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Institute

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for Security  
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editorial

## *The old and the new*

Nicole Gnesotto

*Director*

***I**t's a fait accompli. As from 1 January the Institute has become the European Union Institute for Security Studies. Having devoted the last quarter of 2001 to negotiations on a whole corpus of legal, administrative, social and financial provisions, the Institute is once again operational as an autonomous agency of the Union, financed by the fifteen Member States but still completely independent in the choice of issues it works on and its output.*

■ The Institute is being transformed: a new team of researchers is in the process of being recruited. We are rethinking all of our working methods, both at the Institute itself and where they concern our external partners – Javier Solana and the Political and Security Committee of course, the Union's various institutions, and all the national security and defence institutes that will continue to be the Institute's chosen associates. These reforms concern in the first place most of the things that underpin the Institute's activities: the publications system, the computer network, our database, a new website and a redefinition of the tasks of each member of the Institute. They also include a new programme of work that is being worked out, the emphasis being on the forming of European task forces whose mission will be to prepare and publish collective reports on specific aspects of the Union's security and defence policy. The Institute has already been given the

task of producing a 'Book' on European defence. And the launching of a European Convention will be the occasion for the Institute to make its own contribution to the debate that will determine the future of the Union and its institutions by the year 2004.

■ This reorganisation will of course not happen in a day. A large body of experience was amassed by the Institute during its former existence. It is now a matter of building on the most fruitful aspects of it and abandoning the less productive ones, and constantly enlarging the network of expertise to take in other European institutes. We shall devote whatever time is necessary to that.

■ In the coming weeks, however, the Institute will resume its pattern of external activities. On the Balkans, the strategic dialogue with Russia, political and military developments in the United States, the development of the ESDP and so on, the post-11 September world needs more than ever a calm confrontation of ideas and the constant adaptation of the legacy of the former world. That goes for the Institute too, but it is equally true for all aspects of the Union's security and defence policy.

## Stagnation of the

### Work for the Council

■ The Institute contributed to the organisation (Julian Lindley-French) and funding of a seminar organised by the Belgian Presidency of the EU, under the auspices of the Minister of Defence, entitled 'Towards a European White Book' that was held in Brussels on 3 and 4 October.

■ In the margins of the seminar, the Institute held a brainstorming on the consequences of the terrorist attacks of 11 September on CFSP/ESDP for the Political and Security Committee ambassadors and the Secretariat-General of the Council.

### Institute publications

#### Transatlantic Series

The proceedings of the meeting held in Paris on 21 and 22 June 2001 were published in December as 'The 2001 Paris Transatlantic Conference', edited by Julian Lindley-French.

#### Occasional Papers

■ *N° 31 : Aspects juridiques de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense*, by Lydia Pnevmatidou, a former visiting fellow (November).

■ *N° 32 : Managing separatist states: a Eurasian case study*, by Dov Lynch, a former visiting fellow (November).

#### Forthcoming

■ *Chaillot Paper N° 51: From Nice to Laeken : European Defence core documents (vol. 2)*, compiled by Maartje Rutten.

■ *Occasional Papers N° 33: A new European Union policy for Kaliningrad* by Sander Huisman

### Transatlantic programme

#### Conference

The Institute organised (Julian Lindley-French) a conference in Brussels on 29 and 30 November, 2001 entitled 'Transatlantic Relations and the New World Disorder' that looked at the strategic implications of the attacks on New York and Washington.

### External publications

#### Nicole Gnesotto

– 'Quelle diplomatie et quelle défense pour l'Europe?' in *Assises sur l'avenir de l'Europe*, Assemblée nationale, 7-8 November 2001.

– 'Quelle défense et quelle sécurité pour demain?' (with Jean-Claude Mallet, Bruno Racine, Jean-François Bureau, François Heisbourg and Jean-Pierre Kelche), in *Défense nationale*, November 2001.

– 'Face aux nouvelles menaces, quelle coalition antiterroriste?' (with Thérèse Delpech and Pierre Hassner), in *Esprit*, November 2001.

#### Antonio Missiroli

– 'Sicherheitspolitische Kooperation zwischen Europäischer Union und Nato: Der türkische Verdruss über die ESVP', in *Integration*, October 2001.

– 'L'Europa - di nuovo occidentale?' (with Marta Dassù), in *Italianieuropei*, 1/2002.

– 'Defence Spending in Europe: How to Pay for Improved Capabilities?', in [www.cicerofoundation.org/p4-html](http://www.cicerofoundation.org/p4-html) (*Lectures on-line*), 2002.

– 'EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP', in *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33(1) 2002.

#### Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

– 'Beyond the Kosovo Elections - the EU needs to act' dans *ELIAMEP Times*, winter 2001.

– 'Kosovo vor den Wahlen?', in *SOE-Monitor*, October 2001.

