EU support to African security architecture: funding and training components

Nicoletta Pirozzi
The Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)

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Summary

This Occasional Paper aims at analysing the EU’s support to the emerging African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), focusing on financial and training aspects. During the last few years, African countries have multiplied their efforts at consolidating regional integration and developing common mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. At the same time, EU-Africa relations have significantly improved and led to the establishment of a strengthened political dialogue and enhanced cooperation. Nevertheless, the full implementation of the EU-Africa partnership in peace and security is still hampered by a series of contradictions and significant constraints in the EU’s approach, shortcomings in its coordination with the international community, and huge deficiencies on the African side.

The first chapter is dedicated to the rationale, structures and principles of the emerging African Peace and Security Architecture: it retraces the main ingredients of the discourse that led to its establishment, analyses its structures, norms, capacities and procedures, and finally highlights its critical weaknesses. These elements constitute the parameters within which the appropriateness and effectiveness of the EU’s approach in its support to the APSA may be assessed.

The EU’s approach is firstly investigated, in the second chapter of this paper, in its institutional and financial aspects, disclosing a rather complex and fragmented framework of interaction, characterised by various instances of dialogue, a broad array of actors involved, different cooperation agreements and corresponding financial instruments, as well as geographic compartmentalisation. Particular attention is devoted to the main tool created by the EU to specifically support African peace and security efforts, the African Peace Facility (APF), the purpose for which it was designed and its actual use, the evaluation of the initiatives financed so far, and the cooperation and overlap with other resources within the EU. Perspectives for improvement in the next phase of the APF are identified, including better coordination with other African partners, especially in the G8 and UN framework.
The third chapter is entirely dedicated to the EU’s support to APSA in the field of training, both for headquarters and field personnel. This derives from the recognition of the pivotal importance of a sustainable capacity-building process within the AU, which not only requires financial support, but also the transfer of expertise and know-how. The EU could deliver a real added value in this sector, but its actions must be directed towards the appropriate targets, identified through an inclusive needs assessment and with a strong emphasis on African contributions. Possibilities for information sharing, coordination and cooperation with other players that are active in the same field must also be identified and promoted.

The paper concludes with policy recommendations, which aim to encourage enhanced EU support to African peace and security through a more realistic, coordinated and forward-looking approach.
Introduction: EU-Africa cooperation in peace and security

In the last few years, Euro-Africa relations have been characterised by the progressive development of a continent-to-continent dialogue based, at least in terms of the declared principles, on a consensus on common values, common interests and common strategic objectives. This has been reflected in practice in the gradual Europeanisation of the bilateral means of assistance and cooperation inherited from the post-colonial period and the increasing interaction between the two regional organisations that regroup European countries and African countries, the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU) respectively. Moreover, the political dimension of the EU-Africa relationship, with peace and security issues at its heart, has been significantly strengthened and the African ownership of policies and actions has been embraced as a guiding principle.

This shift in EU-Africa relations has been reflected in a series of landmark steps: the first EU-Africa Summit held in Cairo in 2000, the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa and the new Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted in December 2007.

Nevertheless, the EU’s approach to African peace and security still suffers from a series of contradictions: the rhetoric of partnership between equals has been challenged by the inadequacy of AU capabilities and the need for material support by the EU; the rhetoric of solidarity towards the African continent has been overshadowed by the pursuit of the EU Member States’ own security and economic interests; the rhetoric of dialogue has been put into question by the EU’s tendency to project its normative power and promote its own values and agenda in its relationship with the African continent.

The relevance of the policy issues at stake for both the EU and Africa urges the actors involved to go beyond declarations of well-formulated concepts and look at concrete opportunities for cooperation. These issues encompass peace, security, development, democracy, governance, human rights, migration and terrorism.

In order to address them, a series of structures and mechanisms have been
created in Africa, at both continental and sub-regional level. The main steps of this process can be identified in the establishment of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) in 1999, the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and the replacement of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) by the African Union in 2002. Most importantly, a new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is in the process of being developed.

The EU has established and consolidated its role as one of the major partners of the AU in the development of these structures and mechanisms. Nevertheless, significant constraints within the EU, different priorities among EU Member States, shortcomings in its coordination with the international community, and huge deficiencies on the African side still hamper the full implementation of this partnership.

The establishment of the APSA: the imperatives of unity, non-indifference and ownership

The emergence of an African architecture to address the major security challenges in the continent is guided by three main imperatives: ‘Africa must unite’, the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and ‘try Africa first’.

Pan-Africanism represented a driving force in the decolonisation movement and provided the impetus for the creation of the OAU. The multiple problems faced by contemporary Africa have renewed the debate on the overriding need for unity. The dominant view is that a divided and marginalised Africa is not able to respond to the challenge of globalisation and the complex threats of wars, civil conflicts, terrorist activities, disease, economic crisis, poverty and underdevelopment.¹

The poor performance and the limited results in peace and security achieved so far through regional integration have led to the creation of a new organisation, the AU, and the increasing attention paid to the security aspects of the pan-African project.² This has been concretised in the provision of Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the AU, which sets the promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent as an objective of the Union.³

However, the outcome of recent AU summits still raises doubts and reservations about African leaders’ political will to fully implement this mandate and to devote the necessary resources to the cause of multilateralism. The Accra summit of July 2007 showed that strong disagreements persist

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2. Ibid.
about the end goal of the integration process. The AU summit held in Sharm-el-Sheikh in June-July 2008 revealed striking divisions over the handling of the crisis in Zimbabwe, and African leaders refrained from criticising reelected Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe outright in the final resolution.

The second tenet of the new African peace and security approach is embedded in Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act, which recognises, together with the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State ‘in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’. This provision crystallises the shift from a logic of non-interference, which characterised and indeed paralysed the conduct of the OAU, to a stance of non-indifference and the institutionalisation of the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle. Nevertheless, some doubts persist as to whether this principle has been fully internalised by AU Member States, as demonstrated by their refusal to invoke Article 4 in relation to the crisis in Sudan, Darfur.

Thirdly, the concept of providing ‘African solutions to African problems’ underlines the identity dimension of security issues in Africa. This approach is perceived as part of the ‘African renaissance’ during the twenty-first century, defined as the African Century by former South African President Thabo Mbeki. This refers to the revival and renewal of the continent through the maximum use of its resources, both human and natural, and the imperative for Africa to assume responsibility for its own future. However, it also derives from external factors, such as the progressive disengagement of external actors from Africa during the 1990s, due both to the loss of Africa’s strategic interest that followed the demise of the

9. See David J. Francis, op. cit. in note 1.
bipolar East-West confrontation and the failure of UN-led interventions in responding to African crises.\textsuperscript{10}

The emergence of assertive regionalism, in particular the use of economic groupings in Africa as structures for regional peace and security, provides an example of how the concept of African ownership has been applied. However, the possibility for Africa to offer its own solutions to the many challenges it faces ultimately depends on its capacity to develop adequate capabilities, institutional mechanisms and political engagement to implement effective actions.

