Three pillars for CFSP

Three paradoxes characterise the Union’s attitude to the rest of the world. The first is typical of post-Cold War realities: with very few exceptions, it is now much easier for the Europeans to agree a view on external crises than on American policy. Terrorism provides a classic example of this. After 11 September the Fifteen had to adapt simultaneously and as rapidly as possible to the new terrorist threat and the new America that was recovering from the shock of the attacks. The threat of terrorism produced a leap forward in European integration in a number of fields, including the introduction of a common arrest warrant, financial and police cooperation, the Commission’s early warning system, and extending to consensus within the European Convention on inclusion in the future treaty of a clause on mutual assistance in the event of terrorist attack against any member state.

Conversely, once the initial reflex of solidarity with the victims of the 11 September attacks had passed, the requirement to adapt to the new US strategic priorities – the axis of evil, pre-emption and US exceptionalism – greatly perturbed, and in the end divided, the Europeans, culminating in the Iraq crisis and the division of Europeans into two camps quickly labelled ‘war’ or ‘peace’.

The second paradox is more traditional: while the Europeans find it fairly easy to agree on a more or less common view of the world, they are divided on the Union’s role in managing the world’s crises. Since that role is broadly a function of the type of relationship that each member country wants to build with America, bilateral or within NATO, the Europeans have never managed to agree on the actual purpose of their diplomatic and military cooperation. The recurring debates on the virtues or vices of multipolarity or unipolarity, like the discussions on the possible degree of European autonomy on defence matters, are the most caricatural illustration of this latent division among Europeans on the Union’s role as international actor.

The last paradox is possibly a permanent one: agreed, American policy is divisive, but each time there is a risk of a crisis or even divorce from America, the Europeans manage to reconcile differences on new bases. Before Iraq, raising the question of a European strategic concept amounted to either heresy or utopianism: among the Fifteen a combination of indifference, deference towards the United States and national preference jeopardised the very idea of the EU having its own security concept. Since Iraq, all members of the enlarged Union of 25 are enthusiastically involved in drawing up a common vision of the world and also a shared strategy on the Union’s actions in it. To bring about this spectacular slide from an inexistent Union to one with a strategic vision it needed the shock and anguish caused by the possibility of a radical split between Europe and America, and among the Europeans themselves. The Iraq crisis showed that it could have taken very little for this scenario to become the only possible outcome.

These paradoxes indicate quite clearly the conditions governing the creation of an EU foreign policy, which can only exist on the basis of consensus in three areas: states must agree on a crisis, US policy towards that crisis and action to be taken by Europe itself. Not that agreement on those three elements would be impossible. Kosovo, for example, produced consensus in Europe: on the unacceptable of genocide, the need for American intervention, the Union’s obligation to support Washington and above all the necessity to correct Europe’s lack of a joint approach.

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**The Institute Activities**

**The Institute and the Union**

- EU security strategy. The Institute is contributing to development of the EU’s security strategy. As a result of recommendations made by Javier Solana, High Representative for CFSP and Secretary-General of the EU Council, to deliver his annual speech on CFSP and the state of the Union. The debate centred on his paper on EU security strategy.
- A round-table discussion in the afternoon chaired by Quentin Peel (Financial Times) featured contributions by several European personalities on the future of CFSP after Iraq, enlargement and the Convention.

**Annual conference**

- The Institute’s second Annual Conference, held in Paris on 30 June, was the occasion for Javier Solana, High Representative for CFSP and Secretary-General of the EU Council, to deliver his annual speech on CFSP and the state of the Union. The debate centred on his paper on EU security strategy.

**Institute publications**

- Chaillot Papers
  - No. 64: Partners and neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe, by Judy Batt, Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (September).
  - No. 63: The European Union and armaments: getting a bigger bang for the euro, by Burkard Schnitt (August).
  - No. 62: The European Union and the crisis in the Middle East, by Muriel Asseburg, Dominique Moisi, Gerd Nonneman and Stefano Silvestri; edited by Martin Ortega (July).

- Occasional Papers
  - No. 46: EU-Russian security dimensions operations, by Hiski Haukkala, Thomas Gomart and Anais Marin; edited by Dov Lynch (July).

