PARTICIPATION AND INFLUENCE: FINLAND, SWEDEN AND THE POST-AMSTERDAM DEVELOPMENT OF THE CFSP

Hanna Ojanen
PARTICIPATION AND INFLUENCE:
FINLAND, SWEDEN
AND THE POST-AMSTERDAM DEVELOPMENT
OF THE CFSP

Hanna Ojanen

THE INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

43 AVE DU PRESIDENT WILSON, 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16
January 2000
Occasional Papers are essays that the Institute considers should be made available, as a contribution to the debate on topical European security issues. They will normally be based on work carried out by researchers granted awards by the Institute; they represent the views of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute or of the WEU in general. Publications of Occasional Papers will be announced in the Institute’s Newsletter, and they will be available on request, in the language used by the author. They can also be accessed via the WEU website: www.weu.int/institute/
PARTICIPATION AND INFLUENCE: FINLAND, SWEDEN
AND THE POST-AMSTERDAM DEVELOPMENT OF THE CFSP

Hanna Ojanen*
## CONTENTS

**Summary**  

The difficulty of being on the borderline  
Different profiles but joint initiatives: the ‘achievement’ of Amsterdam  
The Petersberg initiative  
An ever-developing defence dimension: non-alignment under pressure  
Critical elements in the development of the defence dimension  
The ‘Solana case’  
Finnish and Swedish responses: direct and indirect  
Influencing, or being influenced?
SUMMARY

Militarily non-aligned Finland and Sweden are in many ways borderline countries in Europe. Historically, they are newcomers in the process of integration; geographically, they are located at the border of the Union; and borders play an important role also in their foreign and security policies – both because of their concern for the nature of the EU’s outer borders and because of their wish to draw a (border-)line between crisis management and defence.

Contrary to the understanding that non-alignment implies not taking part in joint undertakings, military non-alignment is in these two countries understood as a policy that does not impede them from participating actively in international security cooperation, including military cooperation. On the contrary, both countries have emphasised the importance of cooperation as a part of their security policy. Nevertheless, non-alignment may easily seem increasingly incompatible with the developing common security and defence policy. Both countries have had to react to accusations of not being fully committed to the goal of common security by trying to show that they are both willing and capable of contributing to further progress in this field – something that was particularly clear during the Finnish EU presidency.

The development of a common European security and defence policy constrains military non-alignment in particular through the autonomous crisis management capacity of the EU with its repercussions on, e.g., the question of a need for a mandate and of the means used in these operations. Collective defence (and before that, common goals or criteria for defence forces) is another central problem. The development of an EU crisis management capacity does not as such pose direct problems for Finland and Sweden. They would rather see it as something that they not only take part in, as they have traditionally done in the UN, but also as something that they have themselves been active in starting. They would point out that they played an active role in including the Petersberg tasks into the Amsterdam Treaty. It has also been repeatedly stated that the rights of the non-NATO members of the EU are recognised: they can participate fully and on an equal footing in EU-led crisis management operations.

The non-aligned draw a line between crisis management and defence. In their interpretation, when one speaks about defence in the EU context, one actually means crisis management. Yet, the notion of crisis management is evasive and tends to dilute non-alignment. In time, the non-aligned might have to accept both military operations without a UN mandate, peace enforcement tasks by military forces, the merger of WEU and EU and a strengthening of the role of the High Representative for the CFSP at the expense of that of the EU member states – in addition to practically increasing convergence of armed forces.

In all, the non-aligned seem more influenced than capable of influencing. They need to redefine their non-alignment to fit the changing conditions – perhaps particularly so for Finland, which is afraid of appearing as a ‘footnote country’ and eager to stick to the ‘core’ of the Union. As a result, non-alignment becomes confusingly articulated and, in the end, unconvincing; the two non-aligned seem not to have found, or wanted to find, ways to articulate it as a coherent position within the Union. Yet, what remains of non-alignment seems now to encompass not only the exclusion of defence commitments, with an emphasis on non-military crisis management and relations to the UN, but also a distinctive approach to the EU’s external relations both with non-member states and with other organisations.
PARTICIPATION AND INFLUENCE:
FINLAND, SWEDEN AND THE POST-AMSTERDAM DEVELOPMENT OF THE CFSP

Hanna Ojanen

The difficulty of being on the borderline

The development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy into a Common Security and Defence Policy means difficult times for the two Nordic militarily non-aligned EU member countries, Sweden and Finland: the room for non-alignment seems to diminish if not altogether disappear. This paper seeks to point out where the problems actually lie, and explain the ways in which these countries have responded to them – be it through an adaptation of their views and policies to conform to the steps taken in this field, or through their own initiatives and attempts actively to influence the way the issue is unfolding. In so doing, the paper also points out some similarities and differences between the two countries’ views and positions. After all, their respective policies of non-alignment, although often similarly articulated, tend to be expressed differently in practice due to the different profiles of the two countries.

Finland and Sweden are in many ways on the borderline in questions of European integration. The first and most obvious sense in which they are on the borderline is their geographical location. Being situated at the border of the Union is a fact that has its implications for their interests, notably as to the Union’s external policies and its frontier regimes. In a second, more abstract sense, not belonging to the core countries of the process, these countries are in a border zone also as regards the ideology and tradition of European integration. Many would (still) regard the two countries as being non-European, or on the margins of Europe, despite their having been members of the EU for five years.

This ‘exclusion from Europe’ is particularly clear in the field of the CFSP and questions of security. At the time of these countries’ accession to the EU, non-alignment was found to be compatible with EU membership – provided they assured that they would not revert to this position and hamper the common undertakings in foreign and security policy, something that the countries consented to. This ‘happy ending’ was without doubt a result of both the EU’s need – for reasons of prestige – to take in the then candidate countries, and of the ‘deal’ that was struck at that time over the new member countries’ obligation to accept the whole _acquis_ of the EU, including the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty – without being able to make reservations as, for instance, their Nordic neighbour Denmark had done. To avert possible fears to the contrary, the Finnish and Swedish representatives repeatedly underlined their countries’ willingness to be active and constructive members, even in the CFSP.

Recently, however, this compatibility seems to have been once again questioned, and there seems to be an increasing tension between non-alignment and the CFSP. For some, the fact of having non-aligned members in the EU has always been a source of concern.¹ Recent

¹See, e.g., the Commission’s opinion on Finnish membership application: ‘The question is whether the Finnish policy of neutrality – even reduced as it is to its core of military non-alignment and credible, independent defence – might stand in the way of a full acceptance of the Union’s external policies. Moreover, in respect of the CFSP, the question arises to what extent Finland which, as an armed neutral, has always laid great emphasis on the capability of defending the national territory, can fully share some of its objectives, such as the safeguarding of the independence and security of the Union, and the evolution towards a common defence policy of the Union.’ And, ‘The Community would need […] to ascertain further the full nature of the present Finnish policy in order to be satisfied that this would not hamper the possible evolution of a common European defence. […] ’specific and binding assurances will
developments in the field of security and defence seem to have led both to accusations of these countries being ‘free riders’, full-right participants that expect the others to understand their policies but that are not, in the end, prepared to defend the other members of the Union, and to questioning as to whether it was at all a good solution to let these countries join the Union in the first place without anticipatory institutional changes aimed at curtailing their potential influence and ‘negative’ impact exerted through the requirement of unanimity.

These countries have themselves hardly done anything to deserve these accusations and expressions of mistrust. Quite the contrary: they have tried to do their best to show that they are not only fully committed to the CFSP, but also active and constructive, bringing the development forward with their own initiatives, and certainly not hindering it. For the two countries, passing from neutrality to non-alignment has been an important step, a true change in their policies.

It might take time, however, for any amount of activity, declarations and initiatives to change deep-rooted images of a country. The example of the initiative concerning the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty, described in detail below, is a case in point. For Finland and Sweden, through their initiative, wanted to show their willingness to see concrete progress in this field as well as their capacity to strike good compromises – but others have tended to interpret their action as some kind of concession, and would not give these countries the credit for the step forward that the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks implied.

Yet, it is true that the label ‘non-aligned’ does not make their ‘inclusion’ easier: it clearly implies a negative attitude towards something, maintaining a distance from something, or a reservation as to the degree to which the countries are committed to joint demarches in the field of security.

The Nordics’ conceptual innovative design seems to impress even less. While inviting the others to interpret the label they have chosen, non-alignment, in a much looser way than they did the old ‘neutrality’, the two countries still need some label for their policies that do differ from the policies of some other EU countries and which they preserve not just for the sake of domestic opinion but also for political reasons. The word ‘non-aligned’ itself has been debated; its misleading connotations with the non-aligned countries’ movement and the difficulty of finding expression for the situation in which one is aligned politically but not through alliances with military implications, has led some to try further to change the term into ‘non-allied’. From the outset, however, such a change, though perhaps inventive, hardly makes the situation easier. One has only to think about the apparent impossibility of ‘getting through’ even the basic change from neutrality to non-alignment: these countries still continue to be described as ‘neutral’, almost as if an equivalent for ‘non-alignment’ was missing in some languages. Indeed, ‘non-alignment’, or ‘military non-alignment’, is something that the two countries have created; its contents depend on

---

2See the pointed Reuters way of putting it: ‘Neutral EU states – including Sweden – dropped objections to plans to merge the WEU into the EU earlier this year on the condition that they would not have to assist fellow members who were under military attack’ (‘Solana seeks to reassure Sweden on defence role’ in Latest news, Press and information service, Western European Union, 13 October 1999; emphasis added).

