THE NORDIC DIMENSION IN THE EVOLVING EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF NORWAY

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SUMMARY

During the Cold War, the Nordic countries tried to develop a political identity by being different from the rest of the bipolar European security order. After the end of the Cold War, this particular identity disappeared when the Nordic countries became involved in the great European security discourses, the most important one of which revolved around the concept of *co-operative security*. This discourse focused upon how the different European and Euro-Atlantic security-institutions could fulfil the task of building more integrated security arrangements in Europe. Therefore, to an increasing extent the Nordic countries have to relate themselves to a *European* identity, not a Nordic one. Hence, the traditional factors which were characteristic for the Nordic countries, and which were among the elements that created the ‘Nordic political space’, are becoming relatively less significant. These factors were the Russian-Nordic relationship, the transatlantic relationship and the ‘inner’ political culture connected to isolationism, neutrality and scepticism towards the integration process on the European Continent. The potential difference between the increasing importance of the EU integration process and the three above-mentioned factors introduces a *dynamic element* which creates a Nordic system-transformation process similar to the European system-transformation process caused by the European integration process. Such process is characterised by increased integration, mutual deference and institutional mingling.

The main message in the paper is that such a system-transformation process is starting to affect Norway too, in that this country is also to an increasing extent adapt itself to the new European security logic. This Norwegian adaptation, however, is caused by changes in a structure-related variable, not an actor-related one. The structure-related variable refers to events in the external environment as e.g. the status of the transatlantic relationship, Russia’s role and place, and the speed and direction of the EU integration process. What has happened since the Franco-British St-Malo meeting in December 1998 is that Norway now ‘strongly supports’ the efforts by the European countries to enhance the role of the EU in the sphere of security and defence. In 1999 the Norwegian government stated that it was ready to enhance its contribution to international crisis-management within an EU and NATO framework. This also implies that the Norwegian government is seeing Norway’s security as interwoven with the security of the member states of the EU and that of the Union itself. But it is important to note that such a change is caused by pressure from Norway’s external environment only, and not as a consequence of a more pro-European attitude of the Norwegians themselves (the actor-related variable).

Such a development implies that the traditional Norwegian focus upon defence as defence against an incoming invasion has to be adapted as well. In that respect the paper investigates a Report issued by the Government in 1999 on the creation of an *Armed Forces Task Force* so as to increase the Norwegian capacity to take part in Peace Support Operations. But as a non-member of the EU, the main Norwegian concern has been how Norway would take part in the decision-making process. As underlined by State Secretary Espen Barth Eide at the WEU Council of Ministers in May 2000, the Norwegian view is that a ‘pragmatic approach’ should be pursued so as to find the proper institutional arrangements. Due to a more ‘active European policy’ by the Labour government which took office in March 2000 to an ever-increasing extent, we may see a policy whereby Norway underlines that the future of Europe is also the future for Norway.
INTRODUCTION

The development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) is one of the main achievements accomplished by the EU as a whole during the 1990s. The institutional framework for a European voice in international affairs now exists. The EU as an independent actor that stands ready to defend its security interests at the European and global level will have a significant impact upon cooperative security structures at the regional level and beyond.\(^1\) It will alter relations between states as well as international bodies. It will create new security and organisational patterns and somewhat blur the borders between member states. These developments are the result of a very high degree of integration among the nation states in the EU: according to Ernst B Haas, the most influential integration theorist, ‘… regional integration is concerned with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbours so as to lose factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflicts between themselves’.\(^2\)

The main focus of this paper is to examine the way in which the European integration process influences the Nordic subregion, with special emphasis on the new security and defence dimension of the EU. The reason behind this approach is that the Nordic area is a very special one. First of all, it could be characterised as a pluralistic security community\(^3\) with stable expectations on peaceful settlements of conflicts. But, secondly, the Nordic countries have different institutional connections to NATO and EU (Denmark, Iceland and Norway as NATO members, and Denmark, Finland and Sweden as EU members). In that respect, one of the most important questions this paper will try to address is how the concept of Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) of the EU could be used as an analytical tool to describe and explain foreign policy change in the Nordic countries, with emphasis on how the Nordic countries have responded to the CESDP development. One could argue that the CESDP blueprint first of all relates to what sort of ultimate aim the European integration process should have, and in what kind of multinational setting the different foreign and security policies of the countries involved should eventually be conducted. In order to illuminate these questions this paper will focus upon two different sets of variables, namely a structure-related and an actor-related one.\(^4\) The structure-related variable includes the

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\(^3\) The study of security communities relates first of all to the work of Karl Deutsch. According to his definition, a pluralistic security community was an area where states had not ceased to be sovereign entities, but where stable expectations on peaceful settlements of conflicts existed: ‘…, a pluralistic security community “retains the legal independence of separate governments.” These states within a pluralistic security community possess a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions, and mutual responsiveness – a matter of mutual identity and loyalty, a sense of “we-ness”, and are integrated to the point that they entertain “dependable expectations of peaceful change”.’ Quote from Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 7. On the other hand, an amalgamated security community was an area where the states more or less had ceased to be sovereign. For further references to the work by Karl Deutsch, see for example Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

\(^4\) The variables referred to are also being used by Clive Archer, ‘Nordic Swans and Baltic Cygnets’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, no. 1, 1999, pp. 60-6.
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geostrategic situation, and the strength and the speed of the EU integration process, but also such aspects as the continued involvement of the US in European security policy, as well as the kind of relationship Russia is to have with the rest of the ‘political Europe’.

The actor-related variable refers to such aspects as party political differences in each of the Nordic states, bureaucratic politics within and across ministries, their economic interests, and the general political culture. The main emphasis will be put on the security and defence dimension of the EU, and on the ways in which the different Nordic countries have responded to the development of a security and defence policy by the EU. In this respect, a comparative analysis of the different Nordic countries will be conducted, but with most emphasis on Norway. Accordingly, the paper will investigate how Norway has positioned itself in the European discourse on security and defence, and what kind of contributions Norway may make to European crisis and conflict management. As this paper will show, a change in the Norwegian attitude towards European security and defence took place in 1999. The main reason behind this about turn is to be found in changes in the structure-related variable, not in the actor-related one. In other words, new external inputs have contributed to a much more supportive attitude from the Norwegian side towards an EU role in security and defence matters. The last part of the paper will deal with future perspectives on Nordic security that, as we shall see, are closely connected to the fate of the EU integration process itself.

The methodological approach of this paper makes use of both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources relate to interviews the author made among senior diplomats in the early spring of 2000. Primary sources cover also statements and speeches by foreign and defence ministers and official documents issued by the different Nordic countries on their attitudes towards European security and defence. The secondary sources include books and magazines on Nordic security affairs as well as newspaper articles.

Some theoretical considerations

In the theoretical debate on European integration, it has been quite common among international relations scholars to connect the study of regional integration to the ‘liberal’ schools of IR. These liberal approaches focus on relationships of interdependence with emphasis upon sensitivities and vulnerabilities, regime formation and international institutions. Robert O Keohane defines international institutions as ‘. . . persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations’. According to Keohane, an international system might be more or less institutionalised, where ‘commonality’, ‘specificity’ and ‘autonomy’ are the concepts being used to measure the degrees of institutionalisation. The ‘liberal’ approach to the study of international relations does not, however, disregard discord or conflict in

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5 The traditional Norwegian attitude towards European integration and supranational co-operation has been quite reluctant. In fact, European integration was, as seen from a Norwegian view, not an ideal form for co-operation between European states. Norway’s traditional position has emphasised co-operation between ‘sovereign’ nation-states within a wider Atlantic co-operative framework. For further references, see e.g. Helge Ø. Pharo, ‘Ingen vei utenom? Norge i integrasjonsprosessene i Europa 1946-1994’, in Utenfor, annerledes og suveren? Norge under EØS-avtalen [Outside, different and sovereign? Norway under the EEA-Agreement] (Oslo: ARENA Fagbokforlaget, 1999).


international relations. On the contrary, this approach seems to look upon cooperation in international affairs as a bridge between harmony and discord: ‘Cooperation is contrasted with discord; but it is also distinguished from harmony. Cooperation, as compared to harmony, requires active attempts to adjust policies to meet the demands of others. That is, not only does it depend on shared interests, but it emerges from a pattern of discord. Without discord there would be no cooperation, only harmony’.  

An influential scholar like Andrew Moravcsik draws heavily insight from the liberal school, when he emphasises progress in the EU integration process as a result of patterns of commercial advantage, the bargaining power of important governments, and the incentives to enhance credibility of interstate commitments. This liberal intergovernmentalist approach is based upon political economy, not economics, and tends to focus entirely upon national preference formation. As regards other theoretical approaches to the study of European integration, he seems to agree with Ernst B. Haas who, after introducing neo-functionalism in the late 1950s and early 1960s, came to the conclusion that regional integration studies and regional integration theories as such should be both included in and subordinated to the changing patterns of interdependence. Hence, the study of regional integration should be seen as part of the broader and more global patterns of international political economy, regime formations and complex interdependence.

What such a liberal approach seems to neglect is that the subordination of integration theories to liberal theories of international relations will tend to ‘. . . violate reality in the sense that it disregards the character and fundamental importance of the chief integration motives of some of the main actors involved as well as the potential system transforming effects of the integration process itself.’

Taking into account that EU policy is increasingly becoming an independent process leading towards a transformed European security order, the natural point of departure must be that the EU and NATO should be seen as two different sets of processes. The EU could in that respect be seen as a process which is based upon integration and system transformation, while NATO is more status quo oriented and meant to keep the US as the dominant actor in European security affairs. This implies that although NATO’s tasks (more emphasis on collective security operations and out of area tasks at the expense of collective defence) have changed dramatically during the 1990s, NATO’s power structure is fundamentally similar to the

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10 One might say that neo-functionalism as a theoretical and methodological approach was ‘invented’ by Ernst B Haas in 1958 when he issued his well-known book ‘The Uniting of Europe’. The central concept in the book is the ‘spill-over’ mechanism, where integration in one sector creates demands to upgrade common interests in other sectors too, and thereby create an integration process. The final state or the dependent variable in this respect was according to Haas the creation of either a unitary state, a federation or a confederal arrangement.
11 See Ernst B. Haas, ‘The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory’, *Research Series*, no. 25 (Berkely, California: University of California, Center for International Studies, 1975).
13 This is one of the conclusions Martin Sæter presents in his latest book on European integration and integration theories; ibid.
power structure of the Cold War. This means that the US still dominates NATO politically as well as militarily.\textsuperscript{14}

**Structure of the paper**

The next section will deal with the Northern European security context, where the different Nordic countries’ relationships to EU, WEU and NATO are assessed. This part will then be the major point of departure for the comparative study of the different Nordic countries’ security and defence relationships with the EU, and of the institutional setting the individual countries see as the most important framework for European security and defence. The following two sections will then deal with Norway, focusing both on Norway’s attitude and policies towards the European security and defence question, and on Norway’s contributions to European crisis and conflict management. The final part will look upon some future perspectives on Nordic security, and on the way in which such perspectives are linked to the overall EU integration process.

