Occasional Papers

n° **52** **May 2004**

Rosa Balfour

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

Institute **for S**ecurity **S**tudies
Institut **d' é**tudes **de S**écurité

European Union
Union Européenne

*In January 2002 the **Institute for Security Studies (ISS)** became a Paris-based autonomous agency of the European Union. Following an EU Council Joint Action of 20 July 2001, it is now an integral part of the new structures that will support the further development of the CFSP/ESDP. The Institute's core mission is to provide analyses and recommendations that can be of use and relevance to the formulation of EU policies. In carrying out that mission, it also acts as an interface between experts and decision-makers at all levels.*

Occasional Papers *are essays or reports that the Institute considers should be made available as a contribution to the debate on topical issues relevant to European security. They may be based on work carried out by researchers granted awards by the ISS, on contributions prepared by external experts, and on collective research projects or other activities organised by (or with the support of) the Institute. They reflect the views of their authors, not those of the Institute.*

*Publication of **Occasional Papers** will be announced in the **ISS Newsletter** and they will be available on request in the language - either English or French - used by authors. They will also be accessible via the Institute's Website: **www.iss-eu.org**.*

The European Union Institute for Security Studies
Paris

Director: Nicole Gnesotto

Occasional Papers

n°**52** **May 2004**

by Rosa Balfour

Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue

Contents

Since the summer 2000, the emergence of the new intifada *and the deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations, the terrorist attacks of 11 September and the military intervention in Iraq have all played their part in undermining the security environment in and around the Mediterranean, with negative repercussions on EU policies towards the region, while at the same time highlighting the vital importance of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The 2003 Wider Europe/New Neighbourhood initiative and the European Security Strategy that confirmed the EU's ambition to become a fully fledged regional power and to strengthen its global role could together give fresh momentum to the EU's Mediterranean policies.*

But was the EMP on its deathbed? Should these new strategies signal a change of direction in the EU's Mediterranean policies? This paper argues that, while welcoming the new proposals, the Barcelona process still remains an appropriate framework for deepening relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Its strengths lie in its 'global approach' that binds together economic reform with development, cultural exchange with political dialogue, human rights with security, and in the conceptualisation of 'comprehensive' security that underpins the EMP. It also provides the only forum in which Israel and the Arab countries can sit around the same table.

The core focus of this paper is the first basket of the Barcelona process, which deals with a 'political and security partnership' - perhaps one of the most neglected aspects of the EMP given its uneven and limited record of success, where the ambitions of 1995 were gradually wounded as tension in the Middle East became increasingly explosive. More specifically, the security predicament in the region must be understood in conjunction with the absence of a process of democratisation, which, de facto, has hitherto been tacitly supported by the EU member states for fear of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. But the endurance of more or less authoritarian regimes has created a vicious circle whereby the democratic deficit breeds fundamentalism and fundamentalism provides the justification for authoritarianism.

Only recently has the European Commission started to acknowledge the degree to which the creation of a secure environment also depends on the individual human dimension, and the new European Security Strategy, too, posits a strong relationship between security and good governance, human rights and the rule of law. This paper explores the relationship between these two dimensions, traces the developments in these fields from 1995 until the most recent achievements during the Italian EU Presidency of the second half of 2003 and suggests some policy recommendations.

Rather than seek radical change to revamp the EU's Mediterranean policies, a modus vivendi between the achievements of the EMP's 'global approach' with the new concepts of 'differentiation' and 'benchmarking' introduced by the Wider Europe strategy should be found, allowing individual countries to make progress without jeopardising the entire regional approach. The EU should also try to strike a balance between the conception of 'soft' security inherent to the EMP and addressed following a comprehensive methodology, and the new developments in the fields of the European Security and Defence Policy and the new European Security Strategy.

Introduction: European security and the Barcelona process

Following the watersheds of 11 September and the military intervention in Iraq, in 2003 two documents approved by the European Union set the stage for a possible renewal of the EU's role in international affairs. The Wider Europe strategy published by the Commission in March and the new European Security Strategy prepared by the High Representative for CFSP and adopted in December, propose major conceptual changes in the EU's relations with the rest of the world which, if implemented, could transform the EU's still hesitant status as an international actor.

At the same time, tackling the political and security challenges posed by relations with the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean has rarely seemed so imperative. The terrorist attacks of 11 September and the military intervention in Iraq have renewed the focus on paradigms such as 'the clash of civilisations' and 'democracy through bombs', making highly debatable analytical categories part of an increasingly polarised popular debate between the so-called 'West' and the 'Arab world', as well as part of the 'philosophy' behind new policy guidelines.

The EU, by nature and because of its history, is ill-suited to embracing paradigms such as the clash of civilisations. Limited by its capabilities as a 'civilian power', it has sought to develop relations based on dialogue, on economic integration as a means of building secure and stable environments, and on diffusing its norms through persuasion rather than coercion. In the Mediterranean region, the EU has promoted dialogue through the Barcelona process and has also been seeking a more prominent role in the settlement of conflict between Israel and Palestine, given the strategic, economic, political and human importance of the entire Southern Mediterranean and Middle East to Europe as a whole.

At the same time, the EU has just embarked on its largest and most challenging enlargement ever. Its members now number 25 and the Union's borders now extend eastwards towards the forests of Ukraine and Belarus, but it has only modestly consolidated its Mediterranean presence. Of the 10 new entrants, only the small states of Malta and divided Cyprus are dotted in this historic sea, while Slovenia looks onto the Mediterranean through a mere sliver of coastline. The balance within the EU of countries concerned with the Mediterranean (traditionally France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and those which tend to look towards the East is likely to shift in favour of the latter, especially as the Union has moved closer to Russia. Even if the balance shifts towards the East, the risks and challenges emanating from the Mediterranean will not go away: thinking strategically about the Union's South remains a necessary priority.

The Mediterranean could also constitute a testing ground for the EU to develop general policies that could serve as a 'laboratory' in developing its foreign policy capabilities elsewhere. Integrating an Islamic, democratic Turkey would represent an example that could

have positive repercussions in the Mediterranean. Thinking imaginatively, the EU could also learn lessons from the Mediterranean in dealing, for example, with so-called 'rogue states' or with issues relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Before examining the possible impact on the Mediterranean of recent developments represented in the Wider Europe document and the European Security Strategy, it is worth offering a bird's eye assessment of the problems the EU has encountered in its policies towards the Southern Mediterranean, which have developed within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), in order to assess possible future developments. This will be necessary to address a number of questions that have emerged since the publication of these two key documents: is the Wider Europe communication complementary or a substitute for a 'failed' Euro-Mediterranean Partnership? Can the 'global approach' inherent in the Barcelona process be reconciled with the greater flexibility and differentiation advocated by Wider Europe? Is the concept of security that underpins relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean compatible with the new security strategy?

This paper is structured in three sections. The first aims to assess the 'vices and virtues' of the EMP vis-à-vis the most recent proposals of 2003. The following section focuses on the first chapter of the Barcelona process, which is dedicated to building a political and security partnership, from its inception in 1995 to the most recent events under the Italian EU Presidency during the second half of 2003. In particular it examines progress in the security field (mostly related to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), but also some issues related to the emerging policy against the proliferation of WMD and the fight against terrorism), and the political dimension of human rights and democracy, arguing that this field is inextricably bound up with security concerns. Finally, an attempt is made to identify some medium- as well as short-term policy recommendations that take into account the general 'philosophy' of the EMP and the recent proposals contained in Wider Europe and in the new European Security Strategy.

The breadth of this paper is limited and broad at the same time: limited because the first chapter is the area of the EMP where less progress has been made; broad because the scope of the issues that the first 'basket' of the EMP includes (political and diplomatic relations, arms control and non-proliferation, political reform in the Southern Mediterranean, regional conflict, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and so on) is vast. For this reason, rather than produce an empirically based research paper, the objective has been to identify some concepts relevant to the understanding of the security environment of the Mediterranean and to translate such concepts into potential political practice and policy recommendations.

Virtues (and vices) of the EU's Mediterranean policies

Since the launch in Barcelona of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995, relations between the EU and the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean have been progressively institutionalised, in the search of means to address 'hard' as well as 'soft' security challenges, such as legal and illegal migration and the fight against terrorism, to enhance economic development and market integration, and to encourage political and cultural dialogue. Indeed, the EMP is structured in three broad 'baskets' or chapters: a political and security partnership, based *inter alia* on the principles of human rights and democracy, and of dialogue and cross-cultural respect; an economic and financial partnership with the ambitious aim of creating a free trade area across the two shores by 2010; and a social and cultural dialogue to nourish cross-societal exchanges. This approach was complemented by the EU's Common Strategy on the Mediterranean approved in June 2000, which essentially confirms the objectives of the Barcelona process.

Yet, despite the crucial importance of the region, the EU institutions have repeatedly recognised that the Barcelona process has not made sufficient progress. In 2000 they seemed to have decided to revamp the process, with the member states agreeing to a Common Strategy and the Commission publishing a Communication which identified the weaknesses of the process and outlining some recommendations to 'reinvigorate' it.[1] These intentions came up against the stark realities of the deterioration of the Middle East Peace Process, with the rise of the new *intifada* in September 2000. Until the Valencia Action Plan approved in 2002 during the Spanish Presidency (discussed in the next section), the Barcelona process seemed on the brink of stagnation.

The first set of reasons for the problems of the EMP are central to the nature of the EU as an external policy actor, with its 'dual decision-making processes'[2] (intergovernmental and supranational) and competences, and its limited capability to act in a unitary manner. Even at the start of the Barcelona process, the EU position on the Mediterranean was the result of a delicate compromise between the member states in an attempt to counterbalance the Union's Northern and Eastern dimensions of enlargement,[3] but did not necessarily reflect a common view of the strategies and priorities to be adopted towards the region.[4] The Common Strategy on the Mediterranean, which was conceived to improve coordination between the member states, seems to have brought about little change.[5]

---

[1] European Commission, 'Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process', COM(2000), 497 final, Brussels, 6 September 2000; and European Parliament, 'Report on the Commission Communication on relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region: reinvigorating the Barcelona Process', Brussels, 22 January 2001.

[2] Jörg Monar, 'Institutional Constraints of the European Union's Mediterranean Policy', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 3, no. 2, Autumn 1998, pp. 39-60.

[3] Esther Barbé, 'Balancing Europe's Eastern and Southern Dimensions', in Jan Zielonka, *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp. 117-29; Ricardo Gomez, 'The EU's Mediterranean policy. Common foreign policy by the back door?', in Helen Sjursen and John Peterson (eds.), *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 133-51.

[4] Jörg Monar, op. cit. in note 2.

[5] Claire Spencer, 'The EU and Common Strategies: The Revealing Case of the Mediterranean', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 6 (2001), pp. 31-51.

Weaknesses in the policy can be found in its tilt towards the economic domain, based on the so-called 'Washington consensus', whereby economic liberalisation would automatically spill over into other fields of reform and lead towards political liberalisation and good governance.[6] There is little evidence to support a causality between economic liberalisation and political reform; if anything, there seems to be more empirical proof of the opposite.[7] In the Southern Mediterranean, Tunisia is a case in which economic reform has not led to any greater degree of political liberalisation; in fact, the regime has tightened its grip over opposition through repression over the past few years. In policy terms, this means that the priority so far accorded to the second basket of the Barcelona process might not be sufficient to satisfy its ultimate aim of creating a free trade area by 2010, as its progress could be stalled by unresolved issues in the first basket. Also, and importantly, the incentive for the Southern Mediterranean states of establishing a free trade area is in blatant contradiction with the EU's continued protectionism towards certain goods which happen to be of great importance to the Barcelona partners, namely agricultural produce and textiles,[8] a contradiction that can be found in all of the EU's relations with third countries and is not addressed in the Wider Europe strategy.

The emphasis on the economic basket has on the one hand tended to obscure the links between economics, politics and security inherent in the setting-up of the framework, while on the other hand allowing those political and security problems which the process is supposed to address to slow down economic progress.

Also, relations between Israel and the Arab states can have huge consequences that go beyond issues directly related to regional security or the Middle East Peace Process and can well block progress in other baskets. And here lies the final set of problems, which stem from the region itself. The longstanding, unresolved conflicts in the Middle East (despite the EU's emphasis on keeping the Middle East Peace Process separate but complementary to the EMP) and in the Maghreb over the Western Sahara, have so far posed insurmountable obstacles to regional security building.

On the other hand, the policy framework set up by the EU provides scope for its strengthening and improvement.[9] Among its strengths is its 'global approach', which embraces a vast number of issues – from development and economic reform to security and human rights – and for this reason has been praised by most observers. Thanks to this global approach, the EMP has provided the only forum in which Israel and Arab states sit around the same table – an achievement per se. It also reflects what the EU has developed since the second half of the 1990s in terms of exercising its influence abroad through the use of a wide range of civilian tools, which have been gradually refined in the contexts of development policy, enlargement and the stabilisation policies, for example, towards the Western Balkans.

The problem with a global approach such as this has been in finding a balance between long-, medium- and short-term priorities.[10] There have been numerous instances, especially in the political and security fields, where stalemate in one area of activity has led to the stalling of

6 Diane Hunt, 'Development Economics, the Washington Consensus and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative', in George Joffé (ed.), 'Perspectives on Development: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership', Special Issue of the *Journal of North African Studies*, vol. 3, no. 2, 1998, pp. 16-38.

7 Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

8 Diane Hunt; Isabel Romeo, 'The European Union and North Africa: Keeping the Mediterranean "Safe" for Europe', *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 3, no. 2, Autumn 1998, pp. 21-38; George Joffé, *Europe and the Mediterranean: the Barcelona Process Five Years On* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2000).

9 Dorothée Schmid, 'Optimiser le processus de Barcelone', *Occasional Paper* 36 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, July 2002).

