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## EDITORIAL



**Álvaro de Vasconcelos** DIRECTOR

## WHY KOSOVO?

The newest ESDP mission to Kosovo is a display of unity by the European Union, focused on the goal of ensuring stability grounded on the rule of law, including strict respect for minority rights, in the newly-independent state. EULEX, which will take over from UNMIK after a 'transition period' of four months, comes with a certain amount of historical baggage however, given the difficult nature of the EU's past relationship with Kosovo. The EU must achieve its objective while remaining a magnet for Kosovars and at the same time for the Serbs, as well as skilfully manoeuvring through the pitfalls of the complex relationship with Russia and, to a lesser extent, with other international players.

The realisation of Kosovo's long-standing aspiration to independence is, after all, a direct consequence of Serbian nationalism. Those who wish to deny Kosovars their right to an independent state would be well advised to meditate this truth. Similarly, the common stance of four major EU powers in favouring Kosovo's independence is consistent with the position taken back in 1999, when the Kosovo crisis erupted. True, not all EU Member States have recognised Kosovo's independence, which was in any case the outcome foreseen in the Ahtisaari Plan (although this required Serbia's accord). But there was

unanimity on the need to field a 2,000-strong civilian ESDP mission, which had been planned since the spring of 2006, and even those who are not yet prepared to recognise Kosovo's independence are contributing policemen or judges. So are candidate and non-EU Member States, like Turkey and the United States.

The Union's collective reaction to Kosovo's independence – namely strong support for the ESDP mission's mandate to strengthen the rule of law – shows that lessons were learned from Europe's failure in Bosnia and, later, its success in Kosovo back in the 1990s. Now as then, the essential issue is to prevent extreme nationalism from ruling the Balkans and destabilising the surrounding region. It is equally crucial to implement a foreign and security policy whose main goal is to ensure that civilians, in the Balkans the same as elsewhere, are protected from the brutal onslaughts of extreme nationalism.

The argument for a unified European recognition of Kosovo is essentially based on the need to dissuade any future attempt on the part of Serbian nationalists, supported by their Russian counterparts, to revert to the kind of disruption they consistently engaged in during the 1990s. It is useful to recall that the main lesson drawn by many EU Member

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Kosovar Albanian teacher introduces Kosovo's new national flag to her class

States, notably France and Britain, from Bosnia and later Kosovo, was precisely the need for Europe, autonomously or in conjunction with NATO, to be able to deal with security on the European continent. This led to the St. Malo summit ten years ago, and ultimately to the European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP).

Critics contend that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, against the will of a Russia-backed, angry Serbia, sets a dangerous precedent and might encourage separatist nationalism in other parts of Europe and elsewhere, in particular in the Basque Country. There is a world of difference, however. Not only does democratic Spain continue to grant to its *autonomías*, true to their name, a great degree of autonomy, but Madrid is the guarantor of the civic and cultural rights and freedoms of all Basques and all Spaniards. Terrorist attacks against civilians, kidnappings and brutal assassinations of politicians and military officers have never led, and indeed could never lead, the government in Madrid to restrict political and civic rights in the Basque Country or resort to some form of 'state of siege' that would result in downgrading the law of the land and reducing the protection owed to its citizens. This was precisely what Serbia's nationalist rulers did with the Kosovars. It was in Kosovo indeed, back in April 1987, that Slobodan Milosevic, Communist apparatchik turned extreme-nationalist leader overnight, made the notorious speech that signalled his conversion to what Edgar Morin would call 'total-nationalism' and Jacques Rupnik 'communist nationalism'. The consequences of this instant metamorphosis would soon be felt in the horrors of ethnic cleansing in

Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the largely frustrated attempt to do the same in Kosovo in 1999. The tide had turned at the close of the Clinton years, however, and this time Milosevic was faced with united European and American resolve not to tolerate the perpetration of another crime against humanity on the Old Continent. The Kosovars were placed under the protection of the international community, and the secession from Serbia was consummated in all but name.

