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Preface

2006, another year in which ESDP has gone from strength to strength. Unfortunately, it is true that its dynamism is also a symptom of the continuing deterioration in the international security situation since 2003. Iraq’s slide into civil war, Iran’s intransigence over the nuclear issue, the war in Lebanon, the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock, the resurfacing of the energy issue on the international security agenda, the impasse over Darfur, the violent disintegration of Somalia, tensions between Georgia and Russia – all these events have increased instability in the EU’s neighbourhood, both to the east and to the south. At the same time, ESDP’s rude good health also shows that the Member States, despite their major differences over the reform, purpose and budget of the European Union, now share a common vision of their strategic responsibility and of the overriding necessity for the Union to influence the political evolution of the world.

Among the new operations launched in 2006, Operation EUFOR Congo, launched to support the UN during the democratic elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo, stands out as another success for ESDP. In the Lebanon, the deployment of European troops, although not formally classified as an ESDP mission, reinforced UNIFIL and restored a minimum of stability at the southern border of the country. Decisions were also taken and preparatory missions set up regarding two other operations in 2006: the police and rule-of-law mission to Kosovo, established to facilitate the resolution of the final status of the province in 2007, and the police mission in Afghanistan, also scheduled for 2007. With regard to the actual organisation of ESDP, the major achievements were the publication by the European Defence Agency of the Long-Term Vision report, the implementation of the Code of Conduct on weapons transfers, the finalisation of the EU Battlegroups, the reinforcement of civil capacities and especially of the coordination between civilian and military crisis management instruments.

Ultimately, 2006 will be memorable for three key challenges. The first concerns the increasing demand for European crisis management operations in an unchanging context as regards institutions and capabilities. Europeans are being asked more and more to intervene in increasingly complex conflicts; but the institutional crisis in the EU means that it is not possible to make fundamental adaptations to CFSP structures, while the available personnel in the military and police contingents of the Member States cannot be expanded indefinitely. So what can be done? And what further action can be taken, if the deteriorating international situation requires it?

The second challenge concerns the role of the participating states. Without the will and commitment shown by some of them, ESDP would not exist. In the Lebanon especially, the decision by some Member States to reinforce UNIFIL militarily was crucial, not just for Lebanon itself, but also for the international status and role of the Union. Conversely, this type of ad hoc cooperation between nations only makes sense when incorporated
into a European political framework. The lessons of this experience will undoubtedly have an impact on the future: not only is it necessary to integrate the will and commitment of individual nations into a European framework, but it is equally necessary to build a CFSP which takes into account the different contributions that countries have actually made.

The last challenge concerns the relationship between the civilian and military assets of the external action of the Union. Some commentators have emphasised the scope and importance of civilian ESDP operations in 2006 and drawn hasty conclusions regarding the NATO-EU relationship and the fact that the European Union conducts mostly civilian missions. But to do so is to overlook the fact that, in the modern strategic equation, complex political crises cannot be resolved by purely military means, as demonstrated every day by the situations prevailing in Iraq, Lebanon and Iran. In this sense, the strategic modernity of the Union, signified by its capacity to combine civilian and military instruments to serve the same policy, is immediately apparent. Provided however that the coherence of these instruments is assured and that policy is clearly defined: which brings us back to the debate on the institutional reform of the Union – without doubt, in terms of its global role, the most important task facing the Union in 2007.

Nicole Gnesotto
Paris, March 2007
Core documents

2006
Iran – Statement by the E3/EU on the Iranian nuclear issue

Berlin, 12 January 2006

On 9 January 2006, Iran resumed nuclear activities in breach of its commitments under the Paris agreements and in defiance of its obligations under IAEA resolutions. On 12 January, the British, French and German Foreign Ministers and the EU (E3/EU) High Representative declared that the E3/EU negotiation process with Iran had reached an impasse and referred the matter to the United Nations to reinforce the IAEA’s requirements with regard to Iran. This position was echoed in the London declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the E3/EU, the United States, Russia and China on 30 January 2006, as well as in the Conclusions of the External Relations Council on 30 and 31 January 2006.

STATEMENT BY GERMANY, UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE AND THE EU HIGH REPRESENTATIVE ON THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

The Foreign Ministers of Germany, France and Great Britain, Mr Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Mr Jack Straw and Mr Philippe Douste-Blazy, and the EU High Representative Javier Solana met today to consider the situation following Iran’s resumption on 9 January of enrichment related activity.

Iran’s nuclear activities have been of great concern to the international community since 2003, when Iran was forced to admit to the International Atomic Agency Authority that it was building a secret installation to enrich uranium, which could be used to produce material for nuclear weapons. The IAEA Director General at the time found Iran’s policy of concealment had resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of its Safeguards Agreement. Under the IAEA’s rules, this should have been reported to the Security Council then.

We launched our diplomatic initiative because we wanted to offer an opportunity to Iran to address international concerns. Our objective was to give Iran a means to build international confidence that its nuclear programme was for exclusively peaceful purposes, and to develop a sound relationship between Europe and Iran.

Given Iran’s documented record of concealment and deception, the need for Iran to build confidence has been and continues to be the heart of the matter. It was Iran’s agreement to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities while negotiations were underway that gave us the confidence to handle the issue within the IAEA framework, rather than refer it to the Security Council. We had strong support from the IAEA Board, which repeatedly urged Iran to suspend these activities and stressed that the maintenance of full suspension was essential.
Last August, Iran resumed uranium conversion at Isfahan, in breach of IAEA Board Resolutions and the commitments she had given us in the Paris Agreement of November 2004.

The IAEA Board reacted by passing a Resolution in September formally finding that Iran was in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and declaring that the history of concealment of Iran’s programme and the nature of its activities gave rise to questions that were within the competence of the Security Council. Since then the IAEA has raised more disturbing questions about Iran’s links with the AQ Khan network, which helped build Libya and North Korea’s clandestine military nuclear programmes.

Nonetheless, in response to requests from many of our international partners and despite the major setbacks through unilateral Iranian actions, we agreed to delay a report to the Security Council and go the extra mile in search of a negotiated solution. We held a round of exploratory talks in Vienna on 21 December 2005 to see if we could agree a basis for resuming negotiations. We made crystal clear that a resumption of negotiations would only be possible if Iran refrained from any further erosion of the suspension.

Iran’s decision to restart enrichment activity is a clear rejection of the process the E3/EU and Iran have been engaged in for over two years with the support of the international community.

In addition it constitutes a further challenge to the authority of the IAEA and international community. We have, therefore, decided to inform the IAEA Board of Governors that our discussions with Iran have reached an impasse. The Europeans have negotiated in good faith. Last August we presented the most far reaching proposals for co-operation with Europe in the political, security and economic fields that Iran has received since the Revolution. These reaffirmed Iran’s rights under the NPT and included European support for a strictly civilian nuclear programme in Iran, as well as proposals that would have given Iran internationally guaranteed supplies of fuel for its nuclear power programme.

But Iran was to refrain from the most sensitive activities until international confidence was restored. Such a step would not affect Iran’s ability to develop a civil and nuclear power industry. We proposed that the agreement be reviewed every ten years. The Iranian government summarily rejected our proposal, and all the benefits that would have flowed from it, nor have they taken up proposals by others. The Iranian government now seems intent on turning its back on better relations with the international community, thereby dismissing the prospect for expanded economic, technological and political cooperation with the international community which would bring tremendous benefits for Iran’s young, talented and growing population.

This is not a dispute between Iran and Europe, but between Iran and the whole international community. Nor is it a dispute about Iran’s rights under the NPT. It is about Iran’s failure to build the necessary confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.
Iran continues to challenge the authority of the IAEA Board by ignoring its repeated requests and providing only partial co-operation to the IAEA. It is important for the credibility of the NPT and the international non-proliferation system generally, as well as the stability of the region, that the international community responds firmly to this challenge.

We continue to be committed to resolving the issue diplomatically. We shall be consulting closely with our international partners in the coming days and weeks. We believe the time has now come for the Security Council to become involved to reinforce the authority of IAEA Resolutions. We will, therefore, be calling for an Extraordinary IAEA Board meeting with a view for it to take the necessary action to that end.
European Gendarmerie Force – Speech by Javier Solana at the opening of the EGF Headquarters

Brussels, 23 January 2006

The plan to establish a European Gendarmerie, launched in 2006 by five member states of the EU (France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) came to fruition at the beginning of 2007 with the opening of the headquarters of the European Gendarmerie in Vincenza in Italy. The aim of this force is to provide the EU with an effective crisis management instrument.

« L’inauguration du Quartier général de la Force européenne de gendarmerie s’inscrit dans la perspective d’une Europe mieux à même de faire face aux crises. Une des principales conclusions de la Stratégie européenne de sécurité concerne la nécessité pour l’Europe de se doter de capacités plus performantes et mieux adaptées pour répondre aux défis et aux menaces dans le monde.

Dans ce contexte, la Force européenne de gendarmerie est un instrument des plus pertinents. Les forces de gendarmerie, capables à la fois de remplir des missions de police et d’opérer efficacement dans des structures militaires, sont en effet une composante utile dans le cadre de l’approche multidisciplinaire qui est la notre en matière de gestion des crises. Et ce d’autant plus que la coopération civilo-militaire est devenue un élément-clé dans ce domaine. L’initiative annoncée il y a deux ans et qui devient aujourd’hui une réalité est donc un atout pour la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense. Je salue les efforts de la France, de l’Italie, des Pays-Bas, du Portugal et de l’Espagne et souhaite beaucoup de succès à la Force européenne de gendarmerie et à son Quartier général. »

Background:

Initiative de cinq pays (ES, FR, IT, NL et PT) dotés de forces de gendarmerie, la Force européenne de gendarmerie (FGE) vise à renforcer les capacités internationales de gestion des crises.

Évoquée pour la première fois par la France à l’occasion d’une réunion des ministres de la défense de l’Union européenne à Rome à l’automne 2003, l’initiative a débouché le 17 septembre 2004 sur la signature à Noordwijk (Pays-Bas) entre les cinq pays fondateurs d’une « Déclaration d’intention ».


La FGE possède une capacité initiale de réponse rapide d’environ 800 personnes sous un délai de 30 jours. Les forces participantes sont la Guardia Civil espagnole, la
Gendarmerie nationale française, l’Arma dei Carabinieri italienne, la Maréchaussée royale des Pays-Bas et la Guardia Nacional Republicana portugaise.

L’État-major de la force, situé à Vicenza, est composé d’un noyau permanent de 30 personnes.

Afin de contribuer au développement de la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD) et à la création d’un espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice, les cinq États membres ont proposé de :
- contribuer à doter l’Europe d’une large capacité afin de conduire toutes les missions de police lors d’opérations de gestion de crise, dans le cadre de la déclaration de Petersberg, avec une attention particulière pour les missions de substitution ;
- offrir une structure opérationnelle multinationale aux pays qui ont l’intention de se joindre aux opérations de l’UE ;
- participer aux initiatives des organisations internationales dans le domaine de la gestion de crises.

Dans les opérations de gestion de crises, la FGE viendra assurer une présence effective aux côtés d’autres acteurs y compris de composantes militaires et aux côtés de la police locale. Tout ceci pour faciliter la réactivation des moyens de sécurité, en particulier lors de la transition entre les volets militaire et civil.

Les opérations de la FGE sont ouvertes à la participation d’États tiers dotés de capacités de police appropriées.

Les unités de la FGE peuvent être placées soit dans une chaîne de commandement militaire soit aux ordres d’une autorité civile, afin de garantir les missions de sécurité publique, d’ordre public et de police judiciaire.

La FGE doit pouvoir couvrir tous les aspects d’une opération de réponse à la crise, dans les phases initiale, de transition et de désengagement militaire, ainsi qu’être employée en prévention d’une crise.

La FGE sera principalement composée des mêmes forces que celles déclarées au catalogue des capacités d’Helsinki par les États Parties et que celles participant à la capacité de gestion civile des crises, décidée à la conférence de Bruxelles du 19 novembre 2001. Pour cette raison, elle sera mise à disposition, en priorité, au profit de l’Union européenne. Lorsqu’elle est déployée pour le compte de l’Union européenne, le COPS en assure la direction stratégique et le contrôle politique.

À l’occasion de la Conférence d’offres d’engagement en matière de capacité du 22 novembre 2004 à Bruxelles, les ministres de l’UE ont salué l’initiative des Cinq visant à créer une force de gendarmerie européenne et se sont félicités de la contribution que cette force peut apporter à la PESD. Ils ont noté que ces cinq pays avaient mis cette capacité dotée d’un statut militaire à disposition pour les situations les plus exigeantes et en vue d’un déploiement rapide pour garantir la sécurité et l’ordre public. Les ministres se sont également félicités du fait que cette force serait principalement mise à la disposition de l’UE.
Middle East Peace Process

26 and 30 January 2006

On 25 January, legislative elections took place in the Palestinian Territories. The calm in which the voting operations were held and the high voter turnout were proof of the democratic maturity of the Palestinian people. But Hamas’ Victory was unexpected.

STATEMENT BY JAVIER SOLANA

Brussels, 26 January 2006

‘The Palestinian people have voted democratically and peacefully. I welcome this. The European Union has supported the smooth running of these elections.

We await confirmation of the results. These results may confront us with an entirely new situation which will need to be analysed by the Council next Monday. The EU will express its views on prospects for cooperation with the future Palestinian Government in the light of that discussion and of developments on the ground. The Quartet will also discuss this new situation at its ministerial meeting next Monday in London.

The position of the European Union in support of the recognition of Israel and a peaceful negotiated solution leading to two States is well known.’

QUARTET STATEMENT

Washington DC, 26 January 2006

The Quartet consulted today on the Palestinian Legislative Council elections. It congratulates President Abbas and the Palestinian people on an electoral process that was free, fair and secure. The Quartet calls on all parties to respect the results of the election and the outcome of the Palestinian constitutional process so that it may unfold in an atmosphere of calm and security.

The Palestinian people have voted for change, but it is the view of the Quartet that their aspirations for peace and statehood, as articulated by President Abbas in his statement following the closing of polls yesterday, remain unchanged. The Quartet reiterates its view that there is a fundamental contradiction between armed group and militia activities and the building of a democratic state. A two-state solution to the conflict requires all participants in the democratic process to renounce violence and terror, accept Israel’s right to exist, and disarm, as outlined in the Roadmap.
QUARTET STATEMENT

London, 30 January 2006

Representatives of the Quartet – U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, High Representative for European Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner – met today in London to discuss the situation in the Middle East.

The Quartet congratulated the Palestinian people on an electoral process that was free, fair and secure. The Quartet believes that the Palestinian people have the right to expect that a new government will address their aspirations for peace and statehood, and it welcomed President Abbas’ affirmation that the Palestinian Authority is committed to the Roadmap, previous agreements and obligations between the parties, and a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is the view of the Quartet that all members of a future Palestinian government must be committed to nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap. We urge both parties to respect their existing agreements, including on movement and access.

The Quartet received updates from Quartet Special Envoy James Wolfensohn and U.S. Security Coordinator LTG Keith Dayton at today’s meeting. The Quartet called on the Palestinian Authority to ensure law and order, prevent terrorist attacks and dismantle the infrastructure of terror. The Quartet acknowledged the positive role of the Palestinian Authority security forces in helping maintain order during the recent elections. It expressed its view that progress on further consolidation, accountability and reform remains an important task.

Mindful of the needs of the Palestinian people, the Quartet discussed the issue of assistance to the Palestinian Authority. First, the Quartet expressed its concern over the fiscal situation of the Palestinian Authority and urged measures to facilitate the work of the caretaker government to stabilize public finances, taking into consideration established fiscal accountability and reform benchmarks. Second, the Quartet concluded that it was inevitable that future assistance to any new government would be reviewed by donors against that government’s commitment to the principles of nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap. The Quartet calls upon the newly elected PLC to support the formation of a government committed to these principles as well as the rule of law, tolerance, reform and sound fiscal management.

Both parties are reminded of their obligations under the Roadmap to avoid unilateral actions which prejudice final status issues. The Quartet reiterated its view that settlement expansion must stop, reiterated its concern regarding the route of the barrier, and
noted Acting Prime Minister Olmert’s recent statements that Israel will continue the process of removing unauthorized outposts.

The Quartet expressed its concern for the health of Prime Minister Sharon and its hope for his rapid recovery.

The Quartet reiterated its commitment to the principles outlined in the Roadmap and previous statements, and reaffirmed its commitment to a just, comprehensive, and lasting settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict based upon U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The Quartet will remain seized of the matter and will engage key regional actors.
Speech by Javier Solana – ‘The Sound of Europe’
Conference

Salzburg, 27 January 2006

In order to inaugurate the debate on the future development of Europe recommended by the European Council in June 2005, the Austrian Presidency, in collaboration with the European Commission, organised a conference on this theme in Salzburg at the end of January 2006. Some 300,000 opinion- and decision-makers from the worlds of politics, science, the arts and the media were invited to examine citizens’ fears regarding Europe and to give their point of view on the future of the European project faced with the challenges of globalisation.

(...) I am delighted to give this afternoon’s keynote speech. I am especially pleased with my topic: ‘What next? A new sound?’ I understand this session is supposed to be positive and forward-looking. That fits me well.

Let me also commend the Austrian Presidency for taking this initiative. This gathering of politicians, academics, artists is a bit like an 18th century salon of Mozart’s days. It is good that we sometimes take a break from our arid discussions on draft directives and Council conclusions.

If Europe is to thrive – as I believe it will and must – it needs the creative energy that I hope this conference can provide. From time to time, we should debate where we come from; what binds us; what have we achieved and where we are going.

My central argument is that much of today’s pessimism is overdone. I believe we should continue our European journey.

But equally change is needed. We must re-state our case. And demonstrate through clear action how Europe is serving all our citizens – not just select groups like big business, farmers or cosmopolitan elites. We all know that there are different sources of legitimacy. I am attracted to the notion of legitimacy through action.

There is no need to dwell on the reasons for the sense of crisis or drift in Europe. These have been dealt with this morning.

But I can say that this was a strange time to give in to self-doubt. For we have rarely been more successful. If you concentrate only on the daily headlines, you would think that the European Union is all about divisions and missed deadlines. About fudged compromises and political setbacks. But if you take a step back and look at the underlying trends, you will see a much more positive picture. This project has survived numerous crises – currency crises, the wars in former Yugoslavia and Iraq. Each time, we came back and emerged stronger.
Over the years, we have delivered a remarkable run of successes: the single market, the euro, European defence policy. To these we should add other, less ‘visible’ successes: cheap airlines, reduced phone bills, passport free travel in the Schengen-zone. At the same time, the group has more than quadrupled in size: from 6, to 9, 12, 15 and now 25. If we are experiencing pains then these are the growing pains of a promising and still youthful Union. I also have the sense that politically we have turned the corner. Last year was difficult. But the agreement on the budget in December was a tipping point. It showed that also at 25 we can take difficult decisions. Yes, negotiations were tough. They always are over money. But No, the EU of 25 is not condemned to gridlock. There is a new mood in Europe: more forward-looking, more pragmatic.

Economic growth is picking up too, which is good per se and for our self-confidence. But this new momentum needs to be sustained.

It is up to political leaders and pro-Europeans gathered here, to seize the initiative – and do something positive with it. I believe we must do two things in particular:

First, re-state the case for Europe. Not in Brussels-speak but in clear, simple terms that make sense to citizens.

Second, develop and implement a concrete agenda which is both ambitious and result-oriented.

Clearly, the case for Europe is more contested. The memories of the Second World War no longer suffice to give legitimacy and impetus. But I will not shy away from stressing that the EU started as a peace project. And in essence it still is today. An outsider perspective may be helpful. It is striking that what we used to call the Great War, and then the First World War, was in China long referred to as ‘the European civil war’. The Second World War which followed was genuinely a global war. But it started in Europe. And the greatest numbers of victims were Europeans. With this conference we mark the 250th birthday of that great European Wolfgang Mozart. But we also commemorate that 61 years ago today, on 27 January 1945, Auschwitz was liberated. This is a call for solemn reflection – and a call to duty. After 1945, an exhausted continent was ready to try a radical new idea.

Not just ad-hoc international co-operation. That had been tried before and found wanting. But institutionalised integration. The success came from a combination of the big idea and the practical application. What worked was not a single blueprint with a defined end-state. But perseverance, flexibility and strong institutions. So the European project started as a way to banish war and build a new order of peace and law.

Lest people forget: the wars in ex-Yugoslavia ended only 10 years ago. This is not ancient history. No one should take peace on the European continent for granted. More positively, peace and freedom are the pre-conditions for prosperity. And it is worth saying that never before have so many Europeans been so secure, so prosperous and so free. That, in part, is a consequence of the European Union. This brings me to my second rationale. The success of the integration project enabled us to enlarge the zone of peace
and security. First to southern Europe. Then to Sweden, Finland and your own country Austria. And in 2004 with 8 central European countries plus Cyprus and Malta. It is a cliché to say that enlargement is our greatest success story. But throughout history, in the entire field of international relations, I do not think there is another strategy more values-driven, more original in its methodology and more successful in terms of results.

I will keep on saying that because it is my conviction. Even if the political mood is now less favourable. Of course, while I support enlargement, I also see that many people have reservations. We need to balance these two considerations. One way may be by stressing that enlargement cannot be our only project. And certainly we cannot keep on enlarging without political and institutional reform.

People want more than a market plus regional stabilisation project. I am convinced that more integration is needed in some areas - and perhaps less in others.

The topics for more EU-level action are: research, energy, migration and asylum. I left out one more area. This is where our case is perhaps strongest of all: for Europe to become a global player. I see Europe as a new form of power. A force for good around the world. A promoter of effective multilateralism, international law and justice.

The reasons are not so hard to explain. Our world is changing fast. It is becoming more uncertain and harder to manage. New technologies are changing industrial sectors overnight. In political and security terms, complex new threats are emerging, along with new centres of power. We are moving to a system of continents. And we all know that in a borderless world, events in faraway places affect our own security. It therefore is in our interest to be engaged in conflict prevention and crisis management. In this new security environment, we must be alert and creative. Above all, we need to be united. On our own we are political midgets. Policy takers. Condemned to drown in the maelstrom of events.

But together we can help to shape the global agenda. Not resist globalisation but perhaps negotiate its terms. Not impose our views but get a hearing for; them: in Washington today and Beijing tomorrow. I am convinced that our citizens want this. The polls show it consistently. And it is logical too. Europeans want their values – human rights, solidarity, justice and peace – promoted around the world.

There is also another side. It is not self-indulgent to say that from the Middle East to Africa, from the Balkans to South East Asia and elsewhere, the call goes out: can Europe help? In short, when I travel around Europe, I hear a demand for Europe to play a greater international role. The same is true when I travel around the world. It may be fitting to paraphrase Nike’s slogan: let’s just do it.

The good news is that even in the sensitive area of foreign and security policy, we have come a long way in a short period of time. Like a baby, in foreign policy too, we began talking before we started writing. And we started writing before we started acting. But now we do all three. I will not do a tour d’horizon and set out what EU is doing in every region or issue. I will not pretend either that we have an equally developed policy on every issue.
under the sun. But we have acquired a critical mass. After fits and starts, we now have a
united, comprehensive strategy for the Western Balkans. The same is true for the wider
Middle East, for Africa and for eastern Europe. In each of these regions, there is a sub-
stantive set of policies, agreed at 25 and backed up by a broad range of instruments. For
decades we had been confronted by various forms of crises on our doorstep – but without
the means to address them.

Now we have a set of capabilities, plus decision-making procedures and a sense of doc-
trine on how to address these challenges.

We have no fewer than 14 operations on-going. This is no small thing if you consider
that only four years ago we had none.

Our comprehensive approach – part civilian, part military – corresponds to the needs
of today’s complex security crises. Moreover, our presence on the ground in crisis zones
has increased our political leverage. For years we had been giving large sums of money
without getting much political influence. That was our Achilles heel. This is now chang-
ing – for the better. In 2006, we have a lot of work to do: Iran, Kosovo, Israel-Palestine,
Belarus, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nagorno Karabach to name a few.
Each case will require a different response. But standing by and doing nothing is not an
option.

Thematically we will have to focus on energy security, terrorism, human rights, failed
states, and non-proliferation – and many other issues besides. The point is not to dwell
on the breadth of the international agenda. Rather it is to stress that results in all these
areas are achievable. But on one condition. That we tackle them together, as Europeans.
That we don’t just say that we must pool our resource and put out united message – but
actually do it.

That we overcome institutional jealousies and genuinely work for a single purpose.
That we become perhaps a little less risk-averse. If we do, we can get great results. That,
more than anything else, will impress our citizens – and the rest of world.

Of course, we need many other elements for a new sound in Europe. Ideas on how to
fix the economy; on how to handle demographic challenges and on what to do with the
Constitution. On the Constitution, I will not go into details. I will only mention the risk
of a ‘Catch 22’ situation. Some people say that Europe needs to focus on delivering tan-
gible results before turning to institutional issues. I agree with the sentiment behind that
statement. But surely it would be much easier to get a Europe that delivers with the
Constitution than without. To put it positively: if you want a Europe that delivers you
should want the Constitution. And if you want the Constitution, you should work on a
Europe that delivers. I remain convinced that Europe badly needs the ideas contained in
the Constitution for a more streamlined and effective EU.

Let me conclude. If we want a new élan and momentum in Europe, we need to keep it
simple. We must make the case for Europe in plain language. Then, we should ensure
that what the EU does fits well with both logic and people’s expectations. If it does not,
pro-Europeans should not be afraid of saying so. And accept the consequences: poli-
cally, institutionally and financially.

My summary arguments are the following: Where did we start? As a peace project among adversaries. What is our greatest accomplishment? The spread of stability and democracy across the continent. And what is our task for the future? To make Europe a global power; a force for good in the world. There is more to it, for sure. But from my perspective, this is the essence. This year, 2006, we should put Europe to work again. Some may say I am absurdly optimistic. To them I reply with Einstein’s words: If at first, an idea is not absurd, then there is no hope for it.

Dear friends, there is a new mood in the air. It is our shared responsibility and our common interest to make the most of it. Thank you very much.
Iran

London, 30 January 2006

The Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union met on 30 January 2006 to discuss the Iranian nuclear dossier. After this meeting, a joint communiqué was adopted asking the extraordinary board meeting of the IAEA to report its decision on the steps required of Iran to the Security Council. On 4 February 2006, the IAEA board of governors would adopt a resolution to this effect.

STATEMENT FOLLOWING IRAN MEETING

UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw issued the following statement:

The Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union met this evening, 30 January 2006, and agreed the following:

‘Ministers:
underlined their commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and their determination to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
shared serious concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme, and agreed that an extensive period of confidence-building was required from Iran;
called on Iran to restore in full the suspension of enrichment-related activity, including Research and Development, under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
agreed that this week’s Extraordinary IAEA Board meeting should report to the Security Council its decision on the steps required from Iran, and should also report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue;
agreed that the Security Council should await the Director General’s report to the March meeting of the IAEA Board, which would include a report on the implementation of the February Board’s Resolution, and any Resolution from the March meeting, before deciding to take action to reinforce the authority of the IAEA process;
confirmed their resolve to continue to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iran problem.’
External Relations Council

Brussels, 30-31 January 2006

WESTERN BALKANS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘Western Balkans

1. The Council welcomed the Commission’s Communication ‘The Western Balkans on the road to the EU: Consolidating stability, raising prosperity’ as a good basis for further work in preparing discussions at the Gymnich and at the informal EU-Western Balkans Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Salzburg in March 2006. The EU remains committed to help the Western Balkans countries on their road to the EU through practical measures to make the European perspective more tangible.

Serbia and Montenegro/Kosovo

2. The Council expressed its sadness at the death of the President of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova. Kosovo has lost a historic leader who devoted his life to promoting peacefully the rights of his people. In this time of important decisions for the future of Kosovo the Council called on all Kosovar parties and leaders to work together so that further progress is achieved in implementing standards and that Kosovo participates constructively in the Status process.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

3. The Council appointed Christian Schwarz-Schilling as EU Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council commended the departing EU Special Representative and High Representative Lord Paddy Ashdown for his extraordinary commitment to and achievements for Bosnia and Herzegovina and its European future.

4. The Council welcomed the discussions on constitutional reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, assisted in recent months by the international community. It called on all parties in BiH to continue this process in a dynamic fashion and stressed the need for local ownership. In this context, the Council encouraged Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political leaders to ensure that the country’s central institutions function more effectively in order to meet European standards.
Serbia and Montenegro/Montenegro

5. The Council recognised that the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro allows the Republics after a three-year period to hold a referendum on independence. It also stressed that such a process has to conform to internationally recognised democratic standards, a critical element for stability and for the pace of progress towards the EU. In this respect, the Council supported the recommendations of the Venice Commission’s Opinion issued last December.

6. The Council expressed its full support for the mission of Ambassador Miroslav Lajcak, the Personal Representative of SG/HR Javier Solana. It called on all political forces in Montenegro to cooperate with each other and the Personal Representative to agree on the conduct and implementation of the proposed referendum and to refrain from unilateral actions that might reduce the chances of success of the dialogue. Ensuring a broad consensus on the modalities of the referendum in Montenegro, and conducting it in line with international standards, will provide the process and the outcome with the necessary legitimacy and sustainability.

Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

7. The Council expressed concern at the comments of the ICTY President and Chief Prosecutor in their presentations to the UN Security Council on 15 December 2005. The Council underlined again the importance of full cooperation with the ICTY by both Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. While welcoming the parties declared commitment to continue the implementation of the reform agenda, the Council recalled that the pace and conclusion of negotiations on Stabilisation and Association Agreements with these countries will depend inter alia on full cooperation with the ICTY and that it would jointly review with the Commission the performance in this area and other key areas before negotiations conclude. The Council called on both countries to take decisive action to ensure that remaining fugitive indictees, notably Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, are finally brought to justice in The Hague. Full cooperation with the ICTY is essential to achieve lasting reconciliation in the region and lift a fundamental obstacle on the way towards the European Union.

(...)
AFGHANISTAN – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

On the eve of the London conference on Afghanistan, the Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The EU welcomes the international conference to be held in London on 31 January and 1 February 2006 as an important opportunity to generate momentum for reforms and reconstruction in Afghanistan, and to define follow-on to the process launched at Bonn in December 2001.

2. The Council particularly welcomes the launch of the Afghanistan Compact on the basis of partnership between the Afghan Government, with its sovereign responsibilities, and the international community, with a central and impartial coordinating role for the United Nations. This is in line with the EU’s long-standing support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an Afghanistan accountable to its citizens, able to assume its rightful place in the international community and to contribute to regional stability. The EU fully supports all three pillars of activity identified by the Compact (security; governance, rule of law and human rights; sustainable economic and social development), as well as the cross-cutting priority of counter-narcotics.

3. The EU remains committed to long-term support for the Government and people of Afghanistan through Afghan-led reconstruction efforts and will further enhance the effectiveness of its action. The EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration of 16 November (14519/05) is a clear expression of that. EU assistance will mainly aim at fostering the establishment of a democratic, accountable and sustainable Afghan State capable of exercising its sovereignty and protecting the rights of its citizens.

4. The EU will build on its already extensive engagement in the political, security, development and humanitarian fields, and will ensure that counter-narcotics is mainstreamed throughout its activities in each of these areas. The challenges of the phase following the successful completion of the Bonn process call for the deepening and consolidation of progress achieved so far.

5. Counter-narcotics will remain a cross-cutting priority in overall EU policy toward Afghanistan. The EU will sustain and increase its efforts in support of the priorities highlighted in the Government of Afghanistan’s National Drugs Control Strategy. Specifically, it will support the development of strong and effective counter-narcotics institutions, law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, including through the provision of mentors and trainers, and will provide financial support for efforts by the Government of Afghanistan to strengthen and diversify opportunities for legal rural livelihoods.
6. Another cross-cutting priority will be the promotion of human rights, paying special attention to women’s and children’s rights.

7. The EU will pay special attention to governance and administrative reform, including at provincial level, and to promoting human rights and the rule of law. It will increase financial support for justice sector reform at both central and provincial level. The EU will directly support PRT civilian activities led by EU Member States, which will include activities focused on rule of law and good governance at provincial level.

8. The EU will increase support for security sector reform, including by providing training and increased financial support for the creation of an effective and sustainable Afghan National Police and by making available further contributions to support the disarmament and reintegration of former combatants.

9. The EU will continue to support Afghanistan’s sustainable economic and social development, and its efforts to achieve its Millennium Development Goals. The EU will provide assistance within the framework of the Afghan National Development Strategy and the Afghanistan Compact. Programmes and projects will be coordinated with the Afghan Government in order to ensure that they are consistent with its priorities and that donor activities are rationalised. The EU will, where appropriate, provide assistance directly through the budget and will continue to encourage the Afghan Government to reach greater financial self-sustainability.

10. Establishment of regular political dialogue between the EU and Afghanistan is an important step in developing EU-Afghanistan cooperation. The Council welcomes the formal ministerial Troika meeting with Foreign Minister Dr Abdullah to be held on 31 January 2006, in the margins of the London conference.

11. The EU looks forward to continuing to cooperate closely with the rest of the international community, drawing on the Afghanistan Compact and the EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration as frameworks for cooperation. The EU supports the continued central role of the UN, including in the monitoring and coordination of donor activity by the international community. The EU will coordinate closely its actions and programmes with the UN, its agencies, and other relevant international organisations.

BELARUS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. Recalling its previous conclusions on Belarus, in particular those of 7 November
2005, the Council reiterates its deep concern at the deteriorating situation in respect of democracy, human rights and political freedoms in Belarus. The Council once again calls on the Belarusian authorities to ensure that the Presidential elections on 19 March are conducted in a free and fair manner in accordance with international standards and in line with Belarus’ commitments in the OSCE and the UN.

2. In this context, the Council welcomes the invitation by the Belarusian authorities to the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission and notes the willingness of Member States to make timely and adequate contribution to such a mission. In that respect, the Council urges the responsible Belarusian authorities:
   - to allow the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission to operate unimpeded in Belarus;
   - to ensure that all eligible candidates are allowed to register for the elections, to campaign freely and to enjoy equal access to state-controlled media;
   - to allow domestic and international media to report freely on the electoral process;

3. The Council is continuing to closely monitor the situation in Belarus. The Council restates its readiness to take further appropriate restrictive measures against the responsible individuals in the event of failure to uphold international standards in the electoral process, in particular those of the OSCE.

4. The Council reiterates its support for initiatives aimed at supporting democratisation and civil society in Belarus and encourages the intensification and facilitation of contacts between the people of the EU and Belarus. The Council recalls that the EU wishes to have closer and better relations with Belarus – including within the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the European Neighbourhood Policy – once the Belarusian authorities clearly demonstrate their willingness to respect democratic values, human rights and the rule of law.'

**IRAN – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The European Union is gravely concerned at the removal of seals at several nuclear installations, including at Natanz, and Iran’s decision to resume enrichment related activities. The EU calls on Iran to reinstate the seals and to re-establish full, sustained and verifiable suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as called for repeatedly in IAEA Board of Governors’ resolutions as an essential confidence-building measure.'
In line with the requests made in IAEA Board of Governors’ resolutions the EU emphasises the need for Iran to refrain from all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities until international confidence is restored.

This is not a dispute between Iran and Europe, but between Iran and the international community. The EU does not question the right of Iran to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the NPT, a right which we have consistently reaffirmed. The dispute is about Iran’s failure to build the necessary confidence as to the exclusively peaceful nature of its programme. This confidence has further eroded as a result of the unilateral steps Iran has taken contrary to its commitments. The Council noted with concern that the Director-General has reported that the IAEA is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues after two and a half years of intensive inspections and investigation and that Iran’s full transparency is indispensable and overdue.

In the light of recent Iranian actions, which run counter to IAEA resolutions and which are a rejection of the efforts to explore whether a basis can be agreed for resuming negotiations, the European Union Member States will closely coordinate and work for the forthcoming extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna to involve the UN Security Council to reinforce the authority of the IAEA in line with these conclusions. This is a necessary and appropriate step, fully in line with the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution of September 2005, which found that Iran had been non-compliant with its Safeguards Agreement and that the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities and the nature of these activities had given rise to questions within the competence of the Security Council.

The EU believes that the issue can still be solved by negotiations; but this will require a cooperative and transparent approach on the part of the Iranian government with the IAEA, and the return to full suspension. The EU remains committed to a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue in which the IAEA should play a central role. Involvement of the Security Council does not end the IAEA’s responsibilities; on the contrary it strengthens them.

The EU will remain fully engaged in this issue. The EU Member States will closely coordinate their action both in the framework of the IAEA in Vienna and of the United Nations in New York, in coordination also with international partners.

The Council recalls in this context its support for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, including their means of delivery.

The Council recalls that in its conclusions of 7 November 2005 it repeated that the evolution of its long-term relationship with Iran would depend on action by Iran to address effectively all the EU’s areas of concern. The Council regards Iran’s resumption of enrichment-related activities as a negative development that will impact on the overall relationship which we will review in the light of actions taken by Iran. The Council reiterates that it is up to Iran to determine, through its actions, whether its long-term relationship with the EU will improve or deteriorate.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The Council welcomed the holding on 25 January of elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and congratulated President Abbas and the Palestinian people on an electoral process that was free and fair. The Council fully endorsed the statement made by the Quartet issued on 26 January.

The Council stressed the need for the continuous commitment of all parties to the Palestinian constitutional process and emphasised the central role of President Mahmoud Abbas in ensuring stability in this transitional period. It reiterated its full support for President Abbas’ determination to pursue a peaceful solution of the conflict with Israel.

The Council underlined that violence and terror are incompatible with democratic processes and urged Hamas and all other factions to renounce violence, to recognise Israel’s right to exist, and to disarm.

The Council expects the newly elected PLC to support the formation of a government committed to a peaceful and negotiated solution of the conflict with Israel based on existing agreements and the Roadmap as well as to the rule of law, reform and sound fiscal management. On this basis the European Union stands ready to continue to support Palestinian economic development and democratic state building.

The Council reaffirmed its strong support for a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict leading to the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours.

The Council expects Israel to adhere to its obligations under the Roadmap.

The Council reaffirmed the central role of the Quartet in promoting progress on the peace process and looked forward to the meeting of Quartet Principals in London.’

IRAQ – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The Council welcomes the announcement by the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq of the provisional results of Iraq’s 15 December 2005 elections with a broad scope of participation and high turnout.

The Council pays tribute to the courage of the Iraqi people, who voted in impressive numbers despite difficult and challenging circumstances. It congratulates the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) together with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq on the efficient running of the elections. The European Union was pleased to support these elections and welcomes that the IECI has taken note
of suggestions for improvement in view of future elections.

The election results, coming against the background of large participation from all of Iraq’s communities, reflect a very serious commitment by the Iraqi people to democracy and the establishment of democratic institutions. They provide a clear working agenda for the new government to overcome remaining divisions within Iraq.

The Council encourages the swift formation of a new constitutionally elected and truly representative government taking into account the need for inclusiveness and a broad participation by all relevant political groupings dedicated to reaching their goals by peaceful and democratic means. Such an inclusive government will represent another important step towards reconciliation and consensus in Iraq, thereby continuing the building of a secure, stable, unified and prosperous Iraq.

The European Union reaffirms its readiness to support the Iraqi people in broadening further the consensus on the future of their country, including through a thorough and transparent review of the Constitution. The EU calls upon the international community to provide support for the new Iraqi Government and the Council of Representatives. To this end the Council strongly supports efforts by the Arab League to convene a conference of national accord in early 2006. The Council remains committed to supporting Iraq’s political transition and its economic and social reconstruction. It recalls the support it is already bringing through EU’s Integrated Rule of Law Mission (EUJUST LEX), as well as through support to the political process and to improving the delivery of basic services. It also remains committed to holding a regular political dialogue with Iraq in accordance with the Joint EU-Iraq Declaration and to entering into contractual relations with Iraq.’

(...) 

MIDDLE EAST: REACTIONS TO CARTOONS IN A DANISH NEWSPAPER

The Danish and Swedish delegations raised the issue of reactions in the Middle East following the publication last September of cartoons in an independent Danish newspaper.

The Council adopted the following statement in this respect:

‘The Council strongly rejects any threats by militant factions against EU citizens.’

The presidency also underlined the importance of both freedom of expression, as a fundamental freedom, and respect for religious beliefs.

(...)
Caricatures

Brussels, 7 February 2006

The controversy that followed the publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed in the European press and the violent reaction throughout the Muslim world alarmed the international community. A consensus swiftly emerged: the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference and the High Representative for CFSP issued a statement advocating freedom of expression in the press, respect for religious beliefs and intercommunity dialogue but categorically condemning violence.


We are deeply alarmed at the repercussions of the publication in Denmark several months ago of insulting caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed and their subsequent republication by some other European newspapers and at the violent acts that have occurred in reaction to them.

The anguish in the Muslim World at the publication of these offensive caricatures is shared by all individuals and communities who recognize the sensitivity of deeply held religious belief. In all societies there is a need to show sensitivity and responsibility in treating issues of special significance for the adherents of any particular faith, even by those who do not share the belief in question.

We fully uphold the right of free speech. But we understand the deep hurt and widespread indignation felt in the Muslim World. We believe freedom of the press entails responsibility and discretion, and should respect the beliefs and tenets of all religions.

But we also believe the recent violent acts surpass the limits of peaceful protest. In particular, we strongly condemn the deplorable attacks on diplomatic missions that have occurred in Damascus, Beirut and elsewhere. Aggression against life and property can only damage the image of a peaceful Islam. We call on the authorities of all countries to protect all diplomatic premises and foreign citizens against unlawful attack.

These events make the need for renewed dialogue, among and between communities of different faiths and authorities of different countries, all the more urgent. We
call on them to appeal for restraint and calm, in the spirit of friendship and mutual respect.

Kofi A. Annan
Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu
Javier Solana
European Defence Agency

Brussels, 9 February 2006

SPEECH BY JAVIER SOLANA: RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY – AN IMPERATIVE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear friends,

It is a real pleasure to open this conference. It gives me a chance to share with you some reflections on the importance of European defence research and technology.

I would like to begin by putting defence research and technology, and the work of the European Defence Agency, in a broader context.

It is worth stressing that our work in these areas serves a larger purpose, which is to enhance Europe’s ability to deal with a complex and uncertain security environment. Or to promote ‘a secure Europe in a better world’, as the European Security Strategy put it. There is a clear need and an opportunity to work for that goal. It is what our citizens demand. And it is what the rest of the world increasingly expects. So I am pleased that every day our ability to contribute to global security is increasing: from the Balkans, to the Middle East, from Indonesia to Africa and elsewhere. But, every day, I also feel the frustration of knowing how much more we could do. If only we had a bit more political will and greater means at our disposal.

The biggest change – and improvement – in recent years has been that we have become much more operational. We have more than ten operations underway as I speak. Some civilian, some military. All are proof of our comprehensive approach to tackling insecurity. But the more we do, the more we are asked to do. And for that we need the right tools to do the job.

This is where the European Defence Agency comes in. The creation of the Agency has been an enormous step forward. Its main task is to support the member states in developing the capabilities they need for modern crisis management operations. Clearly, research and technology must be at the heart of its work programme.

We all know that acquiring the right defence capability means many things. We need the right forces, the right doctrine, and the right equipment. But we also need to develop our technological base. That is why today’s conference is so important.

There are two impulses behind this conference.

In the first place, it launches what should become an annual series of such meetings between the Agency and the European defence R&T community. But there is also a particular reason for today’s event.

As you know, at the Hampton Court Summit, European leaders asked me to come
forward with ideas and proposals on how we can boost European defence research and technology.

The short answer, it seems to me, is that we should spend more, spend better and spend more together. I will come back to this with more details in a minute. European Defence Ministers will focus on this challenge when they meet as the EDA’s Steering Board in Innsbruck in early March. I am sure that today’s debate will provide many ideas and proposals that will help us to prepare for that meeting.

Why are we focusing so much on Research and Technology? The answer is simple: because it is the key to the transformation of our armed forces.

As we move into the 21st century, we face a radically changed strategic environment. New threats and challenges, requiring new roles and new missions of our armed forces. Today’s and tomorrow’s operations are vastly different from what we planned for during the Cold War.

Previously the aim was to unleash the maximum possible destructive power on opposing conventional forces. Now our operations must be characterised by restraint, precision, and the need to minimise the resultant damage.

We are working under tight rules of engagement and 24-hour global scrutiny. In ambiguous circumstances, where the opponent will often be hard to identify and isolate. In everything we do, we must bring together civil and military instruments, and protect our own people as never before. This is a huge challenge. And of course technology is not all we need to transform our armed forces and the way they operate. But it will play a central role.

Technology is also fundamental for the health of our European defence industry. We can debate just how much of that technology we should generate in Europe, for reasons of autonomy, and how far we can rely on the global market. But we clearly need much of it under our own hands. And for that we need a globally competitive European defence industry. Not only as a key part of our economies. But also as a fundamental contributor to the political consensus that supports the role of defence.

But we will not sustain strong technological capabilities unless we invest in them. And there is now real concern that we are beginning to eat the seed-corn.

It was natural that after the end of the Cold War, people expected a ‘peace dividend’. But cutting back on Research and Technology has too often been seen as an easy option. Comparisons with the US are not always relevant. Still, we should all be concerned that the US now outspends Europe in defence Research and Development by a ratio of five to one. The budget of a single US agency, DARPA, stands at over $3 billion. This is more than the combined total of European expenditure on defence Research and Technology.

Europeans do not lack the skills or the talent for innovation. A European invented the World Wide Web; Airbus stands as an exemplar of what we can do in aerospace when we work together. And Europe is strongly placed in many areas of civil technology. Increasingly these must be ‘spun-in’ to defence. Mobile communications is an obvious example.
But ‘spin-in’ is no panacea. Especially not when Europe’s wider research, development and innovation efforts are also stumbling. There is widespread recognition that current levels of European investment in research and development are insufficient.

In the defence sphere, we can only meet the challenges we face if governments discuss and address them together with industry. For governments it may be a matter of strategy to remaining internationally competitive. For industry, it is a matter of survival.

Ultimately, of course, the defence industry is there to meet the future needs of our armed forces, and not vice-versa. But in a world of ever-accelerating technological change, our military establishments cannot decide what they may want unless industry tells them what they could provide. So it is good to see so many companies represented here today – and to have Tom Enders, the current President of ASD, up here on the platform.

So how can we bring about a step-change in our defence R&T efforts?

I am convinced we must do three things:

First, spend more. I know this is difficult in a world of tight national finances. But it is an imperative nonetheless. Where defence budgets as such cannot be increased, we must work on redeploying funds within those budgets. Manpower costs currently account for more than 50% of European defence spending. But do we really need more than two million men and women in uniform in Europe? Much of our defence infrastructure is duplicative – between countries and between governments and industry. So let us find savings from rationalisation, to increase the proportion of money spent on investment.

Second, we must spend better, so that we get more output per euro spent. Above all, this requires a focus on key technologies of the future. Concretely, this means finding more flexible ways of doing business, particularly at the intergovernmental level. It also means looking at how we can embed new technologies quickly in existing platforms. And it involves matching the ever-shortening cycle times of the civilian world. We should also look at ways how we can harness the ingenuity of companies and universities that are not traditionally seen as part of the defence industry. The same goes for small and medium-sized firms which are often the source of innovation.

Third, and perhaps most important, we must spend more together. This is a fundamental issue and the main raison d’être of the Agency.

Last year, there was an excellent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It reminded us that integrating Europe’s defence efforts should no longer be seen as an interesting idea. It is an absolute necessity. Industry has urged that the proportion of R&T expenditure in Europe which is spent collaboratively should increase from the current level of less than 5% to 20%.

I am convinced that they are right – and we must now, urgently, decide how best to achieve this aim. Some argue that it can be done by increasing the pace and scale of ad-hoc collaborations – the traditional approach, but done better. Others argue that this leaves
cooperation at the mercy of different national budget cycles, and diverging national pri-
orities. They stress that the necessary step-change will only come about if some funding
is pooled, readily available for joint R&T endeavours. Following this logic, there are argu-
ments for a substantial R&T budget for the Agency.

This would certainly be one way. But there could be others. A joint European Defence
R&T Fund, for example, managed within the Agency but controlled directly by its con-
tributors.

Personally, I think the principle of a joint fund matters more than the mechanism.
And what matters even more is that we address the issue with urgency, and decide our
way ahead.

Let me make one final point. It is clear that the traditional boundaries between
defence and the wider world of research and technology are disappearing.

Technologies that the Commission will be promoting under its new programme for
European Security Research may be indistinguishable from those we need for more con-
ventional 'defence' purposes. We are already working with the Commission on software-
defined radio, the next revolution in communications technology. As the respective
agendas of EDA and the Commission's Security Research Programme take shape, we
must work hand-in-hand to maximise synergies. I know Günter Verheugen shares that
ambition.

Ladies and Gentlemen, let me close.

In European defence we have made enormous progress in a short period of time. But
to respond to growing demands and expectations we need more usable defence capa-
bility. And for that we need a step change in defence R & T.

I wish you a productive and successful conference. And I look forward to hearing your
views and suggestions on how we can, collectively, continue the success story of
European defence and improve the contribution that defence R & T can make.

Thank you very much.
INDONESIA/ACEH – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The Council welcomed the very substantial progress made in restoring peace in Aceh and commended the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) for their good cooperation and genuine commitment to implement the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding of August 2005.

The Council noted with satisfaction that the demobilisation of GAM and the decommissioning of its weapons as well as the relocation away from Aceh of non-organic military forces and non-organic police has been successfully completed. However, important challenges remain regarding the further implementation of the MoU. The Council therefore called on both parties to continue to work together for lasting peace in the province.

The Council commended the Aceh Monitoring Mission, in which the European Union operates alongside 5 ASEAN Member States – Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – as well as with Norway and Switzerland, for its important role in monitoring the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding. Following an invitation by the Government of Indonesia, supported by GAM, the Council decided to extend the Aceh Monitoring Mission for a further period of three months until 15 June 2006.

The Council welcomed the European Community’s measures in Aceh, worth EUR 25 million, to support and consolidate the results of the peace process and underlined its support to the forthcoming local elections in Aceh, including the possible deployment of an EU election observation mission.

The Council noted with satisfaction that the EU successfully mobilized its different instruments in a comprehensive manner to support the peace process in Aceh. The Council will consider how further to strengthen the EU’s relations with Indonesia and the wider ASEAN region.’

The Council also adopted a joint action amending and extending joint action 2005/643/CFSP on the EU monitoring mission in Aceh until 15 June 2006 (5901/06).

The mission is extended, on the basis of a recommendation from the head of mission, for a further three months and following an invitation by the government of Indonesia to extend the EU’s presence in Aceh.

The Aceh monitoring mission was established on 15 September 2005 in order to
assist Indonesia in implementing a final agreement on Aceh, as set out in a memorandum of understanding concluded on 15 August 2005 between the government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement.

The Council also adopted a decision extending the agreement between the EU and the government of Indonesia on the tasks, status, privileges and immunities of Aceh monitoring mission and its personnel for the same period (5900/06).

**SUDAN/DARFUR – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The Council noted with concern that the security situation in Darfur remains serious. It called on the parties to respect the ceasefire and urged them to negotiate in Abuja under AU leadership with urgency and in good faith. It reiterated the EU’s commitment to provide the AU with continuing support, both political and financial, and to the military and policing components of AMIS, and expressed its readiness to support AU and UN in a smooth and effective transition to a UN operation, should this be agreed by the Peace and Security Council of the AU.’

(...)

**EU STRATEGY AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

The Council adopted a joint action in support of the biological and toxin weapons convention (BTWC) in the framework of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including EU financial assistance (5821/06).

In order to give immediate and practical application to some elements of the EU strategy, adopted in December 2003, the EU will support the BTWC with the following objectives:

- promoting the universality of the BTWC by carrying out activities, including regional and sub-regional workshops and seminars, aimed at increasing the membership of the BTWC, and
- assisting contracting parties in order to ensure that they incorporate the international obligations of the BTWC into their national legislation and set up the necessary structures.

In the context of the strategy against proliferation, the Council also adopted an EU action plan on biological and toxin weapons, complementary to the joint action, con-
taining measures to be undertaken by the EU member states in order to enhance implementation of the BTWC within the EU (6506/06).

(...)

WESTERN BALKANS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘Western Balkans

1. The Council took note of the report on President Barroso’s and Commissioner Rehn’s recent visit to the Western Balkan countries.

Serbia and Montenegro/Montenegro

2. The Council welcomed progress made so far by the government and the opposition in defining the modalities for the proposed referendum in Montenegro. It called on both parties to reach a rapid agreement on the remaining open issues (majority requirement, the date and the question of the referendum), thus providing the process with the necessary legitimacy. In this respect, the Council fully supported the efforts and initiatives of the HR Personal Representative, Ambassador Miroslav Lajcak.

Serbia and Montenegro/Kosovo

3. The Council welcomed the meeting between Belgrade and Pristina on decentralisation, held on 20-21 February in Vienna under the auspices of the UN Special Envoy, as a demonstration of the preparedness of both sides to engage constructively in the Kosovo Status process. Recalling the statement issued at the Contact Group Ministerial Meeting on 31 January 2006 the Council expressed its continued support for UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and urged all parties to continue their engagement in this process and to maintain the spirit and the momentum of negotiations aiming to reach sustainable and practical solutions acceptable to all parties concerned on all outstanding issues such as decentralisation. The Council also reaffirmed the importance of continued and effective Standards implementation. It urged the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government to intensify their efforts to achieve in parallel with the Status process concrete and rapid progress on Standards implementation, particularly regarding the protection of minority communities.
Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

The Council noted with concern recent comments by ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte about Serbia and Montenegro’s unsatisfactory cooperation with ICTY. The Council strongly supported the recent messages delivered by the Commission in Belgrade and Sarajevo that full cooperation with the ICTY must be achieved to ensure that the SAA negotiations are not disrupted. Recalling its conclusions of 3 October 2005 and of 30 January 2006, the Council urged both Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina to take decisive action to ensure that all remaining fugitive indictees, notably Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, are finally brought to justice without delay. The Council asked the Presidency and the Commission to remain in close contact with the Chief Prosecutor and to continue to keep the Council fully informed.

 IRAQ – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

The Council condemns the criminal bombing of the Holy Shrine of Ali Al-Hadi and Hassan Al-Askari in Samarra aimed at provoking sectarian strife. It condemns the subsequent retaliatory acts, including attacks on religious sites. The Council deeply regrets the resulting loss of life. The Council condemns all acts undermining the political process.

The European Union strongly supports calls by Iraqi political and religious leaders for restraint and non-retaliation and urges Iraq to come together in a spirit of dialogue and mutual respect. The Council expresses its full support for the efforts of the UN in promoting inter-communal dialogue and national dialogue. It welcomes the initiative by the League of Arab States to hold a second conference on national reconciliation with participation of all Iraqi communities.

The Council underlines that recent developments in Iraq highlight the urgent need for the formation of a government of national unity and urges all political leaders in the country to match the courage of the Iraqi people, who voted for them in impressive numbers at the elections on 15 December 2005. This display of trust by the Iraqi people in a democratic system deserves to be met by the formation of a government of national unity which will work for the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq in a spirit of reconciliation.
REACTIONS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD TO PUBLICATIONS IN EUROPEAN AND OTHER MEDIA – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

The Council expresses its deep concern at the events that followed the publication of cartoons in a number of European and other media. The Council acknowledges and regrets that these cartoons were considered offensive and distressing by Muslims across the world.

Freedom of expression is a fundamental right and an essential element of a democratic discourse, with an independent judiciary as a safeguard mechanism. Free media are indispensable to a free and open society and to accountable systems of government. Freedoms, however, come with responsibilities. Freedom of expression should be exercised in a spirit of respect for religious and other beliefs and convictions. Mutual tolerance and respect are universal values we should all uphold.

The Council strongly condemns all violent acts and threats against citizens and property of the European Union, of its Member States as well as of other countries. These actions cannot be justified under any circumstances. The Council welcomes the statements by those prominent Muslim scholars and religious and political leaders who have called for moderation and have spoken out against the violent actions of a minority.

The Council expresses its full solidarity with all those countries whose citizens, diplomatic or consular missions have come under attack. It recalls the special duty of states under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations to protect diplomatic agents and the premises of diplomatic and consular missions. The Council calls upon the governments that have not provided adequate protection to give a positive response to this end and to the demands for compensation made by the countries affected. The Council underlines that boycotts against individual Member States are unacceptable.

The Council welcomes the recent visit to countries in the Middle East and the Gulf by the EU High Representative and the contacts which have taken place in Vienna between the Presidency, the Foreign Minister of Denmark and Islamic leaders. These contacts, including the call for renewed dialogue in the Joint Statement by the Secretary General of the United Nations, the Secretary General of the OIC and the EU High Representative of February 7, 2006, have demonstrated how much common ground exists in this direction.

The EU and its Member States will actively promote dialogue, mutual understanding and respect through all existing mechanisms, including the Barcelona process and the Anna Lindh Foundation as well as the ASEM process. It underlines the specific need for initiatives aimed at representatives of the media as well as young people. The Council also expresses its strong support for the Alliance of Civilizations initiative launched under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General by the Prime Ministers of Spain and Turkey and welcomes the call for dialogue and mutual respect made at the meeting
chaired by the UN Secretary-General in Doha on 25 February, 2006. The Council welcomes the holding of a conference of European Imams by the Islamic Community of Austria in cooperation with the European Commission and the Presidency in Vienna on April 7, 2006.

The EU and its Member States will play an active role in the debate on these issues within the UN, the OSCE and other multilateral fora. The Council welcomes the OSCE Human Dimension meeting in Kazakhstan in June 2006 on Inter-cultural, Inter-religious and Inter-ethnic Understanding. It invites the Presidency, assisted by the HR/SG, and the Commission to continue to look into ways of working with partners and other international actors in the Muslim world, including the OIC and the Arab League, to foster tolerance as well as respect for religious and other beliefs and convictions. Particular emphasis should be given to the role that free media and NGOs can play in this regard.’

