Global security in a multipolar world

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This is the second Chaillot Paper in a series exploring the various strands of a global topic: multilateralising multipolarity. Through the essays collected in the first study, we set out to assess the scope of change in the international system and how EU action could best be suited to bringing about a multilateral order. After the fall of the Berlin Wall brought about the end of bipolarity, the world has changed no less dramatically since the 1990s witnessed the Balkan wars and the first EU military crisis-management operations. Basically, the post-Cold War ‘unipolar’ world turned ‘multipolar’, and as a result the West can no longer tackle global issues – made more pressing indeed due to this very transformation – on its own any more than it can deal single-handedly with regional crises. The comparative analysis of the strategic vision of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the so-called BRICs, showed that the best policy mindset for the European Union, contrary to some suggestions, was not to try to become a normal hard-power player. It further concluded that, in a multipolar world, this was simply not a viable option. For the European Union to survive and to influence the outcome of the international order, it must succeed in giving a multilateral dimension to the current multipolarity; in other words, Europe must be able to define together with other world and regional powers the norms and rules that are needed to drive concerted efforts to stay clear of some future clash of competing unilateralisms.

Earlier this year, the G20 took some steps towards global economic governance that are expected to have immediate repercussions in fighting climate change and dealing with related issues like poverty, food crises and energy. Progress has been less clear in addressing international security issues. Apart from the BRICs, this volume also focuses on the United States, without whom there will be no multilateral order, and South Africa, a voice in the developing world for a new global order. This publication is intended as a contribution to the necessary debate on multilater-
alising multipolarity in the security arena. Other studies will follow, in what is a central and long-term project of the EUISS.

Global security
The consequences for international security of an asymmetric multipolarity are far from clear. Its ‘global’ nature (in the sense that unlike the situation prevailing until the 1990s it is no longer a by-product of the European scene) and the fact that today’s world is interdependent to an unprecedented extent are however beyond dispute – this is what allows us to speak of global security. If the last year or so can be taken as an indication of present and future trends, European and world leaders are likely, in the years to come, to concentrate more on dealing with international issues like climate change, development or poverty-reduction than security proper. A confrontation verging on war or war itself among the big powers, directly or by proxy, remains extremely unlikely. This is not to say that there are no longer major security issues – in the proper sense of involving the use or the threat of the use of armed force – that the international community will need to deal with in the years to come; it does mean however that it is unlikely that security governance will be the main priority for global initiatives, with the notable exception of non-proliferation and disarmament. The role that each one of the global and regional players will play, and wishes to play, in managing international security is far from obvious – as the essays in the following pages illustrate. It is glaringly obvious, on the other hand, that the so-called ‘Western alliance’ is no longer the lonely bulwark of global governance, including in the realm of security.

There are contradictory tendencies in the countries whose security doctrines are scrutinised here. In the United States nationalist-minded unilateralism has lost ground, for the time being, to a clear multilateral drive. By and large, the emerging powers have come to share the concept of ‘responsible power’, an expression often heard, with slight varieties of emphasis, in Beijing, New Delhi and Brasília, reflecting a recognition that international interests, along with a drive for stronger representation in multilateral institutions, entail taking on a fairer share of responsibility for global security. How Russia’s renewed national assertiveness fits with this pattern, which is also discernible, mutatis mutandis, at a regional level – see South Africa – is not at all
clear. As an ‘old’ power, there is hardly the need to re-state the
global ambition with which it was credited, for better or for worse,
at least until the mid-1980s, but Russia does crave to be recognised
anew as a world power and does not shy away from achieving this
on the basis of ample national interests – sufficiently vast, in terms
of Russia’s own self-perception, for Russia to qualify as a big
power. The combination of America’s active return to multilateral-
ism and the desire for global recognition of other main players
opens a window of opportunity for the definition of a common
agenda for effective multilateralism and for moving on with a
reform of global governance institutions whether dealing with
economic- or security-related matters. Creating world-wide inter-
national consensus on global security governance will be an ardu-
ous and difficult task, as the various chapters in this volume
amply demonstrate, due to the lack of a common understanding
on a number of issues, from the definition of security and security
challenges to the concept of sovereignty and its limits.

There is the feeling at least in Europe that hard security chal-
lenges are slipping off the main international agenda. Judging
from the various chapters in this volume, this hardly seems to be
the case in Russia or India, and to a certain extent in China and the
United States. The authors press hard the case for the continuing
importance of hard security challenges, on which national mili-
tary modernisation programmes are predicated notwithstanding
considerations of prestige and status. Major security concerns are
regional in scope, and relate for their most part to weapons of
mass destruction, in particular nuclear proliferation, and main-
taining the existing equilibrium with neighbouring countries.
Hard security is very high on the agenda in Russia’s relationship
with Europe, the United States and NATO. At the same time
peacekeeping and peace-building are, to varying degrees and also
reflecting a variety of traditions, an increasingly important com-
ponent of the international security policy of rising and regional
powers alike. In most cases, unsurprisingly, this tends to polarise
actual military engagement. A fresh willingness on the part of
most aspiring powers – or continuing will, in the case of tradi-
tional major contributors to UN operations like India – to take
part in UN peace operations, or in the case of South Africa in oper-
ations involving the African Union, might give rise to new oppor-
tunities for closer cooperation with ESDP.
Sovereignty and effective multilateralism

The concept of multilateralism held by aspiring world powers, however, is not the same as that to which both the EU and the Obama administration subscribe. If the European Union and United States conceive of multilateralism as a way of dealing with security challenges, including in certain circumstances overcoming the limits imposed by state sovereignty, other powers take, to different degrees, a predominantly defensive view of multilateralism. Authoritarian regimes in particular, are not immune to contagion from nationalistic trends whose proponents contend that national ambitions have been too long repressed or past grievances insufficiently addressed. The risk these kinds of trends could pose to China’s strategy of ‘peaceful rise’ has been noted in this context.

Europeans and Americans stand united in including the international Responsibility to Protect within their notion of multilateralism (‘assertive’ or ‘effective’ multilateralism), and insist the protection of human rights in extreme cases of massive violation should entail military action if absolutely necessary. ‘For China, the role of governments in the protection of civilians should be respected and supported’, as is noted in the chapter on China.² The Russian government sees concerns for good governance and human rights as outright interventionism tied to regime change, and they are not alone in this view. Brazil, India and South Africa have a more ambiguous attitude, defending a cautious approach and the principle of non-intervention as a core foreign policy value.

Different attitudes are potently illustrated by diverging views of the Responsibility to Protect. That civilians must be protected from the ultimate peril of genocide is accepted by all, but some countries are reluctant to sign up to the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect as they interpret this as giving in to a distinctively ‘Western’ notion. The EU global security posture is predicated on protecting civilians, including through the use of force should this be warranted. This is after all at the origin of its security and defence policy, born out of the incapacity of the whole international community, the European Union, the United States, NATO and the UN, to prevent genocide in the Balkans, and of a determination to learn from its own part in this failure. Russia and China want this principle to be applied case by case, never without a specific decision of the UN Security Council in which they are veto-holding members. Similar views are shared by Brazil and India, who both hope to become permanent UNSC members.

² ‘China’s new security perceptions and practice’, Gao Zugui, Jiang Yong, Zhao Hongsu, Sun Bo, Ouyang Liping, Tang Lan, Shi Gang and Huangying, edited by Feng Zhongping, pp. 31-47.
South Africa was a key player in leading the UN Assembly, in 2005, to adopt the concept of the Responsibility to Protect. It has demonstrated a similar commitment in the context of the African Union, which through its constitutive Act empowers the Union to intervene in the affairs of one of its members to ‘prevent war crime, genocide and crimes against humanity.’ This is consistent, according to Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, with the defence by South Africa ‘of the inclusion of human and security agenda in the peace and security framework of the continent’.

The United States and the European Union hold that the circumstances under which the international community accepts the binding Responsibility to Protect other than by invitation should form part of the concept itself, thus justifying in equally exceptional circumstances a coalition of the willing to step in, as happened in Kosovo. In order to avoid veto-paralysis at UNSC level, thought should be given to the proposal put forward in the concluding chapter by Luis Peral for the creation of an independent judiciary body entrusted with identifying *inter alia* the imminent danger of genocide or other serious massive violations of human rights under international law, or alternatively handing over this task to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

While the Responsibility to Protect is inherent to the human security concept promoted by the European Union, ‘human security is virtually absent in Russia’s security doctrine and discourse’, as noted by Andrej Zagorski, but this is not the case, for example, of South Africa. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos points out that, based on that country’s experience of democracy, the prevailing doctrine is “ultimately concerned with the security of people”, i.e. human security, which is essentially defined not merely as the driving orientation for military operations but ‘as encompassing “political, economic, social and environmental matters.”’ This definition fits well, should well-being rather than mere security of the people be the target of socially-relevant aspects, with EU external policy goals. As to security focusing on the citizen, it can form the basis for closer cooperation and concerted action, which should include as the first task the framing of a universal strategy to prevent genocide.

The temptation to put virtually everything that matters under the label of security creates serious problems for an effective, inclusive multilateral system. Brazilians know this well, since a similarly ‘enlarged’ security concept was the doctrine of the mili-
tary dictatorship in the 1960s and 1970s. The dangers of ambivalence in excessively broadening security definitions are particularly clear in authoritarian states, since rulers are allowed a new lease of legitimacy to eradicate all forms of dissent, whether opposition or separatist movements, easily labelled as internal threats.

Excessive blurring of the distinction between internal and external security, and a readiness among big powers to define every important international issue in predominantly security terms, is a tendency portrayed in the chapters in this volume. Some countries do not seem to take fully into account the full domestic implications of such a stance. Suffice to note that a definition of security that includes climate change meets with altogether negative reactions in Brazil. Paulo Wrobel points out that Brazil’s perception of the Amazon question and its importance in the international debate on climate change is being ‘framed in ‘considerations of sovereignty and non-intervention.’ The same is true of China with regard to energy. China does not want to be classified by others as ‘a threat to their energy security’.

The most worrying aspect, from a human security point of view, is that migration, internal or external, should be listed under the threats to national security, an unfortunate development across Europe as well, but one from which Brazil and India, like the United States at federal level, are so far exempt. In India, Radha Kumar points out that immigration, ‘which many other countries would see as a threat multiplier, is not and has never been a serious security concern, though India hosts close to 20 million illegal immigrants, and the ethnic demography of Assam in India’s north-east, bordering Bangladesh, has been permanently altered.’ Brazil, a nation of immigrants where emigration is also on the rise, has a similar perspective and is outspoken in criticising the tendency towards the securitisation of migration in other parts of the world.

Moving towards a more effective and representative international system implies giving a central role to the UN. This is doubtless the framework favoured by the rising powers. It is through the United Nations that notably India, and more recently Brazil and also China, contribute to peacekeeping operations. This can be supplemented by the G20 taking on a transitional supporting role in peace-building and post-crisis reconstruction. This should be a temporary arrangement, for the G20 itself lacks the kind of universal legitimacy to which most countries aspire in their action.
But the G20 dynamics can help reopen the question of the reform of multilateral institutions, including, one might hope, the perennial issue of Security Council reform.

Russia’s world vision stands out in that, as described by Andrej Zagorski, ‘it is based on the belief that there is a need to construct a system of global governance in the form of a concert of great powers based on national interests rather than on shared values.’ Russia’s self-interest-first stance highlights the tension between a multilateral order and a balance-of-power system, more unstable and unpredictable, and challenges the ability of the European Union and the United States to work for in-depth reform of the international system. ‘Managing [this] revolution in world affairs demands nothing less than a new international system’, Robert Hutchings aptly suggests. For this to happen, it is necessary to build on the rising powers’ desire to achieve international status and take them at their word as to their willingness to share responsibility for the international security agenda. Although some would hold that permanent UNSC membership enhances national security, a view not unpopular in Brazil according to Paulo Wrobel, it must be borne in mind that a greater role in security governance will increasingly entail taking a larger share of responsibility for international peace.

The European Union and the United States are not alone in pivoting regional and bi-regional multilateral initiatives; this is a common feature to aspiring world powers. From the 1990s integration projects, we have moved to regional cooperation schemes, whether in trade or security-related issues. Each of the international actors under analysis gives major priority to stability on its borders and promoting multilateral dialogues with countries elsewhere. This is the case of China and India with its summit diplomacy with Africa. Brazil promotes a bi-continental dialogue with Africa and the Arab States. All of them multiply bilateral or other groups of dialogue with other states, including individual members of the European Union. The BRICs have met recently among them. This variety of multilateral and bilateral fora arises from the need to find answers to regional and global issues through different networks and is a characteristic of the global network society in which we are living. South Africa is active in promoting regional and continental cooperation and integration and in the framework of the African Union it contributes actively to peacekeeping in the continent and takes a special role in peace mediation.
As Robert Hutchings points out, ‘the election of President Barack Obama marked a decisive return to multilateralism on the part of the United States.’ The Obama administration has not only abandoned the unilateral policy of George W. Bush, but the new president knows that dealing with the enormous challenges he inherited needs the cooperation of other countries to whom he is prepared, in an unprecedented way, to offer co-leadership, offering engagement with all states including those with whom the United States has serious differences. What is uncertain is if the other players are prepared to respond to Obama’s proposal of strategic partnerships for effective multilateralism and to work for the success of US engagement policy.

Obama’s new international policy is what the European Union but also many other countries of the world have called for. The European Union has a vital stake, for its own present and certainly its own future, in President Obama’s multilateral approach taking hold and yielding tangible successes. Obama’s multilateral agenda, which to an unprecedented extent coincides with the Union’s, must be actively pursued, not least through EU-led initiatives to engage rising powers, along with smaller states and, all-importantly, civil society.

Priorities for common action
The European Union needs to reinforce both its knowledge of the emerging powers but also its presence in those parts of the world. This pro-active attitude is of particular importance, if nothing else because it has hitherto been lacking, particularly in relation to India as is highlighted in this publication. Across the board, the so-called ‘strategic dialogues’ need to become really strategic, by defining priorities for concerted action in the international arena and building mechanisms for better cooperation in the security field. The involvement of ‘strategic partners’ in ESDP/CSDP operations and cooperation on training for peace operations would be a way, among others, to seek such improvement. Given the fact that the international agendas of many countries are not fully developed at this stage, there is a need for the European Union to engage with them in agenda-setting transnational issues, and contributing its own distinctive perspective to the debate, for instance making a clear link between fighting terrorism and organised crime, and increased cooperation on justice and human rights.
The European Union also needs to concentrate on a number of global security issues in line with its own external action priorities and to throw its full weight behind purposeful and inclusive international undertakings, whether or not they are launched on its own initiative. The ultimate reference in this regard is still to be found in the priorities set forth in the 2003 European Security Strategy and the implementation report of 2008.

The Middle East features prominently there, an issue which certainly ranks very high on the American agenda but is almost a marginal concern for most of the other global players, the notable exception of course being the US and to some extent Russia. Not so for Iran, itself an important player in the Middle East and an example of the critical need to involve all concerned in a peaceful settlement of disputes. EU neighbourhoods are areas of interest for America and Russia as well, and critically for a major regional actor not covered by this study – Turkey. This provides a useful reminder that in building coalitions for effective multilateralism the European Union needs to look beyond the big powers and seek all major players, larger and smaller, to find those that can play a decisive mediating role in solving a given crisis.

Helping Africa achieve lasting peace remains an area of converging interest and a prime topic for an effectively multilateral agenda where regional powers and regional organisations can play a decisive role. South Africa with its support of human security, its experience of democracy and rule of law, and in particular of civil-military relations, is an especially important partner for the EU in the African continent.

Disarmament and non-proliferation are truly global in scope and lend themselves well to significantly strengthening a common agenda and multilateral regimes, with obvious regional repercussions. President Obama’s basic bargain put forward in Prague – ‘Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy’ – is a good basis for a broad consensus. More so, arguably, since the divisive missile shield project was scrapped. For the European Union, with two nuclear states that will be faced with difficult choices, nuclear disarmament presents a challenge, but it is doubtless extremely popular among public opinion.

The current involvement of navies from twenty countries in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, including those
from the EU, China, India, Japan and Russia, US and Turkey, is a very good example of cooperation based on shared global security interests.

At the end of the day, the ability of the European Union to be credible in its efforts at multilateralising multipolarity – and nowhere else more clearly than where peace and security are concerned – is tied to the issue of EU representation in international bodies and, first of all, a sustained and unified foreign policy firmly grounded on principle and ideally more adept at averting than managing crises. The Lisbon Treaty is a major step forward in this direction. Wise decisions must now be taken urgently for its full and swift implementation, in order for the greater degree of coherence and consistency enmeshed in the very wording of the treaty to be translated into concerted action by EU Member States and EU institutions.
Brazil’s approach to security in the 21st century

Paulo Wrobel

Introduction

At the dawn of the 21st century, Brazil is a nation whose decision makers seem to believe that it is on course to realise its potential to become one of the big players in world affairs. Given its sheer size, population, aspirations and economic might, both real and potential, Brazil is on the path to fulfilling a sort of ‘manifest destiny’, that of a great power. There is a saying that is often cited in Brazil in a self-deprecating manner: ‘Brazil is the country of the future and it will always be’. It reflects the tension between a self-image of ‘manifest destiny’ and the recognition of an unfulfilled potential. However, when defining the attributes of a potential, or real, great power in world affairs and analysing how this nation thinks and acts, traditional features such as size and geographical location, demography and demographic trends, natural resources and economic might, political leadership and self-confidence must be taken into account.

One could say that Brazil has since its independence in 1822 pursued all the attributes of grandeur, since only then could the country achieve the place it thinks it deserves in world affairs. Borrowing the definition used so creatively by Barry Buzan, in Brazil development was securitised in the sense that it seems to be the key to all other facets of the securitisation of the nation’s domestic and foreign agendas.¹

On the other hand, it is possible to identify secular themes and issues that have recurred over time, despite the remarkable transition that Brazil has made in recent decades – from peasant to urban, agricultural to industrial, and low-tech to mid-high-tech. In terms of security, the agenda has certainly been enlarged but there is a remarkable historical continuity.

¹ Barry Buzan, ‘The “War on Terrorism” as the New “Macro-Securitisation”?‘ (London: London School of Economics, 2006), mimeo.
National defence

In December 2008, after 15 months of deliberations, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva presented the new Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (National Defence Strategy) at a high-profile event in Brasilia. The 64-page document represents a landmark: for the first time, Brazil has a long-term plan resulting from a long consultation process under civilian leadership. It clarifies plans for dealing with the main challenges and tasks that the civil-military defence elites consider essential in the long term. This ambitious document was the result of an extensive exercise, involving both civilians and military elites, under the joint chairmanship of the Secretary of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic and the Ministry of Defence.

The 2008 National Defence Strategy describes the environment in which Brazil’s security operates and lays out the targets and priorities, including the main tasks that the armed forces should perform for a generation or more. On the one hand, the document is detailed and precise, in particular where it singles out specific goals and means of achieving them for the three services of the armed forces. It justifies the need to again invest in an indigenous arms industry. It also dwells on the role the armed forces should play as a force for national integration and civic duty in Brazilian society, opting not to professionalise the forces, thereby retaining universal service for all young men; for those not serving, it establishes a new national service to enhance civic duties.

On the other hand, there is a strong element of continuity with views that have predominated in defence circles for a long time. In relation to maritime strategy, for instance, the priority given to the need for a nuclear-powered submarine was probably a direct result of the navy’s lobbying. In this respect perhaps, the National Strategy is a continuation of some of the goals of defence planners who continue to sustain a mismatch between aspirations and attributes, despite their paradigm shift in terms of openness and security debate.

Indeed, one of the characteristics of Brazil’s defence history has been the difficulty to justify huge investments in hardcore military weaponry, given the low threat level and the benign regional environment in which Brazil operates. Indeed, international relations theory has shown the paradox of Latin America as a subcontinent characterised by continuous societal violence and civil
unrest, but relatively peaceful in terms of intrastate wars. Indeed, Brazil has little actual war experience. The War of the Triple Alliance, or the Paraguayan War as it is known in Brazil (1864-70), is the only long and demanding intrastate conflict that Brazil has ever been involved in. There were serious disputes in the Rio de la Plata region in the 19th century, involving the use of force, but these disputes were inherited from colonial times and were gradually resolved by diplomatic means. In the end, the fact that Brazil has such little war experience has given defence planners a difficult product to sell, that is, selling security for Brazil through traditional military means. It has also lowered the relevance of the defence and security concerns of political thinkers and society as a whole.

If this is the case, one does not need to look much further to explain why national security issues will be more relevant to, say, European states with a long history of wars than to Brazil. Perhaps as a result, Brazil was one of the last of the relevant countries, if not the last, to establish a proper defence ministry under civilian control (it was created as recently as 1999). Civilian expertise on, and indeed interest in, defence and security issues are both still extremely modest. In these circumstances, producing a National Defence Strategy represented the consolidation of the Ministry of Defence almost 10 years after it was set up.

On the other hand, the role played by the armed forces in Brazil’s political history was crucial throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries. The end of the monarchical regime by the close of the 19th century – with the proclamation of the republic in 1889, a landmark in Brazil’s history – was indeed a consequence of a military coup. During the 20th century, the armed forces played a fundamental role in national politics. If it is possible to single out one important contribution to Brazil’s security initiated by the armed forces it was the creation, or rather the adaptation, of a ‘doctrine of national security’. This was the result of an amalgamation of endogenous thinking among young officers who were influenced by French and Brazilian positivism dating back to the 1920s and 1930s, geopolitical influences of the German/Austrian school, and the incorporation into doctrine of counter-insurgency, in this case anti-communist, inculcated by US and French doctrinarians in the context of the cold war. Hemispheric security, under the US defence umbrella, and the many military pacts signed between the US and most hemispheric nations at the height of the East-West
confrontation, was a cunning operation designed by Washington to create a semblance of a region that really mattered for worldwide security of the ‘free world’. However, with the exception of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the region was always on the margins of significance during the cold war period.

Despite the exaggeration of the communist threat in most of the Americas, in Brazil the ‘doctrine of national security’ became sacrosanct for the military, even after the end of 21 years of military rule in 1985, and indeed the end of the cold war a few years later. The armed forces could preserve almost intact their monopoly on defence and security issues, at least institutionally and doctrinally. They resisted several attempts by the political leadership to put them under civilian authority. The armed forces were also able to successfully sustain certain controversial views about their alleged efficiency as entrepreneurs and managers, particularly as regards the arms industry. For some time in the 1980s, Brazil became a relatively successful producer and exporter of some weapons and related equipment of middle-rank technology.

According to many in Brazil, particularly in the armed forces, however, this was supposedly a golden age of arms production and exports. But the fact is that, despite some success in developing equipment that many other nations wanted to buy, the industry was, with few exceptions, bankrupted a few years later. Brazil was never able to achieve the independent military-industrial complex that the armed forces dreamed of. Preserving an aura of competence, pride and nationalism, however, was important for keeping the prestige of the forces intact after 21 years in power. Indeed, the rationale behind the ‘doctrine of national security’ that predominated during military rule under the label of ‘security and development’ was that the country needed to grow, integrate a large territory, and invest in infrastructure, science, technology and innovation towards achieving status as a great power.

Given the above, it was not surprising that, a few weeks after the ceremony in Brasilia that launched the new National Defence Strategy with pomp and circumstance, Brazil concluded an ambitious arms agreement with France. The strategy document identifies three areas as crucial for Brazil’s long-term security: cybernetics, nuclear technology and space technology. Indigenous production of military hardware, based on ‘technology transfer’, was also pointed out as a major goal.


The deal with France for the construction of four submarines includes the set-up of a new company with participation of the Brazilian private company Odebrecht, the Brazilian national company Emgepron and the French company DCNS. A new navy shipyard in the state of Rio de Janeiro, along with a new base for submarines, will host the construction of three conventional submarines (of the Scorpène model), plus the building of a fourth with France’s help. The latter – a nuclear-powered submarine – has for years been a dream of the Brazilian navy. Fifty military transport helicopters are also planned to be built with French technology, while the Brazilian air force has opted for the French Rafale jet, built by Dassault, for its new fleet of 36 fighter jets.

The agreement, Brazil’s biggest arms deal ever in financial terms, was lauded in both Brazil and France as more than a commercial deal between two countries. The presidents of both countries announced the agreement as a result of their countries’ real partnership and common interests. That might well be the case: Brazil gets its much vaunted nuclear-powered submarine and the helicopters and fighter jets it needs, and France gets a substantial market for its products. The rationale behind the deal from Brazil’s perspective is that it includes ‘technology transfer’, a much used and abused term that tends to seduce buyers into thinking that they are getting more than a simple commercial deal. Time will tell if technology will actually be ‘transferred’, but it is not uncommon that big arms acquisition projects are, and not only in Brazil, controversial to say the least, particularly when they involve the transfer of know-how and production practices.

International and regional peace and security

Brazil has for years prioritised permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council as a part of its foreign policy strategy. Since the return of civilian rule in 1985, this has been an obsession of Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations. Even though many other powers would dispute the assertion that becoming one of the UN Security Council P5 states would necessarily or automatically ascribe great power status to a country, some leaders in Brazil believe that it would. They assume that permanent membership, making Brazil as a key player in global peace and
security matters, would enhance its security, but there would of course also be costs attached.

Indeed, there is a precedent in the little known fact that Brazil left the League of Nations, in 1926, precisely because it did not become a permanent member of the Council even though it had argued forcefully for its place since the start of the League. As a founding member, and a temporary member of the Council, Brazil had its demand for permanent membership rejected. It would be an exaggeration to argue that Brazil’s leaving the League was one of the contributing factors for its collapse, but this outcome was seen as another of the League’s failures; it also left a significant imprint in Brazil’s diplomacy. Perhaps Brazil’s obsession about joining the UN Security Council as a permanent member can be partly explained as a claim to put right what is understood as a historical wrong.

Some recent initiatives in Brazil’s foreign policy are perhaps better understood as a way to raise its global profile as a responsible member of the international community, prepared to take up a leadership role. Contributing larger numbers of troops to UN peacekeeping missions is one of them. Brazil has participated in a non-leadership role in many UN peacekeeping missions and regional operations. The role it has played in Haiti, where Brazil has since 2004 led the United Nations peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH, can be seen as part of a strategy to raise its regional and international profile. There have been many other initiatives, from opening a large number of diplomatic missions abroad, particularly in African, Asian and Caribbean nations, to promoting meetings of heads of states from Arab and Latin American nations with the implicit goal of raising Brazil’s international profile.