"Revolutionary", it was called, the development of EU defence after the famous Franco-British summit in St-Malo, in early December 1998. In the period from St-Malo to Nice in December 2000, we witnessed the creation of an elaborate and well-functioning EU defence institutional framework, working out EU defence policy. Simultaneously Headline, capability and Police goals were set in order to create a pool of forces and other tools available to back up such policy.

Seen from this perspective, 2002 made a rather disappointing start. Admittedly, much time and effort are needed to implement the multitude of proposals and initiatives that flowed from Cologne, Helsinki and Feira and which were formalised at Nice. However, one cannot escape the impression, and not for the first time in the EU's history, that institutional arrangements are tackled first and extensively, whilst more political will and resources are needed in more crucial fields, in this case foremost assets and capabilities.

Insufficient additional financial resources have been provided by member states and therefore only about half of the agreed projects for strengthening defence capacities were accomplished in 2001, mostly the easier ones. Successful exceptions comprise the creation of an Airlift Coordination Cell, the European Amphibious Initiative, the A400M (hopefully), increased cooperation among France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Finland inter alia, air-to-air refuelling and Search and Rescue (SAR) as well as

### On-line/http

The institute also has a new website. On this site it is possible to access all the Institute's publications as well as comment on recent events and information on many of the Institute's activities.

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British, German, French and Italian cooperation on Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) capabilities. Overall, however, interest but especially faith has been fading in some countries regarding realisation of the goals. Clearly, the momentum of the embarrassing European track record in Kosovo seems to be disappearing.

Then came the horrifying events of 11 September 2001. Not only does it largely derail the ESDP plans (strategy, goals, geographic limits and character of possible operations, military and civil means, etc) but international anti-terrorism coalition-building and the military campaign in Afghanistan have put 'EU commonality' under significant strain, putting the CFSP/ESDP *acquis* in danger. Possible contributions by EU member states to the US campaign increased the struggle within the EU, between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'. This in turn has negated the pragmatic leadership that was very slowly developing in Europe in the fields of security and foreign affairs, with the trilateral tête-à-tête in Ghent and the semi-War Council in Downing Street as the worst examples. And finally, we are faced with EU political apathy.

The events of 11 September should have been exploited to the full at a moment when public opinion would have supported more expenditure for better defence. The terrorist attacks also provided the best pretext (for once) for the EU to act at 15, as every EU member state condemned the attacks. It is unlikely that any other future crisis, unless it is a similar one, is going to pro-

voke a comparable consensus among the EU member states.

Indeed, the EU has been very active in promoting a judiciary and economic counter-terrorism policy. Important steps have been taken, such as more anti-terrorist specialists under Europol and more counter-terrorist cooperation among member states through joint investigation teams, COTER, the Working Party on Terrorism and the Working Party on NBC and EU-coordinated civil protection measures.

However, a proposal to push for increased national spending on the ESDP in the wake of the terrorist attacks was rejected on 12 October 2001, during an informal meeting of Defence Ministers in Brussels. Nor is any revision of the Petersberg tasks planned, and no consensus has been reached on a suggestion to include the fight against terrorism as an ESDP mission. The Declarations of the Police Capabilities Conference and the Capabilities Improvement Conference, issued on 19/20 November 2001, did not even contain one word on 11 September.

What does this mean? Do we really need a direct terrorist attack on an EU member state before serious action is undertaken and resources provided? Has experience thus far in equipping Europe not shown clearly enough that progress is very slow and that waiting for the 'moment suprême' is too dangerous because it will be too late to develop the necessary means?

The 11 September disaster has revealed the disparity and broadness of threats. Far more instruments are needed in effectively countering any of these threats than have even been discerned thus far. 11 September also showed the vulnerability not only of the US but also of the rest of the world. Security and defence have now become global and thus the European focus on its 'near abroad' looks increasingly anachronistic. Counter-terrorism should become a legitimate part of the ESDP, with a global focus and increased emphasis on crisis prevention. As is widely recognised, the EU has the potential to play a significant role here, especially as regards the broadness of its gamut of instruments, not least economic, and fill a gap in this 'redefined security' in this 'reconfigured strategic environment'.

The Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, annexed to the Laeken Presidency Conclusions, talks of the essence of the EU acting as 'a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism' and proposes updating the Petersberg tasks. Hopefully this will at least comprise all aspects mentioned earlier, strategy, goals, geographic limits and character of operations, military and civil means. This means acquiring the necessary military and civilian tools as well as more financial input: in short, the EU still needs to decide if it wants to exist or not as an international actor.

*Maartje Rutten*

## Briefings

The Director and research fellows gave a briefing on aspects of European security to a group of American institutional investors.

## Research awards

### Senior visiting fellows

- Veron Surroi, the editor of the Kosovo newspaper *Koha Ditore*, was at the Institute in November and December, working on the Albanian question.

### Visiting fellows

*During the period October to December the following studied at the Institute as visiting fellows:*

- Sander Huisman (Dutch), whose research topic was an analysis of how the EU, Russia, Kaliningrad and its neighbours should develop new policies to avoid new divisions.

