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Crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa The role of the European Union

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by Fernanda Faria

**Crisis management in
sub-Saharan Africa
The role of the European Union**



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The increasing number and complexity of crisis situations in Africa and the declining interest of the international community in the region in the aftermath of the Cold War has led many African states and organisations to take a more proactive stance in their attempts to find solutions to their own problems. Significant efforts have been made by African regional and subregional organisations and their member states to develop mechanisms and adapt their structures in order to be able to respond to crisis situations in the region. However, structural, logistical, operational and financial weaknesses, besides political mistrust and ‘conservatism’, remain obstacles to the development of their capabilities to deal with conflicts in the region.

Some Western countries, unwilling to intervene but aware of the problems in Africa, have created programmes to support and develop African capabilities to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the continent – France, the United Kingdom and the United States having important programmes in this respect. Although these vary considerably, they all focus in one way or another on providing training, equipment or financial assistance to African countries directly or through regional organisations. Other countries and international organisations have also included this dimension in their policies or activities towards some African countries/regions. At the multilateral level, bodies like the EU, the UN, the OSCE, the World Bank and others are increasingly focused on peace and stability in Africa.

The role of the European Union is, in this regard, an interesting case of policy changes and shifting priorities. Relations between the EU and African countries were for a long time essentially economic and development oriented. This remains the fundamental dimension of EU-African relations, but the issue of conflict prevention has gained increasing importance in the overall EU policy towards Africa since the early/mid-1990s. The main focus of current EU policy is on addressing the root causes of instability and violent conflict. More recently the EU reinforced its commitment to support African organisations’ capabilities and efforts to deal with crises in the region, through the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa, while coordinating efforts with other international organisations (the UN in particular) and donors aimed at supporting peace-related efforts in Africa, at the institutional and operational levels. Furthermore, the EU has engaged militarily in preventing escalation and supporting conflict resolution efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the summer of 2003, EU (with non-EU) forces were deployed to Bunia (in the eastern district of Ituri, DRC) under an EU-led crisis management operation, Artemis, under a UN mandate and French command. Operation Artemis illustrated EU engagement in Africa and in crisis management in general, and provided an exam-

ple of how EU key actors (institutions and member states) coordinated and cooperated to set up the operation. It was also a good illustration of the potential of combining the EU's various tools to address conflict-related situations, from conflict prevention to post-conflict intervention, and of the complementarity between diplomatic, political, military, humanitarian, financial and development instruments.

The EU intervention in DRC also raised concerns with regard to the overall EU priorities in crisis management, in this case regarding its policy towards Africa. Some perceive it as privileging military instruments for crisis management to the detriment of civilian crisis management and conflict prevention instruments and policies. However, the emphasis of EU crisis management instruments and policy is likely to remain on its civilian dimension for a number of reasons, including financial ones, although it is widely recognised that it is important to be able to resort to military instruments and capabilities when necessary.

Introduction

In the aftermath of the international community's failure to act against the genocide in Rwanda, there has been increasing interest in, and a growing number of initiatives for conflict prevention, management and resolution in sub-Saharan Africa. With the disengagement of the international community from African issues, particularly after the failed intervention in Somalia in 1993, African states and organisations have taken up much of the burden of peacekeeping and crisis management in the region. They have established institutions and mechanisms to deal with crisis management but they all, without exception, face serious (financial, operational and to some extent also political) constraints.

The international community has responded to the Africans' willingness to take responsibility for dealing with the security problems of the continent, and their limitations, with a number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives aimed primarily at reinforcing African capabilities to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the region. On some occasions, critical ad hoc support was given to United Nations (UN) and African-led peace support operations. The most significant capacity-building initiatives have actually been bilateral: France, the United Kingdom and the United States have developed furthest their assistance programmes to support African capabilities.

Since the early 1990s, the perceived failure of development policies and the increasing number of violent conflicts in the region, particularly internal ones, have to some extent put greater pressure on European policies towards the

region. The disruptive impact of conflicts on the region has negative consequences for the European Union's cooperation and development efforts in Africa. They also have a direct impact on the EU in areas such as migration, organised crime and, more recently, on the perceived risk of creating 'safe heavens' for terrorist organisations. This has further accentuated the need for a more active European policy and for more immediate actions to contain and resolve violent conflicts that hinder European and international efforts to support development in the region. The EU-led Operation *Artemis* in Bunia (Ituri district, Democratic Republic of Congo), under French command as framework nation, was perceived by many as a test case for the EU's capabilities and political will to engage and successfully lead this kind of military operation. Its importance may well lie beyond the immediate results of the operation, that is, the stabilisation and pacification of Bunia and surrounding areas to allow for the return of internally displaced persons (IDP), the resumption of humanitarian support and open the way for the reinforced UN mission (MONUC) that took over on 1 September 2003. The impact of this operation is likely to be felt not only internally within the EU, but also in relations with other actors and partners: with African countries and regional organisations, but probably even more so in relations with the UN, NATO and the United States.

Chapters 2 and 3 of this paper focus on, respectively, the root causes of violent conflicts and instability in sub-Saharan Africa,¹ and the various regional and international (bilateral and

¹ Sub-Saharan Africa comprises 48 countries: all African states with the exception of North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia).

multilateral) efforts undertaken so far to reinforce regional capabilities in Africa to prevent and deal with internal and cross-border conflicts. Chapter 4 deals with EU policy towards Africa and how the EU is trying to adapt and respond to challenges in this region. Operation *Artemis*, its context, objectives, organisation and outcome are the subject of chapter 5. Chapter 6

analyses its impact on EU crisis management policy and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The paper ends with some remarks on the prospects for EU crisis management policy towards Africa in the aftermath of Operation *Artemis* and of the most recent developments in European security and defence policy.

Root causes of conflicts in Africa

Africa has undergone significant changes ever since decolonisation in the early 1960s. A new process of change started with the end of the Cold War, and a 'wave of democratisation' in the early 1990s did in fact produce some success stories, but it also left in place some dictatorial regimes. Periods of change have also been periods of turmoil and violent conflict. To quote UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan:

Since 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast majority of them intrastate in origin. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. The consequences of those conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples.²

Compared with this gloomy picture of Africa in the mid-1990s, the early years of the new millennium are somewhat more positive. There are fewer major armed conflicts around the world now than in the late 1990s (21 in 2002 – the lowest figure since 1998), but Africa (along with Asia) still leads on that front.³ Despite the end of the war in Angola, and progress in the peace talks in Sudan and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), many parts of Africa, stretching from Sierra Leone and Liberia to Sudan and Somalia, are still affected by violent conflicts. Even in those cases where war has come to an

end or peace seems close at hand, the long-lasting human, social and economic effects of armed conflicts are likely to be a major challenge to durable peace and development in the countries and regions concerned. At the beginning of 2003, there were 4.6 million people in Africa of concern to the UNHCR. The vast majority were refugees (almost 3.4 million), in addition to many IDP (more than 700,000), returned refugees, asylum seekers and stateless people. Six African countries (Angola, Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, DRC and Eritrea) were in the 'top 10' countries of origin of major refugee population in 2002, the vast majority of them seeking refuge in neighbouring African countries.⁴

Colonialism has often been blamed for Africa's conflicts. The colonial heritage does provide a partial explanation to some of the root causes of recent conflicts in Africa, but that is not the only explanation for the recent history of African countries. The imposition of boundaries that did not correspond to indigenous social and ethnic dynamics certainly did not help to create a sense of national unity upon which the political leadership could rely. Furthermore, the inherited economic infrastructure only perpetuated the dependency of former colonies, as it did not meet their needs as new, independent states. Nor had the indigenous populations acquired the necessary skills that would have best prepared them for statehood. Centralisation, and in many cases authoritarianism, were the political responses adopted by many post-colonial regimes. The nature and perception of political power in some African

² Secretary General Report to the UN Security Council (UNSC) on *The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa*, April 1998.

³ SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2003*, ch. 2; <http://www.sipri.se/pubs/yb03/ch02.html>.

⁴ UNHCR, *Refugees by Number 2003 Edition*, 1 September 2003; <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texts/vtx/home?page=search>.

states was in itself a source of conflict: the 'winner takes all' logic of power did not favour political pluralism, power sharing or smooth transitions of power. The multi-ethnic fabric of populations within most African states has often led to a politicisation of ethnicity – the 1994 genocide in Rwanda being one of its most extreme examples.

During the Cold War, the two 'blocs' supported and legitimated authoritarian, oppressive and corrupt regimes in search of allegiances in Africa. Their influence in the region has often created, fuelled and perpetuated conflicts (namely by providing governments with financial and military support) when that served their interests; but that influence also helped to contain some conflicts. After the end of the Cold War, there was a general decrease of economic and political support and interest in the region on the part of the superpowers and Western countries, including towards their former colonies. The legitimacy of many African regimes started to be questioned more openly; internal opposition became more vocal and more openly declared. The state itself was in crisis: the lack of accountability and transparency of most African regimes, increasing corruption, mismanagement, imposed centralisation and inefficient bureaucracies, failed economic choices and the inability to respond to the most basic needs of their populations were visible almost everywhere. In many cases, the state was increasingly noted for its absence, as social responsibilities were taken up by non-state actors supported by international donors, non-governmental organisations and UN agencies.

However, the impact of the new internal and international environment had different consequences in different African countries and regions. In some cases, longstanding conflicts were finally brought to an end and the parties agreed to a peaceful transition into democracy.

Some southern African countries (e.g. Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa) provide good examples of this, and although not every country in the subregion could be said to have made substantial progress towards peace and stability or increasing pluralism, the general picture was nevertheless more positive than in the previous decades. Other parts of Africa sank into growing domestic unrest and violence, which ultimately led to brutal intrastate conflicts.

Apart from the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, all major conflicts in Africa during the last decade have been intrastate conflicts. Yet they have proven to be a major problem for their region, and in some cases they have also fuelled conflicts in neighbouring countries. The proliferation of armed groups and militias (sometimes used by external political forces to wage proxy wars in neighbouring countries, but not always fully controlled by them), and the inability of state authorities (where the state has not collapsed or disintegrated) to control their movements or confine them to national borders, the proliferation of small arms, and the growing influx of refugees, have contributed to further destabilise the region and pose a major challenge to the ability of states to govern. Economic decline and growing poverty in Africa, the struggle among communities for access to land, water or control over oil and rich mineral resources have also been at the origin of, or have partially contributed to, some internal and interstate conflicts.

Despite this gloomy general backdrop, recent evolution on the political front in sub-Saharan Africa does show some positive signs and certainly a greater willingness of Africans to deal with some of their major problems and conflicts in the region. Hopefully, the international community will follow and provide the necessary support. But the challenge is huge and the risks of falling back are still high.

Regional, bilateral and multilateral initiatives for crisis management in Africa⁵

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has substantially increased the size and scope of its peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping tasks have grown larger and more complex as they applied increasingly intrastate conflicts and involved a growing number of civilians along with military personnel. These tasks include: creating political institutions; working with state and non-state actors to provide emergency relief; protecting humanitarian aid; defending safe areas; maintaining law and order; organising and conducting disarmament, demobilising and reintegrating former fighters; clearing mines; providing good offices for peace building; organising and conducting elections; and promoting sustainable development. In some cases, the UN has gone even further, to assume the administration of countries in post-conflict situations, like Kosovo and East Timor. Such a change could hardly have been made without problems and difficulties, which led the UN to rethink and scale back some of its operations, particularly in the aftermath of the intervention in Somalia in 1993. Compared with 1993, when there were 75,000 Blue Helmets deployed in UN peacekeeping operations, in mid-1999 there were only about 12,000. Proportionally, that reduction was even greater in Africa. While in 1993 there were 40,000 peacekeeping forces on the whole African continent, by June 1999 there were less than 1,600 – but certainly not because Africa had become a continent of greater peace and security.

However, as of late 1999, with renewed outbreaks of violent conflict threatening to spill over again into neighbouring countries, the UN approved new peacekeeping missions in Africa (Sierra Leone and DRC in 1999, Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000, Liberia in 2003). By late November 2003 there were nearly 31,500 UN military personnel in sub-Saharan Africa, and this number will increase to more than 40,000 once the force in Liberia reaches its full authorised strength of 15,000 (until 30 November 2003, nearly 5,600 personnel had been deployed).

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter recognises a role for regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security.⁶ While the UN can rely on European/Western regional organisations to maintain and enforce peace and security on the European continent, few regional organisations in the world have the financial, logistical and human resources and capabilities these organisations have, not to mention the degree of political dialogue and cooperation that allows them to function. That is certainly still true with regard to African regional and subregional organisations, despite the significant progress made by African states in addressing some of these constraints. Some Western countries, unwilling to intervene in conflicts in Africa but aware of the problems there, have created programmes to support and develop African capabilities to deal with conflict situations. Although these programmes vary

⁵ Information in this chapter is based to a large extent on the following sources: Eric G. Berman & Katie E. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000); Eric G. Berman, *French, UK, and US Policies to Support Peacekeeping in Africa: current status and future prospects* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, February 2002); Eric G. Berman, 'The provision of lethal military equipment: French, UK, and US Peacekeeping policies towards Africa', in *Security Dialogue*, vol. 34, no. 2, June 2003, pp. 199-214.

⁶ Articles 52 to 54 of the UN Charter.

considerably, they all focus in one way or another on providing training, equipment or financial assistance to African countries directly or through regional organisations. France, the United Kingdom and the United States are the countries that have the most developed assistance programmes. Other European and non-European countries have also integrated this dimension into their policies towards some African countries/regions.

At the multilateral level, organisations like the EU, the UN, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the World Bank (WB), and to some extent others like the Commonwealth, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), and other groups of countries are increasingly focused on peace and stability in Africa, and some are supporting and developing initiatives to enhance African capabilities to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa. Given the particular focus of this paper on the EU role, EU initiatives and policies towards sub-Saharan Africa will be addressed separately in chapter 4.

As a preliminary general comment, it should be understood that, despite some apparently frenetic activity and the burgeoning initiatives supposedly aimed at reinforcing African capabilities to deal with conflict situations, in many cases effective action falls short of rhetoric.

3.1 Initiatives by regional and subregional organisations in Africa: capabilities, limitations and potential

Regional and subregional organisations in Africa were without exception created to respond to the economic and social development needs of their member states. None had

the vocation to deal with internal or interstate conflicts, and no serious attempts to include these in their remit were made until the 1990s. That shift was to a large extent due to the increasing number and complexity of crisis situations in Africa, and to the declining interest of the international community in the region after the end of the Cold War. African states were well aware of the UN Security Council's reluctance to engage meaningfully in resolving major crises on the continent and, as a consequence, they have been trying for the last decade to develop their own mechanisms and adapt their structures in order to be able to take on this new role.⁷

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU, now renamed African Union) was one of the first to adapt. In 1993 it created the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Many subregional organisations followed suit. They changed their mandates from purely developmental functions to encompass conflict management. In those cases where some sort of regional security mechanisms already existed on paper, attempts have been made to revive them by giving them a meaning and putting them to work. Mediation and negotiation efforts were made by a number of countries and organisations. Early warning systems were or are being planned. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations have been undertaken. Often, African responses to crisis and conflicts developed in an ad hoc manner. On various occasions, African countries were able to put together and coordinate a sizeable inter-African force to conduct military operations at the request of the country in need, often with the assistance of and in coordination with Western countries, but not always.⁸ Significant efforts have been made by African regional and subregional organisations and their member states, but structural, logistical and financial weaknesses remain an impediment to the effective development of African capabilities to deal with

⁷ See 'African regional and sub-regional organizations in Peace Support Operations: general principles', paper prepared by SaferAfrica for the SWP Workshop on the Development of African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations, Berlin, 26 September 2002.

⁸ Intervention in Zaire (1997-99) against the incursion of Angola in Zaire territory; in Chad (1979); in Mozambique (1986-92); in the Central African Republic (1997-98). In 1997, an African-led peacekeeping operation in Congo (Brazzaville) under UN mandate was proposed but did not materialise, although the contributing African countries are not to blame for it.

crisis management situations, not to mention the lack of political commitment of many African states and their fear of the political and diplomatic consequences of intervening in the affairs of other African states, often neighbouring ones.

Initiatives and activities undertaken by these organisations ought to be seen, first of all, as confidence-building measures among their own members, before they can actually commit themselves and harmonise their policies to engage in crisis management operations in the region. Deep-rooted suspicion and rivalry between African states, particularly between neighbouring ones and especially among ruling élites (even if population movement and informal trade between them is often quite significant) has been a major handicap for the development of subregional organisations and for concerted regional action/initiatives.

Furthermore, military intervention with a UN mandate has also been undertaken by regional organisations. However, interventions have not always been successful nor have they always helped to resolve conflicts; in some cases they have exacerbated them and forces intervening to secure or promote peace have actually become part of the conflict.

The table in Annex 1, on regional and subregional organisations in sub-Saharan Africa, gives some general information about the main African organisations, their aims, structures, and activities undertaken to support peace and security in their respective regions, with some general observations on their potential and limitations. It is not an exhaustive list of regional and subregional organisations in sub-Saharan Africa. Others exist that are not mentioned here, either because they are more technical (e.g. monetary or customs unions) or limited in scope (essentially economic organisations or devoted to particular development issues), and because they have chosen not to adopt a more comprehensive approach to development that includes the promotion of peace and security.

However, a brief account of three major organisations in sub-Saharan Africa, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), is called for.