10 Richard Youngs, 'The Barcelona Process after the UK Presidency: The Need for Prioritization', *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring 1999.

progress in other fields. In the absence of clear priorities, the daily agenda of getting the EMP to work, from identifying realistically achievable confidence- and partnership-building measures to creating an 'area of peace and security', has been hard to maintain. Attempts at promoting subregional cooperation involving a few countries have so far met with little success.[11] The Wider Europe strategy could try to address the relationship between maintaining a global approach with all partners on an equal footing while introducing the concepts of 'differentiation' and 'benchmarking'.[12]

Wider Europe is conceived as a post-enlargement strategy to deal with the EU's neighbours from 2004 onwards, with the aim of fostering a 'friendly neighbourhood'.[13] In other words, it is suggesting an alternative to the possibility of extending the Union beyond the current candidate countries. To those countries left out of the enlargement process, the EU offers as its greatest and ultimate incentive – the 'carrot' – a stake in its internal market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the four freedoms of movement (of persons, goods, capital and services). In return it expects these countries to make progress in economic and political reform. The method to ensure that this carrot and stick exercise does not remain merely a good intention is through the introduction of 'benchmarks' that progressively set out clear and realistic objectives through Action Plans prepared on a country-by-country as well as a regional basis. While benchmarks would support the EU's approach of exercising conditionality towards its partners by making it more transparent and consistent, differentiation would allow the EU to reward those partners who are making more progress. In the Mediterranean context, this would help release the Barcelona process from the stalemate in which it has often found itself, allowing some countries to progress more rapidly than others.

The combination of these two principles makes Wider Europe an innovative as much as a necessary strategy: the new neighbourhood initiative ought to prepare the Union to manage the many new challenges that will appear on its doorstep from May 2004 onwards and contribute to it playing a proactive role in the politics and security of Europe writ large. On the other hand, the compatibility, complementarity and potential synergy (or tension) of the neighbourhood initiative with current policies remain to be seen. Despite being a regional strategy, Wider Europe clearly privileges the bilateral over the multilateral framework, whereas the global approach has produced some important achievements in the dimension of developing consensual politics, which can be considered a partnership- and confidence-building measure. Secondly, for the North African states to better accept the proposal, the ultimate 'carrot' of offering a stake in the EU's internal market would have to be backed by credible measures in the field of the four freedoms – put simply, the EU would have to adopt far more liberal measures with regard to migration, agriculture and textiles, to name a few sensitive issues. Finally, there is some doubt on the political feasibility and opportuneness of linking the Mediterranean, which has already been drawn together into a regional framework, to Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, the other three countries included in the new neighbourhood initiative. It will be essential to ensure that Wider Europe injects a new lease of life into the EMP rather than substitute for it.[14]

In terms of the instruments to implement Wider Europe, until the next financial frame-

---

[11] For instance, the Arab Maghreb Union exists only on paper. One recent possible exception in the economic field regards the signing of the Agadir Agreement, which provides for free trade by 2006, between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.

[12] As we shall see, similar approaches can be found in security cooperation in the field of ESDP and in political relations with the May Communication on promoting human rights and democracy in the region.

[13] European Commission, 'Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours', Commission Communication COM(2003), 104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003.

[14] Martin Ortega argues that the new Wider Europe policies should not impinge upon the more traditional EU policies towards the Mediterranean. See Ortega's contribution to Judy Batt, Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, 'Partners and neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe', *Chaillot Paper* 64 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, September 2003).

work in 2006 the Commission is essentially proposing to tailor existing tools (including the projects carried out under the MEDA and INTERREG programmes) to the objectives set out in its new neighbourhood strategy. Thereafter, a new 'Neighbourhood Instrument' should be created with a single regulating framework to couple the EU's external policy objectives with economic and social cohesion.[15]

So far, within the EMP institutional framework the main tools are, in the first instance, the Association Agreements signed bilaterally between the EC and the individual countries of the Mediterranean. Political dialogue at the highest level occurs at the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conferences where the foreign ministers meet, plus plenty of sectoral meetings between desk officers. Senior officials meet regularly in the Euro-Mediterranean Committee. The Association Councils monitor and discuss the implementation of the agreements.[16]

CFSP tools would be available should the member states choose to resort to them. However, with the exception of the Middle East Peace Process, the only CFSP measure that has been adopted towards the region has been the Common Strategy which, as we have seen, has had little or no impact on the region as such. Finally, MEDA assistance is designed to support the objectives of development, cooperation, economic reform and democratisation, with commitments in the region of 5.35 billion for 2000-06. Compared with previous assistance, the Barcelona process has enabled the EU to more or less triple its commitments towards the region, though the Mediterranean still fares badly in both absolute and relative terms compared with the EU's Eastern and South-East European partners.

The toolbox is therefore in place; it is a question of making it more operational. Alongside the incentives contained in the Partnership, the EU can resort to a set of measures that cut across its CFSP and EC pillars to exercise political conditionality on the recipient countries. Political dialogue and diplomatic tools (such as delivering demarches and statements or suspending meetings at the various levels of the dialogue) can be accompanied by changing the content of cooperation programmes or withdrawing aid, up to imposing trade sanctions and suspending military cooperation, or cooperation altogether.[17]

The concept of security that emerges from the Barcelona framework focuses on its 'softer' rather than on the 'harder' aspects, better capturing the nature of economic, cultural and human interdependence that exists between policy spheres and between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. Also, the types of 'risks' that can stem from the region, rather than constituting a traditional security threat, tend to be diffuse in nature, such as the consequences of economic instability, social unrest, international crime, and so on. This conception of 'soft security' has been articulated in a comprehensive way, including notions of partnership-building, multilateral cooperation and the institutionalisation of relations, and involving a broad range of actors that should ensure an inclusive and constructive rather than exclusive approach to building sustainable security in the broad region. The framework aims to link economics and politics to security, and to mobilise a variety of tools to tackle the root causes of conflict. In principle, it is a 'comprehensive security' framework or, to use Javier Solana's terminology, a 'holistic'[18] vision of security. In practice, of course, the politics have often contradicted this concept.

To an extent, the recent European Security Strategy elaborated by the High Representative

---

[15] European Commission, 'Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument', COM(2003), 393 final, Brussels, 1 July 2003.

[16] Extensive information on the EMP can be found at www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations /euromed.

[17] Karen E. Smith, 'The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 3, 1998, pp. 253-74.

[18] Javier Solana, Speech delivered at the Annual Conference of the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 1 July 2002. Javier Solana calls this a 'specific culture of security', which is 'based on conflict prevention, political management of crises and taking account of the economic and social roots causes of violent action of all kinds'. Javier Solana defines this view as 'holistic security'.

for CFSP, discussed at the Thessaloniki European Council in June and approved in its final version at the Brussels European Council held at the end of 2003,[19] confirms the conceptualisation of security that the EU developed during the 1990s of the Union as a 'civilian power'. It, too, considers development, the rule of law and human rights as key to building a secure environment. In terms of the 'methods' of foreign policy-making, it confirms that upholding international law, working through multilateral institutions, building and supporting regional cooperation and institutions, constructing friendly multilateral relations and fostering political and economic reform are the best means to contribute to international peace. The European Security Strategy, however, departs from traditional EU policies where 'hard' security issues are addressed, such as in the spread of WMD and terrorism.

On the whole, the EMP itself has the potential to provide a framework which runs counter and proposes alternative views and strategies to the 'clash of civilisations' paradigm which, having been a debatable analytical category in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the East-West divide, has increasingly entered the political discourse in the post-11 September world, in the West as well as in the Arab world, where

Huntington's book was a bestseller.[20] The recent document prepared jointly by the Council Secretariat and the Commission on the future development of relations with the Arab world also goes in the same direction. It proposes to build upon existing (EMP) and nascent (the Wider Europe communication and the European Security Strategy) policy frameworks to develop relations with the broader Arab world. It also insists on the need to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, upon which a policy that aims to 'advance political pluralism and democracy, and to stimulate social and economic development', could be developed based on the 'mutual interests of Arab countries and the EU'.[21]

The recent developments in the conceptual and practical building of the EU's capability to act in international affairs should take into account the strengths and potential that the EMP has shown so far. In the future these new policies could well supersede the structures set up over the past decade; but in the medium term the EU should ensure that they complement each other: the priority should be to make existing policies work better rather than supplant them with new strategies which, however innovative, still need to be tested.

---

[19] Javier Solana, 'A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy', document adopted at the European Council, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

[20] Gilles Kepel, *L'autunno della Guerra Santa. Viaggio nel mondo islamico dopo l'11 settembre* (Roma: Carocci, 2002).

[21] Council Secretariat and European Commission, 'Strengthening the EU's Partnership with the Arab World', D(2003), 10318, Brussels, 4 December 2003.

A critical assessment of the 'political and security partnership'

3.1 A brief history of the first chapter of the EMP

The general aim of the first basket of the Barcelona Declaration was to establish a 'common area of peace and security' through a number of principles and objectives:

◗ develop the rule of law, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms while recognising cultural diversity and refraining from intervention in the internal affairs of a state;

◗ settle disputes through peaceful means;

◗ cooperate in preventing and combating terrorism;

◗ cooperate in the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking;

◗ promote regional security and conditions likely to create good-neighbourly relations and subregional cooperation;

◗ promote the non-proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons;

◗ consider further steps to combat proliferation and the accumulation of conventional arms;

◗ endeavour to create a Middle East zone free from weapons of mass destruction;

◗ promote the long-term view of creating an area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean and possibly establish a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.[22]

Since Barcelona, however, the content of the first basket has actually been shrinking, initially due to the need to identify priorities and measures that could be agreed upon by consensus, but subsequently, as tensions over the Arab-Israeli conflict grew, agendas were gradually scaled down in order to avoid tackling the most controversial issues. The Action Plan approved at the first meeting of the partners in May 1996 listed six areas of dialogue: strengthening democracy, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM), disarmament, the fight against terrorism and organised crime and drug trafficking. Amongst these, preventive diplomacy, CSBM and the partners' participation in international human rights conventions were to be the priorities.[23] The second meeting, in Malta on 15-16 April 1997, was preceded by threats of Arab sanctions against Israel over the latter's settlements expansion into East Jerusalem. Much diplomatic effort was spent on getting representatives from all countries to sit around the same table. The end result, however, was a scaling down of the Conference's agenda so as to avoid tackling the most sensitive issues. What was approved was for the senior officials to continue their work towards the drafting of a Charter for Peace and Stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region, to be approved 'when political circumstances allow'.[24]

This project received even greater attention at the Third Euro-Med conference in Stuttgart two years later: 'stability in the Mediterranean Region requires a comprehensive and balanced approach in order to address common security concerns, strengthen cooperation and adopt measures conducive to stability' and the Charter was felt to be the best framework providing 'an enhanced political dialogue as well as the evolutionary and progressive development of partnership building measures, good-neighbourly

---

[22] Euro-Mediterranean Conference, *Barcelona Declaration*, 27-28 November 1995.

[23] Rosemary Hollis, 'Barcelona's First Pillar: An Appropriate Concept for Security Relations?', in Sven Behrendt and Christian-Peter Hanelt (eds.), *Bound to Cooperate - Europe and the Middle East* (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 2000), pp. 107-30.

[24] Second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, *Conclusions*, Malta, 15-16 April 1997.

relations, regional cooperation and preventive diplomacy.'[25] The change in language from 'confidence building' to 'partnership building' also signals the cooperative nature of the process,[26] despite the fact that it was heading towards stalemate.

The next conference, held in Marseilles in November 2000, however, witnessed the Charter being deleted from the agenda until further notice in an effort to get all partners to meet at a time of spiralling violence in the Middle East. The absence of the Syrian and Lebanese delegations was noticeable, but within the EU too there were divergent views over the contents of the Charter and whether it should include all security issues. Since then, any security and political dialogue seems to be inextricably tied to developments in the Middle East, despite the Commission's insistence that the Barcelona framework should be 'complementary' to the Peace Process and cannot be considered as a tool to solve the long-standing conflict. Although the idea of a Charter has not been altogether abandoned, any talks on the subject matter have been put on hold pending an improvement in relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Given the Commission's insistence on separating Arab-Israeli relations from the EMP, political dialogue has been overwhelmingly conditioned by their deterioration, and all Euro-Mediterranean conferences have dedicated a large part of their discussions to the situation.[27]

By 2002, the end result of the story of the first chapter of the Barcelona process was that at the moment the only projects which have taken off are the setting up of a network of foreign policy research institutes and think tanks, known as EuroMeSCo, diplomatic seminars held twice yearly in Malta bringing together junior and senior national officials from both shores of the Mediterranean, and a pilot project on cooperation among civil protection services in disaster relief, which was launched in June 1998 and is currently awaiting its first evaluation report.

The Spanish Presidency of the EU during the first half of 2002 presented some more concrete proposals in the security field, largely in traditional 'hard security' issues such as defence. The most significant initiatives in the Action Plan are the creation of a dialogue on ESDP matters and a regional cooperation programme in the field of justice. These issues will be further analysed below. Other themes concern a dialogue on the root causes of instability, involving presentations by the Commission and the member states, exploring the possibility of developing cooperation in the fields of conflict prevention and crisis management, and non-proliferation and the adherence to multilateral instruments on arms control. Developments in 2003, too, will be discussed in the sections below. Suffice to mention, at this stage, that the three objectives set out by the Commission in October,[28] one for each basket, were achieved during the Italian Presidency: the agreement to create a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly with consultative functions, the constitution of a subsidiary of the European Investment Bank, the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), and the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures.

3.2 The security dimension

With the failure of the Charter for Peace and Stability, put on stand-by until the circumstances in the Middle East permit its resuscitation, the security dimension of the Barcelona process became somewhat bereft of substance. The Valencia meeting attempted to address this vacuum by producing the Action Plan and suggesting cooperation in the nascent European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Since 2002

---

[25] Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, *Chairman's formal conclusions*, Stuttgart, 15-16 April 1999.