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Ministers assessed, over lunch, the situation in the Middle East. High Representative Javier Solana briefed Ministers on his visit to Israel and the West Bank. Ministers endorsed, against the background of the Quartet’s appeal for measures to facilitate the work of the interim Palestinian government, the Commission’s intention to provide additional emergency assistance as well as to authorize the (partial) release of resources from the World Bank Trust Fund. The President noted that Ministers would return to the issue of the Middle East at their informal meeting in March in Salzburg.

IRAN – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council welcomed the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 4 February with the overwhelming support of Board members. It supported the Board’s decision to involve the United Nations Security Council. The Council believed that if Iran continues to fail to heed the repeated requests made in successive IAEA Board resolutions, the Security Council should now put its weight behind the Board’s requests and the IAEA’s efforts to resolve outstanding questions.

2. The Council regretted Iran’s decision to withhold voluntary cooperation with the IAEA, contrary to the Board’s requests and to Iran’s earlier decision to implement the provisions of its Additional Protocol. Iran’s decision to limit cooperation further increases international concerns and suspicions about Iranian intentions and makes it more difficult for the IAEA to resolve outstanding issues.
3. The European Union deplored Iran’s resumption of enrichment-related activities, including enrichment at Natanz. Iran’s introduction of nuclear material into centrifuges on 13 February in defiance of repeated calls by the IAEA Board of Governors and the international community is also a step in the wrong direction. The IAEA Board has repeatedly called for Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as an essential confidence-building measure. The restoration of international confidence requires full transparency and cooperation from Iran.

4. The Council reaffirmed the EU’s continued support for a diplomatic solution. It urged Iran to reinstate a full suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The Council called on Iran to meet in full all of the Board’s requests in good time before the next Board meeting on 6 March. The Council welcomed Russia’s efforts to seek a way forward involving the offer to Iran of a financial stake in an enrichment joint venture on the territory of the Russian Federation, conditional on Iran’s resumption of the moratorium on all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

5. The EU does not question the right of Iran to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the NPT, a right which the EU has consistently reaffirmed. If international concerns about Iran’s programme are fully addressed, the EU would be prepared, as already stated in its August 2005 proposal, to support the development of a safe, sustainable and proliferation-proof Iranian civilian nuclear programme.

6. Recalling the European Council conclusions of 16 December 2005, which agreed on the need to keep the EU’s diplomatic options under close review and continue to calibrate the EU’s approach in light of Iranian declarations and actions, the Council agreed that Iran’s resumption of enrichment activities is a negative development. It is time for Iran to reconsider its position on these activities and other areas of concern in order to avoid further deterioration of its relationship with the EU.

7. The recent attacks on European missions in Tehran were unjustifiable and totally unacceptable. The Council calls on Iran to protect diplomatic missions, including through proper policing, in accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

8. The Council calls on Iran to lift all discriminatory restrictions against individual EU Member States.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The Council recalls the importance of completing the transition process in the Democratic Republic of Congo which is also essential for fostering peace and stability throughout the Great Lakes region. The successful referendum of 18-19 December 2005 has demonstrated the importance the Congolese people attach to the democratic process. The forthcoming electoral process will be a key step to that effect. The Council welcomes the promulgation of the new Constitution and the adoption of the electoral law. The Council encourages the Transitional National Government, the political parties, their leaders and the civil society to work together to ensure peaceful, fair and transparent elections according to international standards which should contribute significantly to securing DRC’s future as a democratic and stable country. The Council underlines that the agreed timetable of the transition, including the elections before the end of June 2006, should be respected.

The Council recalls the EU’s engagement in the DRC, notably by its sustained and continued support to the transition, including the electoral process, provided through the EDF and the EC, and ESDP missions EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL Kinshasa as well as through bilateral support by Member States.

The Council recalls its conclusions of 12 December 2005 on the importance of a stable and secure environment for the elections. This is first and foremost the responsibility of the transition government, supported by MONUC. In that context, following a request by the UN, the Council is considering how best to provide support to the UN in this endeavour. To this end, contacts with the UN and the DRC authorities are being pursued, as well as with the AU.’

(...)
JAVIER SOLANA WELCOMES THE EXTENSION OF THE ACEH MONITORING MISSION

Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, today welcomed the Council decision to extend the EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) for a period of up to three months:

“I very much welcome today’s Council decision to extend the Aceh Monitoring Mission. The peace process in Aceh is going well and I firmly believe that this extension will contribute to the further strengthening of confidence and trust between the parties.

Over the last six months a safe and peaceful environment has emerged in Aceh and the peace process has become irreversible. But recovery is long process and there are still challenges ahead. I hope the extension of the EU-led monitoring mission can help overcome these challenges, thus paving the way for a permanent, peaceful and effective recovery from the tsunami disaster that struck Aceh on 26 December 2005.

The joint EU-ASEAN mission has proven its worth, as a transparent and even-handed facilitator, in supporting the parties in their efforts to implement the Memorandum of Understanding, signed in Helsinki on 15 August 2005. Thus far the mission has been very effective in its undertakings.

This decision is a clear signal that the EU wants to continue to support Indonesia, including the people of Aceh, on the path to peace, security and prosperity.”
FACTSHEET

EU Monitoring mission in Aceh (Indonesia)

17 January 2006

In September 2005 the European Union, together with five contributing countries from ASEAN, as well as with Norway and Switzerland, deployed a monitoring mission in Aceh (Indonesia) – the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). This mission is designed to monitor the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on 15 August 2005. The AMM became operational on 15 September 2005, the date on which the decommissioning of GAM armaments and the relocation of non-organic military and police forces began.

The Peace Process

The peace negotiations were initiated in Helsinki between the GoI and the GAM under the auspices of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), a non-governmental organisation chaired by former Finnish President Martti AHTISAARI.

Since January 2005, peace talks have progressed through five sets of negotiations, the latest of which was completed in Helsinki on 17 July 2005. Upon conclusion of the fifth round of talks, the Parties agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed on 15 August 2005.

The EU has supported the peace process negotiations by providing direct support to CMI through the EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism.

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)

The GoI and the GAM committed themselves in the MoU to achieve a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh. The MoU details the agreement and the principles that will guide the political process in Aceh, covering the following topics inter alia:

- political reforms in Aceh (including a law on the governing of Aceh, political participation, economy, and rule of law),
- human rights,
- amnesty and re-integration of GAM members into society,
- appropriate security arrangements for the implementation of the MoU provisions,
- establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, and
- agreement on a dispute settlement mechanism.
Initial Phase

Given that both the GoI and the GAM have indicated that they would like to see a monitoring presence in Aceh immediately after the signature of the MoU, an initial monitoring presence (IMP) was deployed on 15 August 2005. The IMP, which consisted of 80 monitors from EU and ASEAN countries, covered the period between the signing of the MoU (15 August 2005) and the full deployment of the AMM (15 September 2005).

The IMP provided an early demonstration of the EU and ASEAN contributing countries' commitment to monitoring the peace process while contributing to confidence-building amongst the population of Aceh during the early stage of the implementation of the MoU. Final Phase The fourth and final phase of non-organic TNI military and police personnel re-location was completely finalised on 5 January 2006, with the last police officers departing from Lhokseumawe port. During this final phase of relocation, a total of 7,628 troops and 2,150 police personnel have departed from Aceh. This brought the decommissioning and relocation process to an end. As of 5 January 2006, in accordance with the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), the number of military forces remaining in Aceh is not supposed to exceed 14,700 and the number of police forces 9,100.

On 19 December 2005 the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) met its commitments stated in the MoU by handing over the last of its 840 weapons to the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). On 20 December 2005 the GAM leadership also confirmed in writing that there are no more weapons under GAM command in Aceh. GAM officially disbanded its military wing (TNA) on 27 December 2005.

Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)

The EU together with five ASEAN contributing countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and Norway and Switzerland, deployed a monitoring mission in Aceh (Indonesia). The monitoring mission is of a civilian nature and is EU-led.

The deployment of the AMM followed an official invitation addressed to the EU and the five ASEAN contributing countries by the GoI. The GAM leadership has also stated its full support for such a mission. The mission was launched on 15 September 2005.

Aims and Scope of the Aceh Monitoring Mission

The objective of the AMM is to support the GoI and the GAM in their implementation of the Peace Agreement. This includes the following tasks:
- monitor the demobilisation of GAM and monitor and assist with the decommissioning and destruction of its weapons, ammunition and explosives;
- monitor the re-location of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops;
monitor the reintegration of active GAM members;
monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field in the context of the tasks set out in the above points;
monitor the process of legislation change;
rule on disputed amnesty cases;
deal with complaints and alleged violations of the MoU;
establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties.

The AMM does not take on a facilitation or negotiation role. Should this be needed during the implementation process, it will be the responsibility of the two parties and the original facilitator, i.e. the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI).

Size and Structure of the Mission

The AMM is a civilian mission within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises the political control and the strategic guidance of the AMM under the responsibility of the Council of the EU. The costs of the mission are financed from the EU budget (the reference amount for the mission under the EU’s Common foreign and security policy budget line is EUR 9 million) and by contributions of EU Member States and participating countries (EUR 6 million).

The AMM numbers some 226 international unarmed personnel, of which 130 from EU Member States as well as Norway and Switzerland, and 96 from the five participating ASEAN countries. It comprises personnel with appropriate expertise in the range of competencies needed to fulfil the tasks of the mission.

The Headquarters and monitoring teams comprise personnel from the EU, ASEAN contributing countries and Norway and Switzerland. Monitors wear recognizable civilian mission attire with clear mission identification markings.

The mission, whose headquarters is in Banda Aceh, established a monitoring capability with 11 geographically distributed District Offices to demonstrate EU-ASEAN contributing countries’ support and engagement throughout Aceh. The mission also included 4 mobile decommissioning teams, 26 decommissioning monitors were withdrawn by the end of 2005. Monitors conduct their monitoring tasks by patrolling and communicating with both parties, and by carrying out inspections and investigations as required.

The Head of the mission (HoM), Pieter Feith, seconded from the EU Council Secretariat, is supported by three deputies, two EU and one from ASEAN.

The Joint Action (EU Council decision establishing the mission) will expire on 15 March 2006.
Reporting

The Head of the mission (HoM) reports to Javier Solana, Secretary General/High Representative of the Council of the EU on matters related to the AMM, and will inform the parties, the CMI, the PSC and the contributing countries from ASEAN and Europe on possible violations of the MoU.

The EU and Indonesia

The EU has supported the rehabilitation and reconstruction needs in the countries affected by the tsunami. EUR 200 million were committed for the rehabilitation and reconstruction needs of Indonesia alone for 2005-6. Planned EU Member State contributions amount to an additional EUR 391 million. The European Commission Humanitarian Co-ordination Office (ECHO) has channelled EUR 40 million worth of relief assistance to tsunami victims.

Excluding tsunami assistance, total EU aid (EC+25) amounts to EUR 200 million per annum. In addition, the European Commission’s “Country Strategy Paper” for Indonesia (2002-2006 period) foresees commitments for over EUR 215 million covering different development sectors over that period. The disbursements foreseen in 2005 for Indonesia are in the order of EUR 75 million.

The European Commission will further support the Aceh peace process through flanking measures including support to re-integration of former GAM combatants into civil society and democratic political life; support to persons displaced by the conflict and to returnees from third countries; EU observation of local elections in 2006; technical assistance and capacity-building to support local police and civil judicial system and access to justice in particular with regard to the protection of human rights, enhancement of local public administration, and support to the organization of local elections.

The EU has confirmed its attachment to a united, democratic, stable and prosperous Indonesia. It has reiterated its respect for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and recognition of its importance as a major partner.

Further reference:
http://ue.eu.int/aceh
http://www.aceh-mm.org
EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Brussels, 27 February 2006

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION IN SUPPORT OF THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EU STRATEGY AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chapter III of which contains a list of measures to combat such proliferation.

(2) The European Union is actively implementing the EU Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular those related to reinforcing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), including supporting national implementation of the BTWC, and continuing the reflection on the verification mechanism.

(3) The submission of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) constitutes an important element to increase transparency in the implementation of the BTWC and an EU Action Plan has been agreed upon to improve the number of CBMs submitted by Member States and to encourage all Member States to submit lists of appropriate experts and laboratories to the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG), the results of which could serve to define the contents of further Joint Actions in this field.

(4) The Review Conference of the BTWC in 2006 will be a good opportunity to agree on specific, practical and realistic measures to strengthen both the BTWC and compliance with it. In this regard, the European Union remains committed to developing measures to verify compliance with the BTWC. In the absence of negotiations on such a verification mechanism however, much useful work remains to be done within the perimeters of the intersessional BTWC work programme.
The Commission is entrusted with the supervision of the proper implementation of the EU financial contribution,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

Article 1

1. For the purpose of giving immediate and practical application to some elements of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the European Union shall support the BTWC, with the following objectives:
   ◦ promotion of the universality of the BTWC,
   ◦ support for implementation of the BTWC by the States Parties.

2. The projects corresponding to measures of the EU Strategy are those that aim at:
   ◦ promotion of the universality of the BTWC by carrying out activities, including regional and sub-regional workshops and seminars, aimed at increasing the membership of the BTWC,
   ◦ assistance to States Parties for the national implementation of the BTWC, in order to ensure that States Parties transpose the international obligations of the BTWC into their national legislation and administrative measures.

A detailed description of the abovementioned projects is set out in the Annex.

Article 2

1. The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of the Joint Action in full association with the Commission. The Commission shall supervise the proper implementation of the financial contribution referred to in Article 3.

2. In order to carry out the objectives specified in Article 1(1), the Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative for CFSP (SG/HR), who will be responsible for the political coordination of the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2).

3. The technical implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be entrusted to the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, which shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the Presidency and under the control of the SG/HR.
**Article 3**

1. The financial reference amount for the two projects listed in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 867 000.

2. The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the Community procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the European Union with the exception that any pre-financing shall not remain the property of the Community.

3. For the purpose of implementing the projects referred to in Article 1(2), the Commission shall conclude a financing arrangement with the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, referred to in Article 2(3).

**Article 4**

The Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, shall report to Council on the implementation of this Joint Action on the basis of regular reports prepared by the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. The Commission shall be fully associated and shall provide information on the financial implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2).

**Article 5**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

It shall expire 18 months after its adoption.

**Article 6**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 27 February 2006.

*For the Council*

*The President*

U. Plassnik
Informal meeting of the Defence Ministers

Innsbruck, 6-7 March 2006

SUGGESTIONS REGARDING ESDP ASSETS FOR IMPROVING THE EUROPEAN UNION’S DISASTER RESPONSE CAPACITIES PRESENTED BY JAVIER SOLANA

In line with the mandate received from the Union’s Heads of State or Government at the informal meeting at Hampton Court and with the preliminary guidelines submitted to you in December 2005, I am now presenting concrete proposals for strengthening the Union’s disaster response capacity.

The principle of using assets developed in the ESDP context to support civil protection and humanitarian aid is an established one. As we know from the Indian Ocean Tsunami in December 2004 and from recent disasters, particularly in Pakistan, military assets can prove essential.

Our concern is effectiveness. Our action should be complementary: this means respecting the primary responsibility of the competent authorities of the affected State; the key role of the United Nations, especially of its Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); NGO activities, and intervening in support of civilian assets.

I have organised my proposals around three themes:
- short-term measures regarding strategic lift, for which Member States’ support and their strong mobilisation are essential;
- broader work regarding the use of ESDP assets;
- strengthening the European Union’s reaction capability, inter alia through internal organizational measures, which are either already in place or being finalised.

Response capacities for natural and man-made disasters
European security and defence policy assets

Strategic lift coordination

1. Recent experience has shown that this is probably the most serious problem affecting disaster response intervention and weakening its impact and the solidarity effect on the populations concerned.

2. The European Union Military Staff can, where necessary, provide support for transport coordination via its strategic movement coordination unit (being set up as part of the Global Approach on Deployability), making use of the Multinational Coordination
Centres for strategic lift in Athens and Eindhoven. This approach will enable us to identify the strategic lift assets potentially available and to notify the Member States. It will also provide us with a tool for detailed planning and for optimising and coordinating the use of strategic lift assets that Member States provide in response to each disaster situation.

3. Existing crisis management arrangements for the use of these tools are being geared to this new context, in agreement with the multinational strategic lift coordination centres that Member States have made available to the European Union. An initial more detailed analysis should be presented to the Member States as early as the end of March. We will move forward in full association with the Commission, relying on the constructive, practical relations that we have built up in the context of civil protection and humanitarian aid.

4. To achieve these goals, we need resources. A solution will only be found if Member States contribute substantially.

5. The SALIS contract, signed on 20 October 2005 and now ratified by all the participant States, provides interesting prospects in an initial stage for covering strategic lift requirements for the movement of aid to disaster victims. The participant States are allocated a specified number of available flight hours over a 72-hour period (2,000 hours in all), an equal if not larger number of hours (2,800) being offered to other potential carriers. France has announced that its flight hours under the contract (around 450) are to be allocated as a priority to European Union activity. Voluntary contributions of this kind would be crucial in the initial response stage.

6. Experience of the most recent natural disasters and studies on civil protection have already resulted in identification of the main critical areas in which ESDP assets could prove essential; these include: the medical dimension; logistical support and the NRBC dimension, and possibly other relevant capacities.

7. With regard to military capabilities, the European Union Military Staff is currently identifying assets fulfilling specific disaster requirements on the basis of their intrinsic characteristics (deployability, all-terrain adaptability, practicality, etc.) but also their speed of deployment. This work is based on identification of a limited number of generic scenarios integrating the salient features of recent disasters.

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1 The SALIS (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution) contract guarantees participant States, including 12 Member States, access to a strategic lift capacity (Antonov 124) at short notice (72 hours) for individual requests and subject to a longer period of notice (6 to 9 days) for multinational operations.
8. This information will be particularly useful for supplying the military database currently being adapted, which will make it possible to know in advance the appropriate assets voluntarily made available by the Member States as well as the conditions of their availability and deployment.

9. As well as identifying the assets that can be used, it will be necessary to establish the procedures for deploying them, including the allocation of roles between the Brussels level and the capitals. Consideration will be given to the possibility of reinforcing the capacities of the General Secretariat of the Council with Member States’ experts on a case-by-case basis and for a limited period, when necessary. All these factors will have to feed into a process of advance planning, since, in these matters, the expected speed of reaction has to be calculated in hours rather than days.

10. The discussions could draw, in particular, on the capacities of the Civilian/Military Cell.

11. The capacity of the European Union Satellite Centre should be made use of and perhaps developed to ensure the supply of relevant geospatial information. Among other things, this involves locating and identifying the damage in areas affected by the disaster and supporting the effort that has been committed, in particular by providing reliable information on the locally workable infrastructure and means of communication. The Centre should take part in identifying persistent risks to population, environment and infrastructure following the disaster.

12. These discussions should lead to specific proposals with a view to the General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting in May.

**Strengthening reaction capability**

13. The Council has affirmed its desire to be more reactive and to reinforce the political coordination in Brussels in the event of natural disasters both inside and outside the EU (15106/05). To this end, specific measures have been taken, including the setting up of a steering group under the authority of the Presidency to ensure that the decision-making bodies are better informed and prepared.

14. I shall therefore take the necessary decisions to ensure that all the relevant departments of the Secretariat, including the EUMS, are able to support this objective fully, even in cases where the steering group is not convened. These internal organisational measures will enable situations to be assessed more rapidly. With particular reference to the assets identified under the ESDP (military, and possibly civilian), the measures will make it possible to analyse the scope for using such assets and will provide support for
the Presidency and the Member States in the coordination of those assets, made available to Member States on a voluntary basis.

15. I also envisage that, in a crisis, our internal structures will be able to rely on the OPS Centre and its facilities when it becomes fully operational.
Javier Solana – ‘Europeans must act collectively on energy strategy’

London, 9 March 2006

Energy security has shot to the top of the European and wider international agenda. It is easy to see why. Europe will be importing a growing amount of its energy needs from abroad. We already rely on external sources for 50 per cent. Most estimates suggest this will rise to 90 per cent for oil and 70 per cent for gas by 2030. Russia’s recent disputes with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova over the terms of gas supplies have concentrated our minds.

If we are importing an ever greater amount of energy from abroad, we need to discuss this with foreign partners. It also makes sense to do this together, as Europeans. We are already working together on liberalising and integrating energy markets within the European Union. It makes sense to complement this with concerted action on the external side. If you negotiate together, you will have more influence.

It is misleading to describe energy questions solely in terms of dependence. Yes, ‘we’ need to buy from abroad. But exporters need to sell. That the EU imports 30 per cent of its energy needs from Russia is now familiar. Equally significant is that Russia gets 20 per cent of all export earnings from selling gas to Europe. This is a relationship of interdependence. To manage interdependence adroitly, you need partnership and trust.

Three factors make energy different from other products. First, hydrocarbons are sometimes located in unstable countries. Second, long-term and large-scale investments are needed to bring deposits to consumers. Third, global energy markets function imperfectly, notably in gas, where there is no real spot market. For all these reasons, governments have a role in energy policy, both to set a framework for companies to plan and operate within and to negotiate directly with other governments. The question is not whether energy and politics are connected but how. We have to find the right balance between a market-driven and a more strategic approach.

In terms of the foreign policy aspects, what could Europe do? A good starting point would be to give more prominence to energy issues in our political dialogues with producers such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and others. If we want a diversification of supplies, including alternative modes of transport and delivery, we must talk about this with supplier and transit countries (plus industry). We also need to step up our dialogue on energy with other consumers such as the US, China and India.

Some question whether our member states, given their different outlooks and interests, can agree on a substantive set of messages. More dialogue, they say, sounds good. But what are we going to say? My answer would be that we should stress that most producers and all consumers have a shared interest in maintaining a stable, transparent framework in which the pricing mechanism can function as freely as possible. This
means no unilateral measures and no ‘politicisation’ of energy exports to punish foes or reward friends. What we need is an orderly combination of markets, law and consensual negotiations.

When enunciating these principles, many Europeans may think of Russia, which is chairing the Group of Eight leading industrial nations this year and has chosen energy security as its focus. But they are relevant for all producers and consumers. For global security it is vital that China, India and others believe that a predictable and transparent global energy order will work for them, too.

The role of politics is to balance different considerations – for instance, energy versus non-proliferation or human rights concerns. Moreover, politics is essential for fostering trust and confidence on which so much depends in energy matters.

In turn, confidence is built through dialogue and common projects, such as co-operation on developing new pipelines, protecting facilities against terrorist attacks or using satellites to monitor the security of supply.

So we should not just talk to supplier and transit countries – be it Russia or those in the Southern Caucasus, the Caspian Sea or West Africa. We also need to do practical things together.

Last, we have to step up our engagement in the Middle East, which will remain the mainstay of Europe’s energy imports for years to come. It is worth remembering that the only time oil supplies have been interrupted in the past 50 years was as a result of conflict in the Middle East.

In each of these areas, there is a strong case for acting collectively, as Europeans, rather than each on our own. The time has come to forge a European energy diplomacy, based on common interests and shared principles.

Financial Times
Informal meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers

Salzburg, 11 March 2006

As happens every six months, the Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the European Union held an informal meeting (Gymnich) on 10 and 11 March 2006. An informal meeting of EU/Balkans ministers was then held, involving the Romanian, Bulgarian and Turkish Foreign Ministers, as well as the ministers of the five Balkan countries (Croatia, FYROM, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania).

EU/WESTERN BALKANS JOINT PRESS STATEMENT

1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the European Union, the acceding states, the candidate states, the potential candidate countries of the Western Balkans, the Secretary General of the Council/High Representative, and the European Commissioner for Enlargement met in Salzburg at the occasion of the informal Foreign Ministers’ meeting. The High Representative/EU Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SRSG for Kosovo, and the Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe were also present.

2. The participants reaffirmed their full support for the agenda set out at the Thessaloniki summit in 2003, as well as for the Stabilisation and Association Process which will remain the framework for the European course of the Western Balkan countries. In this respect, the EU confirms that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the European Union. The EU recalled that a debate on the enlargement strategy is due in 2006 as set out by the Council conclusions of 12 December 2005. The EU also notes that its absorption capacity has to be taken into account. The participants agreed that each country’s progress towards the EU continues to depend on individual merits in meeting the conditions and requirements set forth in the Copenhagen criteria and in the Stabilisation and Association Process, including full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

3. The Western Balkan countries have achieved considerable progress in the areas of stability, democracy and economic recovery. All have in the last year made significant steps along their road towards the EU, with EU membership as ultimate goal in conformity with the Thessaloniki Declaration. They must now increasingly focus in adopting and implementing European standards and in fostering conditions for sustainable stability and prosperity throughout the region. The countries of the region committed themselves to continue and accelerate the reforms furthering these objec-
tives. All participants agreed on the importance of good neighbourly relations and on the need for finding mutually acceptable solutions on outstanding issues with neighbouring countries.

4. Preserving peace, and enhancing stability and security in the Western Balkans remains a common European interest. The participants agreed that every effort should be made to achieve a negotiated settlement of the status of Kosovo, mutually acceptable to the parties concerned, and expressed their full support for the work of the UN Special Envoy and his team. They recalled the importance of continued and effective standards implementation.

The EU strongly urged both Belgrade and Pristina to work towards a lasting Kosovo Status Agreement that promotes a multi-ethnic and democratic society and good neighbourly relations within the region.

5. The participants welcomed the Commission’s Communication ‘The Western Balkans on the road to the EU: consolidating stability and raising prosperity’, and expressed their intention to take forward its implementation. The EU will continue assisting the Western Balkan countries through practical measures to make the European perspective more tangible. In this context, the participants encourage regional cooperation, including a free trade area building on CEFTA, and look forward to the Commission’s proposals on people to people contacts, including visa facilitation in line with the common approach, as well as on adequate financial assistance. In order to master the challenges that the region faces in 2006 and beyond, the EU is determined to fully implement the commitments given in the Thessaloniki agenda.
European Security and Defence College

Stockholm, 17 March 2006

SPEECH BY JAVIER SOLANA AT THE GRADUATION CEREMONY OF ESDC HIGH LEVEL TRAINING COURSE

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear friends,

I am very pleased to be with you this morning. Let me start by thanking and congratulating all of you, for participating in this high-level training course. I hope, and trust, that you now have a better sense of what ESDP is all about.

The EU is not always easy to understand. It is a political Union, not a state nor a traditional defence alliance. Our constant aim is to promote peace and address the complex security challenges of this century.

The story of ESDP is very exciting. This is the area where the EU has made most progress in recent years. At the heart of ESDP lies a simple conviction. That crisis management should support a broader political strategy.

In many ways, crisis management is about creating the space for politics to work. We also know that we need to bring together civilian and military instruments and perspectives. That we must be ready to act quickly to prevent conflicts or manage crises. But also have the staying power for long-term reconstruction. I hope this much is clear after your course.

And that when each of you goes home, you will agree that ESDP corresponds to a real need in world of trouble spots and new threats. More broadly, these courses prove the value of the European Security and Defence College in promoting a shared 'security culture' across Europe.

I am pleased that they are now a regular fixture. Since last year, 110 senior officers such as yourselves have gone through the High-Level course while 220 colleagues have taken the ESDP orientation course. In this way, the College and the training courses contribute to the other strands of ESDP: the operations, the exercises and the capability improvements.

Let me also stress that I am pleased to be here in Sweden. I know that participants have come from all over Europe. This is as it should be. And I know that this course has been organised in close collaboration with Finland. Let me thank the Finnish authorities for that, and for its staunch support for ESDP.

But being here today, I want to pay a special tribute to Sweden, which has played a crucial role in the development of ESDP. This has been true from the start in terms of political backing.

It has also been true in terms of ideas. I remember well that during the Swedish Presidency, our friend Anna Lindh, with her characteristic enthusiasm and determina-
tion, managed to persuade colleagues of the need to focus on conflict prevention and
develop the civilian dimension of ESDP.

And all our experiences thus far have shown that she was right. And it has been true in
terms of Swedish participation in ESDP operations. Thus far, Sweden has taken part in
all ESDP operations. Today, you have around 140 soldiers and other officials deployed in
9 civilian missions plus Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

You have also helped us with vital logistical support which enabled us to deploy rap-
idly in Aceh, Indonesia and Rafah in Gaza, within very short timelines. I want to thank
Sweden’s leaders and representatives for these reliable and high-quality contributions.

In the same way, I hope that other member-states will look to Sweden and agree that
ESDP is a project worth backing with resources and good people. For let’s make no mis-
take: ESDP has enormous potential. But it is very much what the member-states make of
it.

I have been asked to talk today about the future of ESDP. Before doing so, let me take
you through where we have come from and where we are today.

Historically speaking, security and defence policy have been late arrivals on the
European scene. But we have been travelling fast, ever since we started.

ESDP is Europe’s response to today’s strategic environment. The contours of that
environment are by now familiar. It is the panorama of failing states, proliferation and
organised crime. Of old-style regional conflicts and fights over scarce resources, com-
bined with new threats such as Avian flu and people-trafficking. Of non-state actors,
such as terrorist networks, criminal gangs or Janjaweed-style militias.

Dealing with this dynamic security environment has required a paradigm shift in
terms of response. Because the new threats are diffuse and complex, they defy traditional
ways of operating. They call for agile and multi-faceted responses. That is the central
message of the European Security Strategy.

In principle, the EU has it all. A panoply of instruments, including trade, aid and
diplomacy. An acute awareness of the need to act. Plus the staying power to remain
engaged for the long-term. More than other actors, the EU can bridge the worlds of diplo-
mats, soldiers and development experts.

But we have to deliver on our potential. That is up to us, in Brussels. But also up to you
and your colleagues in capitals. At present, the EU is conducting more than ten opera-
tions simultaneously, on three continents.

From peacekeeping and institution-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina to border con-
trol in Gaza and Moldova. From police and security sector reform in the Democratic
Republic of Congo to monitoring the peace agreement in Aceh, Indonesia. So both the
geographic and the functional range of our operations has expanded.

Some operations have been purely military. Most, however, are civilian. Some are
short-term, others long-term. All are proof of the operational value of ESDP.

No member-state could have done this on its own. Acting under the banner of the EU
adds value in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy. Moreover, our engagement on the
ground is strengthening our political role in conflict zones. This has long been the weakest link in EU’s external relations.

The result is a more serious security culture inside the EU. More like a rounded political actor; less like a campaigning NGO. All this is an enormous improvement compared to only 4 years ago, when we had no missions whatsoever.

Surely there are more to come. As I speak, we are preparing for an EU reserve force in DR Congo, to assist the UN force there during the electoral campaign. I am sure that Sweden will provide a real contribution, as it always does. This is the kind of example that I know other member-states will follow.

We are also looking into options what the EU can and should do in the area of police in Kosovo, later this year.

Nagorno-Karabach is another area where the Union might be playing a role, to oversee a possible agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

So, when people ask how I see the future of ESDP, my reply is that I am a great optimist. The reason is simple: there is a compelling rationale behind ESDP. In fact, there is demand from two directions.

First, it is what our citizens call for. This is an area where they want to see more European-level action. The opinion polls are clear. Second, it is what today’s complex security challenges require.

I strongly believe that if there is demand for something, there will also be supply. It may take time. But it will happen. And the history of our work on foreign and security policy bears this out.

Some future challenges:

Let me now turn to our future ‘work programme’. The future of ESDP is less about searching for network-centric capabilities or radically new forms of operations. Rather it is about making sure that supply can keep up with growing demand.

We must step up our efforts to enhance the EU’s ‘core strength’ which is the blending of civilian and military instruments. Comprehensive planning has become a buzzword on both sides of the Atlantic. Now we have to put it into practice – and we are. Operation by operation; crisis by crisis.

You will be aware of the civil-military cell. But in a way the entire EU is a civ-mil cell. Effective co-ordination with the Commission means we should do so right through the entire cycle of prevention, crisis management, stabilisation and reconstruction.

One extra ‘growth area’ I would like to mention is Security Sector Reform plus what is called ‘DDR’: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of ex-fighters. We are very active in this field which is essential to achieve sustainable peace and stability.

We also need a new impetus for defence reform and modernisation. This means making progress with the Headline Goal 2010, with the battle groups. But also with the Civilian Headline Goal and with creating faster decision-making procedures in Brussels and national capitals.

Defence reform also means looking at how we can get more usable defence capabili-
ties. For this we need a step-change in co-operating on defence procurement. In a nutshell, we must spend more, spend more effectively and above all spend more together.

I am pleased that last week in Innsbruck, we reached an agreement in principle to set up a joint programme for investment in defence Research and Technology. In this and related areas, the European Defence Agency can enable governments to get more usable and useful equipment per euro spent. But the Agency will not deliver unless governments throw their weight behind it.

Recently, we have also worked hard on strengthening the EU’s disaster response capacity. Of course ESDP should not aim to play a leading role in disaster response. But ESDP assets and structures can support civil protection and humanitarian aid efforts.

As we learned in the Asian Tsunami and other disasters, such as the Pakistan earthquake, military assets can play a useful role. This applies in particular in the area of strategic lift. To deal with disaster effectively, we must be able to mobilise all necessary means in a co-ordinated fashion.

Finally, we must intensify our efforts to strengthen our partnerships with key actors. Here I think of the US, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine but also the UN, NATO, the African Union and others. ESDP is all about boosting capabilities and seeking synergies in crisis management – inside the EU and beyond.

Dear friends,

Our world is changing fast. It contains new dangers but also many opportunities. If we play our cards well, we can maximise the chances and minimise the risks. In this uncertain world, the EU has a major contribution to make, in at least two respects.

First, through what it is: a highly successful example of building peace through integration. But also through what it does – by promoting security through active engagement on the ground. In only a few years we have developed the hardware – the instruments – and the software – a comprehensive approach to crisis management. The future is about having the political will to act.

I don’t think there will be shortage of demand for European engagement in crisis management. It is up to us to ensure there will be no shortage or delay in terms of supply. To sum up, let me stress that ESDP is a means, not an end in itself. But it has a clear rationale.

There is a growing number of crises on our doorstep. We live in a world where events in faraway places affect our security and interests. And the complexity of today’s threats mean that only collective and comprehensive efforts will work. Clearly, no country can do this on its own.

All these factors point to the same conclusion: Europeans need to work together. And we need a comprehensive approach, to conflict prevention and crisis management. This is what we have been trying to do.

I am sure that if we mean what we say and implement what we promise, the success story of ESDP will continue. You will all have a key role to play in shaping that success in the future. Thank you very much.
External Relations Council

Brussels, 20 March 2006

(...)

RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN BALKANS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council welcomed the fruitful deliberations at the informal EU-Western Balkans Foreign Ministers meeting in Salzburg on 11 March 2006 as reflected in the Joint Press Statement.

2. The Council underlined its determination to fully implement the commitments given in the Thessaloniki agenda in order to master the challenges the region faces in 2006 and beyond.

3. It welcomed the Commission’s Communication ‘The Western Balkans on the road to the EU: consolidating stability and raising prosperity’ and expressed its intention to take forward its implementation.

4. The EU will continue to assist the Western Balkan countries on their way towards the EU through practical measures to make the European perspective more tangible. In this context, the Council encouraged regional cooperation, notably the creation of a regional free trade area based on CEFTA and is looking forward to the results of the high level meeting on 6 April in Bucharest. It also looks forward to the Commission’s proposals on fostering people to people contacts, including through visa facilitation in line with the common approach, as well as on adequate financial assistance.

5. The Council welcomed the decision of the European Commission to prolong the European Charter for Small Enterprises for the Western Balkans. The Council also invited other Council formations to take work forward in the fields set out in the Communication.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. The Council welcomed the political agreement reached on 18 March 2006 on constitutional reform. The agreement constitutes a significant step forward towards mak-
ing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s state institutions more functional and better able to meet European standards. The Council urged Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure that the necessary legislative steps are taken in time for the agreement to take effect for the October 2006 elections.

2. The Council welcomed the progress made on the negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina since the opening of negotiations in November 2005. It encouraged the relevant authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the newly formed government of Republika Srpska, to ensure that the country is in a position to make swift progress in the negotiations. In this context, the Council recalled that the pace and conclusion of negotiations would depend in particular on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress in developing its legislative framework and administrative capacity, in implementing police reform in compliance with the Agreement on Police Restructuring of October 2005, in adopting and implementing all necessary Public Broadcasting legislation, and in achieving full co-operation with the ICTY.

Serbia and Montenegro

1. The Council expressed its strong support for the Serbian people in their quest to come to terms with the legacy of the Milosevic regime. This will help them in moving forward towards the family of European nations, where they belong.

2. The Council recalled its conclusions of 27 February 2006 that full cooperation with the ICTY must be achieved to ensure that the SAA negotiations are not disrupted, and reiterated the urgent need for Serbia and Montenegro to take decisive action to ensure that all remaining fugitive ICTY indictees, notably Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, are brought to justice. Full cooperation with the ICTY is necessary to achieve lasting reconciliation in the region as well as an international legal obligation and a requirement to move closer toward the European Union.’

IRAQ

The Council discussed the situation in Iraq after the inaugural session of the Council of Representatives on 16 March and against the background of continued efforts to form a government of national unity.

The Council adopted a mandate authorising the Commission to negotiate a trade and co-operation agreement with Iraq.
IRAN – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘On 4 February the IAEA Board of Governors decided by an overwhelming majority that the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme should be reported to the UN Security Council. The EU expresses its deep concern at Iran’s continuing failure to cooperate fully with the IAEA and to take the steps necessary to re-establish international confidence in the peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme, as recorded in the Director General’s report of 27 February.

The EU continues to be committed to a diplomatic solution. The Council deeply regrets that Iran has failed to implement in full the measures deemed necessary by the IAEA Board. As a result, the UN Security Council is currently considering appropriate steps. The Council believes that the Security Council should act to reinforce the authority of the IAEA. The Council calls again upon Iran urgently to meet in full the requests set out in the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution of 4 February. The Council underlines that this should include a full suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

The nuclear issue will remain a central and pressing concern. The Council however also underlines the necessity that Iran addresses effectively all the EU’s areas of concern which include terrorism, Iran’s approach to the Middle East peace process, regional issues as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Council welcomes the release of Akbar Ganji on 17 March. It condemns his detention and treatment while in prison and calls on the Iranian authorities to release all other prisoners of conscience immediately and unconditionally. The Council deplores the deterioration of the human rights situation in Iran and condemns the violence used against peaceful protesters on International Women’s Day. The Council reaffirms that full respect for human rights in Iran is essential, also for progress in EU/Iran relations. The Council affirms that the EU will continue to register its human rights concerns, raising in particular the plight of Iran’s persecuted human rights defenders, the situation of minorities and capital punishment.

The EU will keep all its diplomatic options under close review and will calibrate its approach in the light of Iranian declarations and actions.’

BELARUS

The Council discussed the presidential election held on 19 March. After the discussion, the Presidency noted that ministers:

- had just received the preliminary conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission and agreed with its assessment that the presidential elections in Belarus
were severely flawed due to arbitrary use of state power, obviously designed to protect the incumbent President, which went far beyond acceptable practice, and other shortcomings.

- had, over the last few months, repeatedly called on the Belarusian authorities to abide by international standards and Belarus’ commitments in the OSCE and the UN to assure a free and fair electoral process, and firmly condemned the serious violations of candidates’ campaigning rights, including acts of harassment, detention and violence against candidates and campaign workers.
- wished to stress clearly once again that the EU’s intention is not to target the Belarusian population, with which it wishes to stay engaged, and that it regrets the policy of self-isolation of the Belarus authorities.
- will start discussion on restrictive measures against those responsible for these acts, in line with the Council Conclusions of 7 November 2005 and 30 January 2006.
- had also witnessed, in the course of this election campaign, the emergence of pluralistic forces and the consolidation of a genuine Belarusian opposition as well as a politically active civil society. In very difficult circumstances and at great personal risk, opposition candidates and their supporters had managed to offer the Belarusian population a democratic alternative. Their efforts deserved the EU’s recognition and support.
- urged the Belarusian authorities to allow the people of Belarus to exercise their right of assembly and freedom of expression in line with their OSCE commitments and cautioned the government not to threaten or detain those exercising their political rights in the coming days and beyond.

MIDDLE EAST

Middle East peace process

Over lunch, ministers discussed the situation in the Middle East. The Presidency informed ministers about recent meetings with Egyptian President Mubarak and Palestinian President Abbas in Vienna. High representative Javier Solana briefed ministers on his assessment of the situation taking into account the meeting of Quartet envoys in Brussels on 16 March.

Lebanon – Council conclusions

The Council met with the Prime Minister of Lebanon and adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The Council welcomes the important and timely discussions with Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. The Council welcomes the launching of the national dialogue and its ini-
tial agreements in respect of the relevant UNSC resolutions. The Council encourages the continuation of the dialogue and hopes it will contribute to political stability in the country by addressing critical issues of national concern. It reiterates its support for Lebanon’s unity, stability and independence, and reminds its neighbours of their obligations to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty. The EU condemns the past violent attacks on Lebanese citizens, journalists and political leaders and the ensuing loss of lives. The EU is deeply concerned about the continued intimidation and about attacks against the right to freedom of expression.

2. The Council reaffirms its full support for the UN International Investigation Commission, under Serge Brammertz, into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, as mandated by UNSCR 1595 and 1644, and welcomes the report by Mr. Brammertz. The EU urges all parties to co-operate unconditionally with the UNIIIC and hopes that light will be shed on this and other assassinations.

3. The Council reaffirms its full support for the Government of Lebanon and encourages it to urgently set up and launch the economic and political reforms programme initiated during the Core Group meeting held in New York in September 2005. The EU stands ready to support credible and effective plans for political and economic reform. The EU looks forward to the convening of the first Association Council with Lebanon. It expresses its satisfaction that the negotiations of the ENP Action Plan will start soon. The implementation of this action plan will support the reform process in the country.

4. The Council underlines the importance it attaches to the full implementation of UNSCR 1559, including disbanding and disarming of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. It encourages the Government of Lebanon to extend its authority throughout the country.

**SUDAN – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council reaffirmed its support for a peaceful, democratic and prosperous Sudan based on the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and on a political solution to the conflict in Darfur.

2. The Council strongly encouraged the parties to the CPA to sustain effective and timely implementation of this landmark agreement. In doing so, the parties will be able to count on continued EU support.
3. In this context, the Council expressed its concern about the tensions that have arisen in the East of Sudan. It underscored the need for a genuine, single, transparent, comprehensive and inclusive dialogue to address the tense security situation as well as the socio-economic and political marginalisation of eastern Sudan. It called upon the Government of Sudan and the Eastern Front to rapidly reach an agreement on the modalities of such a dialogue, which should include regional stakeholders.

4. The Council reiterated its deep concern about the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation in Darfur, as well as the situation of human rights. The EU and its Member States will continue to provide financial resources for humanitarian assistance. The Council strongly condemned the continuing attacks on civilians as well as the recurrent attacks on AMIS and the looting of humanitarian assets.

5. The Council welcomed the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) of 10 March and urged the parties to the conflict to implement it without delay. The Council commended the AU for having shown leadership in engaging the parties to the conflict to expedite the peace negotiations in Abuja with a view to concluding a peace agreement by the end of April 2006. In this context, it also welcomed the proposal to establish a Committee of Heads of State and Government.

6. The Council further welcomed the AU decision to extend the mandate of AMIS until 30 September 2006 and to set a framework for a transition from AMIS to a UN operation in Darfur. The AU decision will allow all stakeholders, including the EU, to assist both the AU and the UN in a successful transition.

7. The Council reaffirmed continued EU support for AMIS, together with other international partners, including through additional funding from the African Peace Facility and a donors’ conference to be organised in cooperation with the AU and the UN. It welcomed Canada’s intention to associate a number of Canadian police officers, deployed in support of AU mission, to the work of the EU Police Team working with AMIS.

8. The Council further welcomed the intention of the AU to strengthen AMIS in the transition period by exploiting all possibilities contained in its mandate and by implementing the recommendations made by the AU-led Assessment Mission in December 2005.

9. Recalling the constructive talks on Darfur held in Brussels on 8 March, the Council concurred with the AU that every effort had to be made to speed up the Abuja peace process and underlined its readiness to step up EU assistance in this regard. It welcomed the proposal for an enhanced ceasefire recently put forward by the AU Chief Negotiator Salim Ahmed Salim as part of a comprehensive set of compromise proposals to be tabled
by the AU. It underlined the need to establish a roadmap for implementation with agreed timetables for action.

10. The Council recalled its support for sanctions against those blocking the peace process, committing human rights violations, or violating the cease-fire and the arms embargo. In this context, it will closely follow progress made in the peace negotiations in Abuja and steps taken by the parties to improve the security situation on the ground, including the cessation of hostile military flights in and over the Darfur region. The Council expressed its support for the ongoing investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of human rights abuses in Darfur and urged the Government of Sudan to fully cooperate with the ICC investigators.

**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO**

The Council heard a report from High Representative Solana on his visit to Kinshasa on 19 March and further discussed the EU’s response to the UN request for possible EU support to MONUC during the upcoming electoral period in the DRC.

The Presidency, noting that there was general agreement on the principle of giving a positive answer to the UN’s request, indicated that it would ensure that the competent Council bodies prepared formal Council decisions to that effect.

(...)

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European Council

Brussels, 23-24 March 2006

PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS

(...)

Part two – Energy policy for Europe (EPE)

43. The European Council notes that Europe is facing a number of challenges in the energy field: the ongoing difficult situation on the oil and gas markets, the increasing import dependency and limited diversification achieved so far, high and volatile energy prices, growing global energy demand, security risks affecting producing and transit countries as well as transport routes, the growing threats of climate change, slow progress in energy efficiency and the use of renewables, the need for increased transparency on energy markets and further integration and interconnection of national energy markets with the energy market liberalisation nearing completion (July 2007), the limited coordination between energy players while large investments are required in energy infrastructure. Leaving these challenges unaddressed has a direct impact on the EU environment, and jobs and growth potential.

44. In response to these challenges and on the basis of the well articulated Commission’s Green Paper “A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” and contribution of the Council, the European Council calls for a Energy Policy for Europe, aiming at effective Community policy, coherence between Member States and consistency between actions in different policy areas and fulfilling in a balanced way the three objectives of security of supply, competitiveness and environmental sustainability.

45. The European Council underlines that, to achieve this consistency both in internal and external EU policies, energy policy has to satisfy the demands of many policy areas. As part of a growth strategy and through open and competitive markets, it prompts investment, technological development, domestic and foreign trade. It is strongly linked with environment policy and is closely connected with employment, regional policy and particularly transport policy. In addition foreign and development policy aspects are gaining increasing importance to promote the energy policy objectives with other countries. Therefore, the European Council calls for an enhanced coordination between the relevant Council formations and invites the European Commission to take into account the better regulation principles when preparing further actions.
46. This EPE should be developed with adequate knowledge and understanding of Member States’ energy needs and policies, bearing in mind the strategic role of the energy sector. The EPE should therefore be based on shared perspectives on long term supply and demand and an objective, transparent assessment of the advantages and drawbacks of all energy sources and contribute in a balanced way to its three main objectives:

(a) Increasing security of supply through:
- Development of a common external policy approach in support of energy policy objectives, and the furthering of energy dialogues between the EU and its Member States on the one hand, and their main partners, be they producer, transit or consumer countries on the other hand, in synergy with relevant international organisations
- Intensified diversification with respect to external as well as indigenous sources, suppliers and transport routes supported by investments in the necessary infrastructure, including LNG facilities
- Ensuring common operational approaches to address crisis situations in a spirit of solidarity, taking subsidiarity into account

(b) Ensuring the competitiveness of European economies and the affordability of energy supply to the benefit of both businesses and consumers, in a stable regulatory framework, by:
- Working with Member States to complete the opening of the internal market for electricity and gas for all consumers by mid 2007, while accepting the special circumstances of some small and isolated Member States
- Ensuring full, effective and transparent implementation of internal market legislation, which should play also a key role for the security of supply
- Promoting approaches similar to that of the internal energy market to neighbouring countries and enhancing the coordination and role of energy regulators
- Accelerating the development of regional energy cooperation within the EU, facilitating the integration of regional markets into and further development of the EU internal market, paying particular attention to the countries and regions largely isolated from the EU energy market
- Fostering the rapid and coherent development of storage and infrastructure, in particular of gas and electricity interconnections with, for electricity, the target of at least 10% of Member States’ installed production capacity, and as agreed by the 2002 Barcelona European Council, financing requirements should be met mainly by the enterprises involved
- Reviewing existing directives and legal framework in order to speed up the administrative authorisation procedures for, and develop a regulatory environment more conducive to investment projects
(c) Promoting environmental sustainability by:

- Strengthening the EU leadership by adopting an ambitious and realistic Action Plan on Energy Efficiency bearing in mind the EU energy saving potential of 20% by 2020, as estimated by the Commission, and taking into account measures already implemented by Member States
- Strengthening the EU leadership by continuing the EU-wide development of renewable energies (road map) on the basis of an analysis by the Commission of how to achieve the existing targets (2010) and how to sustain in a cost-efficient manner the current efforts over the long-term e.g. considering to raise, by 2015, the share of renewable energies, considering a target of 15%, and the proportion of biofuels, considering a target of 8%, and developing a medium and long-term strategy to reduce the EU’s dependency on energy imports in a manner that meets the objectives of the strategy for growth and jobs, taking into account the problems of islands or regions largely isolated from the EU energy market
- Implementing the Biomass Action Plan
- In the context of the development of a medium- to long-term EU strategy to combat climate change, completing the review of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme as an instrument to achieve climate change objectives in a cost-effective manner, providing medium and long-term certainty to investors, and assessing the potential of various sectors with respect to these objectives
- Ensuring adequate support from RD & D national and Community instruments to energy efficiency, sustainable energies and low emission technologies

47. In fulfilling these main objectives the EPE for Europe should:

- Ensure transparency and non-discrimination on markets
- Be consistent with competition rules
- Be consistent with public service obligations
- Fully respect Member States’ sovereignty over primary energy sources and choice of energy-mix

48. The European Council invites the European Commission and the High Representative to work closely together on the important issue of external energy relations and to provide input for an EU strategy that may be discussed at the next European Council meeting.

49. The European Council welcomes the Commission’s intention to present a Strategic Energy Review on a regular basis, starting in 2007, addressing in particular the aims and actions needed for an external energy policy over the medium- to long-term. Actions of European interest could be reported by Member States on that occasion. Preparatory discussions should take place in the latter part of 2006.
50. Annex III sets out a series of possible actions that have the potential to contribute to the above objectives. Deciding on new actions should be done in synergy with the work carried out by existing international institutions, fora, mechanisms or processes. On that basis the European Council invites the Commission and the Council to prepare a set of actions with a clear timetable enabling the adoption of a prioritised Action Plan by the European Council at its 2007 spring session.

51. Given the urgency of the challenges to be faced, the European Council invites the Commission to start with the following measures:
   - Submitting an Action Plan on Energy efficiency by mid-2006
   - Implementation of the Biomass Action Plan
   - Developing a priority Interconnection Plan and facilitating the realisation of priority infrastructure projects contributing to diversification of supply and integration of regional markets into the EU internal market, while noting the primary role of the enterprises involved
   - Making the EU-Russia dialogue more effective including as regards the ratification of the Energy Charter and the conclusion of the Transit Protocol during Russia’s G8 presidency
   - Developing a strategy for exporting the internal energy market approach to neighbouring countries
   - Secure adequate priority for energy in the 7th Framework Programme
   - Initiating the analysis of long term supply and demand perspectives
   - Improving the transparency of the energy market in particular data on gas storage capacities and on oil stocks

(...)
domestic demand and in synergy with existing mechanisms, ensuring the availability of effective mitigating measures and coordination mechanisms in the event of a supply crisis based on the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity e.g. by considering a flexible combination of the measures set out in the Gas Supply Directive, taking into account improved data on gas storage capacities and stocks.

2. Enhancing demand-side management, particularly in the housing and transport sectors, to accelerate the demand response.

3. Improving the effectiveness of gas and oil provisions.

**Intensified Diversification**

4. Member States should intensify their diversification strategies while considering the development of a common approach, be it in terms of the supplier countries or the transportation routes. New gas supply routes should be opened in particular from the Caspian region and North Africa. This diversification should not be limited to external sources but include the development and exploitation of indigenous energy potential and energy efficiency.

5. Completion of network infrastructure, in the East-West direction but also along a South-North axis, and LNG (Liquified Natural Gas) facilities contributing to that diversification should be accelerated, and more competitive LNG markets should be promoted.

6. Subject to competition requirements, the contribution of long-term contracts should be acknowledged from both demand and supply points of view.

**External dimension of security of supply**

7. Developing a common voice in support of energy policy objectives when addressing third countries fostering a more cooperative approach regarding access to energy resources, stability in transit and producer countries, and energy security. In this respect the intensified diversification to be pursued will increase the EU margin of manoeuvre in its relations with third countries.

8. Securing the entry into force of the Energy Community Treaty (with South-East Europe) in 2006 and considering the extension of its membership or principles to neighbouring countries.

9. Developing a common framework for establishing new partnerships with third countries, including transit countries and improving existing ones. This framework
should consider the geopolitical implications of third countries approaches towards energy. Consumer to producer partnerships should be supplemented with consumer to consumer ones. All fora should be put to good use for carrying out these dialogues, which can be conducted in a regional setting (e.g. OPEC, Euromed, or Northern Dimension area) if this adds to their effectiveness, including for assisting in mediating in case of disputes affecting supply Member States should be adequately represented in these fora, notably the IEA.

10. In order to maximise the outcome of these dialogues as well as facilitating the access of developing countries to sustainable energy and related technologies, synergies with international organisations, including IFI’s, should be fully exploited.

11. The Energy Dialogue with Russia should be revitalised and become more open and effective in support of EU energy objectives, based on our mutual inter-dependence on energy issues and thus the need for secure and predictable investment conditions for both EU and Russian companies and reciprocity in terms of access to markets and infrastructure as well as non discriminatory third party access to pipelines in Russia, ensuring a level-playing field in terms of safety, including nuclear safety, and environmental protection. Decisive efforts should be made to complete the negotiation of the Energy Charter Transit Protocol and secure Russia’s ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty.

(...)

DECLARATION ON BELARUS

The European Council condemns the action of the Belarus authorities this morning in arresting peaceful demonstrators exercising their legitimate right of free assembly to protest at the conduct of the Presidential election. The European Council deplores the failure of the Belarusian authorities to meet OSCE commitments to democratic elections and considers that the Presidential elections in Belarus on 19 March were fundamentally flawed. On a continent of open and democratic societies, Belarus is a sad exception.

The European Council has therefore decided to take restrictive measures against those responsible for the violations of international electoral standards, including President Lukashenko. We will continue to act in close co-ordination with our international partners.

At the same time, the European Council welcomes the message of hope brought by Belarus’ democratic opposition and civil society. Their brave efforts to advance the cause of democracy in exceptionally difficult circumstances deserve our full recognition and support. The European Union reiterates its commitment to engage with Belarusian society by
further strengthening its support for civil society and democratisation; it will also intensify people to people contacts and enhance access to independent sources of information.

The European Council demands the immediate release of all those detained. It calls upon the Belarus authorities to refrain from action against any further peaceful protests. It urges its international partners, and in particular Belarus’ other neighbours, to follow the same approach towards Belarus.
Iran – Statement

Berlin, 30 March 2006

The Foreign Ministers of the five member countries of the Security Council and of Germany, and the High Representative for CFSP, reaffirmed their view that Iran should adopt an approach that would allow it to return to the negotiating table.

Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has issued the following Statement:

‘The Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union met in Berlin today, 30 March 2006.

We had a very substantive exchange of views on the situation resulting from Iran’s nuclear activities.

We continue to be seriously concerned about the outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme and Iran’s failure to take the steps as required of Iran by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution of 4 February, including suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, including research and development.

We welcomed the fact that the UN Security Council has reached agreement on a Presidential Statement with the objective of reinforcing the IAEA process.

The Presidential Statement sends a strong signal to Iran to take the steps required by the IAEA Board. At the same time the International Community remains ready to find a diplomatic solution.

We have agreed to continue our close consultations on this issue.

We fully recognize the legitimate right of Iran under the NPT to develop a safe and sustainable civilian nuclear programme. At the same time, it is our conviction that there is a need for an extensive period of confidence-building by Iran to convince the international community of the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme.

We therefore urgently call on Iran to address international concerns through a diplomatic solution and to suspend all enrichment-related activities to allow a return to the negotiating table.’
Middle East Peace Process

Strasbourg, 5 April 2006

SPEECH BY JAVIER SOLANA BEFORE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

I am appearing before the European Parliament at a critical time for the future of the Middle East peace process, immediately after the forming of a new Palestinian government and the holding of elections in Israel.

Allow me first to describe how I see the present situation, before going on to set out the points on which, in my view, Europe’s position should be based at this delicate juncture.

Present situation

In the occupied territories, Hamas has taken over the reins of government. Its programme, as presented by Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, is unfortunately unacceptable to the international community. It does not give any clear indication that the Hamas government is prepared to respect the principles established by the European Union: eschewing the use of violence as a means of settling the conflict, recognising the State of Israel and observing the agreements signed between the Palestinians and Israel.

It needs to be pointed out once more that there is nothing arbitrary about those principles. On the contrary, they are the minimum requirements if the political ideal consistently championed by the EU is to become a reality. That ideal is none other than a negotiated solution leading to the creation of a viable Palestinian state in peaceful coexistence with Israel under the principles of international law.

Obviously, there can be no negotiation if the parties do not recognise one another. There can be no peaceful settlement if the parties resort to arms in order to resolve the conflict. Nor can there be any solution based on the principles of international law if the parties disregard the fundamental principle that agreements are made to be honoured (‘pacta sunt servanda’).

Ultimately, the unwillingness of Hamas to come into line with our principles, in spite of some very light steps, along with the fact that Hamas appears on the European list of terrorist organisations, must inevitably have consequences for the EU: the impossibility of regarding Hamas as a valid partner until it changes its stance.

In Israel, the election results are open to a number of interpretations. It is not my intention to engage in an in-depth analysis of the elections, but I think some brief comments will help us to understand what to expect from the political picture to emerge from them.