The African Union

The organisation previously known as the OAU (created in 1963) has tried for most of its existence to stay away from conflicts in Africa rather than intervening to prevent, contain or resolve them. The OAU Charter provided for a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration in case of conflicts, which never really became operational. The organisation's Charter did not allow it to intervene before conflicts actually erupted and therefore no conflict prevention role was foreseen for the organisation. Anyway, African states always tried to address conflicts outside the institutional framework and in an informal way, either through ad hoc committees, bilateral negotiations, heads of state mediation, etc.⁹ OAU pillars have always been the principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in member states' internal affairs. Intervening or playing any role in intrastate conflicts was absolutely out of the question. These were probably noble principles in the aftermath of independence in post-colonial Africa and were certainly perceived as absolutely needed in order to avoid opening a 'Pandora's box', but they did not provide for regional security when that was most needed.

In the 1990s, the increasing number of conflicts (and particularly of intrastate conflicts) in various parts of Africa with disastrous impact on stability and development in the region, the disengagement of the international community and the growing pressure on African states and organisations to address these problems, either from the international community and African public opinion, have pushed the OAU to engage

⁹ Felix Nkundabagenzi, *Le dialogue politique entre l'Union européenne et l'Organisation de l'unité africaine* (Maastricht: ECDPM, document de travail no. 64, 1998).

more actively in conflict prevention and management in the region. It was in the interest of African states to give a greater role to the organisation, and a clear sign of the changes came when some states invited the OAU to monitor and supervise elections in their countries. Since the early 1990s, the OAU had set up a number of observer missions in various parts of the continent (see table in Annex 2) and had used African special envoys or representatives for mediation and facilitation in crisis situations (e.g. in DRC).

In June 1993, OAU heads of state and government agreed to the establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The OAU Mechanism provided for a new decision-making body, the Central Organ, and created the Peace Fund, a separate fund of \$40 million (two-thirds provided by donors) to quickly finance the operational activities of the OAU Mechanism. The Peace Fund has played a very positive role in developing the human and material capabilities of the organisation to intervene in conflict-related situations, although the lack of financial instruments was not the only constraint on an active OAU role. Scarce financial resources remain a key factor in limiting actions in time and scope, but significant progress has nevertheless been made. The OAU has laid the basis for future operations, namely by establishing rules of engagement (which allow the use of force when necessary), and is now able to furnish the forces deployed with basic equipment (even if more advanced equipment would be necessary to boost its operational capabilities).

The launching of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) at the OAU summit of July 2001 and the transformation of the OAU into the African Union (AU) in July 2002 have further reinforced trends towards greater pan-African cooperation and commitment to address conflict-related issues on the continent and developing African capabilities to deal with them. As a condition for sustainable development, one of NEPAD's priorities is peace

and security, including building a capacity for early warning and for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. It therefore reaffirms the commitment to strengthen existing institutions dealing with these matters and to pursue other peace-related programmes. The promotion of good governance is also perceived as a tool to deal with the root causes of conflict – that is the aim of the African Peer Review Mechanism created under NEPAD. At the institutional level, some important changes include the creation of a Peace and Security Council within the AU (due to enter into force on 26 December 2003). This is meant to be a sort of 'UN Security Council' for Africa in the sense that its role will include agreeing upon or endorsing peace operations in the continent. The Peace and Security Council adopted a work programme in October 2002 that aims at increasing cooperation with regional African organisations in conflict prevention activities and peace support operations. The AU defence chiefs meeting of May 2003 announced plans for the creation of a permanent force under the Peace and Security Council by 2010. In April 2003, the AU started deploying its first peacekeeping force, in Burundi; it is meant to be a force of 3,500 peacekeepers, but by August 2003, only about 1,200 men (mostly South African) had been deployed, apparently due to financial difficulties.¹⁰

Plans for a more active and stronger role for the African Union with regard to conflicts in Africa may well face some important obstacles, some well-known and predictable, others less so. The lack of financial resources and weak operational capabilities are well-known problems; cooperation between the AU and international organisations/donors often address these issues. Less predictable but with no less impact is the rate of HIV/AIDS affecting the military in many African countries: some suggest that the infection rate among military personnel in sub-Saharan Africa could be as high as 60% (and even higher in some units of some countries).¹¹

¹⁰ *The Military Balance 2003-2004* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003), pp. 201-2.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

Furthermore, many AU members are still reluctant to grant sufficient autonomy to the AU or to see the organisation engaging further in crisis management and beyond election monitoring, where it has proven it has the ability and the political capacity to perform well. This reluctance is partly also due to political conservatism or the historical legacy of non-intervention and continuing mistrust between its members. Indeed, given this combination of factors, it is not hard to understand why the AU Mechanism over the past decade has made only slow and limited progress, although the renewed interest and the significant efforts and commitment African countries have been making in the last few years deserve recognition.

Notwithstanding such limitations, it is important to note that subregional African organisations or inter-African coalitions generally seek approval of the organisation before they engage in conflict-related initiatives (e.g. ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone). The OAU remained, despite its weaknesses, a legitimate and credible organisation in the eyes of African states. Its transformation into the African Union, with effective support from the international community and a stronger commitment from African actors, is only likely to strengthen it. The tendency is towards reinforcing its role and capabilities at the same time as subregional organisations are also developing their own. There is no contradiction or rivalry in these parallel trends; on the contrary they are mutually reinforcing.

ECOWAS

The Economic Community of West African States, like all other organisations in sub-Saharan Africa, was created to respond to the economic and development needs of its member states. However, ever since the late 1970s/early 1980s, ECOWAS has been developing institu-

tional instruments for security and defence (Protocols of non-aggression and of mutual assistance on Defence, 1978 and 1981 respectively), although these aimed basically at preventing attacks against each other and for about a decade were not translated into any concrete action. However, the 1981 Protocol was the first time that a group of African states had signed a defence protocol that applied also to internal conflicts, where they were engineered or supported from the outside and could endanger the peace and security of other member states. A stand-by force (the Allied Armed Forces of the Community, AAFC) and decision-making and administrative structures were envisaged in the 1981 Protocol, but never really became fully operational, nor was the Protocol invoked until 1990, when the brutal civil war in Liberia broke out and the Liberian president formally requested ECOWAS assistance.

ECOWAS states, concerned with the threat to regional stability posed by the conflict, and well aware of Western countries' unwillingness to intervene, decided to set up an armed Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to restore law and order in Liberia, create the conditions for humanitarian aid to be delivered and allow for cease-fire negotiations. ECOMOG was actually established by a smaller group of ECOWAS member states sitting in the Standing Mediation Committee that had been created a few months earlier, in 1990, and was dominated by Anglophone countries. The ECOMOG mission in Liberia raised a lot of controversy (including over the nature of the mission) and fuelled tensions and division among member states, particularly between Anglophone and Francophone. The significant political, economic and military weight of Nigeria increased already existing fears of regional hegemony.¹² Francophone countries in West Africa were particularly suspicious.¹³ Some ECOWAS member states then argued that ECOMOG lacked accountability

¹² Nigeria contributed most of the troops, material and financial backing for ECOMOG's first operation in Liberia. It also suffered heavy human losses: hundreds of Nigerian soldiers are thought to have been killed in the operation in Liberia.

¹³ Already in the 1970s, following the creation of ECOWAS, Francophone states in West Africa, often with the support of France, established other subregional organisations in West Africa (e.g. UEMOA, CEAO, ANAD) in an attempt to weaken ECOWAS. Some of them still exist or have been revived in the last decade.

and legitimacy, because its legal status was unclear. However, political and diplomatic rivalries and conflicts of interest within ECOWAS have probably motivated those accusations more than genuine concerns about its legality.

Ever since it was set up, ECOMOG – a non-standing military force made up of soldiers from the national armies of ECOWAS member states – has been active almost without a break, as conflicts in the region continued to erupt: Sierra Leone in 1997, Guinea-Bissau in 1998-99, Ivory Coast in 2002 and Liberia again in 2003.

ECOWAS is undisputedly the African sub-regional organisation that has taken the lead in conflict management in Western Africa. ECOMOG was set up even before the OAU had created the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993. ECOWAS has been more active in diplomatic and military terms and has put up more sizeable peace missions than any other regional or sub-regional organisation in Africa. It has shown the strongest determination to address and resolve conflict situations in the region. Despite many shortcomings and the political rivalries among its member states, it has nevertheless been able to take action, and by acting it has considerably improved its knowledge, practices, capabilities and legitimacy. Compared to its first interventions, the ECOMOG intervention in Guinea-Bissau showed significant progress (e.g., it had a clear mandate, it was reporting to the UNSC, it was a multilingual, Anglophone and Francophone, force). Nevertheless, there were some shortcomings, namely, ECOMOG was slow to deploy and the conflict was ultimately resolved by force on the ground. ECOMOG's first interventions, particularly in Liberia in 1990-97, but also in Sierra Leone, were marked by many problems. At the time of its first intervention in Liberia, ECOMOG was also known to stand for 'Every Car Or Moveable Object Gone', so bad was the reputa-

tion of some of its ill-prepared, ill-equipped, unpaid and demoralised forces, and it suffered a huge loss of men. The different political agendas of ECOWAS member states also hampered ECOMOG effectiveness. Brigadier General M. Khobe, a Nigerian army officer who was a force commander of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, summarised its operational problems as follows:

- excessive control by home governments and therefore lack of coordination among ECOMOG forces on the ground (the force commander did not have full control of the various national contingents, whose leaders often insisted on seeking approval from their home governments or even went into the field with different instructions from those issued by the force commander);
- language differences;
- lack of standardisation of equipment, arms and ammunition;
- different training standards, doctrine and staff procedures;
- poor sea- and air-lift capabilities (Nigeria is the only ECOWAS member and sub-Saharan African country with the capacity for sustained heavy military sea- and air-lift);
- absence of vital air-to-ground support assets, particularly ground attack helicopters;
- lack of logistic support for some contingents;
- inadequate resources to deal with humanitarian problems;
- poor coordination and liaison with international relief agencies.¹⁴

These political and operational problems of the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia (which were partly repeated in Sierra Leone and in other ECOMOG operations) were further complicated by the lack of consensus among rebel forces with regard to ECOMOG intervention. Some believe ECOMOG actually did more to

¹⁴ Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe, 'The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG Operations in West Africa', in Mark Malan (ed.), 'Boundaries of Peace Support Operations: the African Dimension', *Monograph* no.44, Institute of Security Studies (South Africa), February 2000; <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/ECONOMOG.html>. General Khobe also pointed out the misrepresentation of mercenary organizations in ECOMOG operations and their manipulation of the international media. However there are different views on this issue. For more information on ECOMOG see also Eboe Hutchful, 'The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in West Africa', in Mark Malan (ed.), 'Whither Peacekeeping in Africa?', *Monograph* no. 36, Institute of Security Studies (South Africa), April 1999; <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No36/ECOMOG.html>.

exacerbate the war in Liberia rather than to bring it to an end, and its involvement in the Liberian conflict also contributed to the civil war in neighbouring Sierra Leone. ECOMOG became part of the conflict, instead of being a neutral force that would help to resolve it. Nevertheless, ECOMOG experience in Liberia (and subsequent interventions in the region) is still considered as positive and successful in the sense that:

- ECOMOG demonstrated its political will and power to address conflicts in the region (and to keep its determination in very adverse conditions, including heavy losses among its forces);
- it proved able to shift the ECOMOG mandate from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and peacemaking as conditions on the ground evolved, and to turn to regional (OAU) and international (UN) initiatives when needed (such ability to adapt was partly made possible by the disorganisation and lack of coordination and unified control of ECOMOG contingents);
- ultimately, it managed to rally support among its member states for the need to create credible common security mechanisms. Not only did ECOWAS survive its bad experiences, but ties and cooperation among its member states seem also to have been reinforced and improved.

ECOWAS's creation, in 1999, of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security was an attempt to address ECOMOG shortcomings, including the command and control issue, and the lack of involvement of ECOWAS member states and of the Secretariat in the management of its operations, among others. The perceived need for an early response to potential conflicts led the organisation to establish an alert system

in 2001. More recently, at the Abuja meeting of May 2003, ECOWAS member states decided to create a rapid reaction military force to respond to conflicts in the region. It has yet to be seen when that decision will materialise, as significant constraints (namely financial) still need to be addressed.

SADC

The Southern African Development Community (SADC), created in 1992, has a quite particular history. SADC was born out of the Southern African Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC) established in 1980 by the Frontline States¹⁵ and Zimbabwe. The main objectives of SADCC were to reduce dependence on the apartheid regime in South Africa and to support Namibia's struggle for independence. At its origin, it was therefore essentially political in nature. In the early 1990s, with the positive evolution towards peace and stability in the region,¹⁶ SADCC had to refocus, and it shifted its role and objectives, previously directed against South Africa, to creating a regional common market. It became SADC in 1992. Notwithstanding the fact that its focus was primarily economic, the SADC Treaty commits its member states to evolve common political values, systems and institutions, and to promote and develop their cooperation in the area of peace and security. Although South Africa's accession to SADC in 1994 contributed to the greater international credibility of the organisation, mistrust and antagonism within its members and in particular with regard to South Africa have not fully disappeared and have continued to hamper SADC effectiveness, economically and politically.

The same reasons creating conflict-related structures that had prompted other regional and subregional organisations in sub-Saharan

¹⁵ The Frontline States were originally Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. It dissolved in July 1994 only, shortly before South Africa's accession to SADC in August 1994.

¹⁶ The end of the apartheid regime in South Africa, independence of Namibia and the peace processes in Angola and Mozambique created a new political environment in the region, more favourable to political and economic cooperation and ultimately envisage some sort of regional economic integration.

Africa (e.g., lack of stability and high potential for conflict in the region, and lack of interest from the international community to get involved in conflict prevention and resolution in the continent), also led SADC states to decide in 1996 to create the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. The SADC Organ (its leadership rotates annually) reports to the Summit of Heads of State and is regulated by a new Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security adopted in 2001.¹⁷ Its structure includes the Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPCD, comprised of SADC foreign ministers) and the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC, comprised of defence and security ministers).¹⁸

However, the existence of defence and security structures within SADC has not proven to be very effective in boosting the SADC role in conflict management and resolution in the region. The SADC Organ has basically been inoperative, partly due to the controversy particularly between Zimbabwe and South Africa over the status of the Organ (whether it should be autonomous from SADC or responsive to the SADC summit). This seems to have been solved in 2001, but other problems remain, due to regional rivalries and mistrust between SADC member states (particularly tensions between Zimbabwe and South Africa). Recently, a Mutual Defence Pact was signed (SADC summit, August 2003). Its objective is to 'operationalise' the mechanisms of the SADC Organ for mutual cooperation in defence and security matters (Art. 2), but it does not seem to add more to what already exists institutionally within SADC in terms of boosting or reinforcing its member states' commitment to crisis management and resolution in the region. The Pact provides for an institutional commitment to collective self-defence and collective action (Art. 6). Its main focus is once again on interstate

conflicts, and non-intervention in the internal affairs of a member state is again emphasised (except under Art. 7, in the terms stated in the Protocol and upon the decision of the SADC summit), as well as the commitment not to engage or support destabilisation actions against a member state (Art. 8). One important aspect of this Pact, which reinforces further SADC initiatives to improve capabilities for joint action, is the commitment to cooperate in defence matters and facilitate cooperation among their armed forces and defence-related industries (Art.9). It is, however, not clear what the added value of this Pact is, nor what is effectively new in it, other than actually reinforcing existing policies/initiatives.

Some SADC members have been particularly engaged in peacekeeping and conflict mediation and resolution in the region and are among the most active in deploying multinational forces for peace initiatives in Africa. They have undertaken military operations in DRC in 1998¹⁹ and in Lesotho in 1998-99.²⁰ These have actually either been a source of tensions between SADC member states or deepened already existing ones, with accusations of self-interest and attempts at regional hegemony being at centre stage of internal divisions within SADC. It is interesting to note, however, that, despite those rows and tensions, SADC managed to present some sort of image of unity by ultimately 'endorsing' those interventions. More recently South Africa, which is actually a 'newcomer' to peacekeeping activities, is playing a major role in mediation and peacekeeping in Burundi, and in other parts of Africa.

SADC has also regularly organised peacekeeping instruction and peacekeeping training exercises which are playing an important role in developing standing operating procedures, involving both civilian and military components, although the integration of these two

¹⁷ In May 2003, only seven countries had ratified the Protocol. Nine ratifications are required for it to enter into force.

¹⁸ The ISDSC existed prior to the set up of the SADC Organ. It was integrated in its structure when the Organ was created in 1996, and already before the new structure was adopted at the 2001 summit.

¹⁹ Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe participated in the Inter-African force that intervened in DRC in 1998.

²⁰ Botswana and South Africa intervened in Lesotho in 1998-99.

components does not always seem to have been successful. Financial and operational capabilities problems are also common in SADC, as in other subregional and regional organisations in Africa, but the SADC potential to play a more active and effective role in conflict management in the region is very high. SADC has probably the largest deployment capacity of all subregional organisations in Africa. In DRC, Angola and Zimbabwe alone are believed to have deployed, in the early stages of the war, about 16,000 troops altogether. To what extent they have the capacity to sustain such a large number of forces on the ground for longer periods of time is, however, doubtful (not to mention the internal political and economic challenges both countries are currently facing, although for very different reasons). South Africa is reshaping its military forces to make them a more credible regional intervention force; it has embarked on the modernisation and reinforcement of its military capabilities aimed both at defence and peacekeeping as well as disaster relief operations.