\section*{Operationalising the APSA}

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) can be defined as a complex of norms, structures, capacities and procedures established in order to enable the AU to carry out its new tasks in the field of peace and security. The collective policy framework for African defence and security is contained in the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), adopted in February 2004.\textsuperscript{11} The Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, agreed in July 2002, defines the APSA components that are meant to implement it.\textsuperscript{12}

The establishment of the APSA can be considered as a major breakthrough in the development of African capabilities to address peace and security challenges in the continent. However, existing and emerging structures at continental and sub-regional level cannot be considered as a panacea for African problems. The real challenge for African security is how to operationalise them and translate all the normative intentions embedded in the APSA into practical realities.

The objective to build up collective efforts on conflict prevention and management interventions entails serious political, financial and socio-economic difficulties for AU Member States, a large number of which are


\textsuperscript{11} See Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), adopted by the Heads of State and Government of Member States of the African Union, Sirte, Libya, 28 February 2004. It not only identifies common principles, values, objectives and goals, but also elaborates common defence and security concepts and defines common internal and external security threats.

AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA)

Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHSG)

Peace and Security Council (PSC)

AU Commission

Peace and Security Directorate (PSD)

Military Staff Committee (MSC)

Peace Support Operation Division (PSOD)

Secretariat to the PSD

Conflict Management Division (CMD)

Continental Early-Warning System (CEWS)

Panel of the Wise (PoW)

Regional Economics Communities (RECs)/mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution (RMs)

Regional Brigades (RBs)

African Stand-by Force (ASF)

Special Fund/Peace Fund
among the poorest and least developed countries in the world. Recent experiences have demonstrated that the APSA still suffers from inadequate implementation of the mechanisms envisaged, resource deficiencies in terms of funding, staffing and logistics, lack of synergy between continental and regional structures, and imbalances between and within regional arrangements.

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the ‘standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts’ and is in charge of wide-ranging responsibilities. However, it operates without the support of dedicated working groups and relies on an under-staffed Secretariat established within the Peace and Security Directorate (PSD) of the AU Commission. The PSD is headed by the Commissioner for Peace and Security and consists of a Secretariat to assist the PSC and two Divisions, a Conflict Management Division (CMD) and a Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD).

The operationalisation of the Panel of the Wise (PoW), designed to support the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission particularly in the area of conflict prevention, had to be delayed until the end of 2007, mainly due to lack of office space and human and financial resources.

The Military Staff Committee (MSC), composed of Senior Military Officers of the members of the PSC, is tasked to advise and assist the PSC in all military and security questions. However, the non-adoption of its rules of procedures, human resources deficiencies in the PSOD, the absence of Attachés de défense in many Member States’ embassies in Addis Ababa.

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13. See ibid, Art. 7.
14. See Audit of the African Union, submitted by the High Level Panel to the President of the African Union on 27 December 2007, pp. 99-100. The Commission is the Secretariat of the AU and it is composed of the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson, eight Commissioners (each responsible for a portfolio) and staff members.
15. The CMD is composed of an Early Warning Unit and a Conflict Management and Resolution and Post Conflict Unit. The PSOD comprises two units, an Operations and Support Unit and an African Stand-by Force and Military Staff Committee Unit. It oversees the strategic and operational aspects of the AU’s peacekeeping operations.
16. See Audit of the African Union, op. cit. in note 14, p. 100. The PoW is composed of five highly respected African public figures, one for each African region, who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent. The PoW has decided to undertake, each year, a thematic reflection on an issue relevant to conflict prevention: for 2008, it focused on election-related crises and tensions.
and the irregularity of its meetings have prevented it from carrying out its tasks effectively.\textsuperscript{18}

The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is a conflict anticipation and prevention tool consisting of a central observation and monitoring centre called Situation Room (SR) and regional units.\textsuperscript{19} It is planned to be fully operational by the end of 2009.\textsuperscript{20}

The Situation Room has been established in the Conflict Management Division within the Commission, but currently has only eight assistants, while developments at regional level still show significant imbalances (See Annex 1).\textsuperscript{21} Links between the SR in Addis Ababa and regional units need to be reinforced through a system of regular exchange of data, but also by sharing and co-developing conflict assessments and policy options. The creation of AU-RECs liaison offices at the AU headquarters and joint meetings on issues of mutual concern can help in this direction. Another key step is the reporting and interaction with decision-makers, particularly the Chairperson of the Commission and the PSC, in order to make them able to translate early warning into early action. Of course, this implies the political will of decision-makers to use the information received and promptly intervene in crisis situations.

Crucial factors that affect the functioning of peace and security structures within the AU have been the fact that the culture of continental integration is still at an embryonic stage, the lack of clarity on the lines of authority and the institutional fragmentation. A significant obstacle in the establishment of a well-functioning internal organisation is the inefficient recruitment process, due to a number of factors: centralisation of the system, application of the quota criteria, lengthy decision-making procedures, inadequate advertisement of the vacancies, proliferation of short-term contracts, and low salary levels that lead quality staff to leave

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} See Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, op. cit. in note 12, Art. 12(2).
\textsuperscript{20} See Framework for the Operationalisation of the Continental Early Warning System as adopted by Governmental Experts meeting on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention held in Kempton Park (South Africa) from 17 to 19 December 2006.
\textsuperscript{21} See Audit of the African Union, op. cit. in note 14, p. 101.
their posts for better-remunerated positions in other international organisations.22

Since 2003, the AU has entered into its operational phase and deployed missions in Burundi (AMIB), Sudan/Darfur (AMIS), Somalia (AMISOM), Central African Republic (FOMUC) and Comoros (AMISEC). However, the shortage of logistical capacity from within the continent has left AU-led PSOs at the mercy of non-African support, thus contributing to the slow rate of troop mobilisation and deployment of missions.23 External pressures for the deployment of AMISOM and the extension and upgrading of the initial six-month observer mandate of AMIS did not take into account the actual capabilities of the AU. In 2004, when AMIS first deployed to Darfur, headquarters personnel numbered just around two dozen. In 2007, the Strategic and Planning Management Unit for AMISOM had only eight out of 35 proposed staff.24

The AU is now engaged in a capacity-building process that is meant to overcome current shortfalls and is seeking to enhance its ability to deliver effective responses to conflicts, namely through its 2010 goals for the African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF will be composed of a central headquarters located at the AU Commission and sub-regional structures, including stand-by multidisciplinary contingents with civilian, police and military components, and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.25 It is aimed at enabling the AU to carry out PSOs decided on by the PSC and interventions authorised by the Assembly.26 By June 2010, the AU should develop the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, validated by a Command Post Exercise. For the time being, AU structures can count on a staff of just nine people for planning and deployment of PSOs and regional brigades are still not fully operational (See Annex 2).