CHAPTER ONE: THE NORTHERN EUROPEAN SECURITY CONTEXT

During the Cold War, the Nordic area (or ‘Norden’) developed a specific political identity by being different from the rest of the bipolar European security order. In contrast to the rest of the system, the Nordic countries tried to pursue a foreign policy orientation which represented a modification of the confrontation, essentially by limiting Soviet involvement in Finland and US involvement in Norway. The level of tension was therefore lower in Northern than in Central Europe, and the Nordic area tried to shield itself from recurrent conflict manifestations on the Central Front.

After the end of the Cold War, this special form of identity disappeared. Instead, during the 1990s the Nordic countries became involved in the great European security discourses, the most important one of which revolved around the concept of cooperative security. The discourse on cooperative security focused upon how the different European and Euro-Atlantic security institutions could fulfill the task of building a more integrated security arrangement in Europe. Contrary to the building of a political identity by being different from the other European states, the main challenge for the Nordic countries seemed to be how the Nordic countries should be integrated into the new pan-European web of security institutions. During the 1990s we therefore saw a development where the states in the Nordic subregion, like other subregions on the European continent, had to relate themselves to a European identity. The main subjects in this discourse were questions like centrality, access, interdependence and independence to the main European and Euro-Atlantic decision-making bodies, where the statuses of the different Nordic countries came to be determined along the axis depicting membership, association or non-membership in these institutions.

In the same way as for the other European subregions, the fate of the Nordic area seems to be dependent upon the geostrategic and political developments which shape the wider European political order as a whole. These elements relate first of all to patterns of conflict and cooperation in the European system, to the density of institutions and other forms for multilateral coordination, to the degree of great power presence, to ideological aspects as well as to the distribution of military and economic power. All of these elements will create the new framework for Nordic security. Like the rest of Europe, Russia, the United States and the EU integration process will determine the status and position of the different Nordic countries in the European system.

16 The concept most often used to describe this situation was the ‘Nordic balance’, a concept coined by the Norwegian political scientist Arne Olav Brundtland. See for example his article ‘The Nordic Balance and its Possible Relevance for Europe’, in ‘Remarks before the Swiss Institute of International Affairs at Zürich University. Meeting of November 24, 1981’. The term Nordic balance was applied by analysts to explain how the low tension situation in the Nordic area could be self-reproducing. For other instructive analysis of this concept see e.g. Håkan Wiberg & Ole Waever, ‘Norden in the Cold War Reality’, in Jan Øberg (ed), Nordic Security in the 1990s. Options in the Changing Europe (London: Pinter Publishers, for TFF, 1992), pp. 23-6.
17 This is based upon the article written by Lodgaard, ibid., p. 283.
18 The concepts centrality and centre-periphery relationships etc are the major elements in the new post-wall security logic in Europe. For a detailed analysis see references made in footnote 33.
I.1 Russia

Russia could in that respect be labelled as the most important ‘security variable’ in the Euro-Atlantic area. Its status in the European political order will have a major impact upon Europe, and will also to a high degree determine what role the US will have in the future European security arrangements. As regards the EU, Russia concluded in 1994 a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the Union, and the Cologne European Council decided to implement a Common Strategy on Russia in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty.

The Northern Dimension is another policy which has been adopted by the EU and is part of EU policies for external relations, with a specific aim to raise the Union’s profile in northern Europe. Its general goal is to enhance security, stability, prosperity and sustainable development in the region through economic cooperation and positive interdependence between Russia, the Baltic Sea states and the EU. The Northern Dimension also has an important link with the EU’s new strategy on Russia.

However, Russia’s relations with the West have become severely strained during recent years, first of all due to a reorientation in Russian foreign policy which took place in the mid 1990s. By doing this foreign policy turn, Russia emphasised to a much larger extent the differences between Russia and the ‘Western’ countries, both with regard to political organisation, the use of military force and foreign policy interests. Accordingly, Russia became for example increasingly sceptical about the Founding Act signed in 1997 with NATO, seeing the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) which it established as primarily a talking shop, not a decision-making body.

When looking at Russia and Russia’s political and military status from a Nordic perspective, it has to be emphasised that the Nordic area is a border area in that the north-western part of Russia constitutes the only direct link between Russia and the western part of the European continent. Consequently, the Nordic area, and especially Finland’s and Norway’s proximity to Russia, plays an important role in defining Norway’s and Finland’s defence policy considerations. But it is also important to note that several challenges emanating from Russia do not necessarily relate to Russia’s military strength; they are also caused by Russia’s political, economical and military weakness. Dangers connected to the possible disintegration of Russian power structures are also security challenges which have to be taken into consideration. Consequently, the Finnish initiative on the Nordic Dimension was primarily connected to the fears generated by Russia’s weakness and to the ‘chaos problems’ such a weakness could create.

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22 This information is based upon the Norwegian MoD publication *Facts and Figures 1999*, [http://www.odin.dep.no/od/odpubl/fakta/eng/sec_policy.html](http://www.odin.dep.no/od/odpubl/fakta/eng/sec_policy.html)
23 As seen for example in connection with the Kursk accident which happened in August 2000. See, e.g., *The Economist* 19 August 2000: ‘Russia – Disaster below the Barents Sea’. 
It is also important to underline that, within post-bipolar Europe, the Nordic region is among the most stable and peaceful ones. In 1997 Russia officially stated that its north-western flank is its most secure. Military confrontation in the Nordic region is a thing of the past and no new conflicts have taken place since the Cold War. The Barents Sea Cooperation framework is a clear example of such a development. This cooperative framework was proposed by Norway in 1993 with the overall aim to build a more cooperative security structure in the Northern part of Europe, even though security and defence issues does not form a part of the cooperation. The Kirkenes Declaration which established the Barents Sea Cooperation in 1993 was signed by Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and the EU Commission. The main aim of this initiative is to enhance cooperation at the subregional level with emphasis upon aspects connected to environmental cooperation, cultural exchange, trade, energy and transport. In that respect one might argue that this Barents Sea Cooperation complements the EU initiative on the Northern Dimension which was proposed by Finland in 1997, and the Northern European Initiative proposed by the United States in 1996.

I.2 The United States

The Clinton administration has since 1996 given the Nordic region, and especially the security of the Baltic states, a high degree of attention. In fact, a major policy goal of the US administration is to turn this region into a testing ground for its concept of cooperative security. This turn may also be seen in the perspective of a more universalistic foreign policy orientation by the US after 1990, stressing enlargement of market democracies, democratic institutions and ‘soft power’ approaches. In this respect it is necessary to underline that the United States is seen as a catalyst behind multilateral efforts to combat aggression and resolve long-standing disputes.

The enlargement of NATO, which officially materialised in March 1999, was perceived by the US administration as part of a strategy to build a lasting peace order on the European continent. The enlargement was said not to exclude anyone, so that NATO would be looked upon as the main vehicle or linchpin for European security in the years to come. The former US ambassador to NATO Robert E. Hunter stated in this respect that the US ‘... rejected the notion of balance of power’ and instead underlined the necessity of building ‘... a European civil space’. What these statements illustrate is that the US underlines its hegemonic power in rather benign terms.

24 In that connection, one exception should be underlined, namely the so-called Have Star Globus II radar which has been built in Vardo, a Norwegian city close to the Russian border. In the Russian view, this radar-site is in conflict with the ABM Treaty.
25 See Dmitri Trenin´s article, ibid., p. 29.
27 This is the expression used by the Norwegian security policy expert Svein Melby to describe a foreign policy orientation by the Americans which focuses more upon collective security than collective defence, and emphasises a broader approach to security. See Svein Melby, Amerikansk utenrikspolitikk, [American Foreign Policy] TANO, 1995.
As regards European integration, and the EU in particular, the US has always underlined its support, although a more reserved one in recent years. As underlined by Charles A Kupchan, the process of integration has produced an effective EU-centred unipolarity in Europe that has succeeded in eliminating competitive balancing among Europe’s major powers. The EU also exerts a powerful centripetal force across the continent, with most current members eager to participate in the inner circle of monetary union and many of Europe’s new democracies waiting impatiently for admission to the club. 32 As a result, EU integration could be seen as a process which corresponds to the main objectives of the US in European security affairs, namely that the EU enlarges the zone of stability on the European continent, and does so through a process which does not alienate Russia from the new political order in Europe.

On the other hand, it is worth noting that it is unfruitful to base the analysis of transatlantic relations on a model of harmony only. As Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch-Lainé and Charles Grant underline in their analysis of a European defence capability, the St-Malo declaration of December 1998 left open the possibility of European military action outside the framework of the US-led NATO: ‘From the European perspective it is important to retain the option of a “purely” autonomous European capability, as a means for pressuring Washington to cooperate in the development of ESDI within NATO’. 33

If we look at the Nordic countries, Norway and Iceland, but also Denmark underline the necessity of building a European role in security and defence upon the conclusions reached at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Berlin in 1996, where it was decided to develop an ESDI within NATO. This is of course due to the fact that neither Norway nor Iceland are members of the EU. Denmark plays a special role within this context, in that the so-called ‘Edinburgh compromise’ of 1992 underlined that Denmark was not obliged to participate in the elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. This means in practice that Denmark is not involved in the adoption of EU decisions that are based on the Article in the EU Treaty which deals with the cooperation between the EU and the WEU. 34 The two non-aligned Nordic countries, Finland and Sweden, stress in this respect that their security status enhances the security in the Nordic area, and see as yet no reason to apply for NATO membership. On the other hand, as underlined by Peter van Ham, the US policy of cooperative security overlaps and even strengthens the Finnish initiative to create a Northern Dimension to the EU, which is reflected in the Clinton administration’s Northern European Initiative (NEI). 35

1.3 Consequences for the Nordic security context

Theoretically, the end of the Cold War could have opened up a wide range of possibilities for the Nordic countries. But the new ‘security logic’ which replaced the old one of East-West confrontation was not a multipolar European security order, but an order more or less connected to centrality, on access to the decision-making bodies. 36 Hence, non-participation

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32 Kupchan, ibid., p. 59.
34 Based upon information given in the brochure *Danish Security Policy*; Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 1996, p. 22.
35 Peter van Ham, ibid., pp. 58-62.
would axiomatically imply marginalisation. Therefore, a fear of marginalisation was the issue at the top of the policy agenda in all the Nordic countries, where questions related to integration versus distance were the main subjects in the discourse. According to Ole Wæver, the EU could be regarded as the most important security institution in Europe because European politics today unfold around one centre only, namely the EU. The concept of the EU as Europe’s most important security institution lies in the fact that the EU in the end will decide which of the two European patterns will prevail: integration or fragmentation.