• It should first be pointed out that, although there was a clear winner, Kadima, that
party did not achieve the results it was hoping for and this will affect negotiations for the formation of a coalition government, although Labour will be the basis for this coalition.

- Secondly, purely political factors can be seen to have carried less weight and economic and social factors more weight; this explains partly the scores achieved by Labour, by the pensioners’ party or by parties with a very limited social or language basis (Shas, the ultra-Orthodox Sephardic Jews’ party, and Yisrael Beiteinu, the Russian-speaking community’s party).

- Thirdly and perhaps most worryingly for the peace process, the elections seem to have shown a consolidation of the desire for separation (materialised mainly by the Wall built between Israel and the Palestinian Territories) and lack of dialogue with the Palestinian people in determining Israel’s borders. This is not a sustainable solution for those, like us, who favour negotiation.

The inward-lookingness on the part of the Israeli electorate is mirrored by the desire of Hamas to focus on internal Palestinian issues and disregard an Israel whose right to exist it anyway denies. We cannot overlook the fact that it will have an impact on the scope for implementing the road map, whose principles remain a point of reference, but we have to tailor our discourse to the new situation.

Apart from aspects relating to the Middle East peace process, the coming to power in Palestine, in free, democratic elections, of a movement affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood represents an entirely new development.

The EU does not want on principle to see the Hamas government fail. What we want is for that government, besides respecting the Quartet’s three principles, also to apply those of the rule of law, a state based on it and democratic transfer of power, and to maintain the pluralistic nature of Palestinian society. If it does so, Hamas can be regarded as a fully-fledged political entity.

**Europe’s position**

Let me once again state the obvious, that a satisfactory solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been, is and will remain a key priority for the EU. Now, more than ever, it needs to be stressed that only a negotiated solution can prove stable and lasting.

The EU should here continue to press both sides to commit themselves to a negotiated two-state solution. It must be pointed out that, in the EU’s contention, peace should be based on observance of the 1967 borders and only any territorial adjustments agreed to by both sides will be acceptable.

The EU’s role in the Middle East peace process has recently seen significant growth. Suffice it to say that just a few years ago it would have been inconceivable for the EU to establish a security mission in the occupied territories, whereas now we have two: one supporting Palestinian police reform; the other supporting the control of the Rafah bor-
der crossing. Nearly 200,000 persons have crossed from Egypt to Gaza and vice-versa since its opening last November.

One of the EU’s basic aims is to get through this incipient period of uncertainty so that, when opportunities for a negotiated peace resurface, we can continue to enjoy the trust of Israelis and Palestinians.

As regards our relations with the two sides in the conflict, our principles are as follows:

**As regards Palestine:**

The EU will continue to support President Abbas and the peace programme on which he was elected by an overwhelming majority of Palestinian voters.

In line with the Quartet’s statement of 30 March 2006, the EU is currently reviewing its programmes of direct aid to the Palestinian Authority. Obviously, until Hamas shows unequivocal willingness to respect the international community’s principles, we cannot do business as usual with the Palestinian Authority.

The EU will, however, continue its aid for the Palestinian people,

- firstly, because this is a moral imperative which the EU cannot shirk and,
- secondly, because the humanitarian crisis and instability in the occupied territories do no good to anyone, starting with Israel itself.

Another of the EU’s key aims is to maintain the Palestinian Authority’s institutional fabric, which we have put so much effort and money into building and whose continuity is crucial if the creation of an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state is one day to become a reality.

**As regards Israel:**

The EU must continue to reject unilateral measures which may jeopardise the two-state solution. The EU will keep a very close watch on developments in East Jerusalem and in the Jordan Valley, where Israel is engaging in action particularly harmful to the Palestinians, and on the construction of the separating fence.

Under international humanitarian law, Israel has a number of duties as an occupying power. Basically, it must facilitate transport of humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population. Over and above a strict interpretation of that duty, Israel must also facilitate movement in the occupied territories, so as to allow economic sustainability, without compromising the security of Israelis.

It is of the utmost urgency here for both sides to apply the access and movement agreement signed in November 2005. That agreement made it possible to open the Rafah border post, where the EU is playing and will, if both sides so wish, continue to play a very significant role. However, that agreement includes other points (transit between Gaza
and the West Bank, and facilitation of movement within the West Bank) which also need to be carried out.

Another obligation is for Israel to transfer to the Palestinian Authority the revenue from customs duties and taxes which it collects on its behalf. This is Palestinian money, which cannot be withheld.

As regards the international framework, the EU’s aims are to

- Continue working within the Quartet. The upholding of international legality requires the firm support of the entire community of nations, represented by the Quartet. Close coordination with the United States can make the EU’s role more effective.
- Involve the Arab countries. They can and should do far more politically and economically to try and bring Hamas into the Beirut peace initiative.

We must not forget that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is part of the serious crisis which the Middle East region is undergoing. In working on the peace process, we have to bear in mind the role of States which may exert a negative influence and the repercussions of the situation in Iraq.

Conclusion

The results of the elections in the occupied territories and in Israel have created a new situation. The EU has to tackle it on the basis of two principles, which are contradictory only in appearance: rigour and flexibility.

- Rigour is needed in order to uphold the principles which have informed Europe’s position since the 1980 Venice European Council meeting, namely respect for the rights of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, rights which should be firmly spelt out in a negotiated solution leading to the creation of an independent, sovereign, democratic Palestinian state in peaceful coexistence with Israel.
- Flexibility is needed in order to adapt to developments in reality on the ground and to support solutions bringing progress in the cause of peace.

Hamas cannot change its past, but it can and must change its future. If it decides that there is no place in that future for terror, violence or negation of the reality of the State of Israel, the EU will be able to respond appropriately, as it has always done.
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

EU crisis management operation in Kosovo

The Council adopted a joint action establishing an EU planning team regarding a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and possible other areas in Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) (7771/06).

The objective of the EUPT Kosovo is the following:

- to initiate planning, including necessary procurement processes, to ensure a smooth transition between selected tasks of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and other areas that might be identified by the Council in the context of the future status process;
- to provide technical advice as necessary in order for the EU to contribute to supporting and maintaining the dialogue with UNMIK as regards its plans for downsizing and transferral of competencies to the local institutions.

EUPT Kosovo will be deployed gradually beginning with a core team from the end of April with the intention of having the full team in place before 1 September 2006.

The Joint Action expires on 31 December 2006.

Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, a process to determine the future status of Kosovo was launched at the beginning of November 2005 with the appointment of the UN Status Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari. The United Nations will remain fully engaged in Kosovo until the end of UNSCR 1244.

The UN Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Kosovo, Soren Jessen-Petersen, welcomed the EU's engagement in the discussions on the future international engagement in Kosovo and invited the EU to deploy a planning team. The Provisional Institutions of Self Government also indicated that they would welcome EUPT Kosovo tasked to take forward contingency planning for a possible ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) mission in the field of rule of law.

Since last year, the Council has been working on an enhanced EU role in Kosovo, on the basis of reports by the High Representative and the Commission. The rule of law and police have been identified as priority areas.
EU Exercise Programme for the period 2006-2010

The Council approved revised exercise specifications for the EU Crisis Management Exercise 2006 (CME 06). The exercise will focus on EU comprehensive crisis management with civilian and military instruments in the context of rapid response.

Crisis management – Agreement with Turkey

The Council adopted a decision approving the conclusion of an agreement with Turkey on its participation in EU crisis management operations (7332/06).

(...)

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The Council discussed the situation of the Middle East Peace Process following the swearing in of the new Palestinian government and the result of general elections in Israel.

The Council noted with grave concern that the new Palestinian government has not committed itself to the three principles laid out by the Council and the Quartet in their statements of 30 January: non-violence, recognition of Israel’s right to exist and acceptance of existing agreements. It urged the new Palestinian government to meet and implement these three principles and to commit to President Abbas’ platform of peace. This would further the Palestinian people’s aspirations to peace and statehood.

Consistent with the Quartet statement of 30 March, the EU is reviewing its assistance to the Palestinians against the new government’s commitment to the aforementioned principles. The Council recalled that the absence of such commitment will inevitably have an effect on direct assistance to that government. The EU will continue to provide necessary assistance to meet the basic needs of the Palestinian population. In this context, it also underlined the importance of improved access and movement and called on both parties to implement the 15 November 2005 Movement and Access Agreement.

The Council notes with concern the recent violent incidents in the Palestinian Territories and calls on all parties to refrain from violence and exercise self-restraint. The Council urged the Palestinian Authority to ensure security in the areas it controls, and ensure the safety of international personnel.

The Council reiterated its aim to preserve and pursue the democratic functioning and development of the institutions of the Palestinian Authority. In this context, it empha-
sized the central role of President Abbas as the highest representative of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO and reiterated its support for him.

The Council noted the result of the Israeli general elections. The Council underlined the importance of a strong commitment by the new Israeli government to work towards a negotiated solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on existing agreements, the relevant UNSC Resolutions and the principles laid down in the Road Map. The Council called on Israel to desist from any action, such as settlement activities and the construction of the separation barrier on Palestinian land, that is contrary to international law and threatens the viability of an agreed two-state solution. The Council urged Israel to take steps to improve the humanitarian and economic situation of the Palestinians including by resuming transfers of the Palestinian tax and customs revenues withheld.

The Council welcomed the recent statement of Acting Prime Minister Olmert to seek negotiations with the Palestinians and the positive response to it by President Abbas. In this context, the Council looked forward to an early engagement between the new Israeli government and the Palestinians in order to advance a just, viable and lasting solution which would bring peace to both the Israeli and the Palestinian people.

IRAN – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The Council welcomes the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of 29 March, which reinforced the role of the IAEA and called upon Iran to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme. It also welcomes the conclusions of the Ministerial meeting in Berlin on 30 March. The Council underlines that the international community is united and determined to uphold the authority of IAEA Board resolutions and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Council remains committed to a diplomatic solution. It calls on Iran to comply with the UN Security Council Presidential Statement and implement all IAEA Board resolutions in full and to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to allow a return to negotiations.

The Council underlines its continued concerns about the human rights situation in Iran, in particular regarding the situation of Bahá’ís and other religious minorities as well as of human rights defenders, including Mr. Akbar Ganji and Mr. Abdolfattah Soltani.’

(...)
EUPT Kosovo – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 10 April 2006

To ensure a smooth transition between UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) and EUPT (EU crisis management operation planned in Kosovo), the EU Council has adopted a Joint Action according to which a core team will be deployed gradually from the end of April with the intention of having the full team in place before 1 September 2006.

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EU PLANNING TEAM REGARDING A POSSIBLE EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF RULE OF LAW AND POSSIBLE OTHER AREAS IN KOSOVO

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and, in particular Article 14 and the third subparagraph of Article 25 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, a process to determine the future status of Kosovo was launched at the beginning of November 2005 with the appointment of the UN Status Envoy, Mr Martti Ahtisaari. The success of this process is essential not only for providing a clearer perspective for the people of Kosovo but also for the overall stability of the region.

(2) The United Nations will remain fully engaged in Kosovo until the end of UNSCR 1244. However, the UN has indicated that it will no longer take the lead in a post-Status presence. The EU has a vital interest in a positive result of this process, as well as the responsibility and the means to contribute to such an outcome. It is likely that the EU together with other partners will make a major contribution. The EU will thus have to undertake an important role in Kosovo in a complex environment. It could take on responsibility for significant operations, particularly in the police and rule of law area.

(3) The Stabilisation and Association Process (hereinafter referred to as ‘SAP’) is the strategic framework for the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkan region, and its instruments are open to Kosovo, including a European Partnership, political and technical dialogue under the SAP Tracking Mechanism, inter alia, regarding standards in the field of rule of law, and related Community assistance programmes.
In June 2005 the European Council stressed that Kosovo would, in the medium term, continue to need a civilian and military presence to ensure security and in particular protection for minorities, to help with the continuing implementation of standards and to exercise appropriate supervision of compliance with the provisions contained in the status agreement. In this respect, the European Council stressed the EU’s willingness to play a full part, in close cooperation with the relevant partners and international organisations.

On 7 November 2005 the Council welcomed Ambassador Kai Eide’s Comprehensive Review of the situation in Kosovo and expressed its full support for the UN Secretary General’s intention to start a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status.

In view of the possibility of the EU enhancing its engagement in Kosovo, the Council on 7 November 2005 also invited the Secretary-General/High Representative (hereinafter referred to as ‘SG/HR’) together with the Commission to continue their work in identifying the possible future EU role and contribution, including in the areas of police, rule of law and the economy, and to submit joint proposals to the Council in the near future.

On 6 December 2005 the SG/HR and the Commission submitted their report on ‘The Future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo’ to the Council. The report suggested an outline for the EU’s future involvement in Kosovo. It stressed the desire to normalise the EU’s relations with Kosovo as far as possible by using all the instruments available within the SAP. In addition it stressed the need to prepare for a future ESDP mission, including by creating and deploying a regular Planning Team soon enough to initiate EU planning for an integrated EU mission inter alia in the areas of rule of law and police.

On 12 December 2005 the Council reiterated its full support for the political process to determine Kosovo’s future status and for Mr Martti Ahtisaari. It also reiterated its determination to participate fully in the definition of the status of Kosovo and its readiness to be closely involved in the negotiations and implementation of Kosovo’s future status, through the EU representative to the Kosovo future status process. The Council stressed again the paramount importance of the ongoing implementation of standards now and in the future to help progress towards European standards. In particular, the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government need to make further progress on protection of minorities, full respect for the rule of law, a transparent public administration free from political interference, a climate conducive to returns, and the protection of cultural and religious sites.

On 12 December 2005 the Council also welcomed the joint report by the SG/HR and the Commission on the EU’s future role and contribution in Kosovo. It asked the SG/HR and the Commission to continue the examination of these issues in coordination
with other international actors, particularly in the areas of police and the rule of law (including contingency planning for a possible ESDP mission), economic development and fostering Kosovo’s European perspective, and to keep the relevant Council bodies actively engaged in order to ensure continuing timely preparation of an EU role in Kosovo.  

(10) A Joint Council-Commission Fact Finding Mission to Kosovo took place between 19 and 27 February 2006 regarding possible future ESDP and Community engagement in the broader field of the rule of law. In its report, the Fact Finding Mission, recommended, interalia, that the EU establish a Planning Team tasked to ensure that EU decision-making could be based on a solid and well analysed basis that is in step with the future status process.

(11) In a letter to the SG/HR on 4 April 2006, the UN SRSG Jessen-Petersen welcomed the EU’s engagement in the discussions on the future international engagement in Kosovo and invited the EU to deploy an EU Planning Team for Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) to Pristina.

(12) During the Fact Finding Mission and other consultations with the EU, the Provisional Institutions of Self Government indicated that they would welcome an EU Planning Team tasked to take forward contingency planning for a possible ESDP mission in the field of rule of law.

(13) The establishment of an EUPT Kosovo will not in any way or form prejudge the outcome of the Future Status process or any subsequent decision by the EU to launch an ESDP mission in Kosovo.

(14) In accordance with the guidelines of the European Council meeting at Nice on 7 to 9 December 2000, this Joint Action should determine the role of the SG/HR, in accordance with Articles 18(3) and 26 of the Treaty.

(15) Article 14(1) of the Treaty calls for the indication of a financial reference amount for the whole period of implementation of the Joint Action. The indication of amounts to be financed by the general budget of the European Union illustrates the will of the legislative authority and is subject to the availability of commitment appropriations during the respective budget year.

(16) Recourse should be made to the extent possible to redeployment of equipment left over from other current or terminated EU operational activities, especially EUPOL PROXIMA, EUPAT and EUPM, taking into account operational needs and the principles of sound financial management.
The mandate of EUPT Kosovo will be implemented in the context of a situation where the rule of law is not fully secured and which could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

**Article 1**

**Objective**

1. The European Union hereby establishes a European Union Planning Team (EUPT Kosovo) regarding a possible EU crisis management operation in Kosovo.

2. The objective of the EUPT Kosovo shall be:
   - to initiate planning, including necessary procurement processes, to ensure a smooth transition between selected tasks of UNMIK and a possible EU crisis management operation, in the field of rule of law and other areas that might be identified by the Council in the context of the future status process,
   - to provide technical advice as necessary in order for the EU to contribute to support and maintain the dialogue with UNMIK as regards its plans for downsizing and transfer of competencies to the local institutions.

**Article 2**

**Tasks**

In carrying out its objective the EUPT Kosovo shall focus on the following tasks:

1. Initiating a dialogue with the international community, the Kosovo institutions and local stakeholders on their views and considerations regarding operational issues linked to future arrangements.

2. Following closely and analysing UNMIK planning towards the end of its mandate, and actively providing advice.

3. Initiating planning to allow the smooth transfer of authority from selected tasks of UNMIK to a future EU crisis management operation, in the field of rule of law and other areas that might be identified by the Council in the context of the future status process.

4. Initiating work on identifying possible elements for mandates, objectives, specific tasks and programmes and personnel strength for a possible EU crisis management operation, including a draft budget, which can be used as a basis for later decision mak-
ing by the EU. In this context the EUPT Kosovo shall initiate reflections on the development of exit strategies.

5. Drafting and preparing all possible aspects of procurement requirements for the possible EU crisis management operation.

6. Ensuring appropriate logistical support for a possible EU crisis management operation, including through the establishment of a warehouse capacity enabling it to store, maintain and service equipment, including transferred from other present or former EU crisis management operation, where this will contribute to the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the possible EU crisis management operation.

7. Drafting and preparing threat and risk analysis, under the guidance of the EU SITCEN and the Council Security Office, for the various component parts of a possible EU crisis management operation in Kosovo and devising an indicative budget (drawing on the experience of OMIK and UNMIK) for the cost of security.

8. Contributing to a comprehensive and integrated EU approach, taking into account assistance in the police and judiciary area provided in the framework of the SAP.

9. In the context of contingency planning for a possible EU crisis management operation in Kosovo, exchanging, as appropriate, specific assistance with EU crisis management operations or Fact Finding/Preparatory missions for the establishment of EU crisis management operations. Such assistance shall be explicitly agreed upon by the Head of EUPT Kosovo and shall be for a limited period of time.

Article 3

Structure
1. EUPT Kosovo shall in principle be structured as follows:
   - an office of the Head of EUPT Kosovo,
   - a police team,
   - a justice team,
   - an administration team.

2. EUPT Kosovo shall establish:
   - an office in Pristina,
   - a coordinating office in Brussels.
Article 4

Head of the EUPT Kosovo and staff
1. The Head of the EUPT Kosovo shall be responsible for managing and coordinating EUPT Kosovo activities.

2. The Head of EUPT Kosovo shall assume the day-to-day management of EUPT Kosovo and shall be responsible for staff and disciplinary matters. For seconded personnel, disciplinary action shall be exercised by the national or EU authority concerned.

3. The Head of EUPT Kosovo shall sign a contract with the Commission.

4. EUPT Kosovo shall primarily consist of civilian staff seconded by Member States or EU Institutions. Each Member State or EU institution shall bear the costs related to any of the staff seconded by it including salaries, medical coverage, travel expenses to and from Kosovo, and allowances other than per diems.

5. EUPT Kosovo may also recruit international staff and local staff on a contractual basis, as required.

6. While remaining under the authority of their sending Member States or EU institutions, all staff in the EUPT Kosovo shall carry out their duties and act in the sole interest of the EU supporting action. All staff shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council’s security regulations (1) (hereinafter referred to as ‘Council’s security regulations’).

7. EUPT Kosovo shall be deployed gradually beginning with a core team from the end of April 2006 with the intention of having the full team in place before 1 September 2006.

Article 5

Chain of command
1. The structure of EUPT Kosovo shall have a unified chain of command.

2. The PSC shall provide the political control and strategic direction to EUPT Kosovo.

3. The SG/HR shall give guidance to the Head of EUPT Kosovo.

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4. The Head of EUPT Kosovo shall lead EUPT Kosovo and assume its day-to-day management.

5. The Head of EUPT Kosovo shall report to the SG/HR.

Article 6

Political control and strategic direction
1. The PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of EUPT Kosovo.

2. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the Treaty. This authorisation shall include the powers to appoint a Head of EUPT Kosovo, upon a proposal from the SG/HR. The powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of EUPT Kosovo shall remain vested in the Council.

3. The PSC shall receive reports at regular intervals and may request specific reports by the Head of EUPT Kosovo on the implementation of the tasks mentioned in Article 2 and on the coordination with other actors referred to in Article 10. The PSC may invite the Head of EUPT Kosovo to its meetings, as appropriate.

4. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.

Article 7

Participation of third States
Without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the EU and its single institutional framework, acceding States shall be invited to contribute to EUPT Kosovo provided that they bear the cost of the staff seconded by them, including salaries, medical coverage, allowances, high-risk insurance and travel expenses to and from the mission area, and contribute to the running costs of EUPT Kosovo, as appropriate.

Article 8

Security
1. The Head of EUPT Kosovo shall be responsible for the security of EUPT Kosovo and shall, in consultation with the Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council, be responsible for ensuring compliance with minimum security requirements applicable to the mission.
2. EUPT Kosovo shall have a dedicated Security Officer reporting to the Head of EUPT Kosovo.

Article 9

Financial arrangements
1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUPT Kosovo shall be EUR 3,005,000.

2. The expenditure financed by the amount referred to in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the rules and procedures applicable to the general budget of the EU, with the exception that any pre-financing shall not remain the property of the Community.

3. The Head of EUPT Kosovo shall report fully to, and be supervised by, the Commission on the activities undertaken in the framework of his contract.

4. The financial arrangements shall respect the operational requirements of EUPT Kosovo, including compatibility of equipment and interoperability of its teams.

5. Expenditure shall be eligible as from the date of entry into force of this Joint Action.

Article 10

Coordination with other actors
1. Close coordination between the EU and all relevant actors, including the UN/UNMIK, the OSCE, NATO/KFOR as well as other key actors such as the US and Russia, shall continue to ensure complementarity and synergy of the efforts of the international community. All EU Member States shall be kept fully informed on the coordination process.

2. In performing his duties the Head of EUPT Kosovo shall participate in the EU coordination mechanisms established in Pristina, Kosovo.

Article 11

Status of staff of EUPT Kosovo
1. Where required, the status of EUPT Kosovo staff in Kosovo, including where appropriate the privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of EUPT Kosovo shall be agreed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24 of the Treaty. The SG/HR assisting the Presidency may negotiate such an agreement on its behalf.
2. The Member State or EU institution having seconded a staff member shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to the secondment, from or concerning the staff member. The Member State or EU institution in question shall be responsible for bringing any action against the secondee.

3. The conditions of employment and the rights and obligations of international and local contracted staff shall be laid down in the contracts between the Head of EUPT Kosovo and the staff member.

**Article 12**

**Community action**
The Council and the Commission shall, each in accordance with its respective powers, ensure consistency between the implementation of this Joint Action and external activities of the Community in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 3 of the Treaty. The Council and the Commission shall cooperate to this end.

**Article 13**

**Release of classified information**

1. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to NATO/KFOR EU classified information and documents up to the level ‘CONFIDENTIEL UE’ generated for the purposes of the action, in accordance with the Council’s security regulations.

2. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to the UN/UNMIK and the OSCE, in accordance with the operational needs of the EUPT Kosovo, EU classified information and documents up to the level ‘RESTREINT UE’ generated for the purposes of the action, in accordance with the Council’s security regulations. Local arrangements shall be drawn up for this purpose.

3. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to third parties associated with this Joint Action EU non-classified documents related to the deliberations of the Council with regard to the action covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of Council Decision 2004/338/EC, Euratom of 22 March 2004 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure(1).

**Article 14**

**Review**

By 31 October 2006 the Council shall evaluate whether the EUPT Kosovo should be con-

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continued after 31 December 2006, taking into account the necessity of a smooth transition to a possible EU crisis management operation in Kosovo.

**Article 15**

*Entry into force and expiry*

1. This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

2. It shall expire on 31 December 2006.

**Article 16**

*Publication*

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 10 April 2006.

*For the Council*

*The President*

U. Plassnik
Democratic Republic of Congo – Council Joint Actions

Brussels, 21 April 2006

In order 'to support the electoral process and the Congolese people at this historic juncture', as Javier Solana said, between 21 and 27 April the Council of the European Union adopted three joint actions aimed at guaranteeing the smooth conduct of the elections to be held in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The first aim is to strengthen the EUPOL Kinshasa police mission set up at the end of 2004 and to extend the mandate of the EUSEC RD Congo assistance for security sector reform. Otherwise EUFOR, launched to provide support to the United Nations mission in DRC (MONUC), is the second autonomous military operation of the EU in Africa, after Operation Artemis, launched in Ituri during the summer of 2003.

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION AMENDING AND EXTENDING JOINT ACTION 2004/847/CFSP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION IN KINSHASA (DRC) REGARDING THE INTEGRATED POLICE UNIT (EUPOL ‘KINSHASA’)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and, in particular Article 14 and Article 25, third subparagraph, thereof,

Whereas:


(2) On 7 November 2005, the Council agreed to extend EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ for another 12 months after the expiry of its mandate.

(3) By Joint Action 2005/822/CFSP, the Council amended and extended the mandate of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ for a first phase until 30 April 2006. This Joint Action covers the second phase of the extension until 31 December 2006.

(4) On 12 August 2005, the Council approved by Decision 2005/680/CFSP (2) the

Agreement between the European Union and the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the status and activities of the European Union Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL 'Kinshasa') on behalf of the Union.

(5) On 23 March 2006, the Council decided that the preparation and planning for a temporary reinforcement of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ during the electoral process in support of the Congolese crowd control units in Kinshasa should be further pursued. Its mandate should be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

Article 1

Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. the following paragraph shall be added to Article 1:
   ‘3. EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ shall be temporarily reinforced during the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in accordance with the provisions set out in Article 3. This reinforcement shall begin no later than one month before the date of the first round of the elections in the DRC and shall end after a maximum period of five months.’;

2. Articles 2 to 4 shall be replaced by the following:

‘Article 2

Planning Phase
The General Secretariat of the Council shall develop all technical instruments necessary to execute EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’. The Head of Mission shall elaborate an Operation Plan (OPLAN) which shall take into account a comprehensive risk assessment. The Council shall approve the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the OPLAN.

The relevant Annexes to the CONOPS and OPLAN applying to the temporary reinforcement of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ shall apply until the end of the period of the temporary reinforcement.

Article 3

Mission Statement
The European Union shall conduct a police mission in Kinshasa (DRC) in order to monitor, mentor and advise the setting up and the initial running of the IPU in order to ensure that the IPU acts following the training received in the Academy Centre and
according to international best practices in this field. These actions shall be focused on the IPU chain of command to enhance the management capability of the IPU and to monitor, mentor and advise the operational Units in the execution of its tasks.

EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ shall continue to monitor, mentor and advise on the setting up and the development of the IPU, including more extensive advice to the chain of command of IPU regarding the execution of missions and further advice on other issues complementary to the effective conduct of policing in DRC, and shall enhance liaison with EUSEC RD CONGO in the field of security sector reform.

For the purposes of the temporary reinforcement of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ during the electoral process, EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ shall establish, as an integral part of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ and under the overall security framework for the elections, a police coordination support element in order to ensure an enhanced and coordinated response of the Congolese crowd control units in Kinshasa, in case of disturbances during the electoral period. The area of responsibility shall be limited to Kinshasa. The police coordination support element, as part of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’, shall not have executive powers.

For the purpose of the temporary reinforcement of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ during the electoral process, EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ shall be authorised to use dedicated bilateral financial contributions in order to procure additional equipment for Congolese crowd control units in Kinshasa. Specific financial arrangements shall be agreed directly between the Head of Mission and the bilateral contributors.

Article 4

Structure of the Mission
The Mission will be composed of a Headquarters (HQ) and police monitors. The HQ will consist of the office of the Head of the Mission and an administration support branch. All monitors, mentors and advisors, as well as the trainers, will be co-located in the IPU operational base.

For the purposes of the temporary reinforcement of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ during the electoral process, EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ will include a dedicated coordination element in charge of the specific tasks assigned to the mission during this period.

3. Article 8(1) shall be replaced by the following:

‘1. Under the responsibility of the Council, the PSC shall exercise the political control and strategic direction of the mission. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the Treaty. This authorisation shall include the powers to amend the CONOPS, the OPLAN and the Chain of Command. The powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of the operation shall remain vested in the Council, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative.’;
4. Article 9 shall be amended as follows:
   (a) paragraph 2 shall be replaced by the following:
       ‘2. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions on acceptance
           of the proposed contributions and to establish a Committee of Contributors.’;
   (b) paragraph 4 shall be deleted;

5. in Article 14, the second subparagraph shall be replaced by the following:
   ‘It shall expire on 31 December 2006.’

Article 2

The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mission
for the period from 1 May 2006 until 31 December 2006 shall be a maximum amount of
EUR 3 500 000.

Article 3

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Article 4

This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 21 April 2006.

For the Council
The President
U. Plassnik
COUNCIL JOINT ACTION AMENDING AND EXTENDING JOINT ACTION 2005/355/CFSP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION MISSION TO PROVIDE ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,

Whereas:


(2) The mandate of EUSEC RD Congo expires on 2 May 2006.

(3) The Political and Security Committee has agreed to the prolongation of the mandate of EUSEC RD Congo until the end of June 2007 and to the adaptation of the structure of the mission to the post transition phase in the DRC.

(4) Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP should be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

Article 1

Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. point (b) in Article 3 shall be replaced by the following:
   ‘(b) experts assigned, inter alia, to the following key posts within the Congolese administration:

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the private office of the Minister for Defence,
the combined general staff,
the army general staff,
the naval forces general staff, and
the air force general staff.’;

2. in Article 15(1) the date of application shall be replaced by the following: ‘30 June 2007’.

**Article 2**

The financial reference amount to cover expenditure relating to the mission from 3 May 2006 to 30 June 2007 shall be EUR 4 750 000.

**Article 3**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

**Article 4**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 25 April 2006.

*For the Council*

*The President*

J. Pröll
COUNCIL JOINT ACTION ON THE EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY OPERATION IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (MONUC) DURING THE ELECTION PROCESS

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14, the third subparagraph of Article 25 and Article 28(3) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) On 28 October 2005, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1635 (2005) on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in which it inter alia reaffirmed its support for the process of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in DRC, signed on 17 December 2002, and underlined the importance of elections as the foundation for the longer term restoration of peace and stability, national reconciliation and establishment of the rule of law in DRC. In that Resolution the mandate of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was extended until 30 September 2006.


(3) On 20 February 2006 the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/122/CFSP extending the mandate of Mr Aldo Ajello as the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the African Great Lakes Region.

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(4) By letter dated 27 December 2005, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations invited the European Union to consider the possibility of deploying a military force to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to assist MONUC during the electoral process.

(5) On 23 March 2006 the Council approved an option paper for possible EU support to MONUC.

(6) The Presidency has confirmed the principles for the EU military support to MONUC in a letter of 28 March 2006.

(7) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006) of 25 April 2006 authorised the EU to deploy forces in the DRC in support of MONUC during the election process; it also contains provisions regarding the application of the Agreement between the United Nations and the DRC on the status of MONUC, signed on 4 May 2000, to the EU-led forces.

(8) The DRC authorities have welcomed a possible EU military support to MONUC during the electoral process.

(9) The Political and Security Committee (PSC) should exercise political control of the EU military operation in the DRC in support of MONUC, provide it with strategic direction and take the relevant decisions in accordance with third subparagraph of Article 25 of the EU Treaty.

(10) In accordance with Article 28(3) of the EU Treaty, the operational expenditure arising from this Joint Action, having military or defence implications, should be charged to the Member States in accordance with Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (hereinafter referred to as ATHENA).

(11) Article 14(1) of the EU Treaty calls for the indication in Joint Actions of the means to be made available to the European Union. The financial reference amount for the common costs of the EU military operation constitutes the best current estimate and is without prejudice to the final figures that are to be included in a budget to be approved in accordance with the rules laid down in ATHENA.

(12) In accordance with Article 6 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the EU Treaty and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Denmark does

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not participate in the elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the European Union which have defence implications. Denmark does not participate in the implementation of this Joint Action and therefore does not participate in the financing of the operation,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

Article 1

Mission
1. The European Union shall conduct a military operation in the DRC in support of MONUC during the election process, named Operation EUFOR RD Congo, in accordance with the mandate set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006).

2. The forces deployed to that effect shall operate in accordance with the objectives for possible EU support to MONUC as approved by the Council on 23 March 2006.

Article 2

Appointment of the EU Operation Commander
Lieutenant General Karlheinz VIERECK is hereby appointed EU Operation Commander.

Article 3

Designation of the EU Operational Headquarters
The EU Operational Headquarters shall be located at Armed Forces Operations Command (Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr (EinsFüKdo Bw)) in Potsdam.

Article 4

Designation of the EU Force Commander
Major General Christian DAMAY is hereby appointed EU Force Commander.

Article 5

Planning and launching of the operation
The Decision on the launching of the EU military operation shall be adopted by the
Council following the approval of the Operation Plan and the Rules of Engagement and in the light of the electoral calendar in the DRC.

Article 6

Political control and strategic direction
1. Under the responsibility of the Council, the PSC shall exercise the political control and strategic direction of the EU military operation. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25 of the EU Treaty. This authorisation shall include the powers to amend the planning documents, including the Operation Plan, the Chain of Command and the Rules of Engagement. It shall also include the powers to take further decisions on the appointment of the EU Operation Commander and/or EU Force Commander. The powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of the EU military operation shall remain vested in the Council, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR).

2. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.

3. The PSC shall receive reports from the Chairman of the European Union Military Committee (CEUMC) regarding the conduct of the EU military operation, at regular intervals. The PSC may invite the EU Operation Commander and/or EU Force Commander to its meetings, as appropriate.

Article 7

Military direction
1. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) shall monitor the proper execution of the EU military operation conducted under the responsibility of the EU Operation Commander.

2. The EUMC shall receive reports from the EU Operation Commander at regular intervals. It may invite the EU Operation Commander and/or EU Force Commander to its meetings as necessary.

3. The CEUMC shall act as the primary point of contact with the EU Operation Commander.

Article 8

Coherence of EU response
The Presidency, the SG/HR, the EUSR, the EU Operation Commander and the EU Force
Commander, and the Heads of Mission for EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo respectively shall ensure close coordination of their respective activities with respect to the implementation of this Joint Action.

**Article 9**

**Relations with the United Nations, DRC and other actors**

1. The SG/HR, assisted by the EUSR shall, in close coordination with the Presidency, act as a primary point of contact with the United Nations, the authorities of the DRC and neighbouring countries, as well as with other relevant actors.

2. The EU Operation Commander shall, in close coordination with the SG/HR, liaise with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the United Nations and MONUC on issues relevant to his mission.

3. The EU Force Commander in coordination with the EUSR and the Heads of Mission for EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo respectively shall, on issues relevant to his mission, maintain close contacts with MONUC and local authorities, as well as with other international actors, as appropriate.

**Article 10**

**Participation of third States**

1. Without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the European Union and to the single institutional framework, and in accordance with the relevant guidelines of the European Council:
   - the non-EU European NATO members shall be invited to participate in the EU military operation,
   - countries which are candidates for accession to the European Union and other potential partners may be invited to participate in the EU military operation in accordance with the agreed modalities.

2. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take, upon the recommendation of the EU Operation Commander and the EUMC, the relevant decisions on acceptance of the proposed contributions.

3. Detailed arrangements regarding the participation of third States shall be the subject of agreements to be concluded in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24 of the EU Treaty. The SG/HR, assisting the Presidency, may negotiate such agreements on its behalf. Where the EU and a third State have concluded an agreement establishing a framework for the latter’s participation in the EU crisis manage-
ment operations, the provisions of such an agreement shall apply in the context of this operation.

4. Third States making significant military contributions to the EU military operation shall have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation as EU Member States taking part in the operation.

5. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take relevant decisions on the setting-up of a Committee of Contributors, should third States provide significant military contributions.

**Article 11**

**Community action**
The Council and the Commission shall ensure, each in accordance with its respective powers, consistency between the implementation of this Joint Action and external activities of the Community in accordance with Article 3 of the EU Treaty. The Council and the Commission shall cooperate to this end.

**Article 12**

**Status of the EU-led forces**
The status of the EU-led forces and their personnel, including the privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the fulfilment of their mission, will be determined in accordance with the relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006).

**Article 13**

**Financial arrangements**
1. The common costs of the EU military operation shall be administered by ATHENA.

2. For the purposes of this EU military operation:
   - barracks and lodging for the forces as a whole shall not be eligible for payment as common costs,
   - expenditure related to transportation for the forces as a whole shall not be eligible for payment as common costs.

3. The financial reference amount for the common costs of the EU military operation for a four-month period shall be EUR 16 700 000. The percentage of the reference amount referred to in Article 31(3) of Decision 2004/197/CFSP shall be 70%.
Article 14

Release of information to United Nations, MONUC and other third parties

1. The SG/HR is hereby authorised to release to the United Nations, MONUC and to other third parties, associated with this Joint Action, EU classified information and documents generated for the purposes of the EU military operation up to the level of classification relevant respectively for each of them and in accordance with the Council Security Regulations.

2. The SG/HR is hereby authorised to release to the United Nations, MONUC and to other third parties, associated with this Joint Action, EU non-classified documents related to the deliberations of the Council with regard to the operation, covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council Rules of Procedure\(^{(1)}\).

Article 15

Entry into force and termination

1. This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

2. The EU military operation shall end four months after the date of the first round of elections in the DRC.

3. This Joint Action shall be repealed following the redeployment of all EU forces, in accordance with approved termination planning of the EU military operation.

Article 16

Publication

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 27 April 2006.

*For the Council*

*The President*

*L. Prokop*

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BACKGROUND – EU SUPPORT TO THE DRC DURING THE ELECTION PROCESS

Ten years ago, and following the genocide in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo was plunged into two successive wars (1996 and 1998) which in the end reached nearly continental dimensions. Millions of people died, the whole Great Lakes region was set aflame, decades of development were destroyed and unaccounted suffering, misery and turmoil was brought upon entire populations. Concerted efforts by the international community led to the Pretoria and Sun City agreements in 2002 which paved the way for the transition taking place since then and which is coming to its term now.

This peace process in the DRC provides a chance for a better future. It is, above all, the responsibility of the Congolese people, with the support of their neighbours and African partners, to seize this chance. The EU has therefore stressed the importance of a transparent and fair electoral process reflecting the full sovereignty of the Congolese people.

Thus, 2006 might well be the most significant year for the DRC since independence. In summer 2006 the citizens of Africa’s third largest country will go to the polls to elect a democratic government and president. As outlined in this background note the EU is strongly supporting this process, as the basis for peace and prosperity in the country. It is launching a new military operation in support of MONUC during the election period, which is part of the EU’s overall support to the DRC transition. That support can be broken down in terms of diplomatic and institutional as well as military and technical support.

Diplomatic support for the election process

- Being strongly committed to supporting peace, stability and development in Africa, the EU has been actively involved in the search for a lasting solution of conflicts in the African Great Lakes region. On several occasions, High Representative Javier Solana and Commissioner Louis Michel played an important role in moving the transition process forward, passing crucial junctures and mobilising international support. The EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes region, Aldo Ajello, has been in regular contact with all key stakeholders on the ground since 1996 in close cooperation with the European Commission delegation in the DRC. The EU is also a member of the international committee (CIAT) supporting the transition. In addition, the EU is in the process of preparing for more structured political dialogue with the newly elected DRC government under article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement.
On 15 May 2006, EU Foreign Ministers welcomed the holding of elections, which should fulfil the earnest desire of the Congolese people to elect those who are to represent them at different levels of the democratic institutions and to vote on programmes and social projects which will affect the future of the country: peace, development, security, good governance, and an end to impunity.

They emphasised how important it is that the international community remain committed to the DRC beyond the election period, thereby showing continued support for the Congolese people with regard to rebuilding the country and to security. It was stressed that the European Union is determined to maintain its efforts in support of the authorities emerging from the elections.

Support for key institutions as a basis for electoral success

The European Community’s cooperation with the DRC was resumed in 2002 under the Cotonou Agreement. The Commission’s indicative programme 2003-2007 aims to fight poverty and provide institution building and macro-economic support. Since 2002, these priorities have been funded with some EUR 750 million. Looking towards the next indicative programme for the period 2008-2013, the Commission will aim to build on the election process with support for governance, judicial reform and security sector reform.

The European Community’s support for judicial and governance reform in the East of the DRC is central to establishing democratic and accountable institutions. The establishment of and support for the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) have also helped to create a basis for modern and professional policing in the DRC. Support for military reform has also been key, especially support for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process and the brassage process. The Commission is also working currently on a number of projects that will help deliver a post-election democracy dividend for the citizens of the DRC, including key infrastructure projects and a large linking relief and development project in the East of the DRC. A similar exercise of defining ‘quick impact projects’ is currently under way as regards the bilateral cooperation of EU Member States with the DRC.

Technical support for the electoral process

European Community support for the election process in the DRC stands at EUR 149 million, making it the largest Community contribution ever to an election process. Together with EUR 100m of bilateral support provided by Member States, this amounts to EUR 250m (USD 320m) or nearly 80% of the overall costs for the elections.

In addition to technical expertise in the delegation in Kinshasa, the EU is deploying a large Election Observation Mission (EOM), headed by General Philippe Morillon,
Member of the European Parliament, which will include a core team, long term observers and short term observers. On the election days, it is anticipated that over 250 observers will be deployed across the country. The mission will pay particular attention to the result tabulation process. While maintaining independence, the EU EOM will liaise closely with other international observer missions, in particular those from the African Union and the Southern African Development Community.

The EU military operation in support of MONUC during the election period

- On 27 April 2006, the Council adopted a Joint Action on the European Union military operation in support of MONUC during the election process. The Joint Action forms the EU legal basis and sets out the framework for the operation. The military operation will be conducted in full agreement with the authorities of the DRC and in close coordination with them and MONUC. This autonomous EU-led operation will be conducted in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
- The Council appointed Lieutenant General Karlheinz VIERECK (Germany) EU Operation Commander and Major General Christian DAMAY (France) EU Force Commander.
- Code-named EUFOR RD Congo, the military operation will be deployed in accordance with the mandate set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006) adopted unanimously on 25 April. In that regard, EUFOR RD Congo will carry out the following tasks:
  - to support MONUC to stabilise a situation, in case MONUC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing capabilities,
  - to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the DRC,
  - to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa,
  - to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel as well as the protection of the installations of EUFOR RD Congo,
  - to execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger.
- EUFOR RD Congo will include: (i) the deployment of an advance element to Kinshasa of several hundred military personnel, and (ii) the availability of a battalion-size “on-call” force over the horizon outside the country, but quickly deployable if necessary. This force will be on stand-by, ready to be deployed upon decision by the EU.
- EUFOR RD Congo will be deployed in the DRC for a period of up to four months after the date of the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections.
- The EU Operational Headquarters will be located in Potsdam (Germany).
- Under the responsibility of the Council of the EU, the Political and Security Committee will exercise the political control and strategic direction of EUFOR RD Congo.
Other ESDP Missions

Before the new operation in support of MONUC, the previous missions conducted by the EU in the DRC under the European security and defence policy – the 2003 ARTEMIS operation and the ongoing EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo missions – are concrete examples of the EU’s action to support stability and transition in the country and of close and active co-operation between the EU and the UN in crisis management. These missions have played an important role in helping to achieve the objectives of peace, development and stability as outlined in the Cotonou Agreement and the EU Africa Strategy.

a) The EU-led Operation ARTEMIS carried out in summer 2003 in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1484 succeeded in stabilising the security conditions, improving the humanitarian situation and protecting the civilian population and international presence in Bunia (Ituri, Eastern DRC). The rapid deployment of the European multinational force halted a dangerous downward spiral and helped re-launch the peace process in the DRC. Operation ARTEMIS created the necessary conditions for the reinforced MONUC to be deployed in accordance with the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1493.

b) The EU police mission in Kinshasa for the Integrated Police Unit (EUPOL Kinshasa) was launched in April 2005, in close coordination with the UN. In response to an invitation by the DRC government, EUPOL Kinshasa is the first civilian mission for crisis management in Africa in the context of ESDP. Its objective is to provide a framework for and advice to the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) under a Congolese line of command. The purpose is to guarantee that the actions of the IPU are in line with international police best practices. The 30-staff mission has deployed personnel to different sections of the IPU line of command.

c) The EU advisory and assistance mission for DRC security reform (EUSEC – RD CONGO) was launched in June 2005 at the DRC government’s request. The mission provides advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law. The mission’s experts are assigned to key posts within the Congolese administration. A key project addresses the chain of payments for soldiers.

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1 This IPU is the subject of a project whose aim is to train 1008 Congolese police. The IPU’s objective is to scale up the neutral force currently made available by MONUC to guarantee the security of the government and transitional institutions. IPU training and equipment is financed by the European Development Fund, managed by the European Commission, and by a joint action covering contributions from the budget of the CFSP and from Member States.
External Relations Council

Brussels, 15 May 2006

(...)

WESTERN BALKANS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘Serbia and Montenegro / ICTY

1. The Council regretted that Serbia and Montenegro was still not fully cooperating with the ICTY and it therefore supported the Commission’s decision to call off the negotiating round on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement scheduled for 11 May, in line with its conclusions of 3 October 2005 and 27 February 2006.

2. The Council reiterated its firm commitment to the European perspective of Serbia and Montenegro. In this context, the Council indicated its support to resume negotiations as soon as full cooperation with the ICTY is achieved. It once again urged the authorities in Belgrade to ensure that all remaining fugitive ICTY indictees, notably Ratko Mladic, are brought to justice without further delay.

3. If the necessary conditions are met and negotiations can resume rapidly, the Council underlines that a swift conclusion of the negotiations according to the timetable envisaged by the Commission is still within reach.

Serbia and Montenegro / Montenegro

4. The Council reiterated the importance of a fair and orderly referendum process in Montenegro. It called on both sides to comply with the referendum law and provisions, to refrain from unilateral actions during the further stages of the process and to accept the outcome of a legitimately conducted referendum. It further stressed the importance of ensuring that the voters in Montenegro can make a free and informed choice between distinct alternatives and can freely express their will, without any undue interference. Direct talks between Belgrade and Podgorica on the way ahead will be needed in the aftermath of the referendum, whatever the outcome.
Bosnia and Herzegovina

5. The Council expressed disappointment that the constitutional reform was not adopted by the BiH House of Representatives. The Council encouraged the BiH authorities to spare no effort to continue the path of constitutional reforms in order to give the citizens of BiH more functional state structures that are better able to meet European standards.

6. The Council indicated the Union’s readiness in principle to reinforce its engagement in BiH in the context of the envisaged closure of the OHR, provided that there will be sufficient progress and without prejudice to the PIC Steering Board decision in this regard. It invited the High Representative/Secretary-General, with the Commission, and in close consultation with the Presidency, to begin consultations to that end with the PIC Steering Board, the High Representative/EU Special Representative Mr Schwarz-Schilling, the BiH authorities and other stakeholders and to present a joint assessment to the Council.

Regional cooperation

7. The Council recalled that regional cooperation is one of the cornerstones of the Stabilisation and Association process. It welcomed the outcome of the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) Summit held in Thessaloniki on 4 May 2006 and took note of the constructive efforts of the Greek SEECP Chairmanship in this context, also welcoming the incoming SEECP Chairmanship of Croatia. The Council emphasised the importance of enhancing regional ownership and encouraged the SEECP to take concrete decisions on its role in the context of the ongoing discussions with the European Commission and the Stability Pact. The Council looks forward to decisions on the future set-up of regional cooperation at the upcoming meeting of the Regional Table of the Stability Pact in Belgrade on 30 May.’

IRAQ – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The Council warmly welcomes progress made in Iraq towards forming a government of national unity. It congratulates President Jalal Talabani, the Vice-presidents Adel Abdel Mahdi and Tariq Al-Hashemi, the President of the Council of Representatives, Mr Mahmoud Al-Mashhadani, and his deputies Khalid Al-Attiyah and Aref Tayfour upon their election. Likewise, it congratulates Mr Nouri Al-Maliki upon his nomination as Prime Minister.

The EU reiterates its commitment to the independence, sovereignty, unity and terri-
The Council reiterates its support for a process of national reconciliation including efforts by the UN in this area and the initiative by the League of Arab States to organise a conference on national accord.

The EU is ready to engage actively with the new government in order to achieve a secure, stable, unified, prosperous and democratic Iraq. In this regard the EU looks forward to discuss concrete measures to enhance EU-Iraq relations based on Iraqi priorities in the new government’s programme and on shared values. The EU equally stands ready to strengthen EU-Iraq relations through continuing the political dialogue at all levels in accordance with the EU-Iraq Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue of 21 September 2005 and to negotiate an EU-Iraq Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Community assistance will be provided through the newly adopted assistance programme for 2006 to the following areas: improvement of basic services, good governance and furthering democracy. In response to Iraqi needs and requests, the Council is prepared to extend the activities of the Integrated Rule of Law Mission, EUJUST LEX, beyond its current mandate.’

IRAN – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council noted the IAEA Director General’s report of 28 April. The Iranian authorities have failed to comply with the requests made by the Agency’s Board of Governors and the UN Security Council and have also failed to actively cooperate with the Agency to clarify the outstanding issues, including those that may have a military dimension.

2. The Council deeply regrets the failure of the Iranian authorities to take the steps deemed essential by the IAEA Board and the UN Security Council as well as their threats to maintain this failure into the future. It calls on the Iranian authorities to cooperate fully with the IAEA, suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, and to suspend the construction of a reactor moderated by heavy water in order to create conditions in which negotiations might resume. The EU fully supports the Security Council making this mandatory.

3. The Council reaffirms the right of Iran to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the NPT. Building on the proposals of August 2005 as confirmed by the Council in its February 2006 conclusions, the EU would be prepared to support Iran’s development of a safe, sustainable and proliferation-proof civilian nuclear programme, if international concerns were fully addressed
and confidence in Iran’s intentions established. The EU hopes that Iran will not fail to take up such an offer.

4. At the same time, the EU is determined to preserve the effectiveness of the multilateral non-proliferation system. The Council stresses the importance of exercising the utmost vigilance in the application of existing export control mechanisms for sensitive material so as to prevent the transfer of goods, technology and materials that might be used, directly or indirectly, in fissile material programmes and missile programmes.

5. The Council remains deeply concerned about the human rights situation in Iran, which is at variance with universal principles and Iran’s specific obligations. It expresses its concern about the increasing number of executions, arbitrary detentions, the growing restrictions on access to information, the increasing violations of freedom of speech and religion, especially concerning the situation of the Sufi and Baha’i communities, as well as the intimidation and harassment of human rights defenders, lawyers and minority groups. The Council is seriously concerned about the detention of the Iranian philosopher Dr. Ramin Jahanbegloo. The Council calls upon Iranian authorities not to penalize Iranian citizens for their contacts with Europeans, including embassies, universities and cultural institutes.

6. The Council remains committed to finding a diplomatic solution. The EU would like to be able to develop relations with Iran based on confidence and cooperation. The alternative is that Iran chooses further isolation. The Council therefore calls on the Iranian authorities to urgently take the necessary decisions required for the development of such relations with the European Union and the international community. The Council also expects Iran to contribute to regional stability.'

**MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council assessed the situation in the Middle East and welcomed the statement of the Quartet Principals on 9 May in New York.

2. The Council expressed its serious concern about the deterioration of the humanitarian, economic and financial situation in the West Bank and Gaza.

3. The Council welcomed the willingness of the Quartet to endorse a temporary international mechanism, the objective of which is direct delivery and supervision of assistance to the Palestinian people. The EU is working urgently to develop such a mechanism
which as a matter of priority will be aimed at contributing to meet basic needs including health services. It will consult International Financial Institutions and other key partners, and invite other donors to actively join in the effort to establish the mechanism as soon as possible.

4. The Council recalled its demand to the Palestinian Authority government to meet and implement the three principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel’s right to exist and acceptance of existing agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap.

5. The Council urged both parties to take concrete steps to implement their obligations under the Agreement on Movement and Access.

6. The Council urged Israel to resume transfers of withheld Palestinian tax and customs revenues which are essential in averting a crisis in the Palestinian territories.

7. In line with their declared intentions and recalling President Abbas’ commitment to a platform of peace, the Council called for an early engagement between the Israeli Prime Minister and the President of the Palestinian Authority in view of the urgent need to relaunch the process towards a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict leading to an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian State living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours. In this regard, the Council reiterated the importance of both parties avoiding unilateral measures which prejudice final status issues. Ministers recalled previous statements that the EU will not recognise any change to pre-1967 borders other than those arrived at by agreement between the parties.

8. The Council commended the services of James Wolfensohn as Quartet’s Special Envoy for Gaza Disengagement and his central role in the conclusion of the Agreement on Movement and Access as well as his promulgation of an agenda for Palestinian economic recovery.

(...)
the restoration of lasting peace and reconciliation in Darfur. The Council commended the Government of Sudan and the SLM/A for having put aside their differences. It strongly urged those parties who have still not signed the Agreement to agree and adhere to the Agreement in full. In this regard the Council also reiterated its full support for the application of sanctions under UNSCR 1591 against those who impede the peace process.

2. The Council condemned the recent ceasefire violations and demanded an end to all hostilities. In particular, it demanded in the strongest terms an immediate end to all attacks on civilians and all violations of human rights and forms of harassment. The Council stressed in particular the need to respect the unhindered deliverance of humanitarian assistance and goods and to guarantee security in the IDP camps, creating a climate favourable for the voluntary return of IDPs and refugees to their home.

3. The Council called on all parties to immediately remove any existing obstacles to the delivery of aid and to end any obstruction of humanitarian work. The Council urged the Sudanese Government to eliminate any restrictions placed on humanitarian access and the work of UN agencies and non-governmental organisations, and demanded that it comply fully with the Joint Communiqué of 3 July 2004 signed with the UN.

4. The Council called on the parties to the DPA urgently to implement the terms of the agreement, including by the rapid appointment of the relevant positions within government for Darfur and the movements and forming the necessary commissions. In this regard the Council stated the EU’s readiness to respond swiftly to any requests addressed to it to support the implementation of the peace agreement and to contribute to the reconciliation of the people of Darfur. In this respect, the EU looks forward to the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation as an inclusive process with representatives of all Darfurian stakeholders, aimed at overcoming existing divisions between communities and building the foundations of a common future. The EU appeals to all parties to respect the autonomy and the integrity of the process.

5. The Council reiterated the EU’s readiness to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Darfur once the peace agreement is effective and when security conditions on the ground allow the mobilisation of funds. The EU stands ready to support, in coordination with the UN, the World Bank and other lead donors in Sudan/Darfur, a Joint Assessment Mission for Darfur, ahead of a donors’ conference aimed at mobilizing funds to promote a progressive shift from humanitarian aid to development cooperation.

6. The Council commended AMIS for its efforts to bring security and stability to Darfur in extremely adverse circumstances and acknowledged its continuing crucial role,
including in relation to the implementation and verification of the DPA. The Council noted that a single comprehensive review was undertaken of the wide range of support that the EU and its Member States are providing to the AU’s efforts to stabilise the situation in Darfur, including planning, technical, financial and equipment support to both the military and police components of AMIS. The Council confirmed the EU’s readiness to continue providing such support, together with the UN and with other international partners, including NATO. The Council agreed to extend the EU civilian-military supporting action to the AU Mission in the Darfur region of Sudan to 30 September 2006. It will consider the appropriate legal and operational framework and the additional resources and capabilities that may be required for this extended EU support action. The Council also welcomed the agreement to provide a further EUR 50 million from the African Peace Facility to AMIS, in addition to the EUR 162 million already provided.

7. The Council urged the AU to take all necessary steps for a robust interpretation of the AMIS mandate to ensure a more forceful protection of the civilian population. The Council emphasised the need to continue efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of AMIS in order to fulfil its mandate as effectively as possible, also in view of the tasks arising from the DPA. The EU stands ready to continue its assistance to the AU and to continue Honouring its commitments in this regard. In this context, it welcomed the decision to establish a Joint Operational Centre and looks forward to the implementation of the remaining recommendations of the Joint Assessment Mission in December 2005, as requested in the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the AU of 10 March.

8. The Council reaffirmed its support for transition from AMIS to a UN mission as the only viable option for providing sustained stability and security in Darfur in the long term. The agreement achieved in Abuja opens the way for the establishment of a UN peace-keeping mission in Darfur. The Council urged all stakeholders to proceed swiftly with the planning for a successful transition from AMIS to a UN operation, and underlined the readiness of the EU to support, as appropriate, the planning of the transition. The Sudanese government to collaborate fully with UN and to immediately allow an AU-UN technical assessment mission to go to Darfur to prepare the transition.

9. The Council welcomed UN Security Council Resolution 1672 of 25 April 2006 imposing travel restrictions and financial sanctions on four Sudanese individuals. Recalling its support for sanctions against those blocking the peace process, committing human rights violations, or violating the cease-fire and the arms embargo, the Council confirmed its position that full use should be made of the measures set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005) and called for continued engagement by the UN Security Council to restore peace and security in Darfur. The Council reiterated its
full support for the ongoing investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of human rights abuses in Darfur as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) and urged all parties, in particular the Government of Sudan, to fully cooperate with the ICC.

10. The Council expressed its grave concern about recent events in Chad, the political and security situation in the country and the instability on the Sudanese-Chadian border, and its potential impact on the humanitarian situation on the population in Chad and Darfur. The Council recalled the responsibility of the Sudanese government to help secure peace along its border with Chad and its obligation, as member of the AU, to promote democratic stability in Chad. Any assistance to attempts to overthrow the Chadian Government by way of unconstitutional means is incompatible with the pursuit of a political solution to the Darfur conflict. If lasting peace is to be achieved in Darfur, both Sudan and Chad must fully comply with the obligations set out in the Tripoli Agreement of 8 February, put an end to any direct or indirect support to rebel groups in the other country and resolve outstanding issues through dialogue and on the basis of full respect for the territorial integrity of the other.

