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Cooperation by Committee: The EU Military Committee and the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management

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European Union Institute for Security Studies

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This Occasional Paper *was completed in summer 2009, before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The institutional reforms envisaged by the Treaty and relevant to the proceedings of the EU Military Committee and the Committee for Civilian Crisis Managament are therefore not integrated in this analysis.*

Summary

Member States have established a permanent presence in Brussels to enhance the EU's capacity to decide, and to facilitate their own influence on intergovernmental policy issues as they arise. Within these permanent representations there is a complex hierarchy of national actors organised into committees and working groups, some tasked to provide advice, others to contribute technical knowledge, and those at the top, to make decisions of political importance. These national representatives perform their work in a transgovernmental setting, in some cases spending more time with their counterparts from other representations than with those in their own. To gain a better understanding of policy outcomes flowing from Brussels it is helpful to begin to expose the inner workings, processes, and discourses that occur on a day-to-day basis within these transgovernmental groupings. This paper examines the examples of the Civilian Crisis Management Committee (Civcom) and EU Military Committee (EUMC), to shed light on this dynamic within the field of ESDP, the EU's cornerstone policy mechanism for crisis response in third countries.

Drawing upon dozens of interviews, the following analysis compares the expertise, culture, meeting frequency, and norms of the two committees, and how these factors influence their overall internal dynamic. A number of illustrative examples as well as an analysis of the committee-capital interaction shed light on how and why the two entities are able to shape ESDP outcomes on a regular basis. In terms of the processes within the committees, the evidence suggests that the EUMC has a higher level of internal cohesion, and a more tangible common culture. Civcom is still emerging in this respect, but in many ways Civcom faces a bigger challenge given the unprecedented nature of its activities. Ultimately, these officials must answer to the decision-makers in their respective capitals, and thus their ability to be persuasive as a group will play a crucial role in the future development of ESDP.

Introduction

Scholars and policy practitioners have put forward a variety of explanations as to why European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has, depending on one's point of view, been successful or has fallen short of expectations. As a policy launched only in 1999, much attention has been paid to its progress. Much of the public commentary on the issue focuses on Member States' foreign policy stances, strategic culture, lack of resources and political will. Commentators tend to emphasise the 'big three' Member States, attempting to gauge the preferences of Berlin, London, and Paris to find insight into the future trajectory of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the intergovernmental area of the second pillar, it is clear that Member States are at the heart of the EU's general 'capacity to decide.'[1] But achieving consensual decisions and implementing them requires intensive exchanges within relevant committees.

This paper seeks to provide insight into the transgovernmental processes of Member States' permanent representations, suggesting that committees can be dynamic, distinctive and influential in their roles. In particular, it focuses on two important examples, the military representatives of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC)[2] and the Civilian Crisis Management Committee (Civcom). These committees report to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which is comprised of Member States' ambassadors charged with controlling the political and strategic direction of crisis management operations under CFSP. The Council may authorise the PSC to take decisions directly on certain practical issues, thus it is a very powerful group when it comes to ESDP,[3] and it has a significant impact on the roles of the EUMC and Civcom. More broadly, the two committees are embedded in a wide and complex decision-making structure at both the EU and Member State levels. The aim of this paper is to isolate the processes, procedures and roles of the

1. Giovanni Grevi, 'ESDP Institutions', in Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane (eds.), *European Security and Defence Policy: the first ten years (1999-2009)* (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009).

2. In this paper, the EUMC refers to the permanent military representatives based in Brussels, rather than the Chiefs of Defence in the capitals who they represent.

3. The role of the PSC has been extensively addressed in works by: Simon Duke, 'The Linchpin COPS: Assessing the workings and institutional relations of the Political and Security Committee', *European Institute of Public Administration,* Working Paper 2005/W/05; and Jolyon Howorth, 'The Political and Security Committee: a case study in "supranational interogovernmentalism"?' forthcoming in Renaud Dehousse (ed.), *The Community Method in Perspective: New Approaches* (New York: Palgrave, 2009).

EUMC and Civcom to illustrate in more depth two comparable cases of transgovernmentalism.

Transgovernmental cooperation is defined by Robert Keohane and Joseph F. Nye as the process under which sub-units of governments engage in direct and autonomous interaction separate from nation states.[4] Possible configurations of this concept of cooperation include transgovernmental networks, coalitions, and committees.[5] Although committees have a degree of autonomy, they are characterised as limited in membership with an official mandate to carry out the broader instructions of higher political bodies. Networks are typically more informal while coalitions have more specific agendas that may even go against what national authorities had in mind.[6] Civcom and EUMC are two transgovernmental committees crucial to decision-making on the operational side of ESDP. They make a particularly good comparison as they both answer to the PSC, deal with the same policy area but with different emphases, and are relatively new committees, still in the process of becoming ever more critical to second pillar issues.

A clearer picture of how cooperation by committee works, through the examples of Civcom and EUMC, may add to our understanding of how decisions are made in the security arena, as well as offer a complement to explanations about ESDP that tend to gloss over the nitty-gritty of how concrete proposals, guidance and advice are hammered out. Moreover, since the PSC very rarely goes against the consensus reached in these committees, their output is arguably quite influential in terms of what the EU actually does on the ground in third countries.

Member States drive ESDP. Indeed, they determine the broad brushstrokes of policies before they are discussed in Brussels, and they may keep certain high-stakes issues from even making it onto a committee's agenda. But at certain junctures, committees do shape the process beyond what would be possible if hard bargaining among capitals were the only route

4. Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations', *World Politics,* no. 27, 1974.

5. See Anne Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); and Giovanni Grevi, 'Transgovernmental cooperation under CFSP: institutional and normative profiles', in Marianne Dony and Lucia Serena Rossi (eds.), *Démocratie, cohérence et transparence : principes constitutionnels de l'Union européenne ?* (Brussels: University of Brussels, 2008).

6. Paul W. Thurner and Martin Binder, 'European Union Transgovernmental Networks: The emergence of a new political space beyond the nation state?', *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 48, no.1, 2009, pp. 80-106.

to compromise. The following analysis takes a sociological-institutionalist approach,[7] suggesting that the group dynamics, shared norms and evolving worldviews within these committees at least in part contribute to whether consensus is possible and play a part in determining what the nature of that consensus will be. In other words, committee processes are relevant to policy outcomes. The focus of this paper will be on the former, drawing upon extensive interviews with committee members from a wide range of Member States.[8]

The key factors that will be examined in this respect are: (1) common culture and *esprit de corps*; (2) expertise; (3) quality and quantity of meetings and shared professional norms; and (4) relationship with the capital and the nature of national instructions. Before analysing these factors, it is necessary to first examine the origins and formal role of the two committees.

7. Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms', *Political Studies*, vol. 44, no. 5, 1996, pp. 936-57.

8. A thorough analysis of the impact of committee processes on ESDP outcomes is beyond the scope of this paper. This analysis explores the findings of thirteen interviews of EUMC military representatives (two of whom were deputy EUMC representatives) from twelve different Member States, and fifteen interviews of Civcom representatives from fourteen Member States. The interviews were conducted by this author during the period February-June 2009 and have provided a strong basis to explain the motivations, norms and other social processes within the two committees. That said, as with any research based on interviews, an element of subjectivity on the part of interviewees is to be acknowledged.

1. The EUMC and Civcom: origins and formal role

Within the Council and below the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) are a variety of committees and working groups. There are now around 160 preparatory bodies, some comprised of senior officials and others of junior experts in technical fields.[9] The committees of senior officials are formed by means of a treaty, intergovernmental act or Council decision. The Helsinki summit of December 1999 outlined the roles of the PSC, the EUMC and Civcom. In February 2000, the PSC was established as an interim body and became permanent in January 2001 after the Nice European Council. Civcom and the EUMC were permanently established through Council decisions on 22 May 2000 and 22 January 2001, respectively.

The EUMC is the highest military body in the Council, composed of Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) of the Member States. The chair of the EUMC must be a four-star officer, while the other committee members who represent the CHODs should hold the rank of a three-star General or Admiral. The Council decision establishing the EUMC stipulates that 'the EUMC is responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. It exercises military direction of all military activities within the EU framework.'[10] On 11 June 2001, the EU Military Staff (EUMS), consisting today of around 200 civilian and military personnel, was established to assist the EUMC. The EUMC Working Group, comprised of lieutenant colonels, is also a critical lower-level support-structure to the committee's work. Representatives from the Council Secretariat and Commission always participate in formal meetings, and the heads of the EUMS and European Defence Agency are frequently present as well. Twice a year the CHODs themselves come to Brussels and participate at the table.

9. Martin Westlake and David Galloway, *The Council of the European Union,* (London: John Harper Publishing, third edition, 2006), p. 217.

10. Council Decision of 22 January 2001 setting up the Military Committee of the European Union, Doc. 2001/79/CFSP, Brussels, 2001.

Military representatives are double-hatted, representing their countries to both the EU and NATO, with a few exceptions.[11] For NATO, they advise the top-level political committee, the North Atlantic Council. For the EU, they generally handle three types of tasks. First, they perform the typical role of high-level military officers, discussing views on what is happening on the ground in EU operations, receiving briefings from operational commanders, and determining long-term capabilities needs. Second, they deliberate on issues that need an immediate decision, such as planning ESDP operations, and determining necessary contributions from Member States. Finally, they have ongoing discussions of informal issues, during which they figure out what is possible before any formal proposals are put forward, such as potential future operations, ongoing security challenges, and prospective projects, like the installation of an air traffic management system.

Like the EUMC, Civcom was also established to provide advice and policy recommendations to PSC ambassadors, but on *civilian* missions and priorities, instead of military ones.[12] On a day-to-day basis, Civcom keeps track of progress in ongoing civilian missions, and engages in planning for future ESDP missions, including the determination of available resources. Civcom is composed of one representative from each Member State, drawn from national ministries of foreign affairs, the interior, and justice, many of them career diplomats. Representatives of the Commission and Council Secretariat must also be present. The Feira European Council of June 2000 and Civilian Headline Goals 2008 (established in 2004) and 2010 (established in 2007) framed Civcom's priority areas in steering, in close cooperation with the Council Secretariat, the development of civilian capabilities – an important part of its responsibilities.

In some respects, Civcom and the EUMC are quintessential Council committees, operating in parallel. But in other ways they are quite distinctive. The EUMC is uniformly comprised of three-star military officers at the pinnacle of their careers, whereas Civcom, with a few exceptions, is composed of officials of a lower level, closer to the beginning than to the end

11. The Belgian and French military representatives are not double-hatted, in addition to the representatives of the EU Member States that are not members of NATO.

12. Council Decision of 22 May 2000 setting up a Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, Doc. 2000/354/CFSP, Brussels, 2001. The committee's role is to '...provide information, formulate recommendations and give advice on civilian aspects of crisis management.'

of their careers. The EUMC is the only ESDP committee whose members are double-hatted to both NATO and the EU. Additionally, the EUMC has a large support structure in the form of the EU military staff and the EUMC working group, whereas Civcom does not have an equivalent hierarchy below them, and can avail itself of relatively limited institutional support in the Council Secretariat. Leadership of the two committees also differs. The EUMC's four-star general serves as permanent chairman of the committee for a term of three years, and out-ranks the representative from the country holding the rotating presidency. Civcom, by contrast, operates in the typical manner, with the representative of the rotating Presidency chairing the meetings. Finally, double-hatted EUMC officials spend most of their time at NATO headquarters, whereas Civcom delegates sit at their respective permanent representations.

It is also important to note that while both committees must grapple with the relatively new area of ESDP, Civcom arguably faces the more difficult challenge. First, many Member States are still developing the domestic structures to complement EU-level efforts to engage in civilian crisis management. Second, the large number of civilian missions, as compared to military operations, was not anticipated at the outset of ESDP. Third, unlike military missions that can rely on standing armies, each civilian mission requires the secondment of officials who are typically indispensable at home, like police, judges, prosecutors and prison officers. Despite this, civilian crisis management has acquired increasing prominence in the context of ESDP, and in many ways, is the EU's comparative advantage in terms of its external image. Thus far, there have only been six military operations under ESDP, yet Member States have considerable experience in this capacity under NATO and the UN.[13]

While these discrepancies should be kept in mind, a comparison of the two committees is nonetheless instrumental to understanding how committees work in the Council, and especially the process by which the details of ESDP operations are hashed out. Each Council committee has its own quirks, but in many ways the EUMC and Civcom are similar. They both answer to the PSC ambassadors, represent each of the Member States, and receive regular instructions from their capitals. In terms of the work they

13. In three civilian (or, as alternatively defined, civil-military) missions – EUSEC RD Congo, Sudan/Darfur AMIS II, and EUSSR Guinea Bissau – military personnel were part of the mission staff.

do, they embody a tidy division of labour between the military and civilian dimensions of ESDP, and are tasked in a similar manner. The following sections highlight the four key aspects of cooperation by committee, mentioned above, and provide illustrative examples of how these committees impact on ESDP outcomes.