3This is what the President of the European Parliament Nicole Fontaine said in Le Monde of 7 October 1999: ‘Ces deux chantiers – nouvelles adhésions et réforme institutionnelle – doivent être menés parallèlement. S’agissant du second, nous serons fermes: on ne nous refera pas le coup de la Suède, de l’Autriche et de la Finlande. Nous pensions que le fait de faire rentrer ces trois pays, qui présentaient un certain nombre de problèmes, comme leur position sur la défense commune, n’était pas la bonne solution.’
them. It is not evident, however, that they can actually be very explicit about its meaning if they are not to tie their hands too tightly.

Would the assimilation of these countries be easier if they gave up the label, and thus the policies, by formally entering into alliances? Even without this label, one could argue, there might be a cultural distance, difficult to define in any exact terms, between these countries and the rest of ‘Europe’ which would colour the way they are perceived – as the ‘post-neutral’ or ‘ex-neutral’ countries – quite independently of their actual behaviour.

This paper thus sets out to analyse the latest developments and these countries’ positions and attitudes against this background of conflicting perceptions, and tries to shed light on what these countries want to say about the CFSP and its further development, and on the ways in which they have chosen to express their wishes.

What emerges from the analysis are two different country profiles within the Nordic non-alignment. The two countries have different approaches to getting their views across, as they also have different bases for their policy of non-alignment; furthermore, they have interests which, although overlapping, are not necessarily identical. This study brings into the foreground what the two countries in the end share, and what can amount to their joint influence on the development of the CFSP – notably, their interest in keeping crisis management separate from other forms of military and defence cooperation. And here, in fact, emerges a third and final sense in which Finland and Sweden are ‘on the borderline’. They are indeed themselves ‘borderliners’, trying to differentiate, or to draw a (border-)line, between crisis management and defence proper.

The ways in which these countries have responded to initiatives on the further development of the CFSP help to locate the ‘border of non-alignment’, or, in other words, what today’s non-alignment means in practice. In a sense, their responses also give an answer, one answer, to the question of how to draw the borders of Europe – the Union’s external relations being a central and sensitive question for these countries. They do have their say in the formulation of EU policies; yet, in the final analysis, one might tend to conclude that the non-aligned seem more influenced than capable of influencing, being obliged to continuously redraw their (border-)lines and redefine their policies.

Different profiles but joint initiatives: the ‘achievement’ of Amsterdam

Whether or not the two non-aligned really share the same policies is an intricate question. During the Cold War, they were neutral but in remarkably different ways. Even though the context of Nordic cooperation brought the two close to each other, it was only after their adhesion to the European Union that their similarities became more visible. It became customary to note that the two countries had never before been so close to each other, and that they now had possibilities for real cooperation, even in the field of defence. Indeed, in recent years, there seems to have evolved

\[4\] They were, to cite the title of a recent book, ‘the protected’ and ‘the threatened’ country. On the basis of archive material, researchers have come to conclude that Sweden was within NATO’s defence perimeter; there were far-reaching preparations in Sweden for receiving military systems from the United States and NATO, and NATO was prepared to deliver them – it had obvious strategic reasons for including Sweden in its defence. To put it more bluntly, NATO’s nuclear umbrella covered Sweden whereas Finland would have been among NATO’s targets in case of a Soviet attack – see in particular Anne-Sofie Dahl, Svenskarna och NATO (Stockholm, Timbro 1999) where Sweden is called ‘the seventeenth NATO member country’, a free-rider in that it enjoyed NATO’s protection without having to share the responsibilities.
almost a habit of the two countries foreign and defence ministers giving joint statements or writing joint articles in newspapers published in Sweden and Finland to explain their positions. Several times, they have also taken joint initiatives.

Yet, the profiles of the two countries within the EU do differ. In general terms, Finland has been more adaptive and flexible, trying to be in the ‘core’ of the Union, while Sweden has taken a more distant position – as in the case of EMU, where Finland joined the third phase from the beginning, whereas Sweden is still outside. At the same time, Sweden is more outspoken, expressing its views with greater emphasis than Finland, and taking a stand on more issues than Finland would do, including the policy of non-alignment. Sweden now seems more eager to stress non-alignment and secure its position as a non-aligned than the more pragmatically oriented Finland, which during its EU presidency was most probably even more cautious and adaptive than before.

These differences can be seen as stemming from a more long-standing divergence between the two countries. For Sweden, neutrality is deeply rooted in national identity, a choice that has become a lasting policy. For Finland, neutrality was not a choice, but an instrument of security policy. Furthermore, the external identities of the two countries differ, as Tiilikainen has pointed out: Finland’s external identity is that of a small state, which is not the case for Sweden. These differences are also reflected in the way in which the countries reformulated their policies after the Cold War. In Finland, the change took place with less debate than in Sweden, which still, at the level of official doctrine, holds to neutrality as its policy in the event of war in neighbouring areas. And, indeed, even EU membership itself is perceived differently in the two countries: in Sweden, membership is seen and assessed from the point of view of its economic consequences and the different duties it entails, while in Finland membership is perceived as something that gives the country more room for action and influence.5

In very general terms, Sweden seems to have changed its traditional foreign policy standpoints less. It has been a Nordic country with global concerns, a strong supporter of the United Nations6 and one that in recent years has been building a strong profile in the Baltic region.7 In the EU, too, it has an agenda of its own: it concentrates on employment policy, gender equality and environment and consumer protection, while it seems to show less interest in the larger questions of foreign and security policy. In Finland, also traditionally a UN supporter as well as a supporter of Nordic cooperation, interest in Nordic issues has declined following EU membership: the EU has rapidly become central both in practical politics and as a factor of identification. Finland channels its policies primarily through the EU, adapting its goals to what is already on the agenda. Some basic interests remain unaltered, though – notably, of course, relations (Finland’s and EU’s) with Russia, and to some extent the Baltic region in general.


6See the article by the Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom Robin Cook in The Scotsman, 22 September 1999, ‘We must be ready to react’, underlining the goal, shared by Sweden and Britain, of a strong and effective United Nations.

7It has, for instance, sought ways to give impetus to the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). See, e.g., Gustav Lindström, Sweden’s Security Policy: Engagement - the Middle Way. The WEU Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Papers 2, October 1997, pp. 34-. The idea of having a strong role in the Baltic obviously has some attraction as Ann-Sofie Dahl (see reference above) uses it as a carrot for NATO membership, assuming that Sweden could within NATO be a country with a strong regional profile.
Differences, institutional or political, have not, however, hindered the countries’ bilateral cooperation. Coordination of views despite institutional or other divisions is actually a phenomenon that characterises Nordic cooperation in general. The Nordic countries have, for instance, formed a particularly homogeneous group in the UN Security Council, even though there are divisions between EC and EFTA members as well as between neutrals and NATO members.  

Finland and Sweden also changed their foreign policy doctrines roughly similarly and simultaneously, the step from neutrality to non-alignment taking place in the early 1990s. The Finnish government redefined neutrality in 1992, reducing it to the ‘core of neutrality’: staying outside military alliances in order to permit neutrality in war, a position supported by a credible national defence. Swedish security policy was also rephrased in 1992: instead of a ‘non-alignment in peacetime aiming at neutrality in wartime’ the new, somewhat more ambiguous formulation was non-alignment ‘which would make it possible to be neutral in case of war in the neighbouring area’.

The change from neutrality to non-alignment was understood to give greater freedom of action, while, however, preserving the inner core of neutrality. Freedom of action, then, meant widening cooperation in foreign and security policies. Since they became EU members, both countries have emphasised the importance of cooperation as a part of their security policy. In Finland, EU membership became one of the central elements of Finnish security policy alongside military non-alignment and independent defence. Similarly in Sweden, it was seen that ‘membership in the EU and participation in the CFSP framework gives Sweden an improved security policy position as well as increased opportunities to engage in foreign and security policy issues in our vicinity’. Gradually, the principle of participation was extended even further: outlined by President Martti Ahtisaari in February 1998, Finnish security policy included, in addition to non-alignment and EU membership, also cooperation within the new NATO structures.

Indeed, both countries have been widening their cooperation with NATO. Finland became an observer in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1992, Sweden in 1994. In 1994, both countries joined the Partnership for Peace programme, and both have participated in the NATO-led IFOR, SFOR and KFOR operations in former Yugoslavia. In November 1997, they became, together with Austria, observers in the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), and will most probably become members next year.

Military non-alignment is thus a policy that does not impede the countries’ active participation in international security cooperation, including military cooperation. As explicitly noted in Sweden, it excludes only bilateral defence alliances, or mutual military security

---

8 Indeed, the aim of forming common views in international forums is part of the Helsinki Agreement of 1962 on Nordic cooperation; there have been foreign ministers’ regular meetings from the 1930s onwards, while defence ministers have met informally.
9 See Lindström (op. cit.), pp. 9-10.
10 Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 7 December 1995; quoted in Lindström (op cit.) p. 27.
11 Transformed into Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997.
12 See also Lindström (op. cit.), pp. 21-22.
13 The WEAG decided, in fact, on 22 November 1999 that the ‘neutral’ countries and the three new NATO members can join the organisation; the final decision will be taken in one year’s time. *Helsingin Sanomat* 23 and 24 November 1999.
guarantees. Politically, the countries are aligned; militarily, non-alignment has been chosen, not as an end in itself, but as an important instrument in achieving security policy stability in northern Europe. In the words of the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Anna Lindh, non-participation in military alliances serves security best, ‘both for us and the world around us’. Moreover, non-alignment also carries some kind of residual merit of traditional neutrality in inspiring other actors’ confidence: ‘Sweden’s role as mediator and partner in dialogue is linked to the confidence which we enjoy. This has largely been based on our non-participation in military alliances, our policy of solidarity and our independent standpoints.’