11. Durable peace in Darfur can only be achieved within the framework of a peaceful Sudan. The Council expressed its concern about recent outbreaks of violence in different parts of Sudan, such as those reported in Eastern and Southern Sudan, which have cost the life of innocent civilians. The Council emphasised the urgency of implementing the security sector provisions of the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) and proceed with the disengagement of forces, disarmament and demobilisation in order to prevent further outbreaks of violence. In this context, the Council called for an urgent start of talks between the Government of Sudan and the Eastern Front, with a view to resolving the existing problems in eastern Sudan.

12. The EU reaffirmed its commitment to support the continuing implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) as the only way to a peaceful, democratic and prosperous Sudan. It encouraged the parties to the agreement to facilitate the full implementation of the CPA and to correct swiftly all delays in this respect, as well as to cooperate in a spirit of partnership and transparency, recalling their common commitment to making the unity of Sudan attractive. In particular, the Council emphasised the paramount importance of the full implementation of the provisions of the CPA concerning Abyei and the other transitional areas.

13. The Council reconfirmed the EU’s commitment to providing continuing support for the CPA process including through the involvement of Member States, the Commission and the EU Special Representative, and its readiness to reinforce the dialogue with the Government of National Unity and the Government of South Sudan.
Similarly, it reiterated the importance the EU attaches to the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) as a key mechanism for the international community’s monitoring of and support to the implementation of the CPA and stated its preparedness to consider ways and means to strengthen the role of the AEC and enhance its effectiveness.

14. Full normalisation of relations with Sudan will depend on progress achieved in implementing the CPA and the DPA and on a nationwide political process leading to democratisation and peace in the whole of Sudan.

ANNEX II: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. As the elections in the DRC draw near, the Council has carried out a comprehensive review of the EU’s external action in the DRC. The Council reaffirms its engagement, and the importance it attaches to the proper conduct of the elections. A successful transition in the DRC will have a major impact on peace and development in the Great Lakes Region, and in the whole of Africa.

2. The Council welcomes the work done by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the support provided by MONUC. It notes the date of 30 July 2006 set by IEC for the parliamentary and presidential elections. The Council urges the Congolese authorities to ensure that the election date is observed. Furthermore, at the earliest opportunity the IEC should set the date for a potential second round of presidential and provincial elections, as well as for the indirect elections to the Senate. Confirmation that municipal and local elections are to take place should also be forthcoming.

3. The Council welcomes the holding of elections, which must fulfil the earnest desire of the Congolese people to elect those who are to represent them at different levels of the democratic institutions and to vote on programmes and social projects which will affect the future of the country: peace, development, security, good governance, and an end to impunity. It urges all political parties and players to conduct a positive election campaign, bringing new hope, and to hold a responsible debate, not attempting to stir up divisions, and showing concern for the maintenance of public order and respect for human rights. In this regard the Council would highlight the importance of the code of conduct for the political parties, drawn up in June 2005, which must be consistently and broadly applied. The Council takes the view that, to create a favourable climate for democratic elections to be held, all possible measures must be taken to ensure respect for freedom of expression, including through fair access to the media. At the same time, it is cru-
cial that the media should have a responsible attitude. The EU will contribute to the proper conduct of the elections by sending an observer mission.

4. The Council has always felt that the holding of elections which are as inclusive as possible would be the best guarantee of stability after the elections. Conditions are such that all those who wish to do so will be able to participate. That said, a law on funding for political parties has yet to be passed. The Council calls on all the political parties, even those which have chosen not to take part in the elections, to undertake to respect the verdict of the polls. Everyone should also look to the future in a spirit of reconciliation and national consensus, a future in which all political forces must participate in the reconstruction of the DRC.

5. The Council calls on all countries in the region to use their influence to contribute to the proper conduct of the elections. The success of the transition in the DRC is in the interest of the entire region. In this respect, the Council welcomes the continuing action of the United States of America in its facilitation of Tripartite Plus.

6. The Council would draw attention to the fact that responsibility for security during the elections lies first and foremost with the Transitional National Government, assisted by MONUC. Despite progress in the reform of the security sector, the Council remains concerned by the situation in many areas in the east of the country, notably Ituri, the Kivus and northern Katanga, and by the absence of some groups from the army integration process. The Council urges the Congolese authorities to pursue army integration and to remedy the problems of command, discipline and impunity, as well as those of financial management and social support. Furthermore, it highlights the need for strict enforcement of the arms embargo against armed groups in the DRC, overseen by the United Nations Security Council committee set up under Resolution 1533 (2004). It welcomes the firm action taken by the ICC to combat impunity in the DRC.

7. The Council welcomes the adoption by the United Nations Security Council on 25 April 2006 of Resolution 1671, authorising the deployment of EUFOR RD Congo during the election period in the DRC. It would highlight the fact that its decision to launch this operation came in response to a request from the United Nations. The operation is designed to provide support to MONUC when it does not have the capacity to confront certain situations. It will be directed from the headquarters which Germany has made available to the EU in Potsdam. In addition, the EUPOL Kinshasa mission will be reinforced during the election period to help the Congolese police forces coordinate their units’ activities while the elections are taking place. The EU will thus be in a position to make a significant contribution to creating a more stable and secure environment during the election period.
8. The EUFOR RD Congo operation is part of the EU’s ongoing engagement in support of the transition process in the DRC (that is why the EU has provided more than half of the funding required to stage the elections) and in the area of security. The Council would draw attention to the action undertaken and the results achieved by EUSEC DR Congo in relation to reform of the security sector, including the Chain of Payments Project, and by EUPOL Kinshasa in the formation of the Integrated Police Unit in Kinshasa.

9. The Council would emphasise how important it is that the international community remain committed to the DRC beyond the election period, thereby showing continued support for the Congolese people with regard to rebuilding the country and to security. The European Union is determined to maintain its efforts in support of the authorities emerging from the elections. The reform of the security sector must continue with the greatest determination; in particular, options will be examined which enable a comprehensive approach in conducting actions to promote it.

10. The Council thanks the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT) for the decisive role it has played in supporting the transitional authorities. The EU remains ready to be a part of any engagement by the international community in the DRC after the elections.

11. The Council notes that the convening of the second Summit of the Great Lakes Region, and the decisions which it will be called on to take, should give additional impetus to the reconstruction of the DRC and to regional cooperation.
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council, in the presence of defence ministers, discussed recent progress under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and adopted the following conclusions:

“Military Capabilities

Headline Goal 2010

The Council noted with satisfaction the progress achieved with regard to the development of new methodologies for the qualitative approach to capability planning called for by the Headline Goal 2010.

The Council recognised the Roadmap to the Progress Catalogue as an important basis for achieving a far more advanced capability development process. It establishes a common understanding of the process of Scrutinising, Assessing and Evaluating of capabilities, using the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), and in defining intermediate steps towards the Progress Catalogue in particular.

The Council noted the new bidding process against the Requirements Catalogue 05 using the Headline Goal Questionnaire, which represents an improved level of refinement over the previous Requirements Catalogue. Thereby the qualitative aspects of Member States’ commitments to fulfilling the Headline Goal 2010 will be emphasised.

The Council welcomed the establishment of the methodology of scrutinising and the introduction of the Scrutinising Handbook as important elements in elaborating a qualitatively improved, capability based approach in the development of the EU’s military capabilities that will be used to establish the Force Catalogue as the next step in the Capability Development Mechanism.

The Council looks forward to the further development of the methodologies and the finalisation of the Compilation of Member States Contributions by June 2006 as well as the timely development of the Force Catalogue in the second half of 2006.

Single Progress Report

The Council noted the Single Progress Report on military capabilities, drawn up in line with the EU Capability Development Mechanism, including the Capability
Improvement Chart, which records progress made in the development of EU military capabilities since November 2005. An overview of the chart will keep the public and the media informed.

In this context, the Council welcomed in particular the improvements achieved in the shortfall area of Strategic Airlift through the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS). SALIS is an initiative by 14 Member States and Canada and Norway assuring timely availability of an additional capability to deploy outsized cargo.

With regard to the improvement of the European strategic transport capability the Council welcomed the launch of the initiative “Improving Strategic Airlift Capability Across Europe” and the work done so far. The Council invited the EDA, as part of ongoing work, to identify potential airlift solutions and coordinate requirements between interested participating Member States, keeping the EUMC informed.

With regard to the maritime dimension in ESDP, the Council noted that work is ongoing to investigate the contribution of EU maritime forces in ESDP missions/operations and their use in a rapid response capacity. It looks forward to further progress in this field.

The Council recognized that there has been further progress in capability development since the Helsinki Progress Catalogue 03, but stressed again the urgent need for further progress to be made in the development of military capabilities to remedy the current shortfalls and to address the largely qualitative limitations and constraints stemming from them.

The European Defence Agency, working with the EU Military Committee assisted by the EU Military Staff and in close coordination with the Political and Security Committee, gave added impetus to this work.

The Council noted that the EU-NATO Capability Group had continued to address issues of coherent and mutually reinforcing development of military capabilities in the EU and NATO where requirements overlap. All EU Member States were informed of these issues.

**Rapid Response**

In the context of Rapid Response, the Council noted the successful outcome of the Battlegroups Coordination Conference on 3 May. It is ensured that from January 2007 on the EU will have the full operational capability to undertake two battlegroup size operations of rapid response, including the ability to launch two such operations nearly simultaneously. The Council also welcomed the progress made by its subsidiary bodies in implementing the EU Battlegroups Concept, and particularly on aspects of the Lessons Learned methodology.

The Council recognised that, in line with the “EU Military Rapid Response Concept”, consideration is being given to a Rapid Response Air Initiative for further development.
within the framework of the Headline Goal 2010. This initiative aims at enhancing the
generation of Air Rapid Response elements and proposes a draft concept on European
Deployable Air Station.

European Defence Agency

The Council noted the report submitted by the Head of the Agency on its activities and
welcomed the progress made.

The Council welcomed in particular the results achieved in pursuance of the
Hampton Court Defence R&T agenda. It noted: the proposed targets for increasing
Europe’s spending, overall and on collaboration; the way forward on launching ad hoc
R&T projects; the approach to develop a European Defence R&T Strategy; and the pro-
posal of a new mechanism for funding and managing joint investment in R&T pro-
grammes. The Council noted the recent conclusion of the Agency’s General Conditions,
the necessary legal framework for launching R&T projects and programmes.

The Council took note of the progress made concerning the Capabilities priorities
under “Hampton Court”, welcoming especially the promising initiatives in the
Command, Control and Communications area. It invited the Agency and its participat-
ing Member States to continue work on solving the shortfalls in Strategic Lift and Air-to-
Air Refuelling, noting the improvements achieved through SALIS.

The Council noted with satisfaction that work was well on track for the implemen-
tation of the Code of Conduct on defence procurement on 1 July 2006.

It noted the good co-operation of the European Defence Agency with the
Commission on this topic, as well as on others.

The Council welcomed the progress made to develop an initial Long Term Vision for
European capability and capacity needs, for Member States’ consideration directly after
the summer of 2006. The aim of the initial LTV is to provide a foundation for follow-on
work to better define future ESDP capability needs and to provide an informed context
for nearer term industrial, technological and investment decisions.

Looking ahead, the Council stressed the importance of the elaboration of a sound
and viable financial framework and agreed priorities for the Agency for the years 2007-
2009, to be approved by the Council unanimously in the autumn of 2006.

Civil-Military Coordination – Management of Operations

The Council noted that effective coordination of all the instruments that the EU has at
its disposal is necessary for the EU to achieve maximum impact and exert maximum
political leverage through its crisis management operations.

The Council therefore welcomed the continued efforts that have been undertaken,
building on the work carried out under previous Presidencies to improve Civil-Military
Coordination: A Framework paper of possible solutions for the management of EU
Crisis Management Operations has been noted by the PSC as a living document, open to amendment as and when new developments or operational experience call for it, for example in light of the results of the work being undertaken by the SG/HR as a follow-up to Hampton Court.

The Council underlined that each EU engagement will have a unique character. This paper provides some concrete recommendations and possible solutions for Civil-Military Coordination in the field and should serve as an orientation guide for further work, recommendations on which should be made available by July 2006.

While noting that the Framework paper constitutes a further step in improving Civil-Military Coordination, the Council welcomed the intention of the incoming Finnish Presidency to pursue work on Civil-Military Coordination.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the Western Balkans

The Council recalled its conclusions from 21 November 2005 when it noted the EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform and recalled that support to SSR in partner countries is a core area for EU action as identified in the European Security Strategy (ESS). It underlined that SSR in the Western Balkans is part of a broader agenda set out at the Thessaloniki summit in 2003 and through the Stabilisation and Association Process which will remain the framework of the European course of these countries.

The Council noted that the EU has continued its engagement through its ESDP operations in the region and is planning for its future engagement in Kosovo in the field of police and rule of law. It also noted that the Community has maintained a number of programmes aimed at supporting Justice, Freedom and Security and that Member States are active on a bilateral basis.

It therefore underlined the importance of a comprehensive EU approach to SSR in the Western Balkans, building on existing EU policies and instruments and respecting the following principles which will need flexibility in their implementation:

- Responsibility and ownership for the reform of their security sector lies with the countries in the region themselves;
- SSR is part of the long-standing requirement regarding fostering the rule of law, democratic institutions and respect for internationally agreed human rights principles in the region.
- Democratic accountability and parliamentary control of the security sector is paramount for the development of stable democratic societies. Parliamentary contacts are considered useful in this regard and are encouraged. Information and involvement of the civil society in the region should be sought as well.
- There is a need for a holistic approach towards the region with a view to finding solutions to existing problems and contributing to stability and security; at the same time, the EU’s SSR activities should be modulated to the country-specific situation and requirements;
SSR can contribute to cooperation amongst the countries of the Western Balkans and to the stabilization and development of the entire region. Therefore, SSR projects that support confidence-building and regional cooperation should be encouraged to the extent possible;

EU support should continue to contribute to fighting organized crime in individual countries and in the region as a whole as well as proactively encourage cooperation between the countries of the region to fight cross-border crime more effectively;

EU support should be well coordinated within the EU (need for an integrated and cross-pillar approach) and with activities of EU Member States;

There is a need to coordinate with other international actors and donors active in the region.

Bearing in mind the need for appropriate coordination and exchange of information, the Council invited the Council General Secretariat and the Commission to elaborate an overview of ongoing EU SSR activities in the Western Balkans supported by the Council, the Commission and Member States in order to avoid unnecessary duplication and ensure coherence of efforts of all EU actors in this field. This should pave the way for an integrated approach.

Emergency and crisis response: Getting assistance quickly where it is needed – Council conclusions

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council welcomed the Secretary-General/High Representative’s proposals to improve the EU’s ability to respond to disasters and the coordination of transport for the relief efforts, in the context of the Hampton Court follow-up. It noted the document “General Framework for the use of Member States’ military or military chartered transportation assets and ESDP coordination tools in support of EU disaster response” and agreed on its way ahead. Ministers also heard a presentation from Mr Barnier on options and recommendations for possible further development of EU capabilities in responding to crises, which are set out in his report to the Presidency and the Commission.

2. Helping citizens in an emergency, crisis or disaster, whether natural or man-made, requires effective delivery of assistance where and when it is needed. In certain cases, Member States are able to offer assistance (notably through EU mechanisms) to respond to an emergency or natural disaster, but have no transport to bring it where it is needed. To this end, the Council, building on the Secretary-General/High Representative’s contribution, has today taken first steps to put in place effective procedures at EU level for identifying potentially available military or military chartered transport capacities, and for coordinating their use as supplementary means when circumstances so warrant.
3. Bearing in mind the specific nature and the principles of humanitarian assistance, the Council, in order to complement civilian means of transport already available through existing mechanisms, notes that Member States may decide to make available on a voluntary basis:
- military-owned strategic air and sea lift capabilities when such capabilities are available;
- military-chartered civilian strategic lift capabilities, in particular under the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) as already decided by one Member State.

This action, in accordance with the UN guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and complex emergencies respectively, needs to respect the primary responsibility of the competent authorities of the affected State as well as the overall role and responsibility of the United Nations in coordinating international relief assistance in third countries. It will take due account of the role of the Red Cross, of NGOs and of the existing Community Civil Protection Mechanism and the Commission department of humanitarian aid (DG ECHO).

4. Once agreed by the Council, detailed procedures to identify potential military owned or military chartered assets will ensure a more rapid match between transport needs with available military transportation capabilities. These procedures will include direct links with duty desks in Ministries of Defence manned 24/7, as well as with the main European air and sealift coordination centres in Eindhoven and Athens. This will ensure better coordination of the use of available assets. An interim capability will be ensured while this work evolves, making use of the capacity currently provided by the EU Movement Planning Cell and the coordination centres.

5. The Council welcomes the fact that procedures will be put in place between the Council Secretariat and the Commission (in particular the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) and DG ECHO) to exchange rapidly information on needs and available transportation means which will ensure effective mobilisation.

6. The Council will continue to closely follow this issue and assess progress achieved in the course of 2006."

Operations

The Council also discussed preparations for the Operation EUFOR RD Congo for support to MONUC during the electoral period in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It was briefed on the state of play by the Operation Commander, General Karlheinz Viereck.

Over lunch, ministers were also briefed on the state of play regarding the ongoing Operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Operation Commander, General John Reith.
Ministers discussed ongoing and future EU support to the African Union mission in Sudan/Darfur (AMIS) as well as prospects for a transition to a UN mission.

Appointments

The Presidency recalled that EU Chiefs of Defence, at their meeting on 11 May, had agreed to recommend that the Council should appoint General Henri Bentégeat, French Chief of Defence, as the next chairman of the EU Military Committee, to take up office at the end of the current mandate of General Rolando Mosca Moschini, which will expire on 9 April 2007. Ministers welcomed this choice and noted that the formal decision would be adopted at a future Council meeting.

They also welcomed the favourable opinion given by Chiefs of Defence to High Representative Solana regarding the appointment of General David Leakey as the next Director-General of the EU Military Staff as from 1 March 2007, following the term of General Jean-Paul Perruche.

SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AND DEFENCE MINISTERS

Civilian disaster response – Co-ordination of transportation assets

Today we agreed on an important initiative that will make a real, tangible difference in rapidly and efficiently getting assistance to where it is needed in response to a disaster – whether a natural disaster or a man-made disaster.

We focused on the key issue of transportation because we know that relief efforts have been hampered in the past by logjams in transporting relief supplies.

We have seen in past relief efforts that transportation has been a key shortfall. We have the assets but – until now – we have not been able to make use of them properly. As of today, we can respond if there is a disaster, and coordinate the transportation of relief.

What we are doing is putting together Member States’ military and military-owned assets – whether military or civilian – in order to respond to a disaster – any disaster, whether natural – an earthquake, a tsunami, a tropical storm, a flood – or man-made – a fire, a major accident, an explosion, a terrorist attack.

We are not creating anything new: We are using existing tools and mechanisms developed under our European Security and Defence Policy and already available to us. We are making the necessary links so that our tools and structures can be used efficiently and rapidly.

Using the European Union Military Staff and its movement coordination cell, our Situation Centre and the air transport and maritime transport coordination centres already available to us in Eindhoven and Athens, we will be supporting Member States
that voluntarily provide air and sea-lift capabilities. This includes, for example, the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) for which one Member State has already said it will make flight hours available.

We have developed a framework for further detailed arrangements relating to transport which will be finalised by the end of this year.

**Background: Civilian disaster response**

Transportation is one aspect of a number of concrete proposals made by HR Solana in Innsbruck, in response to the Hampton Court mandate, to enhance the EU’s ability to respond to disasters. The framework for the detailed arrangements will be finalised by the end of the year.

**EUFOR – Democratic Republic of Congo**

A great deal has been achieved in the past two months:

The UN Security Council resolution authorising the deployment of EUFOR RD Congo has been adopted, the Congolese authorities have agreed to the mission and our African partners are on board.

We are now working along three tracks:

We have started discussions with the Democratic Republic of Congo and neighbouring countries on the stationing and transit of European forces.

The military planning is under way. We expect to agree the operational plan in the very near future. It is vital that we are able to deploy the necessary level of force when and where it is needed.

Force generation continues: we have already significant contributions by many Member States. However, we have to ensure that we meet all the requirements laid down by the Operational Plan in order to be able to conduct a successful mission.

EUFOR RD Congo is part of the EU’s ongoing engagement in support of the process in the DRC.

**Sudan / Darfur**

Abuja peace agreement:

The Abuja peace agreement is a good agreement and we welcome it. The main parties have signed it.

However, the peace agreement is not complete as some segments of the rebel movements have not signed up to it.

We cannot take for granted that the security situation will improve following the peace agreement.

We must now be tough with those who do not respect the agreement.

Additional support for AMIS (the African Union Mission in Darfur):
The Abuja peace agreement opens the way for the transition from the African Union mission to a United Nations Mission – this is essential for long-term security and stability in the region. In the meantime, AMIS faces tough challenges and will need additional support:

The EU is ready to continue assisting AMIS in this new phase, for example, by providing airlift, training and additional planning assistance.

We have promised additional support for AMIS during the rest of its mandate and we will provide it but for this more resources are needed.

I am confident that we will be able to find more resources, on top of the EUR 50 million we decided to grant in March.

But for decisions on further funding we need to maintain the clear prospect of transition from AMIS to a UN operation.

Following Vice-President Tara’s undertaking to us on 8 March, we expect the Sudanese Government to take the necessary measures to accept and facilitate transition to the UN Mission.

Now that the Abuja peace agreement is signed Khartoum must cooperate fully.
Brussels, 15 May 2006

CAPABILITIES IMPROVEMENT CHART I/2006

The development of military capabilities for crisis management has been a key aspect of the European Security and Defence Policy since its inception.

Every six months a progress report on EU military capabilities is submitted to the Council, in accordance with the ‘Capability Development Mechanism’ established by the Council in March 2003 for the follow-up and evaluation of military capabilities objectives and commitments by Member States.

The attached chart indicates progress in addressing recognised shortfalls and deficits.

This chart takes as a starting point the Capability Improvement Chart published in November 2001. Military requirements identified in 2002 and 2003 have been included as have contributions by Member States addressing these requirements.

The Headline Goal 2010, set in 2004, aims at the further development of European capabilities for crisis management with a horizon of 2010, reflecting the European Security Strategy, the evolution of the strategic environment and of technology and drawing on lessons learned from the EU-led operations.

The Headline Goal 2010 builds on the existing goal and recognises that existing shortfalls still need to be addressed. Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union. The Headline Goal 2010 adopts a long-term perspective and focuses on the qualitative aspects of capability development and also provides a framework within which to address further the delivery of capability.

A new Requirements Catalogue was approved by the Council in November 2005. It should be noted that Member States’ contributions which have recently been made in light of the Requirements Catalogue 2005 are not yet taken into consideration in this Capability Improvement Chart but will be included in future ones.

Improvements have been achieved in the shortfall area of Strategic Airlift by introducing the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) assuring timely availability of an additional capability to deploy outsized cargo. SALIS enhances the European Union’s capability of strategic airlift in support of European Security and Defence Policy operations.

The European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) launched in 2001 underpins Member States’ progress in remedying identified shortfalls with respect to the Helsinki Headline goal set in 1999 by rationalising Member States respective defence efforts and increasing synergy between their national and multi-national projects. Following the Council’s approval in May 2005 of the migration in whole or in part of 11 ECAP Projects Groups to
a more integrated process coordinated by the European Defence Agency, 8 ECAP Project Groups have already completed this migration. The remaining ECAP Project Groups will pursue their work following the ECAP principles and under guidance from the EU Military Committee. The objective is to further improve the development of military capabilities in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy.

*     *

Note:

This Capabilities Improvement Chart draws on Member States contributions to the military requirements identified in 2002, which led to the identification of capability shortfalls and catalogue deficits that needed to be addressed.

This chart lists those Shortfalls and Deficits and indicates improvement or otherwise in accordance with the following legends:

Solved Shortfall/Deficit solved

↑ Situation has improved
≈ Situation remains approximately the same
S Identified as significant in the assessment of capability

A specific column highlights qualitative (Q)/readiness (R) shortfalls.

Information reflected in the P&I column should not be regarded as a contribution nor a commitment.
### Capabilities Improvement Chart I/2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalogue Deficits</th>
<th>Progress 2002-2006</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Qualitative/Readiness Shortfalls</th>
<th>Projects and Initiatives</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LAND</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Attack Helicopter Battalions</td>
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<tr>
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1 This list does not reflect any order of priority.
### Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalogue Deficits

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<th>Capabilities Shortfalls and Catalogue Deficits</th>
<th>Progress 2002-2006</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Qualitative/Readiness Shortfalls</th>
<th>Projects and Initiatives</th>
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1 This list does not reflect any order of priority.
In November 2005, a Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement was approved by Defence Ministers to cover defence equipment purchases which are exempt from the normal cross-border competition rules of the EU single market. To underpin this regime and in view of the European defence equipment market due to be launched on 1 July, the Ministers of the EU Member States participating in the EDA approved a Code of Conduct which aims to maximising fair and equal opportunities for all suppliers.

THE CODE OF BEST PRACTICE IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN: APPROVED BY ASD ON 27 APRIL AND AGREED BY THE EU MEMBER STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY

Introduction

1. This is a voluntary Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CoBPSC’) for use where Article 296 of the TEC is invoked and the voluntary regime applies (other than for excepted goods and services); it is to be read and implemented coherently with the Code of Conduct, of which the CoBPSC is an integral part. The CoBPSC is to be complementary to national procedures with such procedures taking precedence where they exist. No legal commitment is involved or implied nor is there a transfer of risk involved or implied by the CoBPSC.

2. The CoBPSC is established to promote the principles of the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement in the supply chain thereby encouraging increased competition and fair opportunities for all suppliers, including for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The CoBPSC should encourage value to flow up the supply chain to the benefit of the SME by adopting good practice down the supply chain.

3. Over time the scope of the CoBPSC may be broadened to encompass all public defence procurements undertaken by SME.

Definitions

4. In the CoBPSC, the phrase ‘relevant administrations of the SME’ in the field of defence embraces the acquisition community throughout these administrations. The word ‘Suppliers’ means suppliers and buyers having a technological and/or industrial
basis in a sMS constituting the supply base of these administrations, which includes all existing or potential suppliers and contracting parties at all levels of the supply chain. The word 'Buyers' includes the contracting authorities of the relevant administrations of the sMS and commercial purchasers, including prime contractors.

Objectives

5. The CoBPSC is about influencing behaviour in the supply chain to encourage fair competition at the national level and across the sMS. The CoBPSC does not seek to deal directly with the performance of goods and services nor to specify contractual terms for their supply; rather, the CoBPSC will promote transparency and fair competition at the contract and sub-contract level. Relevant administrations of the sMS, and Prime Contractors and other Buyers in the supply chain are expected to adopt practices that will, wherever efficient and practical, encourage an increase in the level of competition.

6. The CoBPSC will also encourage the evaluation and selection of suppliers on a fair and equitable basis. The objectives are to deliver improvements in quality, efficiency, timeliness and consistency in supply chain relationships in defence acquisition business.

7. The CoBPSC should also encourage a positive and co-operative approach by all stakeholders involved in setting the terms for the supply of goods and services to the relevant administrations; advocating a team approach in all cases, to use best practice to achieve shared goals, while recognising and respecting each other’s interests, by the avoidance of confrontation and the adoption of reciprocal behaviours.

Principles

8. The relevant administrations of the sMS and their Suppliers share the core values of fairness, honesty and openness, efficiency and effectiveness, and professionalism; maintaining the highest levels of integrity, impartiality and objectivity. They will strive to perform their obligations efficiently and to the highest professional standards, treating each other fairly, and with courtesy. The Prime Contractor remains responsible ultimately for the selection and management of its supply chain.

9. The commercial ‘freedom to contract’ in the supply chain is to be maintained except where mandated by law or customer requirement. It is recognised that Buyers must be free to specify terms and performance requirements that meet their acquisition needs; however, those terms are to be clearly stated at the outset, drafted unambiguously and implemented in a balanced manner. Eventual direction from the contracting authorities of the relevant administrations of sMS for a specific source of supply may result in a reassessment of risk sharing.
10. The CoBPSC is to take account of the following within the supply chain:
a) the relationship between Buyers and their Suppliers;
b) the behaviours expected from all Buyers and Suppliers, large and small;
c) transparent and fair conduct of competition and Suppliers selection by Buyers.

11. The CoBPSC is to promote opportunities, where competition is efficient, practical and economically or technologically appropriate on a level playing-field basis for qualified and competent suppliers (both in-house and external), including SMEs, to participate in competitions. In the interests of both buyers and Suppliers numbers invited to tender could be limited to ensure optimum economy, whilst honouring (and testing, where appropriate) preferred supplier status and strategic alliances where these exist. This will include the identification of contract and subcontract opportunities as soon as practicable by publication in the Contracts Bulletin of the relevant administrations of the sMS, the Agency’s Electronic Bulletin Board or the Suppliers websites as applicable.

12. Buyers will make available the criteria for the evaluation of bids; to evaluate the bids objectively and to notify the outcome promptly to all bidders on the same day, and within the bounds of commercial confidentiality, to debrief winners and losers, upon request, on the outcome of the bidding process and the reasons for not being so selected so as to facilitate better performance on future occasions.

13. In assessing what is economically advantageous in the selection of Suppliers, it shall be taken into consideration that both Buyers and Suppliers need to take strategic sourcing decisions that are wider than individual contract or programme requirements.

14. In evaluating tenders of Suppliers, buyers will consider, amongst other things, the approach undertaken or proposed for the selection of sources of supply (including, where appropriate, make or buy plans), having regard to the principles of the CoBPSC.

15. It is incumbent on Buyers at each tier to resolve any difficulties or concerns of their supply chain in relation to the CoBPSC; where these matters remain they may be notified for transparency purposes to a Point of Contact of the relevant administration of the sMS.

16. All methods of acquisition implementation should be carried out in the same spirit of good practice. Whatever procurement method is chosen there is a need for transparency, clarity and certainty.
Monitoring

17. Monitoring arrangements will be introduced to assess the extent to which the CoBPSC is being applied. It will be based on Prime Contractors providing information on sub-contract opportunities advertised.
Javier Solana – ‘Stabilizing Darfur’

Brussels, 19 May 2006

The long-suffering people of Darfur need help – not next week, or next month, but today. The violence that has long terrorized the civilian population is persisting. Extreme human rights violations are continuing and aid deliveries are facing huge difficulties and risk being cut back. Consequently, the humanitarian situation is the worst on the planet.

What is more, the war in Darfur risks spreading to the whole of the region. Chad has already been engulfed by it. This humanitarian and political crisis is unacceptable, an affront to our conscience. Standing by is not an option.

That is why the European Union is engaged, on all fronts, in helping to find a solution to the crisis in Darfur. Darfur is a priority for Europe and will remain so as long as the violence continues and until the displaced people and refugees can return home.

But we also know that African countries must be in the lead. Europeans acting on their own are unable to achieve much. What we can do and are doing is supporting African efforts with political, financial, logistical and other forms of assistance.

From the beginning of the conflict, the European Union has supported the African Union’s efforts to stabilize the situation. It has funded the African Union force to the tune of €212 million. It has trained, equipped and transported the African troops and it has dispatched European military experts and police officers to the field. Without the European Union, there would probably not have been any AU force to offer a degree of protection to the people of Darfur.

EU institutions and member states have deployed more than €800 million for humanitarian aid. Europe has also played a leading role, in support of the African Union and in concert with the United States, during the peace negotiations in Abuja. In particular, the British envoy, Hillary Benn, and the EU special envoy, Pekka Haavisto, have been involved throughout the crucial preparatory phases of the Abuja agreement, under the leadership of President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria.

The peace agreement reached in Abuja is good news for the women and children of Darfur, the only piece of good news they have had in three years. These hopes must not be dashed. Europe will be at the forefront in ensuring that the peace agreement is implemented in full and in good faith by all the parties. Time is short. The rainy season begins soon and security and humanitarian supplies must be restored before then.

To this end, the European Union has set three priorities:

First, we must convince those who have not yet signed the peace agreement to do so by May 31, the deadline fixed by the African Union. Our message to those rebel groups still holding out is that the time for reconciliation and peace has come.

Second, we must stress to the Sudanese government that the Abuja agreement should pave the way for deploying a United Nations peacekeeping operation as soon as possible.
The scale and gravity of the situation require this shift from an AU force to a UN force that is well equipped and has a robust mandate.

Third, pending the arrival of the blue helmets, we will continue to support the African Union force in Darfur. Europe will play its part with extra logistical and other support.

Sudan, with the richness of its thousand-year history and the quality and diversity of its people, has a chance to act as a bridge between Africa and the Arab world. We have seen in southern Sudan that peace, while difficult, is possible. Now, it is the turn of Darfur to stabilize. As the people of Sudan embark on the challenging path of peace and reconciliation, they will continue to find the European Union at their side.

(International Herald Tribune)
Europe Aid – Report by Michel Barnier

May 2006

FOR A EUROPEAN CIVIL PROTECTION FORCE: EUROPE AID

(...) 

Introduction – The need for Europe

‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.’

Robert Schuman, 9 May 1950

In January 2006 Wolfgang Schüssel and José Manuel Barroso, Presidents of the Council of the European Union and of the European Commission respectively, asked me to draw up a report on the EU’s response to major cross-border emergencies for the June European Council.

Since the tsunami of 26 December 2004, the EU and other players, in particular the United Nations, have been eager to improve their response to emergencies. Since January 2005 the EU has been working on the basis of an action plan. Successive EU Presidencies have since shown their resolve to boost the EU’s capacity to show solidarity at home and abroad.

As the tsunami so tragically bears out, the price of non-Europe in crisis management is too high. First and foremost, a series of hastily organised individual responses is no match for an EU response that has been planned, organised and tested against specific scenarios. Secondly, multiplying responses results in a lack of coordination that diminishes the EU’s impact and visibility on the ground. The EU response can only be made more cost-effective by properly organising the Member States’ civil protection capabilities and consular assistance on the basis of common scenarios, training programmes and exercises.

When drafting this outlook report, I naturally took account of the progress of the many projects under way at the Council (especially in the Permanent Representatives Committee) and the Commission. I had talks with a number of Member States, and I sounded out the Commission and the Council’s General Secretariat.

When all is said and done, I wanted to place the work under way in a political context. I have therefore taken the calculated risk of framing my proposals and the associated timetable in the medium term, and more specifically with an end date of 2010, by which
time, one way or another, the countries of the EU will have created the post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, provided for in the Constitution, which they wanted and accepted unanimously in Rome. By 2010 the Council, the Commission and the Member States will be working together more effectively on the EU’s external action. I therefore hope that the reader will make the same mental leap into the medium term. This is the only way in which we can get over the present hurdles and shortcomings. I also hope that no more disasters will be needed in the interim to set our thinking, resources and expertise on the right track.

My mission statement\(^1\) poses the question of what the EU can do to improve its response, especially to major emergencies outside the EU. External emergencies differ in a number of ways from emergencies inside the EU:

- They affect sovereign states, which are free to decide how to respond to an emergency and whether to request assistance from abroad.
- The EU Presidency coordinates the response politically in close cooperation with the United Nations, national and local authorities in the country concerned and non-governmental organisations. We need to find ways to increase the speed and effectiveness of their collective decision-making.
- There are many tools at the EU’s disposal. Naturally, national or regional civil protection resources can be drawn on. At any rate, we have a presence on the ground through humanitarian aid, coordinated at international level by the United Nations and channelled at EU level through ECHO\(^2\). Last but not least, the EU implements reconstruction programmes. We need to work out how best to pool these resources and maximise synergies.
- Such emergencies, often in far-off places, affect more than one country and call for capability projection. This projection of men and resources is currently lacking.
- Lastly, such emergencies call for consular assistance, since EU citizens are naturally more vulnerable when they are far from their country of origin. In 2003 there were more than 30 million trips by Europeans outside Europe. The falling price of air travel will increase this number in the years ahead. In the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 about 200 000 people died and thousands disappeared. In Thailand alone, 2500 foreign tourists, many of them EU citizens, died. At issue is whether the Member States of the EU are willing and able to work together to improve their assistance to citizens in difficulty.

Obviously, if the Member States and the EU institutions take up the proposals outlined in this report and decide to improve our civil protection response considerably, that will apply to emergencies in far-off places as well as to disasters within the territory of the EU. In 1999 Turkey and Greece were hit by earthquakes at the same time. In the more distant past, some 100 000 people were killed by an earthquake and tidal wave

\(^1\) Annex 1 - Mission statement from Mr Barroso and Mr Schüssel.
\(^2\) European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid.
that destroyed the Sicilian city of Messina in 1908. Exactly twenty years ago the Chernobyl disaster, just across the border from the EU, affected the whole of Europe. And the bombings in Madrid and London have shown that a European September 11 is possible.

The need for Europe

Our countries’ citizens need new proof of the EU’s value added. Voters in France and the Netherlands have told us this quite bluntly.

Whether it is the earthquakes or storms of 1999, the wrecks of the Erika and the Prestige off our shores, the floods that hit Central Europe in 2002 and again this year, whether it is the tsunami or the earthquake in Pakistan, Europe is expected to show solidarity: the EU is called on to act and the Member States asked to help.

Obviously, a better EU response to these emergencies reflects a real duty to help as well as responding to the citizens’ political expectations. It has been at the very heart of the European project for fifty years now. Since 1950 Europe’s peoples have shown solidarity towards each other but also towards the other peoples of the world.

It is not by chance that we find this demand for solidarity in two recent initiatives:

- The European Union Solidarity Fund set up in 2002 at the behest of the Prodi Commission in the wake of flooding in Germany, the Czech Republic and Austria can mobilise €1 billion a year for devastated regions of the EU.
- The draft European Constitution, for its part, contains a solidarity clause (Article I-43) for EU Member States. It provides for the EU to mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including military resources, to protect democratic institutions and the civilian population in the event of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster.

The same needs are being expressed and the same proof asked for beyond our continent: international instability, new threats and environmental hazards oblige us to respond. The citizen has consistently asked for this: as recently as December 2005, 77% of EU citizens expressed their backing for a common foreign and security policy and 68% for a common external policy.

Javier Solana has clearly identified the five main threats facing Europe: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organised crime. The governments of each and every Member State have a duty to protect themselves and to respond to these new geopolitical threats. It is also in their interest to do this together.

The Treaties and the risks being what they are, we can and must find the will and the resources to act together more effectively now.

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3 Eurobarometer 64 - December 2005.
But one way or another, sooner or later, we will need the solutions offered by the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, and in particular the following innovations:

1. a *Union Minister for Foreign Affairs* with authority over all services involved in external action (external relations, development assistance and humanitarian aid); a *European External Action Service* will help the Minister fulfil his or her mandate (Article III-296);
2. the *solidarity clause* (Article I-43) referred to above and its implementing procedures (Article III-329);
3. a *European policy on the prevention of natural disasters and on civil protection* (Article III-284);
4. *EU action on humanitarian aid* in the context of the principles and objectives of the EU’s external action (Article III-321);
5. a *public health* policy covering, in particular, the fight against the major health scourges (Article III-278);
6. *enhanced cooperation* (Articles I-44 and III-416 to III-423) making it easier for those Member States that wish to take things further and faster to do so.

**What the EU is already doing**

Since the early 1990s the EU has been able to respond to emergencies.\(^5\) The Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) was set up in 1992. The Commission – like a number of Member States – is already a very active member of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative and of the donor support groups set up by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

In 2001 Margot Wallström, who was Environment Commissioner at the time, proposed a Community Civil Protection Mechanism, which triggers a movement of solidarity in the event of emergencies both inside and outside the EU. Depending on the circumstances, this solidarity currently involves pooling certain resources available in the Member States (transport, equipment, medical teams, etc.). It is designed to respond to the consequences of natural and man-made disasters (industrial and maritime accidents, terrorist attack, etc.).\(^6\)

Lastly, the EU has worked to consolidate its emergency response and provide back-up over time.\(^7\) Preparing reconstruction and stabilising fragile political situations are two key areas of EU action. Just as humanitarian aid and the rapid reaction mechanism\(^8\) have their role to play, so do large-scale reconstruction programmes.

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\(^5\) Council Decision of 23 October 2001 establishing a Community civil protection mechanism.

\(^6\) See pages 40 to 42 of the technical report.

\(^7\) Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism.

\(^8\) Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism.
Moreover, since 2003, at the prompting of Javier Solana and the Council of the European Union, civilian crisis-management operations in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) have been added to this arsenal, helping respond effectively to emergencies with a common foreign and security policy dimension. Twelve such missions are currently under way in, for instance, Bosnia in the Balkans, Rafah in Palestine and Aceh in Indonesia.

Building on and learning from this, I have worked out 12 practical, operational solutions. They address three concerns:

1. making humanitarian aid and civil protection more effective,
2. providing EU citizens with greater protection and assistance,
3. strengthening overall consistency.

Twelve proposals for improving the European Union’s crisis response capability

Our twelve proposals for improving the European Union’s crisis response capability rest on the ideas developed in the second part of the report and on progress in the projects and discussions currently under way in the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Member States.

In general they call for voluntary participation by the Member States and they are spread over a four-year time-frame.
We propose:

1. A European civil protection force: ‘europe aid’
2. Support for the force from the seven outermost regions of the European Union
3. The setting-up of a Civil Security Council and a greater role for the General Affairs and External Relations Council
4. A one-stop shop for the European Union’s humanitarian response
5. An integrated European approach to crisis anticipation
6. Six European Union delegations to specialise in crisis management
7. A clear information system for European Union citizens traveling outside the Union
8. The pooling of consular resources
9. The creation of consular flying squads
10. The setting-up of ‘European consulates’ on an experimental basis in four geographical areas
11. The establishment of a European consular code
12. Laboratories specialising in bioterrorism and victim identification

(...)

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Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), today welcomed the Council decision to extend the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) by three months until 15 September 2006:

‘I welcome today’s Council decision to extend the Aceh Monitoring Mission. I am certain that this extension, which was requested by the Indonesian Government with the full support of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), will contribute to further strengthening confidence and trust between the parties.

Remarkable progress has been achieved in a very short time, but there are still some steps to be taken. With this extension of the Mission, the international community can support the two parties in meeting these challenges. The most important step is the adoption of the Law on the Governing of Aceh by the Indonesian Parliament. This law will pave the way for local elections, a crucial step in the peace process.

The Mission, comprising both EU and ASEAN members, has proven its worth in supporting the parties in implementing the peace agreement signed last August in Helsinki. The time has come for the AMM to be phased out and for the parties and the people of Aceh to assume full ownership of the process of further reconciliation in Aceh. The parties are aware that this extension is the last one.

However, this does not mean that the EU’s involvement will end. It will remain firmly engaged in Aceh through post-tsunami reconstruction assistance and flanking measures to support the peace process.

When I visited Indonesia recently, I was delighted to see that the European Union has made a crucial contribution to peace process through the AMM. I saw that both the Government of Indonesia and GAM remain wholly committed to implementing the peace agreement. We now owe it to the people of Aceh, to our international partners and to ourselves to go the last mile in helping to cement the peace.’
General Affairs and External Relations Council

Luxembourg, 12 June 2006

(AFRICA – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS)

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘Sudan

The EU will work for the full and rapid implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) as a precondition for lasting peace and security in Darfur and an end to the suffering of millions of the people in Darfur. The EU calls on all parties to implement the DPA and states its willingness to take measures against those that impede the peace process. Together with other partners in the international community, the EU will continue to provide planning, technical, financial and equipment support to both the military and police components of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), in order to help it fulfil its mandate as effectively as possible. In doing so, the EU will also take into account the new tasks arising from the DPA, and the need to ensure a smooth transition to a UN led operation in Darfur, in line with the decisions of the Peace and Security Council of the AU of 15 May 2006 and in full cooperation with the Sudanese Government. The EU is ready to respond positively to the requests for support to the implementation of the DPA, including in relation to the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation. Similarly, the EU will continue to be at the front stage by organising in Brussels the forthcoming July 7 conference on AMIS. This conference will be followed by a pledging conference on reconstruction and development of Darfur, to be organised by the Netherlands in September.

The Council calls on the Government of Sudan and all parties in Darfur to remove immediately any existing obstacles to the delivery of aid and to end any obstruction of humanitarian work or of assistance rendered to AMIS.

The Council remains deeply concerned by the risk of destabilisation caused by the Darfur crisis on Chad, on the Central African Republic and by the reports of increasing insecurity in the Darfur refugee camps in Chad. The EU calls on Sudan and Chad to comply fully with the obligations as set out in the Tripoli agreement of 8 February, put an end to any direct or indirect support to rebel groups in the other country, with a view to contribute to secure peace at their common borders.

The Council recalls its support for sanctions against those blocking the peace process as set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005). It reiterates its full
support for the ongoing investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of human rights abuses in Darfur as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) and urges all parties, in particular the Government of Sudan, to fully cooperate with the ICC.

The EU reaffirms its commitment to continue supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, including through its participation in the Assessment and Evaluation Commission. The EU is closely following developments regarding talks between the Sudanese Government and the Eastern Front aimed at resolving existing problems in Eastern Sudan. In all these efforts, the EUSR for Sudan will continue to play an important role in ensuring comprehensive and coherent EU action.

Uganda

The EU stands ready to contribute to put an end to the unacceptable activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in both Northern Uganda and in the sub-region, as well as to assist efforts to improve the humanitarian situation in Northern Uganda. The Council calls on the Ugandan Government to work actively for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Northern Uganda in collaboration with countries in the region. The LRA commanders indicted by the ICC must be apprehended and brought to face justice as a matter of urgency.

Somalia

The EU is deeply concerned regarding recent violence between armed groups in and around Mogadishu. This poses a serious threat to a fragile process of transition towards democratic institutions. The EU welcomes reconciliatory statements from the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), notes the statement from the Union of Islamic Courts and encourages a similar approach from other parties in Mogadishu. It urges all parties to start a dialogue aiming at consolidating reconciliation in Somalia, for the sake of the stability of the country and the safety of its people.

Recalling its commitment to support the development of the capacities of the Somali security sector, the EU urges all parties to observe the arms embargo scrupulously and to avoid further destabilising a country which is already flooded with armaments.

The EU will continue to fully support, in line with the conclusions of the Council of 20 March 2006, all efforts by the Somali TFIs for dialogue, national reconciliation, stable governance and for reconstruction and rehabilitation.
Côte d’Ivoire

The Council calls on the parties to take urgently all the necessary measures for the “concomitant” implementation of the process of disarmament and identification, as prerequisite for the organisation, by the end of October 2006, of free, open, fair and transparent elections. Through its participation in the International Working Group, the EU will continue to support the full implementation of the feuille de route, under the leadership of Prime Minister Konan Banny, and will be ready to push for appropriate measures against those who impede the peace process. At the same time, the EU will be following closely developments in the West African region. The Council recalls the central role of the UN in Côte d’Ivoire.

Democratic Republic of Congo

The EU will continue to assist and help to secure the very extensive process of political transition, in particular through support to the holding of the first democratic elections since more than 40 years. The EU fully supports the electoral calendar by the electoral independent commission and recalls that there is no alternative plan to the holding of elections. The EU has provided substantial funding for the election preparations and is sending an Electoral Observation Mission. It calls upon all political forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to continue pursuing this path of peaceful and democratic change in the run-up of the elections, starting on July 30. The Council calls upon all actors to engage in the electoral campaign in a spirit of peace and reconciliation and it will strongly condemn all discourses which appeal to hatred and xenophobia. The EU will deploy the military operation EUFOR RD Congo, in response to a request from the United Nations, designed to provide support to MONUC in certain situations. This deterrence force, for the duration of the electoral period, will include an advanced element deployed in Kinshasa and a force over the horizon. EUFOR RD Congo will build on EU’s longstanding engagement in the DRC. For the same purpose, the EU’s police mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa) will be reinforced. The EU will continue to support the ongoing Security Sector Reform through its mission EUSEC RDC. All these activities will be carried out in full agreement with the government of the DRC. For the period after the elections, apart from continued support for security sector reform, the EU is prepared to engage in quick impact projects to assist immediate reconstruction and rehabilitation, to be followed by a long-term effort for sustainable development taking into account the principles of good governance and transparency. The ongoing process of securing regional stability through the early holding of the second Summit of the Great Lakes Conference has the full support of the EU.'
The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘As a potential candidate country, Bosnia and Herzegovina participates in the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which is the framework for the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries. BiH is currently negotiating a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. In addition to the activities of the European Commission and bilateral initiatives from EU Member States, the EU has deployed a number of instruments in BiH in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): an EU Special Representative (EUSR), an EU Police Mission (EUPM) and an EU Military Operation (Operation ALTHEA). The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) also continues to be active in BiH. The various EU actors act in coordination with each other, and the results of the comprehensive EU approach in terms of security, political stability and overall socio-economic development have been notable in recent years. The coherent EU policy and a clear European perspective have contributed substantially to the country’s transition from stabilisation towards closer ties with the EU.

The Council has undertaken a comprehensive review of the EU activities in BiH, including by conducting concurrent review processes of Operation ALTHEA and EUPM, which has helped ensure a more complete operational overview and a coherent approach to ESDP actions such as in the support to the fight against organised crime. The Council also welcomed the joint efforts of the SG/HR and the Commission in conducting the comprehensive review and took note of the Commission’s contribution.

Within the framework of the comprehensive review, the Council reviewed Operation ALTHEA and welcomed the positive contribution of the operation to ensuring a safe and secure environment in BiH. The Council approved the SG/HR’s recommendations for Operation ALTHEA and confirmed that EUFOR should maintain current force levels and its current tasks for the coming six months. The Council furthermore noted that cooperation with NATO continues to work well in the context of the Berlin Plus Arrangements. The Council considered that a EUFOR presence would be required beyond the end of 2006.

The Council also reviewed EUPM and welcomed the positive contribution of the Mission to the establishment of developing sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership. The Council recognised the important role of EUPM, in close coordination with the EC, in the area of police reform. The Council approved the SG/HR’s recommendations for EUPM.

The Council welcomed the extensive EU support to BiH authorities in the fight against organised crime. In the broader framework of security sector reform in the Western Balkans, the EU has substantially contributed to the build-up of local capacity.
The Council reconfirmed EUPM’s leading role in the coordination of policing aspects of ESDP efforts in the fight against organised crime in BiH. The Council also welcomed the increased cooperation between the EUSR, EUFOR and EUPM in this regard.”

(...)

POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. ‘Council welcomes the release of the European Commission Communication “A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform”. This concept complements the Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform, adopted in November 2005. Together the two concepts constitute a policy framework for EU engagement in Security Sector Reform (SSR), stressing the importance for the EU to take a comprehensive and cross-pillar approach to SSR recognising the fact that SSR is a holistic, multi-sector, and long-term process encompassing the overall functioning of the security system as part of governance reforms.

2. This EU policy framework for SSR is an important contribution to EU’s external action. Preventing and resolving violent conflict and addressing fragile states are part of the EU’s efforts to reduce insecurity and eradicate poverty through strengthening good governance and the rule of law in third countries; finding solutions to existing problems; thus helping to achieve the commitments of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals, sustainable development and global security and to implement “the EU’s Development Policy Statement” The European Consensus on Development”, including the security objectives of the EU as set out in the European Security Strategy.

3. The EU action on SSR should be based on the following principles, drawing on the OECD-DAC definition on SSR:
   - nationally/regionally owned participatory reform processes designed to strengthen good governance, democratic norms, the rule of law and the respect and promotion of human rights, in line with internationally agreed norms;
   - addressing the core requirements of a well functioning security system, including the development of a nationally owned concept of security, well-defined policies and good governance of security institutions;
   - addressing diverse security challenges facing States and their populations, based on a gender-sensitive multi-sector approach to the provision of security and access to jus-
EU security and defence 2006

... and targeting reform needs in different key sectors. This includes separating tasks between different services and institutions and taking into account the role of civil society and other non-State structures of governance;

- accountability and transparency standards should be the same that apply across the public sector, in particular improved governance through greater civilian and parliamentary oversight of security processes;

- political dialogue with each partner country, addressing human rights, development and security concerns, and be carried out in synergy with other instruments.

4. The EU has a broad range of civilian and military instruments which are able to support SSR activities. A case-by-case analysis based on a situation-specific approach is always needed to assess whether any proposed activities are most appropriately carried out through ESDP or Community action or a combination of both with the objective of ensuring effective and coherent EU external action in this area. The Council and the Commission will ensure consistency between their activities in accordance with Article 3 of the TEU.

5. The Council agrees to take forward work during the Finnish Presidency with the Commission to develop an EU approach to contribute to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) as part of broader SSR support and consistent with the EU policy framework for SSR.

6. The Council invites future Presidencies and the Commission to progressively translate this policy framework for EU engagement in SSR into operational actions by the European Community and in the framework of ESDP, in order to provide effective, coherent and sustainable support to EU partner countries and regions.

(...)

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

DR Congo – EU military operation in support of MONUC during the election process

The Council adopted a Decision on the launching of an EU military operation in support of the United Nations Mission (MONUC) during the election process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Operation EUFOR RD Congo).

Under the Decision, the EU military operation is launched on 12 June 2006. It authorises the EU operation commander, with immediate effect, to release the activation order in order to execute the deployment of the forces, and start execution of the mission.
On 25 April 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1671(2006), authorising the temporary deployment of an EU force to support MONUC during the period encompassing the elections in the DR Congo.

**Gabon – Agreement on the deployment of EUFOR RD Congo**

The Council adopted a Decision approving the conclusion of an Agreement with Gabon on the status of the EU-led forces in the Gabonese Republic, with a view to facilitating the swift deployment of EUFOR RD Congo (10256/06).

**Iraq – EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission**


The new Joint Action extends the mandate of the mission for a period of 4 months until 31 October 2006 (Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP expires on 30 June 2006), as the first phase of an 18-month extension agreed by the Council.

EUJUST LEX is designed to address the urgent needs in the Iraqi criminal justice system by providing training in management and criminal investigation to be given to senior officials and executive staff in the judiciary, police and penitentiary. The operational phase of the mission started on 1 July 2005.

**ESDP Training Report 2006**

The Council took note of a report on ESDP-related activities in 2006 and approved its conclusions (10188/06).

The report evaluates activities conducted by the various training actors during the period May 2005 to April 2006 and assesses to what extent identified training requirements in the field of ESDP have been met. It identifies future training needs and requirements which will need to be taken into account in the next review of training requirements, and analyses the overall training management process with a view to its improvement.

**EU exercise programme for the period 2007 – 2011**

The Council approved a draft EU exercise programme for the period 2007 – 2011. It cancelled exercise specifications for the EU’s crisis management exercise 2006 (CME 06) and

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1 The European Security and Defence College, the European Police College, the Community Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, the European Diplomatic Programme, and the Member States / acceding States with their national institutes, colleges, academies.
agreed that an exercise study (EST 06) will be conducted instead as a case-study in the second half of 2006, focusing on the accelerated decision-making process in the context of an EU rapid response operation.

**EU military exercise MILEX 07/CPX**

The Council approved draft exercise specifications for the EU military exercise MILEX 07/CPX, which will focus on the interaction between the EU operations centre and an EU force headquarters.

The EU will conduct this exercise from 7 to 15 June 2007 in the framework of the EU exercise programme approved by the Council in June 2005.

**Presidency six-monthly report on ESDP**

The Council approved a Presidency report on European Security and Defence Policy with a view to its submission to the European Council on 15 and 16 June 2006. The report covers all ESDP issues that have been discussed in the first half of this year and includes terms of reference for the incoming Finnish Presidency.

(...
IRAQ – EUJUST LEX – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 12 June 2006

EUJUST LEX mission, which started on 1 July 2005, was designed to address the urgent needs in the Iraqi criminal justice system through providing training in the fields of management and criminal investigation to be given to senior officials and executive staff from the judiciary, the police and the penitentiary. This mission was extended until 31 October 2006.

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION AMENDING AND EXTENDING JOINT ACTION 2005/190/CFSP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATED RULE OF LAW MISSION FOR IRAQ, EUJUST LEX

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 and the third subparagraph of Article 25 thereof,

Whereas:


(2) On 18 July 2005, the Council welcomed the launch of EUJUST LEX and the Commission’s commitment to begin preparations on complementary work in this field. Noting the needs set out by Iraq, particularly in the rule of law and human rights sectors, the Council invited relevant Council bodies to consider what further follow-up action the EU could take to help Iraq address these needs.

(3) On 7 November 2005, the Council commended the work of EUJUST LEX and noted the Iraqi Transitional Government’s request to extend the mission beyond the end of its current mandate and to expand the scope of the training provided. The Council reiterated its support for the Commission’s preparations to undertake complementary work in this field.

(4) At its meeting on 15 and 16 December 2005, the European Council reiterated its commitment to supporting Iraq’s reconstruction, including through EUJUST LEX.

(5) On 15 May 2006, the Council declared its preparedness to extend the activities of EUJUST LEX beyond its current mandate, in response to Iraqi needs and requests.

(6) On 12 June 2006, following a review of the mission by the Secretary General/High Representative, the Council agreed to extend EUJUST LEX for another 18 months after the expiration of the current mandate, until 31 December 2007. This Joint Action should cover the first phase of this extension until 31 October 2006.

(7) Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP should be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

Article 1

Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. Article 5(3) shall be replaced by the following:
   ‘3. EUJUST LEX shall develop all technical instruments necessary for its execution. The Head of Mission shall elaborate amendments to the OPLAN in accordance with the amended CONOPS, such amendments taking into account a comprehensive risk assessment.’

2. Article 11(3) shall be replaced by the following:
   ‘3. Given the particular security situation in Iraq, services in Baghdad shall be provided through the contracts entered into by the United Kingdom with the companies providing and invoicing for these services. The budget of EUJUST LEX shall cover these expenses up to a maximum of EUR 2 500 000. The United Kingdom shall, in consultation with the Head of Mission, report with adequate information to the Council on these expenses.’

3. The second subparagraph of Article 14 shall be replaced by the following:
   ‘It shall expire on 31 October 2006.’

4. The Annex shall be deleted.

Article 2

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
Article 3

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 12 June 2006.