2. The European Union Military Committee

The EUMC appears to be a very good example of a relatively cohesive Brussels-based committee with a wealth of shared expertise, a rich culture of shared professional norms and common values, a high frequency of informal meetings enabling persuasion to occur and compromises to be found, and a significant level of trust among each other and with their individual capitals. These internal qualities of the committee have smoothed the path to compromise on a variety of issues, including in the context of EUNAVFOR *Atalanta*, EUFOR Chad, and long-term capabilities development.

The role of expertise

EUMC military representatives are experts in defence policy planning, and have a specific, authoritative claim on technical knowledge that comes from career experience, education and training. All EUMC military representatives have spent on average 35 years in the army, navy, or other military branch of their respective countries, working their way up through the ranks. They have been commanders and chiefs of staff, attended military academies and served as faculty members at defence colleges, among other things.[14] At least eleven of them received advanced mid-career training in the United States, and all but two have received training outside of their own country. Seven have attended the NATO Defence College in Rome, five went to Washington D.C. to further their education at the National Defence University, and a handful also attended the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Most have been posted to either NATO or the UN earlier in their careers. The remarkable similarities in training and education contribute to a culture of shared values within the committee. Many of them have decades of experience working with the defence industry, providing advice on security policy research, and leading military operations.

The critical point to emphasise about the impact of common expertise is that finding compromise on military advice is relatively unproblematic

14. See: http://www.nato.int/cv/milrep/cv-mlrp.htm.

for the military representatives. Every interviewee reported that the main obstacles are always political disagreements coming from the PSC or the capitals, not military ones. Once they have the go-ahead to prepare advice within a particular political mandate they very quickly agree on what is necessary. If there is no consensus in the EUMC, it is usually because representatives have 'red lines' from their capitals or they need further information to form a judgment. In short, the purpose of the EUMC is to feed military advice into a broader political debate, based on their shared professional expertise.

The EUMC can also advise against undertaking a specific operation. For example, in late 2008 some political and diplomatic leaders called for a battle group to be sent to the Kivu province in DR Congo, to help protect refugees and provide aid, but the consensus in the EUMC was that this was impractical.[15] Among other issues, there were not enough troops (it was felt that a 1,500-strong battle group would not be sufficient), the region was remote, and the lack of roads was a problem. Military representatives thus advised against using a battle group and had an impact on the political outcome by virtue of their expertise.[16] More generally, one aspect of the EUMC's value-added is a keen awareness that if they allow an operation to go forward that is not successful, ESDP would experience a major setback, one that it might take years from which to recover.

Common culture

By the time the military representatives arrive in Brussels, they have followed very similar career paths and find they have much in common with each other. Often, they have already met each other at previous postings, but even if their paths have not crossed before, they have certainly served in the same locations at one point or other and this creates an instant rapport as a group. As one EUMC general put it, 'We have the same language, same jargon, same kind of military thinking, and we read each other's military philosophers.'[17] They know what it means to have been on the battlefield as a soldier and to be responsible for soldiers' lives.

15. Interview with EUMC military representative in May 2009.
16. Interview with EUMC military representative in May 2009.
17. Interview with EUMC military representative in March 2009.

There is a broad military culture that is common across EU Member States, and exists independently of the unique Brussels environment, which is addressed below. The permanent representatives identify several qualities: efficiency, a can-do attitude, and the belief that not reaching a decision amounts to a decision in itself.[18] All three are interrelated. Efficiency is first and foremost a part of military culture. In many cases, soldiers' lives are on the line, and no matter what rank a military officer holds, he or she must be able to make decisions quickly. To accomplish this, a can-do attitude is necessary, the idea that there is always a solution, and the main challenge is to identify it quickly. Making no decision at all is a decision in itself because if those at the top are silent, events on the battlefield will still play out. Military officers fundamentally accept that inaction is still a kind of action.

These military norms are quite different from political or diplomatic approaches, and this is a key distinction between the two types of committees described here. Generally, if diplomats are unable to reach agreement, they can decide that they have pushed the issue far enough and set it aside for later. Sometimes, they may even determine that consensus is not possible. A lack of consensus after intense negotiations is considered a failed outcome for diplomats, but not a decision in itself as it is for military representatives.

Besides this general military culture that the military representatives share, there is also a distinctive element brought into the mix when they begin their work in Brussels. After military representatives arrive in Brussels they undergo a period of socialisation in their new setting. This happens at different times for different individuals as turnover is not coordinated across Member States. Their shared background, language and experiences certainly help in establishing a common culture that is in some ways unique to the EU-NATO environment. Those within the group are adept at helping new members learn the new aspects of their professional norms.

The process of socialisation is important in the multilateral setting. The atmosphere at NATO headquarters and the double-hatted nature of most of the EUMC posts, define a distinctive working environment. First, as

18. Interview with EUMC military representative in March 2009.

mentioned earlier, in this multilateral setting politics is a part of the job. As one general described it, 'Both the military aspects and other aspects are important at our level. We always think of the population. Factors of influence are numerous. There are clearly military, political, and economic arguments.'[19]

Second, the multi-hatted nature of their work is quite unique. The generals typically spend all but one day per week at their NATO offices, even while they are working on EU issues. The idea that they answer to two different institutions with separate hierarchies and goals is not typical of a military environment. While some generals spend a significant majority of their time dealing with NATO issues, others report that they work equally on both, depending on what is most pressing. 'We don't want to fail because we are very visible,' said one general. 'We are walking around in uniform in a diplomatic world. The civilian staff is four times bigger than the military staff at NATO.'[20] And their previous postings generally do not prepare them for these distinctive institutional aspects of the environment at NATO.