3.2 Bilateral initiatives to enhance African national and regional capabilities for crisis management

France

After decolonisation, France continued to have an active policy towards Africa and has intervened regularly in the region, although sometimes in support of weak and dictatorial regimes (particularly in the 1970s and 1980s). From the mid-1990s, French interventions in Africa became more rare and its military presence in the region was reduced (from more than 8,000

troops in 1985 to less than 6,000 in 2001), reflecting above all changes in French policy towards Africa, rather than a disengagement from the region. Those changes have translated essentially into four main aspects:

- a change in the approach to African peace and stability, centring much of its efforts on developing African capabilities for peacekeeping in the region, namely by preparing units from existing military structures of African countries for rapid mobilisation;
- multilateralism, privileging a subregional approach rather than a country-by-country approach in the attempt to boost a greater cooperation and coordination between African countries and their forces;
- a broader regional focus, no longer limited to Francophone Africa, and greater openness to and support of other countries' activities;
- transparency, as contributions are made known to all countries and operations are limited to peacekeeping and humanitarian aid.²¹

The French capacity-building programme RECAMP (*Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix*), established in 1996, is the centrepiece of the new French policy towards Africa. Under RECAMP, France provides:

- classroom education to the armed forces and police from more than 30 different African countries, Francophone and non-Francophone, on skills relevant to peacekeeping, through courses offered in France and in more than a dozen military schools in Africa supported by France. Although these are national military schools (most of them in Francophone countries), they have a regional vocation and are open to foreign nationals. In some cases, the teaching languages are both English and French (e.g. the Zambakro School in Ivory Coast) The skills taught

²¹ Rear-Admiral Hervé Giraud, 'Efforts at Conflict Prevention and Resolution: the French Experience', in Franco-South African Dialogue for Sustainable Security in Africa, *Monograph* no.50, Institute of Security Studies (South Africa), August 2000, <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No50/Chap12.html>.

include military observer training, battalion- and brigade-level training, as well as specific skills for the personnel from the three branches of the armed forces and the police, and specialised training such as communications and medicine (de-mining skills are also envisaged). In recent years, France has also committed itself to reinforcing African countries' capabilities to repair and maintain military vehicles, by providing spare parts, technicians and funding (to countries with military cooperation agreements with France).

- ▶ multinational field training with a regional focus. Three multinational exercises under RECAMP were completed by 2002 involving countries from all sub-Saharan African regions²² and a fourth one is planned in 2004 (in Ghana and Benin). Exercises organised by subregional organisations (mostly in West Africa but also SADC) were supported by France with troops, equipment and financial and logistical support. France also participates in routine military exercises with African countries (mostly bilateral and a few multilateral).
- ▶ pre-positioning of materiel to support African forces participating in peacekeeping initiatives in the region. Until 2002, there were three depots (in Dakar, Libreville and Djibouti). The materiel pre-positioned in these depots is intended to equip and support a 600-person infantry battalion and includes French-made firearms (mostly personal and a few crew-served weapons), vehicles (light armoured cars, jeeps, trucks and ambulances; armoured personnel carriers were also likely to be included), communication equipment and other non-lethal equipment (uniforms, generators, tents, water purifiers). The depot in Dakar includes a

100-bed field hospital with the necessary medical equipment and support vehicles. This equipment has been used on several occasions to assist peacekeeping missions, including African-led operations in the region, and to support African countries participating in UN peacekeeping missions. RECAMP equipment is to remain under the control of France and is meant to be returned to the depot once the mission is accomplished, which has apparently always been the case.

French support to regional and subregional organisations in sub-Saharan Africa is likely to increase, although there has not been much involvement of or support to regional organisations structures under RECAMP, often due to shortcomings of the regional organisations. France is, however, in the process of developing links with and supporting some African regional organisations (e.g. ECOWAS, IGAD, ECCAS and the African Union), namely by accrediting its defence attachés to these organisations. It is also providing support to ECCAS peacekeeping forces in the Central African Republic (CAR). France contributes to the OAU Peace Fund and actively supports UN and African-led peacekeeping operations in Africa; on some occasions it has contributed crucial logistics and financial support.

France has intervened on various occasions in Africa alongside African subregional organisations or the UN (or with its approval) to restore peace or help contain a conflict. The latest examples are Operation *Licorne* (4,000 troops) in Ivory Coast, the EU Operation *Artemis* under French command in DRC, and a small detachment of French military personnel (about 200) in CAR.²³

²² *Guidimakha* in Senegal and Mauritania in 1998 (participated 8 West African countries and 4 non-African countries: US and European countries), *Gabon 2000* (again 8 Central African countries and 8 non-African countries), and *Tanzanite* in 2002 (the 14 members of SADC plus Kenya and Madagascar, and more than 9 non-African countries). RECAMP training exercises are planned to take place every two years.

²³ For more information see the French MoD website: <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/forces/operations/index.htm>.

United Kingdom

From the mid-1970s, there were British military advisory and training teams (BMATTs) in some (Anglophone) African countries under bilateral initiatives. However, in the 1990s BMATTs were reoriented under the United Kingdom's African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme to provide peacekeeping training to officers from African countries (not just from the countries where they were based, but also to other countries in the region). Besides classroom education, BMATTs also provided field training (mostly in Africa). The United Kingdom also supported UN and African-led peacekeeping operations in the region.

In 2001 the British government decided to create a more ambitious, larger and multidimensional initiative. It set up two Conflict Prevention Pools: the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (or Conflict Prevention Initiative for Africa), which covers sub-Saharan Africa, and the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, which covers the rest of the world. The Conflict Prevention Pools bring together conflict prevention programmes and funds from various ministerial departments in the United Kingdom: the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Department for International Development (DFID). The aim was to encourage closer cooperation, increasing effectiveness and complementarity between these different governmental departments working in the same area.²⁴ The Conflict Prevention Initiative for Africa covers a number of areas and overarching thematic objectives, including: the control of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the reduction in the exploitation of mineral and other natural resources for the purposes of war, inclusive government, security sector reform, support to pro-

grammes aimed at developing regional security bodies and African capacity to undertake and sustain peacekeeping operations.²⁵ A major priority of the British initiative is containing the spread of regional conflict in and around Sierra Leone, the Great Lakes region, Sudan and Angola.

As with RECAMP, activities to support and enhance African peacekeeping capabilities have focused on education, training and equipment. Peace support military education and training is provided mostly in Africa through the BMATTs, based in various African countries (Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, South Africa and, until 2001, Zimbabwe). Military education and training often include human rights education. Field training exercises are generally not provided as part of the capacity-building programme, but the United Kingdom has often contributed (financially, with troops, trainers and transportation equipment) to multilateral and regional exercises led by African countries. The United Kingdom has participated in exercises under the French RECAMP programme and is likely to initiate multinational field training exercises in the future (all over sub-Saharan Africa and with no concentration on a particular subregion).

The United Kingdom does not generally provide military equipment in support of peacekeeping operations, but two notable exceptions were the support to ECOMOG operations in Liberia in 1999 and in Sierra Leone in 2000. British support to ECOMOG in Liberia included spare parts for vehicles, generators and funding for communication equipment. In Sierra Leone (1998-99), it provided even greater support, including vehicles, communication equipment, uniforms, rations, small arms, light weapons, ammunition, rifles, mortars and

²⁴ For more information on the UK Conflict Prevention Initiative for Africa and on the Global Conflict Prevention Pool see, respectively, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1011756005037> and <http://www.mod.uk/issues/cooperation/gcpp.htm>.

²⁵ The budget of the two Conflict Prevention Pools from 2001 to 2003 earmarked more than £400 million a year to peacekeeping (in Africa and elsewhere in the world), i.e. around 78 per cent of the total funds available. Funds from the Africa Pool are more equally distributed in between programmes and peacekeeping; about 55 per cent of the funds allocated to the Africa Pool go to peacekeeping. Berman, 2002, op. cit., p. 14.

rocket-propelled grenades. Although such assistance to ECOMOG and to countries contributing troops to the operation was subject to certain conditions (regarding humanitarian laws and human rights standards; besides, most of the equipment was supposed to be turned over to the Sierra Leone armed forces), not all were apparently met. In the agreements London concluded afterwards with the Sierra Leone government (1999 and 2000), aimed at promoting peace and security in the country, supporting the democratically elected government and upholding law and order, checks and balances were now instituted to avoid any repetition of previous problems or shortcomings.²⁶ These are thought to have been effective. Under the new agreements, the United Kingdom has provided the Sierra Leone army with a substantial amount of weaponry and other equipment and extensive training, in which education on respect for human rights and democratic principles was included. It has also provided training and non-lethal equipment (including communications equipment and vehicles) to the Sierra Leone police. In the summer of 2000 the United Kingdom sent (with UN endorsement) more than 1,000 troops to Sierra Leone to protect and evacuate British citizens, secure the use of Freetown airport, provide technical advice to UNAMSIL and help restore peace and security.²⁷

Support to ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone does not mean the United Kingdom had an active policy of supporting the peace efforts of African subregional organisations. Many consider it was the fear that ECOMOG could fail that prompted UK assistance. However, despite ECOMOG's shortcomings, ECOWAS has gained some respect internationally for its attempts at dealing with crises in the

region, and the United Kingdom seems to be willing to support ECOWAS's efforts to develop its security-related mechanisms by providing funding and training to the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, provided there is real commitment by the ECOWAS Secretariat to make it work. In November 2000, the United Kingdom had organised a map exercise with ECOWAS at the organisation's headquarters, and similar exercises could well be repeated in the future with ECOWAS. The United Kingdom also seems to be willing to fund efforts by the East African Community (EAC) to develop its peace support capabilities (namely by providing training). British support to African regional organisations has been much greater with regard to the OAU. It showed great commitment to support the development of the OAU Mechanism, but funding for its Conflict Management Centre was likely to be reduced (delays and bureaucracy of the OAU have not worked as an incentive).

United States

US programmes indirectly linked to developing the peace-related capacities of African states have existed for a long time. The International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) was formally established in 1976, but existed already before. It provided training and education to foreign military including from African countries. IMET was later expanded in 1990 to draw in also foreign government officials and members of civil society (therefore no longer limited to military personnel) and to provide training overseas (previously it was just in the United States). IMET courses cover, among other issues, defence management, civil-mili-

²⁶ Military advisory and training officers (mostly from the United Kingdom but also from other countries) serve alongside officials at the Sierra Leone Ministry of Defence and Army Headquarters and are also meant to serve as a liaison to army battalions in the field. For each rifle provided by the United Kingdom, the serial number is recorded along with the name of the recipient, who is informed of it. Berman, 2002, op. cit., p. 17.

²⁷ On the legitimacy of this and other military interventions see Martin Ortega, 'Military Intervention and the European Union', *Chaillot Paper* 45 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, March 2001), ch. 3.

²⁸ For more information on IMET, see http://www.dsca.org/mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm.

tary relations, rule of law and military justice in accordance with human rights principles.²⁸

However, a stronger US commitment to reinforce African capabilities to deal with conflict-related situations only materialised in the late 1990s, during the Clinton administration and after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was created in 1997 as part of that policy. It included classroom education, field training, command post and computer-assisted exercises, and some non-lethal equipment (generators, mine detectors, night-vision goggles, water purifiers, communication equipment, uniforms and boots). ACRI sought to train 12,000 African troops for peacekeeping over a 5-year period. When the programme ended in 2002, 9,000 troops had been trained in eight countries (Benin, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Senegal and Uganda)²⁹ and three multinational exercises completed. Various African states that were involved in the ACRI programme have participated, and employed ACRI equipment, in various UN or African-led peace-support missions and humanitarian operations. Recipients of ACRI equipment were supposed to use it for those types of activities and training, and not for other unintended uses. In order to safeguard against such unintended uses, ACRI equipment was checked regularly, but not in cases where training was suspended (Uganda and Ivory Coast). Changes to the ACRI programme in its last stage included engaging more fully international and humanitarian organisations and NGOs in multinational training exercises, as well as a briefing on AIDS.³⁰

In 2000, when the peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone was at risk,³¹ the United States

quickly responded to ECOWAS's appeal with Operation *Focus Relief* (OFR), in which it trained and equipped seven battalions from ECOWAS member states (five from Nigeria and one each from Ghana and Senegal) to serve in UNAMSIL. OFR involved the provision of much more military equipment than ACRI, including lethal equipment, which contributed to the higher cost of the operation in a shorter period of time.³² Medical equipment was also provided and instruction included human rights training. Furthermore, any military personnel implicated in human rights violations could not benefit from the training (for that purpose each country had to provide documentation about the proposed recipients of OFR training and the United States would then start a vetting process). Apparently, OFR-trained forces (at least the Nigerian units, which did not enjoy the best reputation) were credited with being better disciplined and more skilled. Before the May 2002 elections in Sierra Leone, the lethal equipment provided under OFR had been accounted for and not misused, according to US officials.

US interest and engagement in Africa declined under the Bush administration, but that was soon to change after the 11 September attacks (and attacks on US targets and interests in East African countries). The renewed US interest in the region had two major foci: on the one hand, Africa emerged as an alternative source of oil and gas to reduce US dependency on energy from the Gulf,³³ on the other, under the counterterrorism policy of the United States, Africa (East Africa in particular) had emerged as a region of concern. Weak states in Africa are perceived as prominent candidates for terrorist attacks, recruitment, fundraising and

²⁹ Training in Uganda and Ivory Coast was suspended due to the political and human rights considerations. Ethiopia was also on the list of countries that would benefit from ACRI, but because of the war with Eritrea, training was never initiated.

³⁰ Those changes, plus focusing on training trainers, were introduced in the Kenya ACRI programme.

³¹ In May 2002, 500 blue helmets were detained in Sierra Leone by the Revolutionary United Front. The force commander of the UN peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL) had long complained about the quality of the peacekeeping forces serving in the mission (ill-equipped and poorly trained).

³² OFR lasted for only 15 months, but its financial costs were almost at the level of ACRI during the five years of the programme.

³³ Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 15-18 per cent of US oil imports. That share could well increase in the coming years with an increase in the production capacity of countries in the region, Nigeria in particular (it has the largest oil reserves in the region). On the issue of renewed US (and European powers) strategic interest in Africa see namely Jonathan Stevenson, 'Africa's Growing Strategic Resonance', *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 4, Winter 2003-04, pp. 153-72.

money-laundering. In June 2003, the US administration announced the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative, aimed at increasing the regional counterterrorism capacities of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. A package of \$100 million was allocated to this initiative over a period of 15 months. That is indicative of the importance the United States attributes to counterterrorism in comparison to other aims of its African policy. Although one of the stated US policy objectives in Africa is to increase African capacity to prevent, mitigate, and resolve crisis, conflict and regional instability, the financial support given to the latter is considerably less significant if one takes the case of the new ACOTA programme (\$10 million for 2002).³⁴

When ACRI ended in 2002, the United States adopted a new programme – the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) – as well as other smaller programmes with a regional focus that, like ACOTA and previously ACRI, are aimed at increasing African capacity to prevent and deal with conflicts and regional instability.

The objectives of the new programme, ACOTA, as put by US officials are:

- ▶ to train and equip African militaries to respond to peace support and complex humanitarian requirements;
- ▶ to build and enhance sustainable African peace support training capacity;
- ▶ to build effective command and control;
- ▶ to provide commonality and interoperability;
- ▶ to enhance international, regional and sub-regional peace support capacity in Africa.

ACOTA is also meant to be more flexible and tailored to each country's needs, following a country's capacity and needs assessment. Its main focus will be on training African trainers, in order to create a self-sustaining indigenous training capacity and be more adapted to the country's capabilities and needs; it will also

include support to African training institutions (in coordination with European partners). Training will be adapted to the requirements of the operational environment in Africa, which often requires operations more robust than just peacekeeping or (UN Charter) Chapter VI-type operations. The equipment to be provided will vary accordingly and recipients will retain the materiel. Another distinctive element of ACOTA is its greater subregional emphasis. ACOTA is expected to provide support to subregional security structures.³⁵

Another initiative following essentially the same lines is the West Africa Stabilisation Programme (WASP), which focuses essentially on enhancing the capabilities of West African countries. A Pan-Sahelian Initiative has also received funding (but no lethal equipment or even ammunition is foreseen), but it is more focused on strengthening Sahelian countries' ability to counter terrorism, namely through more effective control of their territories.

With regard to support to African subregional organisations, prior to 2001 this was not really a priority or a main trend in US African policy. OAU and ECOMOG (rather than ECOWAS as an institution) had however benefited, prior to that, from US assistance. Ever since the creation of the OAU Mechanism in 1993, the United States has been an important contributor, including to the OAU Peace Fund, namely to help develop the Conflict Management Centre. The little progress by OAU since then has not attracted further institutional funding. The United States has, however, continued financially to support OAU peacekeeping operations. It also funded ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In 2001, the US approach towards subregional organisations started to change: ECOWAS and EAC officials participated in different ACRI multinational exercises in 2001 and 2002. The ACOTA programme seems likely to reinforce that trend, but it is too soon to tell.

³⁴ For an overview of the current Administration's policy on Africa see <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/26772.htm>.

³⁵ 'African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)', presentation made to the G8/Africa Workshop on 'The Development of African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations', Berlin, 26-27 September 2002.

The United States has also funded and/or assisted in regional peacekeeping training exercises led by African countries/organisations, as well as in training exercises organised by European partners. On the other hand, in the summer of 2003, the United States stationed 2,300 marines off the coast of Liberia. American pressure led to President Taylor's resignation and the establishment of ECOMIL, a UN peacekeeping force to supervise transition.

