states already possess binational capabilities.

d. Collective capabilities

Another way of advancing the Union's autonomy is to allow national capabilities to become collective. In NATO, such capabilities, although limited, exist. However, during the Cold War de facto role specialisation was developed between EU member states and the United States. Most capabilities needed to provide the framework for military operations were provided by the United States. Consequently, most shortfalls are related to providing the operational framework. Most of the specific shortfalls mentioned could be remedied through collective measures. Among other things, the 'Berlin-plus' arrangements were agreed upon to avoid unnecessary duplication with NATO and the United States. Nevertheless, some duplication is necessary for autonomous military operations. The following areas need further development.

■ *Command, control and communications (C3)*
At its 1999 Washington summit, NATO decided to develop a C3
system architecture by 2002 as a basis for an integrated Alliance
core capability allowing interoperability with national systems.
The EU countries should harmonise their efforts in this field, to
ensure that this C3 system is compatible or can also be used for
EU operation or force headquarters. This includes electronic
warfare capabilities.

■ *Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
(ISTAR)*
The EU Satellite Centre should have better access to commercial
and military high-resolution satellite imagery and other data
(radar, early warning, etc.) collected by national space-based sys-
tems. The United States possesses some 65 military satellites,
the Europeans only 5. The Union should have more but, if it
appears unlikely that the EU countries can afford to develop a
comparable complete set of satellite systems, they should put
more emphasis on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and human
intelligence (HUMINT). Due to the characteristics of contem-
porary conflict, HUMINT is of equal or greater importance
than satellite imagery. The EU countries could, to some extent,
provide data gathered by UAV and HUMINT in exchange for
satellite imagery collected by the United States.

■ *Logistics*
During the NATO summit it was decided to begin implement-
ing a Multinational Joint Logistics Centre concept by the end of
1999. In addition, EU nations could rationalise, harmonise and
pool their logistical assets, such as strategic lift capability. As it
is unlikely that Europeans will procure additional lift capabili-
ties soon, the EU could prepare the establishment of a European
transport command, 'Eurolift', which should review and
improve arrangements for military use of commercial strategic
lift assets. Europe lacks heavy airlift capabilities, such as the
American C-5, C-17 and C-141 aircraft. Moreover, the Euro-
peans have limited military sealift capabilities, such as large roll-
on roll-off ships (US 12, Europe 2) and fast sealift ships (US 8,
Europe 0).[86] As the Europeans will focus mainly on contingen-
cies on their own continent they should put more emphasis on
road and rail transport capabilities and transport aircraft such
as the C-130. Tactical lift capabilities, including transport heli-
copters, are also required. Tracking and tracing systems could

86. Figures are taken from 'A
Common European Military Pol-
icy', *Strategic Comments*, vol. 5,
no. 6, July 1999.

be included as well. European forces also lack sufficient engineers and deployable medical units.

∎ *Sustainability and logistics*
To sustain their forces effectively, European nations should give high priority to logistic support capability requirements, including shore-based facilities. Logistics include enhanced interoperability through increased standardisation of materiel and procedures, and the implementation of common standards, with special emphasis on medical interoperability.

∎ *Combat search and rescue*
During Operation *Allied Force* most of the CSAR capabilities were provided by the Americans. In Europe, only the French have any CSAR capability. The EU could establish a European CSAR capability.

∎ *Air-to-air refuelling*
Operation *Allied Force* demonstrated that Europe has very limited air-to-air refuelling capabilities. Most of these were provided by the United States. Sustainability requires enhanced European capabilities. One option is to develop a European tanker capacity of the required 350 aircraft. As a first step, Europeans should pool their 52 tankers.

∎ *Suppression of enemy air defences* and support jamming, including associated stand-off weapons and electronic warfare.

∎ *Air defence systems*, including ground-based air defence capabilities and a more effective capability against theatre ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Acquiring sufficient theatre missile defence thus requires emphasis.

∎ *All-weather precision-guided munitions* (PGMs) and *non-lethal weapons* to reduce collateral damage and risks for own troops.

∎ *Stand-off weaponry*, such as cruise missiles.