Shared motivations also give reason for the two countries’ appearing together – indeed, it has been pointed out that the number of shared concerns has increased. It is also recognised that the countries’ voices are better heard when they speak together. Finnish and Swedish ministers have repeatedly published joint articles showing their common positions, and the countries have also made joint international initiatives. In the jargon of the Finnish ministry for foreign affairs, these initiatives are known as the ‘SuRu’s.

The Petersberg initiative

The initiative on including the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty has without doubt been the most significant among the joint Swedish-Finnish initiatives. It actually emerged as a reaction to the on-going discussion in the IGC and to a joint document on the gradual integration of WEU into the European Union that six EU member countries presented in March 1997. According to the document, this merger would take place in three phases, the first of which would consist in laying the foundations of a common European defence policy and harmonising the rules and procedures of both organisations. In the second phase, the EU would assume the decision-making power to initiate military action, using WEU, which would be responsible for the implementation

---

14 As outlined in the Swedish government’s proposal to the security political preparatory committee; see Helsingin Sanomat 8 January 1998.
15 Speech at the Swedish Institute for International Affairs (SIIA), Stockholm, 16 December 1998.
16 Very similarly, in the Finnish security reports of 1995 and 1997 (Security in a changing world. Guidelines for Finland’s security policy. Report by the Council of State, 6 June 1995, and The European Security Development and Finnish Defence. Report by the Council of State to Parliament, 17 March 1997), non-alignment is motivated as the best way of contributing to stability. This standpoint was once again emphasized in a joint article by the two countries’ ministers for defence (Anneli Taina and Björn von Sydow) published in Helsingin Sanomat and Dagens Nyheter on 13 June 1998: Finland’s and Sweden’s military non-alignment ‘will also in the future support stability in Northern Europe’.
17 Anna Lindh at the SIIA, 16 December 1998.
18 Pertti Torstila, director of the political department of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in Helsingin Sanomat, 28 May 1998.
19 ‘Su’ for Suomi (Finland), ‘Ru’ for Ruotsi (Sweden) - somewhat unfortunately, though, since ‘suru’ means ‘sorrow’. SuRu I stands for the Petersberg initiative (see below), while SuRu II comprises an article by the ministers for foreign affairs in April 1997, and a joint high level visit to NATO and to Moscow; SuRu III is an initiative on cooperative security for the Baltic Sea region presented in April 1998 in various forums, including OSCE and EAPC, aiming at increasing openness in the military field. Cf. Pertti Torstila, director of the political department of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in Helsingin Sanomat 28 May 1998. See also the outline of the two defence ministers on possible areas of bilateral cooperation, ranging from procurement, sea control, support for Nordic participation in crisis management (NORDCAPS: Nordic coordinated arrangement for military peace support) to exchange of civil servants, teachers, students and researchers. (Anneli Taina and Björn von Sydow in Helsingin Sanomat and Dagens Nyheter, 13 June 1998).
of military actions. The use of, e.g., the WEU Situation Centre and the Satellite Centre by the EU
should be furthered. Finally, during the third phase, the competences of the institutions and
bodies of WEU would be transferred to the relevant institutions of the EU.\textsuperscript{20}

Not all countries were at that point in favour of merging the two organisations; notably the
United Kingdom opposed. Finland and Sweden, WEU Observers since 1995 but intending to stay
militarily non-aligned, saw a possibility to make a compromise proposal that would be acceptable
to all sides. For them, it was better to take the initiative, using, as it were, attack as the best means
of defence, instead of giving the impression of having to accept the others’ plans. At the same
time, they could also show activism in foreign and security policy and thus counter suspicions
about their hampering developments in this field.

Finland’s and Sweden’s proposal\textsuperscript{21} was to include the Petersberg tasks, that is,
‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis
management including peace-making’, in the CFSP.\textsuperscript{22} WEU would be used for carrying through
these operations. At the same time, the bond between the EU and WEU would be strengthened,
while equal opportunities for participation in these operations would be guaranteed for all EU
member states. The Swedish-Finnish proposal was indeed accepted, and, as a result, the
Petersberg tasks were included in the CFSP remit in the Amsterdam Treaty; the arrangement was
also sanctioned in the WEU Council meeting in Erfurt in November 1997.

Crisis management came to be seen in these countries as roughly comparable with
peacekeeping – an activity in which, particularly in the UN context, both countries have been
active for a long time, partly because of the ‘aura’ of neutrality that made the parties to a conflict
more likely to accept peacekeepers from these countries than from militarily aligned ones.

What was particularly important in this initiative was to ensure, on the one hand, the
political control of the EU over WEU as the executive arm, and, on the other hand, to the right of
non-aligned EU members to participate on an equal footing in planning and decision-making on
these operations within WEU. WEU would then use NATO resources, and also national
resources.\textsuperscript{23}

For Finland, the motivation behind the initiative concentrated on showing activism and
ensuring equal opportunities for participation. It was important to show that a militarily non-
aligned country does not hinder development in security affairs, and that even a military alliance
is in principle not excluded as a possibility. Finland did not want to be a ‘footnote country’. On
the other hand, Finland was against the idea of there being several membership categories, or
decisions on defence cooperation with the possibility of either opt-in or opt-out.\textsuperscript{24}

Not only was the principle of equal participation and full decision-making rights stressed
in the final text of the Amsterdam Treaty – Finland and Sweden also, at least so they saw it,

\textsuperscript{20}Paper submitted by France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg on gradual integration of WEU into
\textsuperscript{21}For the background, see the joint memorandum to enhance the role and capabilities of the EU in conflict
management: The IGC and the security and defence dimension - towards an enhanced EU role in crisis
management. Memorandum by Finland and Sweden, 25 April 1996. - See also Lindström (op. cit.) pp. 29-30 for
further details.
\textsuperscript{22}These tasks had been given to WEU in the Petersberg Declaration of 1992 as a part of the reorientation of the
organisation after the end of the Cold War. In Amsterdam, different versions of the list of tasks were discussed; for
some countries, WEU’s list was acceptable as such, but for others it could have been shortened.
\textsuperscript{23}The European Security Development and Finnish Defence. Report by the Council of State to Parliament on 17
\textsuperscript{24}Interview at the Finnish Ministry for Foreign affairs in April 1998.
managed to draw a line between crisis management and defence, the latter not being among the Petersberg tasks.

The position of the two countries was further consolidated in the conclusions of the Cologne EU summit, which confirmed the equal right of participation, recognising the variety of standpoints and institutional affiliations of the countries concerned. The Cologne Declaration states: ‘We want to develop an effective EU-led crisis management in which NATO members, as well as neutral and non-allied members, of the EU can participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU operations.’ On the other hand, ‘The different status of Member States with regard to collective defence guarantees will not be affected. The Alliance remains the foundation of the collective defence of its Member States.’

Repeating the wording of the Amsterdam (and Maastricht) Treaty, it further states that the policy of the Union shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Finally, the member states ‘will retain in all circumstances the right to decide if and when their national forces are deployed.’

The two countries have been seeking to ensure similar rights to participate in the EAPC/PfP framework too. In the EAPC meeting in Brussels on 8 December 1998, Foreign Ministers Halonen and Lindh emphasised the right of troop contributors to be involved in early preparations and political and military consultations of NATO-led PfP operations. The Swedish government pursued ‘with growing success’ the question of the development of a politico-military framework within the EAPC/PfP that would give rights to partners contributing forces to participate in decision-making processes in NATO-led ‘peace-promoting’ operations, which was indeed established at the Washington summit of April 1999.

Within this ‘equal participation regime’, the two countries have broadened their involvement, participating in WEU missions in Albania and Croatia, and they have also notified their readiness to put military forces at the disposal of WEU. In some respects, their involvement even surpasses that of aligned countries: as Bailes notes, the NATO defence

---


26According to Subedi, the statement referred to Ireland in particular and was included on Irish initiative. See Surya P. Subedi, 'Neutrality in a changing world: European neutral states and the European Community'. International and Comparative Law Quarterly vol. 42, 1993, p. 258. (Similarly Paul Luif in On the Road to Brussels. The Political Dimension of Austria's, Finland's and Sweden's Accession to the European Union. The Laxenburg Papers 11, Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Laxenburg 1995, pp. 43-44.)


28See the statements by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mrs Anna Lindh, and Ms Tarja Halonen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, at the Ministerial Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Brussels, 8 December 1998.

29Speech by Anna Lindh at SIIA, 16 December 1998.


31The ministers for foreign affairs of Finland and Sweden, Tarja Halonen and Anna Lindh, in a joint article published in Dagens Nyheter and Helsingin Sanomat on 5 December 1998.
planning process and the PfP planning process now cover the forces of Austria, Finland and Sweden, but not those of France (or Ireland).\(^\text{32}\)

**An ever-developing defence dimension: non-alignment under pressure**

The Treaty of Amsterdam and the conclusions of the Cologne European Council implied a satisfactory state of affairs from the non-aligned countries’ point of view. They were guaranteed full decision-making rights and the possibility to take part in military cooperation for crisis management purposes without as a result having to reconsider their non-aligned status, and without any obligation to deploy national forces or to sign a defence treaty.