Other bilateral initiatives

Beyond the above-mentioned programmes by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, a number of other similar bilateral initiatives exist. They are more limited in scope and in the financial means made available, but sometimes no less important in the reinforcement of African countries and regional or subregional organisations' capabilities to prevent and deal with conflicts. In some cases, these bilateral initiatives allowed African peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions to be conducted and/or sustained.

Bilateral initiatives generally focus on some of the following activities/policies:

- support to UN and regional or subregional peacekeeping missions in Africa, whether by contributing peacekeepers or providing financial, equipment, logistics and/or humanitarian support to those missions. Almost every European and many non-European countries (including Russia, China, Japan, India, Bangladesh, Korea, Australia, Canada, Brazil, among others) have in one way or another provided support to peacekeeping missions in Africa, either directly to the UN or by providing timely and meaningful support to African troops participating in peacekeeping missions in the continent who lack the necessary capabilities. Support to the latter often translates into logistic support (like supporting the deployment of their forces and equipment in longer distances), providing adequate equipment for

certain types of missions, sometimes even basic equipment, or financial support (for instance, paying the wages of African troops). Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands are some of the countries that have given significant contributions to African countries participating in peacekeeping missions in Africa. Within efforts to support peacekeeping in Africa (but also for all sorts of relief and humanitarian emergencies), it is interesting to mention NOREPS, the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System, which entails stocking humanitarian-related equipment (communications and medical equipment and supplies, rations, tents, etc.) in Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.

- direct financial assistance to African regional and subregional organisations. Many provide financial assistance to the AU Peace Fund (e.g., Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, to name some important contributors), but also to African subregional organisations like ECOWAS, IGAD or SADC (Nordic countries are particularly active supporters).
- supporting or assisting in peacekeeping training for African forces, in the donor countries and/or in African countries. This is done by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. Norway is financing (\$2.5 million) a 5-year training project for peace in Southern Africa aimed at building capacity for conflict management and peacekeeping. The project covers civilian and political aspects of peacekeeping, civil-military relations and specialised training for civilian police. Norway has considered a similar programme also for West Africa. Denmark has, among other forms of support, built peacekeeping training facilities in Zimbabwe and provided courses on defence management to southern African forces, supporting efforts to develop indigenous conflict resolution strategies.

- ▶ support (financial, logistics or equipment) to peacekeeping training exercises by African subregional organisations. Sweden, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway are among those who have actively supported training exercises by African subregional organisations.
- ▶ mediation. Norway is certainly becoming prominent in mediation efforts, not just in Africa but elsewhere in the world. Portugal too, with its very limited financial and military means, has to some extent privileged mediation efforts in its former African colonies (namely in Angola and in Guinea-Bissau through CPLP) as a means to support peace efforts in the region.
- ▶ conflict prevention initiatives by African civil society. There seem to be fewer donor countries supporting such type of initiatives, but on the other hand, these are often included in development efforts rather than in conflict-related policies. They also fall less into the official domain of state-to-state cooperation and involve essentially or for the most part non-governmental actors. Some countries do, however, underline such type of initiatives in their peace-related efforts in Africa. That is at least the case of Sweden, which has also been, within the EU, a great promoter of the development and reinforcement of EU conflict prevention policy.

Some countries tend to focus their activities in certain subregions of the African continent (e.g. Denmark and Norway tend to concentrate on the SADC region, although they conduct or support activities also in other African regions). Others, like Germany, do not have a particular regional focus and their activities encompass all regions of Africa. Countries with a colonial history in Africa – such as Belgium, Portugal and maybe to a lesser extent Italy – tend to concentrate their efforts or develop their programmes

more in their former colonies or areas of influence.

3.3 Multilateral initiatives

At the *United Nations* level (including UN agencies), there are various initiatives regarding Africa, but generally they do not focus on building African capabilities to deal with conflict-related situations. General policies in the area of development do include increasingly a peace and security dimension, but their primary focus is on conflict prevention. The UN is making an increasing effort to coordinate its different policies and programmes for Africa. That is the main task of the UN Special Adviser on Africa (since 1994), who makes the link between development and humanitarian aid, and political and security departments in the UN.³⁶ More recently (in 2000), the UN created an Office for West Africa that brings together security and development instruments for that specific region. The UN has also developed instruments specifically aimed at preventing conflict and building peace. In 2001 it developed early warning indicators (a task for the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). It has engaged in building local capacity to prevent conflict. It created Peace-Building Support Offices in African countries that were affected by conflicts, and where peace is still fragile (e.g. Guinea-Bissau, CAR), whose role is to develop integrated peace-building and conflict prevention strategies with all local actors through confidence-building, political stabilisation, electoral support and coordination of donor efforts. It also adopted various resolutions and action programmes targeting activities that threaten peace and security in various parts of Africa, like the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and mercenary activities, and the often related trade in conflict diamonds,³⁷ and imposed sanctions on these

³⁶ For more information on UN activities in Africa see namely <http://www.un.org/esa/africa/index.htm>.

³⁷ In July 2001, the UN Conference on the 'Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects' adopted a Programme of Action to combat such activities. See also the UNSC Resolution 1467 (2003). On the role of conflict diamonds, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution in 2000 (UNGA Res. 55/56(2000)) and again in 2002 (UNGA Res. 56/263(2002)) targeting the role played by the illicit trade in rough diamonds in fuelling conflict. On the issue of conflict diamonds see also the Kimberley process website (<http://www.kimberleyprocess.com>).

and other activities that were preventing the settlement of conflicts.

Although conflict prevention is a major priority for the UN, it is nevertheless important to underline its conflict-resolution efforts, particularly in mediation (namely through UN special representatives), and in its commitment to peacekeeping, which has increased again since 1999 (see Annex 2 for a list of current UN peace-related operations in Africa). Indeed, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has shown a keen interest in tackling hard issues in Africa. Ever since his 1998 report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable and sustainable development in Africa, the UN Secretary-General has regularly stressed the urgent need to tackle problems in Africa (e.g. the 1999 supplementary report on development in Africa, the Millennium report), not only through the UN and its agencies, but also by calling on other forums, and by engaging in cooperation and partnership with other organisations/institutions (e.g. the EU, the OSCE, the G-8, the AU and subregional African organisations).

Some critics point out, however, that the UN has been doing far less than it could to develop African capabilities for crisis management and resolution, particularly with regard to regional and subregional organisations in Africa. The UNSC has relied too much on 'burden-sharing' with African regional and subregional organisations which suffer at least from the same if not greater constraints than the UN itself, without providing them with the necessary guidance and support for peace operations. The UN Secretary General's argument that the UN cannot do everything is understandable, but critics argue that the UN could nevertheless provide African-led missions with people who are specialised and experienced in conflict management and resolution. It is, however, important to note that UN peacekeeping missions have been a good 'school' for many African forces. Some African countries have been important contributors to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and elsewhere in the world, particularly since the 1990s.

Financial incentives may have been at the start an important motivation, but the huge delays of UN pay back have not made it in the end an attractive deal, financially speaking. More significantly, African military participation in UN operations (as well as in Western-led multinational forces, like operations in Somalia or in Rwanda) has allowed them to acquire experience, training and access to equipment, even if it has not solved their major limitations (e.g. their transportation capabilities or the ability to sustain a sizeable force).

The UN established a working group for enhancing peacekeeping training capacity in Africa that was reactivated in 2000, which could provide a good forum for harmonisation and coordination of international, regional and bilateral efforts for building African capabilities to address conflicts in Africa. UNDP has also conducted a study to review the AU Mechanism in order to make it more capable and operational.

The OSCE has supported the monitoring of arms proliferation in Africa at least since 1999 through the UN and subregional initiatives (e.g. by ECOWAS). In 2002, OSCE and AU representatives met and the AU has since shown great interest in maintaining contact and exchanging information. The OSCE's extensive experience in areas such as crisis management, small arms and light weapons, capacity-building measures, combating terrorism, field activities and election monitoring, are of interest to the AU and African subregional organisations.

The *World Bank* also regards conflict prevention and post-war reconstruction as central to poverty reduction, which is the major objective of its activities. About 16 per cent of the Bank's total lending goes to mitigating the effects of war. In 1997, it established a Post-Conflict Fund. By mid-2003, there were 95 projects amounting to approximately \$6.6 billion under implementation in conflict-affected countries in Africa, and another 105 projects worth \$7 billion were under preparation. Besides providing financial support for post-conflict reconstruction, the Bank also supports institution

building, good governance, measures to improve transparency in the trade of energy and other commodities that are often linked to conflicts (e.g. diamonds, timber, precious metals). The WB also manages a multi-donor Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (of \$500 million for 2002-06), which includes both national and regional programmes (for example, there is one for the Great Lakes region), as well as programmes targeting special groups like child soldiers.³⁸

Other multilateral organisations involving African countries, like the Commonwealth, the OIF or the CPLP, which are seen as pursuing essentially development, cultural or linguistic purposes, have become more politically critical and involved in attempts to address and resolve conflicts in Africa.

The *Commonwealth* has in the last decade focused more on matters like respect for the rule of law, good governance, democracy, human rights and economic and social development. On a number of occasions it has sent electoral observer missions to Commonwealth countries (namely to South Africa in 1992, the Comoros in 1994 and to the last elections in Zimbabwe). Its peacekeeping assistance group has helped train African peacekeeping forces and, although it does not have a peacekeeping vocation, it assists and coordinates African states in organising their efforts.

The *OIF*, created in 1970 as an informal arrangement, and institutionalised as an organisation since 1986, has become more involved in conflict prevention, management and resolution since 1998, but its efforts focus more on mediation and conciliation attempts (Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi, CAR, DRC, Togo). It has also sent election observation teams on several occasions. It does not seem willing, however, to engage in peacekeeping or in supporting African peacekeeping efforts. It has essentially become more political, but not with an operational vocation.

*CPLP*³⁹ was established in 1996 as an organisation to promote cooperation between Portuguese-speaking countries and concerted political and diplomatic efforts. It is not only aimed at the promotion of the Portuguese language. In accordance with its guiding principles, CPLP is also committed to peace, democracy, rule of law, human rights and social justice. Yet CPLP was seen mostly as a 'cultural' organisation based on a common language. That perception only started to change in 1998 with the crisis in Guinea-Bissau, and the mediation attempts by the organisation under the lead of Portugal. That mediation was actually quite successful, at least in the earlier stages of the crisis, in that it managed to achieve a cease-fire agreement in July 1998. Although it did not provide for a general peace plan, it probably prevented regional escalation of the conflict. The mediation role played by CPLP in Guinea-Bissau was later shared with ECOWAS, which ended up taking the lead. ECOWAS was willing to deploy a large interposition force of 5,000 men (although less than a thousand were actually deployed and at a very slow pace), while the CPLP put forward a small military observer mission of 150 men. The diverging priorities of CPLP member states, the lack of a common strategy and financial and organisational constraints on the formation of a peacekeeping force CPLP was sidelined by ECOWAS in mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Guinea-Bissau.⁴⁰ However, the organisation is still engaged in the stabilisation of the situation in the country. In July 2003 it nominated the Nobel Peace Prize-winner and Foreign Affairs Minister of East Timor, Ramos Horta, as its special envoy and mediator to Guinea-Bissau. CPLP played an important role again in Guinea-Bissau in the aftermath of the last coup in September 2003 and it now plans to send an electoral observation mission to the elections that are expected to be held in March 2004.

³⁸ More information on WB activities related to the prevention of conflicts and reconstruction can be found in WB website in <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/conflict.htm>.

³⁹ The Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP in its Portuguese abbreviation) includes Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal and São-Tomé and Príncipe.

⁴⁰ On the role of CPLP in the crisis in Guinea-Bissau, see Norrie MacQueen. 'A Community of Illusions? Portugal, the CPLP and Peacemaking in Guinea-Bissau', *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 10, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 1-26.

The organisation has also stated its willingness to help stabilise the situation in São Tomé and Príncipe, in coordination with regional organisations.⁴¹ In July 1998, at sectoral meetings of the CPLP, an initiative to train and prepare military units for humanitarian and peace missions was approved, as well as the creation of a Centre for Strategic Analysis in Maputo (Mozambique). In 1999, there was agreement to create a peacekeeping force to participate in humanitarian operations. In the last Ministerial Council of the CPLP (July 2003), reference was made to the discussions of the defence ministers of the member countries and their consensus on the role of the organisation in the prevention and management of regional crisis: there are plans for the elaboration of a General Protocol of Cooperation to reinforce CPLP capacities in that sense. Military exercises will be held to develop peace support and humanitarian operations, The Centre for Strategic Analysis will contribute to the exchange of information among strategic and military information services.

Other informal arrangements also address to some extent peace and security issues in Africa (e.g. the P-3 Initiative, Franco-African summits, Franco-British summits, the G-8), or attempt to harmonise and coordinate bilateral policies.

France, the United Kingdom and the United States began efforts towards coordination of their bilateral initiatives only in May 1997 with the so-called 'P-3 Initiative' that later in the year expanded to other interested states. The P-3 Initiative not only coordinates programmes, but has also begun a dialogue with African countries on how best to promote peace and security on the continent, and aims to foster and harmonise donor assistance at this level.

France and the United Kingdom have attempted to further their cooperation and coordination since the St-Malo meeting in December 1998 by exchanging information and sharing embassies and functions in Africa, although that initiative is more directed towards conflict prevention than towards conflict resolution. Their commitment to cooperation in Africa was reaffirmed in their last summit in November 2003 and extends to other areas like peacekeeping training for African forces and support for subregional organisations.⁴²

The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) are also coordinating their efforts in peacekeeping training for African forces and in developing a common capacity-building strategy for the southern African region.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has also made significant efforts to coordinate and harmonise donors' policies towards developing countries in support of conflict prevention. In 1995 a special task force was created by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to look at how development cooperation could best support conflict prevention. In 1997, the DAC adopted policy guidelines on conflict, peace and development cooperation and in 2001 it added further orientations for external partners to help prevent conflicts.⁴³

The G-8, at its Evian (France) summit of June 2003, agreed to help finance the creation, training and equipping of African standby brigades by 2010, under the direction of the AU and African subregional organisations. It remains to be seen whether this long-term project bears fruit.

⁴¹ In July 2003, a brief coup overthrew the elected president. A week later, and with the mediation of the Nigerian president, a deal was brokered between the government and the rebels, and the president was reinstated. Distribution of future oil revenues seems to have been at the origin of the coup and probably also at the centre of the negotiations that resolved it.

⁴² See the Declaration on Franco-British Co-operation in Africa, Franco-British Summit, November 2003.

⁴³ For more information on DAC conflict-related guidelines see OECD, 2001, *The DAC Guidelines. Helping prevent violent conflict*; accessible at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/54/1886146.pdf.

EU policy towards Africa

European policy towards Africa has existed ever since the European integration process started.⁴⁴ That policy was very much influenced by the colonial links some of its member states had with newly independent African states. However, EU policy towards the region has evolved significantly, particularly since the end of the Cold War. What was an almost exclusive focus on economic and social development has increasingly developed into a more complex and comprehensive policy, where the political dimension has gained importance, partly due to the recognition of the ‘failure’ of development policies or impact on the development of the recipient countries. The link between peace, stability, development and respect for human rights, rule of law, democratic principles and good governance was reinforced in EU cooperation and development policies towards Africa, either in bilateral (the EU has concluded Association Agreements with practically all African countries) and multilateral agreements with African countries.

Current relations between the EU and countries in sub-Saharan Africa take place first and foremost within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement and are based on three main pillars: political dialogue, trade and economic cooperation, and development aid. The Cotonou Agreement tries to address the shortcomings of previ-

ous agreements by reinforcing the political dimensions of ACP-EU cooperation, namely by enhancing the importance of respect for human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good governance,⁴⁵ of civil society participation, and of the need to address issues such as the reinforcement of capacities for conflict prevention and management activities.

Since the early 1990s, the issue of conflicts in Africa has gained particular importance in the overall EU policy towards Africa and has been the subject of intense discussions within the European Union and with other international partners (the OECD, the UN and OAU, among others). Following these discussions, triggered by a number of factors including the increasing number of violent conflicts in Africa and the willingness of regional organisations to tackle these problems, in 1994, France and the United Kingdom presented to the EU a joint non-paper on ‘Preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping in Africa’, suggesting in particular measures the EU (and then also the Western European Union) could take to support African capacities for conflict prevention and resolution.⁴⁶ These changes in approach happened at a time when the EU was trying to have a greater political and security role in world affairs. It was developing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and advancing the means through which it could

⁴⁴ Cooperation with African countries exists ever since the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community in 1957. In the aftermath of decolonisation, those relations were institutionalised in the Yaoundé Agreements (1963-69, 1969-75), later replaced by the Lomé Agreements enlarged also to Caribbean and Pacific countries. In June 2000, in Cotonou (Benin), the ACP states and the EU signed a new partnership agreement, named after the city where it was signed.

⁴⁵ The respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are ‘essential elements’ of the ACP-EU partnership in the Cotonou agreement; their violation can lead to a suspension of aid. Good governance is a ‘fundamental element’ of the partnership.