### In the intervening years, Serbia has come a long way towards joining the community of nations, and is today hopeful of EU membership.

In the intervening years, Serbia has come a long way towards joining the community of nations and is today hopeful of EU membership – though it has not progressed to the point of freeing itself entirely from the nationalist syndrome. The ICTY is still awaiting suspected criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic to be handed over for trial on charges of crimes against humanity. Kosovo's independence is, after all, legitimised by the crimes against humanity – not totally atoned for – perpetrated by Serbian nationalism. Every single EU Member State has traded narrowly-defined nationalism for a common European destiny. Serbia is no different in this respect, and bringing this home to the current leadership is perhaps the best way to ensure that long-lasting peace, stability and democracy take root in the Balkans. That there is a 'different' Serbia, one that seeks a European destiny, has been made plain by the latest presidential election. Its leadership must be made to understand who is to blame for Kosovo's secession and must henceforth firmly set its sights on EU membership. This is what the overwhelming majority of Serbs seem to want. Polls put the figure at almost

75% in favour. The forthcoming national election is likely to determine Serbia's immediate European future. A pro-EU attitude is not compatible either with directly or covertly engaging in or supporting any attempts to destabilise Kosovo.

The seamless operational relationship with NATO, which maintains a sizeable UN-mandated security operation in Kosovo, is also crucial for the success of EULEX. This should provide a unique opportunity to overcome the difficulties Turkey has been putting in the way of a smooth ESDP-NATO interface. Turkey was among the first European countries to recognise Kosovo and is contributing 30 policemen to EULEX. There is all the more reason to rid the mission of such obstacles since there are now fresh hopes of ending the artificial division of Cyprus, and in any case the lofty cause of achieving lasting peace and stability in the Balkans, a primary concern for Turkey, should override any other issues.

Obviously, EULEX's success will depend primarily on the ability of NATO and the EU to act as guarantors of diversity in Kosovo, in other words to guarantee fully the rights of the Serbian minority. Just as in the past, the challenge is to defend diversity throughout the continent against all forms of extremism, and to act so that in Europe democracy becomes uniformly consolidated through EU enlargement to the Balkans. If this goal is satisfactorily achieved, then there is no reason why, in the near future, Kosovars and Serbs should not resolve any remaining differences and happily coexist within the Union, one of whose most laudable strengths, it should not be forgotten, is its role in exorcising the demons of vicious nationalisms.

**ANNUAL CONFERENCE****EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM:****ENGAGING WITH THE NEW GLOBAL PLAYERS**

The 2007 EUISS Annual Conference took place on 22-23 November at the Centre de Conférences internationales (CCI) in Paris and had as its theme 'Effective Multilateralism – Engaging with the New Global Players'. Its centrepiece was the keynote speech by Javier Solana, EUHR, outlining developments in the EU's Foreign and Security Policy.



EUISS Director Álvaro de Vasconcelos, EU HR Javier Solana

The premise underlying the conference was that the international order is experiencing great change and that, to deal with global problems, the European Union will increasingly have to work with emerging global powers such as China, India, Brazil and Russia as well as regional actors such as South Africa. In addition, the effectiveness of international institutions increasingly depends on the convergence and agreement of a wider range of old and new powers. This event was attended by researchers and policy-makers not only from Europe but also from the emerging powers and regional actors that were very much the focus of the conference.

**THE FUTURE OF EU DEFENCE AND NATO**

On 11 December 2007, the EUISS hosted close to 50 national, EU and NATO officials plus academics to discuss 'The future of EU defence and NATO'. Participants debated questions such as the roles of the EU and NATO in coping with future threats to our security, such as failing states, terrorism and WMD proliferation, along with new challenges such as climate change and energy security. Speakers included General Jean-Paul Perruche, Tomas Ries, Christophe Cornu, Sven Biscop, Tomas Valasek and Claude-France Arnould.