However, as regards the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) initiative – despite the presence of a retired Brazilian diplomat, Ambassador João Clemente Baena Soares, on the 16-member High Level Panel set up by UN Secretary-General in 2004 to produce the report A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change – Brazil maintains a critical position on R2P, which unfortunately means that it rejects it. Brazil has given two main reasons for its criticism: the principle against the use of force in the domestic affairs of any nation (according to UN Charter Chapter VII); and the risk of diminishing the authority of the UN Security Council in relation to international peace and security.
Towards the ultimate goal of P5 membership, Brazil has actively negotiated with other aspiring members, such as Japan, Germany and India (the so-called G4), to create a joint front. Reform of the UN system, in particular the Security Council, will entail a complex negotiating procedure; and it will take some time for the UN members to reach a consensus on the way forward. Moreover, it could even be argued that the legitimacy of the Security Council as the manager of global peace and security issues has been put into question after the Iraq War. The fact is that, if this is the case, Brazil still seems to believe that this ‘upgrade’ would crucially improve its global status.

As part of the strategy to raise its global profile and gain recognition in world affairs, Brazil became bolder as a regional leader. Brazilian regional diplomacy has always been very prudent. The consolidation of the borders of Brazil as an independent state, with an area much bigger than the original territory given to Portugal, was a work beautifully done by Brazilian diplomacy. Force was almost never used and diplomatic negotiations settled disputes that were sometimes complex and difficult. This is a tradition that Brazil is rightly proud of and has contributed to the view, held both within and outside Brazil, that it is a peaceful nation ready to negotiate, conciliate, and mediate.

On the other hand, given its size, cultural traditions, language, and expanded economic might, there is a understandable suspicion among South American nations that Brazil aspires to regional hegemony. Brazil’s diplomacy in the region has therefore always been cautious, repeating the mantra that sovereignty and non-intervention are the core of its foreign policy values and should be respected at all times. This is still the case, but there are two new facts that have made Brazil’s more assertive initiatives possible if not necessary. The first is that most if not all nations of the region accept that Brazil rightfully plays a much more active role in global affairs and can therefore legitimately play a more active role in regional affairs. In recent years, for instance, Brasília has played a crucial role in mediating the Peru-Ecuador conflict, maintained good relations with both Colombia and Venezuela, and tried to act as a mediator in other regional disputes.

The second fact is that the United States, the dominant player in South America’s affairs, has restrained its influence in the region. In the power vacuum created by Washington’s retrench,
Brazil proposed a new mechanism for regional consultation and cooperation. The Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (Union of South American Nations-UNASUR), established in 2008, is an example of a successful attempt to give some prominence to Brazil’s regional diplomacy. Brazil also took the initiative, accepted by all the members of UNASUR, to set up a security cooperation mechanism that is independent of the United States, the Consejo de Defensa Suramericano (South American Defence Council, CDS). In March 2009, the ministers of defence of all 12 members of UNASUR met in Santiago de Chile. The CDS is not a military pact but rather a confidence-building body that works via dialogue, cooperation and integration. Chile suggested the establishment of an information network on defence and security issues in South America. The ministers also agreed to set up a coordinated mechanism for dialogue and cooperation on defence, bringing together civilian expertise and furthering the dialogue between civilian leaders and the military. A few months later, however, the announcement of an agreement between Washington and Bogotá for the use of Colombian territory for US military bases demonstrated that it will not be easy to reach consensus on a common regional security framework.

Another instrument that Brazil welcomed in raising its international profile has been the agreement with the European Union that was signed during the Portuguese EU Presidency in December 2007. It effectively made Brazil a strategic partner of the EU. This strategic partnership issued a Plan of Action, concentrating on five areas: promotion of peace and security through an efficient multilateral working system; economic, social and environmental cooperation under the guidance of sustainable development; regional cooperation; promotion of science, technology and innovation; and promotion of exchanges between their citizens. It seems that for Brazil the most important aspect of the agreement is the recognition of its special status as a global player. The strategic partnership could also give more impetus to the trade agreement that has been under negotiation for many years between the EU and MERCOSUR, the Southern Common Market, which includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay as full members. However, it has so far not been easy to convince all the members of the EU and MERCOSUR that they need to be flexible to conclude a complex trade agreement.
Economic growth, trade and security: the case of the BRIC states

Perhaps in no other area has Brazil been so successful in enhancing its international profile than in economic and trade issues. Here there is a success story to be told about the past 15 years. Brazil has been able to stabilise its currency and create a stable macro-economic environment, including credible monetary and fiscal policies, even if the tax system is still Byzantine and infrastructure bottlenecks slow down the potential growth rate. Brazil became a powerful commodities exporter, while the economy has diversified, attracting huge foreign direct investments and portfolio capital. Indeed, after China, Brazil has been the primary emerging market attracting foreign direct investment, and Brazil’s merged futures and stock exchanges, BM&FBOVESPA, recently became one of the world’s largest stock exchanges.

The diversification of trade partners has also benefitted Brazilian exporters. The regions North America, South and Central America, Europe and Asia today account for about a quarter each of Brazil’s exports. Meanwhile, in April 2009 China was Brazil’s foremost trade partner, surpassing the United States, which was Brazil’s largest recipient for most of the period since 1916. Recipients in the Middle East and Africa are also growing markets for Brazilian exports.

Brazilian economic and trade diplomacy has been very active. Pragmatism is the name of the game for the opening up of new markets. Brazil has been an active player in trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization; indeed, it was a major force behind the group of developing nations set up at the, by now probably defunct, WTO Doha Development Round. Brazil has also been one of the most active members of the WTO in terms of filing complaints against what it considers unfair trade measures.

Perceptions and images are also crucial in the economic and trade sphere. The acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), invented in 2001 by Jim O’Neill, chief economist at Goldman Sachs, is a good example of how perceptions count. As denoting the big emerging markets and their potential role as a force for growth in the global economy, the acronym was prophetic; it was a clever way of raising awareness of the growing importance of these big nations and the relative decline of Europe, the United States and Japan as the dominant players in the global economy. The

leaders of the BRIC states took it seriously, so much so that in June 2009 the first meeting of BRIC heads of state took place in Yekaterinburg, hosted by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Even if the meeting did not announce any new mechanism for coordination, it did have an effect on the international currency markets; one of the topics mentioned as a theme for the meeting was the attempt to look for alternatives to the US dollar as the international currency of trade and central bank reserves. Ultimately, a new currency was not even mentioned in the final communiqué, perhaps because this is still too contentious, but it showed the evolving relevance of these big nations in the management of international affairs, particularly in economic and trade.

Apart from economic and trade issues, however, one should be cautious in ascribing too much importance to BRIC as a forum for political or security dialogue or coordination on global security. Despite these countries’ exceptional economic performance in recent years, by mid-2009 the combined GDP of the BRIC members was only about 15% of global GDP (measured in US dollars), even though collectively they comprise about 40% of the world population. The US GDP is still, in dollar terms, twice the GDP of these four emerging powers, while the claim that China is about to become the world’s largest economic and political power might well be an exaggeration. Moreover, the idea that the global economy is a zero sum game seems also to be an exaggeration; indeed, the US and China may co-exist as dominant powers in world affairs, and the other BRIC members, along with Europe and Japan, might cooperate to manage the huge challenges associated with maintaining prosperity, incorporating the demands and aspirations of large populations, and trying to smooth the necessary transition towards a low-carbon economy.

Brazil has perhaps been more successful in its role as an active member of the G20 in the context of the 2008-09 world recession. The meetings that took place in Washington, DC (November 2008), London (April 2009) and Pittsburgh (September 2009) to discuss concerted ways of dealing with the recession highlighted the growing importance of Brazil as a global player. Brasilia has been a constructive member of the G20, and President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva has enhanced his profile as a respected leader. With levels of domestic support that other leaders could only dream of, and a credible economic policy, President Lula has contributed, as did his predecessor Fernando Henrique Cardoso, to giving Brazil a
level of credibility that it lacked for most of its recent history. At the G20 meetings in London and Pittsburgh, for example, Brazilian negotiators played a prominent role, arguing in favour of better regulation of the international financial system, avoiding protectionist measures and finding meaningful ways to reform international financial institutions. Brazil has demonstrated that it might become a trustful partner in the, one hopes, more pluralistic governance of international economic affairs. Announcing that it is going to lend $10 billion to the IMF, along with substantial loans from China, India and Russia (a total of $80 billion from the BRIC nations), the Brazilian government, along with its BRIC partners, has signalled that it is prepared to help more vulnerable countries to face the most severe global recession since the Great Crash of 1929.

The degree of dialogue and coordination on economic and trade issues at the global level is growing in tandem with the daunting tasks that all nations face. As economic power becomes more diffuse – the BRIC states are a symbol of that – pragmatism seems to predominate. In economic and trade issues, Brazil, as China and the other BRIC countries, is also a status quo-oriented nation that has a vested interest in preserving the international global economy as it is.

**Energy security**

Securing reliable sources of energy has became one of the crucial global security issues of the 21st century. At least two important areas are unfolding; one is the exhaustion of fossil fuels, particularly oil, on which modern economies depend. Associated with that is the fact that the production and consumption of fossil fuels is one of the most polluting sectors of modern economies and therefore plays a crucial role in the negotiations about how to mitigate climate change. Traditional oil reserves are falling at record speed, while recent discoveries in deep waters far from coastlines, and non-traditional extraction sources such as the oil sands of Alberta, Canada, are much more expensive to extract and require a level of technological sophistication that not many countries or oil companies possess. Coal, with by far the largest known reserves in fossil fuels (more than 160 years according to authoritative estimates), is very polluting, while the technology of
carbon capture and storage, so-called ‘clean coal’, seems to be far ahead, despite the investments that many governments and companies have recently announced.

The other aspect is the ever-expanding surge in energy demand, particularly in developing nations. Indeed, in 2008, for the first time ever, primary energy consumption among non-members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was greater than among the OECD countries.\textsuperscript{10} China and India in particular, with booming economies and large and aspiring middle classes, are the two countries responsible for this trend. Moreover, the energy intensity of the non-OECD nations is much higher than that of the OECD countries, meaning that the amount of energy needed to produce a certain amount of goods and services is 3.4 to 1 in non-OECD countries, against 1.1 to 1 among the OECD countries. Unless there is a drive for much greater efficiency among the non-OECD countries, their relentless rates of growth will multiply the energy required to move their economies.

Against this background, Brazil is well placed to face the challenges of energy security. The country has the cleanest energy mix in the world today: in 2008, 46% of Brazil’s energy supply came from renewable sources, compared with a world average of 16% and an OECD average of 6.7%. The components of Brazil’s energy mix that are mainly responsible for this are hydro-energy for energy production (85% in 2008) and biofuels for transportation; indeed, Brazil’s light vehicles use ethanol from sugar cane more than petrol, while for heavy vehicles, on which most of Brazil’s transportation depends, blending biodiesel to mineral diesel has been mandatory since January 2008. At 4% of mandatory blending of biodiesel to mineral diesel, moving up to 5% in 2010, Brazil is saving billions of dollars in imported mineral diesel, cleaning the air of its big cities and stimulating family holder agriculture that supplies the vegetable oil used to produce biodiesel. In fact, the social component of the biodiesel programme has so far been a success, and most of the supply of vegetable oil comes from small family holders.

In addition to the success of Brazil’s renewable energy mix, recent offshore discoveries of large oil and natural gas reserves in the so-called pre-salt deposits, about 300 kilometres from Brazil’s south-east coast, has definitively put the country on the map of the large oil producers. The magnitude of all oil and natural gas

reserves has still not been mapped out, but the results of the tests of fields that have been carried out by the Brazilian national oil company Petrobras and its partners are excellent. Reserves that have been confirmed are estimated at around 50-90 billion barrels, which would make Brazil one of the leading oil producers outside the Middle East. Indeed, and for obvious reasons, Brazilian leaders are very optimistic about the country’s oil and natural gas: if they are used properly, they could be Brazil’s best chance to reduce its huge economic and social inequalities.

Another dimension of the discovery of these huge oil reserves is that it added weight to those arguing in favour of raising Brazil’s defence expenditure. If there were not enough good reasons to procure a nuclear submarine, the protection of oilfields so distant from the coast in the context of dwindling global oil reserves provides a strong argument in favour. There has been consensus among Brazil’s defence planners for the navy’s doctrine of protecting the Brazilian blue Amazon (the sea) together with protection of the Brazilian green (the Amazon forest).

Whatever the challenges of reliable energy supply may be in the face of increasing demand, energy security will play a crucial role in the years ahead. Even with a cautious prediction that resource wars will be the wars of the future (and of the recent past, as some analysts believe that the Iraq war was fought over oil), Brazil seems well placed to supply all the energy that its growing economy and aspiring population require. Moreover, as the by far largest world supplier of biofuels and a crucial producer of oil, it will play a major role in the supply of energy globally.

**Environmental security**

Brazil’s large territory contains a vast wealth, making it a natural habitat for commodity-intensive activities: huge mineral deposits, almost 10% of all the fresh water on the planet, and the largest biodiversity on earth. With reasonable infrastructure and industrial capacity, a creative exploration of its immense natural resources could make Brazil a key provider of some strategic goods.

As the home of the largest remaining rainforest, the Amazon, Brazil is a key player in the global negotiations on climate change and environmental issues. Deforestation is Brazil’s the major source of the release of gases into the atmosphere, which is respon-
sible for climate change. This has been a sensitive topic for Brazilian policy makers, particularly for the armed forces. Brazil’s views and policy on the Amazon have been framed, rightly or wrongly, in considerations of sovereignty and non-intervention, and it is only very recently that some policy makers acknowledged that deforestation is indeed a huge problem for both Brazilian interests and the health of the planet. Landmark plans to provide legal rights to property owners in the large Amazon region and to combat deforestation, aiming at zero deforestation by 2017, have been passed through both houses of the Brazilian Congress. Programmes for giving proper deeds to landowners and ‘illegal’ occupants are crucial for any plan for rational occupation of the vast region. Fighting for land is a very old problem in this region of Brazil, and only when a working system is put in place to foster respect and enforce legal rights to land will it be possible to implement the tough measures and legislation that already exist to combat deforestation through coercion. Given the sheer size of the Amazon, with almost 30 million inhabitants and an area half the size of Brazil, enforcing the law is not easy. Well-designed measures to deal with deforestation in the dozens of municipalities identified as the main culprits are in place, but the lack of legal enforcement makes the tasks much more difficult.

The other crucial aspect of environmental security is the relationship between the production of commodities, particularly agricultural commodities, and the environment. Over the past 30 years Brazil has developed an efficient agri-business; the country is today the second largest exporter of agricultural commodities. The combination of big business and solid research and development has made Brazilian agri-business both efficient and competitive. Cultivation of the dry lands (cerrado areas) for the production of soya over the past 30 years has made Brazil the leading exporter of this crucial source of protein for animal feed. The expansion of agricultural activities and cattle ranching into the deforested lands of the Amazon, however, has been a major security problem for Brazil, and many initiatives to deal with the sustainability of agricultural commodities have been made in recent years, partly as a response to the demand of the European market and partly as a response to indigenous concerns. Brazilian producers and consumers have realised that sustainable production is crucial, if properly developed, to guarantee the long-term future of the country as a world leader in the production and export of agricultural commodities.

Conclusion

The main issues that Brazilian policy makers consider as crucial for securing Brazil’s ranking internationally have been identified. The long-standing self-image of Brazil as a nation with a ‘manifest destiny’ to great-power status is the underlying leitmotif of the thinking and actions that motivate Brazil’s decision makers in this area. National defence, aspirations for a stronger voice in international peace and security via permanent membership of the UN Security Council, innovative regional initiatives, economic and energy security, the environment and societal integration are the main aspects guiding decision makers’ views of the right path towards great-power status and, ultimately, enhanced security.

Particularly in the economic and trade sphere, Brazil has demonstrated that it is a serious player. A powerhouse in agri-business and commodities export, a force for a cleaner energy mix, including leadership in the production and export of biofuels, and a key player in the international negotiations on climate change are some of the roles that have made Brazil’s voice heard in the most crucial international affairs of the day.

As an influential player in security, however, Brazil is constrained by a lack of traditional hard power and by a still evolving approach to soft power. Despite a more active and assertive role in peacekeeping, and a number of recent regional initiatives that gave Brasilia a higher profile in regional security, the country adheres to a principled view on non-intervention and a traditional notion of sovereignty that make it difficult for Brazil to play a more active role in international peace and security issues. Brazil’s views on the Responsibility to Protect initiative are a case in point. It will be interesting to see how this view will evolve if Brazil becomes a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

The definition of security used in this chapter is holistic and includes the main aspects that impinge on a nation’s well-being; this seems the only way to arrive at a better understanding of the dilemmas of survival and prosperity that every nation faces in today’s ever more complex world.
Introduction

Against the backdrop of today’s intensive globalisation and regionalisation, China has since the 1990s developed a set of concepts and proposals for national, regional and international security. It has abandoned the cold war mentality and adapted its thinking on security towards an emphasis on mutual trust and benefit, equality and cooperation. China is committed to the international efforts to build a common security regime, prevent war and conflicts, and enhance United Nations peacekeeping.

Traditional and non-traditional threats have complicated the international security landscape in regions throughout the world. In the field of traditional security, China engages in bilateral and multilateral talks and cooperation with relevant countries to foster mutual trust and reinforce communication and coordination. China also advocates a common, comprehensive approach to non-traditional security threats. China and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) recently enhanced their programmes for cooperation on such non-traditional security threats such as the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) and avian influenza pandemics, transnational crime, terrorism, piracy and drugs, as well as joint natural disaster rescue and sea rescue actions.\(^1\)

The economic crisis and its impact on China’s security and social development

China’s reform and social development have entered a crucial phase. The financial sector, which has caused economic and social discontent, is China’s Achilles heel. In a precarious global environment, the fragile finance industry has impeded the economic and social development of China and hindered its emergence as a great power.

\(^1\) In November 2002, the sixth ASEAN-China Summit issued the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues, available at http://www.aseansec.org/13185.htm.
Today, the global financial market is in turmoil. The US financial crisis that broke out in April 2007 has spread throughout the world and is still affecting economies. Effective strategies and policy coordination are still not in place. Stock markets, forex exchange markets and future markets are crumbling. As an increasingly open market now in a down cycle, China is feeling the crunch: weak domestic demand, falling exports, bankruptcies, store closures, massive lay-offs and social unrest, a deteriorating housing market, toxic bank debts threatening to rebound and overseas investment incurring heavy losses.

China had amassed as much as $1.95 trillion in foreign exchange reserves by the end of 2008, with annual increases of 27%, two-thirds of which was held in US dollars. Many Chinese institutions also possess large amounts of US dollar assets, which China has continued to build up while most countries are selling. It is replacing Japan as the biggest holder of US treasuries. The US dollar will continue to decline in the future, because the US does not have enough gold reserves to hedge against currency fluctuations, and depreciation of the dollar will become more acute as the US deficit increases. Although the dollar is recovering in the current crisis, this is a temporary phenomenon: it is doomed to plunge in the future since the capital required for the spectacular US stimulus package can only be created by issuing more paper currency. Once that happens, the US dollar assets held by China will also plunge.

China’s housing market is exposed to increasing tensions. The Chinese housing market is precarious: the ratio of house price to income, an internationally accepted index for assessing the health of real estate markets, is quite high. Considering that half of all new Chinese mortgages are related to housing, the increasing risks in this market pose a threat to the entire banking system, even the whole financial system of China.

In this context, financial independence is a precondition for financial security. The roadmap for China’s financial reform is basically designed by Americans or US institutions and is therefore a copy of the US model: financial institutions engaging in securitisation innovations such as creating new financial instruments; independent and high-leverage investment banks; well-paid but poorly supervised career managers; outdated supervision, financial accounting agents, audit and rating, etc. Due to the global crisis, China has only recently slowed down the pace of its ‘learning’ from the US.
The US model is not to be emulated for maintaining financial independence; rather, one should be wary of US supremacy. The US’s abuse of its supremacy is the origin of the current havoc and poses the biggest threat to the financial security of any other state. Under the Bretton Woods system, the US has the responsibility to stabilise the global financial market while reaping the benefits as the system’s hegemon. Today, however, creating and taking advantage of global financial turbulence has become a way of reaping benefits. It is obvious that the US tried to shift financial risks to other countries before the outbreak of the crisis and is still trying to shift the risks. The US’s unfettered hegemony in the economic sphere has become only too obvious, but the Chinese government accepts the US rhetoric and stores only a small quantity of gold reserves: it has even limited the storing of gold by the public. China has only 600 tons of gold reserves while the US has accumulated more than 8000 tons.  

**China’s multilateral policy in conflict resolution**

China is convinced that multilateralism is the key to building a just and effective common security regime, with the United Nations serving as the best platform for multilateral responses to common threats and challenges. In China’s view, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the only body with the right to make decisions on the use of force and should be regarded as the core of a common security regime. Thus any action undertaken by regional arrangements involving the use of force must be authorised by the UNSC. International conflicts should be solved through peaceful negotiations, as defined in the UN Charter and in the framework of international law.

Internal conflicts are more complex and should be dealt with carefully, on a case-by-case basis. Before any intervention in domestic conflicts is undertaken, the international community should examine whether they threaten international peace and security, although it should be borne in mind that the key to resolution of such conflicts generally lies with the population of the country concerned. In the event of external intervention, it should be based on the UN Charter and international law and should be managed in a cautious, responsible manner.

In order to help parties negotiate a peaceful solution, political and diplomatic approaches, rather than military approaches,

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2. An even worse development is that China exports thousands of tons of silver in exchange for US dollars, and then buys up US treasuries with the dollars. Now, as the prices of gold and silver soar and the value of the US currency falls, Chinese decision makers finally understand how serious the problem is.
should be employed first. Sanctions should be used carefully and should always be considered a last resort, but in the event of UNSC-authorised sanction regimes they should be complied with by all member states. China believes that stricter criteria, clearer goals and more specific timeframes should be introduced into the UN sanction mechanism. Humanitarian consequences and damage to third parties should be minimised in any sanctions regime. Consultations and negotiations should be the first consideration towards solving any international conflict; any arbitrary intervention in domestic affairs, breach of the principle of sovereignty, or use or threat of force should be strongly rejected.

As a member of the UN Security Council P5, China has played a constructive role in solving conflicts in such regional hotspots as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestinian territories and Israel. In these processes, China abides by the principles of the UN Charter and takes unbiased positions. Its actions have contributed to world peace and stability. Regarding the issues surrounding North Korea’s nuclear weapon programme (see more below), China acts as a mediator and has successfully hosted the Three-Party Talks (China, North Korea and the US) and the Six-Party Talks (China, North Korea, the US, South Korea, Russia and Japan). On Iran’s nuclear programme, China is against any hasty imposition of sanctions and urges the parties to engage in peaceful negotiations, especially within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). China also participates in the ‘5+1’ (the UNSC P5 plus Germany) mechanism.

In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, China has encouraged the parties to resume talks and comply with the relevant UN resolutions and the principle of ‘Land for Peace’. It helped bring about the ceasefire in the Israeli-Lebanese war and the war in the Gaza Strip. On the Iraqi and Afghan conflicts, China maintains that the issues should be solved politically within the UN and that more attention should be given to the humanitarian situation in Iraq. China supports the Iraqi government’s efforts to bring about stability, reconciliation and reconstruction.

China insists that any UN peacekeeping task should comply with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and with other commonly accepted principles of peacekeeping. China supports and participates in UN peacekeeping programmes that are in line with the spirit of the UN Charter. China first sent military observers to a UN mission in 1990, and has since then sent peace-
keepers to Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Haiti and Sudan. It has deployed 321 peacekeepers in Nyala in South Darfur. Among the UNSC P5, China has contributed the second highest number of personnel to peacekeeping operations. In addition, China has dispatched a total of more than 1,300 civil police and officials to assist in supervising elections and managing the interim authorities. These efforts help to maintain a pacific foreign trade environment and therefore serve the interests of all members of the international community, not only China.

China regards the protection of civilians in armed conflicts as an important task. It holds that the UN Security Council should take prompt action within its spheres of competence to address the root causes of conflicts and mitigate the harm to civilians. These measures should be considered in the context of a particular conflict in terms of the peace process and political situation and should lead to an integrated approach. The role of governments in the protection of civilians should be respected and supported.

Always in line with UN principles and objectives, China is also actively creating or has joined different high-level cooperation mechanisms in order to tackle the more ‘traditional’ threats to security. Among these forums are the Sino-Russia High-Level Meetings and the consultation mechanism of Russian and Chinese deputy foreign ministers on anti-terrorism and strategic stability; the Sino-US consultation on anti-proliferation, anti-terrorism and military cooperation; the Sino-French military strategic dialogue; the Sino-British strategic and security dialogue; the Sino-French military strategic consultation; the Sino-German military strategic consultation; and security consultations and dialogues with Canada, Mexico, Italy, Poland and New Zealand. In its neighbourhood, China holds security consultations with countries such as Pakistan, Japan, Mongolia, Kazakhstan and Thailand. At the same time, as discussed in the sections below, the field of non-traditional security is capturing China’s attention.

China’s policy towards its neighbourhood

China is the country with the largest number of neighbouring countries. It promotes regional cooperation and upholds a good-neighbourly policy. Based on the spirit of consultation on an equal foot-

3. It could be noted that Russia also has 14 neighbours if the countries bordering on the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad are taken into account.
ing, mutual trust and reconciliation, China settles border disputes with its neighbours peacefully. So far, 12 neighbouring countries have signed border treaties with China, ending disputes with a long history. Border negotiations with India and Bhutan are on track.

China endorses regional security dialogues and cooperation and has played a constructive role in regional mechanisms such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ‘ASEAN+China’, ‘ASEAN+3’, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD). In all these forums, China attaches special importance to regional disarmament and confidence building and has concluded a variety of agreements with the neighbouring countries, in the spirit of contributing to enhanced regional security and common development. These agreements embody the new security concepts that China advocates and are in line with the principles of Asian-Pacific security dialogue and cooperation, including common security, consultation and reciprocity, not threatening or damaging the security or stability of other countries, friendly exchanges in military fields, etc.