⁴⁶ For more information on this, see Martin Landgraf, ‘Peace-building and conflict prevention in Africa: a view from the European Commission’, in Ulf Engel and Andreas Mehler (eds.), *Gewaltsame Konflikte und ihre Prävention in Afrika* (Hamburg: Institute for African Affairs, 1998).

engage in activities with defence implications.⁴⁷

Since 1995, the issue of conflict prevention has often been addressed by the European Council (in Council declarations, conclusions of Council meetings, adoption of common positions and Council decisions⁴⁸) and by the Commission, which in 1996 issued its first Communication to the Council on the subject.⁴⁹ EU official documents on conflicts in Africa stress the following key elements that constitute the basis of EU policy with regard to conflict prevention and resolution in Africa:

- ▶ African pre-eminence and ‘ownership’ in conflict prevention, management and resolution in the region;
- ▶ EU commitment to support efforts in favour of the prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa – a priority aim of the CFSP – in close cooperation with relevant bodies, namely the UN, OAU and African sub-regional organisations;
- ▶ assistance for building African capacity to prevent and deal with conflicts, through the OAU and subregional organisations;
- ▶ developing a pro-active, comprehensive and integrated approach, enhancing coordination between EU and member states’ efforts and policies, and making coherent use of EU instruments to best address the root causes of violent conflicts and to support of conflict prevention and resolution in Africa;
- ▶ focusing primarily on conflict prevention, while addressing the whole cycle of conflict and peace;
- ▶ while privileging non-military actions, the EU does not exclude the need to use military means in upholding EU commitment to support peace-related efforts.

Prior to its integration into EU structures, the Western European Union (WEU) had also been discussing ways of supporting African peacekeeping capabilities since 1995. Some areas of assistance were identified – provision of equipment, logistic means and communications, training of personnel – but that support never materialised for lack of either consensus or political will.⁵⁰ WEU often mentioned the possibility of participating in missions in Africa in the framework of the Petersberg Declaration,⁵¹ but this never happened.

4.1 A new EU development policy or the ‘politicisation’ of aid?

EU policy on conflict prevention – puts great emphasis on addressing the root causes of instability and violent conflict. It is therefore understandable that the EU would seek first of all to address the shortcomings of its development policy. According to some observers the EU has put almost all its eggs in one basket:

... consistently with the heavy imbalance of resources in favour of the Commission [as compared with the Council Secretariat], the EU is staking much on the contributions of development cooperation and democratisation to conflict prevention (through peace building). Although the balance is slowly shifting, this has tended to give EU conflict prevention thinking a disproportionately heavy focus on economics, human rights and democratisation to the neglect of diplomatic conflict prevention measures

⁴⁷ In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht replaced European Political Cooperation with a Common Foreign and Security Policy. It outlined the (five) fundamental objectives for EU external policy action and set the framework for the development of policies with defence implications through recourse to WEU. Later in 1992, the Petersberg Declaration stated the type of military/defence activities WEU could engage in, the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’.

⁴⁸ A list of the main Council documents on the issue is given at the end of the paper, in ‘documents and bibliographic references’.

⁴⁹ ‘The European Union and the issue of conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond’, 06/03/1996COM, SEC(96) 332. Other important communications from the Commission on the issue or related matters are listed in ‘documents and bibliographic references’.

⁵⁰ UEO, ‘Note d’évaluation de l’initiative de l’UEO en matière de maintien de la paix en Afrique’, C(00)70, 13 avril 2000.

⁵¹ In the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers stated that forces from member states could be used for ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making’.

that seek to significantly alter the political dynamics of an emerging conflict.⁵²

The European Union is the world's largest provider of official development assistance and humanitarian aid, and the major donor to Africa. According to OECD data, in 2001, about 55 per cent of total world aid was provided by the EU (EC and member states combined),⁵³ and more than 40 per cent of EU aid and humanitarian assistance goes to Africa.⁵⁴ EU relations with Africa are not just limited to aid, though. Other instruments – trade and political and financial – are also of great importance in relations with the continent.

In the last few years, there has been an increasing effort within the EU to improve coherence between its various instruments in the interests of more effective action, namely by pursuing a greater coordination between the Commission Directorates dealing with foreign relations (External Relations, Enlargement, Trade, Development and Humanitarian Aid) and streamlining conflict prevention policies towards Africa (and developing countries in general). There is particular concern, in some circles within EU institutions and among some external actors, about the possible undesired impact of EU common policies on developing countries, in so far as those might contribute (directly or indirectly) to local crises and eventual conflicts. That is particularly true with regard to trade, which is often perceived as being less 'development-friendly', in that trade measures can sometimes have a negative impact on local economic life and the social fabric, undermining stability and possibly even fuelling conflict where stability is already very fragile.

Reform efforts include a simplification of EU procedures that are often too complex and lengthy, to say the least, and are not compatible with the need to quickly disburse funds in order to respond to situations of emergency, imminent crisis or immediate post-conflict needs. In 2001 the Council thus decided on the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)⁵⁵ allowing the Commission to make use of available funds without having to go through the bureaucratic procedures normally required for the approval of a development programme (which take, in average, about 18 months). The RRM has a separate budget of €25 million per year and can be used in a wide range of areas of EU cooperation, including areas which are essentially political and/or emergency-related (namely human rights, election monitoring, institution building, media support, border management, judiciary, police training and provision of police equipment, pacification, resettlement, mediation, civil emergency assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction). Unlike humanitarian aid, which is meant to relieve human suffering, the RRM aims to preserve or re-establish civic structures necessary for political, social and economic stability. It is therefore meant to be a crisis management tool and, in that sense, it is essentially political in nature: it allows quick implementation of activities that can, directly or indirectly, influence a crisis situation or a deteriorating political context.⁵⁶

The RRM is managed by a unit within the External Relations Directorate General (RELEX) dealing with Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and ACP countries political issues, created in late 2000.⁵⁷ The role of this unit is to pursue

⁵² International Crisis Group. *EU Crisis Response Capability. Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and Management*, 26 June 2001. IGC Issues Report no. 2, Brussels, p. ii.

⁵³ Out of the almost \$58 billion of world aid in 2001, more than 32 billion was provided by the EC and EU member states. OECD data can be accessed at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd>.

⁵⁴ Communication from the Commission to the Council. *The EU-Africa dialogue*. 23/6/2003. COM(2003) 316 final, p. 2.

⁵⁵ EC Regulation no. 381/2001, 26 February 2001; available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/doc/rrm.pdf.

⁵⁶ On this issue and for more information and analysis on the overall issue of development and conflicts see Felix Nkundabagenzi & Federico Santopinto, *Le développement, une arme de paix* (Bruxelles: Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP), 2003).

⁵⁷ It was first created as a Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit. The Africa (and ACP) expertise was added later into the unit. This is seen by some as a means of DG RELEX increasing its role in relations with ACP countries, which have been and still are the domain of DG Development, although to a lesser extent since the creation of EUROPAID who is now responsible for the implementation of DG DEV (and DG RELEX) projects. As the reform process continues, there is some talk of a possible fusion between DGs RELEX and DEV.

conflict prevention goals within the work of the Commission. It is interesting to note that a conflict prevention unit was initially created within DG Development (DG DEV) in the second half of the 1990s, and that the first Commission communication on the issue related to conflicts in Africa.

The Commission's efforts to mainstream conflict prevention policies into overall EU external action (at the Community and inter-governmental levels) were further reinforced by the Commission Communication of 2001 on Conflict Prevention (replacing the previous communication of 1996) and the EU Programme on the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, endorsed by the Göteborg Council of June 2001.

Efforts to enhance coordination between EU and member states' policies have also been high on the agenda. That is in principle a role for the Heads of Mission of EC delegations in third countries, whose powers and resources have been reinforced by the 'deconcentration' policy that has been gradually implemented since late 2001. As actors on the ground, delegations are also expected to play an important role in the EU conflict prevention and management policy. Efforts are under way to coordinate donor support (within the EU but also with other donors) to the AU, and the aim is to pursue similar efforts at the subregional level.

4.2 Developing African regional and subregional institutions and capabilities

In line with one of the principles of EU policy on this matter – African leadership and ownership in conflict prevention, management and resolution – the EU has actively engaged in political dialogue with, and support of regional and sub-

regional organisations in Africa. Since 1994 the EU started political dialogue (formalised in 1996) with the OAU, which is seen as complementary to existing dialogue at bilateral and regional levels. The EU has shown particular interest in supporting the Organisation's peace and security efforts. It has therefore supported the development of its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, and provided financial support to the Peace Fund and early warning system, as well as institutional support to the organisation. But effective actions fell well short of expectations, partly due to limitations on the part of both the EU and the OAU.⁵⁸ However, since 2000, EU-Africa dialogue and cooperation have gained a new momentum.

The Africa-Europe Summit (its first meeting was held in Cairo in April 2000, following a Portuguese proposal) has, on the one hand, confirmed the slow progress made since the mid-1990s, but on the other hand renewed the commitment of the parties to cooperate, *inter alia*, in the areas of conflict prevention, management and resolution, and peace-building. Some actions concerning these aims are already under way.⁵⁹

The launching of NEPAD in 2001 and the official establishment of the African Union in 2002 have further boosted cooperation with the African states' commitment to playing a more proactive and effective role in dealing with the problems of the continent. Reactions in Brussels and in European capitals in general have been quite positive. The EU considers the AU to be the central organisation for peace, security and regional integration on the African continent. In April 2002, a programme in support of AU peace-building and transition activities was signed. Its prime objective is to fund the operational activities of the Peace and Security Council. The programme will also reinforce the AU's

⁵⁸ Nkundabagenzi, 1998, op. cit. in note 9, pp. 14-15.

⁵⁹ The Action Plan of the Africa-Europe Summit (Cairo, 3-4 April 2000) refers namely to the reinforcement of the OAU Mechanism, strengthening capacities and efficiency of the Conflict Management Centre, operationalising the OAU early warning system, providing political, financial and equipment support to peace efforts in the region, support disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, fight against the illicit traffic of small arms and light weapons, and combat the use of anti-personnel landmines.

capacity-building in transitional phases.⁶⁰ It will first and foremost finance AU mediation and peace monitoring activities (as is the case with the AU observation mission in Burundi that is currently funded under the European Commission's RRM), but it could include support to peacekeeping training, and logistical and financial support for the deployment of African peacekeepers.

In November 2003, it was agreed that the EU-Africa dialogue would be restructured around four common priority clusters, including peace and security issues.⁶¹ A stronger commitment to EU support for African organisations, capabilities and efforts to deal with crisis in the region was made at the General Affairs Council of 17 November 2003, where the EU approved a draft decision (to be adopted by the ACP-EU Council of Ministers) on the use of European Development Fund (EDF) resources for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa in line with the request made by the African Union and a Commission proposal made in a recent Communication on EU-Africa dialogue.⁶² The Peace Facility will support African-led operations and build African institutions' long-term capacity to carry out such operations. The Commission will propose to the EDF Committee a budget of €250 million from the EDF to enable the Peace Facility to become operational before the end of 2004.⁶³

The European Council on 12 December 2003 confirmed and reiterated its support for such developments as well as its commitment to peace efforts in Africa:

The European Council reaffirms the importance of the partnership with Africa and welcomes the strengthening of the EU-Africa dialogue as indicated by the positive and constructive outcome of the EU-Africa

Ministerial Troika in Rome on 10 November 2003.

The European Council welcomes the developing partnership between the EU, the UN, the African Union and subregional African organisations in the field of conflict prevention, conflict management and development, in particular through NEPAD.

In this context the European Council recognises the importance of restoring peace and security in Africa as a pre-requisite for development and welcomes the establishment of a Peace Facility for the financing of African peace-supporting operations, which will provide a significant boost to Africans' own ability to bring peace to their continent.

The European Council reiterates that the European Union remains committed to supporting the peace processes on the continent such as in the Great Lakes, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia-Eritrea. It stresses the need to make use in a coherent and coordinated manner of all the instruments available to the EU, inter alia as regards reconstruction, development and ESDP. It welcomes the growing role played by the African Union and the African subregional organisations (ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC) in this regard as well as in the field of regional integration and development. (European Council Conclusions, 12 December 2003, paras. 75-78).

The EU also has political dialogue with some subregional African organisations - SADC and ECOWAS - which is perceived as complementary to its dialogue with and support to the AU. Political dialogue and cooperation with SADC

⁶⁰ The EU allocated €10 million to activities of the Peace and Security Council and 2 million for institutional support of the AU transition process.

⁶¹ The other three are: governance, regional integration and trade, and key development issues (Final communiqué of the EU-Africa Ministerial Troika, Rome, 10 November 2003).

⁶² One of the Commission proposals is the pooling of EU aid, now scattered among different financial instruments, in support of an 'operational EU-Africa Agenda' if pan-African activities are to develop in the future. That 'pool' could help establish a continent-wide 'Facility for peace support operations' to enable African partners to cover the costs of both peace support operations and capacity-building efforts in this domain. 'The EU-Africa dialogue', Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(2003) 316 final, 23 June 2003.

⁶³ See the Council Conclusions of 17 November and 12 December 2003.

on peace- and security-related matters has been hampered by internal divisions within SADC regarding the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. The EU nevertheless provides financial support to SADC regional efforts for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Burundi and the peace process in DRC. Finally, the EU supported ECOWAS peace efforts in the region. It provided support to ECOMOG peacekeeping forces in Liberia (1994-97), namely vehicles, and coordinated when possible its development assistance in order to assist ECOMOG operations. The EU has also agreed to finance the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, peacekeeping and security and other related peace efforts, including the reinforcement of the capacity of ECOWAS states and the Secretariat to control the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, it has reaffirmed its commitment to continue its financial support to the countries in the region that are still consolidating the peace process.⁶⁴ The EU is also supporting IGAD in its efforts to reach and implement a peace agreement in Sudan.

4.3 Coordination with other international organisations

As mentioned before, the EU is engaged in coordinating efforts with other international organisations and other donors with regard to supporting peace-related efforts in Africa, at the institutional (e.g. support to the AU and subregional organisations) and operational levels (peacekeeping, capacity-development, etc.), whether these are led by the international community or by regional or subregional African organisations or actors.

The EU recognises a primary role for the UN in the management and resolution of conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. It is highly unlikely that the EU would engage in major peace efforts – much less where military engagement was involved – outside the UN framework or without the approval or endorsement of the UN Security Council. The EU is the largest financial contributor to the UN system. It pays 37 per cent of the UN's regular budget, more than two-fifths of the cost of UN peacekeeping operations and about half of all UN member states' contributions to UN funds and programmes, many directly or indirectly related to peace and security.⁶⁵ The EU has also been urging the UN and other countries to support African efforts and ownership in securing peace and stability on the continent. As the EU High Representative, Javier Solana, put it in his speech on Africa at the UN Security Council:

'African ownership' can only function effectively, when other countries and the United Nations help to enhance African institutional capacities and closely cooperate with them.⁶⁶

Beyond the financial contribution of the EU to the UN system and activities, the EU is getting more engaged in crisis management. 2003 has already provided two major examples (out of four EU crisis management missions launched in 2003, one of them in Africa⁶⁷) of close collaboration between the EU and the UN in that area: the handover of responsibilities from the UN International Police Task Force to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003, and the EU military Operation *Artemis* in Bunia (DRC). Possible support for setting up an integrated police unit in Kinshasa, at the request of the UN and the DRC authorities, is under

⁶⁴ ECOWAS-EU ministerial meeting of 15 October 2003.

⁶⁵ EU, *The Enlarging EU at the UN: Making Multilateralism Matter*, January 2004.

⁶⁶ EU Presidency Statement – HR Solana's Speech on Africa at the Security Council, 29 January 2002, available on <http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=1116>.

⁶⁷ The latest EU crisis management mission to be launched in 2003 is a police mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (PROXIMA), launched on 15 December, the day Operation *Concordia* ended.

consideration by the EU. Under the Italian Presidency, on 24 September 2003 the EU and the UN signed a declaration on cooperation in crisis management. They agreed to establish a joint consultative mechanism whose task will be to examine ways and means to enhance mutual coordination and compatibility in areas like planning, training, communications and regular information on lessons learned and best practices.⁶⁸

In the field of crisis management, the EU collaborates closely with the OSCE. Although OSCE areas of activity do not include Africa, its experience in election monitoring, institution building, confidence-building measures, small and light weapons, among others, could be useful in the EU dialogue and cooperation with African regional and subregional organisations.

Collaboration with NATO in this particular area has developed significantly since the start of the negotiations on the 'Berlin-plus' arrangements.⁶⁹ Being more focused on the operational level, it is meant to enhance EU capacities to conduct crisis management operations wherever the EU considers necessary. So far, the use of NATO assets and capabilities available to the EU under existing EU-NATO arrangements have only been used in Europe (military Operation *Concordia* in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), but there is in principle no geographic constraint on EU-led operations (other than operational constraints, which may help explain the decision to limit EU-led peacekeeping operations to a maximum distance of 4,000 km and humanitarian interventions to a maximum of 10,000 km). Those assets can in principle be used in whatever scenario or part of the world the EU decides. In late November 2003, both organisations conducted their first joint Crisis Management Exercise to test how the EU

plans at the strategic politico-military level for a possible EU-led operation (in a 'Petersberg tasks' scenario) with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities where NATO as a whole is not engaged. The focus of the exercise was on planning prior to a decision to take action and deploy forces.

Future collaboration between NATO and the EU will depend very much on the evolution of ESDP and the relationship between the two organisations. Whatever the outcome, that collaboration is likely to develop further despite the political differences between some European states and the United States, as well as between some EU member states. The more the EU appears as a valid and capable partner, the more the links are likely to develop, although that does not exclude friction along the way.⁷⁰

4.4 Shared views and priorities between the Commission and the Council?

Relations between the Commission and the Council, as well as between these two and the European Parliament, have on various occasions been marked by differences of perspective and priorities, often related to their different but sometimes overlapping competences.