Accordingly, for Finland and Sweden, their old roles of being bridge-builder between East and West have become less relevant, while at the same time these two countries were still outside those organisations in which the most important developments were taking place. Their policies during the years following the end of the Cold War can well be explained in terms of their wish to participate as far as possible in the new relevant forums. Because neither the governments nor a majority of either population wished to abandon non-alignment, they did not put NATO membership on the political agenda. Consequently Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995, and in 1999 Finland (the only Nordic country so far) entered the EMU as well. In the sphere of security and defence they fully support the development of a CESDP by the EU, but draw a line between crisis-management and defence. In their interpretation, when one speaks about defence in the EU context, one actually means crisis management.

To Norway, a strong supporter of NATO with close links to the United States, it became apparent that its geostrategic location was becoming less central. Instead, NATO initiated a process whereby the Alliance would adapt to the new security challenges facing Europe, such as the adverse consequences of instability arising from serious economic, social and political difficulties, as well as ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes beyond the NATO area. Thus, NATO was becoming more or less a ‘virtual alliance’ more focused upon capabilities and interests than territory and collective defence. Although a full member of NATO since 1949, the new strategic landscape characterised by a new ‘security logic’ has made Norway a more marginalised country within NATO. These developments were exacerbated by the fact that Norway still focused upon NATO’s traditional tasks connected to collective defence and with a high degree of scepticism towards NATO’s new missions. In the European context, Norway joined the WEU as an associate member in 1992 (becoming effective in 1995), but after the popular ‘no’ in the Referendum of 1994 chose to stand outside the EU and, instead, based its cooperation with the EU on the EEA Agreement signed by the EU and the EFTA in 1992. This agreement came formally into effect in 1994. Once again, the question of EU membership for Norway must be connected to the greater European discourse on the centre-periphery problématique of getting in to achieve influence versus keeping distance for the sake of independence.

38 Cited in Wæver, ibid., pp. 67-8.
42 See Ole Wæver, ibid., p. 67.
Denmark, a member of NATO since 1949 and of the EU since 1973, was perhaps the Nordic country, along with Finland, most affected by the end of the Cold War. The reunification of Germany, the withdrawal of Soviet/Russian troops from eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the independence of the Baltic states from the Soviet Union, made the Danish ‘security environment’ totally different from the situation of the Cold War. But it is also important to note that the new European security order characterised by centrality and access to the decision-making centres made Denmark more vulnerable: In the words of Ole Wæver: ‘Denmark’s “No” to Maastricht was driven by a fear of coming too close to the centre’. As a consequence of the first Danish ‘No’ to Maastricht, Denmark chose not to join the EMU, and only joined the WEU as an observer together with the non-aligned countries in the EU: Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden.

In a wider European perspective, Iceland is also a special case due to the fact that membership in the EU has never been rejected by the people (as is the case in Norway) nor excluded as a matter of principle by the Icelandic government. But then the case has never been put to the people, and according to the Icelandic government there is no possibility to do so before Iceland has settled the question of how Iceland could stand outside the Common Fisheries Policy of the EU.

In the field of security and defence, moreover, Iceland has no military forces of its own, relying instead upon a defence agreement with the United States which was signed in 1951. According to it, the United States is obliged to defend Iceland on behalf of NATO if the country is attacked. Due to membership in NATO, its defence agreement with the US and its participation in the EEA Agreement (along with Norway and Liechtenstein), Iceland has taken a relatively Atlanticist orientation in its security policies. For example, at the NAC meeting in December 1998, the Icelandic foreign minister stated that the future defence and security arrangements in Europe should reinforce the security and stability of Europe as a whole: ‘They need to be consistent with maintaining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as the essential forum for consultations among its members and must not call into question the fundamental importance of the transatlantic link . . . The Alliance should remain an organisation primarily devoted to transatlantic collective defence against a variety of challenges and risks. This should be the foundation for various non-Article 5 missions.’ In a Nordic context it has therefore to be underlined the strong connections between ‘Atlanticism’ on the one hand and a traditional East-West orientation in its security and defence policy.

But the main theme in the Nordic discourse on European politics and integration has been connected to questions relating to centre-periphery, to access to decision-making bodies versus independence and non-subordination to the most important decision-making body in Europe, namely the EU. In one way, the Nordic subregion is similar to other European subregions. But in another way the Nordic subregion is also quite different. As Hanna Ojanen underlines in her study, the Nordic subregion is a border region, bordering the most important security variable on the European continent, Russia. This fact explains to a high degree the

43 See Ole Wæver, ibid.
44 Speech by the Icelandic foreign minister Mr. Halldór Ásgrímsson in Bangkok 29 January 1999: ‘The European Integration Process as seen from Iceland’.
46 Statements made by foreign minister Mr. Halldór Ásgrímsson at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council Brussels, 8 December 1998.
47 See Ojanen (2000), ibid., p. iii: ‘Historically, they [Finland and Sweden] are newcomers in the process of integration; geographically, they are located at the border of the Union; and borders play an important role
Atlantic-oriented foreign and security policies pursued by Norway and Iceland, and the non-alignment policies pursued by Sweden and Finland. On the other hand, and due to the rise of the EU on the European continent, there are growing possibilities for more united policy by the Nordic countries in the sphere of security and defence. As we will see in the following chapters, such possibilities are strongly connected to the CESDP of the EU.
CHAPTER TWO: NORTHERN PERSPECTIVES ON CESDP AS REGARDS NATO, WEU AND THE EU

At its meeting in Cologne on 3-4 June 1999, the European Council approved and adopted a report prepared by the German presidency on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence. According to the report, the EU should be able to decide on the full range of Petersberg tasks in pursuit of the CFSP objectives and of a common defence policy. To fully take on these tasks, the EU ‘must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so’, thus paraphrasing the text from the St. Malo summit. The meeting also paved the way for an integration of the WEU in the EU, although this subject was not on the formal agenda. As noted by the Danish foreign minister, it will be ‘mostly procedure [but] pointing in a certain direction’. The foreign minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Poos, stated that the Luxembourg WEU presidency would focus on ‘identifying and perfecting the roles of the WEU, which could constitute an essential part of the WEU’s heritage to be handed on to the EU’.

At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 further steps were taken concerning the CESDP. In the presidency report on ‘Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence’ and on ‘Non-Military Crisis Management’, steps were taken to develop more effective military capabilities and establish new political and military structures for these tasks: ‘In this connection, the objective is for the Union to have an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crisis.’ In that respect it was decided to establish new and permanent political and military bodies within the Council of the EU: a standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) composed of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level; a Military Committee (MC) composed of the Chiefs of Defence represented by their military delegates; and finally a Military Staff (MS) within the Council structures which will provide military expertise and support to the CESDP, including the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations. The Military Staff will perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks, including identification of European national and multinational forces. As of 1 March 2000 these bodies were established as an interim measure.

II.1 Finland and Sweden

From a Nordic perspective it is certainly clear that such a ‘militarisation’ of the EU will change the security positions of the different Nordic countries. As regards Finland and

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48 The Petersberg tasks refer to the WEU ministerial meeting at Petersberg outside Bonn (Germany) on 19 June 1992 and refer to the military tasks which can be assigned to the WEU. In accordance with point 4 under the heading ‘II. On Strengthening WEU’s Operational Role’ the military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. In the Amsterdam Treaty these Petersberg tasks are integrated into Article 17.2.


51 Quoted from Annex IV in the Presidency Conclusions, European Council meeting in Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999.
Sweden, their status as non-aligned countries have to be defined in new ways. As pointed out by Risto E. J. Penttilä, there will be little room for non-alignment in the EU, due to an axiom whereby the more integration there is in an international system, the less room there is for neutrality. The further the EU goes in building a common foreign and security policy, the less room there is for non-alignment and neutrality.  

It is therefore arguable that these two Nordic non-aligned countries to an ever greater extent link their security and defence policies to the overall EU integration process: following an orientation that could be labelled security through integration. This has not, however, prevented Finland and Sweden from participation in the peace support operations (PSOs) conducted by NATO during the 1990s, as their participation in the Polish/Nordic brigade in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as their participation in KFOR in Kosovo have shown. In this respect these countries are integrated into NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and in the enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) arrangement, including also the Planning and Review Process (PARP) which is designed to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities which might be made available for multinational training, exercises and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces.

Thus, participation in NATO’s collective security activities (not collective defence) is fully compatible with the aims of building their security policies on EU integration. In this respect, for both Finland and Sweden, EU membership provides protection based on solidarity. Accordingly, in a report issued by the Finnish Council of State in March 1997 with the title ‘European Security and Finnish Defence’, it is stressed that the ‘Union is founded on the concept that its own and its member states’ security are inseparable. Its influence on security depends on its economic strength and political cohesion. Economic and monetary union will deepen EU integration and strengthen security based on common responsibility’. The link between the Finnish military forces and the EU integration process is also expressed in a very clear way when the report says that ‘our [Finland’s] credible independent defence capability supports the collective security of the Union and its members. An effectively functioning Union accords with Finland’s security interests’. It is interesting to note that the report is fairly critical of NATO’s enlargement policies, saying that ‘NATO enlargement involves risks that could pose difficulties for the position of third countries or limit their opportunities to participate in decisions affecting their own security’.

The restructuring of the Finnish military forces in the 1990s must also be seen in connection with the security logic on which Finland bases its security policies. Although still focusing upon territorial defence and compulsory military service, a capacity to participate in military crisis management tasks is being developed as part of Finland’s defence capability. Participation in international crisis management is an increasingly important component of Finnish security policy, and Finland sees its non-alignment policy as a vital element in preserving security and stability in northern Europe. Accordingly, Finland is looking upon non-NATO membership as its contribution to security in Europe.