22. Ibid, Chapter 11.
24. In the case of AMIS, this was exacerbated by problems related to the resistance by the Sudanese government to the deployment of non-African personnel, the unclear chain of command between the AU and UN and the lack of mission support capabilities, i.e. evacuation means. In the case of AMISOM, the extremely volatile situation in the field, the lack of AU willing troop-contributors and the tenuous UN support played a big role. See Katherine N. Andrews and Victoria K. Holt, ‘United Nations-African Union Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa’, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Issue Brief, August 2007.
26. See ibid, Art. 13(3) of the Protocol.
A Special Fund or Peace Fund has been created with the view to provide the
necessary financial resources for PSOs and other operational activities.27
However, only 6% of the already limited AU regular budget is allocated on
average to the Peace Fund. Moreover, a number of Member States have
difficulties in honouring their financial obligations, jeopardising efforts
to make AU institutions work effectively and maintaining them heavily
dependent on external funding. The contributions of AU Member States
to the Peace Fund amounted to an average of 1.9% of its total between
2004 and 2007. As a consequence, the reimbursement of states contribut-
ing contingents to PSOs by the AU has proved to be problematic.28

The PSD of the AU Commission has received a significant volume of
assistance from external partners, but there are constantly delays in its
spending and, consequently, in programme implementation.29 The rea-
sons for budgetary under-performance are both structural and manage-
rial, in particular as concern procurement procedures, strategic planning
and reporting cycles. Internal audit reports for 2005 and 2006 also cited
critical shortcomings in budget execution, expenditure controls and cash
management both at the headquarters and in AMIS.

The role of Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mecha-
nisms (RMs) is pivotal in the effective functioning of the overall security
architecture of the Union.30 However, there are problems related to the
fact that the five regions designated by the AU for the purposes of the
APSA do not correspond to the existing RECs: this determines regional
incoherencies and overlapping in terms of membership and structures.
A Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the area of peace
and security between the AU and the RECs/RMs was adopted in January
2008, but a lot more can be done to improve communication, coordina-
tion and harmonisation between the AU and RECs/RMs, as well as among
and within RECs/RMs themselves.

in note 12, Art. 21. For the year 2008, the AU approved a budget amounting to $140 million, of which $106.5
million assessed to Member States, $32.4 million earmarked for the programmes and secured from international
partners and $1.1 million financed from arrears.
29. Ibid, p. 147.
in note 12, Art. 16.
These observations suggest that it is of the utmost importance for both Africans and their international partners to be extremely realistic about what can be achieved in the short- and mid-term by relatively young organisations, mechanisms and operational forces. Building effective security capacity in Africa will take time, and external actors should not make the mistake of considering it as a quick exit strategy from engagement in Africa.\(^{31}\) They must instead explore longer-term capacity building options in order to make the African peace and security architecture more independent and self-sustainable.

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2. The EU’s support to the APSA: institutional and financial aspects

In order to assess the EU’s support to AU peace and security initiatives, a series of elements must be taken into account: the structures and mechanisms designed by the EU to interact with the APSA, the cooperation agreements and financial instruments established, the destination and use of the funds, the coordination with other donors and funding sources. From all this emerges a highly complicated framework of interaction, which risks reducing and distorting the impact of the human and financial resources devoted to it.

The EU’s interface with APSA: structures and mechanisms

The Joint Africa-EU Partnership, adopted in Lisbon in December 2007, has laid the foundation of a long-term strategic partnership based on a shared vision and common principles. The Strategy’s First Action Plan outlines eight sectors of cooperation for the period 2008-2010, the first of which refers to peace and security.32

In order to make this strategic partnership work, an ongoing Africa-EU dialogue takes place in various institutional frameworks and at different levels:

a. Africa-EU summits, held every three years;

b. periodical ministerial-level meetings;33

c. in October 2008 the first joint meeting between the EU PSC and the AU PSC took place in Brussels, followed by the first Africa-EU Defence Ministers meeting in November 2008;

33. These usually involve: on the AU side, foreign ministries from the country holding the AU presidency and the country that held it previously plus the AU Commission (AUC); on the EU side, foreign ministries from the country holding the EU presidency and the country that will hold the next presidency plus the European Commission (EC) and the EU Council Secretariat.
d. annual College-to-College meetings between the EC and the AUC. AU and EU Commissioners with similar portfolios also meet regularly on a bilateral basis and staff from both Commissions meet twice a year (alternately in Europe and Africa) as a Joint Task Force to review sectoral and institutional cooperation;

e. contacts and meetings between ad hoc delegations from the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament;

f. a Europe-Africa Policy Research Network (EARN), which brings together European and African non-governmental research institutions with the aim of providing independent political analysis;

g. an AU representation to the EU in Brussels and an EU Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa, which are meant to ensure ongoing dialogue;

h. Joint Expert Groups created to implement the eight areas for strategic partnership, involving AU and EU representatives.

Within the EU, relations with Africa in the field of peace and security are addressed by a number of bodies and actors, operating in different institutions. In the EU Council, responsibilities for African peace and security firstly involve the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which exercises an overall political control and strategic direction. The Committee on civilian aspects of crisis management (CIVCOM), the DG E IX of the Council Secretariat and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) are concerned with civilian aspects, while the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the Politico-Military Group (PMG) and the DG E VIII take care of the military component. There is a dedicated working group dealing with Africa (COAFR) and doing preparatory work for PSC opinions, and an Africa Unit is located in DG E V of the EU Council Secretariat.

In the European Commission, DG Development (DEV) and DG External Relations (RELEX) are both in charge of policy formulation for Africa, but DG DEV is only responsible for ACP countries (which exclude North African states), while DG AIDCO is responsible for policy implementation. A Commission Africa inter-service task force has been created in order to ensure better coherence and synergy between different DGs and among the eight priority areas.
Eight Implementation Teams – composed by the EC, the EU Council Secretariat and particularly committed EU Member States – have been set up for each of the eight partnerships and form the EU component of the Joint Expert Groups. The work of the Implementation Team (IT) dealing with peace and security is facilitated by the EU Council Secretariat and is organised in line with the three priority actions identified in the Action Plan: priority no. 1 (dialogue) is led by the European Commission and the EU Presidency; the priority no. 2 (APSA) is led by France (military aspects) and Italy (civilian and police aspects); priority no. 3 (PSOs’ funding) is led by the Commission and the United Kingdom. The work of the IT on peace and security has just started, but EU Member States have already showed significant commitment, even if at different degrees and on different aspects. The EU-AU Joint Expert Group on peace and security is still in the process of being set up.

With a view to help streamline the links with the AU, the EU has recently appointed Koen Vervaeke as both EU Special Representative (EUSR) to the AU and Head of the EC Delegation (HoD) in Addis Ababa, thereby combining the representation of both the Council and the Commission. One of the sections in the EC Delegation in Addis Ababa specifically deals with peace and security. However, the ability of the EUSR/HoD to combine EU instruments and ensure a coherent approach towards Africa would considerably improve if he could exercise greater autonomy in programming and managing funds. Moreover, it would be helpful to better define the respective tasks and responsibilities of the EUSR/HoD and the Special Advisor for African peacekeeping capabilities, appointed in February 2008 with the mandate to coordinate all related activities in the Council Secretariat.36

These different EU bodies and actors are in charge of the daily interface with the AU peace and security structures: they can be defined as the EU Architecture for Peace and Security in Africa (EU APSA).

34. On the African side, it would include Algeria (as chef de file) Ethiopia, Morocco, Uganda, Burundi, Gabon, Egypt and Cameroon and is under the responsibility of the Department of Peace and Security of the AU Commission.