Nevertheless, for other member states, what had been achieved was not a final word, a conclusion, but rather a starting point, or a step in an on-going development. Developing the CFSP, with particular emphasis on security and defence policy, quickly consolidated its position on the common agenda. What the British Prime Minister Tony Blair expressed at the informal EU summit in Pörtschach in October 1998 – frustration over European inability to act in Kosovo, willingness to strengthen the CFSP and the determination ‘that Europe plays a key and leading role, that we enhance our defence capability and show the political will to act’\(^\text{33}\) – most probably stemmed from motivations that had little to do with the CFSP proper and more with the need to find *some* areas in which to show activism, commitment, even leadership. Yet, it was not difficult to involve other countries in the idea. On 4 December 1998 in Saint-Malo, France and the United Kingdom declared in their bilateral summit that ‘The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage’ and that ‘To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’. Further, they noted that ‘Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.’\(^\text{34}\) The suitable military means were to be found either within NATO’s European pillar or outside the NATO framework, in multinational European arrangements. For the latter eventuality, it was declared, the Union needed independent capacities for strategic planning, analysis of situations, and sources of intelligence.

In the Vienna summit of December 1998, all 15 EU countries subscribed to this position. All agreed that in order for the EU to be able to play its full role on the international stage, the CFSP must be backed by credible operational capabilities.\(^\text{35}\) This new agreement resulted in a declaration given at the Cologne summit in June 1999. The presidency conclusions mentioned the aim to enhance and better coordinate the Union’s and its member states’ non-military crisis response tools, including the possibility of a stand-by capacity to pool national civil resources and expertise complementing other initiatives within the common foreign and security policy.\(^\text{36}\) While the conclusions of the presidency dealt with non-military crisis responses, military crisis


\(^{33}\) The Guardian 26 Oct 1998, online version.

\(^{34}\) Joint Declaration issued at the Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo, 3-4 December 1998.

\(^{35}\) Vienna European Council 11 and 12 December 1998. Presidency conclusions. SN 300/98, paragraphs 76 and 77.

management was endorsed in the form of a declaration and presidency report on the strengthening of the CFSP.

The summit stated that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks, something that allows the Union to respond to international crises and increases its ability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. To this end, it was confirmed (following the Saint-Malo declaration word by word) that the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so. What is needed, accordingly, is commitment to further develop more effective European military capabilities (national, bi-national, multinational and ‘our own’). This poses requirements to the member states, notably regarding maintenance of a sustained defence effort, implementation of the necessary adaptations and reinforcement of European capabilities in the field of intelligence, strategic transport, command and control. It also requires efforts to adapt, exercise and bring together national and multinational European forces, as well as to strengthen the industrial and technological defence base and foster the restructuring of European defence industries, seeking harmonisation of military requirements and the planning and procurement of arms.\textsuperscript{37}

For Finland and Sweden, the development of a EU crisis management capacity did not pose problems. Without having to stretch their positions too much, they could interpret it as being in line with their own previous activism – finally, they had themselves been advocating the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks – and thus, when they now aligned with the others to support the further development of crisis management, they simply, and logically, followed their own policies.

At the same time, it was important not to let the borderline between crisis management and defence cooperation, the idea behind the Petersberg initiative, become blurred. This intention was visible in the common reaction to the debate that the foreign ministers of Finland and Sweden gave in a joint article published in \textit{Dagens Nyheter} and \textit{Helsingin Sanomat}, 5 December 1998 on the EU and European crisis management. They characterised the debate initiated by Tony Blair as an ‘important debate, and one to which Finland and Sweden are prepared to make positive and concrete contributions’, and recalled that, with the Amsterdam Treaty, crisis management had become a more distinct area of EU responsibility, and Petersberg tasks an important element of the CFSP – as a result of their proposal. Crisis management, they noted, is now identified as the Union’s most important task in the field of defence, while it is clearly distinguished from the question of common defence.\textsuperscript{38} They further specified that European crisis management is based on voluntary efforts and solidarity; it is important to make use of the resources and competences of all the EU member states, irrespective of whether they are militarily non-aligned or NATO members – those who participate in an operation shall all have the same opportunity to influence decisions – and that the use of military force requires, ‘as before’, a UN mandate.

What also happened, however, was that crisis management was put into a larger framework, allowing for the further development of military cooperation. While crisis management within the scope of the Petersberg tasks is noted to be the area ‘where a European


\textsuperscript{38}‘It was both natural and important for the non-aligned EU Member States to make this distinction, but the proposal was also based on a realistic assessment of the military and security challenges that we face in Europe today.’
capacity is required most urgently’, the development of an EU military crisis management capacity ‘is to be seen as an activity within the framework of the CFSP (Title V of the TEU) and as a part of the progressive framing of a common defence policy in accordance with Article 17 of the TEU.’ To this effect, and, as the Cologne Declaration puts it, to ensure the political control and strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg operations, new forms of cooperation between the military staff of the member states are proposed. The Declaration foresees new institutions; the General Affairs Council meetings would include, as appropriate, defence ministers, there could be a permanent political and security committee in Brussels with political and military expertise, a EU military committee consisting of military representatives which would make recommendations to the political and security committee, and a EU military staff supported by, e.g., a situation centre and a satellite centre.

Clearly, thus, ‘borderline drawing’ was not popular among all member countries. On the contrary, the link between crisis management and defence policy was alluded to already in the Amsterdam Treaty, which by no means confines security cooperation to the Petersberg tasks. In fact, Article 17 (subparagraph 2) states that ‘Questions referred to in this Article shall include [the Petersberg tasks – emphasis added]’ – that is, together with other tasks.

Secondly, the link between WEU and the EU was made stronger than the Amsterdam Treaty had implied. Actually, the Petersberg initiative was made almost obsolete, almost as if one had turned once again to the six-nations’ proposal (see above). A de facto merger came closer through the protocol (and similar WEU declaration) on arrangements for enhanced cooperation including, e.g., measures to facilitate links between the new Planning Unit and WEU’s Planning Cell, Situation Centre and Satellite Centre. The Cologne summit asked the General Affairs Council to do preparatory work for putting in practice ‘the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks’. After this, not much would remain of WEU as an independent organisation. The aim to take ‘the necessary decisions’ (on its fate) by the end of the year 2000 was also presented in the declaration, stating that ‘In that event, the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose.’

Finally, member states were asked to start preparations to meet the requirements of an effective European crisis management capacity, that is, to develop further forces suited to crisis management, without unnecessary duplication, and emphasis on deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility and mobility. Finland, as the next presidency country, was thus given the responsibility for putting these elements into practice in the form of a progress report.

---


Critical elements in the development of the defence dimension

The Helsinki European Council of 10-11 December 1999 gave concrete form to the idea of developing an autonomous European crisis management capacity. It decided on setting up a European military force of a considerable size (50-60 000) by the year 2003, and on establishing new political and military bodies and structures as had been envisaged in Cologne, involving also defence ministers in what is now called the common European security and defence policy (CESDP). Furthermore, it was also decided to develop collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport. The incoming Portuguese presidency was invited to carry forward the work on strengthening the CESDP.

Summing up, developments in 1999 seem to be turning the EU into a self-mandatory crisis management organisation; WEU’s institutions are being transferred to it, and defence cooperation is becoming more clearly than before a part of the integration process. The borderline that Finland and Sweden have been drawing between defence and crisis management is being diluted and blurred. When analysing the implications that this development has on non-alignment, three points are particularly relevant:

1) EU’s autonomous crisis management capacity (with repercussions on transatlantic relations, the question of mandates, and the question of the means used),
2) institutional questions (WEU merger; the degree of intergovernmentalism; flexibility), and
3) defence (the questions of collective defence and of common goals or criteria).

The idea of an autonomous crisis management capacity for the EU is as such welcomed by both countries. They share the view that a more effective European response to crises would be desirable, and are, in fact, among the countries with a particularly long tradition of participation in UN peacekeeping operations. They are also prepared to work on improving the suitability of their own troops for these tasks and increasing cooperation at, e.g., bilateral or Nordic level. 42 The question of European autonomy vis-à-vis NATO 43 presents some difficulties; ‘decoupling’ from NATO does not seem to be an ideal goal for the two countries, even though, one could think, closer links would be even less ideal. Both stress the importance of transatlantic relations and United States’s commitment to Europe. 44

The idea of autonomous EU crisis management raises two further questions that are relevant for the non-aligned. The first is whether the EU needs a mandate by the UN or the OSCE for its peacekeeping operations. Part of the idea of the EU developing really autonomous capacities as an international actor is that it should be able to act without being bound to wait for the agreement of the UN – in particular since this could effectively block any action in the event of a veto by a permanent member of the Security Council. Both for Finland and Sweden, such a mandate is, however, very important, both as something that underlines the role of the UN and

---

42 For instance, the Finnish Prime Minister has welcomed both increased capability and a more effective decision-making, including encouraging structural changes in the armed forces, and increasing training and cooperation capacity in the member countries. Paavo Lipponen, speech to a course of staff officers, 24 August 1999.

43 Advocated, e.g., by the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany when they, after the Franco-German summit of 30 November, came with the idea of proposing in Helsinki that the EU can decide independently on starting and leading a military operation without NATO. Helsingin Sanomat 1 December 1999.