The EU has a multitude of tools that range from economic instruments (economic and development cooperation, trade, emergency, reconstruction and rehabilitation aid) to legal and political ones (political dialogue, mediation or ESDP instruments) which allow it to address in a comprehensive manner the root causes as well as the immediate causes of conflict. As the European Security Strategy, 'A secure Europe in

⁶⁸ On EU-UN cooperation see also the EU Presidency Statement on the review of peacekeeping operations, 16 October 2003; available on <http://europa-eu-un.org/article.asp?id=2910>.

⁶⁹ The latest related agreement signed by NATO and the EU regards common standards to share classified information and be able to consult and cooperate on security issues (NATO-EU Security of Information Agreement, 14 March 2003).

⁷⁰ For a point of view on this see Hans-Christian Hagman, 'European Crisis Management and Defence: the Search for Capabilities', *Adelphi Paper* 353, 2002.

a better world' adopted by the European Council in December 2003, has pointed out, this is a quite unique advantage of the EU as compared with other international actors. Furthermore, unlike a single country (which can also dispose of a varied range of instruments) the financial means the EU can mobilise are certainly much more significant. Other international organisations have the means, but few have such a variety of complementary tools. Most of the aforementioned instruments the EU has at its disposal to promote long-term peace and stability are managed by the European Commission. Instruments falling within the CFSP (where the Commission shares the right of initiative with the Council) and ESDP (a fully intergovernmental policy) are the Council's responsibility (although the CFSP budget is also managed by the EC).

The EU intervention in DRC was welcomed by the Commission but it also raised some concerns with regard to overall EU priorities in crisis management, namely regarding previous European policy towards Africa. There are concerns within the Commission that the EU Council may be putting too much emphasis on the military instruments for crisis management to the detriment of civilian crisis management and conflict prevention instruments and policies. Military intervention is seen as a short-term and expensive instrument that, if isolated, is not likely to have the same strong and durable long-term political and economic impact as the other instruments the EU has at its disposal. However, the Commission also recognises that such crisis management operations are indeed sometimes necessary and complementary to other EU instruments. However, it is the Commission

view that military instruments ought to be used only when all other instruments have failed.⁷¹

The Council perspective is not fundamentally different from that of the Commission in acknowledging the primacy of long-term instruments for sustainable peace and stability. However, better coordination between the various EU means is needed, and some crisis management instruments may need to be further developed. As the European Security Strategy prepared by Javier Solana points out:

Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early. In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments . . . The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from member states and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command . . . Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states. Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.⁷²

⁷¹ Presentation by a Commission official (RELEX, unit of conflict prevention, crisis management and ACP political issues) in a Conference at the European Parliament on Conflict Prevention, 16 October 2003.

⁷² Javier Solana, 'A secure Europe in a better world', European Security Strategy document adopted at the European Council in Brussels, 12 December 2003.

Operation *Artemis* in Bunia, DRC: a test case for the EU?

On 12 June 2003, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision⁷³ to launch its first fully autonomous (outside the ‘Berlin-plus’ framework agreed with NATO) crisis management military operation outside Europe. Operation *Artemis*, as it was code-named, was the first ESDP operation in Africa. It took place within the framework of UNSC Resolution 1484 adopted on 30 May 2003, and the Council’s Joint Action adopted on 5 June 2003. The UNSC Resolution authorised the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in Bunia, the administrative centre of the Ituri district in DRC, until 1 September.

5.1 *The background*

For nearly five years, DRC had been at war. In a country as large as Western Europe, where the state administration and legitimacy, and the rule of law, were already weak, war had further increased the underlying problems of the country as well as the divisions, mistrust and tensions between ethnic groups. Although the root causes of the conflict in DRC are indigenous, vested interests of neighbouring countries further helped to fuel and perpetuate the conflict. More than 3.5 million people are estimated to have died since 1998 as a direct or indirect result of the conflict.⁷⁴ Despite the political progress at a national level – on 30 June, a new power-

sharing government was set in line with the peace accord signed in December 2002, in Pretoria⁷⁵ – violence continued and reached unprecedented levels in the eastern district of Ituri and the Kivus provinces, where there were widespread and gross violations of human rights.

Ituri has a long history of ethnic conflicts (especially between Hema and Lendu groups, but lately violence has spread to virtually all communities) over access to land, mineral resources and control of local power positions. Conflict was however exacerbated by Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC government in Kinshasa, who sent in their own military forces and/or engaged in a proxy war. The continuous flow of small arms into the area, the existence of many rival militias and their increasing fragmentation, and a continuous shift of allegiances has made Ituri one of the most volatile, unpredictable and insecure areas in DRC. Accused of plundering north-eastern Congo’s rich resources, Rwanda and Uganda agreed to withdraw their forces⁷⁶ and were asked to refrain from interfering in developments in the region. Some progress was made towards the pacification of the conflict in the district. In April 2003, under the guidance of MONUC, the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC) finally started working and results were quickly produced. An Interim Ituri Administration was elected, along with an interim assembly representing all delegations. MONUC was supposed to support the

⁷³ Council decision 2003/432/CFSP.

⁷⁴ Second special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo; UNSC, 27 May 2003, p.17.

⁷⁵ The pact signed in Pretoria divides 36 ministries among the government, rebel movements and pro-government militias, political parties and representatives of civil society. The power-sharing government is expected to lead the country during the two-year transition period and into the first democratic elections in its 43 years of existence as an independent country.

⁷⁶ Under heavy international pressure, Rwanda withdrew its forces unilaterally in October 2002 and Uganda did so too in April and May 2003.

IPC by providing the necessary security, which it failed to do. MONUC's presence in Bunia was weak both in numbers and in its mandate. In early May, immediately after the departure of the last UPDF (Ugandan) troops, Hema and Lendu militias engaged again in extreme violence (assassinations, ethnic cleansing, looting); MONUC headquarters itself was targeted. MONUC was not able to protect even its own personnel, let alone the IPC and the thousands of IDP who were in Bunia. The humanitarian situation in Ituri became even more dramatic. With a population of 4.6 million, more than 60,000 people were estimated to have died since June 1999 as a result of the violence, not to mention the many more who had been left maimed or severely mutilated and more than half a million internally displaced persons. The prevailing insecurity and the lack of access to some areas have made the provision of aid a very difficult task. However, the degradation of the situation from the humanitarian point of view was not new. For more than a year, those providing humanitarian aid in Ituri had been requesting the reinforcement of MONUC.

In the face of such a disastrous humanitarian situation in Ituri and the revival of extreme violence that could seriously threaten the ongoing progress at national level towards a negotiated settlement of the conflict in DRC, the UN Secretary-General appealed to UN members to form a coalition of the willing to end the humanitarian disaster in Ituri and work as a temporary bridging arrangement before the possible deployment of a reinforced UN presence.⁷⁷

5.2 *How it unfolded*

France agreed to intervene, provided (a) it was granted a UN chapter VII mandate, (b) countries in the region involved in the fighting (DRC, Uganda and Rwanda) officially supported its intervention, and (c) the operation was limited

in time and scope. On 28 May, France officially announced its intention to lead such an operation, with the contribution of other nations, and serve as Framework Nation. Operation Mamba, as it was initially called by the French, was already being prepared. At the same time, the right political conditions prevailed in the EU context to translate this humanitarian intervention into the first EU mission beyond the European continent. EU defence ministers had since mid-May been discussing sending peacekeeping troops, and Javier Solana, EU foreign policy chief, was also approached by the UNSG with a request for forces to help restore order in and around the town of Bunia. Besides France, other EU and UN member states had also expressed their willingness to support such an operation, and the United States (which, following the war in Iraq, was keen to ease transatlantic tensions), did not oppose in principle the idea of a small-scale EU operation without NATO assets. The EU had long been concerned by the situation in the Great Lakes Region and in DRC in particular, not to mention the long history of aid and development cooperation with the country and the region. The European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) had since 1999 been the only donor in the Ituri district, and it actually proved to be a valuable partner for the military operation and for MONUC, given their deep knowledge of conditions on the ground (in humanitarian, political, security and geographical terms, not to mention the fact that they personally knew some of the main players in the region). It is also important to recall that since March 1996 the EU had nominated a Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region,⁷⁸ Aldo Ajello. The EU had also been very much involved in the support of the transition process in former Zaire and in peaceful settlement of the conflict. Through its foreign policy representative, Javier Solana, and Aldo Ajello, it engaged in diplomatic contacts with and in DRC, as well as with Uganda and Rwanda.

⁷⁷ For detailed information and analysis on the conflict in DRC and in the Ituri district see the 'Second special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo', UNSC, 27 May 2003; and the International Crisis Group report on the 'Congo crisis: military intervention in Ituri', *ICG Africa Report* no. 64, Nairobi/New York/Brussels, 13 June 2003.

⁷⁸ Council Joint Action of 25/3/1996 (93/728/PESC).

On 30 May, the UNSC passed Resolution 1484 authorising the deployment of a French-led Interim Emergency Force to Bunia, which a few days later became an EU peacekeeping mission (Council Joint Action of 5 June 2003), code-named *Artemis*, after some changes to the initial operational plan pushed by the United Kingdom and Sweden (particularly in terms of guarantees on issues like child soldiers). On 12 June, the European Council adopted the operational plan and the decision to launch the military operation in DRC, after which deployment of the forces started immediately. On 18 June, 400 troops were already on the ground in Bunia, and 500 in the Entebbe (Uganda) force headquarters to assure the logistic support for operations in the field. Full deployment of the military forces was completed on 6 July.

It is hard to tell whether it was France that judged it politically advantageous – either for the purposes of its European policy and/or because of the vulnerabilities of another French intervention in the Great Lakes region after Operation *Turquoise* in Rwanda – to bring Operation *Mamba* under the EU banner, or whether EU high officials in the Council saw it as a good opportunity to heal the bitter political differences among member states on intervention in Iraq and give a boost to ESDP. According to one source, it was the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Africa (*la cellule africaine de l'Élysée*) that proposed it become an EU operation.⁷⁹ Probably all these considerations (and eventually others) played a part on the decision by France, EU officials and member states. In any case, there were two parallel tracks with the UN Secretary-General requesting support to France and to the EU.

There seems to be wide consensus, though, that if there had not been the intervention in Iraq with all the controversy and divisions surrounding it, one could question to what extent the Europeans would have intervened in DRC. What is certain is that the decision was made on political grounds. From the military point of view, there were probably more problems than advantages in bringing the operation under the EU banner. In fact, the French military were apparently not so willing to transform it into an EU-led military operation, for fears that the decision-making process within the EU would drag out the effective launching of the operation, which needed to be rapid and for which they were already prepared.⁸⁰

5.3 Framework and objectives

Acting under chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorises the use of force when necessary, and in close cooperation with the UN presence in Bunia (MONUC), the main objectives of Operation *Artemis*, as stated in the UN mandate, were ‘to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions in Bunia and the improvement of the humanitarian situation, to ensure protection of the airport, the internally displaced people in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, the UN personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town’.⁸¹ The deployment of such a force, with a mandate limited in time and in space, would prepare the ground and give the UN time to put together a reinforced MONUC mission⁸² to take over on 1 September 2003, when the IEMF mission would end.

⁷⁹ François Grignon. ‘The Artemis operation in the DRC. Lessons-learned for the future of EU peacekeeping in Africa’, IGC, in a paper presented at the IEEI International Conference on ‘The Challenges of Europe-Africa Relations: an agenda of priorities’, Lisbon, 23-24 October 2003.

⁸⁰ Interviews in the Council and in the Commission.

⁸¹ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1484 (2003), 1.

⁸² UNSC Resolution 1493 (28 July 2003) gave reinforced powers and means to the MONUC mission in Ituri. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the new MONUC mission has now 3,800 military personnel (compared to the seven or eight hundred it had before) and equipment (namely combat helicopters) more suited to the tasks it has to accomplish.

5.4 Political control and strategic direction of the operation

As defined in the Council Joint Action of 5 June 2003, the Political and Security Committee (PSC, or COPS in French), under the responsibility of the Council to which the PSC reports regularly, exercised the political control and strategic direction of the operation, including the power to amend the operational plan, the chain of command and the rules of engagement. The decisions regarding the objectives and termination of the operation remain with the Council assisted by the Secretary General/High Representative.

The EU Military Committee (EUMC, or CMUE in French) monitored the proper execution of the military operation and acted as the primary point of contact with the Operation Commander, from whom it received regular reports. The EUMC reported to the PSC on the conduct of the operation. Contact with the UN, the authorities in DRC and neighbouring countries, as well as with other participants in the peace process, was the primary responsibility of the High Representative, assisted by the EU Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, in coordination with the Presidency. Contact with local authorities, the MONUC mission and other relevant international actors, as appropriate, was the responsibility of the Force Commander.

5.5 Organisation and command structure of the operation⁸³

France acted as the framework nation⁸⁴ of Operation *Artemis*, with contributions from 16 other EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,

Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and future EU member states (Cyprus and Hungary), and from Brazil, Canada and South Africa. Apart from French troops on the ground, there were an infantry unit from Sweden, engineer units from the United Kingdom and a medical team from Belgium. Other countries (South Africa, Germany, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Greece and the United Kingdom) contributed with equipment (mostly transport aircraft).

Around 2,000 troops were deployed: 1,100 in Bunia, 750 in Entebbe (Uganda) and 100 in Kampala. Most of the 1,100 forces engaged on the ground in Bunia were French (about 85 per cent), 70 troops from Sweden and 100 men (engineer units) from the United Kingdom. The vast majority of these forces had to be deployed (over a distance of 6,200 km), like almost everything else used for the operation (around 400 combat vehicles were deployed, as well as other military and communications equipment, fuel, food, etc), which explains the need for a substantial number of forces (about 850 in between Entebbe and Kampala) in the force headquarters and support bases in Uganda to assure the logistics flow. A reserve of 1,000 French forces already stationed in other countries in Africa was foreseen in case of need, but they were in the end not used.

As framework nation, France had the command of the operation (General Neveux) and of the forces (General Thonier). The Operation Headquarters, where the operation was planned and conducted, was based in Paris and included around 80 military officers from the three services. Although the majority of them were French officers, some 40 to 50 per cent came from twelve other participating countries (all EU members or future members). Four of the nine specialised branches into which the headquarters was organised were under the command of officers from some of those contributing countries.

⁸³ Information on these aspects was given at the press briefing on Operation *Artemis*, Brussels, 17 September 2003, except when indicated otherwise, and complemented by interviews in the EU Military Staff (EUMS) of the Council.

⁸⁴ On 24 July 2002, the EU endorsed the concept of 'framework nation' as a conceptual basis for the conduct of autonomous EU-led crisis management operations.

At the operational level, the Force Headquarters was based in Entebbe; it was multinational (and not just European) and composed of one hundred troops from the army and the air force. A joint support base (BSVIA – *base de soutien à vocation interarmées*) with 650 men was set up at Entebbe airport, from where forces and supplies were flown into Bunia. About 100 men were stationed in Kampala, which was the initial position for the fighter aircraft that were afterwards transferred to the base at Entebbe airport, and which could also be used as an alternative base to Entebbe if needed. French air combat means stationed in other bases in Africa (namely Chad) were also used in support of the forces stationed in Bunia (the GTIAM - *groupement tactique inter-armes multinational*).

It is interesting to note that the number of non-French forces that were engaged in the headquarters was, in relative terms, much superior to the number of non-French troops engaged on the ground. In fact, none of the other contributing nations offered a substantial number of troops, nor is it certain that the French would have accepted it, as it would most likely have complicated coordination on the ground and might have weakened the robust position the French took against the escalation strategy of the UPC (*Union des Patriotes Congolais*, a Hema armed group, supported by Rwanda, who controlled Bunia after Ugandan armed forces left and prior to the arrival of the French forces under Operation *Artemis*).⁸⁵ The UPC was not keen on an intervention by the multinational force, as this would weaken its position.

5.6 Perception and analysis of the outcome of the operation

The successes

EU authorities made a very positive assessment at the end of Operation *Artemis*, concluding that the EU-led force had been successful in accomplishing its mission.⁸⁶

- ▶ The security situation in Bunia had improved significantly: the threat posed to the civilian population by armed groups/militias in Bunia and the surrounding area diminished considerably as a result of the operation ‘Bunia without arms’ (launched at the end of June) and of the determination of the IEMF to respond to aggression against civilians or its own forces.
- ▶ The return of a significant number of refugees: out of the 200,000 people who lived in Bunia, more than half had returned to the city at the end of August, compared with the 40,000 who were still living there at the time of the deployment of the IEMF.
- ▶ The revival of economic life in Bunia, with the city markets reopening and the degree of normalisation of local economic activity from August onwards.
- ▶ Better security conditions also allowed humanitarian support to resume and extend further.

Furthermore, the improved security situation in Bunia allowed for the Interim Ituri Administration and the Ituri Assembly to resume their work and, at the national level, it gave a new boost to the negotiations between the government and the armed groups. It also gave,

⁸⁵ Interview at the EU Council Secretariat.