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53 Yet neither Finland nor Sweden participated in NATO’s Operation Allied Force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which lasted from March to June 1999.
54 For further references to the report see http://www.vn.fi/vn/english/publicat/970317se.htm
Sweden’s security and defence policy is compatible with that of Finland. But there are also some differences that have to be emphasised: In terms of military-political cooperation Finland is closer to NATO than Sweden, also when it comes to public opinion and overall foreign policy orientation. But like Finland, Sweden stresses the importance of crisis-management as a vital element in the Swedish defence planning. The internationalisation of the Swedish defence forces must therefore be regarded as contribution to the efforts by the EU to strengthen the EU capacity to implement Petersberg operations. The overall aim of the Swedish security and defence policy remains the pursuit of non-alliance policy in times of peace, making neutrality a possibility in the event of war. The implication is that Sweden now looks upon its neutrality policy as a means rather than as an end in itself, as was instead the case during the Cold War. As emphasised by Penttilä, Sweden continues to call itself neutral even as a member of the EU. To be able to reach this overarching goal, the maintenance of a strong and credible defence is essential. In that respect Sweden assesses that the military importance of the Nordic region has grown as compared to Central Europe. In the Swedish perception, the CFE rules concerning flank areas allow Russia to establish more units with a high state of preparedness in the Leningrad Military District. On the other hand, the assessment in the Swedish resolution determining the outlines of defence in the period 1997-2001 is that Russia’s weakness and NATO’s defensive character preclude the emergence of the political circumstances that would be required for a major war.

In that respect Sweden is now leaving the previous anti-invasion concept and instead aims at restructuring the Swedish military forces so that they will be able to secure territorial integrity, defend the country from attacks from the air and other forms for limited attacks. Furthermore, the Swedish military forces shall protect the country from serious consequences coming from attacks against vital infrastructures and, at the same time, enhance the possibility of cooperating in the sphere of international security. This will of course demand a high degree of defence restructuring. Units which prior to the restructuring were prepared to meet an invasion will be disbanded and investments in new defence technology and material will be given a high priority. Following a proposal put forward by the Swedish Chief of Defence (CHOD) in the spring of 1999, the Swedish Army and Navy will be reduced by approximately 50%, while the Air Force will not be as much affected. Due to the new obligations Sweden is facing, a high priority will be given to international peace support operations. Sweden has in fact proposed establishing a Nordic Brigade composed of military units from the different Nordic countries. The aim of this brigade is to conduct peace support operations both within a NATO/PfP framework and within the framework of the emerging CESDP of the EU.

In a CESDP perspective it is also interesting to note that the Nordic countries have jointly proposed to establish military cooperation among themselves, aimed at enhancing their capacity to conduct crisis-management operations of the Petersberg type, the most important one being the so-called ‘Nordic Coordination Arrangement for Military Peace Support’ or NORDCAPS. The idea of a more extensive Nordic military cooperation within peace support

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55 See Penttilä (1999), ibid., p. 174.
57 Conventional Forces Europe (CFE). The treaty was signed at the CSCE summit in Paris in November 1990. Unlike Denmark, Iceland and Norway, Sweden and Finland are not parties to the CFE-Treaty.
58 For information concerning the security assessment of the Swedish defence authorities, see http://www.vn.fi/ vn/english/publicat/970317se.htm
was agreed upon in July 1996 by the Nordic defence ministers (Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark). The aim of NORDCAPS is to adjust (and further develop) existing peace-supporting bodies to the current need for political and military consultations and cooperation. NORDCAPS entails strengthening of joint leadership, education and training operations. A force register of all three forces will also be set up which is to form the basis for potential Nordic efforts, including Nordic contributions to, for example, the UN Expedition Force and the so-called UN Stand-by Force High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). In that connection SHIRBRIG is a practical cooperation between a group of countries which aims to establish a brigade for high readiness within the framework of the UN’s readiness structure. When established, the Brigade will include a capacity for rapid deployment in peacekeeping operations under mandate from the UN Security Council. The Brigade will consist of a number of units which are part of SHIRBRIG’s brigade pool. Thus, in a given situation, it will be possible to put together the desired force from specific contributions to the pool.

II.2 Denmark

The initiative which finally led to the establishment of SHIRBRIG was Danish, when Denmark in August 1995 took the initiative to establish an international working group to investigate the possibility to set up a multinational force of high readiness. But in a CESDP perspective Denmark plays a special role, which is due to the above-mentioned compromise which came into effect after the first Danish ‘No’ to the Maastricht Treaty. According to it, Denmark will not be involved in the adoption of EU decisions which make use of the article in the EU Treaty dealing with the relationship between the EU and the WEU, but ‘. . . will not prevent the development of closer cooperation between Member States in this area’. On the other hand, the Danish government’s assessment is that Denmark can participate in the different committees which are being established as a consequence of the Helsinki European Council decision. But in a security policy perspective, Denmark is getting more marginalised as a consequence of the further elaboration and implementation of the CESDP within the EU. Due to the Edinburgh compromise, for example, it was impossible for Denmark to participate in the WEU mine clearance mission in Croatia, the evacuation of EU citizens in Africa, and the WEU international police operation in Albania. In that respect it is also important to note that the original Danish reaction to the joint Finnish-Swedish initiative to integrate the Petersberg Declaration into the new Amsterdam Treaty was negative. The Danish conservative party was especially critical and accused the Swedish and Finnish governments of betraying Denmark in the WEU question. Negative reactions came also from the Danish prime minister as well as the foreign minister, and further splits emerged both within the parliament (Folketinget) and in the Danish government.
As a consequence, Denmark has reduced its influence on the EU’s general development in security and defence: ‘Although Danish preferences in this field were relatively clear, judging from the memorandum (no defence or defence policy within the EU institutional framework), the Danish exemption in this field meant that it was difficult to speak with weight about the general development of the EU in the field of defence, since this was an area in which Denmark’s involvement was unclear’. 66

However, when judging Danish defence policy during the 1990s, one gets another impression, because Denmark has significantly restructured its defence policy to meet the new demands risen from the new security logic on the European continent. Much emphasis has been put on participation in international peace support operations. In that context Denmark has established an International Brigade which has links with a British Division. The latter is an integral part of NATO’s ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). 67 Furthermore, a Defence Commission put forward its recommendations in December 1998 that underlined that no ‘conventional’ threat is likely to occur within the next 10 years, and furthermore emphasised continued Danish involvement in peace support operations. In that respect, the capacity to conduct such operations is to be upheld. In the years to come the Danish defence forces will go through further restructuring, where the highest priority will be given to crisis management and rapid reaction forces. As a consequence, investments in new defence technology will be enhanced and a capacity to conduct international peace support operations will be maintained. Finally, emphasis is being put on mobility and sustainability. 68 These aims correspond to the decision taken by NATO in 1999 on a Defence Capability Initiative (DCI) aimed at reducing the technology gap between the American and the European allies.

When comparing the three Nordic EU countries, one gets a rather mixed picture. Generally it could be argued that especially Finland but also Sweden put much emphasis on the emerging CESDP of the EU, where the most important aspect was their joint initiative on the integration of the Petersberg Declaration into the new EU treaty. Although Knud Erik Jørgensen might be right when he argues that the Nordic states in some respects ‘punch below their weight’, i.e. they seem unable or unwilling to exploit the possibilities they actually have in influencing the development of the CFSP, 69 it is important to relate their policies on the CESDP development to their chief integration motives in general. To an ever larger extent, they will define their security policies in a more ‘European’ manner, implying a process of system transformation and ‘Europeanisation’ of their defence policies.

67 To the 1st (UK) Armoured Division, where a Danish liaison officer is attached to the Divisional Headquarters.
Having noted a split in the Nordic subregion between Finland and Sweden on the one hand, and Denmark on the other, a country which due to the Edinburgh compromise of 1992 has disassociated itself from the CESDP, the task now is to investigate the Norwegian case. Although a non-member of the EU, Norway has altered its traditional position on European security and defence, and now seems to support the CESDP development.
III.1 A historical overview

Norway has, since gaining independence from Sweden in 1905, based its security policies on the leading Atlantic powers. From 1905 to 1940 Norway pursued a neutral and rather isolationistic policy orientation, resting upon an implicit security guarantee from the then leading Atlantic power, Great Britain. This implicit security guarantee was built upon the premise that if Norway was attacked, Great Britain (in its own interest) would defend it. After being occupied by Germany between 1940 and 1945, Norway (together with the other Nordic countries) followed in the years between 1945-48 what was labelled as a bridge-building policy aiming at lowering the tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. But in reality Norway maintained its Atlantic orientation. In that connection there were also talks between the Nordic countries on the establishment of a Nordic defence alliance. After the failure of this initiative, Norway, together with Denmark and Iceland, joined NATO in 1949. Thus, Norway pursued a policy based upon an explicit security guarantee, but now from the new leading Atlantic power, the United States.

Membership in a defence alliance was not an easy step for Norway to take, because of its traditional isolationism. One could in that respect argue that Norway’s integration in NATO rested upon two conditions: the first one being integration whereby Norway committed itself to collective self-defence based upon the integrated military command structure of NATO. The other could be labelled shielding, which implied that Norway would not let other countries establish military bases and keep nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil in times of peace. This policy of shielding did not prevent, however, the establishment of NATO military headquarters in Norway (AFNORTH), nor intelligence installations, pre-positioning of military equipment and military exercises. What these double-edged policies of integration and shielding contributed to was, firstly, a very high degree of popular legitimacy for the Norwegian membership in NATO and, secondly, military low tension in the North, which was very important due to the significance of the Soviet military bases on the Kola peninsula. This base- and nuclear policy was also one of the main foundations for the ‘Nordic balance’ which contributed to stability and peace during the 40 years of tension.

On the other hand, the foreign policy orientation by Norway did also imply a very high degree of scepticism towards the Continental integration process, a process initiated in the 1950s with the signing of the treaties of Paris and Rome. Therefore, it could be to argued that the traditional Norwegian foreign policy orientation of isolationism has not been expressed that much at the Atlantic level, only at the European one. So, when Norway after all applied for EU membership in April 1962, the main reason behind this move was that Great Britain had done so the year before, followed by Denmark and Ireland. But the scepticism towards supranational cooperation remained, and when France in January 1963 blocked the membership negotiations with the four candidate countries, the reaction in Norway was one of relief. In 1967, Norway together with Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland renewed the

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71 For the sake of simplicity, the expression ‘EU’ is used throughout this historical overview. In the 1960s the correct name was the EEC. Until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty the EC was the concept which was being applied.
72 See Pharo (1999), ibid.
The case of Norway

membership application, and this time too the application was vetoed by France. In 1970 the application from the same four states was revitalised and the formal membership negations started in Luxembourg in the summer of 1970. The negotiations lasted for a year and a half and the formal treaties of accession were signed in Brussels on 22 January 1972.