- Forthcoming
  - Chaillot Paper: Security and insecurity in the South Caucasus, by Dov Lynch.
  - Chaillot Paper: Facing the challenge of proliferation, edited by Gustav Lindström and Burkard Schnitt.
  - Occasional Paper: Shaping an intelligence community within the EU, by Bjorn Müller-Wille (former Visiting Fellow).

**Task forces**

- A meeting of the Institute’s European Defence Book Task Force (Jean-Yves Haine) was held on 5 September.

**Institute staff**

- Dimitrios Triantaphyllou left the Institute at the end of August on termination of his contract for an appointment at the London School of Economics.

**External publications**

**Judy Batt**


**Jean-Yves Haine**

- ‘L’Alliance superflue?’, Esprit, August-September 2003, pp. 5-21.

**Dov Lynch**


**Antonio Missiroli**


**Martin Ortega**


**Research awards**

**Visiting fellows**

During the period July to September the following studies were undertaken:
- Mustafa Aydin (Turkish), whose research topic is EU security policy
- Peter Hauge Berg (Danish), ‘Civil-military cooperation within the EU’
- Markus Mervola (Finnish), ‘Migration: security
The idea of ‘returning to Europe’ was the leitmotif of the revolutions of 1989. Now that eight of the ten Central and East European candidates are about to realise this ambition, the question becomes what sort of Europe it will be. Completing the accession negotiations was a remarkable feat, but popular involvement has been minimal, leaving European citizens feeling ill-informed and, as a result, apprehensive about what is being done in their name. Hence the low turnout in the accession referendums, which was at least as striking as the decisive majorities obtained in favour of accession.

Opinion polls suggested that abstention was to be explained by a fatalistic sense of ‘no alternatives’. Around 70 per cent of respondents on average feel poorly informed about their country’s accession to the EU, as a Eurobarometer poll found in November 2002. Expectations of the impact of EU membership seem to be sober: a majority expect no improvement in their personal socio-economic situation for at least 10 years. They voted for accession as a long-term investment that will benefit their children rather than themselves. The smaller countries, in particular, fear for their national identity and domination by a ‘faceless bureaucracy’ in Brussels. New states having only recently escaped from communist federations are wary about the Union’s federal aspects. All the accession countries are acutely aware of their weaknesses — even Poland, a relatively large and nationally self-confident state. The sense of geopolitical insecurity that underlay the Central and East Europeans’ determination to ‘return to Europe’ has been largely allayed by their recent or imminent accession to NATO, which is prized for its US guarantees. The development of European foreign and security policy is greeted with scepticism, and will be strongly resisted by all the accession countries if it detaches Europe from the United States. Yet citizens in all the new member states want a ‘strong Europe’ to anchor their political and economic transformations. Trust in their own political institutions and élites is at a low ebb, so people in the new member states look to the EU to act as a constraint on misbehaviour by their national élites and to drive forward modernisation of their national institutions.

Ignorance and indifference about EU enlargement pervade public opinion in the existing member states, as a Eurobarometer poll confirmed in March 2003. And those people who feel most informed about the process are also the most sceptical, worried about jobs, wages and investment in competition with the newcomers. Nearly 70 per cent across the present 15 members feel that enlargement will be very costly for their country. They also wonder how the enlarged EU will function, and whether it will become even more remote and baffling. Those people who welcome EU enlargement are often unable to name more than one of the countries involved. But, strikingly, substantial majorities still agree that ‘we have a moral duty to re-unite Europe after the divisions of the Cold War’ (72 per cent) and that enlargement is historically and geographically natural and justified. There is clear support for the EU to become a more effective international actor, and people expect enlargement to contribute to that.

So, for the acceding countries, EU enlargement has been a sobering, if not bruising process. For existing member states, it has coincided with increasing exposure over the past decade to global economic pressures and the retrenchment of welfare states. Europe is being reunited, but there is no dancing the streets. Instead, the prevailing climate is one of apprehension, disillusion, a certain amount of existential fear and mutual mistrust. Elites took charge of the process, but failed to provide visionary leadership that could capture the popular imagination and mobilise the energies that will be needed in the next difficult phase of absorbing and fully integrating the new member states.