44 E.g., the ministers for foreign affairs of Finland and Sweden underlined, in their article in Dagens Nyheter and Helsingin Sanomat on 5 December 1998, the crucial importance of close relations with NATO and the United States, and the need to avoid duplication.
international law and ensures, in a sense, the consensus and support of the ‘international community’, represented by the UN.

The problem seems to have emerged already at the stage when inclusion of the Petersberg tasks was discussed. Apparently, Sweden would have liked to see the UN mandate mentioned explicitly, but this did not happen. The Cologne presidency report, then, was a compromise on this question: it does not explicitly mention the need for a mandate, but states that ‘The European Union is committed to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Charter of Paris, as provided for in Article 11 of the TEU.’

In Helsinki, it was recalled that the Union contributes to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN, and recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. This was reported as particularly advocated by Sweden (cf. below) which has without doubt stressed the need for a mandate more forcefully than Finland. In all, the Helsinki summit confirms the aspiration of the EU for a capacity for autonomous action, in relation to both the UN and NATO. Although the importance of preserving a common understanding with these organisations about general principles and, in the case of NATO, about decision-making modalities is underlined, no explicit requirements of mandate or other formal links are made. Finland and Sweden seem inclined to promote closer cooperation between different organisations, but probably neither of them can make a strong point about insisting on creating such explicit links.

A second problematic question concerns the nature of the EU’s crisis management operations, their extension and the tasks and equipment the troops are to have. It is difficult for Finland and Sweden to foresee their troops in combat tasks for something other than the defence of national territory – apart, of course, from clearly defined peacekeeping operations. The problem, however, is that even the Petersberg tasks go beyond peacekeeping and involve even peace enforcement. For Sweden, participation in peace enforcement as such is possible, although the use of forces of a certain size and capability needs parliamentary approval. In Finland, the issue is somewhat more complicated; the law on peacekeeping has actually set limits on Finnish participation. In fact, the law was already amended in 1995 to allow Finnish participation in peacekeeping operations under the leadership of others than the UN – IFOR, SFOR and then KFOR, the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo – and in order to make possible the use of force not only for self-defence but also for humanitarian tasks. The law in force still excludes participation in peace enforcement. In practice, the IFOR/SFOR operations in Bosnia implied thorny problems of interpretation for the staff in place. Now, there is pressure towards enabling Finnish participation in peace enforcement, and also in order to harmonise the legislation with

---

45 Hufvudstadsbladet 12 December 1999.
46 The Swedish minister for foreign affairs Anna Lindh put this very clearly in her speech at the SIIA in December 1998 (ref. above): ‘The standpoint of the Swedish Government is clear and based on principle. When it is not a question of self-defence or duress, a decision by the UN Security Council is required before military force may be used. These decisions may only be taken when peace has been breached or when international peace and security are under threat.’
47 Conversely, the first time there were foreign armed troops in Finland during peacetime was in September this year when the ‘Nordic Peace 1999’ exercise, part of the PfP framework, brought troops from Sweden, Norway and Denmark to Finland.
other Nordic and PfP countries. The Government emphasises the need to further the possibilities of the armed forces’ participation in international peacekeeping and crisis management operations,\(^{49}\) and a committee was established in May 1999 by the Ministry for Defence to study the need for amending the law. The committee indeed suggests removing all conditionality concerning Finnish participation; if the decision were made to send Finnish troops to an operation, they would take part in it without any limitations as to what they could do. However, enforcement and operations without a UN/OSCE mandate would be excluded.\(^ {50}\)

On the initiative of Sweden and Finland, the Helsinki summit also approved a report on non-military crisis management by the EU. If implemented, it could at some stage also entail a EU non-military rapid reaction capability to be used autonomously or in response to a request by, e.g., the UN or the OSCE.\(^ {51}\) In this context, Sweden in particular has been seen to guard against a dominance of military means in EU crisis management, and the Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh presented the initiative to include a committee for civilian crisis management among the aspects on which the incoming presidency is invited to work.\(^ {52}\)

The institutional questions – setting up new permanent committees as envisaged in Cologne and decided on in Helsinki (a standing Political and Security Committee (PSC), dealing with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP, the Military Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Defence Staff, giving recommendations to the PSC and military direction to the third novelty, the Military Staff, which will provide military expertise) – imply two potential problems for the non-aligned. The first is that of increased coordination of security and military policy as such, following to some extent the (institutional) example of NATO. The second is the question of the degree of intergovernmentalism within the new institutions. Finland and Sweden seem to have tried to avoid the formation of purely ‘military’ institutional annexes, such as a EU military committee, emphasising instead the need to have both civil and military experts who give advice to the Political and Security Committee. Such an expert committee could have been called ‘the Petersberg committee’ to emphasise that the limitation of tasks that was agreed upon still holds.

The second question, decision-making rules and representation of the member countries in these institutions, can be seen in a concrete form in the question of the composition and chairing of the PSC. If it was composed of, e.g., the deputy political directors of foreign ministries, the degree of intergovernmentalism would be preserved as compared with the alternative of a PSC at ambassadorial level in Brussels, which would mean increasing ‘Brusselisation’. As to the chair, then, the two non-aligned countries would prefer to see the country holding the EU presidency chairing the committee rather than give the chair to the High Representative.\(^ {53}\)

Traditionally – that is, in the first years of their membership – both Finland and Sweden have stressed the intergovernmental character (unanimity) of EU cooperation in the second pillar, notably in issues concerning security. Intergovernmentalism essentially guarantees their ability to

\(^{49}\)See the Working programme of Prime Minister Lipponen’s second government, 15 April 1999.

\(^{50}\)Rauhanturvaamistyöryhmän mietintö 1999. PLM KD NRO 980/4200/99/KE. See also the Update of the Working programme of the government on 22 September 1999 at [www.vn.fi](http://www.vn.fi).

\(^{51}\)It would include areas such as civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal rehabilitation, search and rescue, electoral and human rights monitoring. See Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union, Annex 2 to Annex IV, Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999.

\(^{52}\)Hufvudstadsbladet 12 December 1999.

\(^{53}\)Interviews in Paris; similarly Krister Bringéus from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the conference ‘Making the Foreign and Security Policy Work’ at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, on 30 September 1999.
influence. Now, however, both the impetus in the development of the defence dimension and the forthcoming EU enlargement make the appearance of some forms of flexibility more timely – to allow some countries to deepen cooperation among themselves, while others stay outside. This is a problem for the two countries as they will have to assess what such staying outside might mean in practice; yet they have accepted the first concrete manifestations of flexibility in areas such as EMU and Schengen.

The ‘Solana case’

The case of Javier Solana’s appointments is illustrative both of potential manifestations of non-alignment in practice and, at the same time, of differences between Sweden and Finland. When the idea of a single high representative for the EU’s common foreign and security policy came up – motivated by the need to give the Union a more united external representation – Finland was sceptical. In fact, its position was that a separate foreign policy representative was fine in so far as his tasks were limited; however, no general mandate should be given, as this might be confusing.54 The role and competence of the High Representative (HR), as well as his relations to other decision-makers, were debated; France advocated a strong position, but the Amsterdam Treaty seemed first to limit the role of the HR to auxiliary functions, placed under the authority of the Council, and thus of the member states. Yet, even in this question, later developments have given more weight to the early views; as a good example, the letter by Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder to Prime Minister Lipponen argued that all heads of state and government should give Mr Solana their full support in what should be seen as a key role in the external representation of the EU.55

The fact that a former secretary general of NATO was nominated as the first High Representative did not seem to evoke much protest by the two non-aligned. The ‘double hatting’, however, i.e. the decision also to nominate Mr Solana as the secretary general of WEU, led to a difference in views between the aligned and the non-aligned. The international press presented the case as if the ‘neutral’ states were blocking what was the right and obvious decision. Opinions diverged as to which of the countries was the most obstinate: some believed Austria, Finland and Ireland dropped their objections first, Sweden having still to be persuaded,56 while others claimed that Austria and Ireland had removed their objections, but that Finland persisted.57

More or less actively, Finland and Sweden expressed their opposition to Solana’s nomination as WEU secretary general.58 The reasons were both procedural and substantial. On the procedural side, the problem was that the WEU countries had made the decision between themselves, bringing it only subsequently to the other EU member countries. On the substantive side, the problem was that this double-hatting means that ‘Mr CFSP’ in his WEU role also takes

54 Finland’s points of departure and objectives at the 1996 IGC. Report by the Council of State, 27 February 1996.
55 Letter to Prime Minister Lipponen on 13 October, before the Tampere summit; see Bulletin Quotidien Europe n. 7574, 16 October 1999.
58 Latest News, Press and Information Service of the Western European Union, 13 October 1999 quotes a Swedish government source (by Reuters): ‘Sweden wants to have someone else so that we can make a fresh start with someone who has been less involved so that the question of defence can be put to the EU in a different way’.
care of questions linked to common defence (‘Article V tasks’). Thus, common defence enters the EU – something that should not have happened.