Internally in Norway, the onset of the negotiations caused serious political problems and controversies. The four-party government under the leadership of prime minister Per Borten from the Centre Party resigned in March 1971 due to a minor leak of information to the press. The Labour Party in power also had an anti-EU opposition that caused severe strains. At the referendum on 25 September 1972, 53.5% of the electorate voted ‘No’ to membership. As a result, the Labour prime minister Trygve Bratteli resigned and a new minority government representing the parties opposing membership took office. The major task this new government faced was to negotiate a free trade agreement with the EU. The negotiations with the EU on a free trade agreement were opened in December 1972 and finalised in April 1973. The free-trade agreement was signed in May 1973 and ratified by the Norwegian parliament (Stortinget) the same month. The treaty came into effect on the 1 July 1973.

It was this free-trade agreement with the EU that regulated Norway’s relations with the EU in the years between 1973 and 1994, when the EEA Agreement came into effect. One of the main consequences of the Norwegian non-membership in the EU was that the Norwegian political elite came to see the EU integration process as an economic process, only dealing with deregulation of trade between the member states and aiming to create an internal market. The political dimension of the process was to some extent overlooked, and at best viewed with a degree of suspicion. Instead, the foreign policy of Norway remained Atlantic-oriented.73

On the other hand, a turnabout in the Norwegian attitude towards the EU took place at the beginning of the 1990s in connection with the preparations for the third membership application. The main reason behind this turn could be explained by the fact that the Cold War had ended, but also, and perhaps even more importantly, by the increased possibilities for enhanced Nordic cooperation within a larger EU framework. Norway applied for EU membership in November 1992, after a hefty debate within the ruling Labour party under the leadership of prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. The then foreign minister Bjørn Tore Godal stated that Norway strongly supported the integration aims laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. That implied not only full Norwegian acceptance of the EU acquis, but also the acceptance of the preparations being made for an economic and monetary union (EMU) as well as the CFSP. In connection with the membership application and the fact that WEU, as a result of the Maastricht Treaty, was now considered an integral part of the EU, Norway gained associate membership status with the WEU. Together with Austria, Finland and Sweden, Norway signed the treaty of accession in June 1994 at the European Council meeting in Corfu (Greece).

In the period between the signing of the treaty of accession and the referendum held on 28 November 1994, a major change of attitude took place in the Norwegian foreign policy elite.74

This period is considered as a milestone in the understanding of the foreign policy cooperation within the EU, in the sense that Norway fully participated in the different working groups which were established under the CFSP. In the interim period Norway was also connected to the COREU network, which is a restricted data network for exchange of information on foreign and security policy. This change of direction led to an increased understanding of the EU as also being a political project.

But at the referendum in November 1994 the result was, again, a slight majority against membership (47.8% Yes and 52.2% No). The upshot was that Norway had to leave all the committees it had been participating in. Instead, Norway had to base its relations with the EU on the EEA Agreement. This agreement implies nearly full participation in the internal market as well as other ‘flanking’ policies as environment, social standards, veterinary control, etc. Norway is also associated with the Schengen acquis, which is not a part of the EEA agreement, but of the first and third pillar of the EU which was one of the major elements in the Amsterdam Treaty.

The main reasons behind the ‘No majority’ in the referendum could therefore be found in factors connected to perceived loss of national sovereignty, traditional scepticism towards supranational decision-making procedures, and of course more tangible aspects like agricultural subsidies and fishing quotas. As an integral element of such an orientation is focus upon national self-determination and isolationism. The main explanation behind the priority given by Norway to territorial defence and conscription and behind its reluctance towards NATO’s ‘new missions’ during the 1990s can be found in such intangible factors. It is also important to underline the distinction between the continental European and the transatlantic forms of cooperation. The traditional Norwegian isolationistic foreign policy orientation has not been expressed to the same extent at the transatlantic level as at the European level. These elements have contributed to a development where Norway in many ways has become politically more marginalised during the 1990s. The reason behind such a marginalisation is not only due to Norwegian non-membership in the EU. The geographical location of Norway, too, has become less important in other states’ security calculations. Therefore, it could be stated that Norwegian identity first and foremost is connected to a small state identity. What is characteristic is that such an identity is shaped in opposition to the policies conducted by the major powers.

III.2 The end of the Cold War: continued scepticism towards European-only security and defence arrangements

This scepticism towards the policies of the great powers has not prevented Norway from becoming strongly integrated into NATO and establishing a strong bilateral relationship with Great Britain and the United States. As already mentioned, the main reasons behind the first and second Norwegian membership application to the EU in the 1960s were to follow the lead of Great Britain.

In the foreign and security policy elite in Norway there has traditionally been a lukewarm interest and also scepticism towards the foreign and security dimension of the EU. Although cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy in the EU was initiated in 1970 with the establishment of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), little interest has been shown from the Norwegian side towards that. This Norwegian negligence could of course be explained by the fact that Norway conducted its foreign and security policies through NATO,
The case of Norway

and any other ‘competing’ multilateral forums which did not include the United States were regarded with suspicion. Even though the ‘new Cold War’ between the superpowers at the beginning of the 1980s contributed to a reassessment of the traditional Norwegian Atlanticism, the focus upon NATO and the transatlantic link remained. On the other hand, Norway established a ‘political dialogue’ with the EPC in 1980.

In Norway, however, the new moves by the EU on integration of security and defence were seen as superfluous. NATO was, and should remain, the main provider of European security in the foreseeable future; the European integration process should be subordinated to the broader Atlantic community. There was a tendency in the debate to regard the WEU as being a paper tiger only, underlining that the WEU did not have any military forces of its own and disregarding the political discussion taking place in WEU.

Instead, a report from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence submitted to the Parliament (Report no. 54, 1987-88) stressed the eventual negative aspects for Norway of the recent developments in European integration. Especially, the southward enlargement of the EU in 1986 could pose a real challenge for Norway due to the fact that the EU then would turn its focus southwards and to a higher degree disregard developments on Europe’s ‘Northern Flank’. On the other hand, the report also stressed the necessity of observing the developments in EU/WEU. From the Norwegian perspective it was important to underline the fundamental security challenges the Northern flank posed for western European security as a whole.

The end of the Cold War in 1989-90 with the reunification of Germany and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact created a fundamentally new security landscape for Norway. In Report no. 22 (1997-98) the Government’s White Paper on defence stated that active international involvement, substantive contribution to NATO’s mutual defence arrangements and participation in peace operations, even outside NATO’s borders, should form an important part of Norwegian security and defence policy. Although still focusing upon territorial defence and compulsory military service, the Norwegian military forces went through a substantive reform during the early 1990s whose focus was put upon NATO’s new missions. Norway designated military forces to NATO’s IRF which was formed after NATO’s summit in Rome in 1991, where the Alliance adopted a new strategic concept which emphasised the new security risks NATO faced after the end of the Cold War.

On the other hand, scepticism towards exclusive European security arrangements remained. Although a more positive attitude towards European integration as a political phenomenon became apparent, it is a fact that there has been a strong tendency in Norwegian foreign and security policy to make a sharp distinction between foreign and security policy on the one hand and defence policy on the other. The latter has been tied up to the transatlantic frameworks of cooperation with a traditional focus upon territorial defence. This negative attitude towards European defence can also be found in Report no. 22 (1997-98) where the negative aspects of giving the EU a defence role are emphasised, including also negative views on a possible EU-WEU merger. In that connection the Government underlined the

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75 In Norwegian, Stortingsmelding nr. 54 (1987-88).
77 In 1990 Spain and Portugal formally acceded to the modified Brussels Treaty.
78 In Norwegian: Stortingsmelding nr. 22 (1997-98).
79 See Sjursen (1999), ibid., p. 54.
possible adverse consequences of the EU developing into a ‘defence alliance’, saying that such a development could harm the forthcoming EU enlargement because an EU role in the sphere of security and defence could alienate Russia and cause strains in the EU-Russian relationship.\textsuperscript{80}

But, as underlined at the beginning of this paper, a major change of attitude took place in 1999 concerning the way in which Norway perceives the emerging CESDP of the EU. Our task now is to highlight the developments which have taken place in the Norwegian views, and to explain why such changes took place. As we will try to show, the changes can first of all be related to changes in the structure-related variable, i.e. changes caused by new geopolitical circumstances, by the strength and the speed of the EU integration process, and also by the fact that Great Britain changed its views on European defence.

\textbf{III.3 Changes occurring in the structure-related variable: from a reluctant European to a supporter of the CESDP?}

The first sign of a significant change in foreign policy orientation concerning the Norwegian attitude towards CESDP took place in January 1999, when the then Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, Knut Vollebæk, addressed the Norwegian parliament with a ‘Statement on the Government’s European policy, with emphasis on relations with the EU’.\textsuperscript{81} Apart from stating that the ‘... EEA Agreement is Norway’s platform for cooperation with the EU, and enjoys wide support in the Storting’, and that ‘Norway continues to play a significant role and participates actively in international cooperation, despite the fact that we are not members of the EU’, much emphasis was also put on the foreign and security dimension of the EU. In that connection, and due to the rising significance of the EU as an actor in international affairs, he stated that the Norwegian government will coordinate and strengthen Norway’s bilateral contacts with influential EU countries, as well as with the Nordic EU countries.

In the most interesting part of the speech, dealing with security and defence issues, it was underlined that the ‘... experience gained from the peace process in the Middle East, the implementation and follow-up of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and the efforts to reach cease-fire and a peaceful solution in Kosovo have strengthened the position of those who feel that the EU should not only make an economic contribution but also play a more prominent role. For this reason a number of EU countries have wished to give the EU a role in the field of foreign and security policy. This is part of the broad-based efforts to develop the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) that are being carried out in the EU, the WEU and NATO. The aim is to strengthen Europe’s capacity to implement crisis management operations when NATO is not an appropriate choice’. Commenting upon the British position with regard to the St. Malo declaration, it was furthermore underlined that the declaration entailed a change in the British view of the EU’s role in this area. Although the tone was positive towards an increased role for the EU in the security and defence area, the foreign minister also stressed the deriving challenges for Norway as a non-member of the EU, an associated member of WEU and a full member of NATO: ‘... if the EU should become the framework for political decisions on European security and crisis management to a greater extent than at present, the natural result would be for Norway and the EU to deepen their existing cooperation within the framework of the current arrangement for political dialogue’. In that respect he also underlined that ‘Norway makes a substantial contribution to

\textsuperscript{80} This aspect is strongly emphasised in chapter 3.3.7 in Report no. 22.