⁸⁶ Press briefing on Operation *Artemis*, Brussels, 17 September 2003.

as intended, time for the UN to prepare the new reinforced MONUC mission. These key achievements are also generally recognised by other actors (the humanitarian agencies among others) and analysts.⁸⁷

The shortcomings

The EU (Council, Commission and member states) is presently assessing the lessons learned from Operation *Artemis*. However, some shortcomings were already known prior to the start of the operation. The lessons learned assessment will most certainly highlight well-known weaknesses in European military capabilities, in particular a shortage of strategic transport,⁸⁸ the need for better and secure means for long-distance communications, better information technology, intelligence sharing and the need to improve the interoperability of European armed forces. Yet, as stressed by General Neveux,⁸⁹ these weaknesses did not put the success of the operation at risk.

For other actors and analysts, though, the EU-led operation had other more important shortcomings, some inherent in its mandate:⁹⁰

- ▶ the time and location of the operation allowed only the stabilisation of Bunia and the surrounding area, while the fighting and violence against civilians continued outside Bunia;⁹¹
- ▶ although its action and determination weakened the UPC, it has not neutralised its Lendu militias, thus allowing for a renewed cycle of violence and revenge;⁹²

- ▶ given the limited duration of the operation, the effective demilitarisation of Bunia did not really take place or was not fully accomplished. Weapons were no longer visible in Bunia, but that did not mean the town was a weapons-free zone – although it must be pointed out that the task of the forces operating under *Artemis* was demilitarisation and not disarmament. MONUC contingents have now been conducting systematic house searches looking for hidden weapons.

5.7 Interaction with the humanitarian agencies

One of the aspects that went remarkably well in Operation *Artemis* according to those directly or indirectly involved in the operation (certainly so in the opinion of ECHO and the humanitarian community in general) was the excellent cooperation between *Artemis* and humanitarian agencies. It is well-known that relations between military and humanitarian organisations can often be difficult. They operate in the same contexts, but do not always share the same perspective and above all use very different means. Many NGOs, in the humanitarian and other areas, are often reluctant to work alongside the military. In the case of Ituri, for more than a year the humanitarian community had been asking for a reinforced international force to stabilise the security situation. When Operation *Artemis* was being planned, humanitarian organisations wanted it to extend into the wider Ituri region in

⁸⁷ See Emeric Rogier's report of the International Expert Workshop organised by the South Africa-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS) on 'MONUC and the challenges of peace implementation in the DRC', Pretoria, 17-19 September 2003, para. 34; www.iss.co.za/seminars/031008monuc.pdf.

⁸⁸ For Operation *Artemis*, the strategic lift problem was solved by leasing an aircraft from Ukraine.

⁸⁹ Press briefing on Operation *Artemis*, Brussels, 17 September 2003.

⁹⁰ See Emeric Rogier's report of the ISS workshop in Pretoria (para. 35), and IGC report on the military intervention in Ituri of June 2003. Although the latter was published at the start of Operation *Artemis*, it pointed out weaknesses in its mandate.

⁹¹ That was not, however, the mission mandate, one can argue. *Artemis* did, however, go beyond Bunia, sometimes up to 40 km out of the town area. General Neveux stressed that the EU did not want to substitute MONUC nor was it necessary (Press Briefing on Operation *Artemis*).

⁹² There were attacks on Hema groups (by Lendu militias) in late July 2003, which led many thousands to flee to the town of Bule. Other attacks have been reported in the media since then. The deployment of MONUC forces outside Bunia was planned to be gradual, as the new mission would gradually build up security in the region. UN officials did not rule out the possibility of massacres in Ituri, particularly in those areas where the presence of MONUC forces is still weak or non-existent.

order to reach the largest possible proportion of the population in need. That was not deemed possible given the limited timeframe and forces available. Anyway, one of the aims of the operation was to allow humanitarian assistance to resume and extend further, and therefore help and facilitate the humanitarian community in its work. That was already a good starting point. Intelligent planning and capable human resources also certainly contributed a great deal to the success of the cooperation.

The French command of *Artemis* had placed a civil-military liaison officer immediately on the ground along with the first French troops that arrived in Bunia. His role was to link with those providing humanitarian assistance in Bunia and the region and, at least according to ECHO, he did a remarkable job. Experienced in the humanitarian world and having daily access to force commander General Thonier, the liaison officer in question was able to create a good dialogue and cooperation with the humanitarian agencies, including those that were less cooperative at the beginning (apparently only one NGO was against cooperation with the military). According to ECHO, there was an almost immediate understanding that each could be valuable to the other. The advantage of the humanitarian agencies from the point of view of the military forces under *Artemis* was undoubtedly their deep knowledge on the ground. Their cooperation was therefore considered very important, the more so because of the limited number of forces engaged in the operation.⁹³

5.8 Post-conflict intervention of the EU in the DRC

The EU presence in the DRC will continue beyond the limited military operation in Ituri, in its support for the peace process both at the Ituri

district level and at the national level, and for reconstruction and development of the country. At the national level, the EU signed (on 2 September 2003) a cooperation programme with the DRC to the sum of €205 million for a five-year period, aiming to create the necessary conditions for long-term stability and peace by focusing on both reconstruction of the country (namely infrastructures) and improving the social and political conditions. The key areas where substantial aid and financial support (from envelope A of the Indicative Programme⁹⁴) will be channelled include the health system, institutional support to democratic transition and the rule of law (namely the reform of the public administration, the judicial system and the police, and support to the electoral process), and macro-economic support. Most of the non-programmed aid under the indicative programme (€34 million under envelope B, out of the total allocated to the indicative programme) will be channelled to the eastern part of the country, to Ituri in particular. Priority areas of EU intervention in Ituri are mostly of a civilian nature and include the following measures:

- support for the civil administration. The EU has committed financial and technical support to the Ituri Interim Administration and the Pacification Committee. €400,000 have been allocated for that purpose and a European Commission technical assistance mission is already working alongside the Ituri administration.
- urgent rehabilitation.
- re-establishment of the rule of law. EU support in this area is envisaged through the training of judges and the construction of prisons. There is already an agreement with a local NGO to support the re-establishment of the judicial system in partnership with other actors (MONUC, French NGOs, etc).

⁹³ Interview with François Goemans, ECHO field expert in Ituri at the time of Operation *Artemis*.

⁹⁴ EDF funds allocated to the national Indicative Programmes under the Cotonou Agreement are divided into two different envelopes. Envelope A is the EDF amount allocated to financial and technical cooperation; it is generally the most substantial amount and refers to programmable aid (e.g. macro-economic support, sector policies and other programmes and projects) identified in the Indicative Programme. Envelope B is the EDF amount that is not programmed and is meant to cover unforeseen needs like emergency aid that cannot be covered by the EC budget or other urgent needs that cannot be programmed in advance.

Furthermore, ending the culture of impunity and bringing those responsible for war crimes to justice is something that the EU and other international actors are determined to do. There is currently a proposition for double jurisdiction by a local tribunal and the International Criminal Court, since the latter can only try war crimes committed after 2002, but some rebel leaders would prefer to see the matter being dealt with domestically.

- support for human rights activities, including pacification activities, etc.

The EU is also supporting disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in DRC through a multi-regional and multi-donor programme run by the World Bank. Commission funding will come from the EDF fund for intra-ACP conflict prevention. The same fund will also support an integrated police unit in Kinshasa whose role is to provide security for the transition (securing buildings, personalities, etc). Support for an integrated police in DRC that would include members from the different rebel groups is being considered by the EU.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ Interview with Julie Godin, DRC desk officer (DG Development, Commission).

Impact of Operation *Artemis* on EU crisis management policy and ESDP

Although limited in time, scope, geographical area of action and the number of forces involved, Operation *Artemis* was nevertheless significant in many different ways.

- ▶ It was the first EU crisis management operation outside Europe, and to some the fact that it was in Africa adds to its significance. This does, at least to some extent, suggest EU political willingness to act in the region and to contribute more actively to its stabilisation, going beyond its traditional trade and aid instruments (although that had probably not been the main motivation for the launching of the operation).
 - ▶ It provided an opportunity for healing political differences between EU member states, and especially between France and Britain, following the controversy and friction over the intervention in Iraq. The United Kingdom was immediately in favour of Operation *Artemis* and actually no member state opposed it (apart from Germany on its very first reaction, quickly amended).
 - ▶ It was the first fully autonomous EU military operation without the use of NATO assets. As stressed by EU representatives, it showed that the EU is perfectly capable of acting alone. This was actually not that welcome to NATO officials (by the United States in particular), who stressed that autonomous EU military operations should not happen again. Yet US ambassadors in the Great Lakes region had been clear that the United States was not interested in intervening in the DRC, engaged as they were in Iraq.⁹⁶ NATO also had no desire to support *Artemis*, given the
- priorities it had at the time, namely in the Balkans and Afghanistan.⁹⁷
 - ▶ It was decided and mounted very rapidly: it took only 6 to 7 weeks between UNSC Resolution 1484 and the deployment of the first military forces in Bunia: on 6 July all the forces had been deployed (about 3 weeks after the start of deployment). Even decision-making within the European Council was very rapid. In the end, it was *political will* that really mattered. That is certainly the main lesson to come out of this and other previous experiences: when there is the political will to act, operational weaknesses or institutional constraints can be easily overcome.
 - ▶ Coordination and cooperation among all EU key actors involved (the French military leading the operation, Secretariat of the Council, Commission, and member states) was very good. No doubt human resources in Brussels were under considerable strain, but fears of a lack of linkage between the different actors were in the end not confirmed.
 - ▶ It reinforced the EU's stance and credibility as a capable actor in international security and foreign policy. As such it has reinforced EU links with the UN in the area of crisis management (the EU is already a major partner for the UN in areas like development or humanitarian aid). Furthermore, there was very good cooperation with the UN, on the ground as well as at the highest political level.
 - ▶ With regard to the EU-NATO relationship, and despite the negative reaction that was expressed by some NATO allies (the United States in particular), the EU has reinforced

⁹⁶ In fact, the United States did not veto the operation in the Security Council, which it could have done, although it would have been difficult to justify such an attitude.

⁹⁷ Nicolas Fiorenza, 'EU force seeks new mission after Congo', *European Defense*, 8 September 2003.

its position and credibility as an international actor. *Artemis* is one more significant element of the development of ESDP. Operation *Concordia* (in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina are other examples. The increasing EU activities in the area of crisis management, whether conducted with NATO assets or not – which is actually not so important at this stage, despite some occasional US ‘hysteria’ – is likely to boost cooperation with NATO rather than hinder it in the longer term, albeit on probably somewhat different grounds than previously. There is a lot of room for more cooperation and complementarity between EU and NATO. Furthermore, most EU countries do not wish to see the EU develop an alternative military capacity to rival NATO. There is however a clear consensus among EU members that the EU must be able to act in areas where NATO has neither a strategic interest nor the political will to do so.

6.1 Impact on the issue of EU capabilities

Notwithstanding the likely positive impact of Operation *Artemis* on EU political and defence policy, both internally as well as in relations with other international actors, the operation in Congo has also highlighted the increasing need to address real problems over capabilities, even if political will remains the key issue.⁹⁸ Few member states, apart from France and the United Kingdom, have the capacity to deploy, support and command such operations. In that sense, Operation *Artemis* and the continued engagement of the EU in crisis management in the Balkans are likely to give a boost to ongoing EU efforts to reinforce its crisis management capabilities.

While the chances that EU member states will agree to increase military expenditure are slim, particularly in the current economic climate in Europe, the current focus is more on enhancing rationalisation, flexibility and coordination of European capabilities. That at least is one of the aims of the European Capability Action Plan agreed in February 2002. Some steps in that direction have already been taken.

- In May 2003, the EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was declared operational, even though it is one-third short of the intended 60,000 troops that will be available for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.
- In November 2003, the EU decided on the creation of an Agency in the field of defence capabilities, development, research, acquisition and armaments by 2004.⁹⁹

At a different level, but related to the development of EU operational capabilities, is the need for strategic intelligence sharing and contributions to strategic reserve by member states.

6.2 Towards a single EU command structure?

One of the interesting results of Operation *Artemis* is the effective validation of the ‘framework nation’ concept. Although not directly related, it is nevertheless interesting to remark that, after Operation *Artemis*, there is less enthusiasm and interest for the proposal to create a European Defence Headquarters in Tervuren. To some – at least to France and the United Kingdom, but also to others such as Greece and Italy who have been proposed as potential framework nations in possible future military operations of this kind – the ‘framework nation’ formula has worked well. One of the concerns with regard to this formula is liaison between the lead nation and the European institutions in

⁹⁸ For an assessment of EU military and civilian capabilities for crisis management and the partnerships with NATO and the US, see Hagman, 2002, op. cit in note 70.

⁹⁹ General Affairs Council Conclusions, 17 November 2003.

Brussels. That worked well in Operation *Artemis*, which explains why some question the need to adopt another formula, at least for the time being. This may well appease those within NATO who are not at all keen on seeing the creation of a European Defence Headquarters and who perceive this as a duplication of NATO headquarters.

The ‘framework nation’ concept also appears to some as a good solution for the EU, because of the still relatively small size of the current EUMS, which they consider a real shortcoming in EU operational planning capabilities. The need to at least test such capabilities is linked to the decision to conduct the first joint EU-NATO crisis management exercise with EU planning. The framework nation formula may also allow for greater flexibility and time for further trials until new and more engaging formulas can be found. It was certainly not by chance that the command structures for Operation *Artemis* (in Paris and Entebbe) were much more multinational than the composition of the forces on the ground. Most EU nations were represented in the Paris Headquarters in what can be interpreted to some extent as a ‘joint command post exercise’. There will probably be some useful lessons learned from that perspective as well, and this may in turn help EU decision-makers to further evaluate the needs and constraints at this particular level. Others may, however, see in this formula an instrument for the most powerful nations in Europe to use their military might to impose a defence agenda on the EU, although that remains to be seen of course.

At the European summit of December 2003, the EU agreed to establish an autonomous European military planning element within the EUMS. Its natural choice will still be to have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, but when NATO as a whole is not engaged – for instance in a region where NATO has no interest or is not involved, like Africa – the EU will choose

whether or not to use NATO assets. In the case of autonomous EU military operations, the first choice will be to use national headquarters, which can be multinationalised for the purpose of conducting EU-led operations, as was the case in Operation *Artemis*. Where no national headquarters is identified the EU can have recourse to the operational cell within the EUMS to plan and run the operation.¹⁰⁰

It is now more likely that the EU will engage in peacekeeping operations, and perhaps also in peace enforcement, particularly in situations where humanitarian needs are pressing and/or the risks of an outbreak of conflict or escalation are very high, with potentially even higher costs to European nations. Besides, these are the types of situations that are more likely to appeal to European public opinion and where European leaders will probably have less difficulty in getting public endorsement for such operations (at least while the level of risk remains relatively ‘low’).

6.3 *The need to address the issue of financing for CFSP and ESDP operations*¹⁰¹

One of the limitations of the ‘framework nation’ concept is financial. Few EU memberstates have the capability to conduct such operations, particularly when these imply strategic capabilities. It is unlikely that under the current financial arrangements for ESDP, and in particular in the current economic context, those few EU states with the capability to act as framework nation will be willing to accept the inherent financial burden. In Operation *Artemis*, France not only paid for its own troops (which constituted the large majority of the forces involved in the operation) and equipment, but also for the transportation costs and the costs of the Force

¹⁰⁰ In the December 2003 agreement, the EU has, in addition, decided to establish a small EU planning cell in NATO’s military headquarters, SHAPE, and NATO is invited to establish liaison arrangements at the EUMS. See European Council Conclusions of 12 December 2003 and Presidency document on ‘European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations – UK/FR/GE paper’.

¹⁰¹ For an overview of this issue, see Antonio Missiroli, ‘Euros for ESDP – financing EU operations’, *Occasional Paper 45* (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, June 2003).

Headquarters (costs for the latter would be considered as common costs, but were none the less borne by the framework nation).¹⁰² There is a recognised need for the EU to find ways of sharing the burden of costs. The framework agreement on the financing of EU-led crisis management operations with military and defence implications is to be revised, if necessary, in June 2004. The need to do so is recognised by many players. The discussion has already been under way for some time in the Council, but also in the Commission, which can finance certain conflict-related activities.

Conflict prevention, post-conflict and crisis management are also areas where the Commission is active and new financial instruments have been created to address needs for more rapid action often inherent in that type of situation. The RRM is an illustrative example. An even more interesting case regards EDF. Traditionally perceived as an almost purely development-oriented financial instrument of the EU, the EDF is being currently reoriented to cover peace and security related expenditures, in line with the perception that these are necessary conditions for sustainable development. In legal terms, EDF funds cannot be used to finance activities other than those falling under the first pillar and thus within the Commission's competence. However, the Commission also has legal competence in areas that can be perceived as CFSP areas, like activities regarding conflict prevention, civilian crisis management and conflict resolution. Indeed, if one takes for instance the case of the Strategy Paper for Burundi (2003-2007), the EDF is funding activities aimed at restoring peace, reconciliation, integration of demobilised combatants, support to the judicial and penitentiary system. The EDF is also supporting regional and national programmes

administered by the WB on disarmament, demilitarisation and reintegration of demobilised soldiers (namely in the Great Lakes region). It was previously quite uncommon to see EDF funding being channelled to such activities, although they are often of fundamental political importance for long-term stability and development. That seems now to be an *acquis*. Furthermore, on CFSP matters the Commission not only administers the CFSP budget (under the EU budget and in accordance with the inter-institutional agreement of 6 May 1999), but also shares the right of initiative with the Council, which can open new funding possibilities for CFSP activities. ESDP is a different matter; it is purely intergovernmental and is not covered by the EU budget.