**ELECTIONS IN RUSSIA:****BACK TO THE FUTURE OR FORWARD TO THE PAST?**

Russia's long-awaited presidential elections are now over. After United Russia gained a large majority in the Duma elections in December 2007, Vladimir Putin's favoured candidate as his successor, Dmitry Medvedev, has won the presidential elections with 70.2% of the votes.

How can the country he will now inherit from Vladimir Putin be described in economic, political and societal terms? What are the implications of the current state of affairs in Russia for EU policy at this turning point between the two presidencies? These are the questions the EUISS Russia Task Force discussed during its meeting on 18 January.



Sabine Fischer, Marcin Zaborowski, Gunnar Wiegand

**DEMOCRACY, TRANSITION AND REFORM: WHAT ROLE FOR THE EU?**

On 15 February, the EUISS hosted a seminar in Paris on the topic 'Democracy, Transition and Reform: What Role for the EU?'. The event brought together about 30 experts from research networks working on regional integration and EU foreign policy. The EUISS has set as one of its objectives to cooperate with other research institutes and networks with a view to building a 'Network of Networks' that will pool research expertise in the abovementioned areas. The topics under discussion included debating the EU approach to regional integration and democracy; views from ENP countries on political conditionality; and democracy promotion as a foreign policy tool. Speakers included Mario Telo, Gelson da Fonseca, Amr El-Shoubaki and Jacques Rupnik, amongst others.

**THE MEDITERRANEAN UNION INITIATIVE AND THE BARCELONA PROCESS**

On 7 March, the EUISS hosted a seminar in Paris on 'The Mediterranean Union Initiative and the Barcelona Process', which brought together about 40 academics and policymakers working on Euro-Mediterranean relations. Topics under discussion ranged from a debate on the principles and objectives of the Mediterranean Union initiative to the interlinkages between the former and the Barcelona Process and a reappraisal of current Euro-Mediterranean challenges. Speakers included, *inter alia*, Ambassador Jacques Huntzinger, Abdallah Saaf, Andres Bassols-Soldevila, George Joffe and Risto Veltheim.

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**MISSILE DEFENCE IN EUROPE****THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY DIMENSIONS**

by **Gustav Lindstrom**

*Policy Brief* n° 01 – 03/2008

The debate over missile defence in Europe is likely to remain on the political agenda for the foreseeable future as discussions evolve on both sides of the Atlantic. This policy brief provides basic background information on missile defence and highlights some of the principal political and security aspects associated with missile defence in Europe.

**UKRAINE: QUO VADIS?**

**Sabine Fischer, Rosaria Puglisi, Kataryna Wolczuk, Pawel Wolowski**

*Chaillot Paper* n° 108 – 02/2008

Where is Ukraine going? One of the largest and most populous states on the continent of Europe, sandwiched between Russia and the EU, Ukraine is located in the centre of a European sub-region which has been characterised by great instability since the breakdown of the Soviet Union. As this *Chaillot Paper* shows, Ukraine itself has great potential to either stabilise or destabilise the region. Therefore, the question of Ukraine's future orientation is of crucial importance for European security.

**IS THERE AN ALBANIAN QUESTION?**

**Misha Glenny, Denisa Kostovicova, Nicola Mai, Nadège Ragaru, Fabian Schmidt, Miranda Vickers** - edited by **Judy Batt**

*Chaillot Paper* n° 107 – 02/2008

Is there an 'Albanian question'? If so, what is it? Is it a traditional 'national question', centred on the dream of a 'Greater Albania' that would gather in all the Albanian communities in the Balkans? Many outside observers, in particular among the Albanians' neighbours in the Balkans, see it that way and fear its destabilising consequences, but none of the contributors to this *Chaillot Paper* finds this scenario convincing.

**THE EU AND GEORGIA: TIME PERSPECTIVES IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

by **Bruno Coppieters**

*Occasional Paper* n° 70 – 12/2007

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) framework obliges the EU to coordinate closely with Georgia on its policies for conflict resolution in the breakaway entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Brussels and Tbilisi do not share the same time perspective, however.