There were plans to settle this controversy by a declaration to the effect that Solana will, in WEU, only be concerned with crisis management tasks, that this is a temporary solution while the question has to be settled in a year’s time, and that the Cologne decisions shall not be affected. Such a declaration could have been given by the foreign ministers at the Helsinki summit. In essence, the intention was to see to it that the two functions would be kept separate, avoiding, at the same time, any differentiation between non-WEU and WEU countries.\footnote{\textit{Cf.} \textit{El Pais} 13 October 1999 giving as a reason for the ‘neutrals’’ opposition that if this was made a general rule, countries like Finland, outside WEU, could not have their citizens in the role of ‘Mr CFSP’. The declaration would, then, safeguard the rights of the countries ‘de tradición neutralista’.
}

On the other hand, however, the counter-argument was presented that it is practical that one and the same person takes care of WEU in all its aspects and the CFSP with a view to the eventual transfer of the component parts and ‘functions’ of the former to the EU. Indeed, this was also the position of the Finnish prime minister, who noted that, as it is Solana who leads the work to include parts of WEU in the EU, it can be advantageous if he also works as the WEU secretary general.\footnote{Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen in \textit{Aamulehti}, 15 October 1999.} Furthermore, it could be added, a division would create practical problems – if Mr CFSP was occupied with crisis management only, who would then take care of the rest?

Sweden might have been more determinate in ‘the Solana case’ than Finland which, due to its presidency functions, was in a more delicate position. On the other hand, while the presidency clearly limited Finland’s possibilities of furthering any particular views, it should also have enabled it to shape the agenda and forthcoming institutional decisions. Yet, at the Helsinki European Council, no such declarations were given, nor was the question of Solana’s role – to judge from public sources – addressed. Instead, Portugal assumed the task of developing the defence dimension further, and, taking into account the fact that it is now the aim that institutional decisions should be taken during the French presidency (July-December 2000), one might assume that ideas such as those already presented by the leaders of the major EU countries will have a strong foothold – such as the Chirac-Schröder letter (cf. above) containing the idea that Mr CFSP should chair the new Political and Security Committee.

Finally, the question of \textit{collective defence} obviously presents a fundamental problem for the two non-aligned countries. Non-alignment means non-participation in military alliances, and thus non-participation in the collective defence commitments of NATO and WEU. The essential task for the two non-aligned has been to maintain a distinction between the activities in which they can participate and those in which they cannot, keeping crisis management separate from defence.

In its report on security policy of 1997, the Finnish government underlined that crisis management tasks can be separated from actual defence functions – the latter being either a NATO or a national responsibility. For Finland, the report stated, the ‘development of the defence dimension’ means strengthening crisis management and peacekeeping capabilities, the objective being effective collective action. The crucial conditions are that all member countries have, first, the right to decide independently whether to participate in an operation, and, second, the right to participate on an equal footing not only in decision-making within the EU but also in the implementation of decisions by WEU.\footnote{See \textit{The European Security Development and Finnish Defence}. Report by the Council of State to Parliament on 17 March 1997. Pp. 19-20.}
This position still holds. As Finnish Secretary of State Jukka Valtasaari put it, the Union’s task is indeed not collective defence but a more effective and comprehensive prevention, management and resolution of disputes and conflicts.\(^{62}\) On the Swedish side, the borderline thus drawn is characterised as ‘vital’. Speaking about a shared view by Finland and Sweden, the Swedish minister for foreign affairs noted that ‘It is vital that the vital distinction between military crisis management and territorial defence is upheld and that military force may be used only when consistent with international law.’\(^{63}\)

The Helsinki summit documents present a mixed view on the relation between crisis management and defence. On the one hand, the Helsinki report on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence confines the envisaged military capabilities to the Petersberg tasks.\(^{64}\) While the Cologne declaration spoke of crisis management as a part of the progressive framing of a common defence policy, the Helsinki progress report does not explicitly make this connection. On the other hand, the idea that the work on strengthening the CESDP will continue, as, indeed, the very notion of a CESDP, and the ensuing closer integration of defence forces and defence decision-makers in the new institutions refers to something broader than crisis management.

In Finland, it now seems customary to maintain that ‘defence’, when used in the EU context, does not mean ‘defence’ – it means, instead, crisis management. Another question is, however, whether ‘crisis management’ then means the same ‘crisis management’ as before.\(^{65}\) One might argue that the borderline between defence and crisis management is easy to draw in practice, and that defence is only a part of the general discourse on the finalité politique of the Union rather than an explicit goal. At the summit, however, there was a need to keep defence at some distance, and Sweden and Finland wished to see an explicit statement that the goal would not be the establishment of a European army, or, as the Presidency Conclusions came to state, that the process ‘does not imply the creation of a European army’.\(^{66}\)

Similarly, the countries also wish to keep Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty away from the EU treaty. In autumn 1998, Sweden was actively working against Article V, and thus mutual defence commitment, being included, even in the form of a separate protocol. Finland was not as active, but apparently content with the work Sweden did in this question.\(^{67}\) On the other side, the WEU Assembly has been one of those bodies forcefully insisting on the importance of


\(^{63}\) Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh at SIIA, December 1998. She continued: ‘I am glad that I - in an article with my Finnish colleague - recently had the opportunity to emphasize our common standpoint on this matter. We gain in strength by joining forces in important security policy matters.’

\(^{64}\) Note the subtitle: ‘Military capabilities for Petersberg tasks’.

\(^{65}\) Moreover, of course, there are practical difficulties in distinguishing between crisis management and defence, if both involve use of force and even by the same units. Crisis management is actually one kind of defence, at least if seen as aiming at preventing the spreading of crises and their consequences to the EU, and perhaps also the most timely kind, taking into account the decreased need for traditional territorial defence in Europe.

\(^{66}\) Finland, the United Kingdom and Ireland in particular insisted on this point, while France opposed its inclusion. In the end, it was accepted in the Presidency conclusions but not in the report on strengthening the CESDP. Helsingin Sanomat 12 December 1999. Also for the Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson, it was ‘clear’ that the development is not a foundation of a European army, but only about functional capacities for the Petersberg tasks. Hufvudstadsbladet 11 December 1999.

\(^{67}\) Interview with Catharina Kipp at the Swedish Embassy in Paris, 18 October 1999.
safeguarding the article: should the article not be included in the EU treaty, it has argued, all the
initiatives on common European defence would exist only on paper.\textsuperscript{68}

The non-aligned countries preference for ‘independent defence’ poses a political problem,
in that it gives reason for some to accuse them of lacking solidarity (cf. above). In reply, these
countries have pointed out that they are contributing in other ways, and more than might be
expected, given their relative size.\textsuperscript{59} On the one hand, independent defence might also become
increasingly problematic economically. Cuts in defence spending, notably in Sweden, could be a
reason to increase defence cooperation.\textsuperscript{70} On the other, however, defence cooperation could
imply the need to spend more, not less, to meet the requirements or commonly agreed goals, and
increased spending would meet domestic opposition.

The positions have to some extent softened, at least in Finland where Prime Minister
Lipponen’s second government programme of April 1999 quite simply omitted the word
‘national’ from the previous expression of ‘credible national defence capability’ that was seen as
the basis of Finnish security policy. This led to heated debate. For many observers, it was a
significant step that could in time permit membership of alliances. The Government, however,
had explicitly stated its intention not to change the country’s basic security political orientation,
and it insisted that this move had no particular significance.\textsuperscript{71}

In any case, factual security political and military cooperation is widening and increases
the convergence of the member states’ defence forces. As one part of the 1999 discussion on
moves towards more efficient crisis management and better coordination of European forces,
even the idea of explicit convergence criteria for military forces emerged.\textsuperscript{72} The first reaction of
the non-aligned countries was to claim that it was improbable that these would turn into anything
concrete. When France proposed application of the example of the EMU convergence criteria to
the development of military capability,\textsuperscript{73} the Finnish Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen interpreted
the proposal as an indication of French ‘creative thinking’ which was not really intended as a
question to be tackled in the imminent future.\textsuperscript{74} Furthermore, she argued that such common

\textsuperscript{68}See Bulletin Quotidien Europe n.7576, 20 October 1999.
\textsuperscript{69}See, e.g., the Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen (24 August 1999, speech to a course of staff officers),
pointing out that Finland has over 1800 peacekeepers (KFOR included) in UN and NATO operations, which is
relatively more than most other countries. Thus, it carries more than its own part of the load. – Similarly, as a
response to possible ‘accusations’, the ministers for foreign affairs of Finland and Sweden underlined that ‘Finland
and Sweden are ready to shoulder their share of responsibility’ in their joint article in Dagens Nyheter and Helsingin
Sanomat, 5 December 1998.
\textsuperscript{70}Financial Times wrote on 21 October 1999 that the cuts in defence spending are ‘so far-reaching that some senior
officers believe the country may have to abandon its long-standing non-aligned status and join a military alliance.’
On the other hand, also the threats have been reduced; therefore there is no need for sustaining the same defence
capacity as before. This is in fact the motivation for the cuts.
\textsuperscript{71}The government programme of 15 April 1999 states that credible defence capability is the basis of Finnish
security policy, and that military non-alignment is in prevailing circumstances the best way for Finland to further
stable development in Northern Europe.
\textsuperscript{72}Such criteria could comprise, e.g., levels of defence expenditure (a minimum), rules on how the money is spent,
requirements of professionalisation and specialisation rather than traditional conscript based territorial defence, a
common market for defence procurement and more industrial cooperation (see Antonio Missiroli, ‘European
Security and Defence: The Case for Setting ‘Convergence Criteria’ in European Foreign Affairs Review 4/1999,
pp. 485-500. See also Bailes 1999, ref. above.
\textsuperscript{73}This happened in the informal foreign ministers’ meeting in Saariselkä, 4-5 September 1999.
\textsuperscript{74}Helsingin Sanomat 8 September 1999.
criteria would not mean constructing a military alliance; the non-aligned were not the only countries to have their doubts on common defence.