Among the agreements to which China is a party, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed by ASEAN and China in November 2002, is remarkable. It manifests the willingness of the parties to protect the stability of and develop cooperation in the South China Sea. They have committed themselves to peaceful settlement of any territorial or jurisdiction disputes and guarantee not to take any action that might complicate or fuel disputes. The parties agree to build common trust via military officer dialogues and voluntary reporting of joint military exercises. The parties agree to cooperate closely in protection of the sea environment, research and development, sea transportation and safety, sea rescue and in combating cross-border crime. In December 2004, ASEAN and China held a high-level follow-up meeting on the declaration and agreed to initiate South China Sea cooperation programmes and build up a follow-up joint coordination team, which held its first meeting in August 2005. All concerned parties have recognised the complexity of the issues at hand and expressed their willingness to address the problems through friendly consultation under the guidance of international law. China continues to insist on negotiation and consultation with Japan to solve the disputes over the Diaoyu Island and
the East China Sea. China and India have held 13 rounds of talks on the boundary of the contended territory. Both sides agreed to press ahead with the framework negotiations in accordance with the agreed political parameters to find a fair and reasonable solution that is acceptable to both countries. Prior to that, both sides should work together to maintain peace in the border areas. China and Pakistan enjoy an all-weather friendship and cooperate in various fields, including counter-terrorism.

**China’s national defence policy**

China’s military strategy is in line with its ‘peaceful rise’ foreign policy approach, leading to a responsible role for China in world affairs, and is aimed at adapting China to the changing global and domestic security environments. The objectives of this strategy are military modernisation, reinforcement of national security and territorial integrity, and development of a ‘modest prosperous society’. China has unilaterally launched several initiatives since the 1980s to maintain only the minimum military assets necessary for self-defence, an unusual process historically. The strength of Chinese military forces was scaled back to 2.3 million by 2005.

China has also adjusted its military spending in accordance with the pace of its economic growth. It increased military expenditure as its economy thrived and revenue rose: the past three decades saw a rise in the Chinese defence budget of 3.5%, 14.5% and 15.9%, respectively. The 2009 defence budget is RMB 480,686 billion, an increase of 14.9% over 2008. It is 6.3% of the entire state budget, a slightly lower share than that of previous years. However, the ratio of China’s military spending to GDP or to the whole budget is still low compared to that of other countries. In absolute terms, China’s military budget is much smaller than that of many Western countries. More importantly, the increase in the defence budget is used mainly to improve the capability of the existing force, for instance, to increase payment and welfare for the soldiers and ex-servicemen, to build up human resources and facilities, and to combat rising inflation and international oil prices.

China also increases military transparency and fosters mutual trust with other countries. It made two decisions in August 2007 aimed at improving military transparency: to join the UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures and
return to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) regime from 2007; and to in fact summit reports to the UN on military spending and conventional arms transfers, starting from the *China Military Expenditure Report 2006* and the *China Conventional Arms Transfers Report 2006*.

**Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation**

China bases its participation in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation activities on the following principles: they should reinforce China’s sovereignty and security; encourage global strategic stability; and foster common security and mutual trust in the international community. China believes that the production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and associated delivery vehicles should be banned and existing WMD should be destroyed. States possessing WMD should conclude, sign or ratify the appropriate multilateral treaties as soon as possible and immediately begin to implement them, and should strengthen controls over WMD proliferation through political and diplomatic efforts. China holds that nuclear disarmament is crucial for global security, peace and development.

The vision of a world free of nuclear weapons is in line with China’s security interests. The number of nuclear weapon states in China’s surrounding areas has almost reached a point of saturation and has caused an extremely complicated nuclear situation in the region. The uncertainties are posing serious challenges to China and its region, and even to the world nuclear strategic situation.

Two of the most pressing world concerns are in China’s vicinity: the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, which are likely to be on the security agenda for some time to come. It is important to note that they affect not only the strategic interests of the big powers in North-East Asia and the Middle East, but also the stability of these two regions. If these issues are not properly resolved, North Korea’s and Iran’s neighbours may well feel that they also have to enter the nuclear arms race. In addition, since North Korea is a neighboring country with a special relationship with China, any tensions will also affect China.

Exerting pressure or even military action against North Korea or any other aspiring proliferator would only strengthen their
determination to seek a nuclear capability. The vacillating process of the Korean nuclear issue shows that only when the US-North Korean relationship improves can there be progress in resolving the nuclear issue. While not supporting North Korea’s nuclear programme, China nonetheless opposes pushing the country to the brink of war. China holds the same position regarding Iran. In both cases, China is hopeful that the Obama administration’s recent overtures will result in a breakthrough in bilateral relations between the US and these two countries, so that tension is alleviated and the nuclear crises can be resolved.

On the particular issue of missile defence, China’s view is that missile programmes should be transparent enough to dispel the international community’s doubts and suspicions. An example of the opposite is the US deployment of a theatre missile defence (TMD) system in Asia, which has upset the weak strategic balance in the region. On the particular issue of missile defence, China’s view is that missile programmes should be transparent enough to dispel the international community’s doubts and suspicions. An example of the opposite is the US deployment of a theatre missile defence (TMD) system in Asia, which has upset the weak strategic balance in the region. Since the US has included Taiwan in the defensive zone of its TMD system in the region, this has had a negative impact on the unification of China and has objectively damaged China’s national security interests. The US deployment of an anti-missile system, aimed at strengthening its own security in absolute terms while neutralizing other countries’ strategic deterrence, will stimulate other big powers to enhance their security and trigger a new arms race.

China is a strong proponent of a nuclear-free world. Since the US and Russia together possess 95% of all the nuclear warheads in the world, they should take a leading role and assume special responsibilities and obligations in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament. The two states should thus start by bilaterally reducing their nuclear arsenals verifiably and irreversibly, and then China will eventually join a multilateral process, which should be carried out in accordance with the principle of gradual reductions and parity.

The pace and scale of China’s own nuclear development are moderate, since the nuclear weapons it possesses serve only the purpose of self-defence. China also supports any efforts to prohibit the use of biological or chemical weapons and to destroy them, in accordance with the respective multilateral agreements. China also believes that effective export controls are crucial for successful counter-proliferation; it applies strict criteria and has enacted relevant national laws and regulations. The management of export controls in China has basically met international standards.
It must be noted that nuclear terrorism is one of the most dangerous threats facing the international community, given the enormous destructive capability of nuclear devices and the fact that it is not possible to control the activities of non-state actors. Terrorists frequently carry out their activities in areas surrounding China, particularly the western Xinjiang region, which faces threats from ‘East Turkistan’ terrorist organisations. Moreover, nuclear smuggling activities have always been rampant in Central Asia, which borders on the Xinjiang region. These are primary concerns of China today.

Finally, on the exploration of outer space, China is convinced that the existing multilateral agreements are not sufficient to prevent the weaponisation of, or an arms race in, outer space. China endorses any preventive action or international agreements to suspend arms programmes in space or to prohibit the use or threat of force against objects in outer space.

**Anti-terrorism**

China’s position on anti-terrorism rests on the following main points: (1) all forms of terrorism that threaten the livelihood, security and lives of innocent civilians should be condemned; (2) the UN should play the leading role in anti-terrorism, since international cooperation is the key to stopping it; (3) anti-terrorism campaigns should deal with the root causes, not only the symptoms, of terrorism; and (4) anti-terrorism attacks should only be carried out on the basis of solid proof, should be strictly focused on core targets, and the same principles should be applied to all forms of terrorism.

People in China feel that it is unacceptable to link terrorism to certain religious or ethnic groups. The fight against terrorism is not a clash of nations, religions or civilisations. And it is not right to oppress other countries or groups in the name of anti-terrorism. The fight to control terrorism should be conducted at the global, regional and national levels, but not with any bias or double standards. Anti-terrorism must not be used as a pretext for promoting hegemony. Anti-terrorism measures should be in accordance with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and with the commonly accepted spirit of international law. Given that no country is immune to the threat of modern terrorism,
drugs and transnational crime, the international community should cooperate closely in dealing with the global issues mentioned above. China has continuously emphasised that the UN member states and the UNSC should play the leading role in anti-terrorism and had accordingly signed most international anti-terrorism treaties even before the 9/11/2001 attacks. Thereafter, China joined the UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee established in UN Resolution 1373 (2001) and committed itself to implement all UN anti-terrorism resolutions.7

China is an active participant in anti-terrorism dialogues and activities of the ARF and APEC. In June 2001, China and other members of the SCO signed the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism.8 The convention defines terrorism as an act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict or to cause major damage to any material facility, as well as to organise, plan, aid and abet such act, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, violate public security or to compel public authorities or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act, and prosecuted in accordance with the national laws of the parties.9 This regional definition of terrorism has set a legal basis for SCO cooperation on anti-terrorism.10

SCO members subsequently signed the Agreement on a Regional Anti-Terrorism Agency in the Region,11 at a June 2002 meeting in St Petersburg that set out the framework of the organisation’s anti-terrorism mechanism, and in June 2004 the regional anti-terrorism centre was opened in Uzbekistan. Anti-terrorism cooperation has become a cornerstone of the SCO. The fifth ASEM conference, which took place in Beijing in 2003, held a seminar was held on anti-terrorism. In all these meetings, China upheld its position on anti-terrorism and stressed the importance of regional cooperation. China reached consensus with other parties in these meetings on a number of concrete measures, including intelligence sharing, cooperation in legislation and implementation of anti-terrorism laws, cooperation in finance to thwart the transfer of capital to terrorist groups, and government capacity building through training, education, seminars and conferences.

In terms of bilateral anti-terrorism cooperation, China has enhanced its coordination with the US, Russia, the UK, Pakistan,
India and other countries on consultation, intelligence sharing and financial policies such as freezing terrorists’ assets. China has conducted anti-terrorism exercises with a number of countries: in August 2004, for example, China and Pakistan launched the joint ‘Friendship 2004’ anti-terrorism exercise on their mutual border.

As is the case for many other countries, China faces a more treacherous anti-terrorism environment today. Internationally, in spite of two wars on terrorism launched by the US, terrorism has not been halted; rather, they have complicated the campaigns against terrorism, including China’s. In China, ‘Eastern Turkistan’ continues to harbour terrorist activities, which culminated on the eve of the Beijing Olympics. And the relatively ‘mild’ group working for Tibetan independence began to show disquieting signs of extremism. Terrorist activities pose a threat to the social stability and national security of China. The Chinese government stands against any form of terrorism, attaching importance to capacity building and international cooperation in anti-terrorism and having developed its own anti-terrorism approaches.

As part of the capacity-building effort, the Chinese government has developed and improved its anti-terrorism apparatus. Counter-terrorism mechanisms at both the central and local levels were set in motion soon after the 9/11 attacks. At the central level, a National Anti-terrorism Coordination Team was established, headed by President Hu Jintao. Offices were developed under the team to coordinate specific affairs. The Ministry of Public Security established the Counter-terrorism Bureau in 2004 to study, design, construct, coordinate and promote anti-terrorism activities. The National Anti-terrorism Coordination Team is an organisation under this bureau. Meanwhile, coordination mechanisms have also been set up in provinces, autonomous regions and some important Chinese cities.

In the framework of domestic laws and regulations, the Chinese Public Security Ministry published the first list of 4 ‘Eastern Turkistan terrorist organisations’ and 11 terrorists. The second list was published in October 2008. These two lists are a demonstration of China’s effort to base the anti-terrorism campaign on law. The making of the Chinese Anti-Terrorism Law is already under way. President Hu Jintao pointed out at the October 2003 APEC Bangkok Summit that conflicts, turbulence, poverty and backwardness were a breeding ground for terrorism. The eradication of terrorism thus depends on the following three measures: the eas-
ing of regional and international tensions; the alleviation of poverty; and reinforcement of international cooperation.\textsuperscript{16} Military action alone will not solve terrorism.

\textbf{Energy security and climate change}

China has proposed a new concept of energy security based on win-win cooperation, diversified supply and coordinated protection of energy. The international community should cooperate in three areas: energy exploration and use; research and development and promotion of new technologies; and maintenance of a positive political climate for energy security. China, for its part, needs to rely on markets, both domestic and foreign, to protect energy security. It also needs to expedite market-oriented reform of the energy sector while fostering international security cooperation with Europe, the US and international energy organisations. China should complete its market-oriented reform of the energy sector, transforming the government-dictated pricing system and introducing competition. More private competitors should be invited into the sector to break the government-backed monopoly and deepen market-oriented reform.

The Chinese economy has escaped almost unscathed from soaring international oil prices owing to its relatively low oil dependency compared to many Western countries. Rising international oil prices fuelled inflation and complicated the macroeconomic landscape of China; they also hindered market-oriented reform of the energy sector and made the launch of ‘fuel tax’ more difficult, but to some extent China’s economic and export growth has offset the negative impact of rising oil prices. At the same time, the high prices provided an opportunity for a low-carbon economy to develop in China. The biggest risks for China in this context lie in market and price, not in supply. China is producing, and will continue to do so for a long time, 200 million tons of crude oil per year, or enough to meet basic domestic demand even if oil imports are suspended.

Environmental protection is the biggest challenge for development of China’s future energy sector. China should change its model for economic growth so that controlling pollution and climate change are a strategic priority. A low-carbon economy should be high on the agenda.

\textsuperscript{16} Xinhua News Agency, 21 October 2003.
Energy efficiency is crucial for energy security. China’s energy consumption per unit of production, ranging from 25% to 90% (and 40% on a weighted average), is higher than that of the developed countries. China’s extensive economic growth should be transformed into intensive growth, and energy-related elements of lifestyle and energy demand should change accordingly. Fuel tax and resources tax can be used as an instrument to bring about such a change. In addition, it will be helpful to encourage technology innovation, increase resources utilisation rate, and promote energy savings and efficiency. It should also be noted that, although China faces energy shortages, they will not develop into supply crises. China witnessed panics over the shortage of oil, electricity and coal in the past few years that were caused by temporary domestic problems, rather than external ones, including imprecise macroeconomic forecasts, bad energy market management, supply chain distortion, irrational industrial and energy consumption structures, and underdevelopment of the market mechanism of the energy sector.

On the other hand, China’s policy on overseas energy expansion has led to profound misperceptions among Western experts and government officials, in spite of the fact that the policy was not so different from policies in the West. Some developed countries see China as a threat to their energy security, while some emerging countries see it as an energy competitor and some developing countries as a colonialist power. The following are examples of the expression of the main misperceptions, which also represent challenges to Chinese diplomacy:

- **China is adopting a neo-mercantilist policy.** China’s overseas investment is understood as an attempt to directly control energy resources, which is a part of its energy security strategy. Government-backed foreign investment and domestic subsidies are criticised as ‘a betrayal of the principle of market economy’ and a breach of international rules.

- **Energy cooperation is a cover for China’s strategic expansion.** Energy security is seen as a priority of China’s internal and external policy and it is believed that China uses energy diplomacy to ‘gain bargain leverage against the US and the West’ and fight for more spheres of influence.

- **China aims at building an anti-US alliance with ‘rogue states’**. In the eyes of the US, China’s energy cooperation with Iran, Sudan and
Venezuela is a strategic challenge to the US presence in Latin America and the Middle East, and in addition that cooperation might lead to a new anti-America ‘axis’.

Although China’s rhetoric and behaviour have contributed to these misperceptions, it should also be stressed that Chinese energy companies operating overseas observed international rules and sold most of their products in the international market, rather than selling them back to China. Besides, China’s participation in international energy cooperation is at an early stage. China remains relatively low-profile in multilateral talks and cooperation regimes. One reason for the West’s concern about Chinese energy diplomacy is that China is not a member of any legally binding international energy organisations or regimes. Thus it is still at the margin of, and sometimes is seen as a challenger of, the West-led international energy cooperation system, but it should continue to have strategic dialogues on energy-related issues with the US and the European countries and develop a communication regime of formal and informal high-level dialogues. This will help disperse the West’s suspicions of China’s energy cooperation with Iran and Sudan and the of Chinese energy companies’ expansion in overseas markets.

In parallel, China should deepen its cooperation with key international energy organisations. This will not only stabilise energy supply and protect China’s interest in energy, but also alleviate the concerns of the West over China’s challenge to the existing international energy order. For this purpose, China should deepen its understanding of international organisations and regimes for energy cooperation and prepare for accession of such organisations and regimes in terms of policy, law, and even staff. Finally, the Chinese government should in practice help Chinese companies adapt to the rules of the international market.

Since energy issues may jeopardise environmental protection efforts, energy is closely connected to climate change. China insists that the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ should be observed, and that solutions should be feasible and should be reached via consultation and negotiation in the UN climate change conferences. Developed countries should, aside from developing and promoting advanced technologies in domestic markets, fulfil their commitment to transfer technologies and provide financial aid to developing countries (China included), so
as to help improve their ability to meet the challenge of climate change. According to the National Climate Change Program, by the year 2010 China will cut 20% of its energy consumption per GDP unit as of 2005 to increase the proportion of renewable energy in the primary energy structure to 10% and to increase forest cover to 20%. These are binding goals and have been integrated into China’s national plan for economic and social development.

**Cyber security**

China’s concept of cyber security covers many aspects, such as the security of communication infrastructure, application of information systems and resources, transmission of information and data, and dissemination of information via the Internet.

In 2008, hackers invaded 11 local governments’ websites in Jiangxi, Hubei, Guizhou, Sichuan and Jiangsu provinces. They illegally obtained the rights of data-managers of these websites and manipulated the data. Criminals and hackers have worked to commit many types of cyber crime, including writing and disseminating viruses, stealing information from accounts, disposing of stolen goods and money laundering.

Information networks are an international development. No country can develop its own web system without connecting to international web nets. Similarly, any country’s cyber security must be conducted with international cooperation. The characteristics of the structure of the Internet – for example its internationality, worldwide span, mutual connection, openness, sharing of information resources and data, and common use of communication channels – mean that cooperation is one of the most effective means for the international society to meet the challenges of cyber security. In recent years, such cooperation has been gradually improving, involving judicial assistance, legal coordination, investment and evidence collection, technical support and developments in other areas. China advocates peacefully making use of international cyber space and stands for developing an international convention on cyber security. It is prepared to seek the support of all other countries to combat all forms of crime that either are committed against cyber space or make use of it to commit illegal activities. China is willing to join with the international community to construct a safe, stable, and shared global information...
network, to facilitate a healthy, balanced, orderly and harmonious
development of global information dissemination and thereby
contribute to the promotion of world peace and prosperity.

At China’s initiative, China-US and China-UK forums on
Internet issues have been set up. Progress also has been made in the
areas of emergency response and security-technology dialogue
and cooperation, and judicial cooperation on combating cyber
crime. China has concluded several cooperative agreements with
relevant countries, international organisations and non-govern-
mental organisations.

Conclusion

Over 30 years of reform and opening-up has brought profound
changes in China’s perception of security. China fosters the princi-
ple of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination in
its foreign relations, and endorses international cooperation in
comprehensive and common security and the building of effective
common security regimes. China also puts self-defence at the cen-
tre of its military strategy. Based on the spirit of egalitarian consul-
tation, mutual trust and reconciliation, it settles border and sea
disputes with its neighbours peacefully. China has increasingly
believed that multilateralism is the key to building a just and effec-
tive common security regime. In recent years, it has become an
ardent participant of many multilateral forums and playing a con-
structive role in solving international conflicts in regional and
global hotspots.

With the future development of its national strength and for-
ere strategy, China will play an ever more important role in inter-
national security affairs and help promote prosperity and peace
throughout the world. It will seek to increase its contributions to
the construction of international security institutions and in the
areas of non-traditional security cooperation. In particular, China
will play a greater role in the areas of international financial secu-
ity, economic assistance to developing countries, global climate
change, resolving problems of regional hotspots, international
peacekeeping, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and
so on. Thus, as a more active promoter of international security in
all its aspects, China will be regarded as playing the role of the
world leader to which it has aspired.
India’s potential role in a new global security consensus

Radha Kumar

Introduction

Over the past decade, leading members of the international community – the United States and the European Union as well as regional organisations such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations and the African Union – have welcomed, indeed sought, India’s leadership, especially in matters of peace and security. With its rapid economic growth and established democracy, India was seen as a force for stability in a volatile region. But India’s reluctance to take on such a role led many to conclude that the country’s policy community did not want to abandon its cold war isolationism. India, they thought, was bound by self-imposed limitations to be a weak, vacillating power.

India has begun to change. While this is more evident in international economic forums (India is now the main hope for the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round), India is beginning to be perceived as a strong, responsible state in security forums, too. Its membership of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, its new neighbourhood policies, and its role in East Asia all point to a renewed engagement in peacemaking.

While these are important steps, several questions need to be clarified. What will India’s position be on the appropriate instruments to meet major international security challenges, and how actively will the Indian government pursue its position? Will it contribute to forging a global consensus or a global debate?

New government, new impetus

The astonishing result of the election of May 2009, in which the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) came close to winning an absolute majority, led Indian policy pundits to make many predictions. One that they all agreed on is that the new government, with
the support of an absolute majority in the lower house of parliament, will be able to act more decisively than the recent government could since it was frequently blocked by its coalition partners.

The three priority areas that pundits flagged for the new government include: deepening relations with the US, taking new steps towards India’s neighbours, and modernizing security structures. The latter two were also priority items on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s agenda for his first 100 days: he announced that he would introduce an economic stimulus package, a fast-track neighbourhood policy (or set of policies), and an integrated security plan.

Prime Minister Singh’s cabinet appointments reflected the weight that the new government gives to these policy priorities. Home Minister P. Chidambaram has already begun much needed security reform. Finance Minister Pranab Muckerjee is a political heavyweight who will push the economic stimulus package while pursuing poverty reduction, which is also a United Nations Millennium Development Goal. Commerce Minister Anand Sharma may be a gentler voice in the World Trade Organization but he might get the WTO Doha Development Round working again. The Roads and Highways Minister, Kamal Nath, promises to quickly develop infrastructure. Jairam Ramesh, the Minister for Environment and Forests, will be proactive in negotiations on climate change, although not always in line with US and European demands.

Addressing the press on the day after he was sworn in, External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna put peacemaking in India’s neighbourhood at the top of his agenda. Even before the government was sworn in, the National Security Adviser and the Foreign Secretary visited Sri Lanka, where they promised significant humanitarian aid for the country and pleaded for a speedy offer of devolution of power in the Tamil areas.

Notably, in his brief remarks Krishna stressed that India would ‘further consolidate its strategic partnerships’ with the US, Russia, China, Japan and the EU, continue with its ‘Look East’ policy, and engage with the world as ‘a responsible power’. This indicated that India’s political leaders are now willing to play a bigger role in international affairs than they have for many decades. Indeed, the appointment of former UN Under-Secretary-General Shashi Tharoor as one of two ministers of state for external affairs suggests that we might see a long overdue enhancement of India’s public diplomacy.
The threat perception in India

Given India’s extremely volatile neighbourhood, with conflicts in most of the countries, it would seem that concern about hard security threats would far outweigh non-traditional or human security concerns, whether in India’s own security establishment or in the choice of which global or multilateral security initiatives to participate in. However, this has not been the case. While India invests in hard security, especially modernisation of its defence systems, it invests much more in dealing with its human security challenges, especially poverty reduction at home. Its international track record also shows greater engagement with human security operations (such as peacekeeping, nation- and state-building and development aid) than with hard security challenges.

India is reluctant to join the international community in hard security operations. The Indian government rejected the George W. Bush administration’s heavy lobbying for India to contribute troops to the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2002-03 (backed by the UK and Spain), even though it was suggested that India might become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. More importantly, India would have had full backing against Pakistan’s ‘proxy war’ with India, along with a long-term security umbrella. Although some analysts believe that its refusal was dictated by Pakistan’s opposition to any Indian presence in Afghanistan, this would not have deterred India. Rather, it was the belief that sending Indian troops to Afghanistan would severely alienate India’s Muslim community of over 160 million that was decisive. However, it is also true that India has not joined international coalitions in the prosecution of war even when the majority population believe that a war is just, as was the case with Afghanistan.

India’s threat perceptions centre on its vulnerable borders, which are dotted with disputed areas, and its relative failure to properly protect them. Three problem issues dominate the Indian security agenda today:

- The hostilities with Pakistan from the time of independence and partition in 1947, which have led to the de facto division and dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, intensified by cross-border terrorism from Pakistan;
- Periodic tensions with China, involving disputed territory in the state of Arunachal Pradesh in India’s north-east, Tibet, Chi-
nese occupation of the Aksai Chin plateau in Jammu and Kashmir, and its growing security presence on India’s land and sea borders;

- India’s inadequate response to these real and perceived or potential threats, caused by faulty intelligence (in Kargil in 1999), inability to act upon intelligence received (Mumbai 2008), poor training and equipment, and shortfalls in the defence services, especially at officer level.

India’s land borders have been its overriding security concern, especially its western borders with Pakistan and China (Tibet), which are consequently now heavily militarised. But in the past five years India’s far longer and even less protected coastal borders have been recognised as posing a clear and present danger: the Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008, where gunmen used the sea route to land in Mumbai, made coastal protection a real priority. The live television coverage of the five days it took for security forces to end the attacks exposed India’s lacking defence systems and spurred government action. The moribund coastguard is being reformed and expanded, and intelligence sharing, transmission and action are being synchronised between the different defence, home and state security departments. Internationally, India started to work with the US on the Container Security Initiative five years ago, and the attacks in Mumbai revealed that there was close intelligence sharing between India and the US in this context.

Cross-border terrorism remains India’s major hard security threat, but the way it is being dealt with has changed from an enemy response to a rule of law response (see also the next section). India has been proactive in multilateral forums on terrorism, sponsoring UN resolutions and supporting the work of the UN against terrorist financing.

Illegal immigration, especially from Bangladesh, and periodic emigration of refugees from the conflicts in Nepal and Sri Lanka, which many other countries would see as a threat multiplier, are not and never have been a serious security concern, even though India has close to 20 million illegal immigrants, and the ethnic demography of Assam in India’s north-east, the area bordering on Bangladesh, has been permanently altered. Assam has had a severe impact on India’s security concerns – although the United Liberation Front of Assam, today more a terrorist than a political
organisation, was originally founded in protest of Assam’s changing demography. But these were the years of military rule in Bangladesh (the 1980s), when its leadership was inimical to India and illegal immigration was not an issue that the military rulers were prepared to discuss, let alone act upon. As a result, while there is still inter-ethnic conflict in Assam, it is now treated as an internal issue to be resolved rather than a problem of illegal immigration.

As dominant and myriad as India’s hard security threats are, it would be wrong to suggest that India does not have and is not taking action on its soft security challenges, many of which fuel violence in the country. Speaking at an Indian think tank in 2007, the Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon identified three key goals for India foreign policy: ‘Firstly, ensuring a peaceful periphery; secondly, relations with the major powers; and, thirdly, issues of the future, namely food security, water, energy and environment.’