*For the Council*

*The President*

U. Plassnik
June 2006

BACKGROUND ON EU RULE-OF-LAW MISSION FOR IRAQ

- In July 2005, the EU launched an integrated rule-of-law mission for Iraq – ‘EUJUST LEX’ following a decision by the EU Council on 21 February 2005. The mission falls under the scope of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
- The mission consists of integrated training in the fields of management and criminal investigation for senior officials from the judiciary, the police and the penitentiary in order to promote an integrated criminal-justice system in Iraq.
- The Mission is meeting its training objectives beyond expectations: almost 700 judges, investigating magistrates, senior police and penitentiary officers in senior management and investigating magistrates and senior police in criminal investigation have already participated in integrated training courses in 10 Member States. Training is carried out on the basis of a common curriculum.
- Training activities take place in the EU and the mission has a liaison office in Baghdad. Depending on developments in the security conditions in Iraq and on the availability of appropriate infrastructure, the Council will be called upon to examine the possibility of training within Iraq. The arrangements for this mission, which complements the international efforts under way, are determined in consultation with the Iraqi authorities. A coordination element is active in Brussels.
- On 12 June, welcoming the progress of the mission, the Council agreed to extend EUJUST LEX for a further period of 18 months, in response to Iraqi needs and requests and adopted a joint action covering the first four months of this extension. There will be additional learning activities and also work-experience secondments in the EU Member States. Mr Stephen White was appointed Head of the EUJUST LEX mission on 8 March 2005 and on 13 June 2006 his mandate was extended until the end of the Mission.
- An amount of 10 million euros from the EU budget is intended to cover the common costs of the mission (until 31 October 2006). In addition, Member States contribute training courses and trainers.
- The EU started planning the operation following consultations with the Iraqi interim authorities and on the basis of a report by a team of experts, as part of the implementation of the EU programme of action for Iraq presented in November 2004. Following the 21 February 2005 decision by Council to launch the mission, and after the subsequent planning phase, the operational phase of the mission started in July 2005.
COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2006/418/CFSP ON SUPPORT FOR IAEA ACTIVITIES IN THE AREAS OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND VERIFICATION AND IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU STRATEGY AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chapter III of which contains a list of measures to combat such proliferation and which need to be taken both within the EU and in third countries.

(2) The EU is actively implementing this Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

(3) On 17 November 2003 the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP(1) on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery. That Common Position calls, inter alia, for the promotion of the conclusion of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols and commits the European Union to work towards making the Additional Protocol and comprehensive safeguards agreements the standard for the IAEA verification system.

(4) On 17 May 2004, the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP(2) on support for IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Programme and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

(1) OJ L 302, 20.11.2003, p. 34.
On 18 July 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

As far as the EU is concerned, the Council adopted on 22 December 2003 Directive 2003/122/Euratom on the control of high activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources, the strengthening of the control of high activity radioactive sources in all third countries, in accordance with the G-8 statement and Action Plan on securing radioactive sources, remains an important objective to be pursued.

In July 2005, States Parties and the European Atomic Energy Community agreed by consensus to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) with a view to expanding the scope to encompass nuclear material and facilities in peaceful domestic use and storage, as well as in transport, and will oblige States Parties to put violations under criminal sanctions.

In September 2005, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention) was opened for signature. Once entered into force, it will require States Parties to enact legislation to criminalise these offences.

The IAEA pursues the same objectives as set out in Recitals (3) to (8). This is done through the implementation of its Nuclear Security Plan which is financed through voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

Article 1

1. For the purposes of giving immediate and practical implementation to some elements of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU shall support the IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification in order to further the following objectives:
   - to work towards the universalisation of international nonproliferation and nuclear security instruments, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol,

(3) OJ L 193, 23.7.2005, p. 44.
to enhance the protection of proliferation-sensitive materials and equipment and the relevant technology, provide legislative and regulatory assistance in the area of nuclear security and safeguards,

- to strengthen the detection of and response to illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radio-active materials.

2. The projects of the IAEA, corresponding to measures of the EU Strategy, are the projects which aim at:
   - strengthening national legislative and regulatory infrastructures for the implementation of relevant international instruments in the areas of nuclear security and verification, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol,
   - assisting States in strengthening the security and control of nuclear and other radio-active materials,
   - strengthening States’ capabilities for detection and response to illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radio-active materials.

These projects will be carried out in countries needing assistance in these areas after an initial assessment carried out by an expert team.

A detailed description of the projects is set out in the Annex.

Article 2

1. The Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR), shall be responsible for the implementation of this Joint Action. The Commission shall be fully associated to this task.

2. The Commission shall supervise the proper implementation of the financial contribution referred to in Article 3.

3. The technical implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be entrusted to the IAEA, which shall perform its tasks under the responsibility of the Presidency and under the control of the SG/HR. For this purpose, the SG/HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the IAEA.

4. The choice of the beneficiaries and actions shall be made, on the basis of the initial assessment referred to in Article 1(2), by the implementing entity. Member States and the Commission will be consulted in the framework of the competent Council working group.
**Article 3**

1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 6 995 000.

2. The management of the expenditure financed by the general budget of the European Union specified in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the procedures and rules of the Community applying to budget matters with the proviso that any pre-financing shall not remain the property of the Community.

3. For the purpose of implementing the expenditure referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission shall conclude a specific financing agreement with the IAEA in accordance with the Regulations and Rules of the IAEA. It shall stipulate that the IAEA shall ensure visibility of the EU contribution, appropriate to its size.

**Article 4**

The Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR, shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Joint Action on the basis of regular reports prepared by the IAEA. The Commission shall be fully associated and shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2).

**Article 5**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

It shall expire on 12 September 2007.

**Article 6**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 12 June 2006.

*For the Council*

*The President*

U. Plassnik
ANNEX

EU support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation and Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. DESCRIPTION

The international community has recognized, notably in the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Global Directions for the Future, held in London in March 2005, that the risk of successful acts of nuclear terrorism remains high. The international community has reacted strongly and taken several initiatives aimed at preventing nuclear or other radioactive material from falling into the hands of criminals and terrorists.

Meanwhile, IAEA verification remains an indispensable tool for building confidence among States with regard to nuclear non-proliferation undertakings, and for advancing the peaceful use of nuclear material.

Recent international developments have resulted in a new and strengthened set of international legal instruments that are relevant for nuclear security and verification. In July 2005, States Parties adopted the Amendment to the CPPNM; the Nuclear Terrorism Convention was opened for signature in September 2005; and in April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 dealing with Weapons of Mass Destruction and non-State actors. UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001 calls for all States to become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

As of to date, over 80 States have made a political commitment to implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources\(^1\). In addition, in 2005 the General Conference and Board of Governors of the IAEA have adopted several resolutions and decisions to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system\(^2\).

States’ implementation of these international instruments may be significantly facilitated, in part, by assistance provided through the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009, which was approved by the Board of Governors of the IAEA in September 2005\(^3\). This is a continuation to the 2003-2005 Plan of Activities to protect against nuclear ter-


\(^2\) In September 2005, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decided that in order to strengthen the safeguards system, the so-called ‘small quantities protocol’ (SQP) to NPT safeguards agreements should remain part of the Agency’s safeguards system, subject to modifications in the standard text and the change in the SQP criteria; the 2005 IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution in which it noted, inter alia, that, in the case of a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement supplemented by an Additional Protocol in force, these measures represent the enhanced verification standard for that State.

\(^3\) GOV/2005/50-GC(49)/17.
rorism(4). The new Nuclear Security Plan includes three activity areas: (1) Needs assessment, analysis and coordination, (2) Prevention, and (3) Detection and response. It also includes a part referred to as ‘Activities Supporting Nuclear Security’, which comprises activities originally identified for their safety and safeguards objectives but which are also recognized for their important contributions to nuclear security.

International Safeguards, as implemented by the IAEA, represent key means of verifying the compliance by States with their specific non-proliferation commitments and obligations. It is of utmost importance that the required national legislation for the implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and, if applicable, an Additional Protocol, is in place(5). The implementation requires that each State party to such agreements maintain an effective State System for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors requested that the IAEA Secretariat assist States for which comprehensive safeguards agreements had small quantities protocols attached, including non-members of the Agency, through available resources, in the establishment and maintenance of such SSACs.

The Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009 pursues the similar objectives to some elements of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. These provide a comprehensive approach to nuclear security including the regulatory controls, accountability and protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials in use, storage and transport, ‘from cradle to grave’, in the short term as well as in the long term. However, should the protection fail, backup measures must be established to detect theft or attempts to smuggle the material across international borders and to respond to malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive materials, should they occur.

The IAEA is in the process of completing the implementation of Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP, and is implementing Council Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP. With the associated contributions of the EU, the IAEA has initiated major activities to support efforts of the recipient States in Caucasus, Central Asia, South-eastern Europe and Balkan regions, and Northern Africa and the Mediterranean region in Middle East, to strengthen the nuclear security and the implementation of international safeguards in these countries.

Support for these efforts continues to be in high demand in IAEA Member States as well as in States that are not members of the IAEA. Countries eligible to receive support are:

- in South-eastern Europe: Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of Moldova, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
- in the Central Asia region: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan,
- in the Caucasus region: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,

(4) GOV/2002/10.
(5) See the Agency’s Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, as published by the IAEA.
in the Mediterranean region in the Middle East: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syrian Arab Republic, and

in Africa\(^1\): Altogether up to 20-25 countries in Africa are foreseen to receive support for nuclear security upgrades under different projects. Additional countries may be involved in regional training events.

The final selection of those African countries to receive support will be made on the basis of the needs evaluation phase, which will comprise assessment missions and evaluation of already existing information in headquarters. The support activities for each project will be focused on those countries in the region that have major activities in each project area:

- physical protection upgrades are foreseen in four to six of the eight countries in the region that have nuclear reactors; strengthening the security of radioactive sources is foreseen in five to seven of the 10 countries that have most vulnerable sources in use and in storage;
- provision of support to upgrade the capability to detect illicit trafficking in nuclear or other radioactive materials is foreseen in five to six countries which, on the basis of the information available to the IAEA, pose the highest risk of illicit trafficking, taking into account the existence nuclear material and of radioactive sources in the country and its neighbouring countries;
- provision of appraisal service and support regarding the radiation safety and security of radioactive sources regulatory infrastructure is foreseen in 12 countries where the regulatory infrastructure improvements are deemed to be in most need. Provision of legislative support is foreseen in six countries;
- training would be offered on a regional basis for as many participants as possible in Africa, subject to the funds available.

Initially, needs for improved nuclear security will be evaluated in the countries identified in the EU Joint Action in order to identify priorities for support. For that purpose, a team of recognised experts will evaluate the present status of nuclear security system already in place in these countries and give recommendations on improvements. The recommendations will constitute a platform for the definition of subsequent assistance, covering present status and need for improvement as regards prevention, detection of and response to malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive materials, including those in non-nuclear use, and of nuclear facilities. Priorities will be set in identifying the countries for each project that would be covered by the budget made available through EU support. The development of human resources will be implemented as part

\(^1\) Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
of the established training programme of the IAEA, which, to a large extent, is based on a regional approach. The participation of experts from as many eligible countries as possible will be supported, subject to available financial resources.

Subsequently, projects will be implemented in the selected countries in three fields:

1. Legislative and Regulatory Assistance

The legal foundation for nuclear security comprises, in large part, international instruments and recognized principles (treaties, conventions, agreements, norms, IAEA standards, codes of conduct and guidance documents, and recommendations) that are implemented by national authorities to control nuclear material and other radioactive sources. This broad range of norms (many developed under IAEA auspices) provides a framework for using nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their related facilities safely and securely – both those with large nuclear programmes and those conducting only limited nuclear activities.

The existence of proper national legislation, and regulatory control infrastructure, is a precondition for a successful nuclear security regime. National implementing legislation should provide a framework of principles and general provisions that enables authorised governmental entities to exercise the necessary regulatory functions and that regulates the conduct of any person engaged in regulated activities. In many States such legislation is inadequate and the regulatory infrastructure is not in existence or is inadequate. Such gaps, combined with inefficient regulatory control infrastructures result in a weakness of the global security regime. The aim should therefore be to strengthen or establish adequate national legislative and regulatory frameworks, and the effective application of relevant measures.

Radioactive materials are often used in non-nuclear applications, e.g. in medical or industrial use. Some of these sources are highly radioactive, and belong to categories 1 to 3, as defined in the IAEA document ‘Categorisation of Radioactive Sources’. These sources, if not adequately under regulatory control and protected, may come into the wrong hands and be used in malicious activities. The regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of radioactive sources must be effective and must function adequately in accordance with the international standards, the guidelines of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the associated import/export guidance, and the best practices.

The conclusion of safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols with the IAEA is an effective measure that promotes stringent national and international control over nuclear material and related technologies. It is important that national implementing legislation clearly identify the nuclear activities, installations, facilities and material to which safeguards will be applied. In addition, States that have concluded an Additional Protocol need to ensure that their national implementing legislation has been enhanced to enable the State concerned to comply with the additional obli-
gations under the Additional Protocol. In particular, the State’s domestic legislation should be revised to expand the responsibilities and powers of the regulatory body, designated for the purposes of implementing and applying the safeguards agreements concluded.

States also accept obligations to meet international norms related to nuclear security, when becoming parties to the CPPNM, by ratifying the Amendment to the CPPNM, and when becoming a party to the Nuclear Terrorism Convention. In addition, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) also obliges all States to establish domestic controls including the establishment of appropriate controls over materials related to nuclear weapons. States' undertakings included in the aforementioned international instruments in the field of nuclear security have resulted in a juxtaposition of commitments related to the security of nuclear material and facilities and other radioactive sources. These commitments include measures for the establishment of a regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of radioactive sources; accountancy and control measures; physical protection measures; import and export controls and the criminalisation of unlawful acts.

2. Strengthening the Security and Control of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

The materials used or stored at nuclear facilities and locations must be adequately accounted for and protected in order to prevent theft or sabotage. An effective regulatory system should identify those elements requiring implementation at the level of the State and of the operator respectively.

It is also of vital importance that powerful and vulnerable sources in non-nuclear applications are physically protected against malicious acts when used or stored, and when no longer required, they should be dismantled and stored, or disposed of as radioactive waste, in a safe and secure location.

All States with comprehensive safeguards agreements are required to establish and maintain SSACs subject to safeguards. However, IAEA estimates that such systems are lacking or inadequate in many IAEA Member States that are party to such agreements. This situation is particularly widespread among the 120 States or so that do not operate any nuclear facilities.

3. Strengthening of States’ Capabilities for Detection and Response to Illicit Trafficking

Illicit trafficking relates to the unauthorised receipt, provision, use, transfer or disposal of nuclear material and other radioactive materials, whether intentional or unintentional and with or without crossing international borders.

A terrorist-made, crude nuclear explosive device or a radiological dispersal device cannot be constructed without the material having been acquired as a result of illicit trafficking. In addition, sensitive equipment and technology to produce sensitive material
for or to construct a crude nuclear explosive device may also have been acquired via illicit trafficking. It may be assumed that cross-border movement of material or technology is necessary for the material to reach its end destination. To combat illicit trafficking, States thus require the necessary regulatory systems to be in place, as well as technical systems (including user-friendly instruments) and available procedures and information at the border stations for detecting attempts at smuggling radioactive materials (including fissile, radioactive materials), or unauthorised trade with sensitive equipment and technology.

Effective measures must also be in place to respond to such acts and also to seizures of any radioactive materials. Law enforcement staff (customs, police, etc.) is frequently not trained in the use of detection equipment, and thus the sensitive equipment and technology may be unfamiliar. Training of these officers is therefore critical to the success of any measures put in place for detection of illicit trafficking. Different training should be offered to staff of different categories, both in using detection instruments and in understanding the reading of the instrument, to be able to decide on follow-up activities.

Support in this area is in great demand as a result of increased awareness of the threat involved and of the availability of equipment and methodology for improved border-monitoring capability.

2. OBJECTIVES

Overall objective: To strengthen nuclear security in selected countries.


Evaluation will be carried out by the IAEA to identify needs to strengthen the nuclear security in the countries concerned, in which such evaluation has not yet been completed. For the other identified countries, the evaluation carried out earlier will be updated. The evaluation will cover, as appropriate, physical protection and security of nuclear and non-nuclear applications, established measures to combat illicit trafficking as well as the necessary legal and regulatory infrastructure. The results of the overall evaluation will be used as a basis in selecting the countries in which the projects will be implemented.

The projects outlined above will:
- evaluate, in each country, the status of physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials, and the protection of any nuclear or research installation or location in which these materials are used or stored. Identify a subset of facilities and locations containing these materials to be selected for subsequent upgrading and support;
evaluate, in each country, any needs with respect to the upgrading of the security of radioactive sources. Identify any weaknesses and shortcomings against international standards and the Code of Conduct requiring improvement of regulatory infrastructure, and identify the need to provide additional protection of powerful, vulnerable sources. The specific equipment needed to provide protection would also be determined as a result of the evaluation;

evaluate, in each country, the current status of the capability to combat illicit trafficking and identify needs for the required improvements;

evaluate, in each country, the status of the SSAC and identify needs for the required improvements.

2.2. Implementation of specific actions defined as priorities as a result of the evaluation phase

Project 1:

Legislative and Regulatory Assistance.

Project purpose:

- to strengthen national legislative and regulatory infrastructures related to nuclear and other radioactive material taking into account relevant international instruments and recognised principles in the nuclear security field and existing synergies with national systems of radiation safety;
- to strengthen national legislative frameworks for the implementation of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols concluded between States and the Agency;
- to strengthen the national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of radioactive sources.

Project results:

- development and adoption of comprehensive, coherent and effective legislation at the national level, thereby contributing to a harmonised, strengthened and more universal system of nuclear security;
- development and adoption (in national languages) of national legislation necessary to enable States to comply with their obligations under Agency Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols;
- establishment/upgrading of the national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and security of radioactive sources through the provision of the Radiation Safety, and Security of Radioactive Sources Infrastructure Appraisal (RaSSIA), advisory services, equipment and training, in accordance with the international standards, the guidelines of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the best practices.
Project 2:

Strengthening the Security and Control of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials

Project purpose:
- to strengthen physical protection of nuclear facilities and of nuclear and other radioactive materials in nuclear applications in the selected countries;
- to strengthen the control and physical protection of radioactive materials in non-nuclear applications in the selected countries and
- to strengthen SSACs for the implementation of safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols, including in States with ‘small quantities protocols’.

Project results:
- physical protection of nuclear materials and other radioactive materials at selected nuclear facilities and locations upgraded;
- vulnerable sources in non-nuclear applications protected or, as appropriate, dismantled and transferred to a safe and secure storage in the selected countries;
- national regulatory infrastructure for physical protection improved through expert assistance;
- establishment and maintenance of effective SSACs capable of implementing safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols, including in States with ‘small quantities protocols’;
- staff training provided in the countries eligible to receive support.

Project 3:

Strengthening of States’ Capabilities for Detection and Response to Illicit Trafficking

Project purpose:
- to strengthen the States’ capacities for detection of and response to illicit trafficking in the selected countries.

Project results:
- enhanced information collected and evaluated on illicit nuclear trafficking, from open sources and from States’ Points of Contact, to improve the knowledge about and circumstances of illicit nuclear trafficking. This information will also facilitate the prioritisation of the various activities undertaken to combat illicit trafficking;
- national frameworks established through expert assistance, to combat illicit trafficking and to improve the national coordination of control cross-border movements of radioactive materials, sensitive nuclear equipment and technology in the selected countries;
border monitoring equipment upgraded at selected border crossings;
training provided for law enforcement staff in countries eligible to receive support.

3. DURATION

The evaluation will be performed within a period of three months after entering into
force of the Contribution Agreement between the Commission and the IAEA. The three
projects will be performed in parallel during the 12 subsequent months.

The total estimated duration for the implementation of this Joint Action is 15
months.

4. BENEFICIARIES

The beneficiaries are the countries where the assessment and the subsequent projects
will be implemented. Their authorities will be helped to understand where there are
weak points and receive support to bring solution and increase security. The criteria
for identifying the countries for the projects, the final choice of the beneficiaries and
the needs to be addressed in the selected countries shall be made in consultation
between the implementing entity and the Presidency, assisted by the SG/HR in close
consultation with Member States and the Commission in the framework of the com-
petent Council working group. These decisions shall be based, where appropriate, on
proposals made by the implementing entity in accordance with Article 2(1) of this
Joint Action.

5. IMPLEMENTING ENTITY

The IAEA will be entrusted with the implementation of the projects. The international
nuclear security missions will be performed following the standard mode of operation
for missions of the IAEA, which will be carried out by IAEA and Member States’ experts.
The implementation of the three projects will be done directly by the IAEA staff, IAEA
Member States-selected experts or contractors. In case of contractors, the procurement
of any goods, works or services by the IAEA in the context of this Joint Action shall be
carried out in accordance with the applicable rules and procedures of the IAEA, as
detailed in the European Community Contribution Agreement with the IAEA.

6. THIRD PARTY PARTICIPANTS

The projects will be financed 100 % by this Joint Action. Experts of IAEA Member States
may be considered as third party participants. They will work under the standard rules of
operation for IAEA experts.
7. SPECIFIC CONDITIONS FOR CONTRACTING AND PROCUREMENT

In some cases, to improve the security arrangements for nuclear and other radioactive materials, e.g. radioactive sources, originally supplied by the Russian Federation, contracts for procurement of goods, works and services could be offered to providers in the Russian Federation, which are familiar with the Russian technology.

8. ESTIMATED REQUIRED MEANS

The EU contribution will cover the evaluation and the implementation of the three projects as described in point 2.2. The estimated costs are as follows:

- Nuclear security evaluation, including missions: EUR 140 000
- Project 1: EUR 1 200 000
- Project 2: EUR 3 070 000
- Project 3: EUR 2 385 000

In addition, a contingency reserve of about 3% of eligible costs (for a total amount of EUR 200 000) is included for unforeseen costs.

9. FINANCIAL REFERENCE AMOUNT TO COVER THE COST OF THE PROJECT

The total cost of the project is EUR 6 995 000.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) On 12 December 2003 the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chapter III of which contains a list of measures to combat such proliferation which need to be taken both within the EU and in third countries.

(2) The EU is actively implementing this Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, providing technical assistance and expertise to States in need of a wide range of nonproliferation measures and fostering the role of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

(3) On 28 April 2004 the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1540, which is the first international instrument that deals with Weapons of Mass Destruction, their means of delivery and related materials in an integrated and comprehensive manner. It establishes binding obligations for all States aimed at preventing and deterring non-State actors from accessing such weapons and weapon-related material.

(4) UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) called upon States to present a report to the Committee of the Security Council established by UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) (hereafter 1540 Committee) on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement the Resolution. Consequently, on 28 October 2004 the Presidency submitted, on behalf of the EU, the European Union Report on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004), while the EU Member States submitted their reports individually.

(5) The EU has carried out démarches to third States to promote the submission of national reports under UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004). Preparation of the national reports requires considerable effort and technical knowledge on behalf of these States. Therefore technical assistance and an exchange of experience gained from the process of drafting national reports and from the adoption of measures to implement UNSC
Resolution 1540 (2004) can directly contribute to increased compliance with the reporting obligation under the Resolution and to its actual implementation.

(6) On 27 April 2006 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1673 (2006), which extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee for a period of two years, and decided that the Committee should intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) through a work programme, outreach, assistance and cooperation. It also invited the 1540 Committee to explore with States and international, regional and sub-regional organisations the possibility of sharing experience and lessons learned, and the availability of programmes which might facilitate the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004).

(7) The 1540 Committee’s report recommended that the regional and sub-regional outreach activities be widened and intensified with a view to providing States, in a structured manner, with guidance for implementing the obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), taking into account the fact that 62 States have yet to submit their first national report and that 55 States which have submitted their first national report have yet to submit additional information and clarification requested by the 1540 Committee.

(8) The 1540 Committee’s report also concluded that apart from the non-submitting States, 32 States requested assistance in their national reports for implementing UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004).

(9) On 9 June 2004 the Security Council assigned to the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (UN Secretariat) the task of providing substantive and logistical support to the 1540 Committee and its experts.

(10) The Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement, concluded between the European Community, on the one hand, and the UN, on the other hand, sets out a framework for the UN and the European Community in order to enhance their cooperation, including programmatic partnership. This Framework Agreement is to be implemented by the contribution-specific agreement, as specified in this Joint Action.

(11) The Commission is entrusted with supervising the proper implementation of the EU financial contribution,
HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

**Article 1**

1. In line with the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which sets the objective of fostering the role of the UN Security Council and of enhancing its expertise in meeting the challenges of proliferation, the EU shall support the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004).

2. The projects in support of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004), corresponding to measures of the EU Strategy, aim at:
   - raising awareness of the requirements related to UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and the importance of this international non-proliferation instrument,
   - contributing to strengthening third States’ national administration capacities in three regions (Asia-Pacific, Africa and Latin America-Caribbean) in drafting national reports on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004).

   A detailed description of the projects is set out in the Annex.

**Article 2**

1. The Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for the CFSP, shall be responsible for implementing this Joint Action. The Commission shall be fully associated.

2. The Commission shall supervise the proper implementation of the financial contribution referred to in Article 3.

3. The technical implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be entrusted to the UN Secretariat (Department for Disarmament Affairs) (hereafter UN Secretariat (DDA)). In this capacity, it shall perform this task under the responsibility of the Presidency and under the control of the SG/HR. For this purpose, the SG/HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the UN Secretariat (DDA).

**Article 3**

1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 195 000.

2. The management of the expenditure financed by the general budget of the European Union specified in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the procedures and rules of
the Community applying to budget matters with the proviso that any pre-financing does not remain the property of the Community.

3. For the purpose of implementing the expenditure referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission shall conclude a contribution-specific agreement with the UN Secretariat (DDA) in accordance with the Regulations and Rules of the Organisation. It shall stipulate that the UN Secretariat (DDA) is to ensure visibility of the EU contribution, appropriate to its size.

Article 4

The Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council/ High Representative for the CFSP, shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Joint Action on the basis of regular reports prepared by the UN Secretariat (DDA). The Commission shall be fully associated and shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2).

Article 5

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

It shall expire on 12 June 2008.

Article 6

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 12 June 2006.

*For the Council*

*The President*

U. Plassnik
ANNEX – EU SUPPORT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 (2004)

1. Description

On 28 April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 (2004) as the first international instrument that deals with Weapons of Mass Destruction, their means of delivery and related materials in an integrated and comprehensive manner. All EU Member States were strongly in favour of this non-proliferation instrument. The Resolution provided for the establishment of the Committee of the Security Council which was entrusted with reporting to the Security Council on the implementation of the Resolution drawing from national reports. The national reports should cover the steps the States have taken or intend to take to implement the Resolution.

The EU has carried out démarches to third States to promote the submission of national reports under UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004). That Resolution recognises that some States may require assistance in implementing its provisions. Therefore technical assistance and exchange of experience gained from the process of drafting national reports and adopting measures to implement UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) can directly contribute to increased compliance with the reporting obligation under the Resolution and to its actual implementation.

On 27 April 2006 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution 1673 (2006), which decided that the 1540 Committee should intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) including through outreach, assistance and cooperation. In its April 2006 report, the 1540 Committee concluded that since 62 States which have yet to submit their first national report and 55 States which, although they have done so, still have to submit additional information and clarification are concentrated in three geographical areas (Africa, the Caribbean and the South Pacific), and since the gaps in the national reports follow certain regional patterns, activities to assist States in meeting implementation requirements of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) should concentrate on regions and areas where specific needs were identified.

2. Project description

The projects in support of the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) aim at addressing three aspects of the implementation - awareness-raising of requirements and obligations under the Resolution, contributing to strengthening national capacities in three target regions (Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, Asia-Pacific) in drafting national reports on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and sharing experience from the adoption of national measures required for the implementation of the Resolution.
The projects should take into account the conclusions and recommendations of the Report of the Committee of the Security Council established pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004), particularly with regard to regional needs and gaps in the implementation of the Resolution as well as the need of some States for technical assistance, as applicable. The official declaration of interest for hosting the outreach activity in one of the target regions in the Committee of the Security Council shall be considered as the pre-condition for the EU support.

**Project covering Asia-Pacific**

The project consists primarily of organising an outreach activity, in the form of a seminar, which will raise awareness of the obligations under UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and contribute to strengthening national capacities to implement the Resolution in targeted States. The seminar may result in identifying assistance needs, which may be further addressed by future EU initiatives in the area of technical assistance. Within the beneficiary States, focus should be given to policymaking level participants. The agenda of the outreach activity should reflect the regional particularities in the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and should respect the overall objectives of the Joint Action.

China has indicated in the Committee of the Security Council an interest in hosting, still in the first half of 2006, a regional seminar on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) with special focus on export controls.

**Project covering Africa**

The project consists primarily of organising an outreach activity, in the form of a seminar, which will raise awareness of the obligations under UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and contribute to strengthening national capacities to implement the Resolution in targeted States. The seminar may result in identifying assistance needs, which may be further addressed by future EU initiatives in the area of technical assistance. Within the beneficiary States, the focus should be on policymaking level participants. The agenda of the outreach activity should reflect the regional particularities in the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and should respect the overall objectives of the Joint Action.

Ghana has considered positively a request in the Committee of the Security Council to host a regional seminar on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004), by the end of 2006 at the earliest.

**Project covering Latin America and Caribbean**

The project consists primarily of organising an outreach activity, in the form of a seminar, which will raise awareness of the obligations under UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and contribute to strengthening national capacities to implement the Resolution in tar-
geted States. The seminar may result in identifying assistance needs, which may be further addressed by future EU initiatives in the area of technical assistance. Within the beneficiary States, the focus should be on policymaking level participants. The agenda of the outreach activity should reflect the regional particularities in the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and should respect the overall objectives of the Joint Action.

Peru has expressed its willingness to organise a regional seminar on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) by the end of 2006.

Project results:

- increased awareness among targeted States and regions of their obligations under UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and of the possibilities for technical assistance,
- contributing to strengthening national administrative capacities in the targeted States and regions to report on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004),
- report on summary of proceedings of the outreach activities, e.g. seminars and an assessment paper on technical assistance needs.

3. Duration

The total estimated duration of the projects will be 24 months.

4. Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries of the seminar are primarily States of three target regions which have not submitted their national reports on the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004). States which have already fulfilled their reporting obligation under the Resolution but which have not submitted additional information or clarifications as requested by the Committee of the Security Council should also be targeted.

The final choice of beneficiaries will be made by the Presidency assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative through his Personal Representative on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, acting upon proposals from the implementing entity in accordance with Article 2(3) of this Joint Action.

The potential regional and out-of-region technical assistance donors as well as relevant international, regional and subregional organisations will also be invited to attend.

5. Implementing entity

The UN Secretariat (DDA) will be entrusted with the technical implementation of the projects, in the framework of the political coordination by the Secretary-General/High
Representative through his Personal Representative on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The UN Secretariat (DDA) will sign a Host Nation Support Agreement with the States, which will be identified as hosting States. The hosting State will take part in the project implementation. The procurement of any goods, works or services by the UN Secretariat (DDA) from the hosting States in the context of this Joint Action will be carried out in accordance with the applicable UN rules and procedures, as detailed in the EU contribution-specific agreement with the UN Secretariat (DDA).

6. Estimated EU financial contribution

The projects are co-financed by the EU and other donors. The EU should focus on expenditure related to participation of target States in the seminars, conference costs and costs for experts. Expenditure incurred by relevant regional and subregional organisations may also be covered, insofar as this is directly related to participation in, and organisation of, activities under the projects. The UN Secretariat (DDA) will be responsible for the overall coordination of contributions made by other donors, who will finance the remaining costs of the projects. Some donors may contribute to the implementation of the project directly to the host country. The estimated total cost of the EU contribution to the implementation of projects in Asia-Pacific, Africa and Latin America and Caribbean is EUR 195 000. Contribution transfers among projects are allowed if justified by specific requirements in selected regions.

In addition, a contingency reserve of about 3% of eligible costs (for a total amount of EUR 3 395) is included for unforeseen costs.

7. Financial reference amount to cover the cost of the projects

The total cost of the projects is EUR 195 000.
I. Europe listens

2. In June 2005 the Heads of State or Government called for a period of reflection during which a broad debate should take place in all Member States, involving citizens, civil society, social partners, national parliaments and political parties, with the contribution of European institutions. The European Council welcomes the various initiatives taken in the Member States in the framework of national debates, as well as a series of events organised by the Austrian Presidency, in particular the Conference ‘The Sound of Europe’ in Salzburg on 27/28 January 2006. The European Council expresses its gratitude to the Commission for having contributed to the reflection period in the context of its Plan D and to the European Parliament for having organised together with the Austrian Parliament the joint parliamentary meeting on the ‘Future of Europe’ on 8/9 May 2006. The European Council welcomes the intention of institutions and Member States to carry on their activities aimed at involving citizens in the debate about what Europe should stand for in the 21st century. It also welcomed the Commission’s contribution ‘A Citizen’s Agenda for Europe’.

3. The European Council carried out a first assessment of the reflection period. This took place on the basis of the written report prepared by the Presidency and Council Secretariat drawing on information provided by Member States on their national debates (doc. 9701/1/06 REV 1), the ‘Plan D’ initiative and the White Paper on a European Communication Policy. While worries and concerns have been voiced during all public debates, citizens remain committed to the European project. Reinforced dialogue with the citizens requires adequate means and commitment. Citizens expect the Union to prove its added value by taking action in response to the challenges and opportunities facing it: ensuring peace, prosperity and solidarity, enhancing security, furthering sustainable development and promoting European values in a rapidly globalising world.

4. The Union’s commitment to becoming more democratic, transparent and effective goes beyond the reflection period. The European Council reaffirms its commitment to a
Union that delivers the concrete results citizens expect, in order to strengthen confidence and trust, as set out in Part II.

II. Europe at work

(a) Promoting freedom, security and justice

5. Progress on measures agreed in the Hague Programme aimed at addressing problems such as illegal immigration, trafficking of human beings, terrorism and organised crime while guaranteeing respect for fundamental freedoms and rights will be assessed in December 2006.

6. In the meantime further efforts are required, particularly as concerns:
   - following the progress made on the Schengen Information System (SIS II) and implementation of the Schengen acquis in the new Member States, rapid finalisation of the legislative measures on border control and police cooperation and completion of the technical preparations at EU and national levels, making operational the Schengen Information System by April 2007 and the Visa Information System in 2007, thus paving the way for the enlargement of the Schengen area in 2007 provided all requirements to apply the Schengen acquis have been fulfilled, in accordance with the Hague Programme;
   - taking work forward rapidly on the Commission’s proposal concerning the establishment of Common Application Centres and the collection of biometrics for the purpose of visas and initiation of a pilot project, as well as taking work forward on a Community code of visas;
   - taking work forward on visa facilitation and readmission agreements based on the process and considerations laid down in the common approach on facilitation starting with the countries with a European Perspective as referred to in the European Council conclusions of June 2003 and June 2005;
   - further strengthening of practical cooperation in developing a common European asylum system, rapid progress on relevant proposals including the amendments to the European Refugee Fund as well as on Regional Protection Programmes (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Tanzania);
   - achieving further progress on strengthening judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal law, finalisation in particular of negotiations on the procedural rights of accused persons in criminal proceedings and on the Framework Decisions on the European Evidence Warrant, the application of the principle of mutual recognition to the enforcement of custodial sentences and the protection of personal data;
   - intensifying police cooperation, in particular giving an increased role to Europol to support operations;
pursuing the fight against trafficking in human beings, based on the EU Action Plan and fully utilising Europol, Europol and the Task Force of Police Chiefs.

7. The European Council welcomes the ‘Vienna Declaration on Security Partnership’ agreed by Member States and Neighbouring countries of the EU at the Ministerial Conference in Vienna on 4-5 May 2006, as well as the participation of the Russian Federation and the United States of America. It takes note of the first steps made towards such a partnership, e.g. improving cooperation between the EU and the Western Balkan countries to combat organised crime, corruption, illegal migration and terrorism. The European Council takes note of the ‘Vienna Initiative’ on possible future tripartite cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs between the EU, the Russian Federation and the United States of America and invites future Presidencies to consider how this initiative might be taken forward. The European Council calls for further swift implementation of the Strategy for the external dimension of JHA, with a view to enhancing the coordination and coherence between JHA policies and external policies.

8. In the light of the increased cooperation and the need for further progress with third countries of origin and transit in migration issues in particular in the regions neighbouring the Union, namely the eastern, south eastern and Mediterranean regions, the European Council recalls the importance of a balanced and comprehensive approach. Developing the Global Approach to Migration agreed in December 2005 is a fundamental priority for the Union. Recent events reinforce this assessment. In this context the European Council looks forward to the forthcoming report by the Commission on the Hampton Court follow-up to migration and security to be presented at its December 2006 meeting. In the meantime the European Council:

- welcomes the concrete cooperation measures taken by the Commission, Frontex and some Member States in the wake of recent events in the Canary Islands and in the Mediterranean. It calls for enhanced efforts on maritime operational cooperation with a view to developing adequate surveillance capacities at the sea borders as well as on the establishment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams;
- underlines the priority of enhancing cooperation on migration with African and neighbouring countries and calls for a balanced dialogue on migration with African States, regional organisations and the African Union through a pan-African conference on migration and development;
- welcomes the Euro-African Ministerial Conference in Rabat, as well as other conferences with a specific regional focus, as steps to a regular comprehensive dialogue with African countries as well as the launching of a EU-ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) dialogue on migration (on the basis of Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement);
- recalls the Barcelona Action Plan engagement to hold a EUROMED Ministerial Meeting on Migration Management and to highlight cooperation on migration as an important part of our neighbourhood policy;
• looks forward to the presentation by the Commission of a communication on future priorities in the field of illegal immigration and follow-up action;
• calls on implementation of AENEAS funded projects on migration, providing financial and technical assistance to third countries in support of their efforts to ensure more effective management of all aspects of migration flows;
• recognises the importance of the forthcoming UN High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development and the need for an EU common position that integrates the development aspects of migration in a coherent manner;
• calls for discussions to be taken forward on the Commission’s Policy Plan on Legal Migration.

9. The European Council calls for the implementation of the action plans agreed under the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy, including the strategy against radicalisation and recruitment, to be accelerated. Work must also be sped up on the protection of critical infrastructure. The European Council awaits the Commission’s first programme in this connection as well as concrete proposals on detection technologies. The Council and the Commission are also invited to develop measures to combat the misuse of the internet for terrorist purposes while respecting fundamental rights and principles.

10. In the context of the review of the Hague Programme, the European Council calls upon the incoming Finnish Presidency to explore, in close collaboration with the Commission, the possibilities of improving decision-making and action in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice on the basis of existing treaties.

11. Taking note of the progress achieved on the setting up of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the European Council calls for the necessary steps to be taken as soon as possible, so that the Agency is up and running as from 1 January 2007.

12. Improving the Union’s responsiveness to emergencies, crises and disasters inside and outside the Union remains a political imperative. When such emergencies occur, citizens rightly expect a swift and effective response. While Member States are responsible for managing emergencies on their territory or assisting their citizens abroad, the European Union can, in a spirit of active solidarity, play a role by coordinating a political response and by helping to organise and coordinate available assets when requested to do so.

13. The European Council endorses the Presidency report on ‘Reinforcing the Union’s emergency and crisis response capacities’ (doc. 10551/06) which sets out the many practical steps and decisions taken to improve coordination and delivery of available assets; to get assistance quickly where it is needed; and to provide more effective consular protection to EU citizens in third countries. Furthermore, the European Council welcomes the report submitted by Michel Barnier in May 2006 as an important contribution to the debate.
14. Building on work carried out under the Austrian Presidency, particular attention must now be given to:

- further developing the European Union’s rapid response capability based on means that Member States make available, including civil protection modules, which should be identified and coordinated in order to make this response efficient and capable of ensuring a high level of protection for the European citizen;
- rapid implementation of agreed steps and decisions taken as set out in the Presidency report. These include the EU Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements, which set up an ad hoc Crisis Steering Group in Brussels and should be operational as of 1 July 2006, and the recommendations by the Secretary-General/High Representative pertaining to the identification and coordination of Member States’ military transport assets in support of disaster response;
- exercising these procedures and capabilities and learning lessons from these exercises and actual operational experience to improve disaster response;
- Work on the Commission’s proposals on reinforcing the Community’s civil protection capabilities has been brought forward ambitiously during the Austrian Presidency. The Council should work for adoption of the necessary legal provisions by the end of the year;
- closer consular cooperation among EU Member States, including mutual consular assistance points in pre-identified regions. To this end, a joint report by the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission is requested in the second half of 2006.

15. The Council is invited to take work forward on the basis of the suggestions contained in the Presidency report, building on further input from the Commission and the Secretary-General/High Representative. The incoming Presidency will report to the December 2006 European Council on progress achieved across the board.

(...)

III. Looking to the future

(a) Pursuing reform: the Constitutional Treaty

42. At the meeting of the European Council on 16/17 June 2005, Heads of State and Government agreed to come back to the issue of the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in the first half of 2006 in order to make an overall assessment of the national debates launched as part of the period of reflection and to agree on how to proceed.
43. Since last June a further five Member States have ratified the Constitutional Treaty, bringing the total number of ratifications to fifteen. Two Member States have been unable to ratify, and eight have still to complete the ratification process, one of which has recently launched the procedure to that effect. It is hoped that this process will be completed in line with the conclusions of June 2005.

44. Recalling its conclusions of June 2005, the European Council welcomes the various initiatives taken within the framework of the national debates as well as the contributions of the Commission and Parliament to the reflection period. The significant efforts made to increase and expand the dialogue with Europe’s citizens, including the Commission’s plan D initiative, should be continued.

45. The reflection period has overall been useful in enabling the Union to assess the concerns and worries expressed in the course of the ratification process. It considers that, in parallel with the ongoing ratification process, further work, building on what has been achieved since last June, is needed before decisions on the future of the Constitutional Treaty can be taken.

46. After last year’s period of reflection work should now focus on delivery of concrete results and implementation of projects. The European Council agrees a two-track approach. On the one hand, best use should be made of the possibilities offered by the existing treaties in order to deliver the concrete results that citizens expect.

47. On the other hand, the Presidency will present a report to the European Council during the first semester of 2007, based on extensive consultations with the Member States. This report should contain an assessment of the state of discussion with regard to the Constitutional Treaty and explore possible future developments.

48. The report will subsequently be examined by the European Council. The outcome of this examination will serve as the basis for further decisions on how to continue the reform process, it being understood that the necessary steps to that effect will have been taken during the second semester of 2008 at the latest. Each Presidency in office since the start of the reflection period has a particular responsibility to ensure the continuity of this process.

49. The European Council calls for the adoption, on 25 March 2007 in Berlin, of a political declaration by EU leaders, setting out Europe’s values and ambitions and confirming their shared commitment to deliver them, commemorating 50 years of the Treaties of Rome.
(b) Enlargement

50. The European Council takes note of the initial discussions on enlargement held at the informal Foreign Ministers meeting in Salzburg on 11 March and in Klosterneuburg on 27/28 May 2006. It agreed to continue and deepen this general discussion during the second half of 2006.

51. Enlargement has proved a historic opportunity contributing to ensure peace, security, stability, democracy, the rule of law as well as growth and prosperity in the European Union as a whole. Enlargement is equally helping the EU to become a more competitive and dynamic economy and be better prepared to meet the challenges of a globalised and changing world. The European Council welcomes in this context the Commission’s report on the economic success of the Union’s historic fifth enlargement, of which the accession of Bulgaria and Romania is an integral part.

Bulgaria and Romania

52. It is the Union’s common objective to welcome Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007 as members of the Union if they are ready. On the basis of the Commission’s Monitoring Report of May 2006 the European Council confirms this position. While commending both countries for the reform efforts undertaken lately, the European Council calls on Bulgaria and Romania to rigorously step up their efforts to tackle decisively and without delay the remaining issues of concern as mentioned in the commission’s May 2006 report. The European Council remains convinced that, with the necessary political will, both countries can overcome the deficits stated to reach the envisaged date of accession on 1 January 2007. It therefore welcomes the intention of the Commission to present its next monitoring reports by early October at the latest. It encourages Member States to complete the ratification of the Accession Treaty on time.

General questions of future enlargement

53. The European Council reaffirmed that it will honour existing commitments and emphasized that every effort should be made to protect the cohesion and the effectiveness of the Union. It will be important to ensure in future that the Union is able to function politically, financially and institutionally as it enlarges, and to further deepen Europe’s common project. Therefore the European Council will, at its meeting in December 2006, have a debate on all aspects of further enlargements, including the Union’s capacity to absorb new members and further ways of improving the quality of the enlargement process on the basis of the positive experiences accumulated so far. It recalls in this connection that the pace of enlargement must take the Union’s absorption capacity into account. The Commission is invited to provide a special report on all relevant aspects pertaining to the Union’s absorption capacity, at the same time as it presents its annual progress reports on enlargement and the pre-accession process. This specific
analysis should also cover the issue of present and future perception of enlargement by citizens and should take into account the need to explain the enlargement process adequately to the public within the Union.

**Turkey**

54. The European Council reviewed progress made in the acquis screening and welcomes the start of substantive accession negotiations with Turkey. Turkey is expected to share the values, objectives and the legal order set out in the treaties. The Union is committed to support Turkey in its efforts to comply with the Union’s standards and membership obligations, including the Copenhagen criteria. The European Council recalls, in line with previous conclusions, that the current negotiations are based on each country’s own merits and that their pace will depend on each country’s progress in preparing for accession measured against the requirements set out in the Negotiating Framework. This includes the fulfilment of Turkey’s obligations under the Association Agreement and under its Additional Protocol, full implementation of which will be evaluated in 2006 as agreed in the Declaration of the European Community and its Member States of 21 September 2005, as well as the implementation of the revised Accession Partnership. The European Council recalls that the Council will ensure, in the course of 2006, a follow up on the progress made on all the relevant issues included in the above mentioned Declaration. The European Council calls on Turkey to intensify the reform process and to implement it fully and effectively, so as to ensure its irreversibility and sustainability as well as to progress towards the complete fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria, including the commitment to good neighbourly relations. In this context, any action which could negatively affect the process of peaceful settlement of disputes should be avoided.

**Croatia**

55. The European Council reviewed progress made in the acquis screening and welcomes the start of substantive accession negotiations with Croatia. Croatia is expected to share the values, objectives and the legal order set out in the treaties. The Union is committed to support Croatia in its efforts to comply with the Union’s standards and membership obligations, including the Copenhagen criteria and good neighbourly relations. The European Council recalls, in line with previous conclusions, that the current negotiations are based on each country’s own merits and that their pace will depend on each country’s progress in preparing for accession measured against the requirements set out in the Negotiating Framework. This includes the fulfilment of obligations under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement as well as the implementation of the Accession Partnership. The European Council encourages Croatia to continue its reform efforts and to achieve sustainable progress towards the fulfilment of EU standards.
(c) Western Balkans

56. The European Council reconfirmed the European perspective of the Western Balkans as set out in the Stabilisation and Association Process, the Thessaloniki Agenda and the Salzburg Declaration of March 2006. In this respect, the European Council confirmed that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the European Union. Each country’s progress towards the European Union will continue to depend on individual merits in meeting the conditions and requirements set forth in the Copenhagen criteria and in the Stabilisation and Association Process, including full cooperation with the ICTY and maintaining good neighbourly relations. All Western Balkan countries have in the last year made significant steps along their road towards the EU, with EU membership as ultimate goal in conformity with the Thessaloniki Agenda. The Council welcomed the initial progress made in the implementation of the Commission’s Communication ‘The Western Balkans on the Road to the EU: consolidation stability and raising prosperity’. The European Union will continue assisting the Western Balkan countries through practical measures to make the European perspective more tangible and is looking forward to concrete results in the near future notably in areas such as regional free trade and visa facilitation in line with the common approach. The European Council welcomes the intention of the Commission to extend and to intensify its cooperation with the European Investment Bank and other international financial institutions in the Western Balkans with a view to taking appropriate measures aiming at a finance facility for the Western Balkans.

External relations

57. The European Council reiterates the importance it attaches to the European Neighbourhood Policy as a means to strengthen cooperation with its neighbours and expand prosperity, stability and security beyond the borders of the European Union. The European Neighbourhood Policy seeks to support the political and economic reforms of neighbouring countries on the basis of partnership and building on shared values. The Union is determined to strengthen and further develop its Neighbourhood Policy, thus offering an increasingly close relationship and substantial support, as neighbouring countries fulfil their commitments to reform.

58. The European Council attaches great importance to a fruitful co-operation between the European Union and the Council of Europe and encourages them to overcome the remaining difficulties in the ongoing negotiations on a memorandum of understanding. It expresses its appreciation to Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker for his report on the future relations between the Council of Europe and the European Union, which deserves further consideration.

60. The European Council endorses the Presidency report on ESDP (doc. 10418/06), which comprises the mandate for the incoming Presidency.

ANNEX I – AN OVERALL POLICY ON TRANSPARENCY

With a view to further increase openness, transparency and accountability, the European Council agrees on the following measures aiming at a stronger involvement of citizens in the work of the Union:

- All Council deliberations on legislative acts to be adopted by co-decision shall be open to the public as shall the votes and the explanation of votes by Council Members. The Council or Coreper may decide in individual cases that a given deliberation should not be open to the public.

- The Council’s first deliberations on legislative acts other than those adopted by co-decision, which given their importance are presented orally by the Commission in a Council session, shall be open to the public. The Presidency may decide in individual cases that the Council’s subsequent deliberations on a particular act shall be open to the public, unless the Council or Coreper decide otherwise.

- The Council shall regularly hold public debates on important issues affecting the interests of the Union and its citizens. Such debates will be held further to a decision by the Council or Coreper, acting by qualified majority. Implementation of this commitment shall start during the incoming Presidency, which would submit proposals for such public debates taking into account the importance of the matter and its interest to citizens.

- The General Affairs and External Relations Council’s deliberations on the 18 month programme shall be public, as shall other Council formations’ deliberations on their priorities. The Commission’s presentation of its five year programme, of its annual work programme and of its annual policy strategy, as well as the ensuing debate, shall be public.

- All public deliberations shall be broadcasted in all languages through video-streaming and there shall be an obligation for a recorded version to remain available for at least a month on the Council’s internet site.

- The incoming Presidency is invited, together with the General Secretariat of the Council, to develop new means of giving more publicity to public deliberations, in particular through the Council’s web site and mailing list, an easily accessible and constantly updated list of forthcoming debates, appropriate background material, as well as direct communication to target audiences. They will work closely together to
provide the media and citizens with an open, rapid and technically advanced communication service.

The General Secretariat of the Council shall inform the public in advance of the dates and approximate time on which public debates will take place and shall take all practical measures to ensure proper implementation of the rules of transparency.

ANNEX II – DECLARATION ON THE WESTERN BALKANS

The European Council reaffirmed its full support for the agenda set out at the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 and for the Stabilisation and Association Process.

A peaceful and prosperous Serbia fully integrated into the family of European nations is very important for the stability in the region. The European Council, therefore, recalls that the European Union is willing to resume negotiations with Serbia on a Stabilization and Association Agreement as soon as full cooperation of Serbia with the ICTY is achieved.

The Union maintains its support to the ongoing talks about the future status of Kosovo led by UN Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and stresses the crucial importance of moving forward on the implementation of standards in Kosovo. In close consultation with key international actors, the European Union stands ready to enhance its role in Kosovo following a status determination, in particular in the areas of police, rule of law and the economy.

The European Union and its Member States have already agreed to develop their relations with Montenegro as a sovereign, independent State. The European Council calls on both Serbia and Montenegro to pursue a direct and constructive dialogue on their future relations.

The European Union will continue to assist Bosnia and Herzegovina in ensuring stability and progress on key reforms. It urges the Bosnian authorities to ensure real and tangible progress in the implementation of police reform in order to maintain momentum in the Stabilisation and Association Process. The European Council underlines the importance of proceeding with constitutional reform.

The European Council calls on all parties in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to ensure that the parliamentary elections on 5 July are conducted in line with international standards.

The European Council welcomes the signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Albania and calls on Albania to push ahead with its reform agenda.

The European Council strongly encourages regional cooperation including through the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP). It welcomes the initiative for a regional free-trade area launched in Bucharest on 6 April, as well as the signing of the agreement on a European Common Aviation Area with the countries of the region on 9 June, and progress made in the ratification process of the Energy Community Treaty for South-East Europe.
The European Union will continue to back its policies for the Western Balkans with commensurate financial assistance, particularly through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance to be introduced next year.

The European Council is conscious that the question of visa facilitation is particularly important for the people of the countries of the region. The European Union therefore hopes to adopt negotiation mandates for visa facilitation and readmission agreements in the course of this year, in line with the common approach to the development of the EU policy on visa facilitation agreed in December 2005, so that negotiations can be concluded as soon as possible, ideally in 2007 or earlier where possible.

### ANNEX III – DECLARATION ON IRAN

The European Council reiterated its commitment to a diplomatic solution which addresses international concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme while affirming Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the NPT. In this context, the European Council welcomes the important initiative of the EU High Representative, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, China, the Russian Federation and the United States, agreed in Vienna on 1 June 2006. The European Council gives its full support to the balanced approach incorporated in the Vienna initiative, and encourages Iran to take the positive path that is offered.

The European Council welcomes the meetings of EU High Representative Javier Solana, accompanied by representatives of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation, with the Iranian authorities in Tehran on 6 June, and the constructive atmosphere in which this visit took place.

The European Council urges Iran to give an early positive response to this far-reaching initiative and to create the conditions whereby negotiations can resume.

### ANNEX IV – DECLARATION ON IRAQ

The European Council welcomes the formation of the new Iraqi national unity government on 20 May, now completed with the appointment of Ministers of Defence, Interior and National Security. This is a major and important step continuing the transformation of Iraq into a democratic country. The European Union reiterates its strong condemnation of terrorist acts and deplores the continuing campaign of violence against the Iraqi people and their constitutionally elected government. It calls on all Iraqi citizens to avoid sectarian strife and refrain from using violence, prolonging the suffering of the Iraqi people. The European Union stands ready to renew its engagement with the new Iraqi government and Iraqi citizens in their efforts to bring peace, stability and prosperity to an independent and sovereign Iraq.
The European Council welcomes the new government’s programme for its commitment to upholding the rule of law, promoting national unity and reconciliation, protecting and developing Iraq’s resources and using them for the benefit of all the Iraqi people.

The European Union looks forward to rapid and early political dialogue with the new government.

The European Council welcomes the Commission Communication and the joint letter from SG/HR Solana and Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner. The European Council looks forward to pursuing enhanced engagement with the new government at all relevant levels. For example, it is the EU’s intention to support Iraq in the following areas:

- Endorse a model of democratic government that overcomes divisions, e.g. through support to national reconciliation and the constitutional review process in close cooperation with the UN. In this context, the European Council welcomed the United Nations Multi-Party Dialogue on the Iraqi bill of rights in Vienna from 6 to 8 June.
- Contribute towards the rule of law and a culture of respect for human rights, e.g. through Community assistance in these areas. In this context, the European Council notes the agreement to extend the Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX, for another 18 months after the expiration of the current mandate in response to Iraqi needs and requests.
- Support national and regional authorities in improving the delivery of basic services and in promoting job creation.
- Support Iraq’s economic recovery and prosperity, e.g. by launching the negotiations of a Trade and Cooperation Agreement and by commencing a technical dialogue on energy.
- Promote the development of an effective and transparent administrative framework.
- Stepping up its presence in Iraq through the imminent appointment of the Head of the European Commission Delegation in Iraq.

The European Council encourages enhanced international engagement and underlines the EU’s willingness to continue supporting the UN’s role in Iraq.

ANNEX V – DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

The European Union remains committed to working within the Quartet towards the goal of a just, viable and lasting solution based on existing agreements, the relevant UNSC resolutions and the principles laid down in the Roadmap.

In view of the urgent need to re-launch the process towards a negotiated two-state solution which would bring peace to both the Israeli and the Palestinian people, the
European Council calls for an early engagement between the Israeli Prime Minister and the President of the Palestinian Authority, who was elected on a platform of peace. It reiterates its expectations from both parties to respect existing agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap.

As set out by the Quartet, the Hamas-led Palestinian Government needs to meet and implement the three principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel’s right to exist and acceptance of existing agreements and obligations.

The European Council remains concerned by the security situation in Gaza and the West Bank. It condemns the violence against Palestinian civilians. It condemns the launching of Qassem rockets against population centres in Israel. It reminds both parties of their responsibility to protect civilian lives. It calls on the Palestinian Authority to take action to improve security and prevent terrorist attacks on Israel. It reiterates its condemnation of extra-judicial killings. It calls on all parties to refrain from violence and to exercise restraint.

The European Council calls on all Palestinian political forces to engage in a national dialogue aimed primarily at putting an end to inter-Palestinian confrontation and establishing law and order. It calls on the Palestinian government to cooperate with the President of the Palestinian Authority to achieve this, including through the disarmament of groups engaged in violence and terror.

The European Council takes note of the announcement by President Abbas to hold a referendum. It calls on all Palestinian political forces to work towards the widest possible consensus in support of the objectives of the Roadmap.

The European Council calls on Israel to desist from any action that threatens the viability of an agreed two-state solution and from acts that are contrary to international law. Of particular concern are settlement activities, the construction of the barrier on Palestinian land and activities in and around East Jerusalem as well as in the Jordan Valley. The European Union will not recognize any change to the pre-1967 borders other than those agreed to by both sides.

The European Council urges Israel to resume transfers of withheld Palestinian tax and customs revenues which are essential in averting a crisis in the Palestinian territories.

The European Council stresses the need for a coordinated international response to the deterioration of the humanitarian, economic and financial situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The European Council endorses the proposed temporary international mechanism to channel assistance directly to the Palestinian people, which has been drawn up by the Commission following consultations within the EU as well as with Quartet members, major donors, international financial institutions and partners in the region. The European Council appreciates the Commission’s work so far and requests it to continue urgently establishing the mechanism, in conjunction with Quartet members, other key international partners and the PA President’s Office.