[26] Rosemary Hollis, op. cit. in note 23.

[27] On the relationship between the Barcelona process and the peace process in the Middle East see Martin Ortega, 'A new EU policy on the Mediterranean'?, op. cit. in note 14, pp. 86-101.

[28] European Commission, 'Communication to prepare the VI Meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs', COM(2003), 610 final, Brussels, 15 October 2003.

ESDP seems to have become one of the main cards the EU is betting on to relaunch the political and security dialogue, especially given that the confidence- and security-building measures, and ensuing partnership-building measures, foreseen at Palermo, have been put on hold.

ESDP cooperation represents a shift away from the 'soft security' focus that has so far characterised the first basket of the EMP. It essentially consists of bridging the gap in transparency and information in ESDP developments by including it in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue at the level of both the Senior Officials and the Political and Security Committee (PSC). With a view to preparing the ground for future partnership building measures, ESDP cooperation entails information on:

◗ ESDP objectives in general;
◗ ESDP structures and procedures;
◗ information on civilian and military capabilities;
◗ specific information on civil protection;
◗ modalities for the involvement of third countries in civilian and military EU-led operations;
◗ current and future operations, such as the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina launched in January 2003 and the EU peacekeeping mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM);
◗ ESDP's role in the fight against terrorism.

Also, the Mediterranean partners can appoint special envoys to act as points of contact at the Secretariat General of the Council and at the EU Military Staff. Following a first meeting at the level of the EU's PSC during the Greek Presidency, in July the Italian Presidency gave a presentation covering all aspects of ESDP, and a number of seminars involving senior and other officials have taken place.

A significant aspect of this initiative is that, from its inception, ESDP cooperation has fore-seen the possibility of it developing following 'variable geometry' patterns. In other words, it can be pursued with those countries that are willing to increase the level of their cooperation with the EU. It also tries to respond to a perception of suspicion in the South towards ESDP due to the lack of information, transparency and openness on its development, although attitudes towards the EU developing a military capability vary.[29] Previous experience in the 1990s suggests that transparency and information in military matters do need to be addressed. In the previous case of the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR initiatives led by France, Spain, Italy and Portugal, the Maghreb countries had repeatedly accused the Northern partners of creating military units to interfere in the internal affairs of the Southern Mediterranean.[30] Despite reassurances that the units were being deployed with the objective of increasing cooperation between forces and were not directed against the Southern partners, in practice, apart from the presence of Southern observers in EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR manoeuvres, no other forms of cooperation seem to have taken place during the 1990s.[31]

The first basket dialogue between the two shores therefore could indeed benefit from greater military cooperation and in traditional security issues: 'the most profound objective of the EMP is to dispel the historical inertia of misunderstanding and fragmentation'.[32] In this sense the partners could also look elsewhere to find further ways of cooperating. NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OCSE) all have or have had institutionalised frameworks involving Southern Mediterranean countries. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, established in 1994 with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, is the one forum where a division of

---

[29] EuroMeSCO, 'European Defence. Perceptions vs. Realities', Working Group III, First Year Report, Paper 16, June 2002; available at www.euromesco.net/eurmesco/publi_artigo.asp?cod_artigo=78884.

[30] Esther Barbé, op. cit. in note 3.

[31] Sven Biscop, 'Network or Labyrinth? The Challenge of Co-ordinating Western Security Dialogues with the Mediterranean', *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 7, no. 1, Spring 2002, pp. 92-112.

[32] Martin Ortega, 'Military Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Charter: An Unjustified Absence', *The International Spectator*, vol. XXXV, no. 1, January-March 2000, pp. 115-25, quote on p. 118.

labour between the EU and NATO should be found, in parallel with the developing relationship between ESDP and NATO.

The EU could also 'pick and choose' from the defunct WEU Mediterranean dialogue which involved, from 1992 onwards, the same countries participating in the NATO dialogue, as well as from the OSCE initiative.[33] Already in 2000, shortly before the ending of the WEU dialogue, some policy recommendations had been made to upgrade cooperation North and South of the Mediterranean from the exchanges realised in the form of the previously mentioned networks of research institutes and diplomatic seminars. These include:

◗ 'planning and holding of joint military exercises;

◗ sporadic cooperation of Euro-Mediterranean armed forces for specific peacekeeping operations;

◗ maritime cooperation between northern and southern Mediterranean states for tackling refugee and migrant issues at sea;

◗ Euro-Mediterranean cooperation for land-demining.'[34]

EU experiences with other neighbouring or nearby countries could also be looked at to identify measures and methods that can be adapted to the Mediterranean context. Peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, for example, have involved non-EU member states, from the candidate countries in Eastern Europe to Cyprus (before accession), as well as Turkey and Russia. The EU Police Mission in Bosnia also involves non-EU member states such as Turkey, Cyprus (before accession), Russia and Ukraine. As the EU develops its capabilities in peacekeeping abroad, it could evaluate the possibility, in the long term, of encouraging participation of a greater number of countries, including EMP members.

Despite being a recent initiative, ESDP cooperation does seem to be bearing some fruit. In December 2003, at the Naples Euro-Mediterranean Conference, ministers identified some further partnership building measures that could be carried out under the ESDP hat, such as civilian crisis management training and cooperation between civil protection authorities, a theme that was dear to the Italian Presidency. In this latter field, the pilot project on disaster management, an evaluation report on which is to be completed in 2004, could well constitute a positive experience to be drawn upon for future activities. This field is also set to become a growing area of EU activity as the draft Constitution prepared by the Convention on the Future of Europe expands the definition of the Petersberg missions by establishing that the Union can use civilian and military means for 'joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation'. Furthermore, 'all these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories'.[35] The European Security Strategy of December 2003 is also important in this regard.

One final aspect regarding 'hard' security issues deserves a brief mention. The three objectives of the first chapter of the Barcelona process relating to combating the proliferation of conventional and non-conventional arms and WMD have remained a good intention, given the profound disagreements on virtually all issues involved. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address this aspect of regional security,[36] but some new prospects could come about thanks to a recent decision by the Council

---

[33] On the various military cooperation initiatives, see Martin Ortega, op. cit. in note 32.

[34] See Martin Ortega (ed.), 'The Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue/L'Avenir du Dialogue Euro-Méditerranéen en Matière de Sécurité', *Occasional Paper* 14 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, 2000), p. 4.

[35] The European Convention, 'Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe', CONV 850/03, Brussels, 18 July 2003, Article III-210.

[36] See Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, 'Towards a New WMD Agenda in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: An Arab Perspective', and Mark A. Heller, 'Weapons of Mass Destruction and Euro-Mediterranean Policies of Arms Control: An Israeli Perspective', both in Álvaro Vasconcelos and George Joffé (eds.), 'The Barcelona Process. Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community', Special Issue of *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 5, no. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 133-57 and 158-88.

of the EU to develop a policy on WMD.

In the wake of the deep divisions caused by the military intervention in Iraq, the member states have decided to assess the possibility of developing a 'policy . . . to contain proliferation while dealing with the underlying causes'.[37] While the institutional framework for managing WMD threats would remain the UN, including its inspection agencies and coercive capabilities, the EU proposes developing regional security arrangements and regional arms control and disarmament processes. It could make the Mediterranean one area of special focus, by carrying out a WMD threat assessment, including specific non-proliferation issues in the EMP dialogues and promoting a broader adherence to international treaties (see the table on p. 19 for the international conventions and treaties to which the EMP members are party).[38] Libya, having recently announced its intention to give up its WMD and open up its sites for inspection, could provide the opportunity to tie the Mediterranean to a regional non-proliferation programme. However, despite the progress made in the Thessaloniki declaration in elaborating an EU strategy against the proliferation of WMD, the implications of this strategy for the Barcelona process were not discussed with the EU's Mediterranean partners during the Italian Presidency.

Since an EU policy on WMD is still embryonic and ESDP is in its infancy, they can only be considered long- and medium-term objectives. This calls for the identification of policies that can have a more direct impact on building trust, the keyword in building a regional security environment. 'The basic problem of that Partnership in matters of politics and security is the negative perception of the so-called complex of security. In other words, the mistrust between the shores [. . . which] stems as much from the

traditional dimensions of security (military) as from economic and societal dimensions.'[39] This also means that ESDP cooperation should not act as a substitute for an enhanced political dialogue and soft security policies.

Regarding regional conflicts, it has been advocated that it is perhaps time to end the artificial separation between the Middle East Peace Process and the EMP, and use the Barcelona framework to discuss the 'road map' and regional peace building.[40] Secondly, rather than constituting a traditional security threat, the nature of the risks present in the Mediterranean basin highlights on the one hand the degree to which politics, security and economics are intertwined, and on the other the extent to which these issues are linked to the EU member states' security. Economic underdevelopment, poverty and high birth-rates, illiteracy and low levels of mass education, are not divorced from the problems of modernisation in North Africa, which in turn includes political issues relating to authoritarianism, the progressive erosion of the legitimacy of the governing élites and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Instability in the South has direct consequences in the North, of which migration pressures are one of the tangible effects.

Some soft security issues have been moved to the third basket of the EMP. The 'Regional cooperation programme in the field of justice, in combating drugs, organised crime and terrorism, as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants, migration and movements of people'[41] represents a new type of initiative that cuts across the EU pillar structure, in the sense that Community as well as intergovernmental tools can be used, as well as the basket structure of the Barcelona process. The objectives of the programme cover a very broad terrain, from cooper-

---

[37] Council Secretariat and European Commission, 'Basic principles for a EU strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction', Doc. 10352/03, PESC 315, Brussels, 2003.

[38] Council Secretariat and European Commission, 'Action Plan for the implementation of the basic principles for an EU strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction', Doc. 10354/03, PESC 316, Brussels, 2003.

[39] Esther Barbé, op. cit. in note 3, p. 127.

[40] Martin Ortega, op. cit. in note 14.

[41] The programme is published in *Euromed Report* 44, 29 April 2002.

ation in the field of justice to combating drugs and organised crime to exchanging information on international terrorist organisations. In the field of migration, the intentions of the programme seem to respond to the long-standing demand of the Southern partners that the rights of migrants in the EU be included on the agenda of migration issues.

It is premature to assess the progress made in that initiative, formally launched in June 2003. The €6 million earmarked for the programme are still insufficient to tackle justice, migration and police cooperation, but the method adopted could be promising, as it could have recourse to consensual politics and treat the fight against illegal immigration into the EU together with co-development in North Africa and the integration of migrants in the EU. It appears that drawing up this framework within the context of the third basket, which deals with socio-cultural affairs, rather than in the first, has helped depoliticise highly sensitive issues, reach an agreement between North and South on the aims of such cooperation and include the dossier on terrorism. There is a risk, however, that transferring issues so closely related to security concerns could jeopardise the approach that distinctly characterised the third basket, in other words involving civil society organisations in the socio-cultural dialogue between the two shores, and thus the strongest bottom-up dimension of the EMP as a whole.[42] Secondly, it is necessary to ensure consistency between the regional programme and the cooperative initiatives that are taking place bilaterally at the levels of the interior ministries of EMP partners.

Terrorism remains one of the most controversial issues among the Mediterranean partners, given the lack of any basic understanding of its definition. Progress in this field can only be seen at the declaratory level, but should not be underestimated. Following the terrorist attack that hit Morocco on 16 May 2003, the informal mid-term Euro-Mediterranean meeting held in Crete in May 2003 concluded that discussing the fight against terrorism should become a regular subject of political dialogue and that the Senior Officials should continue their dialogue through ad hoc meetings. Significantly, it was also agreed that the fact that the EMP partners have widely different interpretations of the definition of terrorism 'should not prevent partners from identifying areas where they can cooperate'.[43] The Naples Conference went further in declaring the countries' commitment to fight against terrorism 'in all its forms and manifestation wherever and by whomsoever committed' without meeting any opposition from Syria. The dialogue on terrorism will be continued at the level of Senior Officials and cooperation will be pursued at both the bilateral and multilateral levels by preparing programmes on training and technical assistance, 'without prejudice to respect for human rights and democracy'.[44]

3.3 The democratic dimension: EU assistance and political dialogue for human rights and democracy

Both the EU and the EMP have stressed the importance of democratic practices in the region. However, 'the security environment in the southern Mediterranean cannot be understood without bearing in mind the surprisingly consistent pattern of non-democratic regimes in the region'.[45] Indeed, North Africa and the Middle East are in a difficult predicament: the fear that greater political liberalisation could lead to a power transfer into the hands of non-democratic groups is not just a mere justification for the current ruling élites to stay in power, often through permanent states of emergency; it is also a cause of concern for European govern-

---

[42] I am grateful to Annette Jünemann for this observation.

[43] Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Mid-Term Meeting of Foreign Ministers, *Presidency Conclusions*, Crete, 26-27 May 2003.

[44] Euro-Mediterranean Conference, *Presidency Conclusions*, Naples, 2-3 December 2003.

[45] Brynjar Lia, 'Security Challenges in Europe's Mediterranean Periphery – Perspectives and Policy Dilemmas', *European Security*, vol. 8, no. 4, Winter 1999, pp. 27-56, quote on p. 47.