Scarcity and under-administration are root causes of the spread of Maoist insurgencies in eastern India, while food shortages, conflicts over water sharing both within India and with its neighbours, deforestation and the potential impact of climate change, and energy shortages all contribute to tension and open up for violent response.

The Indian government is acting on many of these issues, including cooperation with other countries. India’s most successful coalition operations have been in disaster management (the 2004 tsunami) and anti-piracy. In the former crisis, India led a coalition with the US, Japan and Australia for rapid delivery of aid to affected areas; in the latter, India is part of a wider coalition involving a host of countries and institutions such as NATO that work to protect and rescue ships from Somali pirates. India’s participation in both sets of operations has been led by the navy, which has become the most effective service for India’s participation in multilateral security initiatives – outpacing the army, which traditionally represented India’s major contribution to international security through UN peacekeeping. (It should be noted that this might change in the next decade, with the army and air force also engaging in a larger number of joint exercises.)

While these examples are signs of a new Indian willingness to participate and even take a lead in issue-based coalitions, one element of the Indian approach remains constant. Whether it is UN peacekeeping or tsunami response, Indian policy makers are more
inclined to act globally on uncontroversial peacemaking, humanitarian or soft security issues. On these issues, India is willing not only to participate in multilateral coalitions but also to play a role in forging global consensus.

India is also beginning to engage with a wide range of countries on some aspects of hard security cooperation, such as terrorism or the prevention of strategic competition in the Indian Ocean. Successive Indian governments have begun to cautiously adapt many of their traditional foreign policy stances – for example, India supports NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan and the Obama administration’s ‘Af-Pak’ policy (insofar as it places Pakistan at the centre of a square hole, although there are concerns that India might be asked to square the circle). These positions are a far cry from the previous official Indian stance of upholding state sovereignty and resisting any international presence in its neighbourhood.

While it may be argued that India had little choice but to tailor its positions and policy to the new security environment and that these are adaptations that actually further India’s national interests, the point is that Indian policy makers no longer perceive international engagement as a threat to the country’s right to make its own policy choices. This opens unchartered ground for cooperation, primarily in South Asia and the wider neighbourhood but also on issues of global concern, such as disarmament, nuclear proliferation, climate change, implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals, and reform of international peace and financial/economic institutions. Treating all these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter, so the next sections focus on three major priorities set by India’s new foreign minister.

Neighbourhood first
In the early part of this century, it looked as if some South Asian countries – Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal – might be entering a new era of stabilisation (probably at a high cost), but the impact of the US-declared ‘global war on terrorism’ would further destabilise other countries, in particular Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since then, the probability of rapid stabilisation has greatly increased for Bangladesh but declined for Sri Lanka and Nepal, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are involved in a cross-border conflict and internal civil war.
India’s response has been varied and sometimes ineffective but always guided chiefly by the peacemaking priority stressed by Foreign Minister Krishna. In the case of Nepal, after teetering between consternation and working with the official government, India supported the nine-party agreement and the new political process, with some success. Unfortunately, the peace process is now fractured by the resistance to admitting Maoist fighters into the Nepalese army – a problem that is being blamed on India, to my mind unfairly (how much can India do when China, which has considerable influence over the Maoists and the army, stands back?). In Sri Lanka, the Indian government pushed for humanitarian protection during the recent wave of conflict, but to no avail. However, after the Sri Lankan government’s victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the spring of 2009, the Indian government could coordinate far more effectively with the international community on humanitarian and political reforms, the impact of which remains to be seen. In Bangladesh, India took note of the 2006 military takeover’s promise to restore democracy and was rewarded by the coming to power of Sheikh’s Hasina’s government in 2008. Since then, relations between India and Bangladesh have been cordial, and a number of stalled negotiations may resume, for example on river waters and energy investment.

While India’s relations with these countries are still complicated in spite of recent policy improvements – the unreformed post-colonial bureaucratic practice is a formidable obstacle – the most difficult Indian foreign policy problem is how to improve its relations with Pakistan. Although India has fought and won three wars with Pakistan and come close to but avoided a fourth war in 1999, it has since then ruled out war as an option. Many in India believe that Pakistan’s hostility towards India is implacable and leaves India with few choices. But in the past 10 years there have been significant positive developments. In May 1999 the two countries’ nuclear tests brought them to what Zartman calls a ‘hurting stalemate’ and fitful peace negotiations ensued. Between 2003 and 2006 India and Pakistan engaged in a peace process that resulted in a ceasefire on the borders, significantly less cross-border violence in Jammu and Kashmir, a thriving Track II dialogue among representatives of civil society, and considerable progress in the back-channel talks between the two countries’ envoys. One reason for India’s perseverance was that it was poised to regain
global clout and that the people of Jammu and Kashmir would prosper if hostilities stopped.

At the same time, Pakistan-based terrorist attacks on India increased, reaching a high point in 2007-08, when the peace process had been put on a back burner by Pakistan’s internal unrest. Until 2008 it seemed as if this form of terrorism was a threat that India would have to face in isolation, even though most security analysts (the present author included) believed that the attacks were linked to those in the US and the UK, as well as in Afghanistan and Pakistan, through an organisational and financial chain. After the 26 November 2008 coordinated attacks in Mumbai, however, in which the nationals of 12 countries were killed, the global response and the Pakistani media’s own revelation of a chain of evidence pointing to Pakistan made it clear that India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the international community all faced similar threats.

While it took some time for a rounded Indian response to coalesce, India’s choice of pursuing the legal route to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice brought considerable global support. It was not an easy choice – the Indian public had lost faith in the government’s ability to respond to terrorism, so a short military action might have earned it some praise (and international consternation) – and it marked a new phase in India-Pakistan relations. But it was a choice that yielded only partial results: the Pakistani government arrested some of the perpetrators, but there have been no prosecutions.

Even more important, the Indian government placed this response in the broader context of seeking to assuage Muslim concerns, tying domestic change to international action. The ‘Hindutva terrorist’, an ex-army officer who was implicated in the Samjhauta train bombings of 2006, was charged within days of the 2008 Mumbai attacks in what may be the Indian government’s speediest response to gathered evidence. A Gujarat state minister was arrested for inciting the riots of 2002 (in which around 2000 Muslims were killed); and fast-track courts have been set up to try the accused. Supporting these measures, the Sachar Commission’s report of 2007, which revealed the poor conditions of Indian Muslims, has sparked moves for affirmative action, from increasing Muslim employment in public services and industry to scholarships in education. As a result, the powerful and internationally influential Deoband Seminary in India, which many rad-
ical Muslim groups say they follow, declared a fatwa against the use of violence to further political ends: it was ratified by 50,000 priests and scholars (ulema) in 2008. This is a development that few other countries with sizeable Muslim communities have seen.

India’s by far most successful neighbourhood policy is that on Afghanistan. India has a national interest in preventing Afghanistan from again falling prey to the Pakistani doctrine of strategic depth. During the Taliban rule, when Hindus and Sikhs were forced to wear distinctive yellow markers on their clothing and pay a special tax for ‘protection’, and the country sponsored terrorist attacks against India, relations with Afghanistan plummeted to new lows. After the attacks on the US in 2001, India made rapid strides in repairing relations – today it is one of the six largest donors to Afghanistan, with the most successful aid programme; and it has good relations with both government and opposition. An Afghanistan-India Partnership Council was created in August 2009. Partly due to Indian sponsorship, Afghanistan has joined the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Unfortunately, however, SAARC is still a fairly marginal organisation. Although it was founded to promote regional trade, this trade still comprises no more than 5-7% of each country’s GDP. During the years of the India-Pakistan peace process, attempts were made to give SAARC a bigger role. A South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) was finalised and a South Asian Social Charter, similar to the Maastricht Treaty establishing the EU, was agreed. But action on these two initiatives has been very slow. SAFTA’s entry into force has been postponed indefinitely, and progress on the Social Charter’s action items has proceeded at a snail’s pace. The renewed peace process between India and Pakistan, which was formally initiated on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement’s summit at Sharm Al Sheikh at the end of July 2009, might breathe new life into these two stalemated initiatives, but only if the new Indian government prioritises SAARC.

Consolidating strategic partnerships

At the beginning of this century, India entered into strategic partnerships with the US, the EU, Russia, Japan and China. Progress on the first of these partnerships has been the most rapid, with the Indian and US military, business, scientific and technological communities signing many agreements and interacting frequently and

2. The doctrine is currently being reviewed in Pakistan and might be dropped. On this doctrine see e.g. http://www.kashmirherald.com/featuredarticle/strategicdepth.html.
substantively. After President Bill Clinton broke the ice that had formed during the cold war with his visit to India in 2000, senior US representatives visited India frequently, and high-level interaction multiplied under the G.W. Bush administration, with agreements for joint operations on land and sea and cooperation in space technology, agricultural research and educational exchange.

The landmark Indian-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative of July 2005, which was not approved by the Indian parliament until 2008, attested to the growing depth of the partnership and showed the extent to which the US seeks to accommodate Indian concerns. The resulting Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (the ‘123 agreement’) was important for symbolic reasons as much as for actual benefits in energy generation. It brought India out of the ‘Israel-Pakistan club’, described as ‘nuclear apartheid’ by Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, and freed it to act ‘responsibly’, in Foreign Minister Krishna’s words, in future disarmament negotiations. Although detractors suggest that India’s agreement with the US has encouraged an arms race in South Asia, it is not the agreement that has spurred Pakistan to enlarge its weapon arsenal; Pakistan began to acquire more weaponry with US and Chinese military aid long before the agreement was announced (although US aid was given for the different purpose of combating al Qaeda and the Taliban).

Intangibly, but equally important, the agreement also showed the Indian population that the world, led by the US, was prepared to accept India as a rising power.

Most Indian analysts have been worried that the Obama administration might not be similarly sensitive, but it has moved on an issue that is very important to India – disarmament – in a way that the Bush administration did not. By reviving the START negotiations, President Obama has raised new hopes for an equitable approach to the critical issues of disarmament, unlike the capping embodied in the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allowed China to institutionalise its military edge over India. And on climate change, although there are disagreements between the US and India on what kind of commitments a relatively guiltless country like India should make on restricting emissions, once again the Obama administration is engaging with India on its concerns. On a visit to India in July 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made it a point to attend a conference on renewable energy in Delhi and was not deterred by disagreements
on what the Copenhagen negotiations should aim at. Rather, she pitched differences as reconcilable through sustained discussion, and one of the most important results of her visit was agreement to hold a high-level dialogue between the Indian cabinet and top US officials spanning both the presidency and state. As a result, India is also committed to finding common ground.

By contrast, the EU and India launched their strategic partnership in 2004, a year before the India-US partnership was launched, but little has been achieved strategically and what has been achieved is little known in both Europe and India. Although the EU regrets its lack of visibility in India in comparison with the US, relatively few senior EU representatives have visited the country – with the exception of the EU Commissioner of External Affairs, Chris Patten, who sought close interaction during his tenure, at a high point of India-EU relations.

Despite India’s partnership with the EU, few of the agreed points have been acted upon. For example, dialogue on Israel-Palestine is part of the Joint Action Plan (see below), and India’s interest in contributing to resolution of the conflict should be self-evident given that two years ago the government appointed the first ever Senior Envoy to West Asia, Chinmaya Gharekhan. But as far as I know, the issue has not been on the agenda of the India-EU annual summits.

In 2005 India and the EU launched a Joint Action Plan, and in 2006 the EU began to gradually coordinate its Nepal policy with India. The Joint Statement that they issued at the November 2007 EU-India summit affirmed that India and the EU ‘would preserve and promote peaceful uses of technology through forward looking approaches among countries committed to disarmament and nonproliferation’, implying EU acceptance of the civil nuclear energy agreement. The Joint Statement emphasised their commitment to stabilisation and reconstruction in Afghanistan, an area of cooperation that the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had suggested in 2004 in its ‘Response’ to the EU proposal for a strategic partnership, but the proposal got little purchase due to troop-contributing countries’ fears of a hostile Pakistani reaction. The 2007 Joint Statement also contained shared views on the conflicts and peace processes in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Each party welcomed the other’s membership of multilateral bodies such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process and SAARC. And they announced new forms of collaboration to deal with cli-
mate change, such as research and development of alternative energy sources, including bio-fuels and solar energy.\(^3\)

Although the EU and India agreed to discuss Afghanistan and Pakistan well before the US or any other country was prepared to do so, few discussions are known to have taken place. This is unfortunate for both, but more acutely for India. The international community is deeply engaged in Afghanistan and Pakistan (the EU more in the former, less in the latter), so achieving global consensus on how to deal with the two countries’ security threats is vital to India’s national interests. At the same time, Pakistan’s suspicions of India’s intentions and Afghanistan’s welcoming of India’s presence have not only complicated each country’s bilateral relations with the others, but also hampered the development of a global consensus insofar as policy framing and coordinated implementation are concerned. Under President Obama, the US has initiated substantive consultations with India on ‘Af-Pak’. Having announced dialogue on Afghanistan in the 2005 India-EU Joint Action Plan, and with so many EU countries equally deeply engaged in Afghanistan, why have they not done the same?

India has been less than fair to the EU. It has resisted rather than sought high-level interaction – indeed, fewer senior Indian representatives have sought to engage with Brussels than the number of EU officials wanting to engage with Mumbai. Worse still, Indian policy analysts (especially those who have retired from government) tend to dismiss EU institutions as relatively unimportant in a world of inter-governmental relations, even though the EU is increasingly making consensual foreign policy decisions for its member states.

The gaps between Indian and EU policy are especially surprising given that contemporary European and Indian security doctrines are closer to each other than are Indian and US doctrines. Clausewitz’s dictum that war is an extension of foreign policy is no longer in Europe’s security lexicon, nor in India’s. Like many of the European countries, India has responded to the threat of international terrorism by seeking rule of law rather than military action. Although progress on human development issues is slow, the Indian government is committed: poverty reduction is a reality. It may not be by 50%, as the outgoing National Democratic Alliance government claimed in 2004, but it has taken place at an accelerated pace since the National Rural Employment Guarantee of 2007 and complementary health education programmes.

Most importantly, India is now seeking growth through devolution, a pattern that many EU member states followed successfully to help lagging regions. This is an area in which India can learn from the EU’s experience of the past 20 years, and it could become a rapid results field for local EU-Indian partnerships.

If the EU strategic partnership with India is more like a watermark than the bold print of the US strategic partnership, the strategic partnership with China, signed in April 2005, is at a new low. It began well: China rapidly became India’s largest trading partner, with a volume of trade above $50 billion. In January 2006 the two countries agreed to cooperate on oil and gas by making joint bids on energy assets in third countries, and in May they signed a memorandum of understanding for joint military exchanges and exercises and collaboration on counter-terrorism, anti-piracy and search-and-rescue efforts. In December 2007 they held their first joint military training exercise and in January 2008 announced that they would formulate a joint global economic strategy, including common action in the World Trade Organization and regionally on climate change. They also decided to cooperate on civil nuclear energy. At the same, in national security adviser-level talks, they agreed to revive the five Panchsheel principles of peaceful co-existence that were outlined in the Zhou-Nehru talks in the late 1950s.

On the track of making haste slowly, it looked as if the two countries were beginning to edge out of the mistrust that had ensued following the 1962 Sino-Indian war. But few of the agreements yielded positive results. The agreement on energy cooperation resulted in a partnership in Sudan in which China gets 75% of the yield and India 25%; it is questionable whether this is a sufficient gain for India to offset the cost of any blame for Sudan’s intransigence in Darfur. In Iran, China has taken over gas concessions that were initially earmarked for India. There has been no cooperation on terrorism, civil nuclear energy or counter-piracy.

China’s disingenuous and somewhat churlish response to the Indian-US civil nuclear energy agreement – tacitly supporting the Indian Communist Party’s attempt to torpedo the agreement and opposing it in international forums – strained what could have been an emerging equilibrium in Sino-Indian relations. They were further damaged by incursions of Chinese troops on India’s eastern border, where China claims a part of the Indian state of
Arunachal Pradesh; such incursions began in 2007 and allegedly are still being made.

It is too early to say whether the Sino-Indian strategic partnership is collapsing or not. The Indian government is not pursuing a policy of estrangement from China, and many Indian analysts argue that China is simply ‘flexing its muscles’ rather than intentionally provoking India. A renewal of the national security adviser-level talks would be helpful to clarify and settle any misperceptions.

By comparison, India’s partnerships with South-East Asian countries and Japan, described as the ‘Look East’ policy, are working as well as its partnership with the US. Although India has been a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum since 1996, relations intensified in the footsteps of the partnership with the US. There was a rapid rise in trade, joint naval exercises and military-to-military exchanges, and India joined the ASEM process and the East Asia Summit (EAS) forum. Maritime cooperation between India, South-East Asian countries and Japan is primarily aimed at protecting commercial sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and East Asian straits, through which over 60% of the region’s energy imports are shipped. In 2007 India and Japan held joint exercises with Singapore in the Malacca Straits; with the US off the Japanese coast; and in the Bay of Bengal with the US, Singapore and Australia. They also held a quadrilateral meeting on the sidelines of the annual East Asia Summit.

That said, India’s partnerships with Japan and South-East Asia are qualitatively different. ASEAN-India trade far outstrips India-Japan trade, and India and the South-East Asian countries have deep ‘civilisational ties’, in the words of former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, that are reinforced by the presence of large Indian diasporas in several South-East Asian countries (for example, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand). India’s Look East policy combines realpolitik and peacemaking goals: a key hope is that India’s conflict-ridden north-east will become a trade and cultural bridge to South-East Asia and that conflict will thereby be mitigated.

**Acting as a ‘responsible power’**

US, Indian and EU interpretations of this phrase are very different. The US and the EU see it as denoting a global Responsibility to Protect human rights and promote democracy, if absolutely nec-
essary even by military means. India upholds the principle of state sovereignty, but is ambiguous on what the limits of sovereignty are. Basically, the Indian position is to be lenient with the decolonizing and emerging states, sometimes on the premise that nascent state and civil societies need nurture rather than criticism and at other times because it is in its own national interest. For example, India supported the UN sanctions against apartheid South Africa but opposed those against President Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Recently, India’s ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva opposed placing Afghanistan’s controversial bill on Shia family law on the UN’s list of human rights infringements on the ground that this was an internal matter. (Note that Indian women’s groups deplore this position of their government.)

Perhaps the two biggest issues between India, the US and the EU have been humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Despite its sympathy for the situations in Bosnia and Kosovo, India opposed humanitarian intervention there as undermining state sovereignty. Most Indian policy makers and analysts do not see any difference between European policies in Bosnia and Kosovo and the US-led coalition’s invasion of Iraq. Humanitarian intervention, they argue, is no different from regime change or ‘shock and awe’: it is merely a cover for imperial design. The R2P proposals are similarly tarnished, even though they were made by the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. An eminent Indian general, Satish Nambiar, was on the panel.

In some respects, too much is made of these debates, because India has nonetheless supported and participated in humanitarian operations as long as they were in conformity with international law and were mandated by the UN or were carried out at a government’s request. In recent years India’s involvement in multilateral humanitarian missions has increased in terms of both personnel and aid, and Indian peacekeeping doctrine has moved closer to acceptance of the use of force in situations of grave civilian threat (again, only when under a UN mandate). In Sierra Leone, Indian peacekeepers were the first to try peace enforcement and the first to experience it (the UK had a similar failure soon thereafter). Since India joined the UN Peacebuilding Commission, peacemaking capabilities are likely to be included in its foreign policy doctrine in the coming decade. It is too early to predict whether India’s contributions will be primarily civilian, as its
peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan. But given the Indian military’s track record in UN peacekeeping, where it has been one of the largest troop contributors for nearly 50 years, it is likely that its contribution to international peacebuilding will have both military and civilian components.

Indian policy analysts appear to have been overtaken by the government on R2P. In 2005, at the UN World Summit, India was among the countries that agreed to R2P principles (with application to genocide and associated crimes). And in the July 2009 UN General Assembly debate on R2P, India went further, accepting that coercive action might be necessary in cases of a failure to protect, so long as it is seen as a last resort, when all other measures have been tried and failed.

Nevertheless, India’s views of what it means to act as a responsible power prioritise different measures than those used by the US and the EU. According to outgoing Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon, to build peace in the neighbourhood India looks to create social partnerships, offer economic benefits such as zero tariffs for the poorer South Asian countries, support cross-border infrastructure and development projects, stress ‘civilisational linkages’ that emanate from the ancient flow of people and ideas, and work for intra-regional trade through SAARC, ASEAN and the EAS.

Turning to the broader Asian neighbourhood, the first striking point is that India’s Look East policy has clearly been a primary impetus for India’s recent economic growth. India’s trade with East and South-East Asia makes up close to 40% of its total trade volume, virtually matching its trade with EU countries and the US. The focus on maritime interests is also a new departure in the area of collective regional security: India has found it easier to develop strong relations with its neighbours at sea than with its land neighbours, and these successes have influenced Indian doctrine. Today, Indian policy makers see the country as ‘at the confluence of two seas’, to use the words of the 17th century Indian ruler Dara Shikoh, rather than bound by the Himalayas.

Although India’s strategic partnerships with the US and the EU had somewhat different goals from its Look East policy – in Menon’s words the goals were ‘access to markets, high technology and resources crucial to our future economic growth and development’ – they have both boosted trade and maritime cooperation. There is also cautious cooperation between Indian, US and Euro-

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pean security organisations on a few multilateral operations. For example, in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) that was set up after conclusion of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the 2000 Indian troops there had NATO air supplies and support (under an arrangement with the UN in which the UN would provide ground troops and NATO would provide logistical support).

On peacemaking abroad, India is closer to the ASEAN position than to the US or EU positions. It is generally reluctant to intervene on contentious human rights or political issues, and it prefers to be invited to help by the concerned government rather than being pressured to act. However, in the past five years India has engaged in active, sometimes shuttle diplomacy in Sri Lanka and Nepal to promote reconciliation and political solutions that are supported by the international community. In years to come there will probably be more India-US-EU policy convergence and coordination in resolving conflicts in South Asia conflicts, especially on stabilisation and development programmes and using the instruments of diplomacy and aid. (There could be similar cooperation on conflicts outside South Asia and its immediate neighbourhood, but there are few signs that either the US or the EU are seeking India’s cooperation.)

**Conclusion**

Several conclusions can be drawn from this account of the development of Indian policy. First, India is becoming a part of a new global consensus on peace and security, as evidenced by its changed position on the UN concept of the Responsibility to Protect and its membership of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. In the next five years I expect to see India develop its peacebuilding capabilities in both the civilian and military spheres (in coordination). Second, India will face major security challenges in its neighbourhood, because China’s urge to contain India and its new role in Afghanistan will bolster Pakistan’s hostility towards India. The perception that the US should leave Afghanistan, shared by many European countries, will strengthen this negative trend. This is an issue to be flagged for India-US and India-EU discussion. Third, India’s engagement in global security will in part depend on what the international community does to prevent security threats to India in its neighbourhood. This challenge can be compensated by
giving India a seat on the UN Security Council, but that seems far away. If there ever is a move to take in India, it will have to be at a European initiative since the Obama administration does not appear to have placed UN Security Council reform high on its agenda. Fourth, for a global security consensus to emerge, the changing security dynamic in East Asia has to be given attention.

India can play a leadership role in forging a global security consensus, but only if its national security concerns are factored into such a consensus. Whether this will happen depends on how strongly India puts its case and on how strongly the international community responds.
The limits of a global consensus on security: the case of Russia

Andrei Zagorski

Introduction

The official Russian foreign policy doctrine, as it has evolved over the past several years, tends to view the world as in a transition from the bipolar confrontation of the cold war and a short period of attempted but failed US domination, moving towards a more diverse landscape based on a changing distribution of power. With the new world economic and political centres, the West is gradually losing its monopoly on the setting of universal standards and values. The rising powers are claiming a greater say in determining the rules of the game. Particularly the current economic crisis has boosted new regionalism as a counterweight to economic globalisation and the political and ideological interventionism of the Western powers. In the current era of both harder competition and greater cooperation among the leading nations, Russia is returning to world politics as an influential sovereign state that can effectively protect its national interests.

Against this background, on 12 May 2009 the most recent National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation was endorsed by President Dmitry Medvedev. It is meant to guide Russian security policy until 2020 and is subject to regular review.

Most commentaries have praised the comprehensive nature and innovative approach of this document because of its broad definition of national security, with both external and domestic dimensions, projected through the prism of stable, sustainable development. Apart from addressing traditional security requirements, such as the need to defend Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity from external threats and to ensure state security domestically, it encompasses such goals as developing democracy and civil society, raising citizens’ living standards, reversing demographic decline, supporting the middle class, shrinking the gap between rich and poor, improving public health, enhancing economic growth and competitiveness, combating corruption, and

advancing scientific and technological development, environmental protection and resource conservation. It elevates economic modernisation to one of the major goals of Russian national security policy.

It is very tempting to look for a shift in Russian policy towards a broader post-modern understanding of security. This would imply that Russia is open to the relatively new concept of human security, but such a reading of the new Russian security doctrine would be misleading.

**A broad definition of security**

A broad definition of security is not new for Russia. It is prescribed in the 1992 Law on Security of the Russian Federation, last amended in 2007. The law defines security policy as safeguarding from domestic and external threats the vital interests, individual rights and freedoms, and material and spiritual values of society as well as the constitutional order, sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the state. It gives priority to the provision of individual (human) security and ranks the economic and political means of achieving security above the traditional security policy instruments.

As required by the 1992 law, which also defined the extremely broad mandate of the Security Council of the Russian Federation in drafting relevant doctrines, every National Security Strategy (or concept, as it was previously called) has been comprehensive. They have dealt with virtually every issue on the national agenda. As a result, the regularly approved doctrines tended to reflect the mainstream political discourse and rhetoric. They defined or guided the real security policy of the Russian Federation to a much smaller extent.

Over the past 17 years, this broad definition of national security has not helped shape a similarly comprehensive national security policy. Policy was driven predominantly by developments and concentrated on issues which, for whatever reason, the president of the country or his administration considered vital or important. Thus, the comprehensive security approach enshrined in the 1992 law was never fully implemented in actual policy, which instead focused on a few chosen pieces of the complex mosaic of the relevant security landscape to which resources were allocated.

At the same time, in recent years not only the Russian security landscape but also Russian security policy thinking has changed in recognition of the changing nature of the main transnational security threats and challenges of globalisation. Appreciation of the importance of security policy instruments other than defence followed this evolution. However, traditional hard security issues have continued to figure prominently on the agenda of Moscow’s security relations, especially relations with the West, and in particular with the US and NATO.