36. For the time being, the Special Advisor has focused on mobilising EU Member States’ resources, managing the Brussels end, and stimulating African RECs and key countries in view of a more active participation in the EU-led process. The EUSD/HoD is far more involved at the political level on the Addis Ababa side, both conducting dialogue with the AU institutions and the main African actors and implementing support measures for the AU.
EU Architecture for Peace and Security in Africa (EU APSA)
This architecture is extremely complex and fragmented and could significantly hamper the development of a coherent and straightforward interaction with the AU. It is complicated even further by the bilateral interventions by EU Member States. In order to foster a more coherent continent-to-continent approach, in line with the recently adopted Joint Strategy, Africa-related working arrangements both within the EU Council and the EC should be urgently and effectively rationalised.

### Setting the APSA in motion: the African Peace Facility (APF) and other financial support

Beyond the complexity of the inter-institutional dialogue, EU relations with Africa are characterised by different frameworks for partnership and cooperation in addition to the new Joint Africa-EU Strategy. The latter coexists and overlaps with pre-existing arrangements such as the Cotonou Partnership Agreement for Sub-Saharan countries, the European Neighbourhood Policy for North Africa states, and the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement with South Africa. Moreover, a series of actions and operations are conducted by the EU in the African continent – autonomously, in support to AU-led operations or as a contribution to UN operations – in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

These frameworks correspond to different financial instruments, which include the African Peace Facility (APF), the European Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), the Instrument for Stability (IfS), and the CFSP budget. Separated and fragmented financial procedures imply higher transaction costs and a time-consuming decision-making process, considerably jeopardising the process of interaction between the EU and its African counterparts.

This picture is further complicated by EU Member States’ financial support, provided on a bilateral basis or in the framework of ESDP actions.

Bilateral activities of EU Member States in the field of peace and security in Africa include the UK’s Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), an interdepartmental mechanism established in April 2001 in order to support conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Africa. It draws together resources and expertise of the Department for International Development.
(DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defence (MOD), with a budget of £62.8 million for 2007/2008. Priority countries for the ACPP are the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.

The French Directorate for Military and Defence Co-operation (DMDC) is in charge of the management of French structural cooperation in Africa: it disposes of a €90 million budget, 80% of which is earmarked for Sub-Saharan Africa. French support is mainly directed towards French-speaking African states and is implemented through constant military and defence cooperation, including the establishment of regionally-oriented schools (ENVRs) that provide technical and tactical training to African personnel and the Reinforcement of the African Peacekeeping Capabilities Programme (RECAMP).

An Italian African Peace Facility (IAPF) was established by an agreement between the AU Commission and the Italian Government at the margin of the Africa-EU Summit in December 2007, with a total amount of €40 million to support the implementation of the AU peace and security agenda.37 The IAPF was originally designed to focus on regions of particular concern to Italy in Africa, with special attention to the Horn of Africa. Discussions are underway for the financing of five new projects and possibly other initiatives in the framework of the Africa-EU peace and security partnership.38

Belgium is particularly active in Central Africa, and in particular in the former Belgian colony of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), through a series of military cooperation activities implemented by the Belgian Defence Ministry. In 2006, Portugal established a programme for the support of peace missions in Africa called PAMPA, which aims to strengthen Portugal’s cooperation with African Portuguese-speaking countries (PALOP) to enable them to develop their crisis management capacities.

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37. Three Projects have been implemented so far, for a total amount of €6 million, aimed at enhancing the security, police and institutional capacity of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, which is one of the two priority areas for the IAPF (together with Sudan).

38. These projects would focus on: support to the PoW in order to foster conflict prevention and peacemaking efforts; operationalisation of the AU Liaison offices in Khartoum and Juba, aimed at contributing to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan; implementation of the AU Border Programme, dealing with border delimitation and demarcation, cross border cooperation and capacity building; strengthening the AU Commission capacity for preventing and combating terrorism; support to the operationalisation of the ASF by financing components of the ASF training plan.
EU Member States’ policies on Africa are diverse: they respond to different historical legacies, economic interests and political priorities. Some EU Member States have specific interests and policies on certain African countries, thus making coordination and complementarity within the European framework not always easy. This risks negatively affecting the coherence of EU Africa policy and making it difficult to involve those EU Member States that do not have such a strong interest in the African continent, like Germany or the Central and Eastern European countries.

**Improving the African Peace Facility (APF) and ensuring coordination with other resources within the EU**

Some developments in the direction of a more coherent EU support to the African peace and security agenda have been achieved through the African Peace Facility (APF), which was established in 2004 following a request of African leaders in order to provide funding for African-led PSOs and capacity-building activities.³⁹

The APF is funded through the European Development Fund (EDF) under the Cotonou Agreement. This implies that the use of the APF is subject to significant limitations. First of all, it can be used to finance costs incurred by African countries in deploying their peacekeeping forces in Africa (cost of carrying troops, soldiers’ living expenses, development of capabilities, etc.), but under no circumstances to cover military and arms expenditures (including military training, EU military technical assistance, specific individual and collective equipment for the ASF, etc.).⁴⁰ This kind of expenditure has to be funded through other financial resources, in most cases by bilateral contributions from EU Member States. Concerning its geographical scope, North African countries and South Africa are not part of the Cotonou Agreement and are not eligible under its main financial instrument, the EDF: as a consequence, legal obstacles have so far prevented these states from co-financing the APF.

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³⁹. At the Maputo Summit in 2003, AU Heads of States and Governments proposed that a facility be set up from funds allocated to their countries through EU development cooperation agreements with Africa. See Assembly of the African Union, Decisions and Declarations, Assembly/AU/Dec.21 II), Decision on the Establishment by the European Union of a Peace Support Operation Facility for the African Union, Maputo, 10-12 July 2003.

⁴⁰. See Decision 2003/3 of the ACP/EC Council of Ministers of 11 December 2003 on the use of resources from the long-term development envelope of the ninth EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa.
An initial APF allocation of €250 million was foreseen under the 9th EDF (2000-07). These funds soon proved to be insufficient, mainly due to the financing of the AMIS mission, and the APF financial envelope had to be raised to €440 million by 2007. In this first phase, the bulk of the APF has been directed to the support of AU-led PSOs: the greatest part of these resources has been devoted to the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS, €305.6 million), the rest allocated to the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM, €15 million), the FOMUC mission to the Central African Republic (€33.4 million) and the AU mission in Comoros (AMISEC, €5 million), for a total of €349.5 million, that is 90% of the APF amount.

Only the remaining 10% of the APF has been allocated to capacity-building actions, amounting to €34.5 million, of which only €3.5 million have been spent by the AU so far. Among the activities planned to be financed through this component of the APF there are:

- €1 million to financing ASF workshops;
- €6 million to strengthening the role and leadership of the AU, mainly directed to finance the staff in the PSD. So far, only €1.6 million have been paid: due to major procedural obstacles within the AU Commission, only 11 personnel out of 40 have been recruited;
- €20 + 7.5 million to reinforcing institution building in the RECs, including administrative and financial staff, training, equipment for the EWS, ASF and Planning Elements Structures (PLANELMS), and coordination between AU headquarters and RECs through the establishment of liaison officers from RECs to Addis Ababa. This part is currently being implemented and is encountering a lot of difficulties. For the time being, 3 out of 5 liaison officers have been recruited.