Third, the EU side of their work is quite specific in that it embodies a more encompassing interpretation of security than is usually found in more traditional military cultures. Military representatives increasingly take into account the civilian dimension of crisis management when planning EU operations. For example, during discussions to establish NAVFOR *Atalanta*, which deals with the problem of pirates off the coast of Somalia, many interviewees described how they were quite occupied with developing a legal framework that would determine what would happen to pirates *after* they were arrested at sea, and arguing that the problem could not only be resolved at sea, but must also be tackled on land, especially in terms of dismantling the financial system upon which the pirates relied. There was a general understanding that 'the EU could get involved in civil dimensions',[21] and this is what they sought. The EU is more comprehensive in its approach to security, compared to NATO, and military representatives who are new to this environment must quickly incorporate the civil dimension into their military thinking. As a group they are

19. Interview with EUMC military representative in March 2009.
20. Interview with EUMC military representative in March 2009.
21. Interview with EUMC military representative on 10 June 2009.

also continuously discovering and shaping the nature of the EU's broad approach to security themselves.

In this process, the traditional military norms shared among EUMC members are flanked by an emerging, post-modern military culture and doctrine, where the use of force is embedded in a context of a more comprehensive approach to security.

Meetings and shared professional norms

The amount of time that members of a transgovernmental committee spend together is a critical factor in determining cohesiveness. Quantity of meetings is one simple measure of this, but to dig deeper it is also necessary to consider the quality of the meetings, i.e. if a meeting is too formal or structured for the individuals to speak openly then it is not as productive. Ultimately, professional norms determine the quality of meetings. Meetings must be an opportunity for real deliberation. The strength of common culture and the quality of meetings are mutually constitutive as meetings are the primary forums in which professional norms are expressed and culture is consolidated.

Formal EUMC meetings are on the agenda once per week, and additional meetings are quickly scheduled if there is a crisis. Additionally, informal meetings are held quite frequently in the form of working dinners for which a range of military representatives and diplomats get together three or four times per week, presidency receptions every six months, and 'away-day' visits to EU military operations. They may also meet on numerous occasions at conferences, seminars, and think-tanks, when their schedules allow. These are all good opportunities for military representatives to get to know each other, but most importantly, to reach informal compromise before they are on-the-spot in their official meetings.

Beyond the sheer quantity of meetings, it is important to consider what actually happens in these meetings and whether or not real deliberation takes place. First of all, translation is not a part of these meetings, which aids in direct communication. A strong military norm is to speak in English or French (which are also the two working languages of ESDP), meaning that the generals share language as part of their shared culture. A general said: 'we can't speak so many languages. If you are on the battlefield and

everyone is speaking seventeen different languages nothing can work.' In practice, only the French and Belgian generals regularly use French while the others use English.

Second, a central aspect of the military representatives' body of shared professional norms is the distinction between 'flags-up' and 'flags-down'. In formal meetings, flags are up, and everything is recorded. Generals present their national positions. Reports of their discussions become official papers, and are circulated to those with high enough security clearance. Very few are de-classified for general public consumption. When flags are down, the generals can discuss frankly with one another whether or not they agree with their instructions. Discussions take on a tone of expediency. A delegate said, 'there are sub-dynamics to the process when flags are down. In an informal meeting we are always honest.' They are free to express their perspectives as professionals, rather than as transmission belts for state preferences. They can distance themselves from their instructions, and focus on reaching consensus based on their own expertise.

Sub-dynamics in flags-down meetings include 'signalling'. For example, if a general begins his statement with 'I have instructions to say...' everyone is alerted to the likelihood that he has strict red lines from his capital, and that even though he does not personally agree with them, he may not be able to move from his country's position. An even clearer signal is when a general sends his deputy to the meeting instead of going himself. Upon the deputy's arrival, there is an understanding that he would read aloud his instructions verbatim. Military representatives often choose this strategy to distance themselves from the debate and from the reactions of colleagues. Everyone appreciates that on any given occasion, any one of them might find himself in a tough position, with strict instructions that he personally does not support. Yet, they collectively define success as reaching a compromise, and tempers can flare when this success is threatened by one stubborn position. A delegate said, 'we remain friends and [can] proficiently fight at the same time and that's the best way to get results."

Another signal that there may be obstacles to compromise is when the quality of the argumentation itself flounders. One delegate described how a military representative could advance a weak argument, but will not admit that this is the case. Sometimes a general, obliged to state his case in a certain way, ends up fighting an uphill battle, trying to work with the twin

forces of his nation's agenda and his own doubts about what he must say working against him. The military representatives know each other well enough to be able to discern if the argument is instrumental, and this undermines the would-be persuader's ability to convince from the start.

The capital-EUMC dynamic

It is in the relationship between each military representative and their respective capital that the value-added of the committee becomes quite evident. As one interviewee described, capitals can and do negotiate directly with each other, but while each may know how to carry this off successfully with two or three other capitals, communicating directly with 26 others is simply impossible. Thus, the final compromise rests with the committee. And this is important because it is necessary that everyone's voice is heard. This is the forum where even a small Member State can ask for a change in the wording of a document, and the Member States may find themselves agreeing to something they had not entirely foreseen. Even on the occasion when the CHODs meet in Brussels, they are not as close to the issues as their military representatives. A permanent presence in Brussels is a necessary prerequisite to really maintaining a full understanding of ongoing formal and informal deliberations.

It might be illustrative to briefly outline two examples of how the EUMC has shaped policy outcomes, and found agreement despite Member States' different starting points. NAVFOR *Atalanta* was somewhat controversial in the beginning because ESDP had never executed a naval operation before. Not all the Member States were on-board. Moreover, NATO ships were already in the region, as were those of non-EU nations. At the same time, some believed that action against piracy could be taken without a formal ESDP operation. Many military representatives, however, felt that the details of a potential operation had not been studied properly, but that having a formal operation under ESDP would be preferable for a variety of reasons. These included the ability of the EU to complement the intervention via military means with an array of other instruments, the potential of the mission as a catalyst for cooperation with other actors involved in the theatre, as well as the political profile of the envisaged operation. After some deliberation, the committee came to a compromise that they could advise moving forward with the operation if a coordination network could be established that would enable ships to communicate

with sources on the ground, and with ships from non-EU nations, such as China, Russia and India. By pushing for a wider mission – including the coordination network and agreements with nearby countries on what to do with captured pirates – the 27 Member States were able to agree. They could see the benefit of a formal ESDP operation under EU leadership, what was to become NAVFOR *Atalanta*. These various initiatives were spearheaded by the military committee, based on military logic in close cooperation with national capitals and the PSC. Once the political mandate was in place, it took only a few days for the military to launch the operation at sea.[22]