**LE MONDE****19 février 2008****Le phantasme de la Grande Albanie**

Sous le titre 'Y a-t-il une question albanaise?', un essai publié par l'**Institut d'études de sécurité de l'Union européenne** (*Chaillot Paper* n° 107) conclut que les intérêts des Albanais d'Albanie, du Kosovo, de Macédoine (20 % à 30 % de la population), du Monténégro (5 % des Monténégrins) et de la vallée de Presevo, dans le sud de la Serbie, sont suffisamment divergents pour que tous ces albanophones ne songent pas à se réunir...

**DEFENSE NEWS****14 January 2008****Paris vows to protect defense research budget**

French Defense Minister Hervé Morin called for a strategy in building a European defense industrial base, with the European Defense Agency (EDA) taking the leading role. The EDA should act as a catalyzer and greenhouse for defense cooperation, while the Organisation conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement (OCCAR) should become its executive arm, he said. Britain views that federalist role with suspicion. London blocked a proposal to grant the EDA a three year budget, preferring to keep the agency on a tight leash with annual funding. "It's clear European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is a high priority for the French presidency," said Daniel Keohane, research fellow at the **European Union Institute for Security Studies** here. The problem is how meaningful the ESDP proposals would be without British support, he said. London says it cannot commit to defense proposals before the simplified EU Treaty has been ratified in Parliament, which could be in May or June. That leaves France proposing but London disposing. "Basically, we're stuck," Keohane said.

**USA TODAY****7 January 2008****Polish PM shows waning support for US missile base**

European heavyweight France has recently dramatically improved the tenor of its trans-Atlantic relationship under new pro-American President Nicolas Sarkozy. But a look at the details of the diplomacy reveals a different picture. A possible deal on France rejoining NATO's military command and other crucial policy issues — including Middle East peace — are essentially on hold. "People here in France are aware that making deals with Bush, well, it's not the best time to do it," said Marcin Zaborowski, a specialist in trans-

Atlantic relations at the **European Union Institute for Security Studies** in Paris.

"They will be more willing to compromise or make deals with those who will replace him."

**DER SPIEGEL****22 December 2007****Türkische Militäraktion im Nordirak gegen PKK**

Wenige Tage nach der bislang größten türkischen Militäraktion im Nordirak ist Ankara davon überzeugt, der kurdischen Rebellenorganisation PKK empfindliche Schläge versetzt zu haben. Die türkischen Medien verbreiten Siegesmeldungen, Generalstabschef Yasar Büyükanit schwärmt, er habe die Zerstörung von PKK-Stützpunkten wie eine Fernsehshow erlebt. Kritiker befürchten jedoch, dass die Türkei damit eine politische Lösung der Kurdenfrage erschwert ... Türkische Politiker werfen der DTP vor, sie sei der verlängerte Arm der PKK - derzeit läuft ein Verbotsverfahren gegen die Partei. Sollten die Kurden mit weiteren Repressionen überzogen werden, drohe dem Land eine gefährliche Welle der Radikalisierung, meint der Türkei-Experte Walter Posch vom **EU-Institut für Sicherheitsstudien**. Auch Bombenanschläge kurdischer Untergrundbewegungen seien dann nicht mehr auszuschließen.

**LEFT****21 December 2007****Bruxelles chiama Berlino**

"La sfida fondamentale è quella di far convergere gli interessi nazionali", continua Giovanni Grevi, ricercatore dell'**European Union Institute for Security Studies**, "il nuovo alto rappresentante avrà potere di iniziativa e si avvarrà di un servizio esterno di azione comune, una sorta di rete diplomatica. Questo significa che ci sarà un centro di gravità più forte che potrà incoraggiare la convergenza".