For the period 2008-2010, the APF initiative has been expanded, by allocating €300 million under the Intra-ACP Indicative Programme of

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41. Ibid. Of this, €126.4 million came from each African country’s contribution of 1.5% from its allocated envelope, while the remaining €123.6 million were transferred from unallocated resources (reserves) of the 9th EDF.
42. Additional funding to the original allocation was provided through four successive replenishments, the last of which relied on contributions from EU Member States (mostly Germany and France), as no more funds were available under the EDF.
the 10th EDF (2007-13). Some improvements have been designed for this phase. For example, additional contributions from EU Member States, exceptionally authorised in the last part of the previous phase, become a permanent feature in the new cycle: this means that no specific calls for contributions are needed anymore, thus simplifying the approval process and reducing the transaction costs.

In order to speed up the decision-making process when necessary and to inject funds faster, the new APF also includes an early response mechanism, which is aimed at financing activities such as fact-finding missions, preparation phase of missions, etc. It will rely on an ad hoc, shortened decision-making procedure: the overall envelope will be approved by the EU Council and agreed upon by the AU in advance and the agreement for disbursement of funds under this mechanism will be then completed through a simple exchange of letters between the AU, the EC and the EU Council.43

However, while helpful, these innovations do not involve the thorough overhaul of the instrument as it currently exists that would be necessary in order to achieve tangible improvements. Some of the main problems of the current APF functioning are likely to continue in the next phase, namely the exclusion of military expenditures from the APF budget, the limitations in its geographical scope, the lack of sufficient funding and the limited resources devoted to longer-term capacity building actions. Concerning expenditures with military implications, EU Member States will continue to contribute to them bilaterally, notably through their Ministry of Defence budgets. However, these budgets are already overstretched and the provision of adequate resources for African peacekeeping is at risk.

In order to address the shortage of resources, priority should be given to building bridges between the different agreements and related financial arrangements that exist between the EU and Africa. The restricted geographical scope of the APF and the legal obstacles to the combination with other instruments, namely the ENPI for North African countries and the DCI for South Africa, still remain major obstacles.

43. For an overview of the usual APF procedure, see Annex 3.
This has been confirmed by the legal objections advanced by the EU Council to a proposal made by South Africa to transfer €7.7 million from the EU budget to finance capacity-building activities under the APF. The European Commission has finally managed to overcome this impediment by complementing the €20 million APF resources with an amount of €7.5 million from the Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) for South Africa. Nevertheless, this has been an one-off arrangement and no new mechanisms are foreseen in this direction. The European Commission is currently looking for a similar stratagem to fund additional initiatives, and specifically the support to a training centre in the Maghreb region, through the ENPI for the Mediterranean states, but no action has been implemented so far.

There are some examples of effective coordination between the APF and the Instrument for Stability (IfS): in 2007, €5 million from the IfS have been used to finance the Strategic Planning Unit for AMISOM, as the APF was out of money.\(^4^4\) The decision to establish an early response mechanism under the new APF is liable to result in new overlapping with the IfS: a streamlined interaction between the two instruments based on the clarification of the respective targeting would have probably proved more effective, while avoiding unnecessary duplications.

The lack of sufficient funding can be also addressed by ensuring better coordination with other initiatives at the national level. Resources coming from EU Member States – such as the ACPP in the UK, the DMDC in France and the IAPF in Italy – could increasingly contribute to the activities foreseen under the peace and security partnership.\(^4^5\)

Concerning the destination of funds, the bulk of the next APF, corresponding to a total of €200 million, will be again directed towards the support to AU-led PSOs. The share of resources devoted to capacity building will

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44. However it is worth mentioning that these funds were meant to allow the recruitment of 37 staff over a period corresponding to AMISOM deployment, but only 5 people were recruited in 9 months.

45. Italy is currently rethinking its IAPF and considering the possibility to fund initiatives in the framework of the Africa-EU peace and security partnership, for example activities related to the development of African civilian and police capacities, for which Italy has taken the lead within the Implementation Team. As for France and the UK, during a bilateral meeting in June 2006 they agreed to strengthen their bilateral cooperation within the European framework, while continuing to support existing arrangements with African countries and working alongside other actors. In the last few years, France has shown a tendency towards the Europeanisation of its activities in Africa, which would allow both to reduce the costs of French engagement in the continent and to gain a European legitimacy for French interventions. The British seem less convinced of the need to have a European label on their bilateral programmes, which they consider very efficient, and insist more on the necessity to meet African rather than EU requirements.
slightly increase, reaching €65 million. These funds will be mainly used to finance African training centres and develop strategic transport capabilities within the AU. Only €7 million will be allocated to audit, monitoring, technical assistance, lessons learned and visibility, while €13 million will be earmarked for contingencies.

It seems that lessons learned from the previous APF cycle have not been fully integrated in the new financial planning. Past experiences, including AMIS and AMISOM, have shown that concrete actions are needed in order to address shortcomings such as shortage of headquarters personnel, inefficient procurement mechanisms, weak financial management, lack of transparency on allocation of funds, and inadequate reporting procedures. The capacity-building element of the APF is still weak: it has to be reinforced through additional funding and longer-term approach, based on clear needs assessments concerning human resources, expertise, material resources, and institutional organisation. Priority should be given to financial and human resources management within the AU Commission, without neglecting resources for PSOs planning, management and assessment.

It should also be recalled that PSOs in this context describes a wide range of interventions, from conflict prevention to peacebuilding, through military peace enforcement. In this perspective, civilian conflict prevention initiatives and peacemaking efforts, including the Early Warning System and the Panel of the Wise, reconstruction and consolidation activities to ensure sustainable peace after conflicts and civilian crisis management, need to be significantly reinforced.

A key area for improvement concerns support to a balanced development of regional mechanisms, as well as the reinforcement of their communication and cooperation with the AU. In this perspective, the EU could make a better use of other instruments at its disposal, such as the Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) under the EDF: a series of regional initiatives in the field of peace and security could be directly and effectively financed through this means, thus complementing the initiatives taken under the APF.
**Coordinating international financial support**

The last few years have witnessed a significant increase of external funding to African peace and security initiatives. However, the huge amounts of money pledged by international donors have met major shortcomings in the AU’s absorption capacity. Uncoordinated proliferation of external offers further exacerbates AU deficiencies, creating overlapping while leaving some crucial areas uncovered, and at the same time making it difficult for the African counterparts to set priorities for action.

The effectiveness of international support to African structures and operations also resides in the ability of external actors to design concerted and coherent strategies of intervention. One concrete example is related to reporting procedures: currently there are more than 130 different contributions channelled to the AU, each with its own reporting requirements. A standardised format for reporting on expenditures established by external partners would considerably lighten the burden and transaction costs on the AU.

For the EU, it is of crucial importance to further explore mechanisms of coordination and cooperation with its international partners, moving beyond policy dialogue and focusing on concrete opportunities for fruitful interaction. One new instance to be developed is the triangular dialogue between the EU, China and Africa that has been proposed by the European Commission and supported by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) in its conclusions of November 2008.46

One of the frameworks in which the EU could adopt a more proactive stance is the G8. An African Action Plan has been adopted by the G8 in Kananaskis in 2002 and a Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations has been agreed between G8 and key African leaders at Evian in 2003, with the aim of providing a focus for the cooperative efforts of external partners in supporting African capacity-building initiatives.47 However, the follow-up process has been rather poor.