In the case of EUFOR Chad, the initial controversy arose from the feeling among many nations that it was not central to their political and economic interests. At the same time, the pressure to launch a humanitarian mission to bring security and relief to refugees and displaced people was mounting. The main concern of the military representatives was whether the operation would be successful. The situation was more precarious than in the case of *Atalanta* because of the lack of troop contributions, despite successive attempts to generate more forces. Ultimately, enough reserves could be ensured to satisfy the requirements of the operation despite an initial shortfall of 2,000 troops and the EUMC felt that, if the UN took over as planned, the operation could be successful. In particular, France agreed to make up for much of the shortfalls in terms of troops. The ability of the EUMC to perform as a catalyst of information and expertise and as a platform of dialogue and common advice in a difficult phase of the planning process was critical to the final outcome. To reach a compromise, those EUMC representatives who were more sceptical about the operation decided not to block the initiative.

These two examples illustrate how the military representatives are sometimes able to find military solutions that contribute to overcoming political obstacles stemming from the capitals. They are also able to put an operation into place quickly once the political dimension is complete. They also have an impact in the process of persuasion, engaging in a constant dialogue with their capitals and seeking to influence PSC ambassadors even in informal settings. Of course, the degree of flexibility that each military representative has from his capitals varies, and thus the level of

22. Interview with a Member State's Chief of the Operations and Exercises Branch in June 2009.

autonomous influence is also different. In some cases, the delegate may find himself in the driver's seat, within the framework of broader national positions, and inform his superior of what he has specifically agreed to after the fact. This requires a great deal of trust and experience.

The role of the EUMC in developing military capabilities in the context of the EU over the long term is another dimension of its added-value. Interviewees, with one or two exceptions, describe themselves as supportive of more security integration to achieve a common security identity. Many feel it is necessary for the EU to have a permanent operational headquarters. This pro-EU worldview is reflected in how the committee approaches military capabilities development and the goal of interoperability. It is somewhat distinctive from how the capitals approach ESDP, which tends to be much more nationally oriented. The EUMC works closely with the European Defence Agency (EDA), in pursuing the goals of the Long-Term Vision for European Defence and Capability Needs. The EUMC is thus a bridge between the CHODs and the EDA. Only this transgovernmental committee can bring different philosophies together to deliver common positions to the EDA.[23] Moreover, since their primary goal is to execute successful ESDP operations, and provide for the common security of EU citizens, they realize that working together will be necessary for the EU to have efficient and effective planning and procurement, particularly in the light of declining populations and defence budgets.

To sum up, the representatives are clearly experts at 'military art'. They are driven by their shared expert knowledge, and a culture that pushes them towards finding solutions. They find that they rarely disagree when it comes to military planning. Rather, the main obstacles to cooperation arise from their political red lines. Their high status and experience, as well as their strong *rapport* with their capitals, enable them to persuade others of their compromise solutions. Shared professional norms, meeting frequency and informal gatherings are also a critical part of enabling cooperation by committee in the EUMC. At the same time, ESDP does not yet boast a high number of military operations. If the military side of ESDP grows in the future, it will be possible to test how this committee holds up under greater pressure.

23. Interview with EUMC representative in June 2009.

3. The Civilian Crisis Management Committee

In comparison to the EUMC, Civcom comes across in several ways as a somewhat younger transgovernmental committee, despite the fact that the two were created within a year of each other. While Civcom does enjoy a distinctive *esprit de corps*, the shared professional norms and common culture within this committee are less defined compared to those of the EUMC. Most of Civcom's decisions are made in formal settings, informal meetings are rare, and members do not all share the same type of expertise. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that the experience of civilian crisis management is relatively recent for Member States, whereas the history of military culture and organisation can easily be traced back for centuries, and this is even more the case in the context of the EU. Thus, while EUMC and Civcom are both relatively new committees, Civcom does not have the same wealth of professional experience to draw upon as the EUMC.

The role of expertise

Technical expertise in EU affairs and/or civilian crisis management, and experience in the diplomatic art of compromise are important qualities for a group like Civcom. Most Civcom delegates do not come to Brussels with experience in either civilian crisis management or EU affairs.[24] Rather, they learn on the job. They are early to mid-career diplomats who are more generalists than experts.[25] Over time, the evolution of Civcom's remit has gone from the more conceptual to the more operational, but the number of delegates with operational expertise has not increased. One delegate said: 'There are problems because some areas are very technical, like in [civilian crisis management], and experts are needed. This presents

24. Civcom delegates with a police background do have considerable operational experience, but not specifically related to EU missions.

25. The author argues elsewhere that high-level diplomats, such as ambassadors, are typically experts at what they do, and cease to be generalists. The expertise of the ambassadors in Coreper, for example, is so significant that they comprise a powerful epistemic community, or transnational network of experts, in the EU. See Mai'a K. Davis Cross, *The European Diplomatic Corps: Diplomats and International Cooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007).

a problem for postings like this one: the lack of expertise.'[26] Those diplomats with limited experience in CFSP and who come from countries with little structure to deal with these issues are more likely to be broadly in support of what the Council Secretariat proposes.

Civcom might benefit from a stronger presence of those with specific civilian crisis management expertise, but there are several ways in which they are able to mitigate any shortcomings. First, as mentioned, each Civcom delegate is replaced one by one, and thus relative novices in EU and/or civilian crisis management can benefit from the support of their colleagues when they arrive in Brussels. There is a steep learning curve during this early period on the job. One Civcom delegate said: 'Formal qualifications rarely tell all the truth about a person ... It takes diplomats with enough expertise or experts with enough diplomatic skills.'[27] As compared to the EUMC, Civcom delegates more often learn from those in their own permanent representation than from those in the committee. The opposite tends to be true for EUMC socialisation.

Second, the August 2007 creation of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) within the Council Secretariat provides Civcom with police, rule-of-law, financial, procurement and logistical advice from some 70 experts.[28] In situations where technical expertise is lacking within the group, Civcom representatives can therefore rely on various bodies within the Council such as the CPCC and DGE IX (civilian crisis management). The Secretariat also sets up fact-finding missions to collect information and provide Civcom with operational options.