Under the European Capability Action Plan, the shortfalls relating to these collective capabilities have been identified. The framework for dealing with these shortfalls thus exists. It remains necessary to step up progress in the project groups and to create these collective capabilities.

e. Top-down specialisation

The measures mentioned above are essentially based on a bottom-

up approach. Top-down specialisation implies combining capabilities for collective use, which entails a collective decision-making process or a supranational authority. This option offers some advantages which deserve consideration. A European defence based on collective or supranational decision-making opens up the perspective of role specialisation and commonly owned capabilities. In this framework, member states may be more willing to pool scarce resources and create more collective capabilities.

Consider the following example. Country x specialises in air power, country y in land forces and country z in naval forces. In this case, a supranational authority has the power to combine force elements of these countries into one Combined Joint Task Force.

With the resulting economies of scale, this type of role specialisation would enhance Europe's efficiency in defence spending dramatically, and costly overheads would be reduced. Obviously, this revolutionary method for improving the EU's military effectiveness does not correspond to present-day political realities within the EU. However, the potential added value of this method if the situation were to change should not be disregarded.

f. Standing nucleus force and permanent operation headquarters

A last approach to enhancing the Union's autonomy is to set up a permanent force at the Union's disposal. In order to meet the readiness requirements suggested by the scenarios and to increase the level of common standards, training and doctrine among the European member states contributing to the ERRF, a permanent core force would be necessary. This emerges from the lessons of scenario I. In parallel with this standing nucleus, an EMPF of approximately 250 police personnel is necessary to improve civil-military cooperation and interoperability with the permanent force. In addition, as finding 5 has argued, a permanent operation headquarters (OHQ) has to be created. While the concept of framework nation is suitable as an interim solution until 2010, inefficiencies arise due to the lack of standardised force packaging. The permanent OHQ should be tasked with determining EU planning assumptions and facilitating the creation and training of force elements to plug in to the standing nucleus.

g. Preparing the future

Europe has highly competent research centres and a competitive industrial capacity to address technological requirements in the field of security. Yet the absence of a genuine framework for security research at the EU level and insufficient cooperation among member states have undermined Europe's investments in defence technology. The Union needs to increase its funding in R&D programmes and activities, and to coordinate national and European efforts. Obvious synergies, increased coherence and new technology transfer rules could significantly enhance the technological level of Europe's defence capabilities.

In March 2003, the Commission launched several initiatives aimed at improving R&T funding in the Union in the field of security. The role of the Commission, as is the case with the *Galileo* programme, can be critical. Since nationally based funding is too narrow, and since the duality of these technologies is growing, the gap between civil and defence research is decreasing. The Commission's Preparatory Action in the field of security-related areas has recognised this urgent need to bring a more coherent and integrated approach to R&D in Europe. The Agency could also play a significant role in identifying needs and harmonising co-funding of R&D programmes among member states and with the Commission. The EU's future defence posture depends on today's investments.

Last but not least, an effective CFSP is a condition for European defence. This was the basic lesson from the tragedy of Bosnia. The best military tools are useless if the Union members disagree among themselves as to why, when and how to use them. With the Solana document, the Union now has a genuine framework for the protection and projection of its interests and values around the world. An effective CFSP is also a condition for initiating radical defence reforms such as pooling of forces. Trust remains the basis of effective collective action. Without it, a capacity for autonomous action will remain elusive.

Conclusion and recommendations

With the European Security Strategy document, a real and genuine strategy framework does exist for the Union. In the document, it is acknowledged that 'the European Union is inevitably a global player [and] it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security'. This ambition must be backed by adequate capabilities. Even if the use of force is a last resort, peacekeeping operations, including police operations, could encounter a hostile environment. The readiness and effectiveness of European forces remain crucial to fulfilment of the Union's strategic objectives. Lessons from the scenarios lead to the identification of general and specific shortfalls. To achieve the necessary transformation of European capabilities, the following measures should be taken.

1.

Deployability should be increased. Up to 50 per cent of European forces must become deployable at any given time for operations outside the EU or to face consequences of catastrophic terrorism. This objective should be fulfilled within 10 years. At the moment, only 10 per cent of the committed forces within the Union are deployable. European countries have almost 1.5 million men under arms but can only deploy 150,000 troops.

2.

Sustainability should be improved. The Union must be able to sustain 60,000 *combat* troops for 3 years. At present, the Union's members are unable to sustain a 50,000-troop operation (20 brigades) over a number of years.

3.

The highest priority should be put on C4ISTAR, which is a critical enabler for any EU mission.

4.