An increased effort to link EU policies, in so far as the use of civilian and military crisis management tools may be more often required in support of long-term policies aimed at enhancing 'structural stability', may well lead to a more flexible use of community financial instruments, although these are likely to be subject to certain conditions and in limited amounts.

6.4 Civilian-military cooperation and complementarity with other EU instruments

Despite fears by some inside and outside the European institutions that reinforcement of the military dimension of crisis management may be pursued to the detriment of the civilian dimension, the emphasis of EU crisis management instruments and policy is likely to remain on the civilian dimension for various reasons,

¹⁰² The General Affairs Council of 17 June 2002 (Luxembourg) approved a general framework for financing operations having military or defence implications, confirmed by the European Council held in Seville on 20 June 2002 (see Annex II of the Presidency Conclusions). Under the agreed framework 'common costs' cover costs for headquarters for EU-led operations (such as transportation costs, administration, locally hired personnel, communications, transportation/travel within the operations area and HQs and barracks and lodging/infrastructure) and for providing support to the forces as a whole (infrastructure, additional equipment, medical care). 'Individual costs' (personnel, arms, equipment) are to be borne by each member state involved accordingly to its degree of involvement ('the principle of 'costs lie where they fall'). Furthermore, the Council will decide on a case-by-case basis whether the costs for the transportation of the forces and their accommodation are to be funded in common.

including financial ones. There is widespread recognition that it is important to have the possibility of using military instruments and capabilities when necessary, but the issue of the balance, coordination and complementarity between military and civilian power assets is very much under discussion these days.

Operation *Artemis* may have exacerbated such fears, as it was essentially a military operation. The civilian dimension was not very visible and yet probably at least equally needed. It is recognised that, for instance, the issue of an

integrated police force, urgent reform of the judicial system and support for the Ituri administration are important elements for the stabilisation of the situation in Bunia and in the district beyond the EU military intervention. The EU has already approved programmes related to some of these areas, while others are still under consideration. In that sense, the benefits of military efforts may prove to be short-lived if they are not immediately accompanied by other complementary measures.

Conclusions: prospects for EU crisis management policy on Africa

Despite the welcome reaction to Operation *Artemis* from different African and international actors, as well as within EU institutions, it is not likely to bring major changes to EU policy on Africa and to the EU approach to crisis management in the region. The EU will remain attached to the essential principles of its well-established policy. Addressing the root causes of conflict and instability in Africa will remain the priority and conflict prevention the privileged approach. Political will for further EU engagement in Africa already remains a key issue for an EU of 15 member states; the upcoming enlargement is certainly not likely to make Africa a higher priority.

However, it is difficult for everything to remain exactly the same after Operation *Artemis*. Short-term military operations are not the long-term solution for African problems, but they may at times be necessary and instrumental in creating the minimal conditions for long-term instruments to be used. How to derive the maximum benefit from such short-term military operations to enhance long-term goals is a key issue where there is room for improvement, whether they are EU-led or conducted by the UN or other regional organisations. There is also a need for better coordination of EU policies and with the bilateral initiatives of EU member states. It is, however, necessary that the latter are willing to put their national interests in second place when it comes to defining priorities in Africa. This may prove to be a major challenge, although one can say that, to some extent, things have improved. The same goes for coordination with international organisations/actors and the UN in particular.

A likely impact of Operation *Artemis* may be a further boost of EU policies aimed at developing and reinforcing African capabilities to deal with conflict-related situations in the region and a greater support to peace operations by the UN and African regional and subregional organisations in the continent. That is currently a high priority of EU dialogue with the African Union and other African organisations. It has been also high on the agenda in EU dialogue and cooperation with other international organisations, particularly with the UN, but also the G-8 and the OSCE. Programmes or initiatives that have proved successful in building African national and regional capacities for crisis management ought to be expanded, taking into account the serious lack of capabilities of most African states and organisations (e.g. command and control, logistics, specialised skills like engineering and medical services, communications and movement control). One could for instance envisage programmes like the French RECAMP, or other bilateral initiatives by EU member states that are focused on building African capacity for crisis management, becoming 'European' programmes. The French government would apparently be open to such a possibility, if the EU shows political interest. This could lead to further expansion and integration of this dimension into a broader European policy towards Africa. Other possibilities could be for the EUMS to provide military or civil-military advisers to African organisations, or support them with relevant information for peace operations (e.g. intelligence information, imagery from the EU Satellite Centre). Some of these 'scenarios' or possibilities are currently being discussed within the EU.

However, unlike many bilateral initiatives, the EU should continue to focus primarily on dialogue and cooperation with and development of African regional and subregional organisations. Reinforcing African organisations (and their capabilities) is in itself an important confidence-building measure in a continent torn by conflicts, where internal and regional threats are sometimes hard to separate.

Training and programmes for the reinforcement of African capabilities to deal with conflict-related situations ought also to take into account the context in which African forces are likely to operate, and, in most cases, that is not the traditional peacekeeping context. African forces have in recent years been operating in rather complex conflict situations where peace-making and peace enforcement skills have often been required. Yet some of the initiatives aimed at reinforcing their skills and capabilities are sometimes too focused on traditional peacekeeping.

There is of course a selfish interest in the whole issue of developing African capabilities for conflict-related activities. Europeans are less willing to engage in peace support missions in Africa now than they were in the 1980s or early 1990s. They have continued to be involved, but more on their own and in very specific and limited types of operations or, as in the last few years, in support of regional efforts (particularly when there has been a high risk that those regional efforts could fail). Operation *Artemis* is

a good example of the type of military engagements Europeans might eventually be willing to undertake in Africa, in the future: short, precise, limited in scope. Whether EU member states would be willing to intervene more often under the EU banner rather than on their own, remains to be seen. However, given the positive experience of Operation *Artemis* and the recent agreements on ESDP (of December 2003) for a fairly flexible approach to the political control of EU-led military operations, it may become increasingly difficult for EU member states to justify, politically, engaging in such operations alone or without at least consulting the EU. Furthermore, there may be some significant political advantages in carrying out a military operation under the EU banner, namely in terms of perceived neutrality, but also in terms of a comprehensive approach to conflict-related situations, to the extent that the EU can back such operations with supporting policies at the civilian level in post-conflict situations, given the wide range of instruments that it has at its disposal.

A more open dialogue with African actors could lead to a more effective use of resources and probably to more flexible and innovative approaches to crisis management in the region and building the capabilities of African actors. Much depends on the latter, too. There have been many European/international and African initiatives and plans to deal with problems in the region. It is to be hoped that those initiatives will be followed by effective action.

Annexes

Regional and subregional organisations in sub-Saharan Africa

Organisation (year it was established)	Members	Defence/security protocols or related aspects in mandate	Defence/security-related organs	Conflict-related activities undertaken	Observations
African Union (former OAU, established in 1963. It officially became AU in 2002)	53 (all African countries except Morocco because of the status of the Western Sahara in the organisation)	- OAU Charter put great emphasis on the principles of national sovereignty and non- interference in other states' internal affairs. - AU Constitutive Act (2000) gives the organisation the authority to intervene in cases of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (Art. 4(h)).	- Conflict Management Centre (1992) ? early warning network (1995). - Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (1993), including a Central Organ and a Peace Fund. - Creation of a 15- member Peace and Security Council (July 2002). Replaces the structure existing under the OAU Mechanism. - Plans for the creation of a Military Staff Committee, under the Peace and Security Council, 2003), and for the creation of an African Standby Force by 2010.	- OAU Neutral Force in Chad (1981-82). - Neutral Military Observer Group in Rwanda (1992-93). - Observer Mission in Burundi (1993-96). - Military Observer mission in Comoros (1997-99). - Neutral Investigators Team in DRC (1999-) - Mediation/Facilitation in DRC - Liaison Mission Ethiopia/Eritrea (2000-). - AU peacekeeping force in Burundi (AMIB, 2003-)	Remarkable progress achieved. However, weak (financial and operational) capabilities and lack of political willingness to engage more deeply in strong and complex operations limits its role in crisis management. Election monitoring and conflict prevention still likely to be its main area of action in the near future. Yet, significant changes in the last couple of years seem to point to a greater political willingness and commitment to address structural and operational shortcomings.

Organisation (year it was established)	Members	Defence/security protocols or related aspects in mandate	Defence/security-related organs	Conflict-related activities undertaken	Observations
SADC – Southern African Development Community (1992, entered into force in 1993)	Angola Botswana DRC Lesotho Malawi Mauritius Mozambique Namibia South Africa Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe (Seychelles withdrew in August 2003)	<p>Defence/security protocols or related aspects in mandate</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Arts. 4, 5 and 21 make reference to the promotion of and cooperation in the area of peace and security. - Mutual Defence Pact (2003, not yet adopted). - Various security-related protocols signed since the late 1990s, including the one on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (2001). 	<p>Defence/security-related organs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (1996). - Recently a decision was taken to create a sustainable brigade-size peacekeeping force over a five-year period (to serve the AU planned African Standby Force). 	<p>Conflict-related activities undertaken</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SADC members have undertaken military operations in DRC (1998) and Lesotho (1998-99) on an ad hoc basis, but ultimately endorsed (officially) by SADC. - Regular peacekeeping training exercises (1997, 1999) and peacekeeping instruction (1994, 1998). 	<p>Observations</p> <p>SADC Organ was not functioning until very recently and it has not really proved itself. Main obstacles lie in regional rivalries and lack of political will. Yet, SADC is among the most active in deploying multinational forces and has great potential, political factors allowing. Some MS have the human resources and equipment to conduct (and sustain?) sizeable crisis management operations. SADC exercises are helping to create and develop capabilities to conduct joint operations.</p>

Organisation (year it was established)	Members	Defence/security protocols or related aspects in mandate	Defence/security-related organs	Conflict-related activities undertaken	Observations
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States (1975; CEDEAO, in its French abbreviation)	Benin Burkina Faso Cape Verde Ivory Coast Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mali Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo (Mauritania withdrew in late 1999)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protocol of Non-Aggression (1978). - Protocol of Mutual Assistance on Defence (1981, became effective in 1986). - Revised ECOWAS Treaty includes regional peace and security issues (1993). - Signed various protocols including a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons (since 1998). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Standing Mediation Committee in 1990, which established ECOMOG. - Mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping and security (1999). - Structures of the Mechanism include: Council of Elders, 10-member Security and Mediation Committee (May 2000), Executive Secretariat and ECOMOG. - Early Warning System created in 2001. - Decision to create a rapid reaction military force (May 2003). - Plans for a regional criminal investigation and intelligence bureau (2002). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Military intervention in Liberia (1990-98, 2003-) - Military intervention in Sierra Leone (1997-2000) - Mediation and military intervention in Guinea-Bissau (1998-99). - Mediation again in 2003. - Stationed troops on the Guinea-Liberia border to stop guerilla infiltration. - Deployment of military forces to Ivory Coast (2002), under a French-led operation. - Peacekeeping training programme for ECOMOG standby units (as of 2002). - Plans to set up two military bases for storage of equipment and other items. - Multinational field training exercises. 	<p>Very active in deploying international forces. Pioneer in the political will and determination to try to address and resolve conflicts (including internal ones) in the region, although often controversial and with mixed results. Fractions between Anglophone and Francophone MS and fears of Nigeria's regional hegemony are divisive factors, but improving with progress in the accountability, coordination and operational structures of ECOMOG operations. Financial difficulties are a real problem. Operational capabilities ought to be further developed.</p>

Organisation (year it was established)	Members	Defence/security protocols or related aspects in mandate	Defence/security-related organs	Conflict-related activities undertaken	Observations
EAC – East African Community (1967, revived in 1996)	Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda (Rwanda and Burundi may also become members)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Memorandum of Understanding on Defence matters (1998, revised in 2001) between their armed forces. May lead to a defence pact. - MoU on Foreign Policy Coordination (1999). - EAC Treaty (2000): one of its objectives is the promotion of peace, security and stability in the region. 		Joint peacekeeping exercise, which included a contingent from the US (1998).	Some consider it has the potential to undertake peacekeeping or emergency operations in the near future, provided it finds the financial and material resources to do so.
ECCAS – Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC in its French abbreviation, created in 1983, began functioning in 1985; revived in 1998).	Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, São Tomé e Príncipe.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No initial provision to address political and security issues. - Pact of Non-aggression (1994). - As of 1999, it listed in the organisation's priorities the development of capacities to maintain peace, security and stability (prerequisites for social and economic development). 	<p>COPAX - Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (1999). It includes a:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Central African Early Warning System (MARAC) for the collection and analysis of data for early detection and prevention of crisis. - Defence and Security Commission (plan, organise and advise on military operations by the organisation). - Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC), a non-permanent force for peacekeeping, security and humanitarian relief. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Exercise <i>Gabon 2000</i> (under RECAMP) conducted with COPAX. - Peacekeeping mission in Central African Republic (350 troops deployed in late 2002 and 2003). 	Although estimated not to be able to give a meaningful response to crisis in the region (whether internal or among member states), it seems to be willing to play a more active role in crisis management in the region.


Organisation (year it was established)	Members	Defence/security protocols or related aspects in mandate	Defence/security-related organs	Conflict-related activities undertaken	Observations
IGAD – Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (named as such in 1996. Prior to that and since its creation in 1986 it was known as IGADD – Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development)	Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda	New Charter adopted in 1996: - Conflict prevention management and resolution, and humanitarian affairs as a priority area of cooperation. - Commitment to respect principles of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs of MS, and peaceful settlement of inter or intra-state conflicts ‘ <i>through dialogue</i> ’ (Arts. 6A and 7).	- Division of Political and Humanitarian Affairs created in 1996 (includes a section on conflict prevention, management and resolution).	- Mediation in Somalia (since 1991) and in Sudan (since 1994), in association with the UN and the OAU and outside the framework of IGAD secretariat. - Programme on conflict prevention, resolution and management (1996). - Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN, 2002).	Has the political will to play an active role, but that is likely to be limited to mediation and negotiation. Weak capacity of IGAD Secretariat to play a role in such efforts (due to mandate limitations). Limited human and financial resources and capacity to undertake peace support operations, not to mention the political dilemmas such activities would entail. Could, however, gradually evolve to a more significant engagement on that front.

Organisation (year it was established)	Members	Defence/security protocols or related aspects in mandate	Defence/security-related organs	Conflict-related activities undertaken	Observations
COMESA – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (1994)	Angola, Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe	- Since 2000 it has included in its objectives the cooperation in the prevention of peace, security and stability among MS in order to enhance economic development. - In 2000, it considered the possibility of drawing up a regional protocol on peace and security.	- Established a Committee on Peace and Security (meets once a year).	- Agreed to set up efforts to control the proliferation of small and light weapons and a campaign against landmines.	It is considering ways of promoting MS capabilities for conflict management, but efforts in this sense are still at a very early stage, and it is not likely that they will materialise soon. Even less likely is the possibility of the organisation engaging in peace support missions in the near future.

Organisation (year it was established)	Members	Defence/security protocols or related aspects in mandate	Defence/security-related organs	Conflict-related activities undertaken	Observations
ANAD Treaty – Treaty of Non-Aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defence (1977)	Burkina Faso Ivory Coast Mali Mauritania Niger Senegal Togo (Observers: Benin, Guinea)	- Provides for conflict management and collective defence mechanisms, including the use of force and military actions if needed. - Various protocols and statutes on these matters adopted (1981-84).	- Commission of two representatives from each MS for mediation, arbitration or conciliation. - Agreement to create a peacekeeping force (1999).	- Small observer mission (Dec. 1985-Jan. 1986)	MS have shown some political willingness to act, but financial limitations alone are likely to hamper attempts to create a standby peacekeeping force. Besides, with ECOMOG playing such an important role in the region (and improvement in relations between Francophone and Anglophone countries within the organisation), it may be difficult to get the international political and financial support – particularly if perceived as an attempt to weaken ECOWAS.

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African and UN peace missions



Sources: UN Africa Recovery from various sources.

* Data on UN peacekeeping missions as of 31 August 2003, from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Source: African Recovery, ECOSOC, United Nations.

Abbreviations

ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACP	African, Caribbean, Pacific
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
ANAD	Treaty of Non-Aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defence
AU	African Union
BMATT	British Military Advisory and Training Team
CAR	Central African Republic
CEAO	Communauté des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
CFSP/PESC	Common Foreign and Security Policy/Politique étrangère et de Sécurité commune
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPLP	Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DG DEV	Directorate General for Development (European Commission)
DG RELEX	Directorate General for External Relations (European Commission)
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EC	European Commission
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUROPAID	European Commission Cooperation Office
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
IDP	Internally displaced people
IEMF	Interim Emergency Multinational Force
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IMET	International Military Education and Training Programme
IPC	Ituri Pacification Committee
ISDSC	Interstate Defence and Security Committee (SADC Organ)
ISPDC	Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (SADC Organ)

MOD	Ministry of Defence
MONUC	UN Mission in DRC
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MS	Member States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOREPS	Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFR	Operation Focus Relief
OIF	Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PSC/COPS	Political and Security Committee/Comité politique et de Sécurité (EU Council)
RECAMP	Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Cooperation Conference
UEMOA	Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNCHR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	UN Security Council
UNSG	UN Secretary General
UPC	Union des Patriotiques Congolais
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
US	United States
USD	US Dollars
WASP	West Africa Stabilisation Programme (US)
WB	World Bank
WEU/UEO	Western European Union/Union de l'Europe Occidentale

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