Third, despite the fact that many Civcom members do not tend to come to their posts with specific expertise in EU affairs or civilian crisis management, they do typically arrive with experience in how to conduct negotiations and find compromise solutions. For example, one diplomat described the technique of stressing opposition to a capital's red lines in order to be more successful at adjusting his instructions. The justification for this is that oftentimes those in Brussels have a better grasp of what is possible in negotiations than their counterparts in the capitals. The style

26. Interview with Civcom delegate in May 2009.

27. Ibid.

28. *ESDP Newsletter* no. 6, Council of the European Union. July 2008.

in which each delegate chooses to put his or her point forward within Civcom also requires a particular kind of expertise. A delegate described how experienced diplomats may simply state what they want without giving reasons, leaving it to those in opposition to give reasons for their case instead. Holding 'pre-meetings' or finding 'pre-agreements' are also important, especially when it comes to influencing the Council Secretariat. If a diplomat's fingers are on the pulse of the Secretariat, he or she can ensure that his or her country's input is wrapped into the Secretariat's discussion document before it is even circulated.

In short, the gradual turnover of Civcom members, the ability to learn quickly on the job, and the use of the Secretariat as a resource, mitigate the lack of specific technical expertise.

Common culture

Given the variety of delegates' experience and professional background, the bulk of Civcom's culture lies mainly in its *esprit de corps*. Common culture is a more encompassing notion than *esprit de corps* as it is typically a key part of the identity, heritage, symbolism and sense of purpose shared by a group of individuals. By contrast, *esprit de corps* is often thought of as a sense of camaraderie and devotion to the goals of the group.

First, Civcom's *esprit de corps* consists of pride in what they are accomplishing as a committee. Many interviewees describe how they accomplish tasks that are practical – there is often an immediate impact on the ground – while still being politically relevant. Their pride also stems from the feeling that their ambassadors and political masters at home recognise their achievements, and that they are dealing with issues that are fundamentally new. One interviewee expressed it as a feeling of 'blazing new trails' as a group. And even when negotiations do not always run smoothly, members of Civcom find that their *esprit de corps* can even spring from internal professional rivalry and competition. Just because they sometimes must represent opposing positions does not mean that they entertain personal hostilities.

The second main element of Civcom's *esprit de corps* is the legacy from its predecessors, how early committee members shaped the group's dynamic

from the start. *Esprit de corps* can be somewhat path dependent.[29] Once certain norms of interaction are entrenched within an institution like Civcom they become self-reinforcing. Since Civcom is re-populated piecemeal, each new member is socialised into the existing culture, and it is difficult for any one member to change it. This is true for many Council committees and as a result each now has its own distinguishable dynamic. A Civcom delegate described his committee as possessing '... a common understanding that in the end, apart from the concrete questions, there's a common desire to move the EU forward. The spirit of consensus is there.'[30]

Third, Civcom's *esprit de corps* is determined to some extent by the types of people who fill its ranks. It stands to reason that if the individuals selected for their committee postings have a similar professional background, they will find that they naturally have similar worldviews, experiences to draw upon, and working methods. From this standpoint, Civcom is perhaps unique compared to other Council committees, especially the EUMC, in that it is more heterogeneous. Its members are both diplomats and non-diplomats. Civcom representatives come from Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Justice. Some used to be senior police officers, but increasingly they are drawn from pools of career diplomats. Many delegates are at a relatively early stage in their careers and, for them, a posting in Civcom is a career bonus. A delegate said: 'Age is a factor. Most of us are younger, and very happy to be in this position ... It's considered an interesting step to be here. You feel privileged, enthusiastic.'[31]

The heterogeneity of Civcom does result in some fragmentation within the overarching *esprit de corps*. On the one hand, Civcom is like a club in that everyone recognises each other as equals. On the other hand, some delegates develop deeper relationships among themselves by virtue of their longer time together serving in the committee. They share a deeper trust and common points of view, which enable them to work things out among themselves separately and more easily. Other sub-communities within Civcom exist along the lines of certain consistent, normative values. The Nordic countries, for example, find they have more in common, as well as neutral countries like Austria. Countries like France, Italy,

29. Paul Pierson, 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics', *American Political Science Review*, June 2000.

30. Interview with Civcom delegate in May 2009.

31. Interview with Civcom delegate in March 2009.

Germany and the UK contribute more resources or manpower to civilian ESDP missions and thus have a bigger stake in the outcome. They may communicate more frequently to determine their shared interests. A sub-community of Central and Eastern European Member States is not so manifest. While it is true that Central and Eastern European countries are relatively new to the EU, their Civcom delegates are just as likely to have served in the committee for the same period of time as the older Member States' delegates. All postings are 3-4 years on average. It is actually more common to find a shared sub-community among longer-standing *delegates* than longer-standing *Member States*.

Apart from these more enduring secondary communities within Civcom, coalitions also form depending on the issue, but these are fluid over the long run. For example, the EU Member States that do not recognize Kosovo's independence – Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain – stood together on certain aspects of EULEX Kosovo, but have little reason to form an automatic coalition when it comes to other missions. National interest will ultimately trump the ties of *esprit de corps* if Member States have a lot at stake. Delegates with experience in working groups with a geographic focus argue that Civcom is actually not a group they would describe as like-minded. Unlike in other committees, Civcom has a horizontal mandate, dealing with many areas of the world, which often makes the agenda less predictable and entails different patterns of negotiation on successive crises. By contrast, even though the EUMC deals with horizontal issues in a similar way, their high degree of shared expertise makes them remarkably like-minded when it comes to military advice.

Overall, in comparison to Civcom, EUMC's common culture is more tangible, not least because military representatives have spent many more years in their professions than their Civcom counterparts, and they come from very similar backgrounds. Nonetheless, Civcom does benefit from a certain *esprit de corps*.[32]

Meetings and shared professional norms

It is widely recognised that political decisions are not made in formal meetings because procedures and protocol get in the way of real deliberation.

32. All interviewees except one responded in the affirmative regarding the presence of an *esprit de corps*.

Civcom is somewhat of an exception to this as its formal meetings – Mondays and Wednesdays – are conducted in an informal fashion with a relaxed atmosphere. Oftentimes, these 'informal-formal' meetings run hours longer than scheduled. At the beginning of the meeting, everyone must agree on the agenda, circulated a couple of days in advance, and highlight any points for further discussion. The committee will then listen to briefings about the latest developments in the field, often from the Council Secretariat.