International arms conventions to which the EMP countries are party

	NPT	GP	CTBT	ENMOD	SBT	BWC	CWC	CCWC	APM
Algeria	*	*	**	*	**	**	**		**
Austria	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
Belgium	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
Cyprus	**	**	*	**	**	**	**	**	**
Denmark	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
Egypt	**	**	*	**		*		*	
Finland	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	
France	**	**	**			**	**	**	**
Germany	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
Greece	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
Ireland	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
Israel		**	*				*	**	
Italy	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
Jordan	**	**	**		**	**	**	**	**
Lebanon	**	**		*	*	**			
Libya	**	**	*		**	*			
Luxembourg	**	**	**	*	**	**	**	**	**
Malta	**	**	**		**	**	**	*	**
Morocco	**	**	**	*	**	*	**	**	**
Netherlands	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**
Portugal	**	**	**	*	*	**	**	**	**
Spain	**	**	**	**	*	**	**	**	**
Sweden	**	**	**	*	**	**	**	**	**
Syria	**	*		*		*			
Tunisia	**	*	*	**	**	**	**	**	**
Turkey	**	**	**	*	**	**	**	*	
United Kingdom	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**

* Signed
** Ratified

NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
GP	Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
ENMOD	Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
SBT	Sea-Bed Treaty on the Prohibition of Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

BWC	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction
CWC	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
CCWC	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects
APM	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

ments. On the other hand, the vicious circle that is perpetuating itself is that authoritarianism is a cause as well as a consequence of the democratic deficit. Some of the fears of EU governments (the rise of fundamentalism, the perception of its links to Islamic terrorism), need to be understood in the light of the lack of democracy and of failing post-colonial state-building projects. It is for these reasons that human rights and democracy need to underpin any conception of security in the Mediterranean, both at the level of developing 'comprehensive security' and in the human dimension.

The countries in the region have had very different experiences with fundamentalism, and each of these experiences seems to confirm that there is no consistent pattern of relations between the state and political Islam in the Arab world. The heterogeneity is such that it 'shows the obvious limitations of viewing political Islam as a security issue by considering the movement solely as a powerfully uniform and transnational threat'.[46] There is no recipe for dealing with fundamentalism. The governments of the region have themselves tried various strategies to deal with political Islam, from integration, such as in Lebanon and Jordan, to repression, with more or less violent outcomes.[47] There is plenty of evidence, however, to suggest that one common thread in all countries

of the Mediterranean basin is that the channelling of opposition into fundamentalist groups or parties stems from disaffection with governing élites, their propensity for self-perpetuation, the growing gap between them and the lower strata of society, and the lack of political integration and participation in a democratic framework.[48] In other words, containment, or turning a blind eye to human rights violations whilst hiding behind the justification that these are necessary to fight terrorism, constitutes a short-sighted policy that does not produce long-term stability or security.

Until very recently, human rights and democratisation were among the most neglected aspects of the political and security dialogue in the EMP, despite the fact that the EU does have a range of tools at its disposal to exercise pressure for respect for human rights and democracy in the Mediterranean.[49] All Association Agreements signed bilaterally with the individual countries contain an essential clause based on such principles. In cases of breaches of such clauses, the EU can adopt a number of measures that cut across its foreign policy capabilities, from the deferment or suspension of aid or of the agreement itself to negative measures under the CFSP umbrella, from the issuing of warnings up to sanctions. What is more, the Wider Europe communication

---

[46] May Chartouni-Dubarry, 'Political Transition in the Middle East', in Álvaro Vasconcelos and George Joffé (eds.), op. cit. in note 36, pp. 53-76, quote on p. 66.

[47] May Chartouni-Dubarry, ibid.

[48] See for instance George Joffé, 'The Islamist Threat to Egypt', *The Middle East and North Africa* (London: Europa Publications, 1996), pp. 3-10; Michael Patrick Tkacik, 'Democratization and Islam: Towards the Creation of a User-Friendly Environment', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 10, no. 2, Spring 1999, pp. 136-62; May Chartouni-Dubarry; Gema Martin-Muñoz, 'Political Reform and Social Change in the Maghreb', in Álvaro Vasconcelos and George Joffé, op. cit. in note 36, pp. 96-130.

[49] See Rosa Balfour, 'Promoting Principles of Democracy and Human Rights. A Review of the European Union's Strategies towards its Neighbours, in Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners (eds.), *Values and Principles in EU Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge: forthcoming (manuscript under revision) 2004).

proposes a more consequential use of those instruments.

The Barcelona process uses bottom-up as well as top-down approaches. On the one hand, assistance promotes human rights and democracy in Mediterranean partner countries, channelled through the MEDA Democracy programme (now subsumed in the general budget line that funds the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights). The Commission prefers to target civil society organisations, with 96 per cent of projects implemented by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), while only 4 per cent are contracted to public bodies such as government ministries or international organisations.[50] If this approach seeks to promote democratisation from below through the empowerment of citizens, its weakness is that it avoids tackling controversial issues with the recipient governments, which are often extremely hostile to substantial assistance aiming at political institutions, like those of Syria and Egypt.[51]

The top-down approach would see these issues being discussed at the level of political dialogue, which has so far produced rather unsatisfactory results. The EU member states have been extremely reluctant to engage with their partner governments in any dialogue that gives real substance to the principles subscribed to by all in the Barcelona Declaration, let alone exercise much pressure in an effort to convince the Southern Mediterranean states to respect some basic civil liberties. There have been only a few instances in which the EU and its member states, through their delegations or embassies, have voiced some concern.

Indeed, the EU's exercise of pressure aimed at respect for the principles of the Barcelona Declaration – political conditionality – has been defined as 'the dog that didn't bark'.[52] With the exception of the European Parliament, officially documented episodes of expression of concern have been few and far between. No negative CFSP provisions have been adopted (Libya excepted), economic and technical assistance has not been suspended or officially threatened to be made conditional, and the 'essential element' of the Association Agreements has never been invoked, even with regard to countries with whom an agreement has been in force for some years.

By and large, the EU member states have been receptive to the arguments put forward by their Southern partners, both sides fearing that political liberalisation could lead to Islamic fundamentalist organisations - which make up the bulk of opposition across North African Arab states - winning power through open electoral competition. The fight against terrorism has further accentuated this perceived dilemma between democratisation and the rise of fundamentalism: 'by focusing on the "terrorist threats", southern regimes have been very successful in branding all manifestations of opposition - violent and non-violent – as a threat to the stability of the region'.[53] In this sense, the EU priorities in the Mediterranean of developing security and stability[54] have so far translated largely into maintenance of the status quo, rather than questioning the origins of the *problématique* of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the legitimacy of the partner governments. The tightening grip on opposition seems to have become more stringent in the post-11 September environment,[55] partly due to pressure from Western governments.

---

[50] Nadim Karkutli and Dirk Bützler, 'Evaluation of the MEDA Democracy Programme 1996-1998. Final Report', Brussels, April 1999.

[51] Richard Youngs, 'Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy', *Working Document* no. 167 (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2001).

[52] Ibid.

[53] Brynjar Lia, op. cit. in note 45, pp. 49-50.

[54] Gorm Rye Olsen, 'Promotion of Democracy as a Foreign Policy Instrument of "Europe": Limits to International Idealism', *Democratization*, vol. 7, no. 2, 2000, pp. 142-67; Richard Youngs, 'The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: A New or Disingenuous Strategy?' in Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs, 'European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa'. Special Issue of *Democratization*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2002, pp. 40-62.

[55] Annette Jünemann (ed.), 'Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11. Regional and Domestic Dynamics', Special Issue of *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 8, no. 2-3, 2003.

That tendency was confirmed during 2002. The only proposal made in the Valencia Action Plan was to continue national presentations on internal human rights practices and tools for the protection of those rights. Despite the modest proposal made at Valencia – it is widely admitted, at least at the EU level – this exercise has produced very little improvement in terms of mutual understanding on the substance of the principles enshrined in the Barcelona Declaration and on the ways of enhancing them. Later on, the Commission stated that these general presentations 'can serve as a pretext to avoid serious discussion'.[56]

The Barcelona Declaration itself leaves space for ambiguity in understanding the relationship between the universalism of human rights and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. On the one hand the Declaration is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and on international law, and aims to develop the rule of law and democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental principles, and for diversity, pluralism and tolerance. On the other, the EU conceded to the requests of the Southern partners to include some elements of cultural relativism – a concession that was not offered to the partners involved in other regional strategies such as enlargement and the Stabilisation and Association process in the Balkans. The point, however, is not so much trying to solve this ambiguity, which in any case generally exists between the universalism of rights affirmed in the UN Declaration and the principle of non-interference enshrined in the UN Charter, but lies in using these interpretations as a springboard for a serious debate between Northern and Southern partners, rather than hiding behind the excuse that different culturally determined interpretations of rights make it impossible to address the plight of citizens whose basic rights are often denied.

In 2003 seeds of change seemed to take root in the stated intentions of the EU institutions.

At the start of the year the first signs came from the Commission in particular. At the end of March, Romano Prodi visited Algeria and Tunisia, his third visit to the region since becoming President of the Commission. It was the first time that human rights issues were mentioned so explicitly, the audience being reminded of the 'essential element' clauses of the Association Agreements that commit the two countries to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. He recognised recent progress but emphasised that more needed to be done: 'I am not here to sermon and judge. I am here to underline that we are attentive . . . towards these fundamental principles of human rights.'[57] While expressing sympathy for the difficulties the Southern Mediterranean states face in the fight against terrorism, he also emphasised the fact that those difficulties could not be used as a 'pretext for reduce public freedoms, nor to give up of improving the human rights situation'.[58]

Two months later the Commission published a report on how to improve the EU's human rights and democratisation strategy towards the region. Three factors stimulated this shift in policy. Firstly, it was implicitly based on recognition that the EU record in this field had been flawed and inconsequential, while the human rights situation in the region had, if anything, deteriorated over the previous few years. Secondly, the report seems to represent an attempt by the Commission to counter both the 'clash of civilisations' and the 'democracy through bombs' discourses that littered the Western and Arab press in the run-up to and during the intervention in Iraq. Conversely, the Commission seems keen to establish a dialogue on matters that go to the heart of any renewed relations, with the Arab world in particular. On the other hand, it should be remembered that Israel, too, is addressed in the Commission's report, especially with regard to the violation of human rights in the Occupied Territories and

---

[56] European Commission, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, 'Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners. Strategic guidelines', COM(2003), 294 final, Brussels, 21 May 2003.

[57] Romano Prodi, 'Devant le membres du Conseil de la Nation Algérien', SPEECH/03/162, Algiers, 30 March 2003.

[58] Romano Prodi, 'Discours à la Université de Tunis le 31 mars 2003', in *EuroMed Report* 56 (Brussels: 1 April 2003).

the rights of non-Jewish minorities within Israel.

Last but not least, the publication in November 2002 by the United Nations Development Programme of the seminal Arab Human Development Report was very influential in the Commission, providing a valuable contribution to the debate on the importance of human rights and democracy in the region and their relationship to economic development. Indeed, as we have seen, the Barcelona process seemed to rest on an unproven assumption that economic reform would lead to political liberalisation. Conversely, the Arab Human Development Report emphasises the need for a tighter relationship between human rights and development. The 'freedom deficit' shared in varying degrees by all the citizens of the Arab world was, according to the Report, hindering economic development, and this provided the Commission with a significant warning over the salience of pursuing a human rights policy: 'equity, knowledge and the freedom and human rights integral to good governance matter for their own sake as well as for their critical role as enablers of development. They are both means and ends'.[59]

On the basis of the analysis of the 'freedom deficit' situation in the region contained in the Arab Human Development Report (see the tables overleaf for some indicators on degrees of freedom in the region), the Commission made ten policy recommendations for improving the EU's strategy towards the Mediterranean that are worth summarising. At the level of the EU, it recommends that political dialogue should include a 'systematic' dialogue on human rights issues, and that a specific technical subgroup could be established. In order to enhance EU knowledge on the human rights situation within the partner countries, sources of information (from delegations, member states' embassies and the EU country reports) should be streamlined, which would enhance coordination between the Commission and the member states. In order to better identify priorities, the EU should promote workshops with 'civil society', even at a regional level, integrate those priorities in the National Action Plans agreed with the partner governments, which should indicate the objectives and how to achieve them. National Action Plans should also serve to introduce the promotion of human rights and democracy objectives into MEDA assistance programmes, along with the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights funding programme.[60]

So far, it seems that the Commission's intentions have not fallen on deaf ears. There does appear to be a greater awareness among the EU member states that political reform needs to address human rights if it is to help to create a more secure environment. Whereas in Crete ministers 'took note' of the Commission's Communication, the Naples conclusions chose to recognise that 'promoting human rights and democracy is crucial to the success of the Partnership'[61] and accepted the use of the differentiation method, based on Action Plans for each country, advocated by the Wider Europe and human rights communications. The preferred way forward on this theme appears to be to make progress on the less controversial matters in order to avoid alienating partners. Alongside the subcommittees on human rights and democracy that exist within the framework of the Association Agreements, in the second half of 2003 the Italian Presidency initiated the debate by creating two working groups within the Partnership's regional framework on the rights of children, proposed by the countries on the Northern shore, and on racism and xenophobia, following the preferences of the Southern Mediterranean states.

Further confirmation that human rights and democracy deserve a more important position in North-South relations, and in European foreign policy in general, can be found in the European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003, as well as in the joint Commission-Coun-

---

[59] United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Arab Human Development Report 2002. Creating Opportunities for Future Generations* (New York: United Nations Publications, 2002).

[60] European Commission, op. cit. in note 56.

[61] Op. cit. in note 44.

Some indicators of degrees of freedom in the southern Mediterranean states

	Freedom House Country Ratings, 1995-2002*	**Number of authorised parties****
Algeria	6.6 Not Free (1995-98) 6.5 Not Free (1999-2002)	37
Egypt	6.6 Not Free	16
Israel	1.3 Free	
Jordan	4.4 Partly Free (1995-2001) 5.5 Partly Free (2001-02)	36
Lebanon	6.5 Not Free	18
Libya	7.7 Not Free	0
Morocco	5.5 Partly Free	22
Syria	7.7 Not Free	6
Tunisia	6.5 Not Free	7

	Number of parties in government, 2000**	**Number of banned parties ****
Algeria	6	4
Egypt	1	10
Jordan	Non-partisans	0
Lebanon	0	0
Libya	0	10 Exiled groups
Morocco	7	1
Syria	1	6
Tunisia	1	9

Sources:
* Freedom House, downloadable from www.freedomhouse.org (the lower the score, the freer the country)
** Source: Arab Human Development Report 2002

cil Secretariat paper on strengthening relations with the Arab world dated 4 December 2003. While the former considers 'spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights' as 'the best means of strengthening the international order',[62] the latter suggests that the combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches needs to be strengthened through a 'firm and frank' political dialogue and by identifying partners at different levels to build a dialogue with civil society.[63] Even if it is too early to see the impact of such a shift, the signs that the EU institutions produced in 2003 are certainly encouraging.