The Russian security community has not embraced the postmodern security concepts that have evolved, particularly in the European Union. Russian security actors define Russia mainly as a lone warrior in the globalized world, in an ever tougher competition with other major nations and seeking to protect its own national interests.

This understanding of the contemporary world and of the future world order not only motivates the Russian political elite to reassert the status of the country as a big power but also results in a reading of the concept of ‘multilateral diplomacy’ as very different from the EU’s concept of effective multilateralism. From Moscow’s perspective, ‘multilateral diplomacy’ should develop into a sort of ‘concert’ of the leading – and responsible – nations of the world to improve cooperation among them and to establish common rules for governing and reducing the growing competition among them. Such a concert should be based on a bargain over the individual interests of its members rather than on any common values of a group of like-minded nations.

While focused predominantly on its understanding of its own national interests, Russia seeks to project stability and security across its borders. Owing to limited resources, it concentrates primarily on its immediate neighbourhood. In doing so, it largely rejects the concept of ‘good governance’ as a key strategy for the stabilisation of weak or authoritarian regimes. As in its domestic politics, Russia defines international security and stability mainly in terms of preserving the stability of existing and Russia-friendly political regimes. The promotion of democracy and the rule of law is seen as merely a tool of various ‘regime change’ strategies that lead to political destabilisation rather than stabilisation in the target areas.

Economic development is another aspect of Russia’s evolving security thinking. Economic policy was supposed to be developed
and laid down in another strategy document but it has not yet matured or materialized. As a result, economic cooperation with neighbouring and underdeveloped countries is predominantly reduced to either assisting friendly regimes in order to buy their loyalty to Moscow or nurturing and protecting the Russian economic or business elites’ interests. Both strategies are seen as part of the global and regional competition for political influence and the legitimate pursuit of economic interests.

Against this background, it is not surprising that Moscow’s security thinking and policy are far from embracing the modern (although rather vague) concept of human security, which is still largely unknown to or not understood by the majority population, particularly the mainstream Russian security community.

### Evolution of the Russian perception of threats and security policy

The change in security thinking that had taken place in the Russian Federation over the preceding two decades was summarized by President Medvedev in 2008, at the beginning of his presidency: ‘Security that we need today is not from each other, not to speak of against anybody else, but from trans-border threats’.  

Indeed, the Russian security community’s perception of the security threats to the country has changed dramatically in the post-cold war period. This change was captured in a survey conducted in 2006 on the security perceptions of Russian parliamentarians and experts.

The respondents identified the five most challenging security threats to Russia. They were, in descending order, criminalisation of the economy, migratory pressures, narcotics trafficking, and terrorist attacks against the state or society and those against critical infrastructure. These were closely followed by the perceived danger of an ethnic conflict near Russia’s borders. The survey also indicated that, in the years to come (until 2010), such issues as pressures generated by migration and, to a lesser extent, the challenge of narcotics trafficking were likely to increasingly absorb the attention of the Russian security community. At the same time, security experts expected that developments in and outside Russia would divert attention to environmental issues and ethnic conflicts in its neighbourhood – largely at the expense of attention to terrorist attacks.
Traditional external military threats such as conventional war and nuclear/radiological or biological/chemical attack, came very low down on the list of perceived threats, along with the emerging threat of a cyber attack. Traditional security policy preoccupations were thus no longer high on the agenda of either politicians or experts.

The perception that threats to Russia’s security emanate from other states underwent a similar transformation. Although many respondents singled out the hegemonic policy of the United States and NATO’s eastward enlargement as threats to Russia’s security, their vision of the geographic spread of existing and future security threats and challenges was much more differentiated. China, Central Asia, Afghanistan, South Caucasus and the Middle East figured prominently in the 2006 survey as a source of transnational security threats such as interstate environmental problems, illegal narcotics trafficking and migration, regional instability along the Russian borders and terrorist activities.

In general, the respondents saw external non-state actors as an almost equally important source of threats to Russia’s security, while around a quarter of them pointed out that many security threats originated within Russia itself.

The 2006 survey also reinforced the basic assumption that changes in the threat assessment would result in different thinking about the best policy instruments to meet the most acute threats. The respondents did not see traditional military means as an adequate response to the predominantly non-traditional security challenges that they perceived as most important for the time being or the near future. At the same time, they attached nearly the same importance to such policy instruments as (in descending order) police cooperation and intelligence sharing, diplomacy, economic and financial assistance, and special operations.

This combination of police cooperation, intelligence sharing and special operations clearly dominated thinking on how to combat criminalisation of the economy, narcotics trafficking, and the threat of all sorts of terrorist attacks. Diplomacy and economic and financial assistance, supported by police cooperation and intelligence sharing, were perceived as a more appropriate combination of tools to meet the challenges generated by migration and ethnic conflicts.

The results of the 2006 survey corresponded to two major trends in the Russian security discourse as it has evolved since the
1990s. First, Russia was gradually shifting from a focus on traditional external military threats to new types of threat, including soft security challenges such as illegal migration and narcotics trafficking and, from the late 1990s, terrorism. Second, the evolving Russian discourse was characterized by an increasing preoccupation with domestic security challenges as opposed to those emanating from outside the country.

These trends were most explicitly reflected in the revised Russian foreign policy doctrine that was approved in July 2008. It is based on the conclusion that the most relevant contemporary global security threats and challenges are those related to the danger of terrorist attacks, illegal narcotics trafficking and transnational organized crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, regional conflicts, demographic challenges, the spread of poverty, shortage of energy resources, illegal migration or climate change. It specifically mentions the relevance of environmental protection and the prevention of pandemics.5

Any assumption of a significant shift in the Russian security community’s thinking about contemporary threats and the appropriate policy instruments to meet them must be supported by new security policy, especially as reflected in budgetary allocations.

Figure 1

The share of defence and national security appropriations in the Russian federal budget (1997-2009, in %)

Source: Data from the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, http://www.minfin.ru. Data from 2005 are recalculated according to the method applied since 2008.
The Russian state budget has two separate aggregate lines for expenditure: one for appropriations for national defence and another for national security. The latter includes in particular spending on the General Prosecution Office and its branches, the Ministry of the Interior, interior troops, judicial bodies, the penitentiary system, security agencies, border security, combating narcotics trafficking, civil emergencies, fire security, and migration policy (all predominantly instruments of domestic politics).

Both budgets were increased until 2008, with a steeper rise for national security appropriations. While in 1997 security spending comprised around 45% of Russia’s defence appropriations, in 2007 it comprised 83% and from 2008 an even bigger share (see also figure 1).

Fire security, the migration service, the justice system, prosecution offices, the penitentiary system, interior troops, drugs control and interior affairs agencies were the main recipients of these growing security sector allocations. As shown in figure 2, the respective sub-budgets grew over the past five years above the average increase of national security allocations, not to speak of those for defence. In 2009 the allocations for border security, prosecution offices, interior affairs, civil emergencies, the penitentiary system and fire security were not raised as much as the national security budget in general, while allocations for the justice system and drugs control were reduced at the average rate of the security budget.

These data clearly show that the Russian Government continued to assign greater importance to (domestic) security issues than to defence. In the former category, the government increasingly invested in the improvement of law enforcement and in the institutions established to address the new transnational soft security challenges, particularly those emanating from illegal (im)migration, drugs trafficking and civil emergencies. This conclusion generally corresponds to the current threat perceptions of the Russian security community.

6. The official defence budget includes appropriations administered by the Defence Ministry. From 2008, a number of items (mobilisation preparedness of the economy, defence-related nuclear programmes and international defence-industrial cooperation) have been excluded from these data. Before 1998 those items took around 3% of total defence appropriations.
The contrasting official doctrine

The Russian security community’s threat perceptions were not reflected in either public opinion or official rhetoric and doctrine. This became particularly evident after the tough speech that former President (now Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin delivered at the Annual Munich Security Conference in April 2007, and this did not change after Medvedev was elected president. On the contrary, although he has pursued his proposal for a European Security Treaty, hard security issues are still a major concern. This has led many observers to suggest that Russian security policy is becoming focused on traditional defence and hard security issues:

‘Increasingly, the armed forces and a vision of security as emphasizing hard rather than soft security have come to the fore in Moscow’s national security policy process. Due to this institutionally-driven vision, Russia sees itself facing increasing military-political and strategic threats all along its frontiers.’

Source: Data by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation: www.minfin.ru
Indeed, despite the new broad, comprehensive approach to security, Russian policy towards the West is largely, although not exclusively, focused on traditional hard security issues. NATO enlargement, the US’s plans to deploy components of a ballistic missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic, both nuclear and conventional arms control as well as a ban on the deployment of weapons in outer space became the central points of a controversy that has affected Russia’s relations with the West, particularly the United States, since 2007.

Russia’s preoccupation with these issues is widely shared by the general public. A Russia-wide opinion poll conducted in September 2008 by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences revealed a reversal of the perceptions of threat compared to the polls conducted in the 1990s and early in this decade. The prospect of Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership of NATO ranked highest among threats perceived by the Russian public (46%), followed by the danger of involvement in a protracted conflict in the Caucasus (39%), international terrorist activities (35%), the outbreak of World War III as a result of mounting international instability (33%), the strengthening of the global military-political power projection capabilities of the United States (29%), the prospect of deployment of US ballistic missile defence systems in East Central Europe (26%), the danger of pandemics (25%), a deterioration of Russia’s relations with other post-Soviet states (24%) and of US-Russian relations (22%), the global financial crisis (16%), the widening gap between rich and poor nations (15%), and the danger of an international isolation of Russia (9%).

The 2009 National Security Strategy manifested a return to predominantly traditional security thinking in Russia. It acknowledges many international developments as increasing the vulnerability and affecting the security of states, particularly Russia, vis-à-vis the challenges of globalisation. These developments include:

- The eventual recidivism of unilateral power politics by individual nations
- The increasingly conflicting relations between the major actors in international affairs
- The threat that weapons of mass destruction will come into the possession of terrorist groups
- New forms of illegal activity that use information, biological and other sophisticated technologies

More intensive information warfare
- Threats to the stability, social and economic development and the democratic institutions of both developed industrial and developing countries
- The rise of nationalism, xenophobia, separatism and aggressive extremism, including groups acting under a banner of religion
- Deterioration of the global demographic situation
- Environmental degradation
- Growing uncontrolled illegal migration, narcotics trafficking and trafficking of human beings as well as other forms of transnational organized crime
- New pandemics
- Shortage of drinking water.

The effect of these challenges is aggravation of existing conflicts and the emergence of new interstate and regional conflicts emanating from the competition for access to natural resources, including water and food, as well as mounting friction among them generated by the gap between rich and poor nations.

Indeed, the understanding of the sovereign state as the single most important actor, and interstate relations and conflicts as the single most important determinant of international affairs in general and of international security in particular, remains central to the Russian worldview. The latter largely dismisses the post-modern approaches emphasising the relative nature of state sovereignty and the increasing importance of the transnational interaction of non-governmental actors as a result of globalisation.\(^9\)

The international security landscape, as noted in the 2009 National Security Strategy, is in the long term expected to be shaped by interstate conflicts (competition), primarily over the scarce energy resources of the Middle East, the Barents Sea and other parts of the Arctic region, the Caspian Basin and Central Asia. Second, since the world is expected to be increasingly less oriented to the West, the assertion of alternative values and ways of life (e.g. the Chinese or the Russian social models) is seen as another possible source of interstate conflict. The perception of mounting interstate competition and conflict leads Moscow to conclude that the use of force will become more, not less, likely in the future. This is an even more urgent consideration seen against the background of the probable proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.

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9. See e.g. the statement of Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at MGIMO University on 1 September 2009: http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/5A8819A0990D110EC325762400464E6C.
Moscow expects traditional hard security affairs to deteriorate further, both at the global level and near its borders. In this context, the main goal of Russia’s security policy is to prevent wars and armed conflicts, and to deter any aggressor state or coalition of states.

The 2009 National Security Strategy generally follows the rules of political correctness and avoids attaching specific countries to particular threats. The US is mentioned only once in the document, but it is impossible to miss the underlying point that the United States is seen as the major threat to the security of the Russian Federation. The military threats identified in the strategy document include the policy of ‘a number of leading foreign countries’ that aims at achieving overwhelming military superiority, primarily in the realm of strategic nuclear forces, by developing high-precision weapons and the means of IT warfare, by developing strategic arms with conventional munitions, and by unilaterally deploying a global ballistic missile defence system and weapon systems in outer space. Only the US fits this description.

Another set of threats to Russian military security is the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery vehicles.

Threats to the state (constitutional order) and public security that are identified in the 2009 National Security Strategy include the activities of foreign intelligence and other special services; terrorist organisations; nationalistic, religious, ethnic and other forms of extremism; and transnational organized crime involved in the illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons, explosives or other criminal activities. They also represent for Russia a source of corruption.

The assertion of Russia’s status as one of the leading world powers is meant to serve the purpose of entering Russia in the global competition that is expected to intensify in the years to come and of ensuring that the relevant Russian national interests are respected, not ignored, by other major powers. This would enable Moscow to contribute to maintaining strategic stability and to perform as a respected partner in a multi-polar world. Against this background, other key Russian objectives – including modernisation and diversification of the economy, sustainable economic growth, and improving public administration and the delivery of public goods – all serve the purpose of preparing the nation for the envisaged era of global competition and reducing Russia’s vulnerability to external crises, in particular the economy and finance sector.
Multilateralism and regionalism in Russian security policy

As noted above, Moscow pursues a concept of multilateral diplomacy\(^\text{10}\) that differs from the EU’s concept of effective multilateralism. Russia’s concept is based on the belief that there is a need to construct a system of global governance in the form of a concert of great powers based on national interests rather than on shared values.

The March 2007 issue of *The Russian Federation Foreign Policy Review*\(^\text{11}\) calls for improving governance by establishing a ‘collective leadership of leading states with objective special responsibility for the state of world affairs’, as opposed to the leadership ambitions of a single superpower or a group of like-minded nations. This concept assumes that any concerted multilateral policy would be negotiated among the member states, which would include the Russian Federation. It also assumes that Moscow would not accept as legitimate any decisions by organisations with exclusive membership, such as NATO\(^\text{12}\) or the European Union, when they go beyond their direct area of responsibility and take decisions without due consultation with and approval of the Russian Federation.

At the global level, Moscow emphasizes the central role of the United Nations and the UN Security Council as the single most legitimate forum for multilateral diplomacy and responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council is seen as the natural, appropriate body for political consultation among its permanent members, with Russia among them.

Over recent decades, Moscow has also learned to appreciate informal intergovernmental institutions with limited membership, such as the G8 and the recently established G20, as relevant forums in which to enhance global governance, although such institutions should not duplicate the work of or substitute for the central role of the UN Security Council. While Moscow values Russia’s membership in such exclusive clubs it also considers them as too Western – not representative of the diverse contemporary world. Hence, Moscow proceeds on the basis that the ‘collective leadership ... ought to be representative in geographic and civilizational terms’\(^\text{13}\) and reflect the new distribution of world power by including such rising powers as China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa.

At the same time, the Russian commitment to multilateralism is ambivalent. The emphasis on the principle of sovereignty, and

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12. The 2009 National Security Strategy contains explicit criticism of the alleged ambition of NATO to take on a global responsibility.
the wish to remain independent in international affairs, particularly in its immediate neighbourhood, often cause Moscow to act unilaterally or in ad hoc coalitions. When confronted with the choice of either joining multinational efforts or acting bilaterally or unilaterally, Moscow usually opts for the latter option.

There are numerous examples of this pattern of behaviour. Although Russia was one of the original founders of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in 1999, it has not supported any of the projects created at donors’ conferences. Instead, it has for example contributed to economic reconstruction in Serbia on the basis of bilateral arrangements. The same policy characterized Russian policy in 2003 after the war in Iraq had ended and in Lebanon in 2006. These examples illustrate how Moscow’s reluctance to join in multinational efforts, even though it is prepared to devote resources to multilaterally agreed objectives.

Moscow has championed the concept of ‘regional multilateralism’, particularly in its immediate neighbourhood. The 2009 National Security Strategy praises the unique value of the Russia-sponsored Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and of the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC), both of which include a number of the Soviet successor states, primarily in Central Asia. Russia also recognizes the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in building confidence in Central Asia with the participation of China. All three organisations fit Moscow’s concept of the role of regionalism: to ensure that regional security threats are met primarily by regional actors so that extra-regional powers or organisations have no legitimate reason to intervene.

The CSTO and the SCO are the two main regional security organisations in which Russia plays the leading role in addressing non-traditional security threats, such as combating terrorism, extremism and separatism as well as illegal drugs trafficking and migration. Regional countries cooperate much more closely in these areas with each other than with the European Union or the United States.

The inherent logic of the Russian concept of multilateralism and the emphasis on state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs largely explain Russia’s reluctant, ambivalent approach to the new concept of the Responsibility to Protect. Moscow did not try to block the inclusion of this concept in the concluding document of the 2005 World Summit. Furthermore,
with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1674 it rec-
ognized that ‘the deliberate targeting of civilians and other pro-
tected persons, and the commission of systematic, flagrant and
widespread violations of international humanitarian and human
rights law in situations of armed conflict, may constitute a threat
to international peace and security’ and may require ‘appropriate
steps’. Indeed, in August 2008 Moscow sought to justify its mil-
itary intervention in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict by
referring *inter alia* to its Responsibility to Protect the civilian pop-
ulation in South Ossetia.

At the same time, Russia had vehemently opposed the legiti-
macy of the humanitarian intervention by NATO in Kosovo in
1999 and in general does not accept the theory of limited sover-
eignty implied by legitimizing international intervention. The
only cases in which Russia recognizes a legitimate application of
the Responsibility to Protect is by decision of the UN Security
Council. This would imbed the concept in the existing legal world
order while allowing Russia to veto such a decision whenever it
deems that there is no need to apply this principle.

The concept of *human security* is virtually absent in Russia’s
security doctrine and discourse, despite its ambition to be recog-
nized as a security provider in the post-Soviet countries in ‘areas of
responsibility’ or of ‘privileged interest’, in the words of President
Medvedev.

While pursuing this ambition, however, Moscow prioritizes its
own national interests either in improving regional stability to
prevent local or regional conflicts or in strengthening its positions
in the projected global competition for access to natural resources
in the Caspian Basin and Central Asia or in ensuring the loyalty of
local regimes.

In pursuing its national interests, Moscow relies predominantly
on traditional instruments, such as military cooperation, troop
deployments, the supply of weapons and cooperation among rele-
vant law enforcement agencies. Russian investment in the
economies of its neighbouring states is reduced to a few attractive
sectors, such as energy and raw materials extraction, telecommu-
nications and banking. The 2007 *Foreign Policy Review* mentioned
above announced the idea of elaborating a Russian doctrine of
development aid to benefit, in the first instance, Russia’s closest
neighbours and allies. However, it has failed to develop such a con-
cept, and the financial crisis has further delayed work on it.
In the rare cases of Russian engagement abroad, Moscow applies mainly traditional means of military power and is prepared to accept the collateral damage that this may incur. The massive Russian intervention in Georgia in August 2008 is but one example of the application of this policy.

Against this background, it is not surprising that the Russian Federation has not signed or ratified the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (APM Convention) or the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (in the latter case, Moscow referred to the ongoing negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a more elaborate and comprehensive convention on cluster munitions).

Russia is not seen as championing the cause of enhanced security and stability through promoting democratic concepts and practices, the rule of law and good governance. On the contrary, it finds the Western states’ policy on good governance, the rule of law and human rights counterproductive and serving to undermine the legitimacy of the predominantly autocratic political regimes in its neighbourhood. Moscow perceives Western policy in these areas as serving Western interest in installing West-oriented regimes in Russia’s neighbourhood. From Moscow’s perspective, this will lead to regional destabilisation and the installation of Russia-hostile political regimes in the post-Soviet states, which would endanger Moscow’s position in the global competition for natural resources. Moscow sees its own policy as a strategy of tolerance and support of the Russia-friendly political regimes in its neighbourhood, even the most autocratic ones.

**Limits of a rapprochement with the West**

In Russian policy, there is an apparent gap between an increasing recognition of the relevance of new transnational threats and a predominantly traditional security doctrine that focuses on interstate conflict or war. However, the discrepancy is not as big as it may seem.

While hard security issues dominate Russia’s agenda for its relations with the West – primarily with the United States but also NATO – they constitute a relatively minor part of the agenda for relations with its immediate neighbours or Asian partners. This
generally applies, with the notable exception of Moscow’s attempts to construct a sort of defence alliance with a few other post-Soviet states in order to erect a glacis to regional conflict and to formalize its geographic area of security responsibility. Practical cooperation between Russia’s law enforcement agencies and those of most Central Asian states and China is much closer than its cooperation with the European Union or the United States.

This state of affairs can be explained along the following lines:

- First, Moscow does not have the kind of hard security legacy in its relations with its neighbours or even with China as it has inherited from its relations with NATO, particularly the United States. US policy and particularly NATO’s waves of enlargement are seen in Russia as the overwhelmingly most important revisionist forces that could change the status quo in the post-Soviet area and deprive Moscow of what it perceives to be a geographic belt of security on its borders.

- Second, Russia considers the recently launched EU Eastern Partnership as a policy tool that could also change the political status quo in the post-Soviet space, while depriving Moscow of a geographic integration area of its own in this region.

- Third, both the United States and the European Union are generally seen as opponents rather than partners of Russia within the framework of the global competition for access to scarce resources. They are seen as seeking to promote their own interests at the expense of Russia’s.

- Fourth, as noted above, most of the new transnational security threats perceived by the Russian security community originate from the non-Western parts of the world. Many, if not most, of them are generated in Central Asia, China or the Near East. The EU and the US are in this context important but hardly critically so for Russia, and they only reluctantly address the threats to Russia.

As a result, Russia sees closer cooperation with regional actors as not only more important but also much easier, not least because it is not burdened with an ‘ideological’ Western tint, which would require more participatory forms of good governance and thus a transformation of the currently predominantly autocratic political regimes.

This overview suggests that there is no quick fix for the current disharmony between the Russian and European security dis-
courses. Russia would welcome closer cooperation with the European Union in addressing the new transnational threats but it can hardly be expected to be inspired by the concept of human security. If this were nonetheless to come about, it would rather be after hard negotiations on the input Russia wants and what the European Union could afford.

There is also little chance that intensified cooperation between Russia and the EU to address soft security threats could substantially contribute to alleviating the contemporary controversy with Russia on hard security issues such as NATO enlargement, ballistic missile defence and arms control. Such a development is unlikely, at least with the current Russian government, or at least as long as this or any other Russian government can live in the illusion of being self-reliant.

Conclusion

Despite a shift in Russian thinking and policy away from the traditional definition of security as defence of state sovereignty and territorial integrity against external encroachment towards contemporary transnational soft security challenges, particularly in Russia’s relations with the West, Moscow has persistently concentrated on hard security issues. NATO eastward enlargement, ballistic missile defence and arms control are back on the agenda of this relationship.

Russia believes that the new world order will be shaped by a progressive shift in the distribution of power in favour of non-Western states and that this will bring with it increasing competition over access to mineral resources and possibly interstate conflicts. The Russian political elite proceeds on its understanding that the new international security order should be negotiated on the basis of the national interests of the leading world powers rather than on Western values. In order to be able to protect its own national interests and be respected as one of the leading nations, Russia must be strong – not only in the military sense but also economically, financially, technologically and politically.

It is very unlikely that the Russian political elite will embrace post-modern security concepts such as human security at the expense of what it believes to be its national interests. As long as the West is unwilling to accept Moscow’s hard security demands,
based on its concerns, the promotion of post-modern concepts of human security, the prevention of further climate change, or the advancement of good governance and participatory democracy as an indispensable foundation for peace and political stability will be seen as merely an attempt to divert attention from the real security issues.
International security and African regional security: perspectives from South Africa

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos

Introduction

Since 1994, with the end of apartheid and South Africa’s return to the community of nations, the country has taken its role on the global stage very seriously. Although its primary focus has been on African issues, South Africa has also engaged on global issues in multilateral forums. It is convinced of the importance of multilateralism in dealing with global issues and has sought to play an active role in international organisations – notably in negotiating the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (APM or Ottawa Convention) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) five-yearly Review Conferences. Although South Africa believes that a rules-based multilateral system is important, it also believes that it can never be properly effective if it is not reformed to reflect the changing dynamics of power and greater justice and equity for developing states.

As an emerging regional power, South Africa wants to be more a rule maker than a rule taker. The country may also not necessarily share the West’s sentiments on the system and values that should underpin a new global order: South Africa and other new global actors feel an ‘ownership deficit’ in the rules governing the global system. Thus, while the overarching objective of maintaining global stability may be recognised by emerging actors, their means and methods of ensuring this may differ, as may their threat perceptions.

In the African continent, South Africa has largely – but not only – focused on conflict resolution, especially because of its own experience of a successful negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy. The country’s approach to continental peace-making was shaped by a combination of ‘values, experiences and practical considerations’.  

can make in preventive diplomacy is [to employ] the moral authority it has derived from its own process of national reconciliation and democratisation'.

South Africa’s identification of itself as an African state since 1994 and its recognition of the vastly transformed local and international conflict environment underpin the country’s foreign policy with regard to security. Pretoria acknowledges this, saying that,

Although South Africa acknowledges its global responsibilities, the prioritisation afforded Africa in South African foreign policy makes Africa the prime focus of future engagements. South Africa has an obvious interest in preserving regional peace and stability in order to promote trade and development and to avoid the spillover effects of conflicts in the neighbourhood.

Key drivers of South Africa’s decision to involve itself in addressing challenges of the continent were the need for Africans to take ownership of these problems; South Africa’s own economic might, which could make a positive contribution in this regard; and reinforcement of multilateralism, whether continental or global, to minimise unilateral external interference in the continent.

Framework for defining South Africa’s security

Very early after South Africa’s first democratic elections, in 1994, the country began identifying priorities in its foreign and security policies to take into account the vastly different regional and global environment. The framework for these policies has largely reflected a broader definition of security and one that is anchored strongly in Africa. This section examines South Africa’s own framework policy documents as well as its input to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which it joined in 1994, and in continental policy debates on security. In the 1990s the South African government adopted three policy papers that are relevant to the theme of this chapter: the 1996 White Paper on National Defence, the 1998 Defence Review, and the 1999 White Paper on Peace Missions.