These meetings are governed by certain shared professional norms which help smooth interactions and create certain expectations. Professional norms range from behaviour in the conduct of meetings to a shared notion of how consensus is best reached. During formal meetings, Civcom representatives often find themselves talking in the corridors, making phone calls to their capitals, or even text-messaging each other across the table to informally resolve conflicts before they are formally aired in the negotiating room. They generally want to avoid sharp confrontation in the open, which distinguishes the group from other committees, particularly considering that they often deal with controversial issues.

There is a common expectation that some type of consensus should be found by the end of the proceedings. Interviewees explain that for them the means are not as important as the ends. When they do speak, they express their positions and misgivings frankly to facilitate mutual understanding. But in another sense, the means are what make the difference between success and failure at reaching compromise. A critical professional norm that governs Civcom meetings is the decision of when to speak or not. This is part of the skill of each Civcom delegate, and clearly depends on the degree of their respective countries' involvement in or commitment to specific issues. With 27 people in the room, the hours would fly by if a *tour de table* were commonplace, even if everyone kept their remarks to three minutes. At that rate, one *tour de table* would find the group one hour and twenty minutes into their meeting, not including contributions from the Commission and Secretariat, and without any real discussion having been accomplished. Consequently, Civcom delegates have developed a sense of when it is appropriate to intervene in the negotiations and when it is better not to. One delegate explained that if your country is not going to participate in a mission, rather than blocking agreement on a point, it is appropriate to remain silent and let the others go forward.

Along with this, Civcom delegates avoid putting one or two Member States on the spot even if they are the primary obstruction to accomplishing the majority's goals. Instead, a Civcom delegate who is sceptical of a particular idea may not take issue with it if the matter is not consequential from his standpoint. This is something that the EUMC and Civcom share, a sense of when to let something pass, and when to tackle it head-on. In other words, the dynamic is to always keep in mind the big picture, the shared goal of moving ESDP forward, as long as the issue up for debate is in their hands. This comes back to the overarching *esprit de corps* of the committee. Ultimately this determination to leave the room with a compromise in hand has an impact on what happens in ESDP missions. A critical observation made by interviewees from both the EUMC and Civcom is that the PSC nearly always accepts their agreed positions.

Finally, as in all multilateral settings, there is a keen understanding that everyone has to work with some degree of instruction from their capitals. A kind of empathy arises from this because at any given point in time, any of them could find themselves in a tough situation, trying to find the middle ground between their capitals and the collective will of the committee. They deal with this inherent aspect of the job professionally. 'There's a certain personal detachment from the content. You don't always identify the person with what he says.'[33] As a general rule, in Civcom *esprit de corps* and shared professional norms have less of an impact when instructions contain red lines and the issues are controversial.

Kosovo, for example, was a tough case for Civcom delegates. There were several ways in which Civcom delegates influenced outcomes of the mission and navigated through rough waters to find compromise. The main problem was that five Member States were against Kosovo's independence. As a result, their Civcom delegates were given very specific instructions on the treatment of the Kosovo question in negotiations concerning the envisaged rule-of-law mission EULEX, and had little flexibility. To deal with this, a key tactic they agreed upon was to quickly adopt the planning documents for the mission very early on in the process, before Kosovo formally declared independence. By doing this, Civcom was able to use status-neutral language in the documents in an unproblematic way. As one delegate put it, it was 'a *technique du non-dit*. We don't say it,

33. Interview with Civcom delegate in May 2009.

but it's there.' If they had waited until after the declaration of independence, then they would have had to deal with the question of what to label Kosovo, its leadership and its government. Compromise would have been unlikely. Those from the five Member States against the recognition of Kosovo also played their part in rationalising compromise at Civcom's level. They found that by taking a more technical approach, they could leave aside the independence issue. One delegate said: 'we considered it a technical job that should be done to create capacity for a functioning, lawful administration respecting the rule of law.'[34]

Besides the shared professional norms outlined above, it is also important to consider the role of the rotating presidency in determining the quality and outcomes of meetings. Chairing Civcom meetings entails distinctive responsibilities. The chair of the meeting becomes a manager, ensuring that meetings are organised and prepared well. While those not in the chair can focus on how the content of the document impacts on their Member States' priorities, the chair is judged based on how well he or she can find solutions in the common interest. In the presidency, a delegate can still try to push some priorities more than others, but his or her administrative role is of utmost importance. By contrast, in the EUMC, the non-rotating chair is also a critical manager in the process, but he or she is obliged to be completely neutral. Across Council committees, meetings can fall apart if the chair has not properly prepared the groundwork.

Of course, the weight of the responsibility does not fall solely on the shoulders of the delegate sitting at the head of the table. Much also depends on how the capital decides to run its presidency. If the capital tries to manage everything from afar, then it makes work difficult in Brussels. Another factor is how well the capital is able to follow what is happening in Brussels. But the size of the Member State does not determine how the presidency will be run.[35] From one presidency to another, the nature of meetings change, and coordination between various bodies runs differently to the benefit or detriment of cooperative outcomes.

In terms of informal meetings, it is particularly noteworthy that EUMC representatives tend to meet more frequently outside of regular meet-

34. Ibid.

35. Lucia Quaglia and Edward Moxon-Browne, 'What Makes a Good EU Presidency? Italy and Ireland Compared', *Journal of Common Market Studies,* vol. 44, no. 2, June 2006, pp. 349-68.

ings as compared to Civcom. Civcom delegates report a particularly heavy workload, given their committee's position in ESDP decision-making, and the sheer number of missions they must work on at any given moment. Delegates attend their own bi-weekly meetings, and sit in on any PSC meetings pertaining to points they have made. After these meetings, they then have to write up reports, and read hundreds of pages in preparation for the next meeting. They must be knowledgeable about a narrower range of issues than their counterparts in the PSC, but they discuss them in great detail, sometime spending hours debating a single line in a document. Twelve-hour work days are typical.