[62] Op. cit. in note 19.

[63] Council Secretariat and European Commission, 'Strengthening the EU's Partnership with the Arab World', D(2003), 10318, Brussels, 4 December 2003.

Policy recommendations

The EU's 'comprehensive' approach to security contained in the EMP, the Wider Europe communication and the new European Security Strategy does provide an appropriate framework for dealing with the political problems and potential synergies that affect both sides of the Mediterranean. This approach reflects the EU's capabilities in external relations as well as the 'style' it developed throughout the 1990s as a 'civilian power'. In addition, the evolution of the ESDP and the 'hard' security proposals put forward in the European Security Strategy introduce a new dimension into the EMP. This 'comprehensive' approach holds notwithstanding the value of NATO's Mediterranean dialogue and its possible expansion both substantially and geographically.[64]

'Comprehensive' security also better captures the complex nature of the risks that emanate from North Africa, where economic underdevelopment and poverty, demographic growth, informal economic practices, low levels of education and the marginalisation of women are deeply tied to political systems based largely on authoritarianism. The problem is that authoritarianism is the cause as well as the consequence of perceived security threats emanating from fundamentalism. In reinvigorating the Barcelona process, the challenge for the EMP is to confront together root causes of instability in the Mediterranean basin as well as short-term priorities.

4.1 Enhanced political dialogue

Alongside the specific issues relating to the Part-nership, the EU could initiate a *dialogue on matters of global interest*, such as the future of multilateralism, non-proliferation or the internationalisation of terrorism. The aim would be to involve partners on an equal footing, as these issues are of common interest. It is important to ensure the participation of EU partner countries in multilateral processes as well as to enhance the socialisation and mutual understanding between leaders North and South of the Mediterranean.

Reciprocity requires that the EU and its member states address some issues of concern to its Southern partners. *The rights of North African migrants in the EU*, especially in the context of the fight against terrorism, is one area (included in the regional programme for cooperation in justice) in which the EU member states should practice what they preach.[65]

Key issues, such as respect for human rights and good governance, should also be mainstreamed into political dialogue at all levels, from ministerial meetings to the technical committees and subgroups.

4.2 Institutions

The issues at stake are so important and wide-ranging that the Partnership merits a permanent secretariat. The role of the secretariat should be to draw together the threads of all the activities carried out under the auspices of the Barcelona process as well as of the other EU policies that have an impact on the region, such as the new Wider Europe initiative. Similarly, the secretariat could provide information and,

---

[64] On NATO's Mediterranean dialogue, see Roberto Aliboni, 'Strengthening NATO-Mediterranean Relations: A transition to partnership', Report to Italian Parliament-NATO seminar (2002); and Thanos Dokos, *NATO's Mediterranean dialogue: prospects and policy recommendations* (Athens: ELIAMEP, 2003).

[65] Britain's 2001 anti-terrorist act combined with its immigration rules is providing one example of different treatment of British and foreign suspects of terrorism. For a critique, see 'Coming quietly', *The Economist*, 1 March 2003, pp. 33-4.

when necessary, coordination between the EMP and other Mediterranean initiatives such as the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, the '5 plus 5'[66] group, or other subregional arrangements, as well as the sectoral cooperation that is occurring between national ministries other than foreign affairs, such as the cooperation between interior ministries on matters regarding migration and the fight against terrorism, or defence ministries in the field of ESDP. With the forthcoming possible creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Assembly, a secretariat could also serve as its administrative and information unit and involve officials from both shores of the Mediterranean who could report to the parliamentary representatives, thus promoting greater involvement of the latter.

4.3 Security

Dialogue on ESDP issues is no doubt an activity that might lead to greater mutual trust. Most of the *Southern Mediterranean states are eager for greater Euro-Mediterranean transparency and cooperation on military and traditional security matters*, which they otherwise view with a degree of distrust.[67] Transparency on ESDP can thus provide incentives to the Southern states to build partnerships. However, Mediterranean partners are not for their part so eager to reciprocate with the same transparency and to apply good 'security governance' practices.[68]

Given that ESDP is still in the process of being developed, increasing transparency and information is only a modest step and a medium-term objective that should be accompanied by other measures in the future. These could include *involving the Mediterranean partners*

in EU-led peacekeeping operations, following the experiences with the EU's Eastern partners, *maritime cooperation in the Mediterranean* and *joint military exercises*.[69] Cooperation should also possibly be linked to military *training*, especially in the field of international law practices that fully respect civil and political rights.

Similar exercises could be envisaged in the civilian domain, such as involving the EMP partners in any future EU *police missions* following the example of the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina launched in January 2003.

4.4 Human rights and democracy

It would be naive, unrealistic and damaging to suggest that the EU should take on the objective of 'exporting' democracy to the South. Yet political instability and many of the security risks emanating from the region are linked to the endurance of regimes which fall far short of observing the most basic democratic standards. The policy recommendation in the recent Commission communication on reinforcing its policy on promoting human rights in the region are a good starting point; to be credible they clearly require a positive endorsement by the EU member states.

It is obvious, however, that European-styled democracy cannot blossom overnight in Mediterranean states that have little in the way of democratic tradition. The EU should instead promote more flexible concepts, such as 'good governance', best practices, the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms, on which a frank dialogue between partners should be pursued.[70]

While maintaining its overall objective of

[66] The '5 plus 5' group involves five countries from the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain. At the latest meeting held in Tunis after the December 2003 Euro-Mediterranean conference, both Romano Prodi and Javier Solana participated in the discussions that revolved around many of the dossiers debated in Naples.

[67] Dimitris K. Xenakis, 'Order and Change in the Euro-Mediterranean System', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 11, no. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 75-90.

[68] On security governance in the Mediterranean, see Fred Tanner, 'Security governance. The difficult task of security democratisation in the Mediterranean', *Euromesco Brief*, 2003.

[69] See for instance Carlos Echeverria, 'Cooperation in peacekeeping among the Euro-Mediterranean forces', *Chaillot Paper* 35 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, February 1999), and Michael Pugh, 'Europe's boat people: maritime cooperation in the Mediterranean', *Chaillot Paper* 41 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, July 2000).

[70] On good governance, see Richard Youngs, op. cit. in note 54.

promoting 'universal' human rights and freedoms, which are based on UN law and accepted by all parties to the EMP, the EU should focus on just a few issues, such as *freedom of the press, freedom of association* and *the rights of women*. The link between human rights and development, most recently reiterated by the UN Human Development Report, should also be a cornerstone of the EU's strategy, *inter alia* because it makes the dialogue on human rights more acceptable to its partners.

In addition, the EU should *use the tools it has at its disposal for exercising pressure on governments* to comply with the commonly agreed principles, from the 'essential' clause of the Association Agreements to aid (the tools of positive and negative conditionality will be discussed below). The *bottom-up and top-down approaches need to be reinforced and complement rather than contradict each other*.

4.5 Differentiation and political conditionality

The EMP is the only forum in which Israel and the Arab states of North African and the Middle East meet. This is one of its strengths. On the other hand, it has been hard to make progress with all countries at once. Thus, some degree of flexibility should be introduced, as advocated by the Wider Europe document, *in order to allow those partners that are most willing to deepen relations with the EU*, in the hope that this will also serve as an example to the less willing countries.

Differentiation requires the use of incentives to encourage the most willing states to further cooperation. It should be remembered that the main interests of the Southern partners lie not so much in the political and security field as in the economic and trading opportunities that the Barcelona process offers. This requires *far greater consistency between the economic and the political and security objectives of the EMP*. Linking the

two chapters together in a *clear, transparent and agreed regime of political conditionality* might provide one route to greater cooperation in the first basket.

Positive conditionality should therefore rest on *offering trade incentives*, *compensation mechanisms* to ameliorate the negative effects of harmonising internal legislation to speed up the free trade agreements, and measures of *asymmetrical liberalisation* to favour South Mediterranean products, such as agricultural. If the EU persists in maintaining trade restrictions on the key products of the Southern shore, the ultimate objective of trade liberalisation will not be credible. Thus, some positive steps need to be taken in the second basket and tied to progress in the first.

The EU could offer other incentives and cooperation, including in the fight against terrorism (exchange of information and intelligence), cooperation in fighting illegal migration and trafficking in human beings (including transit migration from sub-Saharan Africa), the rights of migrants in the EU, and cooperation in the field of legal migration to the EU.

The EU and its Mediterranean partners should set clear *benchmarks* on the progress expected through the use of incentives. These should concern commonly agreed objectives for the short, medium and long term. The EU has developed experience in benchmarking through the enlargement process: regular reports from the Commission monitoring the progress of the candidate countries towards the *acquis communautaire* have included an evaluation of priorities to be achieved. '*Micro-conditionality*' has been introduced in the assistance programme devoted to the Western Balkans, clarifying what was expected from each of the projects the EU supported through aid. Similar measures could be introduced for the Mediterranean partners.

A regime based on political conditionality would also have to include the possibility of resorting to negative measures should conditions not be met. At the risk of stating the obvi-

ous, *negative conditionality* should be governed by an incremental use of tools, clarity over the conditions expected and equality of treatment of partners so as to avoid accusations of double standards.

Critics of political conditionality argue that without offering the real 'carrot' (i.e. accession to the Union), the 'sticks' do not work. Enlargement beyond the current candidate countries and the Western Balkans is currently not on the cards, nor is it likely in the future. The 'Wider Europe' document suggests that a 'stake' in the single market would be a substantial 'carrot', alongside privileged and enhanced relations with the EU's neighbours.

This said, the regional approach should not be abandoned. The EU should ensure that the positive effects of greater cooperation serve as an example, making differentiation a tool with which to draw the less willing countries into its fold. Matching this ambition, however, is not without costs: *the EU should back its words with money*. Following the MEDA allocation of funds for 2000-2006, the EU and its member states will have to decide on a new economic package for the region. It is to be expected that neither enlargement nor renewed interest in the Eastern neighbourhood would not impinge upon the urgent needs for development in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean.

Conclusions

Nearly ten years ago the Egyptian sociologist and civil rights activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim captured well the nature of the security dilemma in the Mediterranean region as well as the way forward for Western policy: 'the Establishments of both sides of the Mediterranean are clearly keen on avoiding a Huntington "Clash of Civilizations" and have been cooperating on narrow security issues to contain and/or pre-empt violence and terrorism. These, however, are sheer sedatives. What is truly needed are drastic socio-political-economic reforms. Because the Establishment on the southern side is not democratically elected, it will not engage in such serious reform. Even if it did, credibility may still be lacking. Hence the imperative of a carrot-and-stick strategy with the southern Establishments.'[71]

So far, policies towards the Mediterranean have been caught in something of a paradox. On the one hand, the prime motivation for the EU's involvement in the region was to avoid the spillover effects of instability and insecurity from the South. The hitherto bleak prospects of peace in the Middle East, but also in the Western Sahara, a potentially explosive cocktail of high demographic growth coupled with rising unemployment and economic stagnation, the proliferation of arms including nuclear and possibly biological and chemical weapons, and the revival of international terrorism, all place the region in a complex security predicament.

On the other, the EU has been de facto supporting precisely the status quo regimes that play a part in putting the region at risk by undermining civil and political rights, and human and social development. The risk (which has also served as an alibi) of Islamic fundamentalism has emptied much of the laudable exercise of engaging in political dialogue with the governments of North Africa of its reforming zeal. This paradox runs through the policy framework set up by the EU and its partners in the Barcelona process, which has struggled to reconcile the 'global approach' that characterises it with the short-term security concerns of the EU member states.

The challenges therefore can be seen as articulated in two stages. In the first, they concern the ways in which the security environment is understood and defined, which should include the human dimension as well as the more traditional security threats. On the basis of this conceptualisation of security, the next set of challenges has to do with: the identification of those policy options and methods that are most likely to reflect the EU's actual capabilities and thus be credible and effective; meeting the expectations of its partners to the South and thus supporting the deepening of political dialogue; and achieving the objectives of reform, democratisation, and security-building through a method based on partnership rather than by imposing a model from the outside.

The good news is that increasing recognition of the need to tackle the democratic and security deficits differently is surfacing. Wider Europe overall confirms the 'philosophy' behind the EMP, but introduces the new methodological principles of 'benchmarking' and 'differentiation' that could help carry the process forward. The new European Security Strategy aims to reinforce the EU's foreign policy capabilities in many of the 'hard' security areas in which it has so far failed to pull its weight.

Even beyond EU initiatives, some greater awareness of the importance of these issues is

---

[71] Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'From the Battle of Tours to the Battle of Algiers', *Civil Society*, August 1995; quoted in Hollis, op. cit. in note 23, p. 129.

beginning to appear even in the United States, after 11 September, Afghanistan and Iraq. The Bush administration intends to present a proposal on a Greater Middle East Initiative at the June Group of Eight meeting. According to initial information, it seems that the United States is planning a major change in its Middle East policy and is preparing to call upon the Arab governments to adopt political and economic reforms and be held accountable on human rights.[72]

It is of course too early to give even a tentative evaluation of the American proposals. While some convergence may be emerging between the EU and the United States on the need to give democracy and human rights a role together with security and stabilisation in the wider Mediterranean region, the first responses to the US proposal reveal that the issue of *how* to encourage reform in the Mediterranean is likely to become a matter of debate. Germany endorsed the plan but then, together with France, produced a joint proposal which underlines that voices from the region, governments and civil society alike, need to be listened to and need to play their part in defining future Western policies towards the Mediterranean.[73] In the region, where US credibility is at a low, scepticism or 'near-universal scorn' have greeted the

Bush administration's plan.[74] Many Arab observers view the plan as placing all the onus on democratising Arab countries instead of resolving the question of Palestine, which is seen as the source of the region's democratic deficit, and reform-minded opposition leaders argue that change has to come from the countries in question rather than from abroad.[75]

None the less, the US plan should complement well the framework and policies of the Barcelona process. American traditional leverage in the Middle East, accompanied by the EU's relations with the countries in the region, which have suffered less from the 'war against terror', could together provide a strong stimulus for change. The question of method, though, is not secondary. Finding a balance between engaging the governments of the Southern Mediterranean, supporting those pushing for democratisation from within, exercising adequate pressure to reform without causing internal strife, acknowledging cultural diversity while supporting respect for civil and political rights, at the same time pursuing the fight against terrorism and the creation of a secure environment, will be no easy task. The 'carrot and stick' exercise in the Mediterranean will require careful fine-tuning and a concerted effort by all actors involved.