2. Ibid.
Defence White Paper and defence review

With the end of apartheid and the change in both the global and regional strategic landscape it was necessary for South Africa to redefine its defence and national security based on the principles set out in its new constitution. In addition, the end of apartheid meant that South Africa was no longer at war with its neighbours.

The defence White Paper reflected this changing nature of security in the immediate post-cold war environment. A broader definition of security was already being discussed in international forums, and these debates shaped the focus and context of the White Paper. Thus, in the new South Africa national security was no longer viewed as a ‘predominantly military and police problem’ but rather as encompassing ‘political, economic, social and environmental matters’ and ultimately concerned ‘with the security of people’, i.e., human security.\(^4\)

The White Paper outlined the objectives of security policy at both the domestic and international levels. On the domestic front it should encompass ‘the consolidation of democracy; the achievement of social justice, economic development and a safe environment; and a substantial reduction in the level of crime, violence and political instability’. The greatest threats to the people of South Africa were poverty, unemployment, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, poor education, the lack of housing, the absence of adequate social services, and the high level of crime and violence. On the international front, security policy encompassed the ‘defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the South African state, and the promotion of regional security in Southern Africa’.\(^5\)

The White Paper highlighted the close correlation between South Africa’s and the region’s security – the two were mutually dependent:

> South Africa has a common destiny with Southern Africa. Domestic peace and stability will not be achieved in a context of regional instability and poverty. It is in South Africa’s long term interests to pursue mutually beneficial relations with other SADC states and to promote reconstruction and development throughout the region.\(^6\)

Thus, the paper stressed the need for a common approach to security in Southern Africa because ‘many of the domestic threats to individual states are shared problems and impact negatively on

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5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 20.
the stability of neighbouring countries’; ‘inter-state disputes could emerge in relation to refugees, trade, foreign investment, natural resources and previously suppressed territorial claims’; and internal conflicts could give rise to cross-border tensions and hostilities in an environment where national and regional institutions were weak.7

In the paper’s discussion of the strategic context it identified the post-cold war environment as being a ‘profound challenge to the notion of “sanctity” of state sovereignty and national borders’. It also noted that a ‘fault line’ was emerging between the North and the South, as the people in the latter were becoming poorer.8 This observation is extremely important if one is to understand South Africa’s growing stridency in global debates about the necessity for the creation of a more equitable global order.

The Defence Review followed in 1998 and elaborated on the framework set out by the White Paper. It affirmed the broad security definition that the White Paper had adopted and set out further non-military tasks that the defence force might have to deal with. However, as the review emphasised, the government was ‘disinclined’ to employ [the South African National Defence Force] SANDF in socio-economic development’. It felt that this blurred the distinction between the military and civilian spheres and it undermined the preparedness of the force with regard to its primary function – the defence of the country.

**White Paper on peace missions**

This review was followed by the White Paper on peace missions in 1999, drawn up largely by the Department of Foreign Affairs. This paper is probably one of the most significant foreign policy documents of the post-apartheid period, not only setting out the philosophical underpinnings of participation in peace missions but also focusing the minds of South African policy makers on what the country’s interests were in participating in peace missions. Addressing conflicts and crises sustainably required a long-term involvement. As Deputy Director General of Foreign Affairs Welile Nhlapo noted at the time, South Africa’s philosophy of peacekeeping was that no conflict can be solved only by addressing the symptoms and that it was crucial to delve into the causes to prevent an escalation or a recurrence.9 The drafters recognised that peace missions were far more complex and needed far more tools than simply

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7. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
8. Ibid., p. 17.
the military to be successful. Peacebuilding was as much a part of the mix of resolving the conflict as trying to end the fighting. Effective state governance, rule of law, and the protection of human rights were also necessary ingredients of peace missions and had to be factored into any strategy.\textsuperscript{10}

While the staging of free and fair elections normally marks the transition of the post-conflict state, this state has little chance to prosper unless emphasis is also placed on the essentials of efficient and effective governance, namely: adherence to the rule of law; competent and fair judiciaries; effective police services and criminal justice systems; professional civil services with an ethos of democratic governance […].

In this sense, this White Paper was in line with progressive and evolving thinking on peace and security internationally in the late 1990s. It was also very much a part of the country’s recognition that conflicts in Africa were inimical to its own interests. Contributing to conflict resolution was thus as much about self-interest as it was about altruism. Even before the development of the 1999 White Paper, South Africa had been approached to participate in peace missions by many Western countries that believed that, given its history, South Africa was an ideal candidate to become involved, especially on its continent. In the mid-1990s Africa had faced some horrific conflicts including the genocide in Rwanda and conflicts in Burundi and Zaire. Clearly, at the time it did not have the structural, administrative or practical resources to become involved, but by the late 1990s, as the domestic transformation was moving apace, the government was ready to begin assuming ‘part responsibility for stability in Africa and elsewhere’.\textsuperscript{11} The White Paper provided the framework for South Africa’s subsequent participation in various peace missions.

Continental security agenda
Much of South Africa’s thinking on security and the continent’s related challenges in the late 1990s and early 2000s also fed into the regional and continental debates. In this respect two documents are significant. The first is the Constitutive Act (CA) of the African Union, the organisation that replaced the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in 2002. The OAU was established during African

\textsuperscript{10} White Paper on Peace Missions, op. cit., p. 10.
\textsuperscript{11} Cilliers and Mills (eds), op. cit., p. 5.
decolonisation and had a classical non-interference approach to matters of domestic concern in its member states. However, the AU Constitutive Act was an extremely progressive document, which moved from the OAU’s principle of non-interference to one of non-indifference. Article 4(h) empowered the AU to intervene in the affairs of a member state to ‘prevent war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’. This was clearly an inversion of the previous principle that placed sovereignty above all else and had thus provided no protection to citizens from authoritarian leaders who acted with impunity. Under the CA, a two-thirds majority in the Assembly would be sufficient for intervention to be approved. This has no precedent in either international or regional interstate organisations. Furthermore, member states are committed to promote ‘respect for the sanctity of human life’, and Africans have the ‘right to live in peace’.

In the mid-1990s, first under President Nelson Mandela and then under President Thabo Mbeki, South Africa was a keen advocate of the inclusion of a human security agenda in the peace and security frameworks of the continent. Together with Nigeria, Algeria, Mozambique and Senegal, South Africa was instrumental in pushing for the inclusion in the AU Constitutive Act of the right to intervene in the affairs of member states in grave circumstances. Mbeki stated that the CA gives the AU ‘legislative powers to act against member states acting against the ethos of good governance and the rule of law’. South Africa’s position was consistent with the ideas espoused by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which was largely Mbeki’s brainchild and advocated a good governance agenda as an essential responsibility of African states.

An important innovation of the AU was the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which aims to ‘promote peace, security and stability in Africa’. The PSC can assess a potential crisis situation, send fact-finding missions to trouble spots, and authorise and legitimise AU intervention in internal crisis situations. The PSC came into being officially in 2004 and South Africa was elected as an inaugural member. South Africa has financed many of the PSC’s initiatives, including the AU’s first peacekeeping operation, the African Mission to Burundi (AMIB), while being one of the top five contributors to the AU’s budget.

The AU’s new peace and security architecture provided for an African Standby Force, which envisions the deployment of five

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brigade-sized forces in security hubs across the continent. This project is particularly ambitious and, in the short term, unachievable, largely because of capacity constraints and sometimes a lack of political will. South Africa was a key proponent of the idea: President Mbeki argued that, unless the AU had a force of this type at its disposal, the PSC could not enforce its decisions.

Regional security agenda

In the subregion, the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation was signed in 2001. The mandate of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security established by the Protocol, in Article 2.2(e-f), includes the objectives of promoting democracy and human rights within states, as well as considering ‘enforcement action’ to prevent, contain and resolve both inter- and intra-state conflict. However, this body suffers from capacity constraints and a weak secretariat, although it has engaged at the ministerial and summit level on the situation in Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Madagascar. Yet it continues to interpret these issues in the classic sovereign non-interference way.

A Mutual Defence Pact was signed in 2003, intended to operate as a collective African defence organisation. The pact envisages joint exercises and military training; military intelligence exchanges; and joint research, development and production/procurement of military equipment.\(^\text{14}\)

When the SADC Protocol and the CA were adopted, there was a sense that the ghosts of sovereignty that used to dominate any discussion of dealing with conflict on the continent would begin to dissipate. South Africa, together with Nigeria, was at the forefront of the movement for a more inclusive and people-centred security paradigm. However, this effort has been diluted in recent years, raising questions about whether the departure of Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and South African President Mbeki will further erode the practical application of the commitment to human security in Africa.\(^\text{15}\)

One of the major challenges that Southern Africa and the continent has to overcome is the gap between the very progressive thinking on human security and (often) the absence of political will to take these principles to their natural conclusion. Some of the reasons for this include issues of solidarity among African
leaders; concerns about setting a precedent for interference in their affairs and conduct; and, linked to all of this, the strong attachment to the principle of sovereignty, especially given that many of these states have been independent for less than half a century. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s use of sovereignty to underpin his arguments against any involvement by any external forces in Zimbabwe’s governance problems over the past decade, and his neighbours’ agreement (largely) in this matter, is a telling example.\textsuperscript{16}

In both its region and the continent, South Africa has promoted a people-centred security agenda. Implementation, however, has suffered from an unavoidable tension between respect for sovereignty and inevitable curtailing of sovereignty when a state has violated its responsibility to its people. South Africa itself has been far more cautious and circumspect in the application of such a security agenda on the continent, also displaying a gap between rhetoric and implementation. Much of this has to do with the fact that, although South Africa is a regional power, this mantle is very grudgingly bestowed upon it and it is very hesitant to act as ‘big brother’.

**Identifying internal and external threats**

The global security situation has changed dramatically since the latter half of the 1990s, especially since 2001 in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, which saw the re-emergence of a ‘hard security’ discourse, although sometimes couched in terms of democracy and good governance. While opposed to the attacks on the US, South Africa equally opposed the Bush administration’s war on terror.

With the exception of two pieces of domestic security legislation – the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act of 2004 (based on UN Security Council Resolution 1373/2001, which is binding on all member states) and the Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism that was adopted by the OAU, requiring member states to become party to instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities as soon as possible – no new policy documents have been developed in the first decade of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. (The Department of Defence began updating the 1998 Defence Review in 2004, but the new review was not completed by September 2009.)

\textsuperscript{16} In pre-election debate on South African foreign policy on SABC television in April 2009, an analyst raised the imperative of South Africa’s holding the Zimbabwean signatories to the September 2008 Global Political Agreement (on power sharing) to account. The response of the South African foreign minister, who was participating in the debate, was that Zimbabwe was a sovereign country and that thus South Africa could not impose on it. Clearly, behind the scenes, South Africa has engaged Zimbabwe on these issues, but there is an invisible line that it will not yet cross on the extent to which these parties should be pressured when they violate an agreement for which South Africa and SADC are the guarantors. This approach is markedly different from that of some Western countries in the arena of conflict resolution.
In 2009 South Africa faces no real conventional threat, although the high domestic crime rate is one of the most pressing issues facing the state. Many of the other threats it faces are largely transnational in nature and can only be addressed through cooperation in the region and globally. The new security threats related to environmental degradation, water scarcity, food security and migration have crystallised in the past few years. Especially in Southern Africa, these are very acute, compounded by the capacity constraints that the governments face.

Although South Africa’s definition of security reflects the broader concept of human security, the manner in which the country has engaged on these issues over time has evolved into one that interprets much of the security discourse, especially at global level, as being determined by the West (and since 9/11 by the US). This has played a singularly important role in South Africa’s responses to some of the global security debates as well as how it has operated at regional level. While terrorism and weapons of mass destruction have dominated the security debate in the US, this has rarely been highlighted as a priority by South Africa or the region. If anything, there has been a growing assertion that poverty and underdevelopment are greater threats to international security. In President Mbeki’s address to the UN General Assembly in 2004 he spoke about the impact of global power imbalances, which meant that the less powerful could not translate their very real concerns into action.17

Internal threats

Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has not faced the threat of an internal insurgency. Nor does it face any real conventional threat from across its borders. However, the onset of democracy was characterised by an increasingly violent crime phenomenon, not uncommon in societies undergoing political transition at that time.18 This went together with the rise in the operations of drug cartels and other organised criminal syndicates that identified South Africa as both a market and a conduit for their goods. Violent gang activity and related drug dealing have been on the rise. Weak social structures and cohesion have contributed to exacerbating this phenomenon, especially in the Western Cape.

Some categories of serious crime have declined in recent years, but crimes against women and children and overall levels of vio-
ence are still high. Little reliable information is available on the extent and nature of organised crime in South Africa and the region, but what is available includes vehicle hijackings, drugs and human trafficking. Some 370 syndicates operate in South Africa alone. The police service has tried with crime effectively as it struggled to transform the service from an apartheid police force into one aimed at fighting crime. It had to deal with serious skills shortages and corruption in the force. However, the police should not be the only instrument for dealing with crime. Violent crime is equally a manifestation of a broader social problem that requires the involvement of other state departments such as education and social development.

Migration policies
The government’s immigration policy has contributed to the criminalisation of migration and fuelling of xenophobia. The Department of Home Affairs is wracked by corruption and inefficiency. The outbreak of violence against foreigners in 2008 was a result of insufficient soft and hard security measures: service delivery failure, policy failure with regard to managing the high influx of migrants, and lax border controls.

Border policing
Since 2004 this responsibility has been entirely the police’s, whereas previously it was the army’s. According to the auditor general’s report of 2008 the border police were 70% understaffed. There was a 71% undercapacity with proposed staff of 970 but only 383 employed in July 2007 for land borders, and 19 of 448 posts filled for coastal duty. This situation has facilitated the operations of organised crime and the flow of migrants from various parts of the continent, who since 1994 have seen South Africa as the ‘promised land’ and who are often fleeing their own conflict-ridden countries of origin – whether the DRC, Somalia or Zimbabwe or other countries with limited economic opportunities.

Service delivery
The social context of high unemployment (around 26%) and poverty (about 50% of the population) presents big challenges to
the South African state. Weak implementation capacity in many local governments as well as at provincial and national level have created substantial resentment and dissatisfaction among the poor, who are also angry at the officials who enrich themselves.

External threats
South Africa’s external threats are largely non-conventional. They are transnational in nature or the indirect result of political instability in the region.

One of the most immediate threats is the indirect effect of political instability in its northern neighbour Zimbabwe, which has resulted in large numbers of Zimbabweans fleeing to South Africa and the spread of disease such as cholera from Zimbabwe in 2008-09. Furthermore, as the richest country on the continent, South Africa has attracted large numbers of other Africans, not all of them legal. While migration is not a threat per se, unless it is managed carefully it has the potential to cause instability. In May 2008 there was an outbreak of xenophobic violence in parts of South Africa that caused the death of about 60 mostly illegal immigrants who were killed by people living in poor communities. The army had to be called in to quell the violence and many foreigners were relocated to temporary refugee camps. This revealed weaknesses in the state apparatus on a number of fronts: the migration and refugee laws; border policing; and health and social infrastructure and service delivery.

Southern Africa is one of the most vulnerable regions in terms of the new security threats of climate change, water and food scarcity, migration and health pandemics, although there is not necessarily a linear progression from these to instability and conflict.

Responding to threats
SADC has adopted a number of protocols and plans aimed at addressing some of these challenges but their implementation is hampered by the weak institutional capacity of the organisation. Furthermore, with the exception of South Africa, most of the other member states also face institutional, financial and human resource constraints. This has been compounded by the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe, which previously was the
breadbasket of the region. In the area of food security the 2004 Dar es Salaam Declaration and Plan of Action on Agriculture and Food Security of SADC commits members to promote agriculture as a key element of their development strategies, allocating at least 10% of their national budgets to the agricultural sector, and to establish a regional strategic food reserve. Food security is also undermined by HIV/AIDS in a region with 37% of the total number of people with the disease globally. SADC adopted a framework plan on HIV/AIDS in 2003 and a business plan has been adopted to guide implementation, with some progress made. Apart from its impact on development, the epidemic also affects traditional security concerns, with infection rates in some militaries of the SADC states ranging from 20% to 60%. However, while the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO) on Politics, Defence and Security recognises the problems for security posed by AIDS, it does not articulate ‘the precise challenges faced by SADC’s political, defence, state and public sectors, nor describes measures to address them’.

In addressing the effects of climate change, South Africa, with a substantial carbon footprint (approximately 35% of Africa’s total emissions), carries some responsibility in taking action to reduce emissions. It is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol but as a developing state is not yet bound to the reduction targets. Clearly, this is likely to change in a post-Kyoto framework. South Africa’s national strategy on climate change identifies the development of renewable energy sources as a priority. It also calls for the rapid development of a national authority to facilitate implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism, which encourages rich countries to finance projects that reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in poor countries in return for credit against their own emissions targets. (South Africa has the highest number of Clean Development Mechanism projects in Africa.) However, in practice, South Africa is building more coal-fired power stations, while exploring alternative energy sources.

South Africa has assumed the role of lead negotiator among the African states at discussions on climate change and the environment but emphasises that developmental priorities should not be ignored. It advocates common but differentiated responsibility. At the 2007 Bali conference South Africa consistently pushed for increased funding for adaptation to developing countries through the UN body. At a September 2007 meeting on

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23. Ibid., p. 35.
energy security and climate change, South Africa’s minister of environmental affairs and tourism emphasised that,

‘[...] multilateralism must prevail. An ambitious and equitable framework must work for all parties. It must balance our stabilisation and sustainable development objectives and our mitigation and adaptation responses. It must deal with the unintended consequences of these responses. And it must be underpinned by an empowering technology and financing framework that allows developing countries to reach economic and human development goals quicker and cleaner than developed countries did.’

South Africa forms part of the G77+China in the negotiations leading up to the Copenhagen meeting in 2009. The bloc’s position is that member countries should not agree to binding targets on carbon emissions individually.

Conflict resolution
The South African government’s point of departure in its engagement on the continent is that the country cannot prosper if the rest of the continent is engulfed in strife. Its initiatives took the form of building up the referred regional and continental institutions for peace and security; becoming involved in mediation and conflict resolution negotiations; contributing forces to peace missions; and working at the global multilateral level to garner support for Africa’s developmental challenges.

Since 1994, South Africa has been involved in a number of conflict resolution attempts in Burundi, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan (Darfur), where South Africa chairs the AU post-conflict reconstruction committee. Zimbabwe and Lesotho may be added to this list. Its record is mixed, but it is not without notable interim successes. In Burundi and the DRC, South Africa’s efforts have resulted in a restoration of political contestation in both countries and in successful elections. These have produced fragile but functioning governments. South Africa’s biggest challenge now is to ensure that these settlements stay on track. In Lesotho, after the attempted coup and South Africa’s intervention in 1998, the country played a key role in the revision of the electoral system and the holding of elections. In Zimbabwe, the power-sharing agreement negotiated by President Mbeki, which was announced in

Global security in a multipolar world

September 2008, provides an opportunity for the political impasse to be broken in that country, but at the time of writing it had not been fully implemented. The parties’ full compliance with the terms of the agreement is still elusive. The effort in Côte d’Ivoire was unsuccessful and that in Darfur is ongoing.

In Somalia, South Africa has maintained that there is no military solution to the crisis in the Horn and has not yet articulated a policy on piracy there. At the September 2009 EU-South Africa summit, the EU asked South Africa to join the international fleet in the Horn, but it is concerned about its capacity and whether any EU-sanctioned operations would be funded by the EU.

South Africa has emphasised negotiated settlement as its preferred mode of conflict resolution, bringing all parties to the negotiating table, creating governments of national unity and seeking reconciliation. However, this template is not always appropriate and partly explains some of South Africa’s failings. It has also developed a reputation for siding with the incumbents in a conflict – whether it is ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe or Laurent Gbagbo in Côte d’Ivoire. It is thus not always regarded as an honest broker. Its sizeable economy, the largest in Africa, also adds a commercial element to perceptions of its involvement in other parts of the continent. Indeed, this element is not entirely absent from the country’s considerations, although it is not always well articulated or even applied.

While the jury is still out on the sustainability of its initiatives, South Africa has ploughed many resources into them, often with little commercial or political gain. A major constraint is that, for all its allocation of resources to conflict resolution, it has limited institutional back-up for senior political leaders mediating in peace processes to ensure that agreements are implemented.26

Furthermore, South Africa is the 17th largest contributor to UN peacekeeping globally. In May 2008, it had over 3,000 troops deployed in various AU and UN missions, including those in Burundi, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Uganda, Eritrea/Ethiopia and Darfur. With the possible exception27 of the Lesotho intervention in 1998, South Africa has never deployed troops outside of a multilateral mandate. However, peacekeeping operations will continue to be constrained even further by a drop in spending on defence from the current 4.4% of GDP to 1.9% in 2009 (projected).28 The global economic crisis, which has brought a recession for the first time since 1993, makes it unlikely that South

27. Technically, Botswana joined in the operation, although South Africa entered Lesotho a few hours before Botswana’s forces. The intervention initially lacked a SADC mandate, but this was subsequently conferred.
Africa will increase its defence budget. In addition, the high incidence of HIV/Aids in the South African National Defence Force further restricts operations.29

**R2P and conflicts in Africa**

South Africa was one of the key proponents of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine when it was adopted at the 2005 World Summit. With the accent on ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, the R2P doctrine reflected what had been adopted in the AU Charter’s article 4(h) in 2002. A number of other African states embraced the concept, including Benin, Rwanda and Tanzania, while others such as Algeria, Egypt and Sudan did not.30

Since 2005, however, some observers in the West argue that South Africa has back-slided on this doctrine.31 Its engagement in the field of conflict resolution on the continent is part of the application of R2P. However, the focus on R2P as military intervention, which sometimes overshadows the doctrine’s fuller mandate, has fuelled perceptions among some African states (and others in the developing South) that the doctrine is another way for former ‘colonial’ or ‘imperial’ powers to intervene in the domestic affairs of states.

There is a valid concern about the possibility of inconsistent application – that R2P will be applied against the weak and powerless in the international realm or that some powers may want to invoke it extremely broadly. For example, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner wanted to invoke R2P in the case of Hurricane Nargis in Myanmar, but South Africa and other states opposed his proposal. Unlike humanitarian intervention, R2P has been defined as narrower in scope but broader in the instruments at its disposal.32

South Africa is a party to the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) and has already incorporated it into its domestic legislation in the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act of 2002. It was the first state in Africa to do so. It did not support the indictment issued by the ICC in 2009 against President al-Bashir of Sudan but nevertheless made it clear that if President Bashir should enter the country he would be arrested.

Ironically, although sanctions were a vital tool of national liberation movements under apartheid to apply pressure on the...
National Party government to relinquish power, the South African government has been exceedingly averse to the use of sanctions since 1994. It has consistently opposed sanctions on Zimbabwe and Sudan, arguing that instead of resolving problems they compound them.

**Linking regional institutions with the UN**

During its tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2007-08, South Africa advocated closer cooperation in conflict resolution between the global body and regional structures. It proposed that the UN provide financial assistance and delegate some of its political and developmental tasks to regional organisations that share the same goals and interests. The South African position is that this would increase the efficiency of the UN and help fulfil chapter VIII of its Charter.

Underlying South Africa’s motivation is its advocacy for a larger voice for the Global South in both the UN and regional organisations in conflict resolution. In April 2008 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1809 on cooperation between the UN and the AU. In addition, one of the outcomes has been annual meetings between the UNSC and the AU Peace and Security Council. Indeed, a practical implementation of UN-AU cooperation was the introduction of the concept of ‘hybridisation’ of peace missions, as those in Sudan and Burundi.

Regional bodies are an important component of South Africa’s solution to problems of global security. It will therefore prefer to deflect issues of global insecurity to respective regional bodies rather than address them in the UNSC. Indeed, regionalism and multilateralism allow South Africa to be seen as a partner in resolving conflicts and promoting peace and stability rather than as a new hegemon. The challenge for South Africa is to help redefine security concepts in the area of overlap between regional organisations and the UN, and in the area of collective security when it comes to the nexus between security, development and democracy.

The flip side of ‘subsidiarity’ is that it may translate into an abdication of responsibility by the UN and important major powers in contributing to conflict resolution on the continent. This is clearly undesirable. In a recently published book, Alex Bellamy argues that the Constitutive Act of the African Union may imply
that the AU rather than the UNSC may ‘assume primary responsibility in the face of humanitarian emergencies’ and that African regionalism could be used to thwart efforts to mobilise action through it.\textsuperscript{35}

**Nuclear matters**

Since 9/11 the debate on weapons of mass destruction has dominated in the West. Not so in Africa. African states in general view the threat posed by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as greater. South Africa, as the only state to have voluntarily given up its nuclear weapons, in the early 1990s, has been a strong advocate of both non-proliferation and complete disarmament. In this regard, it has also complied with UNSC Resolution 1540 of 2004, which prohibits all states from providing any form of support to non-state actors attempting to acquire or produce WMD. South Africa has continuously reiterated that it is unacceptable that nuclear weapons are regarded as safe in the hands of some countries but not in the hands of others, and that all three pillars or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (i.e., disarmament, non-proliferation, and free access to nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes) need to be honoured. The issue is also an important aspect of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), with participating states emphasising their commitment to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In October 2007, South African Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma emphasised in this forum that ‘South Africa remains opposed to the view that the right to peaceful nuclear technology should be a preserve of the rich and powerful to the exclusion of the majority countries depriving the have-nots in perpetuity. The right to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is enshrined in Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and this right cannot be unilaterally abrogated by anyone’.\textsuperscript{36}

South Africa has no intention of restarting a nuclear weapons programme, but it does have plans in place to expand its civilian nuclear capabilities, with the possibility of exporting this technology to other countries in Africa.\textsuperscript{37} South Africa has generally promoted disarmament of the P5 and non-proliferation, in line with the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77. Together with Egypt, it is a member of the New Agenda Coalition, which advocates disarmament.\textsuperscript{38}


\textsuperscript{36} The IBSA Tshwane Declaration of 2007.


Conclusion

Perhaps the most significant constraint on South Africa’s responses to conflict in Africa is its own ambivalence. While Pretoria has put forth a bold vision and supported the building of Africa’s new diplomatic and security architecture, there remains an element of hesitation, possibly a legacy of South Africa’s apartheid past and concerns about being seen as the bully in the region. This has not meant disengagement from active involvement in problem solving in its backyard, but a lighter touch in terms of how much and what type of pressure it is willing to apply.