The European Council agrees that, in order to achieve an immediate impact, the
mechanism will focus on essential supplies and running costs for social services and health, supply of utilities including fuel, and social allowances. Other donors, including Arab states, are invited to provide funding and to consider early and substantial contributions. The Community stands ready to contribute a substantial amount to the international mechanism.

The European Council furthermore underlines the importance of freedom of movement and urges both parties to take concrete steps to implement their obligations under the Agreement on Movement and Access, in order to alleviate the worsening situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The European Council reiterates the importance of preserving and pursuing the democratic functioning of the institutions of the Palestinian Authority whose continuity is crucial for a future independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state based on the rule of law.

ANNEX VI – DECLARATION ON AFRICA

The European Union remains committed to contribute to the African efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, with a view to making the African continent stable and prosperous, laying emphasis on the principles of partnership, responsibility and ownership, good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights. In this context, it reiterates the importance of enhanced EU-Africa Political Dialogue, including holding a second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon as soon as possible. The EU is implementing the Africa Strategy adopted in December 2005 as the comprehensive framework of its activities, and will continue its efforts to transform the EU Strategy for Africa into a Joint Strategy. The strategy puts particular emphasis on the EU’s engagement for peace and security in Africa, as a basis for lasting development, as well as regional and economic integration and development assistance provided to the African partner countries. In this context, the EU welcomes the decision taken by the EU and the ACP partners at the Joint Council of Ministers on 2 June regarding the Financial Protocol for 10th EDF (European Development Fund, covering 2008-2013) and has decided on a short-term replenishment of the funds available under the African Peace Facility and to continue this instrument in the period 2008 to 2010. The EU reiterates furthermore its support to the Economic Partnership Agreements as instruments for development, aiming at enhanced regional economic integration and contributing to reducing poverty in the ACP countries. In addition, the EU stresses the importance of current and future initiatives to put in place an EU-Africa partnership on migration and development. The EU also recalls the importance of the conclusion of ambitious action plans, in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, with its Mediterranean partners.

In Sudan, the EU will work for the full and rapid implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) as a precondition for lasting peace and security in Darfur and an end
to the suffering of millions of people in Darfur. The EU continues to be deeply concerned by the situation of human rights in Darfur and calls upon the government in Khartoum to end impunity by bringing the perpetrators to justice for crimes committed in Darfur and to stop the violence against internally displaced persons, especially sexual violence against women and girls. Together with other partners in the international community, the EU will continue to provide support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), taking into account the new tasks arising from the DPA, and the need to ensure a smooth transition to a UN led operation in Darfur.

The EU calls upon all political forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to continue pursuing their path of peaceful and democratic change in the run-up of the elections, starting on July 30. Building on the EU’s longstanding engagement in the DRC, the EU will deploy the military operation EUFOR RD Congo, in response to a request from the United Nations, designed to provide support to MONUC in certain situations. For the same purpose, the EU’s police mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa) will be reinforced. The EU will continue to support the ongoing Security Sector Reform through its mission EUSEC RDC, as well as new initiatives to ensure good governance, transparency and a sound post-transition and reconstruction strategy. The ongoing process of securing regional stability through the early holding of the second Summit of the Great Lakes Conference has the full support of the EU.

ANNEX VII – DECLARATION ON LEBANON

The European Council reaffirms the importance it attaches to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and independence of Lebanon and reiterates its call for Security Council Resolution 1559 to be implemented in full. It welcomes the adoption of Resolution 1680 and calls for its full implementation, particularly as regards the delineation of the Syrian-Lebanese border. In this context, it calls upon Syria to grasp the hand offered by the Lebanese government following the agreements emerging from the Lebanese national dialogue. It is pleased that this national dialogue has been opened and encourages the parties to continue it.

The European Council reaffirms its full support for the work of the International Independent Investigation Commission into the assassination of Rafik Hariri and his escort, and for the action of its head, Mr Serge Brammertz. It welcomes the Investigation Commission’s fourth interim report, takes note of the progress recorded in the investigation, which is cause for hope for the Lebanese people. It welcomes the Security Council’s adoption of resolution 1686 which extends the mandate of the Independent Investigation Commission for another year and supports the Commission’s intention to extend further its tutorial assistance to ongoing investigations into other political assassinations that have been committed in Lebanon since October 2004. It welcomes the Lebanese authorities’ excellent co-operation with the Independent Investigation Commission.
Commission and calls once again on all parties to co-operate with it fully and unconditionally.

The European Council welcomes the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1664 and expresses the hope that negotiations will progress rapidly with a view to the actual setting up of the international tribunal provided for in that Resolution.

The European Council strongly condemns the serious incidents which took place on the Blue Line around 28 May, appeals to all parties to exercise restraint and reminds them of their obligation to strictly respect the Blue Line, including the respective airspaces. The European Council stresses once again the need for the Lebanese State to restore its sovereignty over the whole of its national territory and to exercise the sole right to the use of force on that territory.

The European Council reaffirms its support for the Lebanese government and urges it to undertake the economic and political reforms agreed, so that the international conference to support Lebanon can be held as soon as possible. The implementation of the action plan concluded in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy will assist the reform process in the country.

(...)
PRESIDENCY REPORT ON ESDP

1. In line with the mandate defined by the European Council in December 2005, the Presidency hereby submits this report on ESDP.

2. In presenting this report, the Presidency has noted that Denmark has drawn attention to Protocol No 5 on the position of Denmark, which is annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty.

I. Operational Activities

3. Under the Austrian Presidency operational activity in the field of crisis management has continued to expand, both in the civilian and in the military field. The EU is undertaking a wide range of civilian and military missions, on three continents, with tasks ranging from peacekeeping and monitoring implementation of a peace process to advice and assistance in military, police, border monitoring and rule of law sectors. Further missions are under active preparation.

4. The growing need in the field of civilian crisis management combined with the increase in the EU’s ambition level, has led to the EU’s decision to increase the CFSP budget significantly.

Western Balkans

5. The EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Operation ALTHEA, continues to guarantee a safe and secure environment in the country. During the last six months, increased focus has been put on the reduction and safe storage of the significant amount of excess weapons and munitions held by the Armed forces of BiH as well as the BiH population. Cooperation with NATO continues to work well in respect of Operation Althea, in Brussels as well as in BiH, in the context of the “Berlin Plus” arrangements. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was invited to participate in the operation as the 12th contributing third State.

6. The Council reviewed operation ALTHEA in June. This review was carried out within the framework of the Single Comprehensive Review of EU activities in BiH. It confirmed that EUFOR should retain current force levels and tasks; stressed the importance of close cooperation between all EU actors in BiH, especially in the area of fight against organized crime, and highlighted the crucial role of the EUSR in ensuring EU coherence.

7. The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) has continued from 1 January 2006 as a refocused mission with an adjusted mandate and size. During the first
months of the year EUPM has undergone a thorough and successful re-organisation in line with its refocused mandate. The Mission, through the Police Head of Mission, is actively engaged in the concerted efforts of the EU and the International Community on police reform. Under the direction of the EUSR, EUPM has progressed in taking the lead in the co-ordination of policing aspects of ESDP efforts in the fight against organised crime. Furthermore, the EUPM is developing tools to strengthen internal and external control, inspection and accountability of local police across BiH. The Mission is also pursuing other tasks, in particular further support to the build-up of state agencies.

8. To ensure a smooth transition between the end of EUPOL PROXIMA and the start of the European Commission project in the field of police reform, the EU decided to establish a team of EU police advisors to provide further support to the development of an efficient and professional police service based on European standards of policing from 15 December 2005 for a period of 6 months. The EU Police Advisory Team in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT) has continued monitoring and mentoring of police on priority issues including Border Police, Public Peace and Order and Accountability and the fight against corruption and Organised Crime. Taking into account the scheduled EC project for implementation of police reform, to start on 1 June 2006, EUPAT closed down, as scheduled, on 14 June 2006.

9. Following the reports from SG/HR Solana and Commissioner Rehn and the conclusions of the December 2005 GAERC on the future EU engagement in Kosovo, the Council has increased its activities in preparation for a possible civilian crisis management operation in Kosovo after a status settlement. A joint Council-Commission Fact Finding Mission (FFM) to Kosovo consisting of experts from the Presidency, the Council General Secretariat and the Commission services was undertaken from 19th to 27th February 2006. The FFM provided a detailed assessment of current and future international engagement in the broader field of the Rule of Law, and recommended the setting up of an EU Planning Team tasked to prepare all aspects of the planning for a possible ESDP mission in Kosovo. The Council on 10 April set up the EU Planning Team (EUPT Kosovo). On 2 May the PSC appointed the Head of the Planning Team following a recommendation by the SG/HR based on a selection process involving the Presidency, the incoming Presidency and the Council General Secretariat. The Planning Team is expected to be fully deployed by 1st September 2006.

Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus

10. The reinforced EUSR Support Team, comprising a Rule of Law follow-up to EUJUST THEMIS and a Border Support Team (BST), continued its activities in Georgia. On 28 February 2006, the follow-up to EUJUST THEMIS effectively came to an end. Continuity of EU support to Georgia in the field of Rule of Law is ensured through
European Community programmes. The BST has been prolonged with a refocused mandate until the end of February 2007 and is, inter alia, continuing to assist the Georgian Border Guard and other relevant government institutions in Tbilisi in preparing a comprehensive reform strategy and to advise the Georgian authorities, at both strategic and operational level.

11. The EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova/Ukraine (EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine), launched on 30 November 2005 under the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, and staffed to a large extent by seconded experts from EU Member States, has continued to assist the Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities in their efforts against illegal trade, trafficking, smuggling, organized crime and corruption as well as to build up appropriate operational and institutional capacity in Moldova and Ukraine to ensure effective border control and surveillance, thus contributing to the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. The Head of EUBAM is also carrying out the function of Senior Political Advisor to the EUSR for Moldova. EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine has been extended and expanded by the European Commission on June 1, 2006 as a TACIS project for a period of 18 months. The mandate of the EUSR for Moldova has been prolonged, unchanged, until 28 February 2007, including the Border Team.

Middle East

12. Since July 2005, upon invitation of the Iraqi government, the EU is running an Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX) aiming at promoting collaboration between the actors of the Iraqi criminal justice system, through training courses in the EU. More than 600 Iraqi senior officials from the police, the judiciary and the penitentiary have been trained in an integrated fashion in EU Member States. On 15 May 2006, the EU has agreed to extend the mission for a further period of 18 months, as well as to enable internships and specialized courses for Iraqi senior officials, in response to Iraqi needs and requests.

13. The EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) continued to fulfil successfully its Third Party presence role at the Rafah Border Crossing Point based on relevant agreements between the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel. More than 250,000 passengers have used the Rafah Border Crossing Point since its reopening with EUBAM Rafah presence on 25 November 2005, thus helping alleviate in part the humanitarian situation of the people living in the Gaza Strip.

14. The EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) was launched on 1 January 2006 with a three-year mandate in order to assist the Palestinian Civilian Police in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements. The support is largely based on a Civil Police Development Program developed with active EU
support in 2005. The EU is keeping ESDP activities in the Occupied Territories under review to ensure consistency with Quartet policy on assistance to the new Palestinian Authority.

**Africa**

15. The EU continued to demonstrate its commitment to supporting the transition process in the DRC, through political action, assistance as well as ESDP operations. As the elections in the DRC draw near, the EU in May carried out a comprehensive review of the EU’s external action in the DRC.

16. Following a request from the UN on 27 December 2005 to deploy a military force to the DRC to provide support to MONUC (EUFOR RD Congo) during the electoral process, the Council on 23 March approved an Option Paper (Crisis Management Concept) and decided to answer positively to the UN request. EUFOR RD Congo will be part of the EU’s comprehensive approach in the DRC.

17. The Council started military planning of Operation EUFOR RD Congo and, following the adoption of UNSCR 1671, adopted a Joint Action on 27 April appointing Lieutenant-General Karlheinz Viereck EU Operation Commander and Major General Christian Damay EU Force Commander and identifying the OHQ in Potsdam. The decision to launch the operation has been adopted by the Council and preparations are ongoing in order to reach full operational capability by the date of the first round of the elections, i.e. 30 July 2006.

18. The DRC authorities have been consulted and have indicated they support the deployment of an EU force to support MONUC during the electoral process. This agreement was confirmed in a letter to the United Nations Security Council. Close consultations with the UN have been maintained throughout this process, both with MONUC and with DPKO. Regular technical meetings have been organised with DPKO to inform them on the state of play regarding the planning process. EUFOR RD Congo constitutes a further enhancement of the EU’s policy of co-operation with the UN in the field of crisis management.

19. The EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa) continued with its mentoring and advisory task regarding the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in accordance with its mandate. In addition, EUPOL Kinshasa participated in the ‘Groupe Mixte de Réflexion’ established by the Congolese Ministry of Interior regarding Police Reform. On 21 April EUPOL Kinshasa was extended until 31 December 2006 and, with a view to supporting the coordination of Congolese crowd control units in Kinshasa during the 2006 DRC elections, temporarily reinforced for a maximum of five months. Furthermore, Angola,
Cape Verde, Mali, Morocco, Senegal and South Africa were invited to participate in the temporary reinforcement of the Mission.

20. The mission EUSEC RD Congo has been fulfilling its mandate in the field of security sector reform since May 2005. It has contributed to the integration of 12 brigades for the new Congolese army. The short term objective is to complete this process through a third and final sequence involving the remaining combatants from former factions prior to the first round of national elections scheduled on 30 July 2006. EUSEC RD Congo will continue its advisory activities on the reform of the security sector with the newly elected government, in accordance with its mandate. Early 2006 the mission also undertook a technical assistance project on improving the chain of payments of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the DRC. This project aims at the modernisation of the MoD administration, thus contributing to the regularisation of the payment of salaries for the military. The Council decided on 25 April to extend the mandate of EUSEC RD Congo until 30 June 2007.

21. The EU has continued its civilian-military supporting action to the African Union Mission (AMIS II) in the Darfur region of Sudan. EU support to AMIS II was reviewed as part of a Single Comprehensive Review of Sudan, which Council noted in May 2006. The EU is providing continuing military assistance in the form of technical, planning and management support throughout the AMIS II command structure. Financial and logistic support has also been provided including the provision of strategic air transport. The EU is also continuing to provide the Vice President of the Cease Fire Commission and a number of EU military observers. EU police officers continue to play a key role in building AMIS II’s civilian policing capacity through support, advice and training to the AMIS II police chain of command and police officers on the ground. The EU is also continuing its support for the development of African Union policing capacity and the establishment of a police unit within the AU Secretariat in Addis Ababa.

22. The EU has maintained close and effective co-ordination with institutional and bilateral donors and worked closely and effectively with the UN, as well as with NATO regarding military support in theatre, including through a joint air transport cell in Addis Ababa. The EUSR for Sudan has played a key role in co-ordinating the EU’s support to the African Union including with other donors and actors in the region as well as in capitals. The EUSR also provided support to the African Union in its efforts to reach a comprehensive peace agreement for Darfur.

23. In view of the African Union’s Peace and Security Committee decision of 15 May 2006 to transfer its mission to the UN and the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May 2006, the EU has decided to continue both the civilian and military elements of the supporting action to AMIS II until 30 September 2006. The EU is considering the appro-
appropriate legal and operational framework and the additional resources and capabilities that may be required for this extended EU support action. The EU has stated its readiness to respond swiftly to any requests addressed to it to support the implementation of the peace agreement and to support, as appropriate, the planning for a UN transition.

Asia

24. Having completed its tasks related to monitoring the decommissioning of GAM and the relocation of GOI military forces, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) continued monitoring the reintegration of active GAM members, the human rights situation, the process of legislation change, rules on disputed amnesty cases and deals with complaints and alleged violations of the MoU signed by the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on 15 August 2005. Pending the adoption of the law of governing Aceh (LOGA) by the Indonesian Parliament, in view of the forthcoming local elections, and following invitations by the Government of Indonesia supported by GAM, the EU extended the Mission in March 2006 for three months until 15 June 2006 and in June 2006 for an additional and final period of three months, until 15 September 2006.

25. AMM is the first ESDP mission in Asia and it is an important step forward for EU-Indonesia relations. The mission is a strong and tangible expression of the EU’s commitment to peace and stability in Asia. It adds an important new dimension to the increasingly close EU-ASEAN cooperation. AMM is co-ordinating closely with other EU activities notably European Community programmes providing reintegration assistance for ex-GAM combatants and former detainees as well as communication and information tools on the MoU and the peace process.

II. Capabilities

Development of European Civilian Capabilities

26. Following the adoption of the Civilian Capability Improvement Plan by the Council on 12 December 2005, implementation under the Austrian Presidency of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008) focused on the following main issues:

- qualitative aspects of the EU civilian capabilities pledged by Member States in 2005;
- enhancement of the involvement in Civilian Crisis Management of sectoral ministries in Member States and the exchange of good practice for raising personnel for civilian crisis management missions;
- development of rapidly deployable civilian capabilities (CRT and IPU/FPU)
- development Support capabilities for civilian missions.
27. Member States’ replies to the CHG 2008 Questionnaire in 2005 provided a comprehensive indication of the availability of mission personnel for civilian ESDP. The Council General Secretariat, assisted by experts from Member States, undertook further qualitative assessment of Member States replies.

28. Work on exploring possibilities of assisting Member States to enhance involvement of sectoral ministries concerned and an exchange at EU level of information and best practices among them was launched on 12-13 January at the International Workshop “The role of the EU in Civilian Crisis Management”, in Vienna, supported by the Austrian Presidency, and was continued in a “seminar for EU Member States on Civilian Crisis Management: Operational Models” on 20 March 2006 in London, organised by the FCO.

29. Initial discussions were held on two main issues, aimed at speeding up the launching and deployment of operations and facilitating their operationality once on the ground, and namely (a) possible solutions to finance preparatory actions and (b) launching of tender procedures for framework contracts for faster and simplified procedures to procure essential mission equipment.

30. The implementation of the Civilian Response Team (CRT) concept adopted by the PSC in June 2005 continued with the objective of having an initial capacity of 100 experts ready for deployment at the end of 2006. Following nominations of more than 260 experts by Member States, 95 experts were selected across the priority areas and key supporting competencies. On the basis of a concept for CRT induction training, agreed by CIVCOM in January 2006, CRT experts are being trained in the framework of the European Community project on training for civilian aspects of crisis management.

31. As regards rapid deployment of police elements, the Police Unit of the Council General Secretariat, together with experts from the Member States, has developed standardized structures of Integrated Police Units (IPU) and Formed Police Units (FPU) designed to carry out the respective tasks that these units are entrusted with, according to the Concept for rapid deployment of police elements. This further implementing step of the Concept will promote a common understanding of those capabilities, and significantly enhance the interoperability between the units deployed by the Member States. In June 2006, CIVCOM delegates attended a training session for IPUs/FPUs in St. Astier/France organised by the Centre National de Formation de la Gendarmerie.

**Development of European Military Capabilities**

32. To facilitate the implementation of the **Headline Goal 2010** a Roadmap to the Progress Catalogue was developed as an important basis for achieving a far more advanced capability development process. It establishes a common understanding of the process
30 of Scrutinising, Assessing and Evaluating of capabilities, using the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), and in defining intermediate steps towards the Progress Catalogue in particular.

33. The Scrutinising Methodology was developed and the Scrutinising Handbook established, enabling Member States to conduct the self assessment and describing the way ahead towards the Force Catalogue via the clarification dialogue. The Scrutinising Handbook represents an important element in elaborating a qualitatively improved, capability based approach in the development of the EU’s military capabilities that will be used to establish the Force Catalogue as the next step in the CDM.

34. On the basis of the Requirements Catalogue 2005, Member States made their contributions using the Headline Goal Questionnaire. This new round of bidding was focussed on an improved level of refinement over previous Requirements Catalogues. Thereby the qualitative aspects of Member States’ contributions to fulfilling the Headline Goal 2010 will be emphasized in the development of EU military capabilities. Acceding States were integrated in the same bidding process as for Member States. An unclassified questionnaire was also sent to the non-EU European NATO-members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU. Their replies will be compiled in respective supplements to the Force Catalogue.

35. The main element in recent achievements towards the Headline Goal 2010 was the establishment of the Compilation of Member States’ Contributions. This represents an important step in preparing the Force Catalogue to be established in the second half of 2006, which will allow capability gaps to be identified, particularly those in respect of key “enablers” such as strategic airlift. Contributions of Acceding States are presented in a supplement to the Compilation of Member States’ Contributions.

36. Concerning ongoing work on developing an Operational Analysis (OA) Tool and Information Gathering (IG) System for the EU’s use, EU requirements for Operational Analysis in support of capability planning were analysed and tools defined to match the needs. A further step includes identifying options for the possible use of Operational Analysis tools and techniques. With regard to Information Gathering, lessons identified while collecting Member States’ contributions through the Headline Goal Questionnaire will be taken into account.

37. A milestone in the improvement of the Strategic Airlift capabilities was achieved with the formal approval of the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) by 15 EU Member States plus Canada and Norway, thereby ensuring timely availability of an additional capability to deploy outsized cargo. It was recognised that SALIS has further growth potential and will also in the future remain open to participation by other EU Member
States and NATO nations. SALIS is a good example of the fruitful co-operation in finding effective and efficient solutions to overlapping capability shortfalls of EU and NATO.

38. Another element aimed at improving the European strategic transport capability was the launch of the initiative for "Improving Strategic Airlift Capability across Europe" and work done so far. In this context the EDA was invited, as part of ongoing work, to identify potential airlift solutions and co-ordinate requirements between participating Member States, keeping the EUMC informed.

39. Most of the remaining tasks within the framework of the Global Approach on Deployability were completed in the first semester of 2006. The remainder of the tasks will be completed in the second half of 2006.

40. With regard to the maritime dimension in ESDP, work continued on investigating the contribution of EU maritime forces in ESDP missions/operations and their use in a rapid response capacity.

41. With regard to Rapid Response, during the last Battlegroup co-ordination conference, Member States have committed the required number of Battlegroup packages for 2007, 2008 and 2009, with the exception of one gap in 2009. Indications have been given that the first half of 2010 will be completely filled. The Member States providing Battle Groups in the first half of 2007 have decided to provide naval enablers for these Battlegroups. The conceptual work on Battlegroups has continued, in particular the "Health and medical support Annex to the EU Battlegroup" and the Battlegroup Lessons learned methodology have been agreed. Work is ongoing on the "Reserves requirement for the BG Concept". It is ensured that from January 2007 onwards the EU will have the Full Operational Capability to undertake two Battlegroupsized rapid response operations, including the ability to launch two such operations nearly simultaneously.

42. In line with the “EU Military Rapid Response Concept”, consideration is being given to a “Rapid Response Air Initiative” for further development within the framework of the Headline Goal 2010. This initiative aims at enhancing the generation of Air Rapid Response elements and proposes a draft concept for a European Deployable Air Station.

43. The completion of the migration from European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) Project Groups to more integrated structures in the framework of the EDA is foreseen by the end of 2006. The majority of Project Groups have migrated.

44. In May the Council noted the Single Progress Report on the development of EU military capabilities, drawn up in line with the EU Capability Development Mechanism,
including the Capability Improvement Chart, which records progress made in the development of EU military capabilities since November 2005.

**European Defence Agency**

45. The European Defence Agency continued to make progress across a wide range of activities, with a particular emphasis on Capabilities and Research & Technology in pursuance of the Hampton Court agenda. The report submitted by the Head of the Agency on its activities was noted by the Council on 15 May. Good cooperation between EDA and the European Commission continued. The EUMC and EDA continued to work closely together on the improvement of the EU’s defence capabilities as well as on the reinforcement of the EU’s systematic and comprehensive capability development process.

46. On Defence Research & Technology, the Agency’s Steering Board supported the aim to spend more, spend better and spend more together. A new approach for funding and managing joint investment in R&T is being developed. By the end of June a multi-annual programme on force protection encompassing a number of projects will be defined, enabling Member States who so choose to invest in this collaborative endeavour from the beginning of 2007.

47. For the benefit of a smooth transition of R&T Projects from the former WEAG/WEAO structure to the EDA, the Administrative Arrangement between the Agency and the Kingdom of Norway was concluded.

48. On Capabilities, the Agency has focussed on three top priorities. In the area of Command, Control and Communications important initiatives are maturing, in particular on Software-Defined Radio, in co-operation with the Commission, and on a Theatre Imagery Exploitation System. Noting the improvements achieved through SALIS, the Agency is working on potential solutions to reduce shortfalls in the field of Strategic Lift as well as concerning Air-to-Air Refuelling. The Agency will further investigate new approaches in this regard.

49. Work on the Code of Conduct Regime on Defence Procurement was completed and it will come into operation on 1 July 2006, opening up the European Defence Equipment Market to suppliers across Europe. So far, 22 Member States have joined this voluntary regime, which is expected to create new opportunities for companies across Europe, strengthen our defence technological and industrial base and offer better value for money for defence.

50. The development of an initial Long-term Vision for ESDP capability needs is progressing. It will be available for Member States’ consideration in the autumn of 2006.
ESDP and Space

51. Following the finalisation of work covering generic space system needs for military operations as well as space system requirements stemming from the Requirements Catalogue 2005, work has started on how best to meet those requirements, including in the context of the development of the European Space Programme (currently under elaboration by the European Commission and the European Space Agency (ESA)).

III. Civil-Military Co-ordination

52. The Civil-Military Cell has reached its full strength. It has provided a contribution to the setting up of ESDP civilian and military operations in Aceh, Rafah and the DRC. In addition, it also contributed to work on military support for disaster relief. In order to be operational in the coming months, work on the Operations Centre was focused on manning, infrastructure including communications, training and on the development of procedures and concepts.

53. Building on the work carried out during the previous Presidencies, the Austrian Presidency initiated a Framework paper of possible solutions for the management of EU crisis management operations, noted by the PSC as a living document. This Framework paper provides some concrete recommendations and possible solutions for Civil-Military Coordination in the field and will serve as an orientation guide for further work.

54. In accordance with the Council Conclusions of 21 November 2005, the Council and Commission have jointly conducted Single Comprehensive Reviews on EU Activities in BiH, Sudan, DRC and Aceh.

IV. Security Sector Reform

55. Building on the work carried out under the previous presidency on Security Sector Reform (SSR), the Austrian Presidency held a seminar in Vienna in February 2006, to discuss SSR in the Western Balkans. The Seminar and subsequent report were conducted in cooperation with the EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). The Council, on 15 May 2006, underlined the importance and the general principles of a comprehensive EU approach to SSR in the Western Balkans and invited the Council General Secretariat and the Commission to elaborate an overview of ongoing EU SSR activities in the regions.

56. In June the Council welcomed the release of the European Commission Communication “A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector
Reform”. This Concept complements the Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform, adopted in November 2005. Together the two concepts constitute a policy framework for EU engagement in Security Sector Reform.

57. Building upon the comprehensive strategy underpinning a “Partnership for Security” between the EU and the countries of the Western Balkans, worked out by the Council in December 2005, CIVCOM contributed to the elaboration of the Action Oriented Paper (AOP) on Improving Cooperation on Organised Crime, Corruption, Illegal Immigration and Counter-terrorism, between the EU and the Western Balkans countries, referring to the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice, underlining the contribution of civilian ESDP missions in support of the fight against organised crime originating from or linked to the Western Balkans.

V. Human Rights Issues and Conflict Prevention

58. In the field of conflict prevention, the EU has continued to develop its instruments for long and short-term prevention. The Presidency Report to the European Council on EU activities in the framework of prevention, including implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts sets out progress in this field.

59. Following the practice established under previous presidencies, a conference entitled “What future for EU Conflict Prevention? Five years after Göteborg and how to move on” was jointly organised by the Presidency, the European Commission and the European Peace building Liaison Office (EPLO) on 3rd May 2006. This conference brought together practitioners and representatives of Member States, the European Commission, the Council General Secretariat, NGOs, civil society, think tanks and academia as well as Members of the European Parliament to share best practice and develop ideas for future EU capacity building in the field of conflict prevention. The Presidency subsequently informed the European Parliament on the outcome of this conference as well as on current work in the field of civilian crisis management.

60. Work on mainstreaming of human rights into CFSP, incl. ESDP, has continued – not least through awareness raising in relevant Council working groups and committees. The chairs of PMG and CIVCOM as well as an advisor to Chairman of the EUMC met with the EU Human Rights Directors working group (COHOM). Relevant human rights issues have been increasingly taken into account and integrated, as appropriate, in all phases of operations, especially during the planning phase. In this respect the experience from crisis management operations with a particular emphasis on human rights, such as the Aceh Monitoring Mission, should be duly taken into account. The SG/HR’s personal representative for human rights has contributed to this mainstreaming of human rights aspects into EU crisis management.
61. Work has continued to implement the document on **Implementation of UNSCR 1325** on women, peace and security in the context of ESDP and gender mainstreaming. An exchange of national best practices on gender mainstreaming and the implementation of UNSCR 1325 has taken place which resulted in a call for a check list to be developed to ensure a proper gender perspective throughout the planning process and conduct of ESDP operations. The Institute for Security Studies is conducting a case study on the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 in the context of the EU presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

62. Work has continued to address the issue of **children in armed conflict** as a follow up to the EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict. Based on the review of progress made towards the implementation of the guidelines, an implementation strategy was developed. It includes a check list for the integration of the protection of children affected by armed conflict, to be introduced into ESDP missions.

63. Work has begun on considering how the issue of **transitional justice** can be better integrated into EU crisis management, reflecting the importance for sustainable peace and stability in addressing the question of past human rights abuse in transitional and post-conflict situations. In March 2006, the Political and Security Committee held a seminar on transitional justice which explored how strategies to confront past human rights abuses in the context of major political transformations could be integrated into EU crisis management. This seminar is being followed by further work aiming at the development of concrete recommendations on integrating transitional justice into EU planning for ESDP operations.

**VI. EU Emergency and Crisis Response**

64. On 15 May the Council noted the document “General framework for the use of Member States’ military or military chartered transportation assets and ESDP coordination tools in support of EU disaster response” developed in the framework of the SG/HR proposals in the context of the Hampton Court follow-up, and agreed its way ahead. The Council endorsed the respective conclusions on getting assistance quickly where needed. As envisaged by the general framework, the elaboration of detailed procedures and information exchange has already started. While this work evolves, an interim capability is being ensured, elements of which were used in reaction to the earthquake in Indonesia. The Council will continue to follow this issue and assess progress in the course of 2006.

65. Work also started on the SG/HR proposals concerning ESDP tools and military support to EU disaster response, with the elaboration of a draft framework on the identification and coordination of assets and capabilities. This i.a. also relates to the ongoing work on deepening and widening the database of military assets and capabilities relevant
to the protection of civilian populations to include natural and man-made disasters. Just as the military or military chartered transportation assets referred to above, the assets and capabilities contained in the database of military assets and capabilities relevant to the protection of civilian populations are made available by Member States on a voluntary basis.

66. Progress in this field is also reflected in the Presidency report to the European Council on 15/16 June on Reinforcing the Union’s emergency and crisis response capacities.

VII. EU-Training in ESDP

67. In view of the expanding role and activity of ESDP, proper training is becoming an increasingly important element of ESDP. The Council approved the EU Training Programme in ESDP for the years 2006-2008. Training activities in the field of ESDP of the various European actors and of the Member States have been thoroughly evaluated by the annual Final Training Report and steps identified to further improve training activities have been approved by the Council, taking into account the need for a balanced approach between civilian and military training.

68. Furthermore, a review of the training requirements in the field of ESDP has been conducted and agreed by the PSC. This review will serve as a basis for the development and design of the training programmes of all relevant training actors in the field of ESDP including the ESDC, CEPOL, EDP, Community Projects and Member States.

69. The European Security and Defence College (ESDC) successfully continued its work on establishing a network between national institutes. A first General Annual Report has been adopted by the ESDC Steering Committee describing the progress reached so far and the activities conducted. The first official ESDP High Level Course was concluded in March. Nationals of Candidate States, Third States as well as representatives of International Organisations were for the first time invited to participate in three ESDP Orientation Courses. One of the two courses, which were organised by the Austrian Presidency, was open specifically for Western Balkan States. This is an example that may be followed for other regions. The third course, organised by Lithuania in close cooperation with France, was aimed at Eastern European countries. The aim of this important initiative is to promote a better understanding of ESDP as an essential part of CFSP and to enhance transparency, thus contributing to the development of a shared security culture.

70. Also in the context of the College activities, a seminar with national experts took place in Brussels in February to examine possibilities for establishing an Internet Based
Advanced Distance Learning System. The results of this seminar were included in the General Annual Report of the ESDC. On 9 June, a networking conference organised by the Austrian Presidency took place with the aim of enhancing transparency and cooperation between the national and EU training actors in the field of ESDP.

71. The increase and development of civilian crisis management operations has brought a greater focus to the need for training of civilian staff for crisis management operations. The Council General Secretariat, in close co-operation with the Commission, will present before the end of the Austrian Presidency, a paper setting out future training needs for personnel in civilian crisis management operations taking full account of the different instruments used for civilian crisis management activities (civilian ESDP operations, support teams in the framework of offices of EUSR’s, community projects, notably under the Rapid Reaction Mechanism).

VIII. Exercises

72. The EU Evacuation Operation Exercise Study (EVAC 06), which was conducted on 5 April, provided a useful opportunity for the Political and Security Committee (with delegations supported by military and consular experts) to consider aspects related to planning and conducting an EU evacuation operation using military means as well as the necessary coordination modalities with the consular authorities. As a follow-up, and taking into account other relevant ongoing work, a concept on EU evacuation operations with military means should be elaborated by the Council General Secretariat for consideration by the PSC.

73. The EU Civilian Instruments Workshop (CIVIL 06) was the first civilian-only exercise-related activity organised by the EU in the framework of ESDP. It examined ways of enhancing rapid deployment of ESDP civilian capabilities, addressing specifically rapidly deployable Police elements, Civilian response teams (CRTs) and Civilian integrated missions (i.e. missions using 2 or more civilian instruments, e.g. Police and Rule of Law). Speakers with a particular expertise in the rapid deployment of civilian capabilities from Third States and International Organisations also attended the workshop.

74. In the framework of the EU Exercise Programme 2006-2010 the Crisis Management Exercise 2006 (CME 06) had been scheduled to be conducted from 25 September to 6 October 2006. The planning and preparation of this exercise, its documentation as well as the development of a new scenario were well on the way and had advanced considerably during the Austrian Presidency. This exercise had to be cancelled due to the real life commitment of the Headquarters involved in the exercise. In order to achieve at least some goals of the cancelled exercise, an exercise study (EST 06) will be held during the Finnish Presidency. It will focus on an accelerated decision making process.
75. The Council approved the European Union Exercise Programme for the years 2007-2011.

IX. ESDP and Africa

76. The **EU Strategy for Africa** has become a document of reference for EU action. A joint implementation matrix has been developed with the African Union that sets out the commitments of the two sides in relation to the Cairo Plan of Action, the AU policy agenda and the EU Strategy for Africa. Furthermore, in the framework of the EU-African dialogue, at the 6th Ministerial Meeting of the African and EU Troikas, Ministers agreed that the EU Strategy shall be transformed into a Joint EU/Africa Strategy ideally to be adopted on the occasion of the 2nd EU/Africa Summit.

77. In terms of concrete implementation of the Strategy commitments **in the area of peace and security**, the EU has recently decided to replenish in the short term the Africa Peace Facility (APF) with EURO 50 million from the 9th EDF responding to AU request to provide increased funding for African Peace Support Operations. The EU also decided to continue the African Peace Facility under the next financial framework, starting with EURO 300 million from 2008 to 2010 from the 10th EDF. African-led missions in the Union of Comoros and in the Central African Republic will also be supported by the EU through the APF.

78. **Co-operation with the AU and the Sub-Regional Organisations** has been intensified in the context of the establishment of the African Stand-by Force where the EU is leading the workshops on doctrine and standard operating procedures (SOP) and funding is being provided by the APF.

79. The EU, through the EUSR for the African Great Lakes Region, also co-chaired a RECAMP (Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix) politico-strategic conference in Brazzaville.

X. Co-operation with International Organisations, Mediterranean Partners and Third Countries

EU-NATO

80. The **EU and NATO** have continued to develop further their strategic partnership in crisis management. In Bosnia and Herzegovina their co-operation on operation Althea in the context of the Berlin Plus arrangements has continued to be smooth and efficient. The EU and NATO have moreover continued to co-operate through a joint cell in Addis Ababa to ensure effective support to AMIS in the Darfur.
81. Co-operation and transparency between EU and NATO have been further enhanced through the setting up of a permanent EU cell at SHAPE and a permanent NATO liaison team at the EU Military Staff.

82. In the field of capability development, the EU-NATO Capability Group has continued to exchange information, in accordance with the Capabilities Development Mechanism, discussing inter alia EU Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force as well as some specific capability areas of common interest such as Software Defined Radio and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. All EU Member States were kept informed about these issues.

83. Work continues aiming to ensure compatibility between the EU HGQ and the NATO DPQ.

EU-UN

84. The EU-UN co-operation in the field of ESDP continued to develop, notably through the preparation of the EU operation in the DRC in support of MONUC. Coordination was also focussed on the transition from AMIS to a UN operation in Sudan/Darfur as well as on ensuring a smooth transition between UNMIK and a possible civilian ESDP mission in Kosovo. Staff-to-staff meetings, supported by the EUMS liaison officer to the UN, proved helpful. Furthermore, representatives of the UN participated in preparation meetings for CME 06 as well as in CIVIL 06.

85. A technical arrangement on modalities for support provided by MONUC to EUPOL KINSHASA was agreed on 23 January 2006. Regarding EUSEC RD Congo, there was an exchange of letters between the Head of Mission and the UN Special Representative on MONUC support to EUSEC personnel deployed in the East. Further discussions remain necessary to expand this support, in particular on access to airlift.

86. Meetings between representatives of both the EU and the UN continued to take place, inter alia through the consultative mechanism known as the EU-UN Steering Committee which took place in New York on 8-9 June 2006.

EU-OSCE

87. In 2006, the EU-OSCE partnership and work co-operation intensified further. Political and expert dialogue was covered by regular meetings at different levels. EU Presidency workshops discussed ways of making civilian crisis management components between EU-OSCE more interoperable, in particular in mission support, recruitment and training.
88. On 15 May 2006 the Brussels EU-OSCE Ministerial Troika bi-annual meeting facilitated a debate on all major issues of crisis management in European conflict zones. The EU submitted to the OSCE a proposal for a Joint Declaration on Enhanced EU-OSCE Co-operation, laying the ground for further and stronger co-operation.

EU-AU

89. Co-operation also intensified with the African Union and the African sub-regional organisations, through EU support both to the AU’s AMIS II mission and to longer-term capacity building measures (see section IX).

Mediterranean Partners

90. A Euro-Med meeting on ESDP, co-chaired by the PSC Chair, took place on 31 May. The meeting addressed ways in which dialogue on ESDP and security issues could be pursued with a view to strengthening co-operation, on a voluntary basis in a number of areas. Activities could include inter alia ESDC orientation courses as well as a seminar to be co-organised by the ISS and a partner country.

Third Countries

91. In the framework of the Road Map for the Common Space on External Security, work continued to strengthen the dialogue with Russia on matters of practical cooperation in crisis management in order to prepare the ground for joint initiatives. An exchange of letters took place in this context covering concrete proposals to implement the road map. An EU-Russia experts meeting took place on 9 February 2006. Also in line with the road map, Russia participated in two ESDP training courses of the ESDC.

92. Negotiations with Turkey were successfully concluded on an Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey which will, after its signature and ratification, establish a framework for the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the European Union crisis management operations. Turkey’s contribution for the EU military operation in DRC has been accepted.

XI. Field Security

93. A Policy on the security of personnel deployed outside the EU in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty on European Union was agreed by the Council. The policy largely codifies and builds on existing practice. It applies to all operational deployments of civilian and military personnel in the field under Title V of the TEU, in particu-
lar crisis management operations and EUSRs and their teams. A number of areas were identified in which further work will need to be carried out in the implementation of the policy.

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Upon the initiative of France, the question of possible co-operation concerning the demolition of decommissioned war ships has been raised. Work has been initiated on the development of guidelines for the protection of environmental and health issues in relation to EU military crisis management operations.

XII. Mandate for the Incoming Presidency

On the basis of the present report and taking into account the European Security Strategy, the incoming Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative and in association with the Commission, is invited to continue work on developing the European Security and Defence Policy, and in particular:

- To prepare and ensure the effective implementation of the decisions related to present and future operations and missions, both civilian and military.
- To continue work on civilian capabilities, in particular to meet the shortfalls identified, and on mission support, with a view to the Capabilities Improvement Conference (Civilian Headline Goal 2008).
- To continue work on military capabilities, in particular the finalisation of the Force Catalogue and the preparation of the Progress Catalogue on the basis of the agreed Roadmap (Headline Goal 2010).
- To continue work on rapid response, in particular the EU Battlegroups initiative with a view to the full operational capability from January 2007, and the Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) to ensure an initial CRT capacity by the end of 2006.
- To support the continued development of the European Defence Agency.
- To take forward work on ESDP-aspects related to reinforcing the EU’s emergency and crisis response capacities.
- To take forward work on the improvement of civil-military co-ordination in the planning and conduct of operations, including lessons learned and mission support.
- To take forward work on security sector reform (SSR), including through region/country specific approaches, and to develop an EU approach to contribute to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).
- To ensure effective implementation of relevant human rights related undertakings in the context of ESDP crisis management activities, including the UNSCR 1612, as well as the UNSCR 1325.
- To continue the implementation of the European Programme for the Prevention of
Violent Conflicts on the basis of the annual presidency report 2006.

- To continue to develop ESDP support to peace and security in Africa, including the elaboration of policy options for the strengthening of EU support to building African capacity for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.
- To implement the EU exercise programme and the training concept, including further work on training for civilian crisis management taking into account Community instruments.
- To conduct the review of the ATHENA financing mechanism.
- To enhance dialogue and exchange of information with NGOs and civil society.
- To pursue the dialogue and co-operation with the UN and the OSCE, to continue to develop the EU/NATO strategic partnership in crisis management, to develop co-operation with the African Union and African sub-regional organisations, as well as to develop co-operation with partner countries, including the European non-EU NATO members, Canada, Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean countries engaged in the Barcelona process.
Energy

Brussels, June 2006

AN EXTERNAL POLICY TO SERVE EUROPE’S ENERGY INTERESTS – PAPER FROM COMMISSION/SG/HR FOR THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

Facing external energy risks

The EU and the world need reliable, affordable and sustainable flows of energy. This is a key element for economic development and the achievement of the Lisbon goals. There is an obvious link between energy security, sustainability and competitiveness.

Increasing dependence on imports from unstable regions and suppliers presents a serious risk. Some major producers and consumers have been using energy as a political lever. Other risks include the effects on the EU internal energy market of external actors not playing by the same market rules nor being subject to the same competitive pressures domestically.

A secure energy supply requires a combination of internal and external policies. More action is needed at EU level – this is why on the basis of the Commission Green Paper\(^1\) the European Council called for an Energy Policy for Europe and a prioritised Action Plan to be adopted at its 2007 spring meeting, following the Strategic Review to be presented by the Commission by the end of 2006. It also invited the European Commission and the Secretary-General/ High Representative in the meantime to provide input for an EU strategy on external energy relations.

The legitimate right of individual Member States to pursue their own external relations for ensuring security of energy supplies and to choose their internal energy mix is not in question. Nonetheless, the development of a coherent and focussed external EU energy policy, drawing on the full range of EU internal and external policies, would enhance the collective external energy security of the Union. It would also help the EU face more effectively possible strategies by major external energy suppliers to adversely influence market fundamentals.

This paper considers how EU external relations, including CFSP, can be used more effectively to pursue our common objective of securing reliable flows of affordable and environmentally sustainable energy.

It is necessarily preliminary and intended to open up debate. But it also highlights concrete actions that could be put into motion straightaway. External energy relations cannot be separated artificially from the wider question of what sort of energy policy the EU and its Member States want. The response to that question will be part of the Action

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Plan to be put forward next spring. A more fully developed internal policy is a pre-condition for delivering the EU’s external energy interests, and for better judging what leverage the EU is able to bring to bear in its external relations for furthering these interests.

**Guiding principles**

In order to enhance the external security of energy supplies of the EU, it is important that a coherent approach be adopted that pursues the following objectives:

1. Promoting transparency and improved governance in the energy sector through energy partnerships with third countries, the objective being to create mutually beneficial, open, transparent, non-discriminatory and stable legal conditions for energy investment and trade.
2. Improving production and export capacities in producer countries and developing and upgrading energy transportation infrastructure in producer and transit countries.
3. Improving the climate for European companies’ investments in third countries and opening up the production and export of energy resources to EU industry.
4. Improving conditions for trade in energy through non-discriminatory transit and third party access to export pipeline infrastructure.
5. Enhancing physical and environmental security as well as the energy infrastructure safety.
6. Encouraging energy efficiency, use of renewable energies including biofuels, low emission technology and rational use of energy worldwide.
7. Implementing the relevant Kyoto Protocol mechanisms.
8. Diversifying energy imports by product and country.
9. Creating an international regime for the supply of enriched uranium to countries that have chosen the nuclear option, in line with non-proliferation commitments and taking into account the EURATOM treaty provisions.
10. Promoting strategic reserve stocks and encouraging joint stock holding with partner countries.

At this stage, it would be useful to consider two building blocks of energy security: functioning markets and diversification.

**Functioning markets**

Well-functioning world markets are the best way of ensuring safe and affordable energy supplies. They create a resilient and responsive world energy supply, facilitate investment decisions, cushion shocks and provide security for both customers and producers. But markets do not operate in a vacuum; they need physical and legal infrastructure, as well as information and transparency, and the active participation of major players.
This could be achieved by the EU extending its own energy market to include its neighbours within a common regulatory area with shared trade, transit and environmental rules. More widely, the EU should advocate reciprocity in market opening and respect for market rules: non discrimination, competition, transparency and enforcement.

We need to convince non EU consumer countries that world energy markets can work for them. If they were to conclude that the only route to security lay in bilateral deals, the risk of disruption of the energy system would grow.

Diversification

EU energy security can be enhanced by diversifying energy sources and geographical origin as well as transit routes. The EU should facilitate the maintenance and upgrade of existing energy infrastructure in neighbouring countries of key importance to the EU as well as the development of new infrastructure.

There are a number of new gas projects which have either been decided or are in an advanced stage of planning (North Africa, Middle East, Caspian region, Russia and Norway). If completed, they could create new energy corridors and new import capacity amounting to a significant share of the EU’s current gas consumption. In addition, LNG terminals offer a particular contribution to security of supply. The development of major international pipelines to deliver oil from the Caspian region and Central Asia to the EU is also vital.

All instruments, ranging from political dialogues and Community policies such as trade, development, competition, research and environment through to financial grants and loans, including those of the EIB, EBRD and other IFIs, should be used in a coherent manner to speed up the completion of these infrastructure projects.

Getting results

This analysis demonstrates the importance of having an EU external relations policy on energy. It must be coherent (backed up by all Union policies, the Member States and industry), strategic (fully recognising the geo-political dimensions of energy-related security issues) and focused (geared towards initiatives where Union-level action can have a clear impact in furthering its interests). It must also be consistent with the EU’s broader foreign policy objectives such as conflict prevention and resolution, non-proliferation and promoting human rights.

An external energy policy has to be based on a clear prior identification of EU interests, and reliable risk assessments. This means ensuring that the EU has the necessary monitoring capabilities to provide early warning and enhance its capacity to respond. The EU should envisage a network of energy security correspondents, including representatives from the Member States, the Commission and the Council General Secretariat to monitor energy security, and develop analysis and action plans. The European Energy
Supply Observatory could also make a valuable contribution.

An effective external policy on energy depends on being able to harness our considerable collective resources and put them at the service of shared interests. That means engaging with producer, transit and consumer countries to produce results. And it means acknowledging that political challenges require dialogue at political level (including Heads of State and Government) on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis.

Possible initiatives that could be developed include:

**At bilateral level**
- Considering that the EU and Russia are and will remain interdependent in the energy sector, work towards a comprehensive agreement with Russia covering all energy products. The aim should be integration of the EU and Russian energy markets in a mutually beneficial, reciprocal, transparent and non discriminatory manner. Such an agreement should ideally be negotiated in the context of the post PCA contractual framework.
- Continue to pursue the strategic energy partnership with Norway (including supporting its wish to join the Energy Community Treaty) and pursue a similar approach with Algeria.
- Help Turkey to make full use of its potential to become a major energy transit hub and in particular promote its rapid integration into the Energy Community Treaty.
- Implement the EU-Ukraine MoU on energy cooperation, the inclusion of a comprehensive energy chapter in the future bilateral agreement and envisage Ukraine’s integration into the Energy Community Treaty.
- Place particular emphasis on the implementation of the energy-related provisions of the ENP Action Plans.
- Develop bilateral energy cooperation with important producer and transit partners in North and continental Africa, the Caucasus, the Caspian Basin and Central Asia, the Middle East and the Gulf, as well as Latin America.
- Enhance bilateral dialogue and cooperation with key consumer countries, particularly the US (where a more political dialogue on energy is needed) as well as Japan, China and India in a bid to seek a common approach to global energy issues. The objective would be to improve the transparency and operation of world energy markets, and to develop sustainable energy resources and energy efficiency.

**At regional level**
- Extend the EU’s internal market, through expansion of the Energy Community Treaty to include relevant EEA and ENP countries.
- Develop regulatory convergence through the ENP in order to improve to investment climate and provide a level playing field in terms of market opening, fair competition, and environmental protection and safety.
At multilateral level

- Integrate the EU’s energy objectives fully into its multilateral trade policy and pursue these through the WTO, as appropriate.
- Conclude the negotiations of the Energy Charter Transit Protocol and secure the ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty by all signatories to the Charter.
- Encourage Member States which are members of the G8 and the Commission to use this forum to promote the EU’s energy interests, including in the G8+5 format which brings together key producers and consumers.
- Consider how to strengthen cooperation with the International Energy Agency and extend its membership.
- Promote an international agreement on energy efficiency, boost development of renewable energies and deployment of energy efficient technologies.

The European Council is invited to consider whether these proposals should constitute input into the wider reflection process leading to an Energy Policy for Europe and an overall Action Plan to be agreed in Spring 2007, and to what extent they should be implemented already in advance of the outcome of this wider process.

Annex: EU gas and oil consumption in 2004 by source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>GAS</th>
<th>OIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Import from Russia</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import from Norway</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import from the Middle East</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Import from Algeria</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Import from North Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous production</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Regions</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EU-US Summit

VIENNA SUMMIT DECLARATION

We, the leaders of the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (U.S.), met today in Vienna to respond to the concerns of our citizens for peace, security, stability and prosperity in an increasingly globalised world.

We welcome that over the past year our Transatlantic Partnership has delivered real results as shown by the political and economic Progress Reports we issued today. We remain committed to finding common or complementary lines of action in many areas. Over the last year there have been many examples of how productive our relationship is, in the Middle East, Iran, the Western Balkans, Belarus, on the frozen conflicts, and Sudan, as well as in our efforts to promote transatlantic trade and investment under last Summit’s Economic Initiative.

We have decided to further strengthen our strategic Partnership by adopting a number of priority actions to support our cooperation in the following four areas:

- Promoting peace, human rights and democracy worldwide;
- Confronting global challenges, including security;
- Fostering prosperity and opportunity;
- Promoting strategic cooperation on energy and energy security, climate change and sustainable development.

Promoting Peace, Human Rights and Democracy Worldwide

We recognise that the advance of democracy is a strategic priority of our age. We will intensify our efforts to promote peace, democracy, freedom, the rule of law and respect for human rights in the world to make it more secure, safe, and prosperous for all mankind. Noting the need for tolerance of diverse cultures, beliefs and religions and the importance of dialogue while emphasising respect for universal human rights, we will sustain our efforts to advance democracy.

We will work with the United Nations and international and regional organisations, civil society, non-governmental organisations and dedicated individuals committed to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. We will work to ensure that the newly created Human Rights Council becomes an effective and efficient body committed to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. We underline our shared commitment to UN-Reform and we welcome the establishment of and give our backing to the Peacebuilding Commission and the UN Democracy Fund.
We will continue to support reform in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East and will promote greater participation of civil society in the reform process through our respective efforts, including the Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, and our joint actions through the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative and the Foundation and Fund for the Future.

We will continue to closely cooperate in the Middle East, notably through the Quartet. We welcome the temporary international mechanism to deliver assistance directly to the Palestinian people. We will continue to deliver humanitarian assistance and promote Palestinian democracy and civil society. Whilst recalling President Abbas’ commitment to a platform of peace, we will continue to urge the new Palestinian government to commit to non-violence, recognise Israel’s right to exist and accept existing agreements and obligations. We will continue to call on Israel to ease restrictions on access and movement and to take additional steps including with respect to the Palestinian tax and customs revenues, to improve the humanitarian situation of the Palestinian people. We remind both sides of their obligations under the 15 November 2005 Agreement. We will continue to promote a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of the Roadmap in order to advance a just, viable and lasting two-state solution and we call on both parties to avoid unilateral measures that prejudice final status issues. We call on the Palestinian Authority government to implement policies that will permit the international community to provide greater support to and review its policies on contact with the Palestinian Authority.

We will strongly urge Syria to implement United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1559, 1595, 1636, 1680 and 1686 and to prevent its territory from being used to support violence in Iraq, and end cross-border transit and support for terrorist groups.

Similarly, Syria must end its support for Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, and prevent the smuggling of arms and other support to these groups. We will work together to increase support for human rights and democracy, and secure the release of political prisoners in Syria. We will strongly urge Syria to refrain from any attempt at destabilising Lebanon.

We will jointly support political, economic and institutional reforms in Lebanon, as well as its sovereignty, democracy, territorial integrity, unity and political independence. We will strengthen efforts to coordinate assistance to Lebanon, and we support the reform plan of the Lebanese government and seek to work towards an international Core Group conference. We support the efforts of the Lebanese government to disarm and disband Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, as called for in UNSCR 1559 and 1680, and we will support the call expressed by the UN Security Council to halt the flow of arms and funds to terrorist groups and militias. We support UNSCR 1686 and the continuation of the investigation of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.
We support progress by the Government of Egypt towards ensuring fundamental freedoms and building multi-party democracy. We will continue to encourage the Egyptian government to proceed with the fundamental political and constitutional reforms it announced, particularly by replacing the emergency law with a counterterrorism law in conformity with international human rights standards.

We will support the newly constitutionally elected government of Iraq and call upon it to continue the policies of inclusiveness as a means to overcome divisions within Iraq. We will continue to assist in building an independent, stable, secure, democratic, prosperous and united Iraq at peace with its neighbours and the international community. We call on the international community to show its support for the new government in particular by increasing development, rule of law, and security assistance, offering capacity building support, providing generous debt relief on terms equivalent to the Paris Club Agreement and extending its local presence keeping in mind the security situation.

Over the past year our cooperation on Iran has reached a new level. We have worked closely together at every stage of the ongoing attempts to address the question of Iran’s nuclear programme. We have agreed on a set of far-reaching proposals as a basis for discussion with Iran. We believe that they offer Iran the chance to reach a negotiated agreement based on cooperation, if Iran is willing to make that choice. The United States has made clear that it is prepared to join the negotiations should Iran resume full and verifiable suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities as required by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We have agreed that if Iran decides not to engage in negotiations, further steps would be taken in the Security Council. We urge Iran to take the positive path.

Building on the success of the London January 2006 conference on Afghanistan, we will support Afghan efforts to build a democratic, accountable and sustainable state. We will pay particular importance to governance, human rights, reform of the public administration, the judiciary and security sector, counter-narcotics as well as an Afghan-led process of reconciliation and justice.

Recognising the next year to be a crucial period for the Western Balkans, we will build on the experience of our successful transatlantic cooperation by cooperating to stabilise the countries in the region, support their European and Euro-Atlantic perspectives and to combat organised crime and corruption. We will continue to work with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as well as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to ensure the security and prosperity of the region. On Kosovo in particular, we will continue to ensure the convergence of our positions on the ongoing talks in order to promote a lasting status that respects the Contact Group principles. We will develop our relations with Montenegro as a sovereign, independent State and call on both Serbia and Montenegro to pursue a direct and constructive dialogue on their future relations.

Ukraine has made remarkable progress in democratic and economic reforms. Building on the March 2006 elections, we will support Ukraine’s development as a dem-
ocratic, prosperous and secure country. We will help Ukraine pursue economic reforms, combat corruption and reform the energy sector.

We will continue to support the democratic aspirations of the people of Belarus and work together to strengthen democratic institutions, assist civil society, and promote independent media. We condemn the use of violence in Belarus and the repression of the democratic opposition and we urge the authorities of Belarus to release all political detainees. The travel ban imposed on President Lukashenko and others, as well as the freezing of assets of individuals responsible for violations of international election standards and human rights abuses, are good examples of our broad cooperation and coordination. We remain resolved to help the people of Belarus achieve their aspirations for a better future.

We will contribute to finding a solution to the Transnistrian conflict that assures Moldova’s territorial integrity. We will work with all relevant parties to resolve through peaceful, negotiated settlements the frozen conflicts in the Southern Caucasus and encourage the democratic processes in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

We will work together to promote democratic and economic reforms, human rights, freedom of expression and the press, the rule of law in Central Asia to promote international security and stability. We continue to call upon the government of Uzbekistan to facilitate an independent international investigation into the tragic events of Andijan.

We attach great importance to our relationship with Russia and are pursuing deeper cooperation on a range of issues of common interest, including some important foreign policy issues, non-proliferation and counterterrorism. We are concerned about some recent developments in Russia and the region and will work with Russia to promote energy security, the application of the rule of law, an independent judiciary and full respect for human rights, including free and independent media and a vibrant civil society, and a resolution of frozen conflicts in the region. We will make constructive use of the OSCE as an important forum for cooperative and comprehensive security and call on Russia to fulfil all Istanbul and OSCE commitments.