---

[72] 'Bush Aims For "Greater Mideast" Plan', *The Washington Post*, 9 February 2004.

[73] 'Paris et Berlin se mettent d'accord sur une réponse au plan américain de "Grand Moyen-Orient"', *Le Monde*, 4 mars 2004.

[74] 'They grumble, but they move', *The Economist*, 6-12 March 2004.

[75] 'Reform and reformulating', *Al-Ahram*, Issue no. 678, 19, 24 February 2004.

Annexes

Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSBM	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
EC	European Community
EIB	European Investment Bank
ELIAMEP	Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUROFOR	European (Rapid Deployment) Force
EUROMARFOR	European Maritime Force
EuroMeSCo	Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission, a network of foreign policy institutes in the 27 countries involved in the Barcelona process
FEMIP	Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
INTERREG	a Community initiative that aims to stimulate interregional cooperation in the EU
MEDA	Mediterranean European Development Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PSC	Political and Security Committee
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	UN Security Council
UNSCR	UN Security Council Resolution
UNSG	UN Secretary-General
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Bibliography

Documents

▌ Council of the European Union (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December

▌ Council Secretariat and European Commission (2003a), Basic principles for a EU strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Brussels, Doc. 10352/03 PESC 315

▌Council Secretariat and European Commission (2003b), Action Plan for the implementation of the basic principles for an EU strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Doc. 10354/03 PESC 316

▌ Council Secretariat and European Commission (2003c), Strengthening the EU's Partnership with the Arab World, D(2003) 10318, Brussels, 4 December

▌ Euro-Mediterranean Conference (1995), Barcelona Declaration, 27-28 November

▌ Euro-Mediterranean Conference (1997), Second Ministerial Conference, Conclusions, Malta 15-16 April

▌ Euro-Mediterranean Conference (1999), Third Conference of Foreign Ministers, Chairman's formal conclusions, Stuttgart 15-16 April

▌ Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2003a), The Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Presidency Conclusions, Crete, 26-27 May

▌ Euro-Mediterranean Conference (2003b), Presidency Conclusions, Naples, 2-3 December

▌ European Commission (2000a), Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process, COM(2000) 497 final, Brussels, 6 September

▌ European Commission (2000b), On the Implementation of Measures Intended to Promote Observance of Human Rights and Democratic Principles in External Relations for 1996-1999, COM(2000) 726 final, Brussels, 14 November

▌ European Commission (2001a), On Conflict Prevention, COM(2001) 211 final, Brussels, 11 April

▌ European Commission (2001b), Report on the Implementation of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights in 2000, SEC(2001) 801, Brussels, 22 May

▌ European Commission (2003a), Communication Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March

▌ European Commission (2003b), Reinvigorating EU actions on Human rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners. Strategic guidelines, COM(2003) 294 final, Brussels, 21 May

▌ European Commission (2003c), Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument, COM(2003) 393 final, Brussels, 1 July

▌ European Commission (2003d), Communication to prepare the VI Meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs, COM(2003) 610 final, Brussels, 15 October

▌ European Convention (2003), Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 850/03, Brussels, 18 July

▌ European Parliament (2001), Report on the Commission Communication on relations between the EU and the Mediterranean region: reinvigorating the Barcelona Process, Brussels, 22 January

▌ Solana, Javier (2002), Speech delivered at the Annual Conference of the EU-ISS, Paris, 1 July 2002

▌ Solana, Javier (2003), Remarques lors de la conférence Euro-Méditerranéenne de Crète, 26 mai

▌ Prodi, Romano (2003a), Devant les membres du Conseil de la Nation Algérien, SPEECH/03/162, Algiers, 30 March

▌ Prodi, Romano (2003b), Discours à l'Université de Tunis le 31 mars 2003, in EuroMed Report, no. 56, Brussels, 1 April

▌ Patten, Chris (2002), Speech on the Valencia Euro-Mediterranean conference, European Parliament, 24 April

Books and periodicals

▌ Aliboni, Roberto (2002), Strengthening NATO-Mediterranean Relations: A transition to partnership, Report to Italian Parliament-NATO seminar

▌ Aliboni, Roberto (2003), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Regional and Transatlantic challenges, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, Washington and Bologna

▌ Balfour, Rosa (2004), 'Promoting Principles of Democracy and Human Rights. A Review of the European Union's Strategies towards its Neighbours', in Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners (eds.), *Values and Principles in EU Foreign Policy*, London, Routledge, forthcoming (manuscript under revision)

▌ Barbé, Esther (1998), 'Balancing Europe's Eastern and Southern Dimensions', in Jan Zielonka, *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 117-29

▌ Batt, Judy, Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega, and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (2003), Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP for a Wider Europe, *Chaillot Paper* no. 64, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies

▌ Behrendt, Sven and Christian-Peter Hanelt (2000) (eds.), *Bound to Cooperate - Europe and the Middle East*, Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers

▌ Biscop, Sven (2002), 'Network or Labyrinth? The Challenge of Co-ordinating Western Security Dialogues with the Mediterranean', *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 7, no. 1, Spring, pp. 92-112

▌ Chartouni-Dubarry, May (2000), 'Political Transition in the Middle East', in Álvaro Vasconcelos and George Joffé, The Barcelona Process. Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community, Special Issue of *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 5, no. 1, Spring, pp. 53-76

▌ Dokos, Thanos (2003), *NATO's Mediterranean dialogue: prospects and policy recommendations*, ELIAMEP, Athens

▌ *Euromed Report*, no. 44, 29 April 2002

▌ *Euromed* Special Feature, no. 35, 18 February 2003

▌ EuroMeSCO (2002), *European Defence. Perceptions vs. Realities*, Working Group III, First Year Report, Paper 16, June; www.euromesco.net/eurmesco/publi_artigo.asp?cod_artigo=78884

▌ Gillespie, Richard and Richard Youngs (eds.) (2002), European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa. Special Issue of *Democratization* vol. 9, no. 1

▌ Gomez, Ricardo (1998), 'The EU's Mediterranean policy. Common foreign policy by the back door?' in Helen Sjursen and John Peterson (eds.), *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP*, London, Routledge, pp. 133-51

▌ Heller, Mark A. (2000) 'Weapons of Mass Destruction and Euro-Mediterranean Policies of Arms Control: An Israeli Perspective', in Vasconcelos and Joffé (eds.), pp. 158-88

▌ Hollis, Rosemary (2000), 'Barcelona's First Pillar: An Appropriate Concept for Security Relations?', in Behrendt and Hanelt (eds.), pp. 107-30

▌ Hunt, Diane (1998), 'Development Economics, the Washington Consensus, and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative', in Joffé (ed.), pp. 16-38

▌ Joffé, George (1996), 'The Islamist Threat to Egypt', *The Middle East and North Africa*, London, Europa Publications, pp. 3-10

▌ Joffé, George (1998) (ed.), Perspectives on Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Special Issue of the *Journal of North African Studies*, vol. 3, no. 2

▌ Joffé, George (2000), *Europe and the Mediterranean: the Barcelona Process Five Years On*, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs

▌ Jünemann, Annette (2003) (ed.), Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11. Regional and Domestic Dynamics, Special issue of *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 8, no. 2-3, forthcoming

▌ Karkutli, Nadim and Dirk Bützler (1999), Evaluation of the MEDA Democracy Programme 1996-1998. Final Report, Brussels, April

▌ Kepel, Gilles (2002), *L'autunno della Guerra Santa. Viaggio nel mondo islamico dopo l'11 settembre*, Roma, Carocci

▌ Lia, Brynjar (1999), 'Security Challenges in Europe's Mediterranean Periphery - Perspectives and Policy Dilemmas', in *European Security*, vol. 8, no. 4, Winter, pp. 27-56

▌ Linz, Juan J. and Alfred C. Stepan (1996), *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press

▌ Lucarelli, Sonia and Ian Manners (eds.), *Values and Principles in EU Foreign Policy*, London, Routledge, forthcoming (manuscript under revision)

▌ Martin-Muñoz, Gema (2000), 'Political Reform and Social Change in the Maghreb', in Vasconcelos and Joffé (2000), pp. 96-130

▌ Monar, Jörg (1998), 'Institutional Constraints of the European Union's Mediterranean Policy', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 3, no. 2, Autumn 1998, pp. 39-60.

▌ Olsen, Gorm Rye (2000), 'Promotion of Democracy as a Foreign Policy Instrument of "Europe": Limits to International Idealism', *Democratization*, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 142-67

▌ Ortega, Martin (2000a), 'Military Dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Charter: An Unjustified Absence', *The International Spectator*, vol. XXXV, no. 1, January-March, pp. 115- 25

▌ Ortega, Martin (2000b) (ed.), 'The Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue/L'Avenir du Dialogue Euro-

Méditerranéen en Matière de Sécurité', *Occasional Paper* 14, Paris, WEU Institute for Security Studies

❙ Ortega, Martin (2003), 'A new EU policy on the Mediterranean'?, in Judy Batt, Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega, and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, 'Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP for a Wider Europe', *Chaillot Paper* 64, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, pp. 86-101

❙ Romeo, Isabel (1998), 'The European Union and North Africa: Keeping the Mediterranean "Safe" for Europe', *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 3, no. 2, Autumn, pp. 21-38

❙ Schmid, Dorothée, 'Optimiser le processus de Barcelone', *Occasional Paper* 36, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, July 2002

❙ Selim, Mohammed El-Sayed (2000), 'Towards a New WMD Agenda in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: An Arab Perspective', in Vasconcelos and Joffé, pp. 133-57

❙ Sjursen, Helen and John Peterson (1998) (eds.), *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP*, London, Routledge

❙ Smith, Karen E. (1998), 'The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 3, pp. 253-74

❙ Spencer, Claire (2001), 'The EU and Common Strategies: The Revealing Case of the Mediterranean', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 6, pp. 31-51

❙ *The Economist* (2003), 'Coming quietly', 1 March, pp. 33-4

❙ Tanner, Fred (2003), Security governance. The difficult task of security democratisation in the Mediterranean, *EuroMeSCo Brief*

❙ Tkacik, Michael Patrick (1999), 'Democratization and Islam: Towards the Creation of a User-Friendly Environment, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 10, no. 2, Spring, pp. 136-62

❙ Turner, Mark (1997), 'Morocco decision frustrates EU', *The European Voice*, vol. 3, no. 39, 30 October

❙ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2002), *Arab Human Development Report 2002. Creating Opportunities for Future Generations*, New York, United Nations Publications

❙ Vasconcelos, Álvaro and George Joffé (2000) (eds.), The Barcelona Process. Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community, Special Issue of *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 5, no. 1, Spring

❙ Vasconcelos, Álvaro (2002), *A European strategic concept for the Mediterranean*, IEEI, Lisbon

❙ Xenakis, Dimitris K. (2000), 'Order and Change in the Euro-Mediterranean System', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 11, no. 1, Winter, pp. 75-90

❙ Youngs, Richard (1999), 'The Barcelona Process after the UK Presidency: The Need for Prioritization', *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring

❙ Youngs, Richard (2001) Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy. Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, *Working Document* no. 167, October

❙ Youngs, Richard (2002), 'The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: A New or Disingenuous Strategy?' in Gillespie and Youngs, pp. 40-62

❙ Zielonka, Jan (1998) (ed.), *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, The Hague, Kluwer Law International

EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE
OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Naples, 2-3 December 2003)
PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The VIth Conference of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers held in Naples on December 2nd and 3rd took place in a positive, constructive atmosphere against an international background casting shadows of tension, instability and insecurity in the region. In this framework, the Ministers reaffirmed their shared willingness to strengthening their partnership, thereby renewing their common adherence to the values and the objectives set out in the Barcelona Declaration. While stressing the emphasis on the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue as the key element for their respective relationship, they underlined the need for enhanced efforts at increasing its effectiveness. In this context, the Ministers also expressed awareness for the necessity to deepen the Process so as to provide it with further visibility and transparency in a bid to bringing it closer to the civil societies of the region.

2. The Ministers sent a message of common interests, shared values and solidarity among Euro-Mediterranean Partners; they reaffirmed their joint interest in reinforcing security and stability in the region, in promoting political and economic reform and in ensuring that extremism and terrorism are not allowed to get in the way of progress. They also agreed that furthering the process of dialogue and co-operation in order to improve mutual understanding is essential to the vision of the Barcelona Process, reiterating that the partnership stands as the best way of meeting the challenges and opportunities represented by security and stability, globalisation, economic reform and social development.

3. The Ministers agreed that such a vision, which has always been at the heart of the Barcelona Process, is even more relevant in the present circumstances. They also agreed that the process of enlargement of the EU on one side and the current situation in the Middle-East on the other, have given rise to a greater demand for Europe on the Southern and Eastern rim of the Mediterranean. These challenges call for a reinvigorated and renewed partnership, based on a stronger commitment both of the European Union and the Mediterranean countries to common values and objectives.