South Africa advocates the view that conflict resolution in Africa must be addressed and resolved by Africa and its institutions. At the same time it recognises that external, Western actors can assist, especially in providing funding and equipment, but by and large this needs to be in the context of an AU mandate.

The regional and continental institutions, with their various policy instruments for dealing with many of the challenges facing Africa, continue to experience serious resource constraints, which undermine their ability to bridge the gap between policy and action. This is coupled with the weak capacity of states themselves to provide either SADC or the AU with the requisite support and resources – and sometimes the political will to act – or to develop policies into tangible and coherent programmes.

In a world with a variety of actors and where multi-polarity is becoming the defining feature of the international system, emerging powers have to shoulder responsibilities for peace and security, first and foremost in their own neighbourhood but also in devising rules and systems in the multilateral sphere that provide for a more legitimate, effective framework for dealing with security threats. In doing so, they must invariably factor in that power and its projection will continue to be a crucial determinant in addressing conflicts and that there cannot be a fully equitable multilateral system that is also effective. For South Africa this also means that at both the global and continental level states with capacity and aspirations to play a positive role in promoting development and good governance will invariably have to take the lead so that consensus in a multilateral arena does not result in settling for the lowest common denominator.
The United States and the emerging global security agenda

Robert Hutchings

Introduction

We are in the midst of the most profound flux in world affairs since the creation of the Western alliance system in the late 1940s. The collapse of the cold war order, the rise of China and India as global powers, and the advent of novel transnational challenges have all combined to introduce new uncertainties into the global system. Seemingly unconnected, sudden events – the global financial crisis of 2008-09, the spread of swine flu, the rise in the price of oil to $140 per barrel, the breakdown of transatlantic solidarity over Iraq, the effects of the Indian Ocean tsunami and Hurricane Katrina, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and others – were not isolated events but rather interrelated consequences, direct or indirect, of the new era of globalisation. Globalisation was rendering obsolete the old dividing lines – East-West, North-South, developed-undeveloped, aligned-nonaligned – that had helped define the international order for half a century. Managing this revolution in world affairs demands nothing less than a new international system.

The nature of these challenges calls for concerted international action, because no country – not even the United States, with its unrivalled power – could successfully address them alone. Yet absent a single overarching threat, forging such a common approach has been elusive. Insisting on the need for a common global approach was one thing; translating that hope into sustainable action is quite another. The election of President Barack Obama marked a decisive return to multilateralism on the part of the United States, but the challenges he inherited are enormous and the willingness of other countries to join the United States in co-leadership is uncertain.

Towards a post-cold war order

The cold war was a unique period in international affairs, in which the Western alliance system held together impressively well for nearly half a century, cemented by a generally shared assessment of an external threat. The United States was the chief architect of this global order, championing the United Nations system, the international financial institutions, and regional alliances in Europe and Asia. It sustained this system consistently, if not always deftly, through both Democratic and Republican administrations for nearly 40 years. Because of the particular circumstances of the cold war and the prominent role of nuclear weapons in defence and security policy, the United States was thrust into an unusual global role. ‘Leader of the Free World’ had a pompous and presumptuous ring to it, but the designation was not far off, even as the US’s European and Asian allies grew in power and self-assertiveness.

The United States also played a key role in ending the cold war by forging a common Western approach and skilfully managing the revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. One of the principal contributions of US diplomacy during this period was simply its consistency and steadiness of purpose. With everything else in flux, US policy was a fixed point of reference around which others could orient themselves.

However, US leadership did not translate easily into a role in meeting the very different challenges of the post-cold war world. The task of forging a viable new order was made more difficult by the way the cold war ended – ‘not with military victory, demobilisation, and celebration but with the unexpected capitulation of the other side without a shot being fired.... The grand struggle had ended not with a bang but a whimper’. With Western institutions intact and Western values seemingly triumphant, it was hard to consider, much less undertake, the kind of radical reforms that the times demanded. Instead, Western leaders settled for incremental steps – often good and appropriate ones, but not far-reaching enough. To be sure, there were important innovations, notably the enlargement of both NATO and the EU and the creation of a common European currency, but the effects were limited largely to the European continent.

The end of the cold war exploded not only the old bipolar order

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3. Ibid., p. 343.
but also the role that the United States had grown accustomed to playing in world affairs. The generally shared security perspectives of the Western allies gave way to greater divergence and new frictions. Common approaches were made difficult because of European preoccupation with internal issues, Russia’s growing sense of exclusion and victimisation, and the failure to bring the rising powers of China and India into the global system as full participants. The United States was often accused of the arrogance of unilateralism – a charge that was levelled at both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations – but the reality was that the US for the most part stood alone in its capacity to wield power on a global scale.

As I wrote more than a decade ago, ‘The problem seems to be, quite literally, that we have more power than we know what to do with. Americans have always been ambivalent about the exercise of power in international relations; this ambivalence has become particularly acute with respect to the country’s status as the sole remaining superpower in a world without a compelling rationale and logic for the continued exercise of its unrivaled power. Even those revelling in what they saw as the ‘unipolar moment’ of US predominance were by no means disposed to exercise US power with the sense of purpose and mission that had guided it during the “American century”’.4

These conditions helped create what might be called ‘the problem of American power – not just the use of American power (whether we are using it wisely or unwisely), but the very fact of having such unrivaled power’.5 It was harder to maintain alliances because other countries lacked the capacity to be full partners. It could prompt other states to make common cause in an effort to constrain US power. It could create resentment on the part of others and foster anti-Americanism. And it tempted US leaders to take on more than they could handle, simply because there was nothing to stop them from doing so.6

For the United States in the 1990s, the sweeping rhetoric of global change – ‘Europe whole and free’, ‘new world order’, ‘assertive multilateralism’, ‘democratic enlargement’ – disguised an essentially cautious set of policies that reflected more continuity than transformation. Under the administration of President George H.W. Bush, ‘Europe whole and free’ was an important rallying cry in 1989-90 and represented an aspiration to open Western institutions to the emerging democracies farther east. The

6. Ibid.
administration deserves credit for successfully navigating the end of the cold war and addressing the challenges in its wake, but it hardly started the more fundamental transformation of the larger international system. The idea of a ‘new world order’ was briefly in vogue but was soon eclipsed by the international community’s inability to deal with a disintegrating Yugoslavia. The world looked neither new nor orderly.

The US public, eager for a post-cold war peace dividend, was in any case unreceptive to grand foreign policy initiatives and in 1992 elected Bill Clinton president on a platform focused on the domestic economy. The Clinton administration nonetheless embraced the same sweeping foreign policy rhetoric, betraying a familiar US propensity to couch foreign policies in grandiose, universalistic language. ‘Assertive multilateralism’, meant to signal a greater willingness to engage in multilateral peace operations, soon fell victim to the missions in Haiti, Bosnia, and especially Somalia, where 18 US soldiers were killed and 77 wounded in 1993 in an ill-conceived, under-manned mission. In the wake of the Somalia debacle, the administration abandoned its early enthusiasm and laid out a highly conditional set of guidelines for US participation in peace operations – anticipating those laid out by the UN itself after the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica.7

‘Democratic enlargement’ helped accelerate the accession to NATO of former Warsaw Pact countries, but it so dominated the transatlantic agenda that other aspects of NATO’s transformation were neglected.8 The Community of Democracies initiative, beginning with a conference in Warsaw in 2000, had a certain symbolic appeal, but it was more an admission of the failure of existing institutions, notably the United Nations, than a viable successor or even complement to them. Aside from some important steps in global trade relations – including the belated conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round and the North American Free Trade Agreement, and creation of the World Trade Organization – there were few truly transformative foreign policy achievements in the eight years of the Clinton presidency. This seemingly harsh judgement is a comment more on the character of the times than on the deficiencies of the Clinton administration. Absent a compelling global security challenge to serve as a catalyst, and with Europe, Russia, and China each for its own reasons internally preoccupied, there was little opportunity for innovative global leadership even if the United States had tried to be such a world leader. Some US
officials liked to declare that the United States had both an opportunity and an obligation to fashion a new global order, but no one at home or abroad was buying this.

**9/11 and the ‘global war on terror’**

At the dawn of the 21st century, for all the tumult of a globalising world, we were occupying what was still called the ‘post-cold war era’ rather than one that had acquired its own designation and defining characteristics. For the administration of President George W. Bush, which had entered office in early 2001 with no clear identity, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 constituted just such a defining moment. There were some early assertions of unilateralism, such as the conspicuous US withdrawal from the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol on climate change in the first few months of the Bush administration, but these did not yet constitute an overarching strategic design.

All that changed with the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Because those attacks were directed at the United States and carried out on US soil, Americans were uniquely affected. More than that, 9/11 seemed to provide a new and all-consuming rationale for the administration. The public at large, eager to rally around the flag at a moment of national emergency, set aside its usual healthy scepticism to acquiesce in an unprecedented expansion of executive authority and foreign policy interventionism.

A country that might have been led in a very different direction was induced to see the appropriate response to the terrorist challenge as a ‘global war on terror’ and the functional equivalent of the cold war. After its successful toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and with only an improvised, poorly designed stabilisation in place, the administration overrode not only foreign critics but also responsible domestic critics to launch an unnecessary and ill-conceived invasion and occupation of Iraq. To justify and win public support for the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration, in its National Security Strategy document of October 2002, advanced the controversial doctrine of pre-emption, which asserted the US’s right to depose foreign regimes that represented a potential or perceived threat to the security of the United States, even if that threat was not imminent.

9. Technically, the Bush administration did not ‘withdraw’ but rather informed the UN Secretary-General that ‘the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty’ and therefore ‘has no legal obligations arising from its signature’ on 31 December 2000 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm).
Nor was the justification limited to an extension of the right of national self-defence. Underlying this assertive unilateralism was the belief that ‘the United States possesses unprecedented – and unequalled – strength and influence in the world’. It was also tied to the belief that ‘our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense’ and the judgement that ‘the great struggles of the twentieth century ... ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single sustainable model of national success’. It was a potent combination: the certain belief in a global mission, the unquestioned rightness of its cause, and the confidence in having sufficient power to impose the US’s will on the rest of the world.

Under normal conditions this extreme brand of global Wilsonianism would have been subjected to countervailing pressures. But the attacks of 9/11 had a profound psychological effect on a country that had not been attacked on its home territory since the war of 1812. And the nature of those attacks – coming literally out of the blue and with no indication of whether or when additional attacks might follow – heightened their psychological impact, which is of course the essential purpose of terrorism. The attacks caused a terrific shock throughout the country and a deep-seated desire to be made safe again, providing the Bush administration and the neo-conservatives at its core with an unusual degree of latitude to shape a national response.

As time went by without another attack and as a series of counter-terrorism policies, both domestic and international, were put in place, Americans began to recover their equilibrium. They came to understand that the challenge posed by international terrorism would be with them for some time to come and that they would have to live with a certain degree of fear. They also began taking a more critical look at some of the emergency measures put in place in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Meanwhile, as the successful military operation in Iraq turned into a disastrous occupation and deepening insurgency, the administration was obliged to retreat from the so-called Bush Doctrine (of pre-emption) and cope with a growing domestic backlash.

The second Bush term, beginning in 2005, reverted to a more traditional US foreign policy orientation. The focus was still on the ‘war on terror’, but within a more balanced set of foreign policy priorities, as reflected in the somewhat more modest National Security Strategy document issued in March 2006. There was a
return to more constructive relations with European and Asian allies, as leaders on all sides recognised the need to put an end to mutual recriminations over Iraq and other issues and begin working together on issues of common concern. The United States gave a new diplomatic push to the six-party talks on North Korea and lent more visible support to EU-led negotiations with Iran. Within the administration, the revamped national security team represented a shift away from the neo-conservatives towards foreign policy realists. Some of the bluster was still there, but the actual content was closer to the mainstream of US foreign policy.

**The Obama administration**

From the outset, the Obama administration, whose transition team website was called change.gov, signaled a very different tone and set of priorities from its predecessor. Proclaiming a ‘new era of engagement’, the administration set as its priorities to ‘end the war in Iraq responsibly, finish the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, secure nuclear weapons and loose nuclear materials from terrorists, and renew American diplomacy to support strong alliances and to seek a lasting peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’. Unilateralism gave way to a predisposition to act within multilateral frameworks; efforts to isolate or displace hostile regimes were replaced by a willingness to open channels of communication with them. The term ‘war on terror’ disappeared from the official lexicon – part of an effort to reduce the overriding priority that had been assigned to the terrorist challenge without weakening the actual efforts to meet it.

In the first days of his administration, President Obama set a date for the withdrawal of US combat forces from Iraq, ordered the closure of the prison camp at Guantánamo Bay within a year, declared the end of the US’s use of torture, pledged US leadership in addressing climate change, and set as a goal a world without nuclear weapons. The underlying policy changes were not always so radical, particularly in dealing with terrorism and the difficult security situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the tone and image certainly were.

The ambition of the agenda was tempered by the reality of overstretched capacities, for another aspect of the outgoing Bush administration’s overestimation of the United States’ power had

10. From the White House website: http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/foreign_policy/.
been profligacy in its use. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, together with the global war on terror, were not accompanied by tax increases or a resumption of the military draft, with the result that the country’s economic resources and military preparedness were stretched dangerously thin. So the Obama administration’s shift towards a more multilateral approach was born of necessity as well as conviction. If there were something that might be called an ‘Obama Doctrine’ – and such a label would be premature at best – it included a focus on international peace and security rather than democratisation and liberalisation, engagement rather than isolation and regime change, and respect for other cultures and social systems rather than the Bush administration’s insistence on a ‘single sustainable model of national success’ that was universally applicable.¹¹

Substantively, the greatest change was in the higher priority attached by the administration to the global financial crisis, threats to the global trading system, and the interrelated challenges of energy and environmental security. All these tended to shift the priority focus of US strategic interests away from hard military concerns towards a new agenda of softer security issues. Even the challenges of nuclear nonproliferation rested as much in diplomacy as on the threat or use of military power. 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had taken the United States back to a cold war-like preoccupation with military security; the new challenges demanded a different response. The very definition of ‘national security’ is now in flux.

These changes were reflected organisationally as well. The Obama administration embarked on the most radical reorganisation of the US National Security Council (NSC) system since the National Security Act of 1947. Presidential Policy Directive 1, dated 13 February 2009, directed that in addition to its statutory members (President, Vice-President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Advisor) the NSC would also include the Secretary of the Treasury, Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, and US Ambassador to the United Nations. When issues related to international economic affairs, homeland security and terrorism, or science and technology were being discussed, the NSC would expand further to include additional cabinet officers and advisers.

In a follow-on memorandum of 18 March entitled ‘The 21st Century Interagency Process’, General James Jones, the National

¹¹ There were many efforts by pundits to characterise an ‘Obama Doctrine’. The sense in which it is used here is similar to Amitai Etzioni’s blog in the Huffington Post (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amitai-etzioni/the-obama-doctrine_b_236087.html).
Security Advisor, laid out the rationale behind these changes. ‘Matters pertaining to national and international security are broader and more diverse’, it argued, and ‘traditional organizations and means of response to global challenges may be inadequate or deficient’. Consequently, he outlined changes to the NSC structure to make it more strategic, agile, transparent, and predictable. These innovations were aimed at ‘the strategic integration of the activities of all government agencies involved in dealing with the expanded notion of 21st Century national security issues’. ‘A truly agile NSC’, the memorandum continued, ‘should be able to cope with multiple major issues simultaneously, consider the full range of options, and propose effective informed decisions in an appropriate time frame’.

These changes were eminently appropriate for the altered global security landscape, but it remained to be seen whether an already overburdened NSC system could manage an even larger agenda. They were in many ways a reflection of the challenges facing the international system as well.

The emerging global agenda

As it set out to translate a new agenda into viable policies, the Obama administration faced a set of intractable foreign policy challenges – not only obvious ones such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, but also others which in the longer run will be more important for global security and well-being. These included the rebuilding of the international financial architecture after the global crisis of 2008-09, protecting a global trading system that was being threatened by an anti-globalisation backlash, enhancing energy security after the 2008 oil price shocks, developing a viable climate change regime to begin reducing carbon emissions, reinvigorating the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and refashioning global institutions that were proving ill-equipped to deal with these challenges.

Rescuing the global economy

The most obvious international priority today is the financial and economic crisis, whose rapid spread revealed both the extent of global financial interdependence and the inadequacy of existing
mechanisms. Assuming power just as this crisis was entering a new phase – the most dangerous since the Great Depression – the Obama administration undertook a set of radical and often controversial steps to stabilise US financial institutions, rescue the US automobile industry, and develop a concerted international response to the spiralling crisis. This international effort aimed at short-term steps to inject new capital into the global economy and longer-term steps to reform the international financial system. It was noteworthy that the International Monetary Fund found itself totally sidelined – the first time since its creation at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference that it played no role in a major financial crisis. In addition, regional initiatives such as MERCOSUR in South America reflected a growing movement away from the IMF, whose loan portfolio was at its lowest ebb in 20 years. It was for these reasons that the Europeans, led by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, called for a summit meeting of the Group of 20 (G20) world economic powers to consider a ‘Bretton Woods II’ world financial architecture, bypassing not only the IMF but also the Group of Seven/Eight (G7/G8) framework.

The convening of the first G20 summit, which was held in Washington, DC even before Obama took office, reflected a growing awareness that the old framework of the G7/G8 and the international financial institutions no longer reflected the actual distribution of economic power and influence around the world. Emerging market economies accounted for 30% of global GDP, 45% of total exports, and 75% of foreign exchange reserves, yet the OECD countries have 63.8% of the total voting share in the IMF, with the G7/G8 alone constituting 43.7% of the total. As the summit opened, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh noted that ‘bodies such as the G-7 are no longer sufficient to meet the demands of the day’, a point echoed more bluntly by Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Yet despite its modest tangible results, the summit was successful in the sense that G20 leaders acknowledged the imperative of reforming the global financial architecture: ‘The Bretton Woods institutions must be comprehensively reformed so that they can more adequately reflect changing economic weights in the world economy’.

A second G20 summit, held in London in April 2009, did not support the fiscal stimulus measures that the United States and the United Kingdom had proposed, but it did agree to an impressive $1.1 trillion package of measures to assist the poorest coun-

tries via a recapitalisation of the IMF and the multilateral development banks and to support trade financing. It also created a Financial Stability Board – replacing the old Financial Stability Forum – to strengthen financial oversight and monitoring. Yet these new measures exposed the fact that the mechanisms did not exist, at the IMF or elsewhere, to regulate governmental financial institutions, much less non- or quasi-governmental institutions such as China’s sovereign wealth funds.

To bring the new economic powers more fully into the global system, the United States should propose further institutional reform. Symbolically, a good place to start would be for the US and Europe to give up their conventional claims to the top jobs at the World Bank and the IMF and open those positions to candidates from other countries. Procedurally, emerging economic powers such as China and India should be accorded substantially greater voting power. One possible formula would be for the US to relinquish its position as the sole country with veto power in return for the EU’s agreement to reduce its combined voting share from 30% down to the same level as the United States.14 Substantively, the IMF, together with the Bank of International Settlements and the Financial Stability Board, needs to strengthen its roles in gathering and disseminating financial information, developing standards and codes such as ‘Basel II’ banking standards, improving fiscal coordination, and strengthening surveillance of both individual country and international financial systems. These combined measures might constitute the functional equivalent of a ‘World Financial Organization’, but without the formal structure of a WTO-like body. The L’Aquila summit of the G8, held in July 2009, offered some proposals to be taken up by the G20 at its next summit.

Meanwhile, the WTO’s Doha Development Round, launched in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, risked becoming the first post-war global trade negotiation to fail. Failure would surely accelerate the movement towards protectionist trade policies and could cause irreparable damage to the credibility of the World Trade Organization. It would have a particularly devastating effect on the developing countries that it was ostensibly meant to help.

This had a security dimension as well, because the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, reaffirmed at the UN General Assembly debate in July 2009, focused particularly on the extent to which peace and

stability are threatened by poverty, resource scarcities, environmental pressures, and weak state capacity. Indeed, the Doha Round was launched in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks out of an awareness of the link between poverty and terrorism.

Yet despite the rhetorical commitment to completing the round that was reaffirmed at every G7/G8 and G20 meeting, neither the United States nor any other economic power had done much to move it forward. The reasons for inaction were not hard to discover. Thus a bold move will be needed to overcome entrenched positions. The elements of a deal would have to involve substantial new concessions on agriculture by the US and the EU in return for commensurate commitments by India, Brazil, China, and others to open their markets in services and agriculture. With the Europeans, simultaneous pursuit of an ‘enhanced transatlantic market’ would make a new US-EU Doha initiative on agriculture more attractive to both sides, as it would aim at reducing additional barriers to transatlantic trade that are not covered in the multilateral round. This would have the added advantage of breaking new ground for future negotiations with other trading partners, particularly India and Brazil.

However, gaining such concessions may require more than just US and EU concessions on agriculture. It may also need an exogenous ‘sweetener’ such as the creation of a global energy and environmental fund on which India, China, and others could draw – and which would also benefit US trade in renewable and alternative energy.

Energy and environmental security
Spurred by the oil price shocks of 2008 and growing public awareness of the effects of greenhouse-gas emissions on global warming, the Obama administration established among its core priorities the development of a clean energy economy and US leadership in addressing global climate change. Domestic innovations were essential, but even the most successful national plan would have little long-term impact unless accompanied by an equally ambitious global strategy. Global energy requirements were projected to double over the next two decades, driven largely by rapidly rising demand from China, India, and other emerging economic powers. These trends pose risks to energy security, owing to the

15. For the official US contribution to this debate, see USUN Press Release #146(09), 23 July 2009.
16. There is a dispute in the literature, but there does seem to be an indirect link between poverty and terrorism in the sense that poverty and relative deprivation are among the conditions that terrorists exploit to expand their support.
supply disruptions or resource competition and severe climatic impacts coming from continued rapid increases in greenhouse-gas emissions.

Some argued that, given its poor track record, the United States had to take the first steps before it could win support from the big emerging economies, but the reverse is also true – that the US Congress and the public at large need some assurance that China, India and others would join in a global regime before agreeing to binding US commitments. Otherwise, many fear that those rising economic powers would be free-riders on and economic beneficiaries from a new global system. Indeed, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (the Waxman-Markey bill, H.R. 2454), which would cap US greenhouse-gas emissions at 17% of 2005 levels by 2020 and at roughly 80% by 2050, specified that the administration will certify annually ‘whether China and India have adopted greenhouse gas emissions standards at least as strict as those standards required under this Act’. Thus the domestic and international dimensions needed to be addressed simultaneously, not sequentially.

The policy challenges are several: to promote more efficient energy markets; diversify energy supply; develop mechanisms to moderate swings in supply and demand and to offset price shocks; catalyse substantial financing for global funds to promote energy efficiency and clean energy technology; and bring producers, consumers and transit countries into more regular dialogue. Gaining Russia’s adherence to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) would be an important next step towards global energy security, and it could improve chances of bringing other key supplier countries with observer status in the ECT Conference – Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Kuwait, even Venezuela – into full participation. Other big energy importers such as China, which is an observer, and India, which is not, should also be brought in. Similarly, the International Energy Agency could play an important role as the political counterpart to the legal commitments embodied in the ECT regime, especially with an enlarged ECT membership. To take on these functions, the IEA needs to expand its membership beyond the members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to include other major consumers, notably China and India, as well as strengthen its links with key producers and transit states, some of which might eventually become members.

A final element of a strategy for energy security, which needs to be integrated with environmental security, is to create global incentives for energy efficiency and a shift to clean, renewable energy. The outline of one such approach is contained in the International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC), proposed at the G8 Energy Ministerial in June 2008 and formally established in cooperation with the IEA at the L’Aquila G8 Summit.

In addition to being the fastest-growing energy consumers, China and India are becoming the biggest polluters as well. China has overtaken the United States as the world’s leading source of greenhouse-gas emissions, with India poised to take second place within the next six years. Thus the overriding international challenge will be to bring these countries, together with the advanced Western economies, into a workable global climate change regime. The challenge is complicated by the facts that Chinese and Indian cumulative emissions are still far lower than those of the advanced Western countries, as are their emissions per capita – points forcefully made by India’s environment minister to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her July 2009 visit to India. The Indians and Chinese are not about to be lectured by the United States and Europe; they need to see that they can pursue ‘green’ policies without sacrificing continued rapid economic growth.

The December 2009 conference of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen is the target date for a new climate pact, as called for at the 2007 UNFCCC conference in Bali. A global mega-deal is probably not feasible under current global economic conditions. Seeking agreement on binding commitments would be too much, too soon. The danger is that no agreement at all will come out of Copenhagen or its follow-on conferences. US leadership is needed to forge a viable, if limited, approach, beginning with the Senate’s passage of a domestic cap-and-trade system (perhaps made contingent upon a positive outcome at Copenhagen) and US willingness to commit to binding targets, even as late as 2050. The US, the EU, and Japan could then need to take the lead in assembling a global fund with significant participation of the private sector to induce China and India to join a consensus at Copenhagen (or soon thereafter). The most realistic outcome would seem to be flexible national plans with political (rather than legally binding) commitments to cap carbon emissions by 2050, reviewed and monitored by an international body analogous to the WTO trade policy review mechanism.19

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Nuclear proliferation

Having forgone nuclear non-proliferation in favour of anti-proliferation under the last administration—relying not on formal arms control agreements but on forceful measures to prevent hostile states from acquiring nuclear weapons—the United States under President Obama articulated a dramatic new vision of a world without nuclear weapons and a reinvigorated Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In his April 2009 speech in Prague, Obama proposed dramatic reductions in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals via a new arms reductions treaty, ratification by the US Congress of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, a global moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes (to be embodied in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, currently under negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament), new measures to strengthen the NPT, and a new effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material throughout the world within four years. The core argument was that unless the United States, together with Russia, demonstrated that it was taking seriously its obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT it would be very difficult to enforce the other provisions of the treaty. As President Obama put it in Prague, ‘The basic bargain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy’.

In basic outline, this was the vision of a nuclear-free world that had been laid out in two influential editorials by former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former Senator Sam Nunn, and endorsed by more than a dozen other former secretaries of state, secretaries of defence, and national security advisers. Yet this seeming bipartisan convergence masked a number of conceptual differences over how best to counter the spread of nuclear weapons. Among these were the ongoing debates about whether other states are better dissuaded from pursuing nuclear weapons by robust US nuclear capability or by US arms reductions, the role and relevance of nuclear deterrence with respect to ‘rogue states’, and indeed the utility of arms control agreements of any sort in countering nuclear proliferation.