Although the notion of ‘convergence criteria’ seemed to them badly chosen, the idea behind it was as much not unacceptable to the non-aligned. That there should be similar standards to increase efficiency, even as applied to the armaments industry, is understandable. Yet, the countries tend to underline that there exist clear practical problems: differences between countries, their defence industries and bureaucracies, as well as the contradiction, alluded to above, between a need to increase military spending to meet the challenge of more professional and technically developed armed forces and the pressure towards cutting defence budgets.

Indeed, convergence criteria did not figure in the Helsinki summit. The summit report opted for the terms ‘headline goal’ and ‘collective capability goals’, the former on the joint forces to be set up, the latter on command and control, intelligence and strategic transport. The idea of increasing convergence among the armed forces of the EU countries is, however, implicitly present. Even without specific convergence criteria, the goal of interoperability, or compatibility of technical and professional standards (for instance, shared systems of command, control and communications) is already accepted by the two non-aligned countries, in particular as regards international crisis management and peace support tasks. These operations become increasingly central, while traditional territorial defence becomes a lower priority, and defence forces are being restructured accordingly. At the same time, cooperation in the PfP framework explicitly aims at increasing the ability to exercise and operate with NATO forces. In all, one could argue that, even though outside collective defence alliances, Finland and Sweden are in the process of increasing the convergence of their defence forces.

**Finnish and Swedish responses: direct and indirect**

Independently of whether the development of the defence dimension actually threatens the interests and policies of Sweden and Finland, the very popularity of the idea of taking cooperation further in this area creates an uncomfortable situation for the non-aligned. They are more or less directly accused of free-riding and lack of solidarity towards fellow EU members. That these countries are entitled to full participation in decision-making but unwilling or unable to take part in all kinds of envisaged common military operations is indeed a difficult question for them. At this stage, they stress their readiness to shoulder their share of responsibility – political, on the one hand, being among those making the decisions, and practical, on the other, contributing in ways which are the most appropriate for them.

In this situation, bluntly taking a stand against such a development would be counterproductive. Instead, the two countries have declared their constructive and responsible attitude, as for instance in the final phase of the membership negotiations, when the two countries declared their support for the development of the CFSP. They have also adapted their policies accordingly, notably to facilitate concrete participation in PfP cooperation and crisis

---

75 See the Presidency report to the Helsinki European Council on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence, annex 1 to annex IV, SN 300/99 ANNEXES. (Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999.)

76 Interoperability also implies that it is easier to receive outside help in defence. See the argument that interoperability for this reason indirectly improves Finnish security in Järvenpää, Pauli, ‘What comes after Madrid? A view from Helsinki’. NATO Review 5 (September-October), 1997, pp. 30-33.
management. Thirdly, they have tried to exert influence, presenting their own initiatives as a way of getting through their important interests.

Of the two, Sweden is generally perceived as less inclined to take initiatives and less constructive in its aspirations and EU policies. The Swedish government has even been criticised for its unconstructive attitude towards the Union and lack of ‘Europeanness’, and with the approaching Swedish EU presidency in the first half of 2001 the criticism has intensified. The opposition is critical of Sweden having too low a profile as regards its EU presidency: the first indications of its priorities have included such issues as employment, equality between women and men, openness, environment, and consumer protection, without any indications of views as to larger questions such as European security – indeed, Prime Minister Persson has characterised the Göteborg summit of 2001 as an ‘Environment Summit’. On the other hand, as regards external relations, Sweden has been an active supporter of EU enlargement, in particular to the Baltic states, and it also sees relations with Russia as one of its priorities.

Conflict prevention is, however, emerging as a Swedish contribution to the discussion on European security and the EU’s external relations. The basic idea is to make conflict prevention an integral part of foreign and security policy. This embraces a broader international framework than the EU, including the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and regional as well as subregional levels of cooperation. The means would be a better use of international economic organisations and financial institutions and mechanisms for the settlement of international disputes, but also a strengthened military crisis management capacity.

Sweden may in fact propose conflict prevention as a common EU strategy during its presidency, thus aiming to combine its traditional concerns (global approach, peace and stability) with a contribution within the EU. Emphasising conflict prevention seems also to fit the overall framework of non-alignment well. Emphasis on prevention rather than management, where military means, too, are necessary, is a way of expressing Sweden’s wishes as to the future nature and role of the Union. At the same time, conflict prevention policy, being global rather than European, links the EU to other organisations, counteracting in some way the tendency of the Union to become an autonomous multipurpose entity. Some kind of division of labour is appearing: the report notes that the EU’s chief potential asset in this realm is the large number of policy areas it embraces – which is the traditional argument of those willing to see the EU essentially as a civilian actor.

---


78 Dagens Nyheter, 12 December 1999.

79 Anna Lindh at SIIA, Dec 1998: ‘[...] more open borders between us and the candidate countries must not lead to a new, sharper border with Russia. We are actively participating in the work on a common EU strategy for relations with Russia.’ See also Ryssland – en del av Europa. Svenska förslag till en EU-politik för samarbetet med Ryssland. Regeringskansliet 22 April 1999 (part of preparations for the Swedish EU presidency).


81 Bringéus in Stockholm (ref. above). He emphasised that Sweden is seriously working for crisis management in the EU; in this work, military and non-military means as well as conflict prevention, are equally important.

In the Helsinki summit, in fact, Sweden worked actively for the inclusion of conflict prevention in the list of priorities when carrying forward the work on security and defence. Sweden also worked for putting civilian crisis management on an equal footing with military crisis management, and on emphasising the role of the UN (cf. above).

Finland, in the same general perception, has been labelled the ‘model pupil’. Generally flexible and adaptive, it was rather silent during its presidency; in fact, in order to carry through a ‘model presidency’, it sought to act indirectly and in advance. A case in point was the Finnish initiative for a Northern Dimension for the policies of the Union, a simple way of giving its main concerns one label, wrapped in terms that make it palatable for others – something that Sweden looks upon as an example for its own policies.

Introduced in Luxembourg in 1997, the initiative builds on the idea of positive interdependence, increasing contacts, and decreasing discrepancy between the Union and its Northern neighbouring areas. It calls for more internal coordination and efficiency in the use of the Union’s existing instruments and resources in the region and brings, as an innovation, the participation of the non-EU ‘partner’ states to the preparatory phase of policy-making, in addition to encouraging cooperation with other organisations. The broad geographical and thematic range of the initiative – even though Russia (its north-western regions) is obviously central – and vague formulations contributed to positive initial reactions to the initiative. It was also carefully adapted to the needs and ideals of the Union, notably by promising an enhanced international role for the EU, economic benefits instead of extra costs, and conformity with the acquis and the enlargement process. In the light of recent developments, the example might, however, be discouraging; this strategy might not be enough to ensure the continuing progress of the initiative that is in competition for resources and interest with many other projects.

For some time one would have still expected Finland to carry forward during its presidency these kinds of broad ideas on the Union on which it would also come close to the Swedish positions – the need to address structural problems rather than conflicts, influencing its neighbourhood using the whole spectrum of the means it already has at its disposal and cultivating the Union’s relations with its neighbours. In reality, however, the presidency agenda

---

83 See also Dagens Nyheter 12 December 1999.
85 The idea was to anticipate the Finnish presidency and to ensure in good time that the notion would be already accepted by that time – so that Finland would not have to promote the initiative itself, thus spoiling its possibilities for being a ‘good’, impartial presidency country.
86 The Northern Dimension is not the only way in which Finland has tried to influence the Union’s policies towards Russia. It has been influential in the formulation of the common strategy on Russia, and earlier on furthered the ratification process of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.
88 On 11-12 November, a foreign ministerial meeting on the Northern Dimension was organised in Helsinki, but none of the EU ministers for foreign affairs participated, with the exception of Tarja Halonen. In the Helsinki summit, however, the issue was carried on as planned through giving the Commission the task to prepare an Action Plan.
89 The Under Secretary of State Jaakko Blomberg argued in a conference on Finnish EU Presidency in Helsinki on 18 June 1999 that the CFSP is most successful in structural problems, in influencing a neighbourhood or a major partner (the Mediterranean, Russia, East and Central Europe, even Asia). It would therefore be wise to develop the CFSP in this direction (that is, not in the direction of conflict management).
became increasingly dominated by precise questions of foreign and security policy, enlargement and institutional questions.

Still, Finland’s role of presidency inhibited it from taking clear stands, and accordingly, even the Finnish media were rather silent about any particular Finnish goals or achievements in these questions. There would seem to be good possibilities to have a say on, e.g., the composition and function of the new institutions, as well as on more specific definitions of the Petersberg tasks and the development of the defence dimension. Officially, however, this possibility was almost denied, or at least played down; the Government did not want to give the idea that Finland has some vested interests in this or other questions. In a way, the presidency seems to have had more a restraining than an enabling influence on Finnish EU policies: the emphasis was on finding compromises rather than emphasising particular matters. Even cooperation with Sweden decreased.\textsuperscript{90}

The EU presidency meant for Finland, as for any EU country, pressure to make the European Council a success, and, particularly in the Finnish case, to achieve something concrete during its term, if possible, in the most ‘unlikely’ fields for a non-aligned country, that is, in security and defence. This is why Finland took seriously the task of preparing the report on these issues. In fact, Sweden’s role might have been to further the non-aligned countries’ interests; conversely, it might be thought, Finland could play a more active role during the Swedish presidency. The concerns Sweden brought to the Helsinki summit, notably non-military crisis management,\textsuperscript{91} were without doubt shared by Finland.