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The EU is bearing the burden of the G8 aid pledges to Africa and should make a better use of this leverage, in close partnership with African partners. This should primarily imply an active support to the constant involvement of representatives of the AU and key African countries in G8 discussions and decisions, even beyond African issues. More specifically, the EU should concentrate on the G8++ Africa Clearing House, which regroups representatives from G8 countries, the AU, the EU, the UN and other donors – including Scandinavian countries, China and others. This is the most inclusive framework in which donors to Africa can come together, exchange information on their respective activities and look at ways for improving coordination and cooperation.

In parallel to EU efforts, the UN is in the process of exploring options to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of resources for AU peacekeeping operations mandated by the Security Council. Based on Security Council Resolution 1809, an AU-UN Panel on Peacekeeping was appointed in September 2008 with the mandate to consider in-depth modalities to support AU peacekeeping efforts, in particular start-up funding, equipment and logistics.  

This process moved from the recognition that funding for regional peacekeeping usually relies on voluntary contributions by UN Member States: it remains *ad hoc*, uncoordinated and depends on the vagaries of donor financing. In order to improve this system, the AU-UN Panel recommends the establishment of two new financial instruments.

The first instrument is based on UN-assessed contributions through both the regular and peacekeeping budgets, which would be more predictable sources of funding. However, the AU-UN Panel recommends the use of these only on a case-by-case basis to cover operational mission requirements. Moreover, this kind of support would be limited to SC-authorised AU interventions and for a period of up to six months, after which the UN would take over the mission. This means that such an arrangement would be excluded when it is either unclear if there will be a transition to the UN, or the SC is undecided. It also implies that any proposal by the AU for the

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48. See United Nations Security Council, ‘Peace and Security in Africa’, S/RES/1809, April 2008. The AU-UN Panel is chaired by Romano Prodi (Italy) and includes James Dobbins (USA), Jean-Pierre Halbwachs (Mautitius), Monica Juma (Kenya), Toshi Niwa (Japan), and Behrooz Sadry (Iran).

use of assessed contributions must be accompanied by oversight and financial accountability mechanisms that have to respond to stringent UN requirements.\textsuperscript{50}

The second instrument proposed by the Panel is a multi-donor trust fund that would finance an AU Comprehensive Plan for long-term capacity building.\textsuperscript{51} The idea is to establish a flexible and responsive funding mechanism that would attract contributions from UN Member States (not only traditional donors such as EU countries, the US and Japan, but also China, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Turkey) intergovernmental organisations and other sources, including the private sector.\textsuperscript{52}

Regarding logistics, the Panel recommends that the AU considers alternatives to stockpiling large quantities of equipment such as commercial multi-function contracts (LOGCAPS).\textsuperscript{53}

The complexity of the task assigned to the Panel contrasts with the limited resources and timeframe foreseen for its implementation. However, the follow-up process could represent a great opportunity to stimulate a wider dialogue between international actors on how to improve their support to the AU peacekeeping capabilities, looking at possibilities of complementarity and interaction with already existing funding mechanisms, particularly with the APF.

\textsuperscript{50} See ‘Report of the African Union – United Nations Panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations’, op. cit. in note 50.


\textsuperscript{52} See Opening Remarks by the South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sue Van der Merwe at the Roundtable Discussion with Members of the AU/UN Panel, 27 October 2008, Pretoria.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
3. The EU’s support to the APSA: training aspects

In line with the principles of the Joint Strategy, the primary responsibility for the EU and the international community is to support AU efforts in developing its own sustainable capabilities in the field of peace and security. In this context, beyond the development of the AU’s structural and procedural capacity, there is the need for appropriate training. Having well-trained civilian and military personnel is crucial to make the AU able to plan, manage and conduct peacekeeping missions, to carry out mediation and negotiation activities, and to implement preventive and post-conflict actions.

It must be recognised that the EU itself is currently experiencing significant constraints in the design and implementation of training activities, especially in the civilian field. Nevertheless, training has been identified as a priority in the EU’s support to the operationalisation of the APSA and the implementation of targeted actions in this field could really improve African capability development.

This firstly implies working with African continental and sub-regional institutions to develop concrete needs assessments. Relevant work has already been carried out by the AU concerning ASF training: documents on the ASF Training Policy, the ASF Training Standards and the ASF Evaluation and Validation, including the role of Centres of Excellence, were produced in 2006. The PSOD is currently proposing to carry out an ASF Training Needs Analysis (TNA) for the three components (military, civilian, police), based on the ECOWAS TNA model, UN and other organisations. Moving from the TNA, regional Centres of Excellence are mandated to conduct training and training evaluation, and validation of training in the ASF.54 However, this system is still in an early stage of implementation.

54. These Centres of Excellence must be designated by RECs to conduct tactical, operational and strategic levels of training in the various regions and be accredited at the AU level.
A further step would be the mapping of training activities already undertaken by African centres and various international actors (EU institutions and agencies, EU Member States, the US, the UN, NGOs, etc.), in order to avoid duplication of efforts and overlapping. Only on this basis, the EU could develop a sound and forward-looking strategy to support African capacity-building and the implementation of the ASF in particular. A series of possible options are explored in this chapter.

Training aspects of the EU’s support to APSA: assessment and prospects

Training African officers in AU and RECs structures

As underlined in the analysis above, AU and RECs institutions lack qualified personnel to perform a number of specific tasks. The EU could support African headquarters capacity by reinforcing military and civilian training for PSOD and RECs personnel, in order to improve their expertise in planning and conducting PSOs, and particularly in the sectors that have shown the greatest gaps: command and control, logistics, financial management and legal aspects. Technical support can be offered to African personnel in charge of the implementation of the Early Warning System (EWS) in the form of direct assistance and practical advice, notably in the development of an Open Source Information System. A structured cooperation should be established between the AU Situation Room and relevant bodies in the EU, namely the Situation Centres at the EU Council and Commission, the EC Joint Research Centre (EC-JRC) and the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC).

Supporting African training centres

With the objective of building up African own training capabilities, the EU has decided to focus on African training centres in peace and security with a regional dimension, which are active at the strategical, tactical and operational levels, and provide them with financial resources and technical assistance, including for a substantive civilian component.

In order to identify suitable African training centres, the EU required the AU to compile a list of potentially qualified institutions for European support. The first list of eleven training centres provided by the AU in
December 2007 was rejected by the EU on the grounds of geographical imbalances between sub-regional organisations, excessive concentration on the military component and on purely operational aspects, as well as due to political considerations. One year later, the finalisation of this list is still pending.

The EU could rely and further support existing networks of African peacekeeping training centres. An interesting example is the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA), which was established in Pretoria in 2002 and is composed of institutions involved in education and training related to peace operations. Even if not originally determined for the purpose of APSA operationalisation, APSTA member institutions already provide a wide range of capacity-building training and education programmes and courses: these activities could be usefully expanded and realigned to serve the training needs for APSA in a more focused manner.