Despite this overload, like the EUMC, Civcom does manage to participate in two types of regular, informal meetings: the bi-annual visit to the capital of the rotating presidency, and the field visits to specific civilian ESDP missions. This time away from the office promotes relationship-building among delegates. The field missions in particular are also directly useful for the work they do. They are able to see with their own eyes what the problems are on the ground in missions rather than relying solely on mission reports. In general, however, the emphasis in Civcom is on formal meetings, albeit conducted in a relatively informal way, rather than informal ones as in the EUMC.

The capital-Civcom dynamic

Instructions are conveyed to Civcom delegates in a variety of ways, and the means are indicative of the level of importance and flexibility of the capital. For day-to-day work, Civcom delegates play a key role in shaping their own instructions. After all, they are more knowledgeable about developments in Brussels and have a keener sense of what can be agreed to and where they might become isolated. A Civcom delegate might occasionally get instructions by telegram, immediately indicating that her capital has certain red lines that cannot be crossed. By contrast, another delegate might *never* receive instructions by telegram. Instructions by phone or email tend to indicate that the Member State's position is less fixed, and usually the Civcom delegate has played a strong role in preparing them. Finally, instructions by text message constitute the least formal type of instructions, and there is always the possibility that the delegates will have no instructions at all. One representative said that in two-thirds of the cases he does not receive any particular indication from his capital.

In general, smaller Member States tend to not provide formal, binding instructions while bigger Member States seek to exert more control on events from their capitals. Representatives from smaller countries will always have some instructions for more politically important issues, but on occasion they take the initiative to ask for instructions so that they can ensure that they have backing from their capitals. A Civcom delegate's relationship with his capital is to some extent a reflection of how policy is determined domestically and smaller countries do not possess the administrative resources to follow everything that is happening in Brussels. In fact, reportedly, only the biggest countries and the Commission can really follow everything that the Council Secretariat produces. Besides, the fact that bigger Member States also have larger and more complex security interests adds to the potential rigidity of their instructions. In the EUMC, the degree of instructions and flexibility with them is tied less to the size of the country and more to the relationship that a military representative has with his CHOD or Minister of Defence. To complicate matters, the practice of multilateral civilian crisis management is still relatively new in some Member States, and many are in the process of setting up structures to better handle ESDP missions.

There is a strong sense among many Civcom delegates that the value of instructions is twofold. First, they serve to tell them what to do. Second, abiding by instructions means ensuring that they have the capitals' support. Without instructions, they take on the personal risk that whatever they agree to will not be accepted by their capitals, or they will not be able to persuade officials at home after the fact that they took the right stance. It is important to have a certain degree of ownership in the capitals. But to go too far in terms of detailed instructions harms the process. Some delegates expressed a preference for flexible instructions so that they have room to argue a certain position well. Often, the level of autonomy within these instructions is also determined by the specific relationship of the delegate with his or her capital. It is vital that the delegate is able to feed back to his capital the real sense of the proceedings in Brussels in order to gain some room for manoeuvre and make compromise possible. Ultimately, interviewees say that the capitals tend to be tougher in their stances than their representatives in Civcom.

In sum, Civcom delegates come from a variety of backgrounds and levels of experience. There is a sense of newness in what they are doing, and that

has fostered a natural *esprit de corps*. Their day-to-day tasks can be quite technical, involving hours of negotiations over each line in a document. But they are driven to try to leave the meeting room with a completed paper in hand. At the end of the day, their advice is rarely rejected by the PSC, and in that sense they are able to carve out compromise solutions against the backdrop of competing interests. Finally, Civcom operates in a particularly difficult environment, given the quantity and diversity of civilian missions that the EU runs simultaneously and the various challenges that this presents to Member States.

Conclusion

The above analysis explores the distinct processes of cooperation among national officials in the transgovernmental committees of the EUMC and Civcom. There are several conclusions that can be drawn. First, the high level of expertise and tangible common culture among EUMC representatives has resulted in the ability to reach compromise quickly, achieve a greater degree of flexibility with instructions, and persuade political actors of their military advice both formally and informally. By contrast, Civcom's varied expertise alongside *esprit de corps*, has resulted in longer negotiations, varied room for manoeuvre, and closer reliance on domestic structures. Second, both committees are constrained by political mandates. For both EUMC and Civcom, the emphasis is on finding common solutions to political obstacles, providing sound technical (military or civilian) advice while bearing the political context in mind. Third, while the EUMC tends to resolve issues in informal settings, relying on relationships that have often been built up over a career of interactions and similar experiences, Civcom's main forum is formal meetings, even while striving to maintain an informal atmosphere and avoiding sharp exchanges. Beyond these specific conclusions, it is important to remember that if an issue has particularly high stakes for Member States, national interests supersede *esprit de corps* in determining outcomes.

In many ways, the EUMC is more than a committee. It is an 'epistemic community', defined as 'a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.'[36] Beyond the existence of the EUMC's position within the Council structure, a much broader military epistemic community among high-ranking officials exists. The EUMC may just be at the core of this wider network. At the same time, the military profession is a product of centuries of evolution, Member States have a lot more experience dealing with military operations, and NATO has served as a strong model for recent multilateralism in this field. In contrast, Civcom is a transgovernmental committee that does not quite reach the status of an epistemic community, but it is forging

36. Peter M. Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,' *International Organization,* vol. 46, no. 1, 1992, p. 3.

new ground. Civilian crisis management does not yet benefit from large national structures to support the activities in Brussels. From this standpoint, different countries are pursuing a variety of options in developing stronger civilian capabilities, depending on their size, legislative and institutional framework and crisis management culture. Yet, Civcom is likely to play an increasingly visible role with the growth of ESDP and the realisation that civilian operations contribute greatly to the value-added of the EU's actions globally.

Given the newness of ESDP, exploring what drives Brussels-based committees in practice is useful in understanding outcomes of security cooperation. Moreover, as civilian-military coordination (CMCO) moves forward, the current gap between the EUMC and Civcom may become narrower. Mutual understanding will be important. ESDP will certainly face many challenges on the horizon, including intermittent political will, smaller defence budgets, and operational overstretch. It is clear, however, that if anything, transgovernmental committees such as the EUMC and Civcom serve to alleviate these tensions and shortcomings, finding solutions and achieving compromise that might have not otherwise been found.

Annex

Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHOD	Chief of Defence
Civcom	Civilian Crisis Management Committee
CMCO	Civilian-Military Coordination
Coreper	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
DGE	Directorate General
EDA	European Defence Agency
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMS	EU Military Staff
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PSC	Political and Security Committee

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