\textsuperscript{81} The speech can be found on http://odin.dep.no/ud/taler/1999/u990119e.html
international crisis management . . .’, and for this reason Norway’s rights as an ally, and as an associate member of WEU, should be maintained in any future solutions that may change the cooperation between the EU, the WEU and NATO. Accordingly, the Norwegian view is that Norway is a country which contributes to international crisis-management operations, and should therefore be involved in discussions on defence and security policy issues within the EU: ‘This can be done within the framework of the current foreign policy dialogue arrangement with the EU’. Commenting upon the reactions Norway had received from the leading EU countries, he stated that it ‘. . . is the Government’s impression that the key Allies fully acknowledge Norwegian needs and that they welcome Norway’s initiatives. They are prepared to consider solutions that also safeguard Norwegian interests’.

In other words, the Norwegian concern was not the development of an EU dimension in the sphere of security and defence per se, but the fear of being excluded from the process in such a way that Norway’s status in the end would be inferior to the current one, namely that of an associate member of WEU. In that respect Norway underlines the WEU Council decision from April 1997 that the associate members are to be treated in the same way as full members in situations where WEU makes use of NATO resources (‘the so-called all-European allies decision’). Furthermore, whereas in the sphere of NATO the main line of Norway has been firstly integration (membership, collective defence and later on also peace support operations) and secondly shielding (the base and nuclear policy), the opposite is true when one looks upon Norwegian policy towards the EU, namely firstly shielding and secondly integration. In the sphere of European integration Norway has sought to keep distance, but at the same time underlined the necessity of keeping close ties with its European partners.

As a country with a traditional Atlantic orientation in security and defence affairs, Norway has recently underlined the necessities of reinforcing the transatlantic relations as a consequence of an enhanced role of the EU in security and defence affairs. At the WEU Council of ministers meeting in Bremen in May 1999 the Norwegian foreign minister underlined these necessities while at the same time (and in a much stronger wording than in the speech he made in January 1999) stressed the strong support of Norway on the CESDP question: ‘Norway has all along strongly supported strengthening European Security and Defence. We see the need for an effective European Foreign and Security Policy’. It is interesting to note that the minister also underlined the Government’s support for continued European integration; increased European responsibilities in the field of security should be an essential contribution to European integration, and to the development of cooperative security among all European states. This statement must also be seen in connection with the results of the NATO Washington summit of April 1999, where the 19 allies adopted a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance. In this concept the allies emphasise the role of the EU in security affairs and noted, in paragraph 17, that the ‘European Union has taken important decisions and given a further impetus to its efforts to strengthen its security and defence dimension. This process will have implications for the entire Alliance, and all European Allies should be involved in it, building on arrangements developed by NATO and WEU’.

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82 This decision refers to the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Paris in May 1997 on the ‘…. participation of European Allies in WEU operations using NATO assets and capabilities, as well as in the planning and preparation of such operations’ (Art. 17).
84 The statements made by the minister of foreign affairs can be found on http://odin.no/ud/taler/1999/u990510e.html
Interesting to note is that these developments, where Norway for the first time ever supported the development of ‘European-only’ security arrangements based upon an enhanced role of the EU, the Government also submitted a report to the Storting which emphasised the need for reform in the Norwegian defence forces so that Norway improves its capability to take part in peace support operations by NATO and the EU. This report could be seen as a major step towards Norwegian adaptation to the new security logic in Europe, where military threats to NATO are becoming less salient, and where international peace support operations outside the traditional NATO-EU area become more relevant. As noted earlier, Norway has traditionally had a territorial approach to defence, where defence of the national territory was the main task for the Norwegian military forces. Although Norway is still among those NATO countries which put most weight on NATO’s traditional tasks (Article 5), a change in the Norwegian attitude and defence policy culture is now definitely taking place.

The main content in the report is that the Government recommends the establishment of an Armed Forces Task Force for international operations. According to the report the task force will consist of units from all branches of the armed forces and include a total number of more than 3500 personnel. It will be capable of fulfilling both NATO Article 5 as well as non-Article 5 missions and tasks, it will also be answerable to WEU, and will be ‘. . . assigned to future European force structures’. The report further says that the most substantial quantitative improvements concern the Army’s capacity to contribute to international operations. The Norwegian contribution to NATO’s Immediate Reaction Forces (Land) (IRF(L)) will be increased by over 50 per cent, to approximately 1400 personnel, organised in a battle group equipped to handle the full range of potential operations, including outside NATO’s core area of responsibility as defined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The report further suggests that the main elements of the Task Force should be operational by mid 2001, and that the entire force be fully operational by 2005.

When it comes to questions connected to European security and defence and CESDP in particular, the report further emphasises that Norway aims at constructive participation in the developing ESDI. But when it comes to the question of the forthcoming EU-WEU merger, it emphasises that, in any future new European institutional set-up, the non-EU European Allies should be granted the same rights as they currently enjoy in WEU. Therefore, the main Norwegian concern is not the development of the CESDP as such, but the ability of the current 6 European NATO members not belonging to the EU to participate adequately in the decision-making process.

This aspect, connected to the ability of becoming involved in the decision-making structure of the CESDP, was perhaps the main reason behind the PM (Pro Memoria) the Government issued in October 1999 in connection with the EU’s own preparations for the European Council meeting in Helsinki. On the one hand, this PM could be regarded as a continuation of the different statements made by the Norwegian government during 1999, which fully acknowledged full Norwegian support for the ongoing efforts by the EU. On the other hand, the PM went further when it proposed to the EU how the 6 non-EU allies could be involved in the decision-making structure. What the Norwegian government did propose was ‘day-to-day consultations and activities relating to security and defence issues, in the proposed Political and Security Committee and in subsidiary working groups . . . Non-EU European allies would

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86 The Norwegian PM issued in October 1999 and handed over to the 23 EU and NATO states can be found on [http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/publikasjoner/andre/dokumenter/memo.htm](http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/publikasjoner/andre/dokumenter/memo.htm)
have the right to speak and make proposals, and access to all the relevant information and documents. This format would also be the basis for regular consultations in the proposed Military Committee’. Furthermore the PM underlined the necessity of the non-EU European allies to be invited at an early stage to take part in EU operations not drawing on NATO assets and capabilities: ‘Once their participation in an operation was confirmed, non-EU European allies would have the same rights in respect of the preparation and conduct of the operation as participating EU member states. Their effective contribution to operations presupposes full participation in planning and other preparations. Transparency and timely information at all stages will be necessary in order for the required national decisions on contributions to military operations to be made, and the non-EU European allies would meet their EU counterparts at political level, including ministers of defence as appropriate, to discuss European security and confirm participation in EU-led operations’.

Besides the wish to take part in the decision-making structures, Norway also underlined its role as a major contributor to conflict prevention and crisis management in political, financial and military terms. It was also stated clearly that Norway was ready to continue and to strengthen its contribution to future European and EU-led crisis management. The recommendations being made in Report no. 38 could in that respect be regarded as a Norwegian adaptation to the new European security logic which put emphasis on international peace support operations.

When comparing this PM with the final outcome of the Helsinki European Council, the main impression is that the Norwegian ideas did not have significant influence upon the decisions taken on how the emerging CESDP would relate to other European non-EU states. What the European Council in Helsinki did do was to suggest the establishment of ‘appropriate arrangements’, where the main condition should be that the decision-making autonomy of the EU is kept. The non-EU European allies and other European states as well will not be totally excluded from the decision-making process as such, meaning that they to some extent will participate in the ‘upstream’ of decisions, that is on a permanent basis in the preparation of EU plans and concepts and then in the early stages of addressing an individual crisis. They will also be able to participate in the ‘downstream’ of decisions by contributing forces or other material support to operations which the EU has decided to launch and for which it has declared itself open to participation by others. Non-EU countries contributing in this way will have practical access to the running of the operation through a ‘troop contributing nations’ mechanism, in addition to whatever part they may play in detailed planning, command structures and activities.

But the overall conclusion which could be drawn is that in the future it will be very difficult for non-EU European countries to become part of the decision-making structure in the same way as they did as WEU associate members. One could also argue that the latest developments in the EU illustrate how difficult it will be to stick to the WEU ‘all European allies’ decision from April 1997.

87 The Helsinki European Council stated the following with regard to non-EU European NATO members and other European states (paragraph no. 28): ‘appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union’s decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management.’
89 Ibid.
90 A final solution for the six non-EU European allies as well as for the EU applicant states has yet to be found. But according to a British-French paper issued by the end of April 2000 different mechanisms were proposed on how to consult the six European NATO nations which are not members of the Union. The proposals are
Another element important for Norway is how the CESDP will affect the transatlantic relationship at large. According to the foreign minister’s speech to the Storting in January 2000, the CESDP could go further than just discuss Petersberg operations only:\footnote{\textsuperscript{91}} ‘This development may lead to the EU member states discussing important issues among themselves and to their increasingly presenting coordinated positions within the Alliance. This would obviously have considerable effect on Norwegian interests. This may have an impact on one of the mainstays of Norwegian security policy: the central role played by NATO in all matters affecting the security of the member states’.

Having said that, he also implicitly touched upon the main reasons for which Norway now seemingly supports the development of a CESDP. According to the Norwegian view, the preferential institutional framework for European security should still be NATO. But in a situation where Great Britain defines itself as being inside the core of European security and defence, and with the United States on certain conditions supporting the development of a CESDP, it was impossible for Norwegian policy-makers, even among those who oppose Norwegian EU membership, to disregard the geopolitical changes now taking place in Europe. This development must therefore be connected to the main European security logic, related as it is to centre-periphery relationships, where European policy-making to an ever higher degree will unfold around one centre only, namely the EU.

The changes in Norwegian attitudes towards European integration can therefore be linked to changes occurring in the structure-related variable, not in the actor-related one. When looking upon the actor-related variable, which includes such aspects as party political differences, bureaucratic politics within and across ministries, economic interests, and the general political culture, the most obvious conclusion one could draw is that Norway is a status quo country.\footnote{\textsuperscript{92}} There are still great differences of views in the policy-making elite and in the population on the future relationship between Norway and the EU,\footnote{\textsuperscript{93}} and in the sphere of security and defence the original Norwegian view was that the WEU should also in the future be an independent organisation and act as a bridge between EU and NATO; the NATO-WEU relationship was regarded as the most important one. Another interesting fact is that the turn-about in the Norwegian policy towards Europe in this field took place when Norway had a government composed of three different parties which all opposed Norwegian membership in the EU. This fact supports the hypothesis saying that the Norwegian change of attitude stems from the structure-related variable.