Most of the African centres are oriented towards the military, although they offer some courses on the civilian aspects of crisis management, such as the police courses offered at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana. The civilian crisis management capability of AU and regional brigades remains underdeveloped at the conceptual and operational level. Thus, EU support should very much concentrate on developing the civilian dimension of African training centres.

Finally, the EU should aim at maintaining a balance between the five sub-regions identified by the APSA. Some African training centres are well-established institutions that are provided with significant external financial support. EU funding should focus on those regions and training centres that are still underdeveloped and that do not receive sufficient funding from the international community, paying particular attention to Central Africa and North Africa.

55. For example, the list included three centres located in West Africa (the Kofi Annan Centre in Ghana, École militaire in Nigeria, École du Maintien de la Paix in Mali) and only one in Central Africa (Cameroon). Moreover, civilian aspects and background functions (logistics, administration, financial management, etc.) were not taken in due consideration. Finally, one of the training centres identified in the list is located in Zimbabwe.

56. For example, the Kofi Annan Centre in Ghana is already generously financed by Germany, Canada, the UK, France, Italy, Norway and the USA. The UK also finances the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) and the International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) in Kenya, as well as the Mali Peacekeeping School. France contributes to the establishment and development of 14 Écoles Nationales à Vocation Régionale (ENVR) for military training in 8 African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo).
Coordinating training to African personnel in Europe

One of the actions identified by the EU is the coordination among European training programmes involving African personnel and creation of poles of excellence.\(^\text{57}\) This would imply a preliminary survey of relevant training activities within the EU framework, including training provided by EU-relevant agencies and by other actors (Member States, NGOs, the private sector). Training activities in Europe remain fragmented and uncoordinated and this survey would be highly beneficial also for EU actors.

For example, the European Police College (CEPOL) is currently implementing the Euromed Police II project, which aims to strengthen international police cooperation against major forms of organised crime and involves EU and MEDA countries. The European Group on Training (EGT), within the European Community Project for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, is currently developing training for civilian crisis management and stabilisation missions in Africa. Finally, a special role of coordination in the field of military training could be assigned to the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), which could accept African trainees.

EURO RECAMP/AMANI AFRICA

EURO RECAMP represents the Europeanisation of a ten-year bilateral project for military cooperation between France and ECOWAS, the Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix (RECAMP) initiative. It is now designed as a framework for cooperation between the EU and Africa, aimed at offering strategic-level training to African partners in both military and civilian fields and contributing to the operationalisation of the African Standby Force by 2010. Among its objectives, there is the support to the PSOD in the AU Commission to realise a Command Post Exercise at the continental level by 2010. It is financed through the APF and voluntary contributions by EU Member States (€20 million) and other actors, such as the US and Canada.

\(^{57}\) These include the Centre of Excellence for the Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Vincenza for police training, the Hungarian Defence Forces Peace Support Training Centre (HDF PSTC) in Szolnok, the Institut des Hautes Etudes pour la Défense nationale (IHEDN) in Paris, the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC) in Shrivenham.
EURO RECAMPE is subject to the control of the PSC and implemented by an international team, involving European and African representatives. For the first cycle, which was launched in November 2008, France acts as framework nation and relies on the Etat-major interarmées de Force et d’Entraînement in Creil (France). Even if African political control is foreseen, there is an unambiguously European stamp on the structure and functioning of the project. Giving a more genuinely and recognisably African character to the project, which would go beyond the renaming of the initiative as AMANI AFRICA to entail a greater African role in devising and driving the initiative, would contribute in a more effective manner to the appropriation of the process by the AU.

Training European personnel

Providing civilian and military expertise to the AU requires well-trained European personnel with an adequate knowledge of African realities, including a ‘do no harm’ approach,58 cultural awareness, and effective communication tools. Appropriate training activities for European personnel should be foreseen at the EU level, relying in particular on the experience gained in the field by NGOs and other non-governmental actors. A list of military and civilian personnel with an African background should be established and constantly updated by the EU for such activities. Moreover, frequent EU-AU joint courses and exercises would allow European personnel to benefit from African experiences in crisis management and related training activities. In this perspective, sharing of information and development of cooperation should be further encouraged.

Coordinating international initiatives in the field of training

A number of international actors have launched and implemented training activities for African personnel. For example, the Training for Peace programme, active since 1995 and funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has already trained thousands of military, police and civilian personnel to be deployed in peacekeeping missions. Recently,

58. The concept of ‘Do No Harm’ is based on the understanding that it is of pivotal importance to assess the potential impact of external interventions in the context of a conflict, and to adapt them accordingly, in order to avoid unintended negative outcomes, i.e. by imposing culturally inappropriate processes. See Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace – or War (Boulder, CA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, February 1999).
it has engaged with the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) in Nairobi to develop the police and civilian dimension for EASBRIG.

Through the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), the UK offers training to African personnel at continental, sub-regional and country level: for example, it provides financial and technical support to the PSOD of the AU Commission and is engaged in the development of the ECOWAS stand-by brigade and EASBRIG. It also conducts training activities in several African countries through more than 130 military personnel permanently based in Africa. Five permanent training teams are located in Sierra Leone, Kenya, South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria.

US activities in this field are also relevant and received a decisive boost under the Bush administration. The purpose of the US African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme is to prepare African troops to conduct complex operations in a hostile environment, possibly requiring offensive action. ACOTA packages are designed to equip the units trained under the programme and include a weapons component and all the equipment necessary for combat. This programme would usefully complement the strategic training activities implemented by the EU under EURO RECAMP/AMANI AFRICA with logistical and tactical aspects. The newly-created US military command for Africa, AFRICOM, is also intended to provide support to the ASF, in particular assuming sponsorship of the command and control infrastructure development and liaison officer support, as well as resourcing military mentors for peacekeeping training. These activities include reconnaissance, patrolling, maritime security, communications and other tactics.

The Multi-National Stand-By High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG), a multinational brigade that can be made available to the UN as a rapidly deployable peacekeeping force, has recently developed a system that can be used as a model for African standby forces and provides planning and expert team assistance. In 2006, the UN established a Peace and Support Team both at the UN Department of

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59. It was established in 1996 with a PLANELM located near Copenhagen (Denmark) and currently counts 16 members and 7 observers. The force consists of units from a number of Member States, trained to the same standard, using the same operating procedures and taking part in combined exercises at regular intervals: this should make the force available for deployment at short notice.
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York and at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa to help build long-term capacity for ASF and AU institutions. The UN component is designed to function as the focal point at the UN for building African peacekeeping capacities, while the African component is intended to develop African headquarters and field capacity for planning, deploying and managing peacekeeping missions. It also delivers logistics and financial advice. DPKO has also been involved in training exercises for African troops and police and provides technical advice for the enhancement of the AU’s Situation Room.

These initiatives are active at different levels and regarding various aspects of African capability development. Therefore, through adequate consultation and coordination mechanisms, they could prove to be mutually beneficial. The AU itself has identified a series of instruments to maximise their impact: organising joint training exercises involving Africans and international partners, conducting periodical consultations among AU, RECs, and international partners, creating a database of ongoing activities, and establishing a joint training review process, to ensure a common lessons learned process and validation procedures.