- Gloria Ogayar Suárez (Spanish), who worked on 'The role of the EU in the Middle East Peace Process'.

## The future of Kaliningrad

Due to its history, location, and its position as a backward region in the midst of the Baltic Sea region, the Russian autonomous province of Kaliningrad is arguably the most controversial entity in post-Cold War Europe. It is an exclave cut off from mainland Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Kaliningrad is notorious for the immense problems it has to deal with, perhaps mirrored by the inconclusive ways the EU and the Kremlin are figuring out how to assist it. Any government would be daunted facing a task of the magnitude that Kaliningrad's governor Yegorov and his administration confront.

■ Kaliningrad's officials have to deal with the highest percentage of HIV-AIDS infections in Europe and with an intimidating scale of organised crime. Large outdated industries face structural collapse, resulting in high unemployment rates. One third of Kaliningrad's one million inhabitants live below the poverty line, and the average wage is 6 to 8 times lower than that of Lithuania or Poland. Kaliningrad's environmental legacy also poses threats to the whole Baltic Sea region. The fundamental concern is that Kaliningrad will play less and less of a role in the region. Trade flows are being diverted and the main transport routes are increasingly bypassing the exclave. Neighbouring countries have developed far more competitive economies.

■ For a long time Russia's leadership did not know how to manage the crisis and adopted instead some 'creative' initiatives such as the Special Economic Zone which gave the impression of action but little else. However, nothing worked and Kaliningrad drifted further into decay. The EU also had apparently no idea what to do, choosing benign neglect in place of policy. Prompted by the accession negotiations of Lithuania and Poland, Brussels recognised that some action was imperative given that Kaliningrad would one day be a Russian enclave within EU territory.

Unfortunately, the action the EU took was ineffective both the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) with Russia and its Common Strategy on Russia (CSR) proving weak solutions.

■ The weakness of the EU's response has been reinforced by the inherent conflicts between the internal and external policies of the EU, which have prevented a constructive approach towards Kaliningrad. Whilst the Schengen area is reliant upon strong and well guarded external borders, external policy is committed to engaging 'outsiders' through cross-border cooperative projects. Only after the development of the Northern Dimension (ND) in 1999 was the EU willing to approach Kaliningrad with a new and more flexible policy, incorporating Russian government involvement. Brussels took a proactive approach towards Kaliningrad during the Swedish EU presidency in the first half of 2001, presenting its communication on Kaliningrad to the Council, which highlighted the areas where both the EU and Russia needed to take action.

■ At the same time things were looking brighter in Kaliningrad itself. The new governor Yegorov is widely regarded as a pro-European and reform-minded pragmatist. He also has a good relationship with Putin, who wants to make Kaliningrad a pilot-region in the framework of the EU-Russia relationship. In addition a new federal programme on Kaliningrad was adopted. However, both the new federal programme and Putin's own pronouncements conceal or neglect more fundamental issues. The programme seems to be based on an erroneous analysis of Kaliningrad's needs and problems. Putin has been successful in putting his appointees and favourites into the right places but has failed to tackle difficult reforms and to make systematic changes (such as providing sufficient leverage to Kaliningrad to increase its administrative capacity and implementing clear legislation that takes the interests of foreign investors into account).

■ The EU must also do a lot to improve its own performance. First, the EU needs to find ways to make the overlapping areas of its internal and external policies more cohesive. Second, it has to coordinate its aid programmes to increase the efficiency of financial support and enlarge the possibilities of cross-border projects. Third, Brussels has to bring consistency into the PCA, CSR and ND when it is dealing with Kaliningrad. The current frameworks are too loose to be effective. Fourth, the EU has to increase the involvement of Lithuania, Poland and the Council of the Baltic Sea States to increase the regional expertise in the making and find solutions for Kaliningrad after EU enlargement, as well as enhancing the participation of local officials in these discussions.

■ Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Brussels should seriously consider creating a Common Strategy for Kaliningrad that is markedly different from the old and ineffective CSR. It would be easier to accomplish than the CSR, as Kaliningrad is small and manageable, and currently none of the EU member states has a specific policy. It would also be sensible because after 2004 Kaliningrad will represent a bloc surrounded by EU territory. Most importantly, it would allow a coherent cross-pillar and targeted approach, in keeping with Javier Solana's objectives.

■ 2001 witnessed several new initiatives to assist Kaliningrad, both from the EU and Russian sides. Even though the commitment of Brussels will be periodic (due to the rotating presidency), the action undertaken gives cause for moderate optimism. And whereas the new federal programme is based on an erroneous analysis of the real obstacles to growth, the Kremlin is at least willing to adopt new initiatives. So finally there seems to be light at the end of the tunnel for Kaliningrad. However, whether that light flickers like candlelight or shines like neon will depend on crucial improvements that sooner or later will have to be confronted.

**Sander Huisman**  
Former visiting fellow at the Institute