Against this background, there is relatively little evidence to suggest that the change has to do with the actor-related variable, i.e. party political differences and so on. Even though one cannot exclude the possibility that Norway, during its OSCE chairmanship in 1999, went through a ‘learning-process’ as regards Euro-Atlantic cooperation, there is also little evidence to show that this chairmanship role had any significant impact on Norwegian perceptions on close to the existing arrangements for members of the EU’s existing defence arm, the WEU, with ambassador-level meetings at least every six months and ministerial sessions twice a year. The plan reflects a recognition among EU diplomats that ensuring the six countries concerned feel fully involved in the new decision-making bodies is a key challenge for the Union. See \textit{European Voice – A weekly view of the Union}, see also \url{http://www.european-voice.com/cgi-bin/article.pl?article=2}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{91}} The speech can be found at \url{http://odin.dep.no/ud/taler/2000/u000120e.html}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{92}} See Sjursen (1999); ibid., p. 51.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{93}} Even though public opinion polls during spring 2000 show a slight majority in favour of Norwegian membership in the EU, it is very difficult to predict the outcome of a referendum. Norwegian EU-membership is not on the political agenda, and it still is a fact that nearly 50% of the electorate oppose Norwegian EU-membership.
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the CESDP question. On the other hand, it is evident that the dominant actors in European integration pursue their integration aims in a larger European perspective, whereby the EU from, for example, a German perspective is looked upon as a core element in a European peace order. This implies that the CESDP concept must be connected to the steering principles of collective security and all-European cooperation.

The only possible answer to the Norwegian turn-about is to be found in changes in the geopolitical environment surrounding Norway, where the EU together with Russia and the United States determine the framework for Norwegian security. As part of the changes in the geopolitical environment it is also important to note that the two leading Atlantic powers, powers which traditionally have been of vital importance for Norwegian security, now seemingly support the development of a security and defence dimension of the EU.

Furthermore, as underlined also by the WEU’s Political Director, Alyson J. K. Bailes, the most effective solutions for the Nordic nations’ security identity are provided by larger European, not Nordic-specific structures. One conclusion it is possible to draw from this analysis, therefore, is that the changes occurred could be seen as rather reluctant, which could be explained by the fact that Norway earlier enjoyed a rather privileged status, in which it could draw upon a dedicated bilateral cooperation with the United States to such an extent that it was regarded as an ‘Alliance within the Alliance’.

Another important conclusion which can be drawn is that we are witnessing an enhanced ‘Europeanisation’ of Norwegian security politics as a consequence of the latest developments in the EU. This does not only mean that Norway now accepts the EU as a political phenomenon. At least as important is the fact that Norway is now adapting its security and defence policy to the new challenges facing Europe. Although Norway still focuses upon territorial defence based upon conscription, more emphasis is now put on the capacity to conduct peace support operations. In this regard, the above-mentioned Report no. 38, which was submitted to the Norwegian parliament in 1999, could be regarded as an important milestone in the ‘Europeanisation’ of Norwegian security and defence politics. As already mentioned, this force could also be regarded as the Norwegian contribution to the ongoing efforts by the EU to develop a security and defence dimension.

Nevertheless, Norway still seems to look upon NATO as the most important European security institution. Which in turn implies that Norwegian support for the CESDP is conditioned to the expectation that the emerging security and defence dimension of the EU shall reinforce the transatlantic link. That is to say that Norway to some extent seems to underestimate the system-transforming effects of European integration in general and CESDP in particular. The main point of departure, from the Norwegian perspective, is that these developments will not and should not affect the contents of the transatlantic relationship in general. Furthermore, such a perspective on the CESDP implies that Norway to some extent still tends to make a distinction between crisis management operations on the one hand and ‘traditional’ defence tasks on the other. This implies in practice that, from a Norwegian perspective the Petersberg tasks are looked upon as rather ‘limited tasks’, while NATO will still provides the main bulk of Euro-Atlantic security at large. Such views were very


95 Besides the fact that this element forms a central conclusion of this paper, this line of argument could also be found in Alyson J. K. Bailes’s paper.

96 See Tamnes (1997), ibid.
prominent in a debate in the Norwegian parliament on 9 June 2000, when the CESDP was discussed. Several speakers underlined the continued importance of NATO and the fact that Norwegian membership in NATO will protect Norway against any form for marginalisation. But, as underlined by the new Labour foreign ministerThorbjørn Jagland at a seminar held in Oslo on 5 June 2000, the arrangements made by the EU for the European non-members of the EU were not as good as the government had hoped for. The original Norwegian view was the EU and the 6 non-EU NATO member states should establish day-to-day consultations relating to security and defence issues in the Political and Security Committee and in the subsidiary working groups. Instead, the Feira European Council in June 2000 decided to establish a single, inclusive structure in which all the 15 countries concerned (the non-EU European NATO members and the candidates for accession to the EU) can enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the EU. Furthermore, the European Council decided to establish within this structure exchanges with the non-EU European NATO members when the subject matter requires it, such as on questions concerning the nature and functioning of EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities.

The original Norwegian view was that the EU+6 format should be the main format for consultations, but it is interesting to note that Norway, at the Florence North Atlantic Council meeting in May 2000, proposed to establish a 19+4 arrangement for the 4 non-NATO EU member states. Such an arrangement should, according to the Norwegian view, run parallel to the arrangements inside the EU framework. The overall aim for such an arrangement is to establish as close a cooperation as possible between NATO and the EU and would in practise imply a relationship to NATO which goes far beyond their status as EAPC/PfP member states. The overarching goal for Norway, in that respect, is to achieve as much influence over the CESDP via NATO as possible. This fact must also be seen in the perspective of the strong resistance inside the EU to extend the modalities for cooperation earlier established inside the WEU.

Therefore, to avoid the most adverse consequences of marginalisation, Norway has made it clear that it will stand ready to contribute to crisis-management operations by the EU. On the other hand it must be underlined that there seems to be a connection between Norway’s ability to contribute to EU-led military operations and its status as a non-member of the EU. The main reasons behind such a connection is that Norway, as a non-member stands outside the security and defence machinery inside the EU, including also such vital aspects as formulating objectives connected to the common European headline goal and the collective capabilities goals, etc.

But the overall conclusion seems to be that Norway now supports the CESDP objectives. The new and pro-European Norwegian labour government which took over in March 2000 stated that it would follow an active European policy. On the other hand, it seems quite evident that Norway underestimates the radical changes in the transatlantic relationship the CESDP is likely to generate. While Norway underlines that the CESDP will reinforce the transatlantic relationship, other European states look upon the CESDP initiative as a means to somewhat balance American power and to make ‘Europe’ a more autonomous actor in security and defence affairs.  

97 The debate can be found on www.stortinget.no/stid/1999/s000609-01.html
Against this background, it is interesting to refer to a Norwegian non-paper on Norwegian contributions to European crisis management issued by the government in January 2000 and handed over to the Portuguese presidency of the EU. According to the non-paper, Norway has a long tradition of participation in crisis management, and has been one of the major contributors to the peacekeeping activities of the UN during the past fifty years. More than 60,000 Norwegians have participated in every major UN peacekeeping operation, including those in the Middle East, Congo and the former Yugoslavia. The largest Norwegian contribution today is towards the KFOR operation taking place in Kosovo, and consists of a reinforced mechanised infantry unit in the Multinational Brigade Central in Kosovo. As of January 2000, Norway has 1,240 personnel in KFOR. But in order to concentrate its forces in Kosovo, Norway withdrew most of its forces from SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end of 1999.

According to the non-paper, in Norway’s conception, an enhanced European crisis management capability should meet two requirements: it should strengthen the overall ability to prevent, contain and resolve crises and to build stability on the European continent, and it should also enhance the transatlantic relations. In that connection, Norway has made a number of troops and other military resources available for European-led crisis-management operations. At present Norwegian Forces Answerable to the WEU (FAWEU) include:

- one Norwegian headquarters as operation of force headquarters

**Army**
- one infantry battalion
- one engineer company
- one military police platoon
- one movement control platoon
- one combat service support company
- one maintenance company
- one medical company

**Navy**
- one frigate
- one submarine
- one guided missile patrol boat
- one mine hunter/mine sweeper
- one mine countermeasures support vessel

**Air Force**
- one fighter squadron
  - two transport planes
  - one squadron utility helicopters

**Civilian components**
- one incident site commander unit
- one disaster victim identification unit
- two logistic support units
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For operations related to peacekeeping

- one police observer unit

As the non-paper further underlines, the Norwegian Government is committed to continuing to provide support for European crisis management as long as the basic political and constitutional requirements for deploying forces abroad are met. The assignment of Norwegian forces for EU operations would have to be commensurate with the Norwegian possibilities for participation in the EU security and defence policy and crisis management framework.

Such a development where the Norwegian defence forces adapt to a new security environment and therefore also to a new security logic, must imply that the traditional Norwegian focus upon defence as defence against an incoming invasion has to be adopted as well. It is against this background that the Norwegian Government, in July 1999, established a Defence Policy Commission\(^99\) . . . to review Norwegian defence policy, its scope and objectives. Our current defence is based on general conscription, allied coordination and international cooperation, and civil society is heavily involved in national defence as a whole. The Commission is charged with assessing how these instruments can be applied and adapted to meet the challenges of the future\(^100\).

The Norwegian armed forces and Norwegian ‘security thinking’ are undoubtedly going through a rather dramatic change. In many ways, such changes were inevitable anyway due to economic restraints, but the higher priority given to forces capable of reacting more rapidly and more flexibly to a wider spectrum of operational tasks than is the case today indicates at least some willingness to adapt to new challenges from the Norwegian side. The overall aim of Report no. 38 was to enhance the Norwegian capacity to react more rapidly to international crisis, based upon the framework of the existing defence structure: ‘This has to be combined with the ability to maintain over time a relatively extensive involvement in operations abroad, sufficient in terms of both quantity and quality to enable us to fulfil our current commitments.’\(^101\) According to the Report the Armed Forces Task Force will consist of the following elements:

**Army (approximately 2,100 persons)**

Rapid Reaction Forces (approximately 1,400 persons)

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\(^99\) The Defence Policy Commission put forward its conclusion at the end of June 2000. The main conclusions in the report were that the Norwegian armed forces are in deep crisis: ‘The idea of nationally balanced forces exists only in rhetoric. The adjustments made during the 1990s have to a considerable extent failed, despite good intentions and high ambitions. The infrastructure and organisation of the forces are too large’. Furthermore it is emphasised that a ‘… continued turn away from the singular focus on traditional invasion defence towards a broader and more balanced structuring of the forces is needed. The future forces must be flexible, i.e. able to meet the challenges that may arise in the short and medium term, and able to adapt to a fundamentally different situation in the longer term’. The implication of the latter is the importance of ensuring flexibility rather than setting fixed goals and making detailed plans. For further information about the conclusions drawn in the report see [http://odin.dep.no/fd/engelsk/010011-990155/index-dok000-b-n-a.html](http://odin.dep.no/fd/engelsk/010011-990155/index-dok000-b-n-a.html)

\(^100\) Quote from the Norwegian non-paper submitted to the Portuguese presidency in January 2000.