The EU force projection capability should be enlarged with new force packaging. The EU political and military authorities must first be aware of forces in Europe that remain outside the catalogue. This would give them a clearer picture of the overall reality of European forces. These authorities should secondly set up a certification mechanism of EU forces according to the different missions that these forces could be called upon to undertake. This certification must be given at the EU level.

5.

To enhance deployability and sustainability, a standing strategic headquarter is deemed necessary. A mobile deployable operation headquarters should similarly be set up. This headquarters should be able to call upon standing EU forces for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

6.

A nucleus of standing joint combat forces at the disposal of the Union will greatly facilitate the military planning and political decision-making processes when launching operations. This standing force should be organised at the level of battle groups, i.e. 1,500 men, complemented by air and naval components.

7.

Planning at the European level should include network enabled operations, which are key to European military transformation. So far, only a handful of countries have begun to incorporate this revolution in military affairs in their defence planning. The EU Military Staff could be tasked with deepening and coordinating these efforts towards European network enabled capabilities, based on a European transformation concept.

8.

In order to increase the harmonisation of doctrine among EU members, a doctrine centre is necessary. A European Defence College could bring together military and civilian personnel from all EU countries in order to promote a common strategic culture that incorporates new doctrines and concepts. A common European security and defence culture is also an indispensable component of

a common strategy for Europe. Since European operations do exist, a common doctrine should underpin them.

9.

In the interest of harmonisation, a European fund for forces transformation could be set up in the Agency. Economic incentives at the European level must support national efforts. National reforms and transformation must follow European guidelines and procedures. At a minimum, co-financing of national capabilities should achieve better efficiency.

10.

Permanent structured cooperation in defence matters must be developed. This will allow the indispensable flexibility among EU members to maximise the necessary reforms.

11.

Research and development activities must be better funded and coordinated. The *Galileo* satellite system is a good example of successful cooperation between member states and the Commission. The Commission's European Security and Research Programme to co-finance research on technology should be fully operational by 1 January 2007, with funding levels in line with the recommendations of the Group of Personalities' report (€1 bn-plus per year). Moreover, the Agency could advise Union members on how to tackle capabilities needs and technology programmes. The Agency should receive an autonomous budget for conducting its own capabilities-related research projects.

12.

At the European level, a Council of Defence Ministers should be considered. Only regular meetings will be able to provide the necessary continuity and coherence in defence policy in the Union.

13.

Priority must be given to homeland defence. Civil protection, medical supplies, logistics and emergencies must be coordinated at the European level. In this respect, the post of European coordinator is necessary.

14.

As far as the NATO Response Force is concerned, it should be available for either NATO or the EU. In its current plans, this rapid reaction force is made up entirely of European forces, and it is mainly a mechanism for developing European military forces in qualitative terms.

15.

EU member states, together with the EU's political and military authorities, should consider the drawing up of a fully-fledged European Defence White Paper in order to set priorities and collectively to identify corresponding capabilities shortfalls and remedies.

The members of the Task Force

André Dumoulin is a Research Fellow at the Royal Military School (Belgium), working on various aspects of the ESDP, including values. A member of the Réseau multidisciplinaire d'études stratégiques (RMES), he is also a guest Lecturer at the University of Liège and University of Brussels. Recent publications include *La Belgique et la PESD* (Brussels: Bruylant, 2003) with Philippe Manigart and Wally Struys; and *La Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense. De l'opératoire à l'identitaire* (Brussels: Bruylant, 2003), with Raphaël Mathieu et Gordon Sarlet.

Jan Foghelin, M.Sc. (Engineering Physics, Royal Institute of Technology) is head of the Division of Defence Analysis at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), where he has been working since 1971 on Operational Analysis, Defence Economy Studies and Security Analysis. He has published on Swedish security and defence policy, defence structures, international operations and the character of future conflicts. Since 1987 he has been a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.

Nicole Gnesotto has been the Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies since 1 January 2002. She was previously the Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, Professor at the *Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris*, Special Adviser to the Director of the *Institut Français des Relations Internationales* (IFRI) and Deputy Head of the French Foreign Ministry's Policy Planning Staff. She is the author of many books and articles on transatlantic relations and the European Union, including *La puissance et l'Europe* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, September 1998).