60. See Katherine N. Andrews and Victoria K. Holt, op. cit. in note 24.
Conclusion

African peace and security structures still present huge resource deficiencies in terms of funding, staffing and logistics. Poor financial and human resources management, together with lengthy procurement procedures, are the main cause of these difficulties. To this must be added the lack of synergy between continental and regional structures and imbalances between and within regional arrangements. Early warning mechanisms and peacekeeping capabilities are at the initial phase of development. Moreover, strategic ambiguity and lack of political will still prevent the AU from fully implementing its mandate, as demonstrated by the divided AU reactions to the crises in Sudan and Zimbabwe.

This suggests that the long-awaited goal of restoring control of the African continent back into the hands of its citizens must be based on a process of incremental appropriation by the Africans, a ‘partnership in ownership’ gradually achieved and with an emphasis on stable financial support and long-term capacity building initiatives. International donors must remain engaged in Africa, and plan and design their interventions more effectively. In particular, more coherent and coordinated external offers would help African stakeholders to establish priorities and reduce the transaction costs in their implementation. Existing mechanisms of consultation such as the G8++ Africa Clearing House, the AU-UN Panel on Peacekeeping and the triangular EU-China-Africa dialogue, must be further exploited to improve collaboration.

EU-Africa partnership must be improved through a real continent-to-continent dialogue, aimed at reinforcing the AU’s capabilities and leadership. Instances of interaction, financial instruments and implementation procedures must be unified and harmonised accordingly. In particular, the institutional mechanisms and the financial instruments created in the aftermath of the adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, namely the double-hatted EU Special Representative to the AU/Head of EC Delegation in Addis Ababa, the Implementation Team for Peace and Security and the Africa Peace Facility, must be enhanced and bridges with pre-existing frameworks of cooperation must be established.
Resources for the development of African capabilities must go beyond purely financial support. Improving training of African personnel can contribute enormously to implement effective responses for growing peacekeeping demands, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. The EU’s action should be focused on training African personnel to conduct specific tasks (financial management, early warning, PSOs planning) at headquarters level; supporting African training centres, with particular attention to underdeveloped sectors (civilian, police) and regions (Central and Northern Africa); coordinating training activities for African personnel at the EU level and with international actors; and training Europeans involved in African peace and security.

Ready-made solutions developed in a purely European framework cannot be the answer for the complex security situation of the African continent. At the same time, the EU cannot be relegated to the role of a mere payer of others’ initiatives. European and African stakeholders must embark on a more targeted and frank dialogue on strategic priorities in order to resolve this dichotomy and better guide policy formulation and implementation.

The development of a peaceful African continent is perceived as a moral imperative by the EU, in accordance with the guiding principles of its foreign policy. In the current context of growing international instability and interdependence, the EU should start to look at this objective more strategically, being aware of the threats deriving from African poverty, failing states and conflicts, but also of the potential of a more prosperous and powerful African continent, both as a neighbour and as a partner in multilateral fora.
### Annex 1: Regional economic communities, membership, regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution and regional early warning systems

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<th>Members</th>
<th>Regional Mechanisms on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution</th>
<th>Early Warning Systems</th>
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<tr>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)</td>
<td>Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Article 3(d) COMESA Treaty (1994) and Peace and Security Committee (2000)</td>
<td>Early Warning System addressing war economies, with focus on mineral resources, and terrorist activities (to be implemented)</td>
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<td>Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo</td>
<td>Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999)</td>
<td>ECOWAS Early Warning System (ECOWARN): Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) within the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and Security at the ECOWAS Commission + 4 zonal information and reporting bureaus located in Cotonou, Ouagadougou, Monrovia, Banjul + 15 focal points in Member States + 15 civil society focal points (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)</td>
<td>Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya</td>
<td>IGAD Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR)</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN): CEWARN Unit in Addis Ababa + 2 regional coordinating structures, the Technical Committee for Early Warning (TCEW) and the Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS) + Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs) in Member States, composed of both governmental and civil society representatives (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA)</td>
<td>Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia</td>
<td>Council for Common Defence (1990)</td>
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### ANNEX 2: Regional brigades, membership and current status*

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<td>Framework Document</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>PLANELM</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<td>Brigade HQ</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>Pledged Units</td>
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<td>YES</td>
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<td>Civilian Component</td>
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<td>ONGOING</td>
<td>ONGOING</td>
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<td>Centres of Excellence</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standby Roster</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>ONGOING</td>
<td>NO</td>
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*Source: Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria (South Africa), October 2008*
ANNEX 3: African Peace Facility (APF) Decision-Making*

Informal dialogue with potential implementing partners, monitoring of events, etc. ➔ Request from AU or an REC through the AU for support from the APF ➔ Initial consideration of request by COM-DG DEV ➔ Preparation of EDF brief and approval process ➔ Consideration by EU Member States in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) ➔ Internal COM consideration of request — DGs DEV/AIDCO/RELEX ➔ Preparation of Contribution Agreement (CA) by AIDCO with implementing partner

Possible advice from, for example, EUMC/COAFR ➔ Achieve appropriate UN support to the proposed mission (PSOs only)

COM decision ➔ CA signed ➔ 1st trench of funds released

Informal dialogue with potential implementing partners, monitoring of events, etc.

The entire decision-making process takes from 8 to 10 weeks.

*Source: European Commission, EuropeAid Co-operation Office, October 2008
ANNEX 4: Abbreviations

ACOTA  African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance
ACP  African, Carribean and Pacific (States)
ACPP  Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
AFRICOM  United States Africa Command
AMIB  African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS  African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISEC  African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros
AMISOM  African Union Mission to Somalia
APF  African Peace Facility
APSA  African Peace and Security Architecture
APSTA  African Peace Support Trainers Association
ASF  African Standby Force
AU  African Union
AUC  African Union Commission
CEWS  Continental Early Warning System
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC  Civil-Military Cooperation
CIVCOM  Committee on civilian aspects of crisis management
COAFR  African Working Group
CPCC  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
DCI  Development Cooperation Instrument
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DG AIDCO  Directorate General for Aid Cooperation
DG DEV  Directorate General for Development
DG RELEX  Directorate General for External Relations
DGs  Directorate Generals
DMDC  Directorate for Military and Defence Co-operation
DPKO  Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
EASBRICOM  Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism
EASBRIG  Eastern African Standby Brigade
EC  European Commission
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EDF  European Development Fund
<table>
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENVR</td>
<td>Écoles Nationales à Vocation Régionale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDC</td>
<td>European Security and Defence College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>EU Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOMUC</td>
<td>Force multinationale en Centrafrique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAPF</td>
<td>Italian African Peace Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF5</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Implementation Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILOBs</td>
<td>Military Observers</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Staff Committee</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLANELM</td>
<td>Planning Elements Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMG</td>
<td>Politico-Military Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoW</td>
<td>Panel of the Wise</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council (APSA) / Political and Security Committee (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Peace and Security Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOD</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOs</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSTC</td>
<td>Kenya Peace Support Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECAMP</td>
<td>Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMs</td>
<td>Regional Mechanisms</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Situation Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>Training Needs Analysis</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UN DPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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