**THE IRISH TIMES****18 December 2007****Chad mission highlights EU military shortcomings**

In October EU foreign ministers sanctioned a 3,700-strong peacekeeping mission for neighbouring Chad to protect refugee camps housing more than 400,000 Chadian and Sudanese refugees fleeing the slaughter in Darfur. Yet eight weeks after politicians gave the green light for the deployment, a shortage of military equipment such as helicopters is still delaying the operation. EU states are expected to finally agree to provide some helicopters tomorrow but the force will not now be

fully operational until the spring, raising key questions about EU capabilities. "EU states are overstretched militarily by deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. They have largely failed to invest adequately in their military forces or to reform armies structured for Cold War combat," says Daniel Keohane, analyst with the **EU Institute for Security Studies**. "In short, the EU doesn't have the military clout to achieve all that it wants to achieve politically in the world."

**REUTERS****21 November 2007****Germany, France add weight to US Mideast drive**

Germany and France, wielding credibility in the Arab world the United States lacks, have launched a diplomatic drive to help ensure a US-led Middle East peace conference later this month is a success. This new alliance, which would have been virtually inconceivable four years ago, reflects a shift in attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic, analysts and officials say. Washington has realised it needs wide European support if it is to achieve anything in the Middle East, while Berlin and Paris are showing a new willingness to help the United States regain some of its lost prestige in the troubled region. Walter Posch, an analyst at the Paris-based **EU Institute for Security Studies**, said many people failed to appreciate just how badly the US reputation had been damaged in the Middle East since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. "If they want to do anything in the Middle East, the US needs European partners, in this case France and Germany, to get more credibility," Posch said.

**INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE****14 November 2007****Amid discord, new leader of Poland completes his cabinet**

Tusk aims to push through economic reforms, to improve relations with Germany and the European Union and to establish what he calls a consensus government. Under the three-party coalition led by the Kaczynskis' Law and Justice, the government lurched from crisis to crisis amid bitter division. "This will be a very different style of government," said Marcin Zaborowski, a Polish expert at the **European Union Institute for Security Studies** in Paris. "Tusk has struck a balance between technocrats and politicians. Tusk will be hands-on when it comes to economic policy. But on other issues, such as foreign and judicial policy, he can expect some tough problems ahead with the president."



## LE NOUVEAU CONTEXTE DES RELATIONS TRANSATLANTIQUES

Comme tout semblait simple au temps de la grande querelle de l'unilatéralisme et du multilatéralisme, lorsque, au début la présidence Bush et de la guerre d'Irak, les Etats-Unis remettaient en question le rôle de l'ONU et que les Européens proclamaient leur foi dans celle-ci!

Depuis 2005, Américains et Européens se disent tous multilatéralistes, mais les interprétations divergent. Les Etats-Unis redécouvrent l'OTAN, mais en mettant sa contribution militaire, technique et financière au service de leur propre stratégie. Les Européens sont divisés : les uns se battent en Afghanistan aux côtés des Etats-Unis, les autres sont réticents à risquer la vie de leurs soldats au nom de politiques américaines erronées.

Au multilatéralisme formel se mélangent ainsi les bilatéralismes multiples concurrents et les unilatéralismes récurrents. Pour implanter, par exemple, des installations antimissiles en Europe, les Etats-Unis contournent l'OTAN et l'Union européenne en s'adressant directement aux pays de leur choix. Tout en prônant une politique énergétique commune, les Etats européens concluent, quant à eux, des accords avec des fournisseurs comme la Russie au détriment d'autres membres de l'Union.

Après la fin de la guerre froide, les Occidentaux tendaient à annoncer la transformation de l'OTAN en organisation de sécurité collective. Mais, si la tendance est au retour de l'alliance militaire, de la dissuasion et même du combat, le reste du monde peut difficilement ne pas se sentir menacé par la globalisation de l'OTAN : la Russie par un élargissement incluant l'Ukraine et la Géorgie ; le monde arabo-musulman par un engagement de l'OTAN au Moyen-Orient, même comme force de stabilisation ou de maintien de la paix.