4. Recalling that the Valencia Action Plan, agreed by Foreign Ministers at their meeting in April 2002, is the most recent comprehensive set of commitments for developing the Partnership and making reference to the review of its outcome at the mid-term Ministerial meeting in Crete, the Ministers took stock of progress made and provided orientations for future work. Furthermore, they supported the idea of engaging in a thorough, open and sincere discussion within the existing bodies of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on how best carry into effect the *acquis* of the Barcelona Process, aiming also at improving the contribution by the Mediterranean partners to the outline of policies and their relevant implementation.

5. The Ministers reviewed progress in particular in implementing the Partnership on three specific issues:
◗ The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly;
◗ The future course of FEMIP;
◗ The Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures.

6. They agreed that achievements on these three issues will foster greater political co-operation, more focussed support for eco-

nomic reform and private sector development and moves to promote inter-cultural dialogue and understanding. All three will move the focus of the partnership further into the domain of civil society, thus producing results that are relevant to ordinary man and woman.

Wider Europe-New Neighbourhood Initiative

7. The Ministers took note of the EU Wider Europe/New Neighbourhood Policy and discussed as far as the Southern neighbours are concerned, how this policy could strengthen cooperation by building on the existing Barcelona Process *acquis*. They noted that the policy aims to support reforms as well as regulatory and legislative approximation, particularly as regards the internal market, between the EU and Mediterranean partners, as they are ready to engage in such intensified cooperation. To develop its full potential to promote political and economic reform based on the shared values reflected in the Barcelona Declaration, the initiative will need to include credible incentives. In this regard, they acknowledged that one of the aspects of these new policies is to reinforce the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in all its chapters as well as the joint ownership of this process with a view to fostering stability, development and democracy in the countries to the South, in the common interest of the E.U. and Mediterranean partners.

Iraq

8. A discussion on the unfolding events in Iraq and the prospects for post conflict arrangements took place. Ministers welcomed the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 1511. They recalled the Union's commitment to play a significant role in the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq, within the framework of the relevant UNSC Resolutions with the following as essential elements for success:

◗ an adequate security environment;

◗ a strong and vital UN role, which could also benefit from an early appointment of a new Special Representative to the UNSG;

◗ a realistic schedule for the handing over of political responsibility to the Iraqi people;

◗ the setting-up of a transparent multilateral donor fund to channel support from the international community which the EU also regards as an essential element for the success of the reconstruction.

The Ministers welcomed the recent agreement establishing the timeline and a programme for a rapid transfer of sovereignty to a transitional Iraqi Government and urged all parties concerned to agree on the necessary constitutional as well as the electoral arrangements. In this context, they recalled UNSC Resolution 1511 and praised its unanimous approval underlining the need of its full implementation.

9. Ministers urged all countries in the region to contribute actively to the stability of Iraq and to support its political and economic reconstruction process. Following the meeting on 2 November in Damascus among neighbouring countries of Iraq, Ministers welcomed the holding of such meetings, in consultation with the Iraqi Governing Council and Iraqi institutions, to help support the political and economic reconstruction transition process under way in Iraq, and emphasised their usefulness. Ministers also welcomed the UNSG's initiative to hold meetings between Iraq's neighbours and Security Council members. A prosperous, stable and sovereign Iraq, whose territorial integrity is preserved, will be essential for the stability in the region and beyond.

10. In this context, Ministers underlined the need to establish a platform for regular and substantial consultations among those members of the International Community which are engaged in Iraq and all neighbouring countries.

Middle East Peace Process

11. Ministers discussed recent developments concerning the Middle East. The were deeply concerned by the situation in the

region and noted that, despite support given by the international community to the quest for a comprehensive, just and lasting solution, insufficient progress has been made by the concerned parties. They should seize the opportunity for peace set out in the Quartet Road Map.

12. Ministers recognised that there is no alternative to a swift and full implementation, in good faith by the two sides, of the Road Map. UNSCR 1515 was seen as an encouraging support by the International Community to the endeavours by the Quartet.

13. Ministers underlined the need for both Parties to work together constructively on solutions to the conflict. They expressed their commitment to the clear objective of two States, Israel and a viable and democratic Palestinian State, living side by side in peace and security, in the framework of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, as laid out in the Road Map. Ministers recalled the importance of the Arab Peace Initiative adopted by the Beirut Arab League Summits of 28 March 2002. They called on both parties – Israel and the Palestinian Authority – to live up to the commitments they undertook at the Aqaba summit on 4 June 2003.

14. They recalled that a comprehensive peace in the Middle East must also include Syria and Lebanon in the framework of the Madrid Principles.

15. Ministers reiterated that the fight against terrorism in all its forms remains one of the priorities of the entire International Community and that it is the duty of all countries, in particular of those in the region, to actively co-operate in the fight against terrorism and to abstain from all support, direct or indirect, to terrorist organisations.

16. It was emphasised by Ministers that the new Palestinian Government under Prime Minister Qorei must concretely demonstrate its determination in the fight against extremist violence. Decisive steps to consolidate all Palestinian security services must be taken by the new Palestinian Government, which deserves to be supported by all. Efforts to implement a lasting cease-fire were welcomed.

17. Ministers also urged the Government of Israel, in exercising its right to protect its citizens, to exert maximum effort to avoid civilian casualties and take all necessary action to ease the humanitarian and economic plight of the Palestinian people and facilitate the relief work of international donors. Israel should refrain from any action that violates international law.

18. Ministers were of the view that decisive steps must be taken to reverse the sharply deteriorating humanitarian situation in the West Bank and Gaza. It is making life increasingly intolerable for ordinary Palestinians and fuelling extremism.

19. Ministers welcomed the upcoming donor's meeting (Ad Hoc Liaison Committee) that will take place on 10 December 2003 in Rome, as a good opportunity to discuss necessary measures and efforts by the parties and the International Community to improve the economic and humanitarian situation of the Palestinian people.

20. Strong concerns were expressed regarding the route marked out by Israel for the fence in the Occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. The envisaged departure of the route from the "green line" prejudges future negotiations and makes the two-State solution physically impossible to implement. Continued expansion of Israeli settlements and related construction is counterproductive.

21. Ministers highlighted the importance of promoting tolerance in all countries of the Partnership, and stressed in particular the need to stand up against both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, as well as xenophobia.

22. Ministers also reiterated that the Middle East Peace Process and the Barcelona Process are complementary, and expressed their readiness to use fully the potential of the Barcelona Process to make a positive contribution to the stabilisation of the Mediterranean region. Ministers recalled the importance of a reinvigorated cooperation within the wider region and with Mediterranean partners.

23. Initiatives from civil society on both sides were welcomed as contributions to the effort to promote rapprochement, confidence building and the search for a lasting peace.

Association Agreement

24. The Valencia Action Plan, agreed unanimously by the participants at the Valencia meeting, contains a series of activities to reinforce all areas of the Partnership. Good progress has been made on many of them. Association Agreements are now in force with Tunisia, Morocco, Israel, and Jordan and on an interim basis with the Palestinian Authority and Lebanon.

25. The Association process remains at the core of the Partnership. The Ministers confirmed commitment to encourage speeding up the ratification process of Agreements not yet in force and to ensure where necessary the early implementation of relevant provisions through interim agreements or other appropriate arrangements. The Ministers welcomed progress made in many areas on the implementation of the Agreements in force notably the regular holding of Association Councils and Committees as well as the setting up of sub-Committees such as under the Agreements with Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia. They reaffirmed the importance of completing the grid of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements by concluding the negotiation with Syria.

II. POLITICAL AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP

Political and security dialogue

26. Ministers reiterated that a concerted effort should be made to give greater substance to political and security co-operation. This requires an overall strategy to the stability/security issue in the region, while paying more attention – with an even-handed and balanced approach – to new security challenges particularly great in the Mediterranean basin. In order to deal more effectively with these challenges, the Ministers considered the option of preparing their discussions also through open ended ad hoc informal groups reporting to the Partners through existing Euromed institutional channels.

27. The Ministers, while reaffirming the complementarity between the Middle East Peace Process and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in accordance with the Barcelona Declaration, recognised that, any direct linkage between the two should continue to be avoided. It is undoubtedly true that when there have, from time to time, been positive developments in the former, they have contributed in large measure to creating a more positive atmosphere for progress in the latter. The converse is equally the case, and applies particularly to political and security co-operation. The Ministers therefore recognised their interest in implementing the Road Map and returning to negotiations.

Human Rights and Democracy

28. Cooperation in promoting human rights and democracy is crucial to the success of the Partnership. The Ministers welcomed the approach set out in the recent EU initiative, based on dialogue with the Partners aiming to reach a consensus on extending cooperation in this area progressively and on an individual basis, in particular by developing joint action plans which would set out the means to implement effectively through national regulation and legislation the commitments which the partners have

agreed to. Such cooperation would be eligible for enhanced EU financial support and the EU will take it into consideration when allocating MEDA funds. The Ministers also emphasized the support provided for direct actions in the field of human rights and for capacity-building of civil society players in a regional or sub-regional framework.

Partnership building measures

29. The Ministers acknowledged that existing political and security dialogue among Senior Officials should be pursued and should aim to agree on further partnership building measures in the field of security; they mandated the Senior Officials to study further and to identify partnership building measures to be implemented among partners such as maritime safety, civil protection and environment. If necessary such measures could be on the basis of participation by a limited number of partners, open to others to join later.

Fight against terrorism

30. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to fight terrorism in all its forms and manifestations wherever and by whomsoever committed. They stressed their engagement in the full implementation *inter alia* of UNSCR 1373. They also mandated Senior Officials to further the dialogue on terrorism, including ad hoc meetings, with a view to increasing cooperation in this field. According to that vision, the Ministers reiterated that co-operation on terrorism will be pursued under existing and future regional and bilateral programmes for training and technical assistance to improve the capability to fight terrorism as well as other forms of organised crime without prejudice to respect for human rights and democracy.

ESDP

31. The Ministers welcomed the launching of dialogue and co-operation on ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy), confirming that the dialogue with the EU Political and Security Committee, and at expert level, can usefully add to the range of instruments available under the Barcelona Process. They also stressed that this dialogue should help to familiarise the Mediterranean partners with ESDP aims and instruments, with a view to their eventual, possible cooperation in ESDP activities on a regional, sub-regional or country basis. They recalled that some of the Mediterranean partners already work with the EU in peacekeeping activities (Balkans, Africa) under the UN aegis. The Ministers expressed their belief that further complementary measures, such as civilian crisis management training; co-operation among civil protection authorities, particularly continuing cooperation on a project on disaster management, drawing on the experience of the on-going pilot project, subject to satisfactory evaluation of its results, would constitute a significant addition to partnership building.

Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly

32. The Ministers welcomed the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and agreed to include this new body, in a consultative capacity, in the framework of the Barcelona Process. They expressed their conviction that this step will provide the Process with further visibility and transparency, thereby bringing the Partnership itself closer to the interests and expectations of public opinions in the region. In this context, the Ministers stressed that the Assembly will add to the depth of the Barcelona Process, ensuring complementarity with the existing institutions of the Partnership. The text of the Recommendation from the Euromediterranean Parliamentary Forum to the Ministerial Conference is attached.

…

**EURO-MEDITERRANEAN MID-TERM MEETING
OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Dublin, 5-6 May 2004)
PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS**

I.INTRODUCTION

1.The Dublin Mid-Term meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers took place as a reaffirmation of the Partners' continuing commitment to the Barcelona process. It confirmed the importance of partnership and co-ownership as essential elements of the process.

2.The meeting took place against the background of a number of initiatives concerning the countries of the Mediterranean region and beyond. The Union has proposed to include Mediterranean partners in the Neighbourhood policy. In addition, on the basis of mandates from the December 2003 European Council, an Interim Report on "An EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East" was welcomed by the European Council in March 2004. On the basis of this Interim Report, work is now in progress to develop for the European Council in June an agreed view on relations with the area which extends from Mauritania to Iran – the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

3.Ministers unreservedly condemned terrorist attacks including those at Casablanca, Istanbul and Riyadh, as well as the appalling terrorist attack in Madrid on 11 March, and expressed solidarity with the victims. These events reinforced the relevance of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as the framework for solidarity and co-operation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners in tackling common security threats. It should stimulate the partners to reinforce all their joint activities, in particular in the fight against terrorism in all its forms, co-operation on justice and home affairs, and the inter-cultural dialogue.

4.Ministers therefore confirmed their attachment and commitment to the Barcelona Process as the main framework for a coherent set of privileged relations within the Euro-Mediterranean neighbourhood. They acknowledged the solid and substantial range of co-operation activities which has been established in a spirit of partnership on issues ranging from political and security questions, including human rights, political reform and good governance, through trade liberalisation, economic reform and infrastructure networks to culture, education and the movement of people. They therefore firmly committed themselves to implementing the Naples agenda in order to reinvigorate the Barcelona Process while seeking ways of improving the sense of co-ownership of the process.

5.The meeting also recognised the potential of the European Neighbourhood Policy to build on the Barcelona Process and to further it on the basis of jointly agreed Action Plans, as well as the opportunities and benefits offered to the Mediterranean partner countries through this policy. Within a differentiated approach, the EU can offer a more intensive political dialogue and greater access to EU programmes and policies, including their gradual participation in the four freedoms particularly the Single Market, as well as reinforced co-operation on justice and home affairs. Such close and co-operative relations will depend on a better mutual understanding of security concerns and the strengthening of commitments to common values and common principles, such as promoting human rights, combating terrorism, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The level of EU support to the implementation of reforms should be related on a mutually agreed basis in a spirit of co-ownership, to the intensity of the efforts of the partners assessed under the framework of agreed evaluation instruments. Articulation of MEDA and EIB

credits should be further reinforced, as well as co-ordination within the EU and with other donors.