A strengthened nuclear non-proliferation regime called for a number of interrelated steps, all of them difficult. With the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) due to expire in Decem-
ber 2009 and with an NPT Review Conference (the eighth) scheduled for May 2010, there was considerable time pressure as well. The essential first step was conclusion of nuclear arms reductions agreements between the United States and Russia, which together account for nearly 95% of the world’s nuclear warheads. Joint reductions by the United States and Russia would provide additional leverage for bringing India and Pakistan – and eventually Israel as well – into the NPT regime. These measures would serve to exert additional pressure on North Korea, the fourth non-NPT nuclear power, and Iran, which has threatened to follow North Korea in withdrawing from the treaty.

At their Moscow April 2009 summit meeting, President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev agreed to replace the START treaty with a new treaty; pursue deeper arms reductions, later set at a maximum range of 1500-1675 strategic warheads each; and work together to strengthen the NPT. These were encouraging first steps, but their realisation was complicated by Russia’s firm rejection of US plans for a theatre missile defence (TMD) system in Europe and NATO’s contentious debate over offering membership to Ukraine and Georgia. The Obama administration put both these plans on a slow track pending the opening of a larger strategic dialogue with Russia, but they nonetheless stood as major obstacles to the arms control agenda laid out in the Prague speech.

Just as US-Russian arms agreements were in some ways hostage to TMD plans and NATO enlargement, the same could be said of nuclear nonproliferation efforts more generally. In East Asia, South and South-west Asia, and the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, nuclear nonproliferation efforts needed to be embedded in a larger strategic dialogue and regional security framework.

A global grand bargain?

The list of global challenges was so long that it was hard to know where to begin and how to prioritise. In the past year, Americans have lurched from seeing climate change as the most urgent priority to being fixated on runaway energy prices and then to agonising over the global financial system. Addressing these challenges separately risked leaving us in the same ruts that negotiators had been in for years. One way around this dilemma was to follow the advice of former US President Dwight Eisenhower: ‘If a problem
cannot be solved, enlarge it’. It is a way of bringing more politically relevant clout to bear and creating opportunities for constructive trade-offs. Most of the challenges were interconnected, and they had better chances of resolution if they were tackled as part of a coherent overall strategy – a ‘global grand bargain’.22

A new bargain was needed for the additional reason that the existing West-led international order was being challenged on several fronts by new global actors who do not fully share the same values and norms. The open question is whether the existing international institutions and patterns of interaction can be successfully adapted to accommodate and integrate the rising powers and address a new agenda of issues brought on by globalisation. If so, on whose terms will this transformation occur? An Indian author recently wrote that ‘the West is within us’. Will those liberal democratic values prevail, or will there be a clash with the competing values and perceived interests of other important global actors – ‘the West versus the rest’, in other words?

In this regard, the evolving role of the G20 is promising in that it brings China, India, and other rising powers into a common forum with the established powers, representing collectively some 85% of global economic activity, energy consumption, and greenhouse-gas emissions. The G20 has already moved beyond economic issues to touch on energy security and climate change; it could continue to evolve into a kind of informal global steering group, brokering deals at the political level and then referring actual negotiations to established forums. It is not a perfect grouping, because it leaves many countries unrepresented, but it could play a useful role in conjunction with other institutions in creating a new and flexible international system.

The task is analogous to the creation of the post-World War II system 60 years ago. The organisations created then – the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Alliance, the European Economic Community, and others – were not part of a single system, but they were linked conceptually. NATO would not have got off the ground without the success of the Marshall Plan, just as the early steps towards a European Community would not have been possible without the security assurance that NATO provided. But an attempt to deal with new problems within the framework of existing institutions cannot provide the required solutions. This is where the international community has been stuck for the nearly two decades since

the end of the cold war: trying to adapt those institutions to new challenges and open them to new members, while invoking a sense of common interests that were more relevant to the last half of the 20th century than they are to the early 21st. That effort at incremental adaptation has about run its course; a new overarching concept, a global grand bargain, is needed.

Conclusion

The old security paradigm, born of a bipolar military standoff between two superpowers, is no longer valid. Nor was the European fixation on peacekeeping, conflict resolution, and stabilisation – appropriate though it may have been for the ethnic conflicts that erupted in the immediate aftermath of the cold war – the right way of addressing 21st century threats to security. The challenges that now affect global security and well-being often spring from resource scarcities and resource nationalism; climate change impacts, including mass migrations that can spawn new intercultural conflict; humanitarian emergencies threatening to overwhelm international as well as local capacity; and state failure coupled with large ungoverned areas, including those in most of the world’s mega-cities. Globalisation accelerates and exacerbates all these challenges. A new security paradigm, together with new institutions and patterns of interstate relations, is needed.

US leadership will be necessary but not sufficient. It is necessary because no other country or group of countries wields the essential power and influence in each of these areas – or as much capacity to block action by others – as the United States does. But the US lacks the capacity to deliver progress entirely by itself in any of them. The illusion that the United States, as the sole superpower, could solve global problems on its own surely has been shattered by the experience in Iraq over the past few years. Nor would the emerging distribution of global power and influence, characterised by a dramatic shift of power and influence roughly from west to east, permit a new global order to be managed by a US-European condominium. Yet, somewhat paradoxically, the United States and its allies have had a crucial role to play in fashioning a new global bargain to integrate the rising powers and accommodate their interests, while at the same time preserving and extending the basic liberal values that have undergirded the Western-led international system.
Conclusion

The context

Security doctrines tend to converge as globalisation deepens. It is only natural that national views on international or ‘external’ threats to the state take shape along the same lines when the global dimension of major problems becomes apparent. This is particularly the case for countries that are competing to achieve and maintain regional or international hegemonic status, a group that has become considerably larger in the past two decades. The chapters in this book analyse the current approaches to security of six of the most relevant players in international relations today: Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa and the United States. Although the selection is always difficult and even arbitrary, the contributions reflect the views of both emerging and ‘consolidated’ powers from all continents, so any commonalities reflect significant global trends in the perception of security threats and the formation of national security strategies.

Most of the countries analysed here use ‘neighbourhoods’ – their own geographical regions and subregions – as their platform for international influence, and they all seek regional stability in order to create a more secure environment in which to operate. Their economic and social strategies are unavoidably connected to their security perceptions in a context of limited resources, especially considering that poverty and even starvation are pervasive in most of their state territories and regions. New global actors in particular see fast economic growth as the main if not the exclusive way to satisfy the basic needs of billions of deprived citizens, while their emerging middle class emulates the Western countries in terms of consumption. In this context, security concerns are becoming broader and convergent.

However, consensus on global trends will not necessarily enhance world security. The dilemma between competition and cooperation in the international realm is more acute in the
absence of complementary goals, and it is exacerbated by introducing compelling economic considerations into the equation. Moreover, the actors are not only states, but also non-state players, who appear to be stronger also in domains that have traditionally been state functions. The paradigm of statehood is certainly at stake. While today’s security problems cannot be solved by one state alone, by a group of states or even by all states acting together, very few effective mechanisms have been devised to hold non-state actors accountable. States are thus expected to provide solutions for problems in a world that they do not control.

The excesses of unregulated capitalism are indisputable these days, but disputes among states may delay or seriously dilute the regulation that is needed. In spite of proclaimed commitments, the most recent G20 meeting, held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in September 2009, adopted only very general recommendations for limiting the excesses of those private actors who triggered one of the biggest financial and economic crises in history. Having delegated the creation of wealth to those who tend to operate outside the constraints of norms, or having created public institutions and companies to accumulate wealth, states are today bound to support misbehaviour and abuses in the name of national interests.

Bailing out the banks and companies that took risks affecting the survival of billions of people may represent an additional burden to those affected, and it shows the extent to which states, especially wealthy Western states, have become dependent on the major economic actors. The existing obstacles to reaching meaningful agreements on fair trade at the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round, as well as on energy and climate change in other forums, for example, conform to this logic. The boundaries between economic and security strategies worldwide are becoming blurred.

Overwhelming military power and nuclear armaments have for many become the symbols of genuine state power, even though they also augur destructive self-defence. At the September 2009 UN Security Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, the first to be chaired by a US president, Barack Obama recalled former President Reagan’s statement that ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’. More recently, military power has dramatically shown its limits: a decade of genuinely multilateral peacekeeping and peacebuilding was suddenly overshadowed by a military-driven ‘war against ter-
ror’ orchestrated by the G.W. Bush administration, which consistently undermined international norms and values.

The devastating, far-reaching consequences of unilateral military responses – even action by those claiming legitimate goals – will be experienced by the world community for some years to come. Meanwhile, in spite of certain improvements, transnational criminals and terrorists benefit from the lack of effective police, judicial and intelligence cooperation among states in a context of mistrust and inadequate action. It is important also to stress that it is not only the ‘failed’ states that cannot control their borders or unlawful activity within their borders.

Cooperation and consensus are nevertheless worthy aspirations in the drive towards the goal of global security. Although it is evident that national and international forms of response do not keep up with today’s challenges, the complexity of current international problems is to some extent contingent on the (lack of) consensus of those states that are global players and realistically represent the international community as a whole. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan put it in 2004, ‘the war in Iraq, the terrorist attacks in the United States and other events of recent years have succeeded in breaking the consensus on what threats to peace are’. 2 The prospects of that consensus being fully restored, however, are slim, even if the ‘war on terror’ is officially over.

The concept

This compilation of essays by national experts supports some of these preliminary ideas. The six contributing authors offer, if not grounds on which to build a common concept of security, at least visions of security from six of today’s hegemons that are not at all contradictory. With the significant exception of Russia, which adopted an all-inclusive security concept already in 1992 (see chapter 5), national security doctrines and approaches have concurred with transnational and international security doctrines.

Although there are precedents in the international arena, such as the NATO Washington Declaration of 1999, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 3 convened by Secretary-General Annan precisely to help restore consensus among states, in 2004 added the AIDS pandemic and climatic change to the catalogue of ‘threats to international peace and security’. 4 Most

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2. ‘Words of welcome by the UN Secretary-General during the meeting with NATO parliamentarians’, New York, 8 March 2004.
4. The Panel thus intended to broaden the key expression in Article 39 of the UN Charter, although it is still hard to imagine how the UNSC should respond to such threats with available means. See Luis Peral, Threats to Human Security: The Need for Action?, FRIDE Working Paper (Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), Madrid, 15 October 2005).
national security doctrines subsequently incorporated and even broadened this approach – the EU’s revised security strategy was a recent example – but they have also expressly or subtly placed national economic interests in the forefront.

In this latter sense, hegemonic states’ contemporary national approaches to security replicate Japan’s traditional security thinking, in which economic prosperity and security are deeply interrelated. Especially since Japan became a modern state in the nineteenth century, a combination of economic and military power was pursued by all governments as the foundation of national security, including fostering economic development in the region as a way to enhance its own security. The approach was consistent with Confucianism in that it holds that the social and economic dimensions of the life of the community cannot be seen in isolation from each other. At its peak, however, such a doctrine also inspired an aggressive regional expansion leading to domination, and ultimately to war. There is no evidence of a similar trend in today’s world, but sustainable and peaceful economic development certainly requires substantial redistribution and solidarity at the international, regional and national levels in order to avoid similar temptations.

Traditional forms of cooperation will not suffice, since the responses required to meet current national and global threats appear to be increasingly incompatible. The new, expanded approach to security integrates national goals entailing competition – energy security – with goals for the good of humankind (halting climate change) and should entail generous concessions in the same fields. When it comes to food security and fair trade, the response needed to eradicate hunger among the impoverished populations in the emerging powers may be at odds with the Western wealthier societies’ drive to maintain the status quo. In the absence of ideologically driven solidarity, and with little control of economic actors that basically do not care about the latter, states have few options left to deal with global challenges. Not even emerging actors are trying to challenge the economic system. As Paulo Wrobel suggests in chapter 2, Brazil, like other members of the BRICs, ‘is also a status quo-oriented nation that has vested interest in preserving the international global economy as it is’.

The approach to international security of the most relevant global actors is thus fundamentally pragmatic and closely connected to the need to manage expectations as well as public opin-
ion at the national level. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding tend to be more ostensibly connected to energy-supply strategies than in the past. Unlike the more balanced pan-European concept of security that prevailed – at least theoretically – in the last quarter of the 20th century, international security is today not anchored in human rights and values as much as in sovereign rights. Even the fair compromise upon which the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was created in 1975 seems to be outdated, but not only in Europe.

At the global level, it seems that, in spite of declaratory commitments, human security does not constitute an alternative paradigm to the current interest-based approach to security. In the words of Andrei Zargorski, ‘[i]t is very unlikely that the Russian political elite will embrace post-modern security concepts such as human security at the expense of what it believes to be its national interests’. However, there is still a chance that after a long period of neglect human rights will be reinvigorated worldwide, if only for pragmatic reasons. It is increasingly being recognised that the ‘war against terror’ and concomitant abuses have in fact exacerbated radicalism in the world. The commander of the ISAF troops in Afghanistan pointed out that a focus on ‘killing the enemy’ has led to too many civilian casualties and has in fact fuelled the insurgency, so it is time to focus on the protection of the local population. This would certainly facilitate full compliance with international humanitarian law.

The time seems to be ripe for reinvigorating human rights, but the paradigm based on state sovereignty will not be overruled for the time being. The timid endorsement of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by some of the new emerging powers during the debate held in July 2009 in the UN General Assembly shows that states are not keen to leave the right to interpret legal principles in the hands of organs that are not considered representative of the world today. It seems only natural that they tend to connect necessary reforms in the world system with the increase in the contributions they are being asked to make.

Obsolete global governance structures may nevertheless be with us for some time: the 2005 World Summit was a major missed opportunity for introducing structural changes in the UN system. The energy needed to revisit the reform of the Security Council, to mention the main symbol of obsolescence, may be garnered only in the aftermath of a global catastrophe. And prob-

ably not even then. In spite of the pervasive effects of the economic and financial crisis it has so far led to a proliferation of informal decision-making and coordination fora, which demonstrates that existing institutions are becoming irrelevant but also undermines their residual remaining legitimacy.

The threats

Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it became abundantly clear that collective security could not continue to be defined as the mere absence of international armed conflict, as it was during the four long decades of the Cold War. The UN Security Council started to qualify humanitarian crises and mass displacement of populations as threats to regional or international security. In parallel, the international security dimensions of pandemics such as AIDS, weapons and drugs trafficking, international terrorism and environmental catastrophes all started to be discussed by experts and government representatives, giving rise to a trend that has been described by critics as securitisation of national and international problems and challenges.7

States are, in this sense, concerned mainly with the spillover effect of the activities and policies of other states, as the classical conception of security dictates. But the approach based on sovereign rights sometimes overlaps with a human security perspective seeking to protect an affected population: and indeed, full implementation of human rights instruments would guarantee international stability. However, only an independent, non-biased interpretation of the internationally recognised principles of human rights would ensure just application for victims. For example, in the case of a mass exodus, the interest of neighbouring states in containing the flow of refugees or emigrants usually conflicts with the human rights, the right to live, of those fleeing persecution.

National security doctrines obviously tend to uphold principles of sovereignty and national interests as interpreted by individual states, but threats to national security become threats to international security when collective action is triggered. It is apparent that the most powerful states today share concerns in their respective neighbourhoods, which shows that security still has a traditional geostrategic dimension. It is also clear that the list of concerns that are common to these global actors has been

considerably enlarged, to include so-called non-traditional threats. According to the proposed pattern, ‘traditional’ problems tend to be of a regional scale and more directly generated by states, whereas ‘contemporary’ problems are created mainly by non-state actors in a more delocalised fashion; in practice, the categories overlap. Finally, it is noteworthy that some of the threats that are common to global actors are also generally shared threats, climate change and nuclear proliferation being the obvious examples.

The following three broad categories of threat are thus based on the scale and relative novelty of contemporary threats:

1. The geographical dimension of security as perceived by global actors ranges from creating a prosperous and stable neighbourhood that they could to some extent dominate in order to enhance their own security, to trying to avoid the consequences of the problems originating close to their borders. Considering that a third world war is not an imminent risk, conflicts – whether internal or regional – belong to the category of predominantly geographical threats. South Africa’s perception of its security is intimately linked to security in the region and in Africa generally. The tensions that in August 2008 escalated to an armed conflict between Georgia and Russia also revived ideological divisions within the EU and clearly exposed the need to accommodate the interests of Russia, the EU and NATO in their shared neighbourhood.

There is, however, a distinction between consolidated powers and emerging powers. As pointed out particularly in the chapters on India and South Africa (see chapters 4 and 6), ‘internal’ threats tend to be analysed in the same framework as ‘external’ ones. Poverty, food, water and energy security, as well as unemployment, are considered as both internal and regional threats, without making a clear distinction based on borders. This illustrates the close interrelation of acute problems within regions, especially when they are human security problems related to scarcity. The security strategies of consolidated actors such as the United States and the EU tend to concentrate on the situation outside their territories, as if managing the external world could be separated from dealing with domestic matters. In any case, only regional solutions can counteract the spillover impact of human emergencies.

8. As in the case of the security dimension of human displacement, a given situation may generate mass exoduses that pose an immediate problem for neighbouring states as well as human trafficking and smuggling structures with an enduring impact beyond the region. In the ‘reactive’ approach that still characterises international action, the first problem usually triggers international financial solidarity – either in the form of humanitarian aid to refugees or peacekeeping in the state of origin – and the second one is normally – and insufficiently – tackled by cooperation.
2. In contrast, responses to the new catalogue of threats – those that should in fact be called contemporary rather than non-traditional – are not closely linked to geography. Transnational crime networks operate from different distant places simultaneously and affect national trade interests overseas, as in the case of the piracy in Somali waters today; cyber attacks paralysing basic services can be launched from distant places with the help of a simple computer; and infectious diseases and pandemics spread today as rapidly as planes and trains travel the world. These new challenges are mostly, but not exclusively, created by those non-state actors – even unintentionally as in the case of contagion – who have access to the tools and opportunities offered by globalisation. States can only cooperate closely in the search for and indictment of suspect individuals and in minimising the impact of the problems – although little has been done in this respect – since they are still the expected provider of security in spite of the fact that the source of problems is not domestic.

For threats in this category, it is significant that terrorism is not at the top of the security agenda of the most important global actors today. US President Obama has deleted the expression ‘war on terror’ from the official lexicon, as noted by Robert Hutchings (see chapter 7), while also reducing the overriding priority assigned to the terrorist challenge by the Bush administration; however, according to Hutchings, ‘[t]he underlying policy changes [are] not always so radical … but the tone and image certainly [are]’. The qualitative difference, and this is perhaps more significant, is that US policies seem now to be carried out largely within the framework of international law. The trend is consistent: as Radha Kumar points out ‘[l]ike many other European countries, India has responded to the threat of international terrorism by seeking rule of law rather than bombardment’.

3. A third category, which encompasses both contemporary and traditional threats, includes those that potentially impact the continued existence of humankind, such as nuclear proliferation and climate change. These new impending common threats rest on the same foundation that led to the proscription of genocide back in 1948, and the ban on mass human rights
violations and war crimes. In this sense R2P should be at the core of the global governance system, since it represents the intersection between security in the traditional sense and the survival of human communities. But the level of international solidarity that is needed to avert and eliminate the most important threats is particularly high, especially in the absence of a centralised authority with sufficient resources.

The priority today for all global players is, however, rescuing the global economy without losing competitiveness, which may leave little room for redistribution and solidarity. According to a series of recent reports, achievement of the UN’s Millenium Development Goals is at stake, and contributions already committed to international solidarity have been postponed while poverty spreads in regions of the world which are already poor. Global actors seem to be concerned mainly with economic success as an intrinsic dimension of their security, and usually try to connect economic gain with leadership in dealing with the current common challenges and threats. In the context of the ‘green revolution’, a new mantra, Brazil is trying to promote the production and export of clean energy, while China seems to be particularly concerned with achieving financial autonomy and is even challenging the dollar as a reserve currency (see chapters 2 and 3). In this and other contexts, new actors need representation proportionate to their weight in the international institutions, so that negotiations and compromise can transform a list of threats and potential conflicts into a list of common challenges.

**Responses and prospects for the future**

The fact that the US has abandoned its unilateralist stance and more and more new global actors are engaging in global problems represents a unique opportunity for effective multilateralism. Even the financial and economic crisis could become an opportunity for remedying the abuses of the prevailing economic system, starting with norms that should hold internationally accountable those private actors whose decisions have international consequences. The time is ripe to strengthen the international legal and institutional architecture, also at the regional level, and including guarantees that basic human rights are not bluntly violated again in the name of democracy; for merely pragmatic reasons, it is time to re-
invent solutions for balancing out the rights of responsible sovereign states with human rights even beyond state borders. It is time for negotiation and compromise through vigorous diplomatic action grounded in international values and principles. Crucially, if it is not already too late, it is also an urgent task to find imaginative solutions for sustainable development that will deter climate change and to initiate real nuclear disarmament.

Some of these processes have been launched or relaunched recently, and new global actors have manifested their willingness to help forge consensus on the most acute challenges – but not necessarily to commit sufficient resources to them. Russia has reacted favourably to the US’s cancellation in September 2009 of the plan to construct ballistic missile shields in Central Europe. Also in September 2009, the UNSC meeting at the level of heads of state and government adopted a seminal decision on nuclear disarmament, symbolically marking the beginning of a new relationship between the US and Russia – but other imaginative ideas, such as the creation of an international uranium bank, should also be acted upon so that all states have access to peaceful nuclear energy technology. China, India and Brazil are cautiously committed to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, but the UN is going to have major difficulties in keeping the system going if no serious restructuring is undertaken. All global players attending the September 2009 climate change talks in Bangkok and the Copenhagen conference in December are conscious of the urgency of taking drastic measures to try to prevent human-induced climate change – and in this case the Montreal Protocol of 1989 stands as an inspiring example of (much less costly) environmental measures which have effectively deterred CFC production.

In spite of these and other positive steps, the question remains whether powerful states and non-state actors are ready to make contributions and concessions that could open the way for effective commitment, including the flexibility to create new negotiation processes and devise tools that are adapted to the new realities. For its part, the EU seems to have landed in a specific crucial dilemma. On the one hand, the new international climate – albeit in transition – is particularly propitious for the Union to play a major role: in fact Europe has the experience and expertise to find compromise and commitment through slow but reliable institutionalised procedures. On the other hand, the Union is probably expending too much energy in the required reforms to become a
global actor, which may in turn overstretch its capacities.

This second aspect, the overstretching of solid multilateral organisations, is important to note. The most striking feature of the international order is perhaps the extraordinary contrast between, on the one hand, the identification of imminent, acute and enduring threats and challenges and, on the other hand, the availability or even promise of resources to meet these challenges. Means of action are moreover inadequate. It is strikingly illogical that most global actors, in spite of the near consensus that the use of force cannot stop terrorism, still justify their ever increasing defence budgets by the need to combat terrorism. Similarly, in spite of wide consensus in official circles that there can be no military solution in Afghanistan, official and unofficial debates on the issues of Afghanistan deal mainly with the number of troops that should or should not be committed there. If there is a law that can safely be breached in the implementation of security doctrines, it is definitely the law of inertia.

Declaratory diplomacy is often the only reaction to the most important problems in the framework of regional organisations, which are little more than confidence-building mechanisms. The list of resolutions adopted by international and bilateral forums dealing with cooperation to avert transnational crime in the absence of effective cooperative responses is a good example. The EU offers at least inspiration in this sense, since it has developed police and judicial cooperation mechanisms to halt transnational crime, particularly terrorism, with due respect for human rights – see especially the chapter on China, as well as relevant considerations on India’s reaction to the Mumbai attacks in the chapter on India.

Sovereignty cannot be the basis on which states cope with present threats, but there seems to be no working alternative to the traditional model in which the state is the guarantor of citizens’ security, including protection against ‘external’ threats. But states are losing control over both domestic and international developments in favour of private actors. In parallel, the fragmentation of world fora makes even more difficult to find solutions to challenges that are deeply interrelated. It is time, as Robert Hutchings claims – and the current climate is again conducive to this – for a great global bargain that will re-accommodate legitimate state interests and reboot international cooperation and solidarity. Can states make non-state actors follow suit?
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**Andrei Zagorski** is Leading Researcher at the Moscow State Institute of
International Relations (MGIMO-University).
### Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACD</td>
<td>Asia Cooperation Dialogue</td>
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<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Mission to Burundi</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>APM</td>
<td>Anti-Personnel Mines</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>BM&amp;FBOVESPA</td>
<td>Brazilian Mercantile and Futures Exchange</td>
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<td>BRICs</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India and China</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Constitutive Act</td>
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<td>CDS</td>
<td>South American Defence Council (Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>EAS</td>
<td>East Asia Summit</td>
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<td>ECT</td>
<td>Energy Charter Treaty</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EURASEC</td>
<td>Eurasian Economic Community</td>
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<td>DCNS</td>
<td>Direction des constructions navales services</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>G4</td>
<td>The Group of Four</td>
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<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>The Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors</td>
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<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human immunodeficiency virus</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IBSA</td>
<td>India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>IEA</td>
<td>International Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IPEEC</td>
<td>International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur)</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>US National Security Council</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation for African Unity</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SAFTA</td>
<td>South Asia Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>SARS</td>
<td>Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPO</td>
<td>Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
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<td>TMD</td>
<td>Theatre Missile Defence</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNASUR</td>
<td>Union of South American Nations</td>
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<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>UN Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNROCA</td>
<td>UN Register of Conventional Arms</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPA</td>
<td>United Progressive Alliance</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapon of mass destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front</td>
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Books

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2009

The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025?
directed by Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi
2006
In the world in 2009, how can the main global players establish a common approach to security and what form will this take? In particular, will this common approach to security be derived from or related to the concept of human security? What strategies have the big powers – both old and new – developed particularly during the last five years to eliminate the identified threats or to minimise their impact?

In order to answer these questions, contributors to this Chaillot Paper were asked to analyse how threats to national and international security are defined in the country of concern. The significance attached by each global player to multilateralism and international cooperation as a means of averting threats, and the extent to which those principles are adhered to, are also examined. The specific means of response range from intelligence sharing and police cooperation to preventing terrorism and organised crime to the use of military force in certain circumstances. The more general approaches include a regional or neighbourhood policy to help stabilise neighbours, adopting measures to counter climate change and engaging in world-wide cooperation to promote development, democracy and the protection of human rights.