In addition to the presidency, the idea that it is important to be in the ‘core’ of the Union in order to have influence has shaped Finnish EU policies.\textsuperscript{92} The need to be in the core obviously influences Finnish policies and requires that its non-alignment policy be flexible enough to be, if needed, accommodated to permit increasing military cooperation. To some extent, anything seems to go; one initiative after another is seen to be in line with Finland’s policies, if not altogether stemming from Finnish initiatives. Even though (a), the Under Secretary of State Jaakko Blomberg noted in September 1999 that the more difficult questions concerning the crisis management capacities would be left for later,\textsuperscript{93} and (b), the Finnish minister for foreign affairs maintained in November that a concrete decision on troops could not yet be made in Helsinki,\textsuperscript{94} when it indeed was made, it was soon understood that this was, in a way, a Finnish initiative, a continuation of the original Finnish-Swedish initiative on the Petersberg tasks.\textsuperscript{95} Thus, the blueprint for 60 000 European troops does not pose a problem: politically, it is a good way of

\textsuperscript{90}In an interview at the Finnish Embassy in Paris on 19 October 1999, Ulla Väistö also noted that this was the case also in the Franco-German relationship: during the German presidency, the two countries did not present joint initiatives or declarations as they otherwise are accustomed to doing.

\textsuperscript{91}The Finnish minister for foreign affairs noted that Sweden and Finland have started to stress the need to work for both non-military and military crisis management capability when developing the Union’s crisis management tools; ‘Europe into the New Millennium.’ Address by H. E. Mrs Tarja Halonen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, at Chatham House, 7 September 1999.

\textsuperscript{92}Now, according to this logic, the core of the Union is in the development of crisis management, something that Finland gladly participates in.

\textsuperscript{93}Kainuu Sanomat, 9 September 1999.

\textsuperscript{94}Tarja Halonen on 15 November in Brussels. This might have prompted the United Kingdom and France in their bilateral summit of 25 November to ask for clear decisions and dates in Helsinki (Helsingin Sanomat 26 November 1999.)

\textsuperscript{95}See the interview of the Finnish EU Ambassador Antti Satuli in Suomen Kuvailehti 49, 10 December 1999.
furthering the Finnish aim of efficient crisis management, and in practice, Finland already has the troops necessary for assuming its own part in such a move.\textsuperscript{96}

**Influencing, or being influenced?**

‘Participation and influence’ has been the motto of Finnish integration policy: one has to participate in order to have influence on decisions that in any case have consequences on oneself. The equation between participation and influence is not a simple one, however. First, one has to take into account that influence acts in two directions: the participant not only influences, but is also influenced. Second, there is no simple way of assessing the amount of influence one gains through participation in any given case. Formal rules of decision-making and right to vote do not suffice; the ways in which influence is asserted also counts – that is, the ways in which countries choose to present their wishes. It takes some time to learn to be able to present one’s own ideas in a setting such as the European Union, to identify the right strategies of influence, the right formats and labels, and the right expressions to use. Another problem, then, is that the interests one tries to put forward might not necessarily coincide with those of the others.

This might be the case with Finland and Sweden as well. As all the other member countries, they have their particular interests; when joining the Union, they, as new members in general, come with a set of preferences, issues and priorities that are still relatively unknown to the old member states. Five years ago, the two were perhaps more ‘conforming’,\textsuperscript{97} as they now start to have a profile of their own, the problem is to assess how far activism can be pursued without causing frustration.

When looking specifically at the domain of the CFSP and external relations, Finland and Sweden, despite their differences of profile and style, have several common interests which set them slightly apart from the other EU member countries, and may thus become increasingly contentious.

An obvious common interest is their geographical emphasis on the Baltic and Russia, as well as support for EU enlargement. Both countries actually perceive enlargement, that is, a continuing integration process, as a central task of the Union, and perhaps the strongest foreign policy tool of the EU in transforming and uniting Europe.\textsuperscript{98} It is even ‘a necessity for stability in Europe’; new members strengthen the Union’s role as an international player, and endow it with...
new cultural riches, while large markets provide the preconditions for stronger economic growth, as the Finnish foreign minister put it.\textsuperscript{99}

Behind these general priorities there are two more profound features that characterise Sweden and Finland: their somehow ‘irreverent’ way of putting the EU into context, handling it in a pragmatic way almost as any other organisation, and their insistence on openness towards countries outside the Union. First, both countries contextualise the Union. Sweden seems to work more through different channels, ‘multiorganisationally’ (see the plans on conflict prevention above), which makes it necessary to think more about the ways in which the organisations differ and relate to each other, instead of trying to make the EU an omnipotent, all-embracing organisation. Finland, although focusing its policies much more on the EU, shows a similar tendency in the Northern Dimension initiative, where regional organisations should help the Union to achieve its aims. At times, however, a certain distancing becomes rather clear, as when the Finnish Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen noted that ‘The Union is important, but I would like to remind that the European Union is not the same as Europe’ and pointed out that there are several nations outside, and that one should not forget the important roles of other global and European organisations. She confirmed Finland’s support for a strong Union; still, she said, ‘we all have to be able to answer the basic questions: do we need a Union and what kind of a Union. We should keep the establishment under scrutiny.’\textsuperscript{100}

The second point, openness towards countries outside the Union, is manifest in the Northern Dimension initiative, where the emphasis is on how the EU relates to its neighbours, and introduces the concrete novelty of letting non-EU member countries in the Northern Dimension area actually give their views on and participate in the formulation of the EU’s policies. Sweden, then, promotes a Europe that is open to the rest of the world, a new pan-European security and cooperation order.\textsuperscript{101} Similarly for Finland, the EU ‘is not and shall not be a closed fortress’.\textsuperscript{102}

Other EU countries, however, seem at this stage to be more occupied with finding ways to deepen integration and defending the acquis; there seems to be need to define, or settle, the Union’s border in the sense of knowing who are outside and who are inside, confining the decision-making to those inside – something that appears very logical but, at the same time, increases the risk of making the borders of the Union ‘higher’, creating dividing lines between countries.

The two non-aligned countries seem also not to take as seriously as the others do the ‘traditional’ core questions of integration. Their approach is pragmatic; they want to get things done, efficiently, and bring the Union closer to concrete problems and to the citizens. The ‘old’ member states’ priorities appear to be more ‘inward-oriented’: they revolve around ways to resolve the problems of decision-making and the international image and prestige of the Union. It is probable that the newcomers perceive the Union in a different way: they do not see the problems that stem, in a way, from the past, a past which is not ‘theirs’.

\textsuperscript{99}Halonen, who also remarked that ‘Integration still is the most efficient and natural way to promote peaceful development across the whole continent of Europe’, thus underlined the Finnish determination to promote enlargement. Halonen in Chatham House on 17 September 1999 (ref. above).

\textsuperscript{100}Address by the Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs Tarja Halonen at Chatham House on 17 September 1999.

\textsuperscript{101}Address by the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Anna Lindh, at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 16 December 1998.

\textsuperscript{102}Halonen at Chatham House on 17 September, ref. above.
In sum, while Finland and Sweden have different bases of non-alignment and different approaches to getting their views across – Sweden relating the others to itself, starting from its traditional priorities, Finland more relating itself to the others, adapting to and being a part of larger settings – the countries together still present a joint challenge in the field of foreign and security policy. Their central concerns are to be able to participate in it fully and on an equal footing, and to bring to the Union questions that are slightly outside the traditional Union domain, bypassing in some ways the established order of importance of certain questions.

From the point of view of formal decision-making rights, the two non-aligned countries seem now to have acquired the maximal formal influence. This might seem to be a happy state of affairs: not only are they able to protect their own interests, but they can also continue to play the role of ‘philanthropic’ non-aligned members within the Union.

Nevertheless, Finland and Sweden are above all being influenced themselves by the process of integration, which now includes the integration of security and defence policies. The three central issues in the current development of the security and defence dimension analysed above – an autonomous crisis management capacity for the EU, institutional novelties and the defence dimension proper – lead to the conclusion that non-alignment is currently being stretched, if not diluted, in several aspects. The non-aligned might have at some point to accept military operations without an explicit UN mandate, combat tasks that go well into the realm of peace enforcement, a merger of WEU and the EU, and a stronger role for the High Representative in the Union’s foreign policy. Furthermore, they are involved in the development of increasingly compatible armed forces. What remains of non-alignment in this situation is the exclusion of defence commitments, but also, and arguably very importantly so, a particular approach to the Union’s external relations.

These two manifestations of non-alignment also give reason for others to complain about non-alignment being ‘allowed to subsist’ in the Union, pointing out the discrepancy between their rights and their responsibilities. Accusations of irresponsibility could, as such, be overcome by a convincing policy of engagement in common operations. The main problem, however, is that the two countries might not have much to put forward in the defence of non-alignment – perhaps because they are not really motivated themselves, perhaps simply because they have not found a way to draw attention to the specific contributions they could make, and perhaps because non-alignment might not, at the moment, seem ‘progressive’ enough as an idea when compared with the general attraction of integration. Thus, despite their formal possibilities of influencing, the two might not have sufficient weight to stand against the others’ informal influence: they do not have much to argue against or with which to resist developments that make their confusingly articulated non-alignment increasingly diluted if the others strongly feel that there now is a particular ‘momentum’ that should not be lost if the CFSP is ‘finally’ to progress.

103 Whatever this means in practice and, in particular, in the context of increasing flexibility, the effects of which are rather ambiguous for these countries.
104 Cf. Bailes 1999, ref. above.