Regarding our respective relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, we recognize the need for greater collaboration to promote stable and effective democracies, as well as market economies that contribute to greater social cohesion. We will actively engage NGOs and civil society, and we will support access to information, establishment of rule of law and independent media where this is not provided. Where necessary, we call on countries in the region to provide coherent and effective support and protection to individuals, organisations or institutions working for the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy. We express our deep concern about the human rights situation in Cuba, and urge the Cuban government to take rapid steps to improve the situation. We welcome the reestablishment of the constitutional order in Haiti, support the renewal of the UN Stabilisation Mission’s mandate, and welcome police and troop contributions to the mission.

We will jointly work towards rapid implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. We will work with the United Nations and other international and regional partners and
organisations, including NATO, to strengthen the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with the assistance required, and UN authorisation to ‘bluehat’ the AMIS force by September. We will continue to support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan and will continue to mobilise resources for humanitarian needs.

We will seek to ensure successful elections on 30 July 2006 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and will continue our support for the building of government institutions, training programmes, and security sector reform. In the post-transition the European Union and the United States will prioritise support for improved governance, the rule of law and security sector reform.

In Somalia, we reiterate our support to the efforts of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI) in pursuing dialogue, reconciliation and stable governance. We will assist the transition and the establishment of viable and inclusive institutions in order to promote stability in Somalia and the region.

We will further coordinate our respective efforts on humanitarian and democracy assistance to address the worsening plight of the population in Zimbabwe. We call on the Government of Zimbabwe to restore democratic freedoms and the rule of law, and to respect human rights. We are ready, as soon as significant action in this direction is taken, to reconsider the restrictive measures now in place against Zimbabwe. We also call for measures by the Government of Zimbabwe needed to reverse the economic collapse.

We will enhance our joint efforts in conflict prevention and crisis management by increasing consultations on current and potential crises, identifying ways to strengthen cooperation in crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction and coordinating efforts to improve international crisis management capacities.

Confronting Global Challenges, including Security

Since no single nation can efficiently and effectively deal with global challenges such as climate change, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, pandemics and natural disasters on its own, we commit ourselves to strengthening our cooperation to address these challenges.

Consistent with our common values, we will ensure that measures taken to combat terrorism comply fully with our international obligations, including human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. We attach great importance to our ongoing in-depth dialogue on our common fight against terrorism and our respective domestic and international legal obligations.

We will step up our cooperation against terrorism, including through denying resources (financing, travel, and other material support) and shelter to terrorists, and we will coordinate efforts to prevent a new generation of recruits from emerging by countering radicalisation and recruitment, and promoting tolerance, including by cooperating on developing regional strategies and by implementing – and encouraging others to
implement – steps required by UNSCR 1624. In particular, we will work to enhance our border security cooperation by improving lost and stolen passport data sharing with Interpol, coordinating the implementation of biometric standards based on International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) recommendations. We will cooperate to block terrorism financing, in particular in the informal financial sector, by developing improved procedures for information sharing and a more pro-active use of financial investigations implementing Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Special Recommendations, among others by enforcing cash declaration regulations for travellers, optimising the use of financial intelligence and controls, and engaging the private sector to develop partnerships to enhance protection of financial institutions.

We will strengthen our cooperation by completing negotiations on a Eurojust-U.S. cooperative agreement and we will step up our coordination to improve counterterrorism capacity building in third countries. We welcome the signature of bilateral agreements by EU Member States and the United States to accompany the EU-U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and Extradition Agreements, and will aim to bring them into force as soon as possible. We intend to agree without delay on a Comprehensive UN Convention on International Terrorism and on a universally accepted definition of terrorism, and we will work with others towards a targeted UN strategy on combating terrorism. We take note of the “Vienna Initiative”, initialled on 4 May, on possible future tripartite cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs between the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United States.

We will strengthen our efforts to prevent access by terrorists to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. We will work together to further implement our Programme of Work on the Non-Proliferation of WMD, in particular by reinforcing our support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and we will continue to work together to strengthen it, stressing the importance of compliance and promoting its universality.

Our cooperation will include the full implementation of UNSCR 1540, including by conducting joint demarches, where appropriate, to urge all countries to fully implement their obligations under UNSCR 1540, and by assisting States to meet their obligations. In implementing UNSCR 1540, we will also address the issue of financing of proliferation-related activities and develop our cooperation in that regard by seeking to identify, track, seize or freeze assets associated with the proliferation trade, in accordance with national legislation and consistent with international law, and consider further actions against proliferation finance.

We will support the rapid opening and conclusion of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament and emphasise that, pending the conclusion of the Treaty and the Treaty’s entry into force, all states should declare publicly and observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

We will continue to work together in the Nuclear Suppliers Group framework on pro-
posals to develop transfer restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology and to support multilateral mechanisms for reliable fuel supply assurances for States that have chosen not to pursue ENR.

We will coordinate efforts in preparing for the Biological Toxins and Weapons Convention Review Conference with a view to promote a productive outcome, the universality of the convention and the implementation by all States Parties through national laws and regulations in order to put these obligations into practice. We reaffirm our commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention and its full implementation.

We reiterate our support for multilateral efforts to improve prevention and combat global health threats such as the spread of pandemics, including HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, and other communicable diseases like SARS and Hepatitis. We agree that priority should be given to promoting effective control measures in animal health as a means to reduce outbreaks of H5N1 in birds. We will further increase regional and global cooperation between states, international organisations and civil society in mitigating and preparing for a pandemic, to which input by the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza is welcome. We will further improve coordination of our response to natural disasters that have cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.

**Fostering Prosperity and Opportunity**

We reiterate our strong commitment to reaching an ambitious conclusion to the Doha Development Agenda by the end of 2006. These negotiations are at a critical phase and we call on all World Trade Organisation (WTO) members to demonstrate the political will and courage necessary to achieve an ambitious and balanced agreement that will help strengthen global economic growth, improve living standards, and alleviate poverty. We recognise the need for trade ministers to make substantial progress on core negotiating areas over the next few weeks in order to ensure that this historic opportunity to liberalise trade is not missed. As responsible leaders, we will continue to work in cooperation with other WTO members towards an agreement that is worthy of the objectives identified in launching the Doha Development Agenda in 2001.

We will increase our partnership with developing countries to promote growth globally for the benefit of all. This will help us to realise the internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals and the objectives and commitments of the Monterrey Consensus, which have helped to galvanise efforts towards poverty eradication through development cooperation and economic growth.

We will redouble our efforts to promote economic growth and innovation and reduce the barriers to transatlantic trade and investment by implementing all aspects of the Transatlantic Economic Initiative, in line with the Work Programme agreed at the EU-U.S. Economic Ministerial Meeting in November 2005, and to be updated and reviewed at a second EU-U.S. Economic Ministerial meeting later this year.
We endorse the new Action Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights against piracy and counterfeiting. Implementation has already started with concrete actions aimed at promoting strong and effective enforcement in third countries, strengthening cooperation to reduce global piracy and counterfeiting, and offering public-private partnerships to protect intellectual property. We will enhance our dialogue to promote a more efficient international patent system.

We will build on the progress of the High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum and associated dialogues, and expand implementation of our Regulatory Cooperation Roadmap to address new topics and sectors and initiate targeted exchanges of regulatory experts. As part of our Innovation Initiative, we will work to measure innovation performance, its impact on the economy, and to understand better each other’s innovation policies. We will implement the EU-U.S. plan on e-accessibility with the goal of reaching a coherent approach on our policies in this area. We will work on an implementing arrangement on environment research and eco-informatics under our Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation. We will continue to work together through the EU-U.S. Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue and the Policy Dialogue on Border and Transportation Security.

We pledge to keep our investment regimes open and to build on existing investment flows to boost growth and create jobs in the transatlantic economy. We will address obstacles to transatlantic investment with a view to promoting closer economic integration.

We will redouble our efforts to conclude a first stage Air Transport Agreement in 2006. The European Union and the United States will cooperate closely on the legal framework governing the transfer of air passenger data following the European Court of Justice ruling of 30 May 2006.

We will work together to ensure implementation of phase I of the Wine Agreement, and, as mutually agreed, pursue negotiations on phase II in September.

We have signed today a new Agreement on Higher Education and Vocational Training under which our respective educational institutions will inaugurate innovative joint study programmes, and which will promote exchanges of students, teachers, and other professionals, strengthen the Fulbright-Schuman Programme and encourage greater institutional collaboration in tertiary education.

We recognise the need for tangible progress to be made towards the establishment of reciprocal visa-free travel for all EU citizens to the United States, as part of our efforts to promote the economic and social benefits of increased travel while keeping borders secure.

**Promoting Strategic Cooperation on Energy and Energy Security, Climate Change and Sustainable Development**

We recognise the strategic role of security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability in the energy sector. In this connection, we strongly reaffirm our commitment to the
energy security principles enunciated by the International Energy Agency. We have agreed to reinforce our strategic energy cooperation to:
- support diversification of energy sources and supplies;
- secure our energy infrastructure;
- promote market-based energy security policies that ensure competition, transparency, respect for contracts, and non-discriminatory trade, transit, and access;
- speed development of new lower-pollution and lower carbon technologies;
- accelerate investment in cleaner, more efficient use of fossil sources and renewable sources in order to cut air pollution harmful to human health and natural resources, and reducing greenhouse gases associated with the serious long-term challenge of global climate change.

We will cooperate to ensure sufficient, reliable and environmentally responsible supplies of energy at prices reflecting market fundamentals, facilitating sustained global economic growth as well as expanding access to energy in developing countries. Thus, we agree to:
- Improve energy security by enhancing the dialogue with the main transit, producer and consumer countries and by promoting diversification of energy sources and supply routes worldwide and notably in the Caspian sea region, Middle East, continental Africa and Latin America;
- Analyse geopolitical implications of the worldwide energy situation as it develops, its impact on our external policies and to develop mutually reinforcing policies where appropriate;
- Promote energy security policies in key third countries by encouraging a gradual transition to market pricing and behaviour, and coordinate capacity-building assistance to emerging economies, including to increase energy efficiency, adopt clean technologies and build strategic stocks;
- Support maintenance and improvement of pipeline infrastructure to ensure uninterrupted deliveries and facilitate diversification investments in large transnational projects by ensuring convergence of legal and regulatory frameworks and supporting collaboration among energy regulatory authorities, notably with Ukraine;
- Coordinate where appropriate technical assistance to improve energy legal and regulatory frameworks and investment climates in third countries;
- Improve the security of global energy networks and develop standards for physical security of critical energy infrastructure;
- Facilitate development of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG);
- Increase our coordination within international fora, notably the G8, the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the International Energy Forum (IEF);
- Use energy in a more efficient and environmentally responsible manner, and in particular cooperate on improving the efficiency of worldwide traded products. In this context we have just initialled a new Energy Star Agreement;
Make more and better use of renewable energy sources and reinforce technological cooperation and partnerships, notably on environmentally-friendly low emission power generation technologies, hydrogen energy, carbon sequestration, cutting gas flaring and biofuels;

Promote diversification of fuel sources in the transportation sector, including through increased use of biofuels;

Continue cooperation through the International Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy and increase collaboration over regulatory, standards and trade issues affecting alternative fuels and emerging technologies, especially hydrogen;

Cooperate on developing efficient, transitional transport technologies, and fuel standards, such as plug-in hybrids or efficient diesel engines;

Continue scientific exchanges among EU and U.S. research and development organisations focused on energy efficiency in buildings;

Promote, consistent with national energy policies, safety standards in the production of nuclear energy.

To monitor and guide this process, we will conduct an annual strategic review of EU-U.S. energy cooperation.

We also agreed to promote energy security worldwide by applying the following Energy Security Principles:

a) Contractual commitments should be upheld and market-based principles should prevail at all stages of the energy supply chain.

b) Diversifying sources of energy and modes/routes of transit and ensuring non-discriminatory third-party access to transit infrastructure will improve the functioning of energy markets worldwide.

c) Open, transparent, non-discriminatory and stable legal conditions that ensure fair and equitable treatment for energy investment and trade are essential to helping producing and transit countries meet market demands.

d) Further development of production and export capacities in producer countries in a safe and secure environment, and the upgrading of existing and development of new energy transportation infrastructures by producer and transit countries as well as further development of refinery capacity in all countries are critical.

e) Bolstering and ensuring the highest levels of physical and environmental security and safety of energy infrastructures, as well as the highest level of nuclear safety, is crucial to the durability and sustainability of the global energy system.

f) We should encourage the most economic and efficient use of energy worldwide notably through the use of market-based instruments to minimize negative environmental consequences, and should promote in particular the use of cleaner and more efficient use of fossil fuels and the development of economically competitive non-fossil energy sources based on appropriate policies and market-based instruments.
g) We should promote continued research, development and deployment of alternative energy sources and the facilitation of technological and industrial cooperation.

h) Supporting effective implementation of transparency and data sharing initiatives, such as the Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI), including on the evaluation of oil reserves, and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) will improve transparency and predictability of the market for all stakeholders.

i) Addressing energy poverty endured by many of the world’s poorest people who will still lack access to modern energy services is a priority.

We will work more closely to address the serious and long-term challenge of climate change, biodiversity loss and air pollution and will act with resolve and urgency to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We will continue our dialogue and efforts under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), including work on long-term cooperative action in the process established in Montreal in December 2005. To this end, we have agreed to establish an EU-U.S. High Level Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development to build on existing bilateral and multilateral initiatives and further advance implementation of the G-8 Gleneagles Plan of Action for Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development. This dialogue will be guided by the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC and will initially meet in fall 2006 in Helsinki. Among topics of importance for this dialogue will be experience with different market-based mechanisms to promote cost-effective reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, advancing the development and deployment of existing and transformational technologies that are cleaner and more efficient, producing energy with significantly lower emissions, efficiency and conservation, renewable fuels, clean diesel, capture of methane, lower emitting agricultural operations and energy production and distribution systems, as well as other environmental issues.

2006 EU-U.S. SUMMIT PROGRESS REPORT ON POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES

Introduction

Overall, our relationship has continued to develop in a very positive way in the follow up to the 2005 Summit. We have “put the relationship to work” by concentrating on specific issues. More effective dialogue, often in advance of policy formulation, has led to convergence on some key issues.

We can identify genuine progress in several areas, including those targeted by the joint declarations adopted at the 2005 Summit.
Key Accomplishments

Democracy and Human Rights
Beginning with Ukraine in late 2004, we have seen the development of cooperation in our dialogue on democracy promotion, both in the long-term and with a more immediate focus. Intense exchanges took place on countries like Lebanon, Belarus, Burma, Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Egypt and Yemen. In each case the nature and level of our dialogue has varied, from high-level political exchanges to working level desk-to-desk contacts and co-operation on the ground in ensuring coherence in assistance programmes. We are convinced of the importance and strength of delivering the same political messages and coordinating possible actions in certain countries.

We have pursued dialogue on country resolution strategies in the UN Commission of Human Rights and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Third Committee, where we succeeded in having a number of country resolutions adopted. We have had intensive consultations during the UN negotiations on the establishment of the Human Rights Council, and held regular consultations on human rights. We worked together to help establish a UN Democracy Fund to promote and consolidate new and restored democracies and a Peacebuilding Commission to work in an advisory capacity on specific post-conflict situations. We have moved forward on the management reform agenda outlined in the World Summit Outcome Document. We have supported election monitoring missions by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and collaborated on initiatives to stem trafficking in persons.

Regional issues
We have seen a period of profound and rapid change in the Middle East with the Gaza disengagement followed by elections in the occupied Palestinian territories and in Israel. The European Union and the United States have held regular consultations, in particular within the Quartet, on the evolving situation. Hamas’ election victory in the Palestinian elections means we are faced with an entirely new situation, reinforcing the need for close EU-U.S. co-operation. This was in evidence in the successful conclusion of negotiations to open the Rafah border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, an agreement overseen by EU monitors and reinforced by assistance to Palestinian customs. On Syria/Lebanon, we have developed a joint policy within the UN aimed at ending Syria’s interference in Lebanon, and we have maintained parallel pressure on Damascus to comply with the requests by the UNSC in connection with the murder of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. We have worked together to prepare the international conference in support of the Lebanese reform programme. On the Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative, launched by the G8, we have worked together to produce concrete results in the Forum for the Future meetings, launching or supporting a number of initiatives such as the Foundation for the Future and the Fund for the Future, and initiatives supporting civil society organisations and educational reforms.
On the Western Balkans, we have coordinated our messages very closely to support and accompany the status process in Kosovo, cooperating closely with UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). We have pursued the promotion of constitutional and police reforms, and, in coordination with NATO, defence reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as consolidation of democracy in Serbia and Montenegro and preparations for a Montenegrin independence referendum that ensured the outcome was accepted as legitimate. We have underlined that full cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is an essential element for integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

We have sought to engage with Russia on internal and neighbourhood matters, notably democratic freedoms, respect for human rights, civil society and transparency and a responsible approach to energy security matters. We welcomed Ukraine’s free and fair parliamentary elections held in March. We both have concluded agreements toward Ukraine’s WTO accession bid. We have worked closely on Belarus in order to develop complementary long-term strategies to support democratisation, civil society, opposition and democratic forces, to increase access to independent media and to improve the human rights situation. We delivered strong joint messages both before and after the March elections. We have taken joint steps to expand travel restrictions and to impose targeted financial sanctions against those responsible for the violations of international electoral standards, human rights and the crackdown on civil society and the democratic opposition.

Afghanistan has reached a critical point in its stabilisation. We both have provided financial assistance for Afghani parliamentary elections. At the London Conference on Afghanistan in February 2006, we renewed our commitments to Afghan reconstruction and support for the Afghanistan Compact, which provides a blueprint for building greater security, further progress on rule of law, governance and human rights, and economic and social development. We cooperate in a number of sectors vital to Afghanistan’s development, such as counter-narcotics, security sector and judicial reform, civil society development, human rights, education and culture. Twenty-three EU member states participate in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the European Union has contributed over €3.3 billion to Afghan reconstruction and development since 2002. The United States has requested over $1.1 billion for Afghanistan in its 2007 budget request. Since 2001, the United States has committed over $10.3 billion to Afghanistan.

On Iraq, we hosted the EU-U.S. Conference on Iraq in Brussels in June 2005 to build a renewed international partnership with Iraq, to support Iraq’s political transition process, to encourage its economic recovery and reconstruction and to help establish the rule of law and public order. This conference was attended by over 80 ministerial-level delegations and demonstrated support for the Iraqi Transitional government and people in the period leading up to the elections in the latter half of 2005. The EU-Iraq Joint Political Declaration committed the European Union to holding a senior-level dialogue...
with Iraq. The European Union agreed to open a Baghdad office, and broadened the scope of its assistance beyond already substantial aid and reconstruction programmes by supporting the electoral and constitutional process and opening negotiations on a trade and co-operation agreement. The European Commission, which provided €518 million in assistance from the end of 2003 to 2005, plans to provide an additional €200 million in 2006 for a total of €718 million. The European Union provided electoral experts for the December 2005 elections and trained approximately 300 international experts. Through the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX, the European Union provides a significant number of Iraqi criminal justice officials with professional learning opportunities. The mission is a crucial complement to other international efforts in the area of rule of law in Iraq. The United States provided substantial support for the December 2005 elections through NGOs, which trained approximately fifteen thousand election monitors. In conjunction with the UN, the United States provided the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) $41 million to support a variety of election programmes, including training of election administrators, logistics, voter education, public outreach and conflict mitigation. As of early June, the United States had provided $14.5 billion of the $20.9 billion it had committed to support the reconstruction of Iraq, and expects to complete the large infrastructure projects it had undertaken by the end of 2006. U.S. assistance programmes are increasingly focused on building Iraqi government capacity, both at the ministerial and local levels.

On Iran, joint efforts achieved a strong international consensus that Iran must not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapons capability and must comply with its international obligations, including a full and sustained suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and a return to negotiations. We coordinated closely our political messages, where the EU has taken the leading role and the U.S. has supported EU diplomacy.

We have strengthened our cooperation on Africa, in order to promote peace, democracy and human development, in particular by enhancing AU capacity for peace support operations, backing the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan, supporting AU leadership in the Darfur crisis through the UN and other international and regional partners and organisations, including NATO, pursuing a resolution of the border stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and supporting the Somalia reconciliation process. We have also worked together on a regional approach to peace and security in West Africa, by enhancing conflict management in Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and supporting the peace process on the Democratic Republic of Congo, namely through the assistance to the organisation of the coming elections.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, we have worked very closely to promote stability and security in Haiti through the deployment of a UN mission including troops and police officers, to advance democracy by supporting the organisation of successful presidential and parliamentary elections in February and April 2006, and to address critical humanitarian needs, strengthen governance, and foster broad-based economic
recovery by providing humanitarian and development assistance to the population and local authorities.

On East Asia, we have continued our strategic dialogue on East Asia that includes security and military issues as well as economic and other issues. We have also advocated regional integration and an inclusive East Asian Community process that complements existing fora.

Security Issues
Our cooperation in the fight against terrorism has continued unabated. Well-established working relations at all levels have enabled us to deepen our mutual understanding and information sharing. We have continued to grapple together with important issues related to the fight against terrorism and the role of the UN, terrorist financing, radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism. Our continued contacts have helped to create new avenues for strengthening coordination on provision of technical assistance to third countries. In particular, we welcome our in-depth dialogue on international and domestic legal frameworks that govern individual and collective responses to terrorism and on the need for states to ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, including human rights law, refugee law and International Humanitarian Law.

In the area of Justice and Home Affairs cooperation, all EU member states and the United States have signed bilateral instruments accompanying the EU-U.S. Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements, setting the stage for prompt ratification and entry into force of these important new law enforcement agreements. Negotiations between Eurojust and the United States started on a cooperation agreement. Jointly we have recognised the importance of effective border management and the need for effective exchanges of information to combat trans-national threats while protecting personal privacy. We are working to ensure the Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel Document database is populated with pertinent data from all EU Member States and the United States. We have had extensive discussions regarding the extension of visa free travel to EU Member States not in the Visa Waiver Program.

In our critical efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), we continued to make individual and collective efforts on implementation of key multilateral arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation treaties, core regimes and initiatives including the G8’s Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. Through our action to promote full implementation of UNSCR 1540, we worked to make it an effective tool to prevent proliferation of dangerous materials and WMD to both state and non-state actors. The European Union and the United States worked together to obtain the Security Council’s unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1673, which extends for two years the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540. We took actions to put in place the legal and regulatory infra-
structure to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, particularly to terrorists. We launched a dialogue on compliance and verification issues where we undertook to examine a number of concrete challenges to some specific disarmament and nonproliferation regimes, and have agreed to continue this exchange focusing on individual countries of concern and specific Treaty regimes. We have begun discussions in the run-up to the 2006 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference. We also worked together to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including through the Committee on Safeguards and Verification and by promoting adherence to safeguard agreements and the Additional Protocol and to promote the negotiation in the Conference of Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We reaffirmed the value of continuing consultations on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament issues and will seek ways of strengthening coordination.

On crisis management, we have begun a positive and mutually beneficial dialogue. Working contacts between EU institutions and their U.S. counterparts have multiplied, both in Brussels and in crisis areas, contributing to an efficient cooperation on specific issues such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, where the European Union and NATO have helped support the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Informal consultation and cooperation mechanisms have been established between EU representatives and the U.S. Coordinator for Stabilisation and Reconstruction. For the first time the European Union has hosted a series of briefings for the yearly U.S. politico-military conference in Brussels. We look forward to closer cooperation in early warning in order to identify potential crises at an early stage and respond effectively to resolve conflict and prevent instability.

2006 EU-U.S. SUMMIT PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC INITIATIVE

(...) Energy Security

Joint cooperation on energy security has started with the aim of improving reliability of energy supplies by increasing diversification, making better use of renewable energy sources, using energy more efficiently and cooperating to encourage improved energy security policies in third countries. The European Union and the United States have held four joint workshops on energy technologies, efficiency and alternative fuels. An agreement on the International Thermonuclear Energy Reactor (ITER) was initialed in May 2006 and will be signed at the Fall ITER Ministerial. The European Commission is joining the Methane-to-Markets Partnership.
Trade, Travel and Security

Negotiations are being pursued on visa exempt travel and on comparable results aiming at equivalence between the EU Authorised Economic Operator provisions and the U.S. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. The European Union and the United States are coordinating capacity building assistance for the implementation of the World Customs Organisation Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade. EU and U.S. customs authorities are working on simultaneous risk analyses on identical data to facilitate exchange of information between customs administrations on the results of risk analysis, and to promote cooperation on enforcement and prevention of incidents. As part of container security cooperation, minimum requirements and control standards for feeder ports have been agreed and are currently being implemented. Discussions are taking place on ways of improving cooperation on air transport security and cargo traffic. There have been joint air cargo security training visits and joint air cargo inspection missions. Work on security related technologies is continuing with the aim of creating a better understanding of each others’ security research programmes, sharing experiences on the potential use of sensor-network technologies in addressing security concerns, and discussing new rules for advanced notification of documentation prior to arrival at the port of entry.

(...)
La journée du 1er juillet, qui verra la création d’un nouveau marché européen des équipements de défense, est à marquer d’une pierre blanche. Fait sans précédent, des pays européens se sont engagés à acquérir leurs équipements de défense auprès de celui d’entre eux qui fait la meilleure offre et non en passant automatiquement contrat avec un fournisseur national. Le code de conduite qui introduit cette innovation radicale a été négocié et mis en œuvre dans un délai de dix-huit mois à peine après le démarrage de l’Agence européenne de défense.

Si 22 États membres sur les 24 que compte l’Agence ont accepté de souscrire au code, ce n’est pas qu’ils se soient subitement enthousiasmés à l’idée d’introduire la concurrence dans des domaines qui, jusqu’ici, étaient protégés. Ce sont, en premier lieu, les contraintes exercées sur les budgets de la défense qui ont poussé les gouvernements à tirer parti des avantages de la concurrence, de manière à pouvoir assurer aux contribuables une meilleure utilisation des deniers publics.

Mais la principale raison de cette évolution tient au fait qu’ils se sont rendu compte qu’en matière de défense, nous ne pouvons plus nous permettre de faire cavalier seul ; que, si nous voulons maintenir en Europe une base technologique et industrielle de défense qui soit compétitive à l’échelle internationale, nous devons conjuger nos efforts et mettre en commun nos ressources, ce qui signifie créer une véritable base européenne, et non pas additionner 24 composantes nationales. Ce qui signifie aussi que les forces du marché ont nécessairement un rôle d’entraînement à jouer dans ce processus.

En effet, les statistiques n’incitent guère à l’optimisme : au classement mondial des dix premières entreprises de défense d’envergure internationale, seules trois sont européennes ; en matière de commerce transatlantique d’équipements de défense, le rapport est de 10 à 1 en faveur des États-Unis ; au niveau européen, les dépenses cumulées de recherche et développement dans le domaine de la défense représentent un sixième de celles des États-Unis ; et l’investissement européen en recherche et technologie dans le domaine de la défense, dont dépend l’avenir du secteur, ne représente qu’1,3 % des dépenses annuelles de défense dans l’UE.

Ce n’est pas que, globalement, l’Europe ne dépense pas assez dans le domaine de la défense. Les dépenses cumulées des États membres – 180 milliards d’euros – constituent même une coquette somme. Mais cet argent n’est pas toujours dépensé de manière judicieuse et il est souvent mal ciblé. Nous vivons aujourd’hui sur des investissements réalisés il y a plusieurs années. Si nous voulons que les entreprises européennes restent présentes...
sur le marché des équipements de défense, et si nous apprécions à leur juste valeur les 300.000 emplois et les 50 milliards d’euros et plus qu’elles génèrent, il nous faut consolider à la fois l’offre et la demande et permettre aux entreprises, petites et grandes, de développer leurs activités à l’échelle du continent.

Il s’agit d’un objectif ambitieux, qui ne sera pas atteint en un tour de main, dès lundi matin, au moment où les fournisseurs commenceront à consulter le panneau d’affichage électronique du site Internet de l’AED, à la recherche des avis de marché public. Le volume des transactions annoncées par ce moyen ne va croître que progressivement. Par ailleurs, l’adhésion au code de conduite est volontaire. En effet, aux termes du traité, les marchés publics dans le domaine de la défense dérogent partiellement aux règles ordinaires du marché intérieur de l’UE. Le caractère volontaire de la démarche est aussi une des raisons principales pour lesquelles le code de conduite a pu voir le jour rapidement. Certains pourront être tentés d’en profiter et de recourir de façon excessive aux dérogations. Mais le suivi qui sera assuré par l’Agence et les rapports qu’elle fera aux États membres sur la mise en œuvre du code constitueront une incitation forte à se conformer à la règle librement consentie.

Les États membres devront faire preuve de confiance mutuelle, de détermination et de courage politique pour respecter leurs engagements. Il se peut que des résistances apparaissent au moment où il s’agira de traduire le principe général qui sous-tend le code de conduite en contrats passés avec des fournisseurs d’autres pays de l’UE. Certains gouvernements ont d’ailleurs déjà fait preuve de ces qualités pour parvenir au résultat actuel. Et il faudra encore du courage, notamment pour réaffecter des dépenses militaires et pour accroître significativement la collaboration en matière de recherche et de formation dans le domaine de la défense. C’est à ce prix que nous gagnerons le pari qui consiste à assurer l’avenir de la base industrielle et technologique de défense en Europe.

Tout ces efforts s’inscrivent dans le cadre de la transformation douloureuse mais inévitale de nos forces armées afin que l’Union européenne puisse assumer ses responsabilités dans un monde en proie aux conflits. Les capacités militaires conçues pour lutter contre les ennemis d’hier ne sont tout simplement plus à la hauteur.

Bien sûr, on ne jugera le code de conduite qu’à ses fruits, mais un cap décisif vers un marché européen et compétitif des équipements de défense a d’ores et déjà été franchi. Nous ne pouvons que nous en réjouir.

*Les Echos*
PRESS STATEMENT BY P. DOUSTE-BLAZY ON BEHALF OF THE
FOREIGN MINISTERS OF CHINA, FRANCE, GERMANY, THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION

On the 1st of June, we met in Vienna and agreed a set of far reaching proposals as a basis
for negotiation with Iran, stressing however that, should Iran decide not to engage, fur-
ther steps would have to be taken in the Security Council. This offer was delivered to
Tehran on the 6th of June. It includes offers of cooperation in the political, economic and
nuclear areas which would be of significant benefit to Iran.

Today, five weeks later, we reviewed the situation, on the basis of a report by Javier
Solana who has met three times with Dr Larijani.

The Iranians have given no indication at all that they are ready to engage seriously on
the substance of our proposals. Iran has failed to take the steps needed to allow negotia-
tions to begin, specifically the suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing
activities, as required by the IAEA. We express profound disappointment over this situa-
tion.

In this context, we have no choice but to return to the United Nations Security
Council and take forward the process that was suspended two months ago.

We have agreed to seek a United Nations Security Council Resolution which would
make the IAEA-required suspension mandatory.

Should Iran refuse to comply, then we will work for the adoption of measures under
Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Should Iran implement the decisions of the IAEA and the UN Security Council and
enter into negotiations, we would be ready to hold back from further action in the UN
Security Council.

We urge Iran once again to respond positively to the substantive proposals we made
last month.
SUDAN/DARFUR – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council reiterated the EU’s continuing support to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) as a basis for peace and reconciliation in Darfur and encouraged its full and rapid implementation. The Council underlined the urgent need to show peace dividend to the people of Darfur and noted the important role of the Darfur-Joint Assessment Mission (D-JAM) in this respect. The findings of the JAM will be presented at a Donors Conference organised by The Netherlands which is currently planned for October 2006. The Council stressed that for a successful JAM an improvement in security on the ground is urgently needed. In the light of the recent reports of the situation on the ground, the Council expressed concern that delays in implementing the agreement will have serious consequences for the security and humanitarian situation and in this context condemned the attack by the National Redemption Front (NRF) on Hamrat al Sheikh on 3 July 2006. The Council emphasized the crucial role of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation in bringing the DPA to the grass-roots level and in particular increasing the involvement of women, encouraged the AU to expedite preparations for the process, and expressed EU’s readiness to support this initiative.

2. The Council again urged non-signatories to join in and commit themselves to the implementation of the agreement. The Council expressed support to the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) decision on 27 June to impose targeted measures against those who undermine the DPA, obstruct its implementation or violate the Comprehensive Ceasefire.

3. The Council emphasized the vital role of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) for the peace process in Darfur, and for DPA implementation in particular. The Council stressed the need to continue to enhance the operational capabilities of AMIS, emphasizing especially the need to ensure protection of the civilian population and humanitarian access. In this respect, the Council welcomed the new Concept of Operations for AMIS, and in particular the AU PSC decision of 27 June to approve the additional tasks and the new mandate of AMIS already within its existing strength and capacity. The Council recalled the need to swiftly implement the recommendations of the AU-led evaluation mission of December 2005 in order to enhance the mission’s overall efficiency.
4. The Council urged the Government of Sudan to accept the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council, reaffirmed at its meeting of 27 June, to end the mandate of AMIS within the context of a transition to a UN peacekeeping operation. The Council expressed support for an early UNSC resolution establishing a UN operation in Darfur, as this would provide a clear framework allowing all stakeholders to maximise their support for AMIS in the interim period and to facilitate a successful transition to a future UN mission.

5. The Council underlined that a UN operation is the only viable and realistic option in Darfur in the long term. The Council welcomed the AU/UN Technical Assessment Mission paving the way for sustainable peacekeeping in support of the DPA. The Council noted with concern the position of the Government of Sudan towards a UN operation urging it to enter into a real dialogue with the international community, especially with the AU and the UN, on the details of the future UN peacekeeping force in Darfur in order to show real commitment to peace.

6. The Council reaffirmed the EU's commitment to support the efforts of the AU and AMIS in Sudan and Darfur politically and financially as well as through military and police means. The Council welcomed the forthcoming AMIS Conference on 18 July in Brussels as a joint AU, UN and EU exercise and as an important opportunity to discuss pressing issues regarding the mission's political environment as well as further enhancing the effectiveness of EU technical and staff support to AMIS. The Council recalled that engagement of the Government of Sudan with this joint effort would create opportunities for more broad-based cooperation between the parties, and lay the ground for continuing support for the overall peace process in Sudan, including the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), negotiations in the Eastern Sudan and relations between Sudan and Chad.

7. The Council expressed its concern about the security conditions in the Darfur refugee camps located in Chad.

8. The Council reiterated its full support for the ongoing investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) of human rights abuses in Darfur as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1593(2005) and urged all parties, in particular the Government of Sudan, to cooperate fully with the ICC.

9. The Council calls on the Government of Sudan and all parties in Darfur to remove immediately any existing obstacles to the delivery of aid and to end any obstruction of humanitarian work or of assistance rendered to AMIS.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘After years of war and concluding the transition period, the first democratic elections in 40 years provide a chance for a better future in the DRC. It is for the Congolese to seize this chance. The Council therefore stresses how imperative a transparent and fair electoral process is, reflecting the full sovereignty of the Congolese people. In line with its recent Council Conclusions on the DRC of February 27, May 15 and June 12, the EU will continue to wholeheartedly support the elections which should lay the foundation of a sustained process of peace, democratisation, good governance and the rule of law in the DRC.

The Council therefore commends all efforts undertaken by the Congolese transition authorities, the United Nations and the international community to prepare these elections in line with international standards and recalls the need to respect the overall electoral calendar. The Council appreciates the role of MONUC and the Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition (CIAT) in assisting the Congolese transition authorities in achieving their objectives.

The Council calls upon the transition authorities and on all political forces in the DRC to fully comply with democratic principles and basic freedoms in the electoral campaign. In this regard the EU urges all stakeholders to refrain from any harassment, intimidation or any other form of undue pressure as well as from all attempts of disturbing the electoral process by causing civil unrest. The Council expects that the Congolese security forces exercise restraint and remain impartial while providing security to the electoral process. The Council firmly condemns all acts which are violating basic civil rights, including the harassment of media, and that are undermining a fair and transparent electoral process. It recalls the need to provide sufficient security to all candidates, and stresses the need to fully guarantee the freedom of speech and equal access to the media.

The Council supports every effort of consensus building and of reducing the political tensions during and after the electoral process; the Council keeps encouraging all parties and candidates to conduct a fair and respectful electoral campaign during the coming weeks; in this context, the Council also recalls the need of upholding the democratic consensus by respecting the rules of establishing the final results of the elections. Furthermore, the Council encourages all regional actors to play a constructive role, noting that the entire region will benefit from credible and peaceful elections in the DRC. The successful holding of the second Summit of the Great Lakes Conference, provisionally scheduled for next December in Nairobi, would also help to underpin security in the DRC and throughout the region.

The Council welcomes the progress in deploying the EUFOR RD Congo operation in support of the MONUC peacekeeping mission and notes that the EUFOR RD Congo shall be in a short delay fully operational for a period of up to four months after the 30th
of July, date of the first round of the presidential and parliamentary elections. The Council underlines in particular the importance of good and close cooperation with the United Nations and the transition authorities in the DRC. It furthermore welcomes the support of the Republic of Gabon and the Republic of Congo in this regard.

The Council, active in the security sector reform with two ESDP missions, notes that the temporary reinforcement of the police advisory mission EUPOL Kinshasa is well under way with a view to support the Congolese crowd control units in Kinshasa. The Council welcomes in particular the participation of African partner nations in this mission. The EU will also continue to support the efforts related to the reform of the national army FARDC through the EUSEC RD Congo mission.

The Council also welcomes the ongoing deployment of the EU Election Observation Mission in the DRC and recalls the importance of best possible coordination among the different observation missions.

In continuous cooperation with the United Nations, the African Union and the international community, the EU will work closely with the transition authorities in the coming months, fully committed and looking forward to pursuing its efforts in partnership and cooperation once a new democratic government is in place.

WESTERN BALKANS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council was briefed by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari on the state of play regarding the Kosovo status process. It also had an exchange of views ahead of the EU Troika meeting with the Prime Minister of Serbia later in the day. It adopted the following conclusions:

‘Serbia/Kosovo

1. The Council reiterated its full support for UN Status Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his efforts in conducting the political process to determine Kosovo’s future status. The Council welcomed his intention to move forward into direct political talks on the status issue. It called upon both sides to engage constructively in this phase of the negotiations.

2. The Council noted the report on the implementation of standards for Kosovo presented to the UN Security Council by the SRSG on 20 June 2006. It noted progress reported and stressed again the crucial importance of and the need for further accelerated and effective implementation of the Standards. The Council urged Belgrade to encourage Serbs in Kosovo to participate in Kosovo’s institutions, in which they can most effectively advocate their own interests.

3. The Council welcomed the joint report by the SG/HR and the EU Commissioner for Enlargement on the Future EU role and contribution in Kosovo. It asked the SG/HR
and the EU Commissioner for Enlargement to continue examination of these issues, in the light of the European Council conclusions of 15-16 June 2006, in coordination with other international actors and to keep the relevant Council bodies actively engaged in order to ensure continuing timely preparation of the future EU role in Kosovo. The Council stressed the need for a well coordinated EU presence in Kosovo. The Council welcomed the early deployment of the planning team in preparation for an ESDP mission in the broader field of rule of law and asked the SG/HR to continue informing on progress made.

4. The Council expressed appreciation for the work of the outgoing Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Mr Søren Jessen-Petersen, in Kosovo and looked forward to the appointment of his successor.

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

5. The Council welcomed the generally peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 5 July and the International Election Observation Mission’s preliminary assessment that the elections were conducted largely in accordance with international standards. It noted with concern the incidents of violence especially during the beginning of the electoral campaign and the other shortcomings observed by the International Election Observation Mission in certain constituencies. It stressed the need that all such irregularities be investigated and addressed so that they do not occur in the future.

6. The Council looked forward to the smooth formation of a new Government. Once it is formed, the Government should begin to work resolutely on the European reform agenda in line with the European Partnership. In this context, the Council recalled that further steps in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s progress towards the EU will be considered in the light of the fulfilment of the conditions and requirements set out in European Council’s conclusions of 16 December 2005. The EU remains committed to supporting the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in its European course.

Montenegro

7. The Council took note of the fact that all EU Member States have recognized the Republic of Montenegro as a sovereign and independent state. In line with the Stabilisation and Association Process and the Thessaloniki Agenda, the Council decided to extend bilateral political dialogue at ministerial level to Montenegro. A joint declaration will be prepared to that end. The Council also agreed to invite Montenegro to align itself with EU demarches, declarations and common positions on CFSP issues.
Regional cooperation

8. The Council underlined the importance of regional cooperation in the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process. In this context, the Council welcomed the Energy Community Treaty that entered into force on 1 July 2006 which will be of mutual benefit for both the EU and the Western Balkan states. This treaty is an important step towards secured energy supply that is crucial for social and economic development of the region. The common framework established by the treaty will also increase the transparency and attractiveness of the region for investors.”

MIDDLE EAST – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The Council is acutely concerned at the situation in the Middle East, in particular at the deteriorating humanitarian situation and the destruction of civilian infrastructure, and deplores the loss of civilian lives on all sides. These developments pose a serious threat to peace and security in the region. It calls for the release of abducted soldiers and an immediate cessation of hostilities. The EU recognises Israel’s legitimate right to self-defence, but it urges Israel to exercise utmost restraint and not to resort to disproportionate action. All parties must do everything possible to protect civilian populations and to refrain from actions in violation of international humanitarian law. It is urgent to stop violence and return to diplomacy. Only a political process of negotiation can bring lasting peace to the region. It is urgent that the international community engage actively in this. We express our full support for the High Representative’s active engagement, for the efforts of the UN Secretary General and for the efforts of actors in the region. The Council welcomes an active role of the UN Security Council including through examining the possibility for an international monitoring presence. We support the agenda set out in the G8 statement.

Developments in Lebanon and Israel

1. The European Union condemns the attacks by Hezbollah on Israel and the abduction of two Israeli soldiers. It calls for their immediate and unconditional release and for the cessation of all attacks on Israeli towns and cities.

2. The EU recalls the need for the Lebanese state to restore its sovereignty over the whole of its national territory and to do its utmost to prevent such attacks. The EU expresses its support for Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora. The EU urges the full implementation of the UNSCR 1559 and UNSCR 1680, including disbanding and dis-
arming of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, and strict respect of the sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon.

3. Continued escalation will only aggravate the vicious circle of violence and retribution.

4. The EU appeals to all parties to ensure the safe and speedy passage from Lebanon of all those citizens of EU Member States, as well as other expatriates, who wish to leave Lebanon in the current situation. The EU calls on Israel not to hinder shipping in international waters.

**Situation in Gaza**

5. The Council remains deeply concerned at the deteriorating situation between Israel and the Palestinians and deplores the loss of civilian life it has brought. The EU reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldier. It calls on the Palestinian leadership to bring an end to violence and terrorist activities, including the firing of rockets on Israeli territory.

6. The Council calls on both parties to alleviate the desperate humanitarian situation of the civilian population. The Council urges Israel to engage in the restoration of the destroyed civilian infrastructure. The Israeli air strikes on Gaza’s only power plant have had a far reaching impact on Gaza’s hospitals, food production facilities, water and sanitation systems. The Council urges that the border crossings such as Rafah and Karni be opened and remain open to allow at least the passage of humanitarian aid and basic products to Gaza and the safe return of Palestinians currently on the Egyptian side of the border.

7. The European Union remains particularly concerned about the detention of elected members of the Palestinian Government and legislature and calls for their immediate release.

8. The Council commends the efforts of President Abbas to create the widest possible consensus in support of the objectives of the Roadmap. The Council reiterates that the EU stands ready to work with a Palestinian government that meets and implements the three principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel’s right to exist and acceptance of existing agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap. The Council encourages progress in the Palestinian National Dialogue to that end.

9. The European Union is committed to pressing ahead with the further expansion of the proposed Temporary International Mechanism to which the EU and its Member States have contributed significantly. The EU encourages donors and others in the
region to make full use of the mechanism. The Council urges Israel to resume transfers of withheld Palestinian tax and customs revenues.

10. This crisis underlines the need for the negotiation of a just and lasting settlement. The European Union calls on both parties to demonstrate urgently an active commitment to the search for a negotiated two-state solution. The European Union supports the central role of the Quartet in this process.’

IRAN – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The Council expresses its deep disappointment that Iran has not responded positively to the offer of negotiations put to it on 6 June by the High Representative following agreement between France, Germany, UK, China, Russia and the US, and with the full support of the European Union.

These are far-reaching proposals for a long-term agreement which would provide Iran with everything it needs to develop a modern civil nuclear power programme. They would open the way to a new relationship with Iran based on mutual respect and expanded cooperation in political and economic fields, while meeting international concerns about the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

The Council recalls that the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council have repeatedly called on Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment related and reprocessing activities. The proposals put to Iran are an attempt to find a way for Iran to fulfil these requirements without further action in the UN Security Council.

Since Iran has given no indication of willingness to engage seriously on the basis of the proposals the international community will have to return to the UN Security Council to make the decisions of the IAEA Board of Governors mandatory on Iran. Should Iran not comply, we will work for the adoption of measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

We remain committed to a diplomatic solution, and the ideas put to Iran remain on the table. Should Iran decide to suspend all its enrichment-related activities and to implement the Additional Protocol, the way to negotiation would be reopened and action in the Security Council could be suspended.

The Council reiterates its commitment to exercise the utmost vigilance in the application of existing export control mechanisms for sensitive material so as to prevent the transfer of goods, technology and materials that might be used, directly or indirectly, in fissile material programmes and missile programmes.

The EU remains committed to building a long-term relationship with Iran based on confidence and cooperation. Such a development will depend on progress on all issues of
concern which include terrorism, Iran’s approach to the Middle East peace process and regional issues.

Furthermore, the Council regrets the deterioration of the situation of human rights in Iran. Recalling its statement of 15 May 2006, the Council would like to draw particular attention to continuing violations of the freedom of expression and association, illustrated by the violent disruption of a peaceful demonstration on 12 June that advocated an end to legal discrimination against women. The Council is concerned at the situation of labour activists in Iran and the detention of Mr Mansour Ossanlou.

The Council calls on Iran to ensure implementation of its human rights obligations including in the case of detention of Dr. Ramin Jahanbegloo. The Council deplores the lack of progress in this case and urges the Iranian authorities to ensure access to legal counsel for all detainees without delay.’

(...)
Darfur Conference

Brussels, 18 July 2006

This conference held on 18 July followed the one organized four months earlier by the EU together with the United Nations and the African Union, which aimed at supporting the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), and enhancing support for the African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS). Below is a summary of remarks made by Javier Solana on this occasion.

SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA

(...)

Security Basket

- I welcome you all. We meet at a difficult time for Darfur. Those who have signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) are not implementing it. And there remain two important parties who continue to refuse to sign it. Meanwhile the people of Darfur continue a third year of suffering.
- I thank you for being here today. I would like in particular to greet Said Djinnit. We all commend the efforts of the African Union (AU) and AMIS for reducing large scale violence.
- The challenge before us today is to draw together our efforts in support of AMIS in the period leading to transition to the UN.
- So we need to focus on how we can support AMIS both within its present means and capabilities, and to look at what additional donor support is required to reinforce AMIS.

Strengthening AMIS:

- The current situation requires immediate action. Therefore, our first service to AMIS is to see how we can support its recommendations on how to support implementation of the DPA within its current means and capabilities. In particular, so that AMIS defines and adopts a new peacekeeping posture immediately and robustly; takes forward vigorous 24 hour operations and proactive monitoring in all sectors; sets up the Joint Force Mission HQ. We must also look at re-training of existing troops and police, and especially incoming personnel, to implement the peace-keeping mandate.
- All of our people who are supporting you in Addis, Khartoum, El Fashir and the sectors will ensure that you receive the detailed support you require to take these issues forward.
Donor Reinforcement of AMIS:
- AMIS is going to need additional support for the next six months.
- We, the donors, have a part to play in ensuring that the 8 AMIS units due to rotate soon are trained, prepared and deployed so that they can play a more robust peacekeeping role.
- We know the AMIS needs communications equipment and training, additional tactical air and ground mobility.
- And it needs more cash to pay for salaries and other running costs.
- The donors have been generous. But we now need to resource AMIS properly for this final and critical phase.

Transition to UN:
- While we do what we can to help AMIS stabilise Darfur in the next few months, we also need to be working on setting the conditions for the longer-term effort there. We all have a role to play in ensuring a successful transition to the UN.
- The AMIS Concept of Operations and the Joint UN-AU Technical Assessment Mission Report are an excellent start.
- We urge Khartoum to cooperate with the UN to that effect.
- Today we have a unique opportunity to discuss the issues and identify priorities with our AU and UN colleagues and consequently, to consider how best to help both organisations to meet the challenges that lie ahead.

Summary/Conclusions
- Implementation of DPA is critical – we must not miss the opportunity.
- AMIS needs to begin to implement the DPA within the current means and capabilities immediately.
- AMIS needs further support from donors to carry on this work.
- The UN and the AU will continue working closely together to achieve successful transition. Donors stand ready to support them.
- I thank all for their engagement and their offers.

Political Basket
- Darfur is, by far, the worst conflict in Africa today. It affects Sudan, is now already speeding to the whole region (Chad, Central African Republic).
- This meeting is therefore very timely, coming after Abuja and Banjul and as we are in the middle of the debate on the transition to the UN. I can’t foresee any realistic exit of the Darfur conflict without such a transition, and I can’t either imagine that the government of Sudan would continue to oppose it.
- We now have to do everything possible to implement the DPA.
- We will have to consider a series of questions today, including: consolidating the DPA,
possible sanctions against those who violate the ceasefire; how do we evaluate the
Janjaweed disarmament plan? Where are we with the Darfur/Darfur dialogue? The
situation at the borders of Chad and Central African Republic.

- And of course the transfer to the UN: we all agree that there is no alternative to that.
FACTSHEET

European Union response to the Darfur crisis

Responding to the Darfur conflict that has been raging since 2003, the European Union has been at the forefront of international assistance backing up efforts led by the African Union (AU). The EU’s support has included the following major components:

- **Mobilisation of funds of around €1 billion.** Most resources have been provided for humanitarian assistance, including food aid and aid to Darfur refugees in neighbouring Chad. The European Commission alone has allocated €282 million in humanitarian support. EU Member States have provided around €12 million in support of the political process. Contributions to the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) amount to approximately €325 million, including funding from the African Peace Facility of €212 million.

- **Support for human rights inquiries and calls for an end to impunity in Darfur.** On 26 July 2004, the EU supported calls for the creation of an international commission of inquiry into human rights violations, which was duly established. It welcomed the international commission’s findings, submitted to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 25 January 2005 and condemned the crimes described in the report. The EU stresses the importance of terminating impunity in Darfur and was the prime mover behind UN Security Council Resolution 1593 which referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court. Similarly, the EU fully supports the ongoing investigations by the ICC of human rights abuses in Darfur.

- **Support for the efforts of UN Special Representative, Jan Pronk, to ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions (1556, 1564, 1574, 1590, 1591, 1593, 1651, 1665, 1672 and 1679).** EU Heads of Mission in Khartoum participate in the Joint Implementation Mechanisms established by the Government of Sudan and the Special Representative to supervise compliance with the Resolutions.

- **Active support for the Abuja peace talks leading to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).** From its early involvement, when it helped broker the N’djamena ceasefire, the EU has steadily increased its diplomatic activity in relation to Sudan, as well as its operational support to AMIS (see details below). The EU, which has been assigned a specific role in the agreement, will continue to play a crucial part in its implementation – notably in the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) process and in the Darfur Assessment and Evaluation Commission, and by providing assistance for post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation efforts.

- **Continuing support for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.** This is provided through diplomatic efforts – notably by the EU Special Representative, through political dialogue with the Government of National Unity

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of Sudan, and through EU assistance programmes that particularly focus on war-affected areas in Southern and Central Sudan. The EU is thus contributing to the overall stabilisation of Sudan, a country that has suffered from civil strife throughout most of its modern history.

EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur – AMIS

The EU and its Member States have been providing a wide range of support to the African Union’s (AU) efforts to help stabilise the situation in Darfur since January 2004. This support has included financial, personnel and political support to the Abuja talks process and the Ceasefire Commission. It also includes support to AMIS through the provision of equipment and assets, planning and technical assistance, military observers, training of African troops and civilian police officers and strategic transportation.

- Almost 100 personnel from the EU and its Member States have been deployed to Sudan in support of the military component of AMIS and a further 50 in support of the civilian police component.  
- In the same period, EU Member States have provided coordinated strategic airlift for well over 2000 African Union personnel.  
- The EU has committed a total of EUR 212 million from the African Peace Facility in support of AMIS since June 2004. This has provided the funds necessary to pay personnel costs including salaries, allowances, insurance, travel, rations and medical costs.
- Additionally, EU Member States have made substantial bilateral contributions – financial as well as the provision of expertise, equipment, food rations, airlift, etc. The estimated amount of Member States’ support to AMIS is approximately EUR 115 million.
- The EU Special Representative for Sudan, Mr Pekka Haavisto, who was appointed in July 2005, ensures coordination and coherence of the EU’s contributions to AMIS. He is assisted by a team of EU military and police advisers in Addis Ababa.

(...)
Kosovo

Brussels, 17 July 2006

Prior to the first round of direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina on Kosovo’s status held by the Contact Group, Javier Solana and Olli Rehn issued a report on the future role and contribution of the EU in Kosovo, based on previous joint papers submitted to the Council in 2005. Extracts from this report are reproduced below.

SUMMARY NOTE ON THE JOINT REPORT BY JAVIER SOLANA, EU HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE CFSP, AND OLLI REHN, EU COMMISSIONER FOR ENLARGEMENT, ON THE FUTURE EU ROLE AND CONTRIBUTION IN KOSOVO

(...)

Extracts from the report:

The Status Process

- UN Special Envoy Mr Martti Ahtisaari has been working on developing a clearer understanding on the parameters of the future settlement and to identify common ground between the two sides. The work is on-going. Mr Ahtisaari presented his latest assessment of progress on the status process to the Security Council on 13 July.
- The UN Special Envoy has been working closely with all major international stakeholders. The EU, the United States and NATO have their own representatives in the status talks. The Commission’s Liaison Officer is part of the EU team.
- It is of paramount importance to ensure that the outcome of the status process will respect the European perspective of Kosovo and provide the conditions for a functioning and viable Kosovo fully integrated in the region.

The UN Standards and the European Integration Process

- Progress on the status also depends on progress on standards implementation
- The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Kosovo presented a generally positive report on the implementation of the Standards for Kosovo to the UN Security Council on 20 June. Authorities in Kosovo are currently focusing on the implementation of UN standards which need to be tackled in the short term.
- With the European Partnership adopted in January 2006, the EU has sent a clear message to Kosovo’s authorities that fulfilment of the UN standards is not only needed to pave the way for a status settlement, but also for the fulfilment of the Copenhagen
political criteria in the longer term. The rights of Kosovo Serbs and other minorities will be better protected by engaging Pristina in the implementation of European standards concerning human and minority rights and the rule of law. At the same time, Kosovo’s structures for European integration should be strengthened.

The future international engagement

- Following a settlement and the phasing out of UNMIK, Kosovo’s own institutions should be responsible for managing its affairs. Local ownership and accountability should rest with Kosovo.
- The primary objective of the future international engagement in Kosovo should be to support and monitor the Kosovo Government’s efforts to promote local and regional security, political and social stability, economic sustainability and reconciliation.
- An international presence will need to be established in Kosovo to monitor the implementation of the status settlement, the rule of law, and certain economic and fiscal matters. The international presence will need to have some limited intervention powers to ensure that the status settlement is implemented.
- In addition, the international community will continue providing institution building assistance. The Commission will assume a leading role in this area.

The EU engagement in Kosovo

- The EU intends to become the driving force within the future international presence. Its contribution will have 3 main components:
  1. The Head of the international civilian presence will also be EU Special Representative (double hatted). An EU team will contribute to the preparation of the future international civilian presence in Kosovo in close cooperation with other international actors.
  2. The EU will play an important role in the rule of law area most importantly through an European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operation. An EU Planning Team is already working in Pristina to prepare a future ESDP operation, which will focus on the justice sector and on the police. In parallel, assistance under the future Pre-Accession Instrument (IPA) will focus on capacity building of the local authorities.
  3. The Community instruments will continue to be deployed to support Kosovo’s progress within the Stabilisation and Association Process. The Commission will establish an office in Pristina that will absorb the functions of the EC Liaison Office and of the European Agency for Reconstruction.

Kosovo’s EU perspective after the status settlement

- The common objective of the EU and Kosovo is to ensure that Kosovo becomes a reliable partner, progressing towards integration with the EU together with the rest of the region. This will reinforce Kosovo’s political and economic viability.
The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and the EU perspective that it offers have greatly enhanced stability and security in the region. Provided that Kosovo reaches a sufficient degree of democratic and institutional stability, including further progress on the implementation of the European Partnership and satisfactory implementation of the future status settlement, all instruments presently available for the Western Balkan region should be made available to Kosovo, including the prospect of contractual relations with the EU.

It will be essential to consolidate a sound basis for Kosovo’s economic development. Political and social stability requires sustainable economic development. Building on UNMIK’s work and allowing for maximum local ownership, the EU will need to continue supporting Kosovo’s government in setting up a modern, open, market-oriented and business-friendly environment, based on EU-compatible structural reforms.

### Financial implications
- The EU’s financial contribution to the implementation of the status settlement will have two main components:
  1. Contribution to the operation of the international civilian presence and the ESDP mission. The cost of the international presence will depend on the scope of its intervention as defined in the status settlement. However, the aim is to keep it as lean as possible. The EU Planning Team deployed in Pristina will elaborate the costing aspects of the future ESDP mission.
  2. Local authorities are preparing ‘A Kosovo Development and Strategy Plan’ that will underpin the economic and fiscal reform agenda. To support Kosovo’s stability and socio-economic development, the Commission and the World Bank will convene a donors’ conference upon status settlement. Together with other donors, the EU will contribute to a well-coordinated mix of grant assistance, macro-financial support and loans.