Jean-Yves Haine is a research fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Sciences Po, Paris, was formerly a fellow at the Government Department, Harvard University, and a lecturer in International Relations at Sciences Po. He has recently published 'Power without Restraint? Back to Realities', in Gustav Lindstrom (Ed.), *Shift or Rift* (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003), pp. 105-26; 'The EU Soft Power: Not Hard Enough?', *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Winter 2003/Spring 2004, vol. V, no. 1, pp. 69-77, and *Les Etats-Unis ont-ils besoin d'alliés ?* (Paris: Payot, 2004), 397 pp.

François Heisbourg is Director of the Paris-based Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) and Chairman of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). He has held senior executive positions in the European defence industry, first (1984-87) at Thomson-CSF (now Thales) and subsequently (1992-98) at Matra-Defense Espace (now part of EADS). His career has

included postings in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Policy Planning Staff (handling nuclear proliferation issues) and at the French Mission to the UN in New York (1977-81), and international security adviser to the French Minister for Defence (1981-84). Extensively involved in the think-tank world, notably as Director of the IISS (1987-92) and in academia (giving the International Politics course at Sciences Po, Paris, in 1998-2000), François Heisbourg has written numerous articles on security and defence affairs in the general and specialist media. His books include *inter alia The Future of Warfare* (London: Orion, 1997) and *Hyperterrorisme: la nouvelle guerre* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2001).

William Hopkinson was appointed Head of the UK's Defence Arms Control Unit in 1988 and Assistant Under Secretary of State (Policy) in 1993. He was a Visiting Fellow in the Global Security Programme, Cambridge, 1991-92, and on leaving government service in 1997 he joined the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), becoming Deputy Director and Director of Studies before retiring in June 2000 to read and write. His particular concerns are transatlantic relations and forceful intervention. He has been an Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute and Chatham House, and a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for International Studies, Cambridge University. In 2001 he was a Senior Visiting Fellow at the WEU Institute in Paris and in 2003 a visiting researcher at SIPRI, Stockholm.

Marc Otte is European Union Special Representative to the Middle East Peace Process. From 1999 to 2003, he was adviser on defence and security policy to the High Representative for CFSP and Head of ESDP Task Force at the EU Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. As a Belgian diplomat, he was *inter alia* Ambassador to Israel, Consul General in Los Angeles, and Head of Division, Interministerial Coordination, Department of European Affairs, Foreign Ministry, Brussels.

Tomas Ries, is a Senior Researcher at Finland's National Defence College, focusing on globalisation and security, the EU and security and the Atlantic relationship. In 1992-96 he was Director of the International Training Course in Geneva and 1996-97 Deputy Director of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. Between 1986 and 1992 he worked as a security analyst in Norway, specialising in Soviet military interests in the north.

Stefano Silvestri is President, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and Commentator for *Il Sole 24 Ore*. He began his career as a researcher at the IAI in 1967. From 1974 to 1976 he was Deputy Director of the IAI and became Vice President in 1981. He was a researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 1970-71 and lecturer at the Johns Hopkins University in Bologna 1972-76. His varied career has included posts as special assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, consultant to the President of the Council of Ministers, the Minister for Internal Affairs, the Minister for Industry and Trade and the Minister for Defence. He was Under Secretary of State for Defence during the Dini Government. He is also a Member of the Economic Advisory Council to the French Minister for Defence.

Lothar Rühl was State Secretary at the German Federal Ministry of Defence for Policy, International Security and Alliance Affairs from 1982 to 1989. From 1991 to 1999, he was a member of the Governing Board of SIPRI Stockholm, and from 1992 to 1998 a Member of the Board, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and Member of the Council of the Federal Academy for Security Policy, Bonn. He is a Professor at the Research Institute for Political Science and European Affairs, University of Cologne, Member of the Strategic Studies Group at the Research Institute for External Policy Berlin, DGAP, and the IISS, London. He is also Senior Fellow at the Centre for European Integration Studies of Bonn University.

Hans-Bernhard Weisserth is Head of the ESDP Task Force in the Policy Unit of the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana (General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union). Before taking up his post in the Policy Unit in November 1999, he was a career General Staff Officer (German Armed Forces), graduated from Bundeswehr University in Munich (Education & Sciences), General Staff Officer Course at Führungsakademie Bundeswehr in Hamburg (1984-86) and Hogere Krijgsschool in The Hague (1988-90), with subsequent various planning functions at the operational and strategic levels. Since 1993, he has had various functions in the field of European Security and Defence Policy at different levels: Western European Union Planning Cell in Brussels (1993-96); Assistant National Military Representative to the WEU and NATO in Brussels (1996-98); German Ministry of Defence/Armed Forces Staff, Security and Defence Policy Division in Bonn and Berlin (1998-99).