Given all this, it is surprising how ‘EU-Europe’ continues to exert a powerful attraction for the countries left outside. While some of the new member states, notably Poland, strongly support keeping the door open to further enlargements, and potential candidates in the Western Balkans are anxious to firm up a clearer timetable for accession, ‘enlargement fatigue’ is evident in existing member states. At the same time, in most of the would-be candidates for accession, ‘transition fatigue’ is setting in. If the EU is to act as an effective external motor of reforms in its neighbourhood, it has first to define that clear vision of itself that is so far lacking, in order to provide a convincing rationale for its further enlargement (or not), and to offer credible and attractive alternatives to membership for its neighbours.†

† Judy Batt

On-line/http

All of the Institute’s publications and reports on seminars can be accessed on the Institute’s website:

www.iss-eu.org
The debate on how to reform Europe’s armaments sector has a long history. However, since the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe, discussions have entered into a new phase. Firstly, (most) member states have given up their principle hostility vis-à-vis EU involvement in armaments. The draft Constitutional Treaty (stipulating the creation of an Armaments, Research and Capabilities Agency), the Commission’s Communication on a Defence Equipment Policy (announcing new initiatives on market and research issues) and the Thessaloniki Presidency Conclusions (deciding to establish an Agency as early as 2004) illustrate that there is now for the first time a fair chance of bringing armaments into the framework of the EU.

Secondly, the debate has gained a remarkable dynamic. Immediately after its Communication, the Commission started work on a preparatory action in the field of security-related research. At the same time, it has begun to prepare a Green Book on defence procurement law and to explore options for a defence industry monitoring service. In parallel, COREPER has established an ad hoc Preparation Group to develop, by the end of the Italian presidency, a basic concept for the Armaments, Research and Capabilities Agency. These are positive developments, because they indicate a growing awareness of two things. First, member states cannot avoid going beyond traditional armaments cooperation schemes if they want to maintain a viable defence industrial base and equip their armed forces adequately. Second, the EU offers a broad range of policies and instruments for action in those areas where reforms are needed: procurement, research and market.

However, all this is by no means a guarantee for success. Reforms in a field as complex as armaments are always slow and cumbersome. Moreover, member states still diverge on key issues like procurement philosophy, industrial policy and arms exports. These divergences will be particularly difficult to overcome in an intergovernmental decision-making process with 25 governments and numerous services and administrations involved. If one adds to this the usual bureaucratic inertia and the traditional reluctance of national defence establishments to surrender prerogatives to European bodies, one gets an idea of the difficulties in reaching efficient, effective solutions.

The first test case will be the creation of the Armaments, Research and Capabilities Agency. The Ad hoc Preparation Group has made a promising start, but the more detailed discussions become, the more difficult it will be to maintain the current consensus. Moreover, the Agency set up in 2004 will probably be only a light structure with a limited mandate (coordination of existing elements like OCCAR, ECAP and WEAO). This makes sense if – but only if – it is the first step towards a more ambitious project.

It will be essential, therefore, to ensure that the statutes of the new Agency contain provisions for a progressive build-up in the future. If the Agency is to make its weight felt, it must cover the whole procurement cycle, contain innovative elements (like permanent working groups and an autonomous budget) and provide in particular an effective link between military research and the harmonisation of capability needs.

Moreover, one should not forget that even a ‘strong’ Agency will not be able to solve by itself all the European armaments sector’s problems. Serious reform should therefore include: (a) the establishment of a European defence equipment market, based on legally binding commitments and a single set of rules; (b) the development of a comprehensive research strategy that allows for full exploitation of synergies between civil, security and military research. These objectives can only be achieved through the combined use of Community and CFSP instruments, i.e. in close cooperation between member states and the Commission. This means that both sides must overcome their mutual mistrust and engage in a common learning process.

This is easier said than done, since important mental barriers persist that are deeply rooted in different philosophies, cultures and institutional instincts. However, if common sense is to prevail, there is simply no alternative. Within the Commission, all relevant directorates must fully recognise the specificity of defence and develop a greater readiness to adopt their practices and instruments accordingly. Member states, in turn, should finally accept the Commission as a partner committed to a strong European industry and overcome their defensive attitude vis-à-vis the use of Community instruments in armaments.

Granted, politics and common sense do not necessarily coincide. However, in armaments, the discrepancy between the two must not become too wide. Otherwise, the price for Europe’s industry, armed forces and, last but not least, taxpayers will become too high.

Burkard Schmitt