\(^101\) Speech by Minister of Defence Eldbjørg Løwer with the title ‘Defence policy challenges for the year 2000’, held on 11 January 2000 at the Oslo Military Society. The speech is also available at [http://odin.dep.no/fd/taler/2000/000217e.html](http://odin.dep.no/fd/taler/2000/000217e.html)
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- One battalion-size battle group, including:
  - battalion staff, headquarters, and support companies
  - 2 mechanised infantry companies
  - 1 armoured infantry company
  - 1 artillery target acquisition platoon
  - 1 engineering platoon
- National Contingency Commander
- Reinforced logistics support element

Reinforcement Forces (approximately 700 persons)
Will reinforce the above battle group with more robust elements, in particular for peace enforcement and Article 5 purposes:
- 1 main battle tank squadron
- 1 armoured reconnaissance company
- 1 expanded engineer element
- 1 artillery battery
- 1 movement control unit

Navy (approximately 440 persons)
- 1 fast patrol boat (FPB) squadron (4 FPBs and 1 support vessel; approximately 150 persons)
- 1 frigate (approximately 130 persons)
- 1 mine countermeasure vessel (approximately 40 persons)
- 1 command and support vessel (approximately 75 persons)
- 1 submarine (approximately 20 persons)
- 1 underwater demolition platoon (approximately 25 persons)

Air Force (approximately 1,000 persons)
- 1 fighter squadron (12 F-16s; approximately 420 persons)
- 1 maritime patrol aircraft (approximately 40 persons)
- 2 transport aircraft (C-130; approximately 115 persons)
- 1 helicopter unit (4 BELL 412 SP; approximately 75 persons)
- 1 surface-to-air missile system unit (NASAMS; 340 persons)

Joint assets
- Special forces (elements from both the Army and the Navy)
- Intelligence elements
- Medical elements

Only time will show if these changes in Norwegian security thinking will become successful. On the other hand, these changes indicate that a ‘Europeanisation’ of Norwegian security thinking is starting to take place, but it is important to note that such a change is caused by pressure from Norway’s external environment only; i.e. the changing nature of NATO and the EU becoming a security and defence community as well. Firstly, within the NATO context changes are taking place where the Strategic Concept from 1999 underlines that NATO’s fundamental security tasks should not only concentrate upon collective defence, but also upon
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crisis management and partnership. Secondly, there are new geopolitical realities connected to the EU integration process, a process which aims at collective security based upon all-European cooperation. Suffice it to say that the European integration process changes the patterns of relations both at the international and domestic levels as well as between them. These developments could be referred to as European system transformation where the borders between the member states becomes increasingly blurred, in which also countries not belonging to the EU adapt their policies to the policies emanating from the EU. The changing position of Norway in the sphere of security and defence could be regarded as a consequence of these system-transforming events.

102 The fundamental security tasks of NATO are listed in paragraph 10 in the Strategic Concept issued by NATO’s 19 Heads of State and Governments in April 1999. The document can be found on [http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999p99-065e.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999p99-065e.html)

CONCLUSION: FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON NORDIC SECURITY AND DEFENCE COOPERATION

When assessing the future status of the Nordic subregion in the sphere of security and defence, the main point of departure seems to be that this European region is becoming a more ‘normal’ one. The days when the Nordic countries could develop a political identity by being different from the rest of Europe are gone. Instead, developments have shown that during the last 10 years the Nordic countries have become participants in the main European security discourses. As noted earlier, the traditional factors which were characteristic for the Nordic countries, and which were among those elements which created the ‘Nordic political space’, are becoming relatively less significant. These factors were the content of the Russian-Nordic relationship, the transatlantic relationship and the ‘inner’ political culture connected to isolationism, neutrality and scepticism towards the integration process on the Continent. While these three factors are becoming relatively less significant, the EU integration process is becoming more important for the Nordic states. The potential difference between the increasing importance of the EU integration process and the three above-mentioned factors introduces a dynamic element which generates a specifically Nordic system-transformation process:

- The Nordic identity is becoming less important
- The neutral and isolationistic/idealistic aspects in Nordic policy will come under increased pressure
- In the sphere of security and defence, the old tradition of neutrality will more or less be undermined
- The potential role of military alliances has been altered and reduced, due to increased focus on collective security. This development will challenge the alliance policies conducted by Denmark, Iceland and Norway.

As a consequence, the Nordic countries have to relate themselves to a European identity, not a Nordic one.

The main reason behind this is that the ‘new Europe’ which has emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War to an ever greater extent is unfolding around one centre, the EU. Therefore, Hanna Ojanen is right when she argues that the Nordic non-aligned countries seem more influenced than capable of influencing, where the non-alignment status of Finland and Sweden is ‘. . . being stretched, if not diluted, in several aspects’. But what this paper has shown is that such a development is beginning to take place in the case of Norway too: it now seems probable that also this country will adapt to the new security and defence arrangements which are currently being set up by the EU. Changes occurring in the structure-related variable have led to a change in the original Norwegian view on European security and defence; ‘strong support’ now seems to be the key Norwegian word in the CESDP

104 See Yves Boyer (1997): A French Perspective on Western European Union’s Role; in Anne Deighton (ed.): Western European Union 1954-1997: Defence, Security, Integration. Published by the European Interdependence Research Unit, St Anthony’s College, Oxford, with the support of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1997. Boyer writes in that respect: ‘. . . , the growing importance of geo-economics rather than geo-politics reduces the potential role of military alliances, as the ‘enlargement’ of democracy and free markets are considered as means of reducing the risk of military conflict’.

105 Ojanen (2000), ibid., p. 25.
Although a non-member of the EU, Norway is increasingly influenced by the gravity of EU integration. This implies adaptation to nearly all fields of EU policies, including the internal market (due to the EEA Agreement) and the Schengen acquis. As a logical consequence of such a development, convergence and/or redefinition of traditional Norwegian views will become more and more visible. The argument of this paper is that the new Norwegian perceptions of the CESDP must be seen as a consequence of such a redefinition of traditional interests, in such a way that Norwegian views now fit into the new policies emanating from the EU integration process. The main Norwegian concern is over the necessity to take part in the decision-making process but, as underlined by State Secretary Espen Barth Eide at the WEU Council of Ministers in May 2000, the Norwegian view is that a ‘pragmatic approach’ should be pursued so as to find the proper institutional arrangements.

When looking upon the Nordic subregion, it seems clear that Denmark is the country which will have the greatest problems concerning the emerging CESDP. The Edinburgh compromise of 1992 underlined in that respect that Denmark was not obliged to participate in the elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the EU which have defence implications. The practical consequences of this opt-out clause are that Denmark has not been able to participate in e.g. the mine-clearing mission in Croatia. But in a future perspective, this Danish opt-out could have some consequences for the Nordic cooperation in the sphere of security and defence. The most important part of this cooperation is the above-mentioned NORDCAPS initiative. The objective of the NORDCAPS is to improve the ability of the Nordic countries to make joint efforts in international peace operations. This will include planning, implementation, and evaluation of operations. In a long term perspective NORDCAPS seeks to establish a system in which the Nordic countries can identify various units which may constitute a joint Nordic peace force. In that respect, the establishment of a Nordic brigade has been discussed.

But the reality is that the more the other Nordic countries define their security and defence policies in an EU perspective, and the more the EU becomes the core element of the new European security and defence order, the more difficult it will become to cooperate with Denmark in the sphere of security and defence. The consequence of such a development could be that joint Nordic efforts in peace support operations could be diluted and that other forms of cooperation have to be found. On the other hand it should also be underlined that increased pressure may be put on Denmark to remove this opt-out clause which was adopted by the European Council in 1992.

In that connection it could be useful to refer to the intervention made by the Norwegian (MFA) State Secretary Espen Barth Eide at the WEU Council of Ministers, Oporto, 15 May 2000. He then underlined that ‘the new Norwegian government strongly supports the ambition of the European Union to strengthen its role in security and defence… The future of Europe is also the future of Norway. Thus we are prepared to do our share and to make a full contribution in shaping this future… Indeed, one of the purposes of the ongoing transformation of our armed forces is to enhance our ability to participate in international crisis management operations’. Important to note was that when it came to Norwegian influence in these new security and defence arrangements he underlined that ‘we should take a pragmatic approach in seeking institutional arrangements that reconcile the legitimate needs of the EU and those of the other European Allies and the candidate countries, guided by inclusiveness and partnership’. The whole speech is available at [http://www.weu.int/portugala2000/speeches/20000515-no2.html](http://www.weu.int/portugala2000/speeches/20000515-no2.html)

The concepts of convergence and/or redefinition of interests are also the main elements in the neo-functionalist approach to integration, where the different actors acts on the basis of selfish interests only. See Ernst B Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State. Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964). See also Martin Sæter (1998), ibid., pp. 20-7.

See the Norwegian MoD brochure ‘NORDCAPS – Strengthening of Nordic co-operation in international operations’ available at [http://www.odin.dep.no/fd/publ/fd-fakta/fakta973.html](http://www.odin.dep.no/fd/publ/fd-fakta/fakta973.html)
The cases of Denmark and Norway illustrate well the dynamics which are taking place as a consequence of enhanced EU integration: the stronger the EU core becomes, the more pressure will be put on non-participating states to act in accordance with the policies emanating from the core. It is also against this background that the emerging CESDP could be looked upon as part of a system-transforming process, where the EU as a whole changes the whole political landscape of Europe, and thereby also potentially vital aspects of world politics, including the future nature of NATO. As regards NATO, the CESDP should be seen as a manifest sign of increased “Europeanisation” of European security politics: The higher the level of integration in the EU, to an ever less extent the EU will be dependent on external actors for its security. And furthermore, to an ever higher extent the EU will influence cooperative security and defence frameworks both in a wider European setting and beyond.

As a consequence of such a security logic, also intra-Nordic cooperation in the sphere of security and defence must be seen within the context of a wider European security and defence framework. Therefore, solutions for Nordic nations’ security identity are provided by larger European, not Nordic-specific structures. It is therefore very difficult to isolate and earmark a specific Nordic identity in security affairs from a larger European one. Against this background, it arguable that there is no specific Nordic region anymore, just a subregion which is part of the greater European process of integration.

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