C'est ici qu'intervient le changement fondamental du système international survenu ces dernières années, et dont le monde a pris conscience après le 11 septembre 2001, et surtout depuis la guerre d'Irak et l'échec du « moment américain au Moyen-Orient » (Philippe Droz-Vincent, *Vertiges de la puissance. Le moment américain au Moyen-Orient*, Paris, La Découverte, 2007). Les évolutions sont technologiques (moyens de communication et de destruction), économiques (« pays émergents », Chine, dépendance énergétique, flux finan-

ciers) et politiques (Chine et Russie – à la fois partenaires, rivaux et adversaires de l'Occident –, échec commun devant l'Iran, perte de crédibilité diplomatico-stratégique des Etats-Unis suite à la guerre d'Irak, perte de crédibilité de l'Occident dans le conflit israélo-palestinien). L'ensemble de ces facteurs pose de manière urgente la question fondamentale : comment les démocraties libérales occidentales peuvent-elles défendre leurs intérêts, leurs principes et leur influence dans un monde qu'elles ne contrôlent plus et où leur légitimité est contestée ?

géré que sur le long terme et ce, avant tout, par une modification de la politique ou de la stratégie militaire américaine et par une inclusion de tous les partenaires régionaux. L'Europe doit à la fois manifester plus de solidarité atlantique que certains de ses Etats, et une plus grande capacité de critique et de désaccord, ainsi que de proposition et d'initiative que certains autres. Elle n'y parviendra que dans le cadre d'un dialogue multilatéral entre Européens et avec les Etats-Unis, aboutissant à un rapprochement des perspectives politiques. D'autres

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Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Bernard Kouchner, Javier Solana, Condoleezza Rice et David Miliband

La seule réponse est la nécessité de combiner les deux types de multilatéralisme : défense collective à l'intérieur des organisations occidentales, et sécurité collective réciproque à l'intérieur des organisations universelles et sur la scène mondiale. En ex-Yougoslavie, le partage des tâches et le passage de relais entre l'ONU, source de légitimation, l'OTAN, indispensable acteur militaire et l'Union européenne, seule capable d'offrir une perspective d'intégration, s'est opéré de manière à peu près satisfaisante, même si les vetos russe et chinois empêchant l'ONU de jouer officiellement son rôle et si celui de l'Union européenne repose sur une promesse d'aide et d'adhésion qu'elle n'est pas sûre de pouvoir tenir. Ailleurs – en Afghanistan et au Pakistan, en Irak, face à l'Iran et, surtout, dans le conflit Israël-Palestine – la situation est beaucoup plus grave. Le fait que les responsabilités soient d'abord américaines comme au Pakistan (et, donc, en Afghanistan) et en Irak, ou partagées (problème palestinien et Iran) ne change pas le fond du problème : dans tous ces cas, il ne peut être résolu ou du moins

problèmes non moins urgents, comme l'environnement, la prolifération nucléaire, ou plus généralement, le sort de la planète, appellent des solutions d'urgence qui ne peuvent être trouvées que dans le cadre d'une négociation globale. Le rôle de proposition et d'exemple de l'Union peut y être encore plus important, à condition que ces propositions et ces politiques s'appliquent à leurs auteurs eux-mêmes dans un cadre de réciprocité régionale ou universelle. Les Etats-Unis et l'UE doivent renoncer à l'illusion qu'ils peuvent encore dicter son comportement au reste du monde et, à plus forte raison, qu'ils peuvent s'exempter des règles qu'ils prétendent prescrire. Mais ils doivent tout autant résister à la tentation de la dispersion, à celle du retrait et à celle d'une mentalité de forteresse assiégée.

Il faudrait plutôt agir à l'intérieur de cadres à la fois multilatéraux et multipolaires imbriqués : des politiques européennes communes promouvant le dialogue avec les Etats-Unis et se constituant, avec eux ou séparément, en parties prenantes de négociations et de décisions globales.