Rob de Wijk began his career in the world of journalism and publishing. He subsequently lectured in international relations at the University of Leiden. In October 1989 he was appointed Head of the Defence Concepts Division of the Defence Staff at the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, advising the Chief of the Defence Staff in matters relating to strategic plans and policy. Since September 1997 he has been on secondment to the Clingendael Institute for International Relations in The Hague, studying military aspects of international security. He is also professor of International Relations at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy, Breda, professor of Strategic Studies at the University of Leiden and a member of the National Defence Research Council of the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research.

Abbreviations

AFSOUTH	Allied Forces South Europe
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
C3	Command, Control and Communications (Consultation, Command and Control also found, e.g. in NATO)
C3I	Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
C4	Command, Control, Communications and Computers
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
C4ISTAR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CENTCOM	Central Command
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIS	Communications and Information Systems
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force(s)
COPS	French abbreviation for PSC (q.v.)
CSAR	Combat Search And Rescue
DCI	Defence Capabilities Initiative
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EBO	Effects Based Operations
EC	European Community
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
EDC	European Defence Community
EDF	European Development Fund
EMAW	European Multinational Air Wing
EMEC	European Multinational Expeditionary Corps
EMETF	European Multinational Expeditionary Task Force
EMMF	European Multinational Maritime Force
EMPF	European Multinational Police Force
EOC	Essential Operational Capability
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy

ETA	Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna (Basque: 'Basque Homeland and Liberty')
EU	European Union
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUPM	EU Police Mission
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPS	Global Positioning System
HJA	Home and Justice Affairs
HPC	Helsinki Process Catalogue
HQ	Headquarters
HTF	Headline Goal Task Force
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IFOR	Implementation Force
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
IGO	Intergovernmental Organisation
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
IPTF	International Police Task Force
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISAF	International Assistance Security Force
ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KIA	Killed In Action
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
MAPE	Multinational Advisory Police Element
MC	Military Committee
MCM	Mine Countermeasures
MONUC	UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MPF	Multinational Protection Force
MSU	Multinational Specialised Unit

NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NCW	Network-Centric Warfare
NEC	Network Enabled Capability
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPT	Treay on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSS	National Security Strategy
OCCAR	French abbreviation for Organisation for Joint Armaments Cooperation
OHQ	Operation Headquarters
ONUC	UN Operation in the Congo
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PGM	Precision-Guided Missile
PJC	Permanent Joint Council
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSO	Peace Support Operation
R&D	Research and Development
R&T	Research and Technology
RAF	Royal Air Force
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAP	Stabilisation and Association Process
SAR	Search And Rescue
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SEAD	Suppression of Enemy Air Defences
SF	Specialised Forces
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SOF	Special Operations Forces
STANAG	Standardisation Agreement

TEU	Treaty on European Union
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCAV	Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNPF	UN Peace Force
UNPREDEP	UN Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force
UNSC	UN Security Council
UNTAET	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union
WHO	World Health Organisation
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Europe is at peace but the world is not. Following the shock of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the Institute decided, two years ago, to convene an independent task force in order to address the issue of future European capabilities. Made up of some of the best-known academic experts on ESDP, this independent task force shared a basic assumption: even though the use of force is not the first nor the only way to deal with regional or international crises, the EU will need to have at its disposal a certain level of forces, at a certain level of readiness and operational efficiency, if only to widen the range of its options when faced with a crisis and facilitate the ultimate decision at the highest political level.

The main task of the group was to determine the most likely generic crisis scenarios that the EU could face in the decades to come, to assess the capabilities needed to meet each of these contingencies, to identify the main shortfalls within current European forces, and to propose remedies and options for adapting European capabilities, if military intervention were to be decided on at the EU level.

Members of the task force were:

Chair: Nicole Gnesotto

Rapporteur: Jean-Yves Haine

André Dumoulin	Tomas Ries
Jan Foghelin	Lothar Rühl
François Heisbourg	Stefano Silvestri
William Hopkinson	Hans-Bernhard Weisserth
Marc Otte	Rob de Wijk