6.Against this background, Ministers took stock of progress in implementing the Valencia Action Plan and the conclusions of the Ministerial meeting in Naples. In the perspective of the Euro-MediterraneanForeign Ministers meetings to be held under the Dutch and Luxemburg Presidencies as well as the 10th anniversary next year of the launching of the Barcelona Process. Ministers requested the Euro-MediterraneanCommittee to draw up firm proposals and guidelines for moving forward. They acknowledged that progress on the implementation of the Valencia Action Plan had been insufficient and needed to be speeded up. There should be more focus on deliverable achievements rather than on process. Final decisions were taken on the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures which will ensure its establishment in line with the agreed timetable.

7.At Naples, Foreign Ministers mandated senior officials to examine the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership's working methods. The Presidency has carried this work forward and, following an extensive consultation process with Partners, published its Working Paper on the Improvement of the Working Methods of the Partnership. This has met with the approval of the Senior Officials of the 35 partner countries. Ministers welcomed agreement on improving the working methods of the partnership, which includes the setting up of ad-hoc groups to prepare discussion, proposals to increase the sense of co-ownership by giving a greater role to the Mediterranean partners, and certain technical improvements. In addition, arising from this paper, two ad-hoc thematic groups have been set up and had their initial meetings on 5th and 7th April respectively, with a view to preparing work-plans on Partnership-Building Measures and the European Neighbourhood Policy. These draft work-plans were welcomed by the Ministerial Meeting.

8.Good progress has been made within the association process which lies at the core of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Association Agreements are now in force with Morocco, Tunisia, Israel and Jordan and on an interim basis with the Palestinian Authority. There are interim agreements in place with Egypt and Lebanon as well. The ratification of the agreement concluded with Egypt is now finalised and the first meeting of the EU-Egypt Association Council is scheduled for June 2004. The ratification processes of the agreements with Lebanon and Algeria are also well underway. All partners were again encouraged to expedite the ratification process of those Association Agreements not yet in force. The EU is also encouraged by the progress made towards concluding an Association Agreement with Syria, and is hopeful that the few outstanding points will be resolved soon, allowing Syria to join the group of Euro-Mediterranean countries which have signed Association or Interim Agreements with the Union, thus completing the network of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements. These are important developments for the fulfilment of the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration and for the reinforcement of South-South cooperation.

9.Ministers drew attention to the priority they attach to the promotion of gender equality and the promotion of the role of women in society, in the framework of pursuing the objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Ministers acknowledged the important contribution of women in all sectors, including: education, the public service, the administration of justice, business, agriculture and rural development. They adopted the promotion of the role of women in society, north and south of the Mediterranean, as one of the major ambitions in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

II.EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

10.The setting up of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly in Athens on 22-23 March was welcomed as a means to improve co-operation on democratisation and to provide an input into all areas of the Partnership. The President of the Assembly addressed the meeting of Foreign Ministers. It was agreed that the views of the Assembly on the major issues of the partner-

ship would be welcome. Ministers agreed that the appropriate articulation between the institutions should be established without setting up an over-burdensome formal consultation procedure.

III. EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

11. The EU presented an overview of its internal discussions on its proposed Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle East and encouraged partners to make comments and suggestions on the Strategic Partnership and follow up actions relating to it. The EU stressed that the most recent European Council underlined the importance of intensive consultation with the countries involved. Ministers welcomed the opportunity provided by the Dublin Mid-Term Ministerial meeting to discuss with Partners the proposed EU Strategic Partnership with regard to its Mediterranean dimension and also to underline its commitment to the Barcelona Process and its wish to develop this further including through the European Neighbourhood Policy.

12. In this respect the European Union and Mediterranean partners discussed issues relating to reform and democratisation in the region. Existing instruments such as the Association Agreements and the national action plans under the European Neighbourhood Policy should be fully used to support reforms and modernisation.

13. The EU indicated that it will continue to pursue its specific EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, based on the existing frameworks and in particular the Barcelona Process as far as the Mediterranean is concerned, and aiming for the appropriate articulation between the different frameworks. The EU also stated its readiness to cooperate with other actors, with a view to achieving complementarity with other initiatives, notably with the US and in the framework of the G8 and NATO Summits in June. The EU expressed its willingness to cooperate closely with initiatives coming from the region, including taking account of the outcome of the Arab League Summit.

14. Ministers agreed that the clear commitment to pursuing the Middle East Peace Process through the implementation of the Road Map was central to the success of such a policy. Progress on the resolution of the Middle East conflict cannot be a pre-condition for confronting the urgent reform challenges facing the countries of the region, nor vice versa. But it is clear that it will not be possible to build a common zone of peace, prosperity and progress unless a just and lasting settlement of the conflict is in place.

IV. MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

15. Ministers reviewed developments since their last meeting in Naples and view with great concern the situation in the Middle East. The Presidency informed partners about the meeting of the International Quartet in New York on 4 May. They noted with appreciation the statement issued by the Quartet after the meeting and welcomed the programme of action outlined therein. The Quartet should play an active role in pursuing the goal of a comprehensive regional peace and encourage the parties to move ahead vigorously on the basis of the principles outlined in their New York statement.

16. Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to a negotiated two-State solution agreed between the parties which would result in a viable, contiguous, sovereign and independent Palestinian State existing side by side in peace with an Israel living within recog-

nised and secure borders. They reaffirmed their belief that the Roadmap represents the only route to achieving such an outcome. They called on both sides to fulfil their obligations under the Roadmap. They stated that any change to the pre-1967 borders can only be arrived at by agreement between the parties. Ministers noted that the refugee question and the manner in which the right of return may be realised is also a Final Status issue and that the Roadmap states that a final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must include an agreed, just, fair and realistic solution to this question. Ministers emphasised the principle that Final Status issues are a matter for negotiation and agreement between the parties themselves and must not be prejudged. Issues such as borders and refugees must be mutually agreed to by Israelis and Palestinians based on Security Council resolutions 242, 338, 1397, 1515, the terms of reference of the Madrid peace process, the principle of land for peace, previous agreements and the Arab Peace Initiative adopted by the Beirut Arab League Summit; and be consistent with the Roadmap.

17. Ministers took note of the announced intention of Israeli Prime Minister Sharon to withdraw from all Gaza settlements and parts of the West Bank. They agreed that such a withdrawal must bring about a full Israeli withdrawal and complete end of occupation in Gaza, and can be a step towards achieving the two-state vision; it could represent a significant step towards the implementation of the Roadmap provided that it is carried out in accordance with certain conditions, as set out in the conclusions of the March 2004 European Council. They consider that such a step should provide a rare moment of opportunity in the search for peace in the Middle East. Such an initiative should be properly orchestrated with the international community so as to ensure that an orderly situation in Gaza results which will permit the maintenance of security as well as rehabilitation and reconstruction. Ministers urged all parties to undertake urgently preparations towards this end. Ministers stressed the need to avoid a political vacuum, and the dangers which that would involve, in the interim period between now and the beginning of any withdrawal. They recalled that there are a number of measures which need to be adopted in the period immediately ahead in the political, security and humanitarian spheres in order to prevent further deterioration and to resume progress. Ministers urged an end to violence and terrorism as well as the resumption of a ceasefire embracing all parties and groups. They called on both sides to resume negotiations on the peace process without further delay.

18. Ministers stressed the importance of the Arab Peace Initiative adopted by the Beirut Arab League Summit of 28 March 2002 to achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East which must include Syria and Lebanon.

19. Ministers recalled that a just, lasting and comprehensive peace must meet the legitimate aspirations of both the Israeli and Palestinian people. Ministers called on all States in the region to exert every effort to promote peace. They also urged all states to act to combat terrorism.

V. IRAQ

20. The EuroMediterranean partners stated their determination to assist the Iraqi people as they enter a new era in the history of their country.

21. Calling on all parties in Iraq to work together to establish a sovereign, independent, democratic and peaceful Iraq whose territorial integrity is preserved and which lives in peace with its neighbours, the EuroMediterranean partners committed themselves to continue to help the Iraqi people rebuild their country and regain its proper place in the regional as well as the international family.

22.They welcomed the consensus reached by the various parties in Iraq in signing the new Transitional Administrative Law on 8 March and expressed the hope that this encouraging development would permit the transition process to move ahead expeditiously.

23.They noted that the security situation in Iraq remained a major impediment to successful political and reconstruction processes.

24.They condemned all violence and terrorist attacks, including the kidnappings and brutal murder of hostages. They deplored the taking of hostages in all circumstances and called on those responsible to release immediately and unharmed all remaining hostages and to desist from any further such activity.

25.The partners condemned any incidents of abuse of prisoners in Iraq by occupying forces which have taken place as contrary to international humanitarian law. They noted the prompt response by the UK and US authorities in instigating investigations into reports of such abuse and their commitment to rectify any failure to adhere to international humanitarian law.

26.Convinced that a strong UN role in this political transition process is an essential element for its success, the EuroMediterranean partners welcomed the decision of the Iraqi Governing Council to invite the UN to help with the transfer of sovereignty at the end of June 2004 and future national elections and the acceptance of this invitation by the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan. They looked forward to the UN playing a vital and growing role endorsed by the UN Security Council in the run-up to transition and beyond and expressed their support to UN Special Advisor Mr Lakhdar Brahimi in his endeavours.

VI.POLITICAL AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP

Political and security dialogue

27.Ministers expressed their determination to give greater substance to the political and security dialogue despite the obstacles posed notably by the absence of progress in the Middle East Peace Process. The noted the work programmes presented by the ad hoc working groups and looked forward to progress being made on the areas covered by the groups.

EuroMeSCo

28.Ministers noted the upcoming EuroMeSCo/EuroMed Senior Officials seminar to be held in Dublin on 1 June. They acknowledged that EuroMeSCo continues to make an important contribution to the promotion of ongoing dialogue in the Political and Security chapter of the Barcelona Process which is recognised by the Euro Mediterranean Partnership's adoption of EuroMeSCo as an official confidence building measure.

Diplomatic Seminars

29.Ministers noted with appreciation the 16th Seminar that was recently held in Malta. Ministers agreed that these Seminars are an important contribution to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and expressed their support for this ongoing activity.

Human rights and democratisation

30.Ministers underlined the importance of taking forward the recommendations in the Commission Communication on reinvigorating EU actions on human rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners. They reaffirmed that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is based on respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy and that these form an

essential element both of the bilateral Association Agreements and of the multilateral framework governing relations between the EU and Mediterranean partners. They also acknowledged the need for further progress in the region with regard to respect for human rights and democracy. This could focus on extending and strengthening political pluralism, regulatory reform for the implementation of international commitments, improving the judicial and penal systems, greater transparency, education and awareness raising, as well as full acceptance of and improving conditions for activity by civil society. They confirmed the need for full adherence to international law by all parties.

31. Ministers noted that contacts have taken place with a number of partners to draw up joint action plans in line with the Commission's Communication on the subject and an allocation is envisaged for the countries that adopt action plans. An EU-Morocco Association sub-committee on human rights, democratisation and good governance is being established; other partners were encouraged to do the same to allow for structured discussion and follow-up; the EU indicated that human rights will be an important component of the political chapter of the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans, and two regional workshops will be held this year on the rights of the child (including matters relating to family law and parental responsibilities) and on racism and xenophobia. Ministers noted that activity under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights has also been stepped up with a focus on strengthening civil society and improving governance and the fight against corruption.

32. Ministers expressed the conviction that addressing these issues is essential to achieving lasting economic, social and human development and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership's goal of a region of peace, stability and prosperity.

Fight against terrorism

33. Ministers deplored the recent terrorist attacks which have demonstrated that the fight against terrorism must be a priority objective. Ministers therefore took this opportunity to stress that progress in cooperation on the fight against terrorism should be stepped up. The need to move to the stage of concrete operational joint activities has been heightened by these attacks.

34. The EU, in the European Security Strategy adopted at the European Council in December 2003, identified terrorism as one of the key threats to EU interests. The European Council on 25/26 March 2004 adopted a Declaration on Combating Terrorism. The European Council urged full implementation of measures to combat terrorism as a matter of urgency and called for the development of an EU long-term strategy to address all the factors contributing to terrorism. It also agreed updated Strategic Objectives to enhance the EU Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism which was adopted in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks and subsequently supplemented by many important initiatives.

35. Cooperation should be intensified both at regional level and bilaterally. In the latter context, Ministers mandated the Justice and Security sub-committees existing or currently being established under the Association Agreements to take forward such joint activities at expert level with the aim of improving and assisting the development of counter-terrorism standards and capabilities. The fight against terrorism should also be pursued in the framework of the Action Plans to be agreed under the ENP.

36. Ministers also noted that the informal Ad Hoc Senior Officials and experts' meeting on Terrorism on 21 April concentrated on an exchange of views on the possibility of engaging in operational joint activities.

Non-proliferation

37. Ministers instructed Senior Officials to explore possibilities for enhancing dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation issues, in particular in order to promote universal adherence and effective compliance with all relevant multilateral agreements, and the implementation of effective export/end use control policies. The development of a cooperative mechanism should be

examined, as well as the designation of points of contact between Euro-Mediterranean partners. On the EU side, the Personal Representative of HR Solana could assist in this process. The final objective should remain a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their means of delivery, as set out in the Barcelona declaration.

ESDP

38. Ministers noted the report on dialogue and cooperation on ESDP between the EU and Mediterranean partners prepared by the relevant EU body and undertook to discuss the issue further at official level.

39. Ministers noted ongoing efforts to deepen this dialogue in the framework of the Barcelona Process, as agreed at Valencia. These efforts should focus on means to raise the visibility of this dialogue, establishing contact points on a voluntary basis and exploring the possibility for cooperation with Mediterranean partners in concrete activities on conflict prevention and crisis management. This could be done through possible cooperation in the Senior Officials' meetings and in other appropriate formats, including on a subregional or country basis; this would be fully coordinated with the activities of the Euro-Mediterranean Process. These general efforts would be made with a view to encouraging participation of Mediterranean partners, on a case by case basis, in crisis management operations.

...

Occasional Papers