# THE STRATEGIC RISE OF EU DEFENCE POLICY

Since its first peacekeeping operation in 2003, the EU has undertaken roughly 20 missions through its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Although these operations have been relatively small in size – the largest was a 7,000-strong peacekeeping operation in Bosnia (which now numbers 2,500) for the most part they have achieved their goals. Most ESDP missions have not been primarily military operations. More interesting has been their complexity and range, such as preventing civil unrest in Macedonia; reforming the Congolese army and the Georgian judicial system; training Afghan and Iraqi police forces; monitoring the Rafah crossing point in Gaza; and overseeing the implementation of a peace agreement in Aceh.

And demand for EU action is growing. In February 2008, EU governments started sending 1,800 police, judges and customs officials to Kosovo, who are operating alongside 16,000 NATO peacekeepers, to help prevent a return to violence in that region; and they started deploying a peacekeeping force to Eastern Chad to protect refugees, which will comprise of 3,700 soldiers.

For all these notable achievements, the EU has not yet carried out a military operation anything like the scale of the NATO operation in Afghanistan or the UN mission in Congo. For instance, NATO is leading 43,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, some of whom are fighting in extremely dangerous conditions, while the UN has 16,600 peacekeepers in Congo. It may be that the EU does not need to carry out military operations of a similar size and nature to the UN or NATO. Perhaps it will continue concentrating mainly on smaller humanitarian and state-building operations for many years to come, for which there is already considerable demand. But looking to the future, this assumption seems risky for at least two reasons.

First, the world in and around Europe will probably become more dangerous. The threats identified in the European Security Strategy, a document agreed by EU governments in 2003, remain unresolved. The risk of spread of weapons of mass destruction has probably increased, as has the demand for interventions to safeguard human rights (think Darfur). The possibility of ethnically-motivated violence remains high

(think Kosovo). An unstable mix of demographic, economic and political pressures in Europe's neighbourhood mean that the EU's already challenging security agenda could be more difficult in the future. Plus other challenges will surely evolve, such as climate change or energy security.

Second, the EU will increasingly have to assume roles previously played in and around Europe by the United States. The US Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland, made it clear that the US welcomes the

future security challenge can be resolved with force alone, on occasion EU governments may need to deploy robust armed forces. For instance, the experience of multinational peacekeeping in places such as Lebanon, Somalia and Afghanistan has shown that well-intentioned missions can quickly turn into situations that resemble war-fighting. Or the EU may need to intervene in a nearby country with a large-scale force to separate sides in a civil war, or to prevent a humanitarian crisis.

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Members of the European Union peacekeeping force (EUFOR) in Bosnia

strategic rise of EU defence policy in a speech on 22 February: "I am here today in Paris to say that we agree with France – Europe needs, the United States needs, NATO needs, the democratic world needs – a stronger, more capable European defence capacity. An ESDP with only soft power is not enough." Strategically, this makes sense. The US is stretched thin by the demands of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the medium-term future it may not be as willing as in the past to take on new military responsibilities. When and if it does, these are unlikely to focus on Europe and parts of its neighbourhood. US military priorities these days are not in the Balkans or North Africa, they lie in Asia and the Middle East.

The EU, however, will need to develop a more effective set of policies for stabilising the Balkans, North Africa, and the countries that lie between it and Russia. Many of these policies will involve trade, aid and political dialogue. But EU strategy towards its near-abroad will also have to include a military component. While no

However, even if EU governments were willing to deploy large numbers of soldiers, would they be able? The 27 EU governments collectively spend €200 billion on defence, which is a significant amount of money. But despite these hefty financial resources, Europeans do not have nearly enough soldiers with the necessary skills. The 27 governments of the EU have close to 2 million personnel in their armed forces but they can barely deploy and sustain 100,000 soldiers around the globe.

Europeans will increasingly have to take more responsibility for their own security, as they are doing in Bosnia. They will also increasingly be asked to intervene to protect refugees, as they are doing in Chad. They will probably frequently be asked to keep fragile peaces in difficult places, like the European-led UN operation on the Israeli-Lebanon border. Each of these examples fits in with a strategic trend – European governments will probably have to carry out many more autonomous military operations in the future, especially in their turbulent neighbourhood.