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Lebanon

From July 2006, an escalation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon resulted in a large number of casualties both among the soldiers and the civilian population. The international community attempted to broker a ceasefire. The Finnish presidency of the Council, the European Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council published several joint press releases, two of which are reproduced below.

**JOINT PRESS RELEASES**

**Brussels, 28 July 2006**

The crisis in Lebanon: EU Council will meet to assess the situation

The EU Council will hold an extraordinary meeting on 1 August in order to assess the situation in Lebanon and to prepare further EU action following the International Conference on Lebanon in Rome on 26 July.

President of the Council Erkki Tuomioja and Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner will report on their visit to the region after the Rome meeting. The High Representative for the EU’s common foreign and security policy, Javier Solana, will give his assessment following extensive talks in the region and contacts with the EU’s main partners.

The Rome meeting agreed to offer Lebanon a major humanitarian package, with both immediate relief and financial support. It addressed the conditions for a ceasefire process and agreed on the scope for deploying an international force in Southern Lebanon. The EU expressed its readiness to play a substantive role in contributing to such a force.

Conference participants expressed their determination to work immediately to reach with the utmost urgency a ceasefire that put an end to the current violence and hostilities. The conference affirmed that the fundamental condition for lasting security in Lebanon is the Government’s full ability to exercise its authority over all its territory. It also considered that an International Force in Lebanon should urgently be authorised under a UN mandate to support the Lebanese Armed Forces in providing a secure environment.

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Update on the EU’s response to the crisis

Evacuation of EU citizens from Lebanon
Latest indications are that for the most part, those EU citizens who wished to leave Lebanon have now been evacuated. Roughly 20,000 have now left, mainly via Cyprus. Most Member States have confirmed that they have completed the evacuation of their citizens.

However, there are still a few hundred people trapped in pockets in Southern Lebanon, mainly in Blida, Al Mansouri and Ramais. Efforts are continuing to establish a safe land corridor in order to evacuate them.

Evacuation of Lebanese and third country nationals from Lebanon
The conflict has left a large and potentially vulnerable group of migrant workers and their dependents from developing countries – thought to number between 100,000 and 200,000 – who are at risk of being stranded. Their governments do not, in general, have the means to support their evacuation and repatriation and have appealed for international assistance; requests have been made by Sri Lanka, Philippines, Bangladesh, Ghana, Ethiopia, Sudan, Iraq, Moldova and Nepal.

The Commission has significantly reinforced its presence in Beirut to ensure optimal coordination with the Member States, the Lebanese authorities, the United Nations and other humanitarian partners. Following activation of the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism, the Commission’s Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) has established an EU civil protection coordination and assessment team in Lebanon.

On 26 July, the Commission allocated EUR 11 million under the EU’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism to fund in its entirety an appeal by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to help around 10,000 citizens from developing countries return home from Lebanon. The package will assist in particular in evacuating the most vulnerable people, essentially women and children.

The main evacuation route for third country nationals is through Syria and Jordan; smaller numbers are being evacuated through Cyprus. The IOM has been called upon to provide assistance to evacuees to cover their basic needs while in transit and to ensure a swift and orderly repatriation.

There are estimated to be 150,000 Lebanese and 20,000 other nationals in Syria. According to the United Nations Development Programme, around 300,000 refugees are expected in Syria in the coming weeks, and many will not be able to leave for a second destination. In Lebanon itself, there are approximately 30,000 refugees in the Beirut area, and about 80,000 displaced people in the Aleye Valley. The number of displaced people arriving in the Shuf Mountains continues to increase.

Onward repatriation of EU citizens and third country nationals from Cyprus
As of 25 July, a total of 41,200 evacuees had arrived in Cyprus – of whom roughly 18,000 are EU citizens – with 38,000 to 40,000 onward departures.
MIC is assisting the Cypriot authorities in removing bottlenecks to the evacuation effort. Commissioner Stavros Dimas, responsible for the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism, was in Cyprus on 25 July to discuss further EU support in coping with the evacuation flows.

The humanitarian situation in Lebanon
The high numbers of displaced people in Lebanon poses a serious challenge. The Commission took emergency decisions on 24 and 26 July on a total of EUR 20 million in support of victims in Lebanon and evacuees in neighbouring countries. For the time being, the following most urgent needs are to be addressed immediately:
- Drugs and emergency medical supplies;
- Water and food;
- Non-food items;
- Shelter (adaptation of sanitation facilities in schools and public buildings);
- Support to health, water and sanitation structures in Beirut.

ECHO is currently assessing the UN’s flash appeal for USD 150 million and an expected appeal by the International Committee of the Red Cross for an estimated SFR 76 to 90 million; the Commission stands ready to increase its assistance and its support to a total of EUR 50 million. It is preparing for the mobilisation of the EU’s Emergency Reserve, to be agreed on by the EU’s budgetary authorities.

The EU has urged the Israeli authorities to guarantee access and safe passage for humanitarian goods and workers in line with international humanitarian law, which has been a major difficulty since the start of the Israeli military action in Lebanon.

(...
**Brussels, 31 August 2006**

**Humanitarian aid and early recovery in Lebanon: the EU action**

**Summary:**

This joint press statement from the Presidency/European Commission/Council General Secretariat:

- highlights the EU’s overall effort in support of Lebanon; figures are updated in the light of the pledges made at the Stockholm International donor conference held today;
- provides a background on what has been done and what is expected to be done by 31 December 2006 by EU Member States and the European Community for humanitarian aid and early recovery;
- recalls the political efforts carried out by the Finnish Presidency, the SG/HR Javier Solana and the European Commission in the region in order to put an end to the hostilities and to provide humanitarian aid to Lebanon;
- underlines that the EU effort has to be seen as part of an overall framework for a stable and lasting peace in the Middle East.

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**Stockholm donor Conference on Lebanon**


The European Union’s humanitarian aid response to the emergency situation in Lebanon has been swift and significant. Furthermore in-kind contributions were provided through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (MIC). Member States have met in August at political level in order to coordinate their further efforts for the early recovery of Lebanon.

European Union humanitarian aid (pledged or effectively granted by Member States and the European Community) after the Stockholm conference is approximately €330 million, of which €107 million are provided by the European Commission. The European Union will continue to support the Lebanese people.

Since the cessation of hostilities, the humanitarian situation in Lebanon has changed dramatically. Therefore, the focus of humanitarian assistance has now turned to short-term initiatives that support returnees and strengthen local capacity to respond to prevailing needs.

In this context, the European Union welcomes the establishment of the Relief and Recovery Cell in Prime Minister Siniora’s office to take over the coordination of the early
recovery and later the reconstruction efforts.

The European Union stands ready to help preparing the needs assessment for reconstruction under the leadership of the Government of Lebanon and in close cooperation with other international partners including the World Bank, by making available expertise and technical support. A comprehensive approach to reconstruction is the key to success. It is therefore essential that the needs assessment is undertaken in a coherent overall framework for the social, economic and political development of Lebanon.

The key priorities assessed at EU level at this stage in the areas mostly affected by the war in Lebanon are:
- removing all landmines
- ensuring access to drinking water in cooperation with the UN
- lifting of sea and air blockade.

Background
The comprehensive EU effort falls within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1701(2006).

From the onset of the crisis in Lebanon, the EU has responded through a coordinated effort in Beirut, Cyprus, national capitals and Brussels. The Presidency has been actively coordinating the situation in the consular field. The EU triggered the Community Civil Protection Mechanism to help Cyprus address the difficult logistical situation resulting from two large influxes of evacuees.

Visits to the region were made by Finland’s Minister for Foreign Trade and Development, Paula Lehtomäki, as well as the EU High Representative, Javier Solana, and members of the Commission.

At the extraordinary Council on 25 August 2006, EU ministers for Foreign Affairs reiterated the European Union’s determination to bring humanitarian relief to the people of Lebanon. To that end, the Council underlined the urgency of lifting the air and sea blockade, and, in the light of the relevant provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1701(2006), recalled that establishing effective control measures, in the area of arms, related material, training or assistance, is therefore a priority. The Council welcomed the Stockholm Conference for Lebanon’s Early Recovery. The Council emphasized that humanitarian aid, early recovery and reconstruction efforts must be conducted under the authority of the Lebanese Government and in the context of its national plan for rehabilitation, reform and development.
LEBANON - COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council held an exchange of views with the UNSG Kofi Annan on the situation in Lebanon. Following this exchange of views, the Council expressed its strong will to see all parties in the region playing a constructive role in helping to implement UNSCR Resolution 1701.

The Council gave Kofi Annan its full support in his efforts to find ways to swiftly implement Resolution 1701. Aware of the urgency of the need to implement it, the Council welcomed Member States' willingness to contribute rapidly to the reinforcement of UNIFIL forces together with their international partners. The Council stressed the important role of UNIFIL in assisting the deployment of the Lebanese Army to Southern Lebanon. The Council welcomed the elements provided by UNSG Kofi Annan on UNIFIL's operational framework.

The significant overall contribution of the Member States to UNIFIL demonstrates that the European Union is living up to its responsibilities. The Council welcomes Member States' intentions to commit a substantial number of troops to be deployed in Lebanon, as well as significant maritime and air assets, command, communications and logistical support. Additional contributions are likely to be made in the future. This gives a leadership role for the Union in UNIFIL.

In addition to UNIFIL contributions, the Council welcomed the EU Member States' readiness to provide support to the Lebanese Army. The European Union is ready to contribute to rebuilding a Lebanese State able to exercise full sovereignty over its territory.

The European Union has reiterated its determination to bring humanitarian relief to the people of Lebanon. To that end, the Council underlined the urgency of lifting the air and sea blockade, and, in the light of the relevant provisions of UNSCR 1701, recalled that establishing effective control measures, in the area of arms, related material, training or assistance, is therefore a priority.

The Council welcomes the Stockholm Conference for Lebanon’s Early Recovery that will be hosted by the Swedish Government on 31 August. The Council emphasized that humanitarian aid, early recovery and reconstruction efforts must be conducted under the authority of the Lebanese Government and in the context of its national plan for rehabilitation, reform and development.
The Council renewed its commitment to promote a comprehensive peace plan for the Middle East in close cooperation with international partners and the countries in the region.

IRAN

SG/HR Javier Solana briefed the meeting on Iran’s answer to the offer relating to the nuclear issue. The issue will be further discussed at the informal Gymnich meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs on 1-2 September in Lappeenranta (Finland).

On 31 July the UNSC adopted Resolution 1606(2006) demanding that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities to be verified by IAEA. In the event that Iran has not complied with the resolution by 31 August, the UNSC stated its intention to adopt measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter1.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The European Union has noted the results of the first round of the presidential election, published by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). It pays tribute to the Congolese people, who turned out to vote in very large numbers, and congratulates the IEC, which worked to ensure that voting was properly conducted. It also acknowledges the crucial role played by the United Nations.

The European Union deplores and condemns the unacceptable acts of violence which occurred in Kinshasa between 20 and 22 August. It appeals to Congolese leaders’ sense of responsibility, and especially the two candidates in the second round of the presidential election, President Kabila and Vice-President Bemba, to show restraint and refrain from any provocation. The European Union asks the parties to implement without delay and adhere scrupulously to all measures required to bring the situation in the capital back to normal, in line with the agreement made public on 22 August.

The European Union reiterates that the democratic process under way must be taken to its conclusion and that the use of force in any form is unacceptable. Any disagreements must be resolved peacefully, within the legal framework laid down for complaints and appeals. The IEC’s role must be respected and supported. The European Union urges both candidates to conduct a constructive campaign, focusing on the Congolese people’s concerns and their hopes of seeing their country return to peace and stability, in a

1 Article 41 provides that ‘The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.’
spirit of reconciliation and national consensus. To this end, the European Union asks them to agree and adhere to a code of conduct.

The European Union also stresses the importance of the legislative and provincial elections. The imminent declaration of the outcome of the legislative elections should enable the National Assembly - an institution essential to the sovereignty of the Congolese people - to convene as soon as possible. The provincial elections scheduled for 29 October should provide the basis for democracy at provincial level and for decentralised rule of law.

The European Union will remain fully committed to ensuring the smooth conduct of the electoral process in the DRC, as is shown by the commitment of the European Eufor RD Congo force to support MONUC in restoring calm to Kinshasa, and by Eupol Kinshasa’s support for the Congolese National Police, which has sole responsibility for maintaining order in the capital. The European Union and its Member States will also continue to shoulder their responsibilities within the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT), which it commends for the role it has played in the events of recent days. The EU’s electoral observation mission will remain in place to observe the continuation of the electoral process.
The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) of the EU in Indonesia was extended for an initial period of three months until 15 December 2006. Javier Solana welcomed this decision of the Council.

JAVIER SOLANA WELCOMES THE EXTENSION OF THE ACEH MONITORING MISSION

(…)

‘It is with satisfaction that I welcome today’s Council decision to extend the Aceh Monitoring Mission. In view of the remarkable progress in the Aceh peace process, which we have helped to achieve, it seems clear that it is our obligation to respond positively to the request from the Government of Indonesia (GoI), with the full support of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) leadership, to a final extension of the joint EU-ASEAN mission in Aceh until December.

It is of great importance to keep the momentum in the continued implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Helsinki on 15 August 2005 and build on the positive spirit prevailing in Aceh. This becomes even more important now when the people of Aceh are preparing to exercise their civil and political rights in the local elections to be held on 11 December 2006. Therefore we will accompany the people of Aceh, in the run up to these first ever direct and democratic local elections to be held in Aceh. The EU will further support these elections by sending an Election Observation Mission to conduct the monitoring of the elections, following an invitation from the GoI’. 
General Affairs and External Relations Council

Brussels, 15 September 2006

(...)

WESTERN BALKANS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. The Council expressed concern at recent cases of inflammatory rhetoric used during the election campaign. In this context, the Council reaffirmed its unequivocal commitment to the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement and the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

2. The Council emphasised that the elections scheduled for 1 October should be conducted in accordance with international standards. In the light of the envisaged closure of OHR, these elections will be particularly significant as the leaders chosen will have to take greater responsibility for the realisation of BiH’s European perspective.

3. While welcoming the progress made on the negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, the Council regretted that many key reforms had been delayed in 2006. It called upon the relevant authorities to agree and implement as soon as possible the reforms necessary for the conclusion of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement as set out in the General Affairs and External Relations Council conclusions of 12 December 2005. In particular, the Council expressed concern over the lack of progress towards the implementation of the October 2005 agreement on police restructuring, and looked forward to the swift removal of this obstacle.

Montenegro

4. The Council welcomed the peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections in the Republic of Montenegro on 10 September and the International Election Observation Mission’s preliminary assessment that the elections were conducted largely in accordance with international standards. The Council called upon authorities in Podgorica to address the remaining challenges listed in the IEOM assessment.
5. The Council looked forward to the smooth formation of a new Government and a swift agreement in the Parliament on the procedures for adoption of a new Constitution, fulfilling European standards, and its subsequent adoption. In this respect, the Council stressed that a continuous dialogue between the new government and the opposition will be necessary. The Council expects that the new Government, once it is formed, will continue to work resolutely on the European reform agenda in line with the European Partnership. In particular, the Council underlined the importance of reforms in the area of freedom, justice and security and building up the administrative capacity. The Council welcomed the Commission’s intention to re-launch shortly the SAA negotiations with the Republic of Montenegro while emphasizing that the pace and conclusion of these negotiations will depend on Montenegro’s progress in relevant reforms. The EU remains committed to supporting the Republic of Montenegro on its European course.

Serbia

6. The Council recalled that a peaceful and prosperous Serbia fully integrated into the family of European nations is very important for stability in the region. The EU is ready to resume negotiations with Serbia on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement as soon as full cooperation of Serbia with the ICTY is achieved. The Council urged the Serbian authorities to step up their efforts in implementing their Action Plan in order to meet this criterion.’

* * *

The Council also adopted:
- a joint action establishing an EU team to contribute to the preparation of a future international civilian mission in Kosovo;
- a joint declaration on political dialogue with Montenegro (...).

**SUDAN/DARFUR – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The Council expresses its deep concern about the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur. The Council condemns the continuing violations of the cease-fire by all parties, particularly the violence directed at the civilian population and the targeting of humanitarian assistance. It reiterates the obligation of all parties to permit the unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Council reminds the leadership of the Sudanese Government of its collective and individual responsibility to protect its citizens from all violence and to guarantee respect for human rights. The EU
strongly endorses the statement by the UN Secretary General to the UN Security Council on 11 September, including his urging of the Government of Sudan to embrace the spirit of UN Security Council Resolution 1706 and his warning that those who decide and carry out policies leading to death and suffering in Darfur will be held accountable.

2. The Council is alarmed by the renewed fighting in areas of North Darfur, the recent military build-up in Darfur and the reinforcement of the government forces. It condemns the reported military attacks by both the Sudanese government and the rebel groups and stresses that any military action will only further aggravate the already alarming humanitarian situation. The Council stresses that the Sudanese Government should stop their military action in Darfur, abide by the ceasefire agreement and respect their commitments under the DPA. The Council recalls the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1591 asserting that those individuals impeding the peace process or threatening the stability in Darfur shall be held responsible.

3. The Council strongly supports the UN Security Council Resolution 1706 of 31 August 2006 which expands the mandate of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to Darfur and strengthens its military and civilian components in support of the early and effective implementation of the DPA and the 2004 N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. The Council reiterates the readiness of the EU to support the efforts of the UN and other partners in the planning for transition from AMIS to UN.

4. The Council strongly calls upon the Sudanese Government to give its consent to the deployment of the UN operation and to extend its full cooperation to the UN in preparing for the implementation of the extended mandate of UNMIS.

5. The EU reaffirms its strong support to the AU. Until transition to the UN is completed, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the effective and impartial implementation of its mandate will continue to be of critical importance for the peace process in Darfur. The Council stresses the need to continue efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of the mission, particularly regarding the tasks related to the protection of the civilian population and humanitarian access, and reiterates the EU’s support to that end in view of the AU PSC meeting on 18 September.

6. The Council reiterates that a broadly based and inclusive implementation of the DPA, signed in Abuja on 5 May 2006, remains the basis for stability, peace and reconciliation in Darfur. It calls on the non-signatories to join in and commit themselves to the implementation of the agreement. In this regard, the Council urges the signatories to the DPA to continue working to find ways to address the concerns of the non-signatories, allowing them to adhere to the agreement.
7. The Council in particular emphasises the need to involve the non-signatories in the effective monitoring of the cease-fire and the investigation of violations committed. The non-signatories should be held fully responsible for the fulfilment of their commitments set out in the N’djamena Agreement. The Council thus urges the DPA signatories to accept the participation of the non-signatories in the mechanisms set up by the existing cease-fire agreements and to facilitate a swift resumption of their work. The Council also suggests considering confidence-building measures such as inviting the non-signatories to participate in the Core Coordination Group (CCG) and take immediate steps to better involve civil society through an inclusive Darfur-Darfur dialogue.

8. The Council underlines its deep concern at the potential negative impact of a continuing conflict in Darfur on the rest of Sudan and in the wider region. The Council is particularly attentive to the situation of the refugee camps in Chad and it welcomes both the recent indications of an improvement in the relations between Sudan and Chad and the on-going talks in Asmara between the Sudanese Government and the Eastern Front.

9. The EU calls on the international community to combine its efforts and to work with the parties to the conflict to improve the humanitarian situation and to build a sustainable peace in Darfur.

DEMONCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The European Union looks forward to the orderly and peaceful conclusion of the ongoing electoral process in the DRC, allowing for legitimate and democratically elected institutions in expression of the full sovereignty of the Congolese people. The Council has noted the results of the legislative elections published by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) which mark another important step in this direction.

2. The Council commends all efforts undertaken by the Congolese transitional authorities, and in particular the IEC, the United Nations and the international community to prepare the upcoming second round of presidential elections as well as the provincial elections. The Council notes the Supreme Court ruling on the period in which the second round of the presidential elections takes place. In this context, the Council calls upon all parties and candidates to support and to respect the IEC, recalling its central role in organizing and overseeing the electoral process.

3. In line with its recent Council Conclusions on the DRC of 17 July and 25 August, the Council welcomes the progress made in confidence building and in reducing the ten-
sions between the two presidential candidates and urges them to abstain from any acts of violence. The Council welcomes the meeting of President Kabila and Vice-president Bemba in the margins of the ‘Conseil Supérieur de la Défense’ on 13 September which is an encouraging sign. It appreciates the role of MONUC and the Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition (CIAT) and commends the efforts undertaken by SG/HR Solana in facilitating these developments.

4. The Council welcomes the signature of an acte d’engagement on the use of the media and stresses that media channels should remain operational and that no material should be broadcast that could incite violence or ethnic hatred. Both sides should abide by the decision of the Haute Autorité des Medias.

5. The EU will continue to actively support the electoral process. This support will include continuing the close and effective cooperation between the EU military operation EUFOR RD Congo and MONUC, which, together with the EU’s reinforced police mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa), has so far proven instrumental in maintaining the stability during the electoral process. Furthermore, the EU has provided additional funding for the election preparations and continues to conduct an Electoral Observation Mission.

6. On the basis of a successful conclusion of the electoral process, the EU remains committed to cooperating with the newly-elected government in promoting projects to assist immediate reconstruction and rehabilitation, to be followed by a long-term effort for sustainable development and taking into account the principles of good governance.

7. Following the conclusion of the electoral process, it is of crucial importance that the Congolese authorities show strong commitment to good governance and remain committed to strengthening the rule of law as well as security and stability in the DRC. The Council underlines the importance of the DRC authorities continuing the reforms in the security sector. In this context, the Council underlines the role played by EUSEC RD Congo, EUPOL Kinshasa as well as the EC and Member States activities. The EU will pursue its ongoing efforts in order to support the Congolese authorities in this field, building on its experience and that of its Member States. In view of the need for a comprehensive approach combining the different initiatives underway, the EU would be ready to assume a coordinating role in international efforts in the security sector, in close cooperation with the United Nations, to support the Congolese authorities in this field.’

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The Council also adopted a common position on restrictive measures against certain individuals in the DRC amending a 2005 common position to reflect amendments
introduced by the UN Security Council. The Council common positions implement UNSC resolution 1596 as modified by resolutions 1649 and 1698 (...).

**IRAQ – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The EU welcomes the progress made in developing the International Compact with Iraq since the launch of the Compact process on 27 July 2006. It appreciates the efforts of the Iraqi government in preparing the draft outline for the Compact, which was presented at the meeting of the Preparatory Group of the Compact in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, on 10 September 2006.

2. The EU confirms its support for the purpose of the Compact, which is to bring together the international community to support Iraq in achieving its National Vision of building a "secure, unified, federal and democratic nation, founded on the principles of freedom and equality, and providing peace and prosperity for its people".

3. The EU reaffirms its readiness to participate actively in the Compact process, and encourages Iraq to further develop a balanced Compact in all its dimensions through an inclusive consultative process at the national, regional and international levels. Domestic consensus-building will assist in ensuring that the Compact responds to the needs of the Iraqi people, and help to secure commitment to its implementation by the Iraqi government and throughout Iraqi society.

4. The EU underlines the importance it attaches to Iraqi ownership and inclusiveness of the Compact process, and to the broad involvement of the international community, including the active participation of Iraq’s neighbours and partners in the region. Furthermore the EU stresses the importance of ensuring coordination with existing reconstruction assistance, notably the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI). The EU continues to support the central role of the UN as co-chair of the Preparatory Group of the Compact and as advisor to Iraq. It encourages the Executive Committee of the Compact to ensure transparency in the process of developing all aspects of the Compact, as a means to achieving full support of the Iraqi people and of the international community.

5. The EU looks forward to further discussions with the Iraqi government and other partners during the ministerial meetings on the Compact in New York and Singapore on 18 September 2006 and beyond.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council discussed the situation in the Middle East. It underlined that lasting peace and security in the region can only be ensured by a comprehensive settlement with a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at its core. The Council underlined the importance of reinvigorating the Peace Process and requested the High Representative to pursue his efforts to this end.

2. The Council stressed its commitment to support the full implementation of UNSCR 1701, welcomed the declared commitment of all regional parties to this end, and commended the efforts of UNSG Annan. It welcomed the early deployment of the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon and the substantial contribution by EU Member States to the reinforced UNIFIL mission. It appreciated the significant contributions pledged by other countries. The Council called for a full and speedy implementation of UNSCR 1701, including the withdrawal of Israeli troops in parallel with the deployment of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Council welcomed the lifting of the Israeli air and sea blockade, which will ease the delivery of humanitarian aid and facilitate economic recovery, and the instrumental role played by EU Member States. The EU reiterated its call for the immediate release of the two abducted Israeli soldiers. The Council invites the Presidency, the High Representative and the Commission to draw up a report on a possible European contribution to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 on the Lebanese-Syrian border.

3. The Council underlined the EU’s commitment to assist the Lebanese government in meeting emergency, humanitarian and environmental needs, launching the rehabilitation and reconstruction process, extending its authority throughout Lebanese territory and taking forward political, security, economic and social reforms. It called on all outside actors and neighbours to support this process. The Council welcomed the Stockholm Conference for Lebanon’s Early Recovery on 31 August. It noted that the EU/Lebanon ENP Action Plan provides an agreed framework through which the EU can assist the Government in implementing its reform agenda.

4. The Council underlined its commitment to promoting tangible progress towards a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It welcomed the announcement by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on an agreement to form a government of national unity and expressed the hope that its political platform will reflect the Quartet principles and allow for early engagement. The Council welcomed the prospect of a meeting between PM Olmert and President Abbas in the near future with a view to relaunching negotiations. It called for an immediate end to violence by Palestinian factions.
as well as to Israeli military activity in the Palestinian territories. The Council reiterated its call for the immediate release of the abducted Israeli soldier. It further repeated its call for the immediate release of Palestinian ministers and legislators in Israeli custody. The Council reiterated the need for all parties to respect their Roadmap obligations. It renewed its call on the Israeli Government to freeze all settlement activity, including natural growth of settlements. Ministers reiterated that the EU will not recognise any changes to the pre-1967 borders other than those agreed by both parties.

5. The Council expressed deep concern at the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian territories. In this context the Council recalled the strong EU commitment made at the Stockholm International Donor Conference on 1 September. It welcomed the expansion of the Temporary International Mechanism, by which the EU and its Member States have already channelled substantial resources directly to the Palestinian people, and agreed that its operation should be extended for a further three months. It encouraged donors and others in the region to make full use of the mechanism. The Council repeated its call on Israel to resume transfers of withheld Palestinian tax and customs revenues. The Council called for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access and, in this regard, reiterated its continued commitment to EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah. It urged that Rafah and all other border-crossings be re-opened and remain open.’

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The Council also adopted a common position imposing an arms embargo in Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1701 (...).

IRAN

Ministers discussed the situation regarding the Iranian nuclear programme on the basis of a briefing by High Representative Javier Solana on his meetings with the Secretary-General of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Dr Ali Larijani, on 9-10 September, and subsequent meetings at senior representative level.

They took note of the report by IAEA Director-General El Baradei dated 31 August 2006, which concludes that Iran has not acted in conformity with UN Security Council resolution 1696, and agreed that it was now appropriate to work to follow up this resolution.

Ministers welcomed the High Representative’s consultations with Dr Larijani to explore the possibility of opening negotiations with Iran. They supported these efforts and stressed the importance of reaching an early conclusion.

(...)
ANNEX – JOINT DECLARATION ON POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND MONTENEGRO

Brussels, 5 September 2006

Based on the commitments undertaken at the EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Thessaloniki on 21 June 2003, the European Union and Montenegro (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Parties’) express their resolution to reinforce and intensify their mutual relations in the political fields.

Accordingly, the Parties agree to establish a regular political dialogue which will accompany and consolidate their rapprochement, support the political and economic changes underway in Montenegro, and contribute to establish new forms of cooperation, in particular taking into account Montenegro’s status as a potential candidate for European Union membership.

The political dialogue, based on shared values and aspirations, will aim at:

1. Reinforcing democratic principles and institutions as well as rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
2. Promoting regional cooperation, development of good neighbourly relations and fulfilment of obligations under international law, including full and unequivocal cooperation with the ICTY;
3. Facilitating the integration of Montenegro to the fullest possible extent into the political and economic mainstream of Europe based on its individual merits and achievements;
4. Increasing convergence of positions between the Parties on international issues, and on those matters likely to have substantial effects on the Parties, including cooperation in the fight against terrorism, organised crime and corruption, and in other areas in the field of justice and home affairs;
5. Enabling each Party to consider the position and interests of the other Party in their respective decision making process;
6. Enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe and, in particular, in South-Eastern Europe, through cooperation in the areas covered by the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.

The political dialogue between the Parties will take place through regular consultations, contacts and exchange of information as appropriate, in particular in the following formats:

1. High-level meetings between representatives of Montenegro on the one hand, and representatives of the European Union, in the Troika format, on the other;
2. Providing mutual information on foreign policy decisions taking full advantage of diplomatic channels, including contacts at the bilateral level in third countries as well
as within multilateral fora such as the United Nations, OSCE and other international organisations;
3. Contacts at parliamentary level;
4. Any other means which would contribute to consolidating, and developing dialogue between the Parties.

Political dialogue will also take place within the framework of the EU-Western Balkans Forum, the high level multilateral political forum established at the EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Thessaloniki.
Kosovo – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 15 September 2006

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2006/623/CFSP ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A EU-TEAM TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PREPARATIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN MISSION IN KOSOVO, INCLUDING A EUROPEAN UNION SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE COMPONENT (ICM/EUSR PREPARATION TEAM)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and, in particular Article 14 and Article 25, third subparagraph, thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, a process to determine the future status of Kosovo led by the UN Status Envoy Mr Martti Ahtisaari was launched at the beginning of November 2005. The success of this process is essential not only for providing a clearer perspective for the people of Kosovo but also for the overall stability of the region.

(2) The United Nations will remain fully engaged in Kosovo until the end of UNSCR 1244. However, the UN has indicated that it will no longer take the lead in a post-status presence. The EU has a vital interest in a positive result of this process, as well as the responsibility and the means to contribute to such an outcome. The EU has declared that it stands ready to enhance its role in Kosovo following status settlement. The EU will thus have to undertake an important role in Kosovo in a complex environment.

(3) The Stabilisation and Association Process is the strategic framework for the EU’s policy towards the western Balkan region, and its instruments are open to Kosovo, including a European partnership, political and technical dialogue under the SAP Tracking Mechanism, and related Community assistance programmes.

(4) On 12 July 2006 the SG/HR Solana and Commissioner Rehn submitted their report on “The Future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo” to the Council. The report analysed the nature, size and responsibilities of a future international engagement, the EU’s role after status settlement, and practical means to realise Kosovo’s future EU perspective, without prejudice to the outcome of the Status negotiations.
The Report stressed that the future international civilian mission in Kosovo (ICM) should be based on a UN SC Resolution. It should ensure the implementation of non-military aspects of the status settlement. The ICM will work with the Kosovo authorities to support implementation of the status settlement, exercising intervention powers if needed.

The Report recommended that the head of the ICM, who will be the international community representative (ICR) nominated by the UNSC, should be “double-hatted” as EU Special Representative (EUSR). The ICR/EUSR will assume the central coordinating role with other international actors on all issues relating to the implementation of the status settlement and establish appropriate mechanisms. He/she will be an EU national appointed at the time of the status settlement. An important part of his/her mandate should be to play a major role in the establishment of the ICM during the transitional period between the status decision and the end of UNMIK’s mandate.

The Report also recommended that an EU team to contribute to the preparations of the ICM, including the EUSR component, should be established as soon as possible. The European Commission should be fully associated to this effort. The ICM preparations should be carried out in close cooperation with other key international actors (notably UNOSEK, UNMIK, US).

In a letter to the SG/HR on 11 August 2006 the acting UN SRSG for Kosovo Steven P. Schook welcomed the EU’s engagement in the discussions on the future international engagement in Kosovo and invited the EU to deploy an ICM/EUSR Preparation Team to Pristina.

On 10 April 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/304/CFSP(1) on the establishment of an EU Planning Team (EUPT Kosovo), regarding a possible EU crisis management operation in Kosovo; the activities of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team should be closely coordinated with those of EUPT Kosovo.

In accordance with the guidelines of the European Council meeting at Nice on 7 to 9 December 2000, this Joint Action should determine the role of the SG/HR, in accordance with Articles 18(3) and 26 of the Treaty.

Article 14(1) of the Treaty calls for the indication of a financial reference amount for the whole period of implementation of the Joint Action. The indication of amounts to be financed by the general budget of the European Union illustrates the will of the legislative authority and is subject to the availability of commitment appropriations during the respective budget year.

(12) The mandate of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team will be implemented in the context of a situation where stability is not fully secured and which could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

Article 1

Objectives

1. The European Union hereby establishes a team to contribute to the preparations of the establishment of a possible international civilian mission in Kosovo, including a European Union Special Representative component (ICM/EUSR Preparation Team). The ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall be operational no later than end September 2006.

2. The objectives of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall be:
   - to contribute to the preparations of the establishment of a possible international civilian mission, in cooperation with the international community and the Kosovo institutions, and in close coordination with UNMIK regarding both its plans to complete the implementation of UNSCR 1244 and any necessary transitional arrangements towards a possible ICM,
   - to prepare, in full cooperation with the European Commission, as well as in consultation with the international community and the Kosovo institutions, the elements for the future EU contribution to a possible ICM,
   - Ensuring, without prejudice to Community competences and to the mandate of EUPT Kosovo, a comprehensive, coherent and integrated EU role in Kosovo with regard to timely preparation of the EU’s support for the implementation of a status settlement.

Article 2

Tasks

In order to carry out its objectives the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall focus on the following tasks:

1. conducting a close dialogue, particularly through the informal ICM task force, with all key local and international partners on their views regarding the preparations of a possible ICM;

2. initiating, with international partners and in consultation with UNOSEK, work on
identifying possible elements for functions, structure and personnel strength for a possible ICM, including division of responsibilities and contributions among international actors and any transitional arrangements;

3. initiating work on identifying all necessary elements for the EU contribution to a possible ICM, including an EUSR component;

4. conducting close coordination with all relevant local and international partners, as set out in Article 10.

Article 3

Structure
The ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall have an office of the Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team in Pristina, a team of advisors and an administration team. The ICM/EUSR Preparation Team will be gradually deployed, taking into account the progress of the status talks.

Article 4

Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team and staff
1. Mr Torbjörn Sohlström is hereby appointed Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team.

2. The Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall be responsible for managing and coordinating the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team’s activities.

3. The Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall assume the day-to-day management of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team and shall be responsible for staff and disciplinary matters. For seconded personnel, disciplinary action shall be exercised by the national or EU authority concerned.

4. The ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall primarily consist of civilian staff seconded by Member States or EU institutions. Each Member State or EU institution shall bear the costs related to any of the seconded staff seconded by it including salaries, medical coverage, travel expenses to and from Kosovo, and allowances other than per diems.

5. The ICM/EUSR Preparation Team may also recruit international staff and local staff on a contractual basis, as required.

6. While remaining under the authority of their sending Member States or EU insti-
tutions, all staff in the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall carry out their duties and act in the sole interest of the EU supporting action. All staff shall respect the security principles and minimum standards established by the Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council’s security regulations\(^{(1)}\) (hereafter referred to as Council’s security regulations).

**Article 5**

**Chain of command**

1. The structure of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall have a unified chain of command.

2. PSC shall provide the political control and strategic direction to the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team.

3. The SG/HR shall give guidance to the Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team.

4. Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall lead the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team and assume its day-to-day management.

5. The Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall report to the SG/HR.

**Article 6**

**Political control and strategic direction**

1. The PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team.

2. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with Article 25(3) of the Treaty on European Union. This authorisation shall include the powers to appoint a Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team, upon a proposal from the SG/HR. The powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall remain vested in the Council.

3. The PSC shall receive reports at regular intervals and may request specific reports by the Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team on the implementation of the tasks mentioned in Article 2 and on the coordination with other actors referred to in Article 10. The PSC may invite the Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team to its meetings, as appropriate.

4. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.

**Article 7**

**Participation of third States**
Without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the EU and its single institutional framework, acceding States shall be invited to contribute to the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team provided that they bear the cost of the staff seconded by them, including salaries, medical coverage, allowances, high-risk insurance and travel expenses to and from the mission area, and contribute to the running costs of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team, as appropriate.

**Article 8**

**Security**
1. The Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall be responsible for the security of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team and shall, in consultation with the Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council, be responsible for ensuring compliance with minimum security requirements applicable to the mission.

2. The ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall have a dedicated security officer reporting to the Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team.

**Article 9**

**Financial arrangements**
1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall be EUR 869000.

2. The expenditure financed by the amount referred to in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the rules and procedures applicable to the general budget of the EU, with the exception that any pre-financing shall not remain the property of the Community.

3. The Head of ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall report fully to, and be supervised by, the Commission on the activities undertaken in the framework of his contract. To this end, the Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall sign a contract with the Commission.

4. The financial arrangements shall respect the operational requirements of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team.
5. Expenditure shall be eligible as from the date of entry into force of this Joint Action.

Article 10

Coordination with other actors
1. The Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall, together with international partners, and in close consultation with UNMIK, carry forward work in the informal ICM Task Force.

2. The ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall meet regularly with EUPT Kosovo and with other EU actors in order to ensure close coordination and coherence in the preparation of the planning for the EU’s post-status engagement.

3. Close coordination between the EU and all relevant actors, including the UN/UNMIK, UNOSEK, the OSCE, NATO/KFOR as well as other key actors such as the US and Russia, will continue to ensure complementarity and synergy of the efforts of the international community. To this end, the Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall play an active role in the informal Steering Board for future arrangements in Pristina.

4. In performing his/her duties the Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall participate in the EU coordination mechanisms established in Pristina, Kosovo.

5. All EU Member States shall be kept fully informed on the coordination process.

Article 11

Status of staff of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team
1. Where required, the status of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team staff in Kosovo, including where appropriate the privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team shall be agreed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 24 of the Treaty on European Union. The SG/HR, assisting the Presidency, may negotiate such an agreement on its behalf.

2. The Member State or EU institution having seconded a staff member shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to the secondment, from or concerning the staff member. The Member State of EU institution in question shall be responsible for bringing any action against the secondee.

3. The conditions of employment and the rights and obligations of international and
local contracted staff shall be laid down in the contracts between the Head of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team and the staff member.

**Article 12**

**Community action**
The Council and the Commission shall, each in accordance with its respective powers, ensure consistency between the implementation of this Joint Action and external activities of the Community in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union. The Council and the Commission shall cooperate to this end.

**Article 13**

**Release of classified information**

1. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to NATO/KFOR EU classified information and documents up to the level “CONFIDENTIEL UE” generated for the purposes of the action, in accordance with the Council’s security regulations.

2. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to the UN/UNMIK and the OSCE, in accordance with the operational needs of the ICM/EUSR Preparation Team, EU classified information and documents up to the level “RESTREINT UE” generated for the purposes of the action, in accordance with the Council’s security regulations. Local arrangements shall be drawn up for this purpose.

3. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to third parties associated with this Joint Action EU non-classified documents related to the deliberations of the Council with regard to the action covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of Council Decision 2004/338/EC, Euratom of 22 March 2004 adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure(1).

**Article 14**

**Entry into force and expiry**

1. This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

2. It shall expire on 31 March 2007 or on the day of the appointment of an EUSR for Kosovo if the appointment of an EUSR occurs before 31 March 2007.

Article 15

Publication
This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 15 September 2006.

For the Council
The President
E. Tuomioja
Informal meeting of the Defence Ministers

Levi, 2 October 2006

SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY JAVIER SOLANA

Operations

Bosnia and Herzegovina:

- Yesterday’s election results are still preliminary – but the challenges before the new governments are known: Bosnia and Herzegovina still needs the same reforms today as a week ago.
- The EU is committed to BiH. We are prepared to work with any government that is genuinely committed to implement the reforms that BiH needs to move closer to the EU, and to uphold the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement. What we need to see now is an effective government, quickly formed, so that it can get on with the people’s priorities.
- The people of BiH will judge the next governments by their actions – not their words. And so will the European Union.
- Any decision on the future parameters of operation EUFOR Althea must reflect careful political judgements. It is too early to make any such definitive judgements now. We will have to return to this in December at the Council.
- I count on continued support from member states to the operation.

Sudan/Darfur

- It is important to continue engaging with the government of Sudan to achieve acceptance of the deployment of a UN mission in Darfur. The UN General Assembly ministerial week offered many opportunities to raise Darfur and to underline that Darfur is a major priority for the international community.
- On EU action: it is good news that the African Union came to the decision to extend its mission. That means we too must continue to do our utmost to support AMIS on the ground especially with financial and logistical support. Experience shows us that these are likely to remain critical and recurring challenges.
- The current EU military and civilian police support needs to continue and we hope Member States will continue to send personnel.
- We also need to continue to provide strategic airlift, especially during the upcoming rotation period. This continues to be a significant contribution. We are very pleased with the efficient cooperation between the EU and NATO on this, but there are still gaps in the airlift programme that has been requested by the AU.
AMIS should start to implement the security elements of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). We should continue to seek ways to assist AMIS in improving its operational capabilities.

Everything we do must be closely coordinated with the UN and complement their support mission. We stand ready to support and cooperate with DPKO (the UN’s Department for peacekeeping operations) with their plans to help AMIS in the coming period. It is now decisive that the Sudanese authorities allow the deployment of this UN supporting package.

In the perspective of a transition to a UN operation, we will also need to work with DPKO, in the light of developments, to find out what support the UN may require.

**Development of Military Capabilities**

**Headline Goal 2010 process / Force Catalogue**

- We must put a continuous effort into military capability development.
- We should finalise the Force Catalogue in time for the November Council. The Force Catalogue will be the basis for assessment and evaluation of Member States’ contributions in order to develop the Progress Catalogue in 2007.
- We also need to keep our eye on quality and not just quantity. In this respect, the Force Catalogue will lead to a better identification of shortfalls in the Progress Catalogue at the end of 2007.

**Battle groups**

- Battle groups reach Final operational Capability on 1 January 2007. In view of existing commitments, battle groups represent a key military instrument. Their availability is essential to underpin the EU’s ambition and capacity to be a global actor.
- We are on a good track with Member States’ commitments for the coming years. Thanks to those Member States who contributed.
- It would be useful to assess how the battle groups interact, exchange their lessons learned and work more closely together. Homogeneity at operational level should be ensured by well harmonised training.

(...)

**Liban**

- La mise en œuvre de la résolution 1701 est en bonne voie. Le cessez le feu est globalement respecté et les forces armées libanaises sont en cours de déploiement dans le sud du pays (15.000 hommes déployés). Le blocus aérien et maritime a été levé et le redé
ploïement des forces israéliennes, même s’il a pris un peu de retard, est presque achevé. La FINUL poursuit son déploiement conformément au calendrier prévu.

- La participation des Etats de l’Union européenne à la FINUL renforcée est importante, notamment en terme de contribution de troupes (environ 7000 hommes). C’est la crédibilité de l’Union dans toute la région qui est renforcée. Plusieurs pays européens ont également indiqué leur disponibilité à apporter une aide au gouvernement libanais: aide à l’armée libanaise, éventuellement d’autres besoins dans le domaine de la sécurité.


- Il nous faut maintenant aller de l’avant et préciser les contours d’une éventuelle action de l’UE. Nous avons besoin de connaître les besoins que le Gouvernement libanais souhaite que nous prenions en compte.

- Je voudrais rappeler les principes qui devraient gouverner une éventuelle action de l’UE : celle-ci devra évidemment respecter la souveraineté libanaise et s’inscrire dans le cadre d’une coordination d’ensemble conduite par les Libanais eux-mêmes. L’Union devra agir là ou elle peut apporter une valeur ajoutée, en facilitant la coordination des actions entreprises sur une base bilatérale ou en apportant une expertise spécifique. L’effort de l’Union devra être complémentaire de celui de la FINUL, sans interférer avec le nouveau mandat de cette dernière.

**Opérations**

**EUFOR RD Congo:**


- Je ramène de Kinshasa des motifs de satisfaction. Ma démarche politique, en pleine coordination avec d’autres (Président Mbeki et des ministres européens) a permis la reprise du travail gouvernemental, le Vice président Bemba réintégrant l’espace présidentiel.

- La coordination entre les différentes missions sur le terrain est excellente, nos trois missions (EUFOR / EUSEC et EUPOL) collaborent de manière très étroite. La coordination civile-militaire, qui a été au centre de nos débats ces derniers mois est, sur le terrain, une réalité qui démontre toute son efficacité.

- Nos missions sur place ont pleinement rempli, chacune dans leur domaine, les tâches
qui sont les leurs. Le rôle de la force européenne et l’action de notre mission de police ont été déterminants pour ramener le calme lors des événements du mois d’août.

Beaucoup des interlocuteurs que j’ai rencontrés m’ont dit que, sans l’intervention de EUFOR, le processus électoral aurait été en grand danger. Il n’est sans doute pas exagéré de dire qu’après Artémis, l’Union Européenne a pour la deuxième fois permis de maintenir sur les rails le processus de transition. Je voudrais rendre hommage à nos soldats qui, sur le terrain, ont mené à bien leur tâche dans des conditions difficiles.

Mais nous devons rester vigilants. Le calme est encore fragile à Kinshasa, les tensions persistent entre les deux candidats au deuxième tour. Le code de bonne conduite pour la campagne électorale n’a pas réglé tous les problèmes. Le renforcement récent des deux camps en armes est particulièrement inquiétant.

Dans ces conditions, il faut poursuivre nos efforts en matière de réforme du secteur de sécurité. Il faut en particulier achever de manière urgente le brassage des unités qui ne sont pas encore intégrées.

Il faut continuer également à souligner auprès des principaux acteurs du deuxième tour que l’UE n’acceptera pas que le processus de transition soit remis en cause. Il faut que le code de bonne conduite soit respecté et que la campagne soit digne et respectable. Il faut respecter les accords sur le cantonnement des troupes et des milices. Il faut respecter l’embargo sur les armes prévu par la Résolution du Conseil de sécurité. Il faut aussi que nos missions sur place poursuivent leur action et soient prêts à agir avec la même efficacité que lors du mois d’août.

Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO)

Improving our civ-mil coordination has been a key theme of recent years. Operational experience (BiH, Darfur, DRC) shows its importance.

I am glad that work is underway. We should move forward quickly. The Union’s strength lies in its capacity to integrate the defence element with the wide range of other tools at the Union’s disposal. I believe the practical ideas we are working on based on lessons learned from operations can deliver rapid improvements.
In November 2005, the European Defence Agency was tasked by its Steering Board with developing an initial ‘Long-Term Vision’ of Europe’s defence capacities and requirements. On 3 October 2006, after a year of work, EU Defence Ministers welcomed the outcome of this undertaking, and authorised its publication. ‘This fascinating document offers planners, working their way through the fog of the future, a shared and stimulating analysis of some of the major trends that will shape that future,’ said Javier Solana at the beginning of the ministerial meeting. ‘It provides shared views on the state of the world in which European Security and Defence Policy operations will take place and on what kind of capabilities will be needed to conduct those operations successfully’.

**AN INITIAL LONG-TERM VISION FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY NEEDS**

[Endorsed by the Steering Board with the status of a document extensively discussed with and broadly supported by pMS – but without word-for-word agreement.]

(...) 

Acknowledgements

The European Defence Agency (EDA) has had a huge amount of help in this exercise from a pantheon of authorities; pre-eminently from the Institute of Security Studies in Paris, who analysed all the available literature bearing on what we call the global context; from the EU Military Committee, who focussed on the likely future nature of ESDP operations and what that implies for future defence capability needs; and from distinguished scientists and technologists across Europe, who generously helped our understanding of what science and technology may have in store. We are also grateful for input from the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe; from Allied Command Transformation, who are attempting a similar exercise; from numerous defence academics and experts; and of course from the defence ministries of participating Member States. All this support and expertise has been indispensable.
Executive Summary

1. A vision of the future nature and context of ESDP operations is essential to inform those near-term decisions which will determine Europe’s long-term defence capabilities and capacities. The picture offered here will need further development, and regular reassessment - but may be judged a useful starting-point. (Introduction)

2. The global context is sobering, with the central predictions of demography and economics foreshadowing a Europe which, two decades hence, will be older, less pre-eminently prosperous, and surrounded by regions (including Africa and the Middle East) which may struggle to cope with the consequences of globalisation. Defence will need to contend with public finances under pressure from a growing pension burden; a shrinking recruitment pool; and societies increasingly cautious about interventionary operations, concerned with issues of legitimacy in the use of force, and inclined to favour “security” over “defence” spending. (Section I, The Global Context)

3. Defence will need to continue adapting to:
   - the changing role of force. Traditionally, war and politics were practised sequentially - and war involved largely unconstrained violence directed towards destroying opposing conventional forces. Today and tomorrow, force will be intimately interwoven with political (and media) developments – and will typically be applied in opaque circumstances against an obscure enemy under tight rules of engagement and 24/7 media scrutiny.
   - the technological revolution. Continued developments in micro-electronics, communication and sensing technologies, bio- and material sciences and energy technologies will provide modern Armed Forces with great advantages. But the adversary will work hard to adopt and exploit our own advances against us. Increasingly, defence will need to draw from the broadening flood of civil technological progress. (Section II, Challenges for Defence)

4. ESDP operations will be expeditionary, multinational and multi-instrument, directed at achieving security and stability more than “victory”. Information will be critical, whether informing the “war of ideas” in cyberspace, or facilitating effective command decisions. "Asymmetry" will apply not merely to an opponent’s tactics but also to his aims and values. In such circumstances, the military will be only one of a range of instruments applied to achieve the campaign goals. (Section III, Implications for the Military Contribution to ESDP Operations)

5. The key future force and capability characteristics may be:
   - Synergy – going beyond combined-arms warfare to coordination of effects with non-military actors;
Agility – implying speed of reaction and deployability, but also the capacity to reconfigure for optimum force size and balance, and move quickly at the tactical level;

Selectivity – meaning a wide range of capabilities, and the means to ensure an informed and appropriate choice at each stage of the operation; and

Sustainability – suggesting the right logistic support, but also theatre access.

(Section IV – Implications for Capability Development)

6. These characteristics are translated into a Future Capability Profile for each of the main capability domains of Command, Inform, Engage, Protect, Deploy and Sustain.

(Annex – Future Capability Profile)

7. In working towards this capability profile defence planners will need to concentrate on some key issues, including

- Knowledge exploitation – improving intelligence, information and analysis at all levels, and developing appropriate forms of network-enabled capability
- Interoperability – preferably through greater commonality of equipment and systems, and shared or pooled capability
- The manpower balance – finding ways to enable greater investment by cutting manpower numbers and costs, whilst providing for “boots on the ground”
- Rapid acquisition – in particular quicker exploitation of new technology
- Industrial policy – averting a steady contraction and decline of the European defence industry by increasing investment; consolidating the European technological and industrial base; harnessing Europe’s full potential; and targeting what we want to preserve or develop
- Flexibility for the unforeseen – recognising the limitations to how far we can penetrate the fog of the future.

(Section V: Key Issues for the Defence Planner).

Introduction

1. Every day, defence planners, technologists and industrialists across Europe take decisions which materially affect the sort of defence capabilities, and underpinning technological and industrial base, that Europe will have at its disposal in 20 years time. Those involved in such decisions are, in the French phrase, “preparing the future” – and they need the best help that can be given them to understand the future for which they must prepare. Accordingly, the Ministerial Steering Board of the European Defence Agency (EDA) tasked the Agency, in November 2005, to lead a wide-ranging exercise to develop an initial long-term vision of European defence capability and capacity needs, looking some two decades ahead.
2. Any attempt to “forecast the future” – to assert with confidence that the world will be thus or so in 20 years time, or that defence ministries can accurately specify what capabilities will be required to meet the challenges so far ahead – would be self-deluding and dangerous. But we can reasonably aim to identify some of the most relevant and robust trends, and recommend them as guidelines for those working their way forward into the fog of the future. For example, a key hypothesis in what follows is that the phenomenon known as globalisation will continue. It is easy to think of scenarios which might invalidate this hypothesis: an uncontrolled pandemic; massive use of weapons of mass destruction; or perhaps regionalisation of the world’s economic system, with competition for inadequate resources leading to the emergence of mutually suspicious regional blocks. But, so many stand to gain so much from the continuation of the globalisation process that it seems a reasonable assumption to make, at least for now, about the world in which the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) will operate.

3. “At least for now” is fundamental. This document does not pretend to offer a route map to be followed over the next twenty years. It aspires only to provide a sort of compass bearing, to indicate the directions in which it would be sensible to move forward. Accordingly it is an initial vision, intended as something to be revisited on a regular basis, to check whether the directions indicated still seem appropriate. And it cannot answer the question how much effort and resource should be invested in insuring against the unexpecteds and the unknowns which will inevitably present themselves along the way.

4. The European capability and capacity needs referred to in the Steering Board’s tasking are those needed for the ESDP. They are only one part of the spectrum of what defence practitioners need to plan for, alongside, for example, separate national or NATO requirements. Thus, the initial long-term vision (LTV) makes no claim to influence the totality of Member States’ defence planning. Nor does it attempt to anticipate how ESDP itself may evolve over the next 20 years. However, the Headline Goal and European Security Strategy envisage a broad and significantly challenging set of potential missions. These include separation of warring factions by force, on the sort of scale that would have been required had a ground invasion of Kosovo in 1999 turned out to be necessary. They may also encompass stabilising operations in a failed state in the face of a determined and capable asymmetric threat. So the demands of today’s ESDP are already potentially deep and comprehensive.

5. Against that background, what is offered here is a basis, a proposed foundation upon which follow-on work can be built, involving progressively more detailed analysis and therefore more useful guidance to those developing the defence capabilities and capacities of the future.
I. The Global Context – What Sort Of Europe In What Sort Of World?

6. Unless globalisation stops or goes into reverse, the world of 2025 is likely to be more diverse, more inter-dependent, and even more unequal. A forecast tripling of Chinese GDP will make China the second global economy; India may have overhauled Japan, to take third place. Europe will continue to grow modestly – in GDP and perhaps membership – but with its technological advantage in such areas as IT, biotechnology, and nanotechnology being steadily eroded.

7. Europe will in particular be held back by low fertility rates (currently 1.5). The population may remain roughly stable, compensated by lower mortality and greater longevity. But by 2025 the effective economic old age dependency ratio (retired over 65s as a percentage of the working population aged 15-64) will have risen from 37% to 48%; and the average European will be 45 years old. Europeans will by 2025 comprise a mere 6% of the world population. The aging of Europe’s people will lead to fierce competition for young and skilled workers. The Armed Forces recruitment pool (16 – 30 age group) will fall by over 15% by 2025.

8. These demographic trends will have major implications for public finances, with increasing health care and pension costs. Future public benefits to the elderly could rise from today’s spectrum of 11-16% of national GDPs to 17-33% over the next 4 decades. Low economic growth and high unemployment could further exacerbate fiscal pressures on national budgets as unemployment and social benefits are funded by a decreasing tax-paying population. Inevitably, costs of armed forces personnel will also rise.

9. Globalisation will produce winners and losers, as between countries and regions, and within societies (whilst universal communication will make these disparities ever more apparent). The regions neighbouring Europe will face particular challenges. High fertility should see Africa’s population growing faster than anywhere else – up by 48% to 1.3 billion by 2025 – despite AIDS. The average African’s age is projected to be 22. Desertification may increasingly concentrate this young population in urban centres (11 African mega-cities of 5 million plus by 2025) – many of them without hope of employment. The implications for despair, humanitarian disaster and migratory pressures are obvious.

10. The Middle East will see a comparable growth in its young population – a 50% increase in the working age population – with similar uncertainties as to how they are to find employment, and 70% of the population in cities by 2015. Russia, by contrast, looks likely to suffer a 10% population decline by 2025.

11. So the prognosis is for tensions and strong migratory pressures in the regions around Europe, at a time when Europe is becoming increasingly dependent on the rest of
the world, especially for energy. Global energy demand is reckoned to rise by 50% by 2030 – oil consumption up 40%, gas up 90%. The resources are available but the question is whether investments will be made in time to avoid constant supply pressure at the margin and steady price increases. By 2025, Europe will be externally dependent for 90% of its oil and 80% of its gas. China and India in particular will drive global energy demand, and seek new sources in central Asia, Africa and the Middle East. In this and other ways, European security interests may be directly or indirectly challenged by tensions arising not only in the near neighbourhood but also further afield.

12. Even as Europe becomes more dependent on the wider world, and the immediate neighbourhood becomes more problematic, so it may become more cautious about military intervention. The “CNN effect” and associated casualty aversion are already familiar. Military operations will be subject to ever-increasing scrutiny by elected officials, media and populations. Governments and societies increasingly concerned about internal security and social cohesion may be even more hesitant to undertake potentially controversial interventions abroad – in particular interventions in regions from where large numbers of immigrants have come. Continued proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities may also be expected, complicating the calculus of interventions.

13. Caution may be reinforced by increased concern with the legality of military action, as globalisation disseminates the concept of international law. Military action, not explicitly authorised by the UN may become increasingly controversial. In the conduct of war, ever greater attention will be paid to proportion and justification in the application of force, with an increasing tendency to hold individuals responsible for their actions not just at head of state or military commander level but down the command chain. Attention to collateral damage will be ever more acute.

14. Increasing concern with homeland security will erode distinctions between what is regarded as the province of “defence” and of “security”, and indeed may call into question the taxpayer’s willingness to fund “defence” if this is seen as wholly concerned with interventions abroad or deterring increasingly improbable conventional attacks on European territory.

15. Europe will remain one of the most prosperous and stable regions on the planet. But, as it ages, loses economic pre-eminence and becomes more anxious about its security, it may also find the problems on its periphery increasingly challenging.

II. Challenges For Defence

16. Against this background: what are the principal challenges for defence? Apart from the danger, noted above, of “defence” becoming perceived as peripheral to the primary
security concerns of European citizens, we identify two key issues:

- Adapting to the changing role of force
- Adapting to the technological revolution

Adapting to the changing role of force

17. It is a familiar thought that war is the continuation of politics by other means. But we have become used to these activities being conducted in distinct phases. When the politicians and diplomats fail, they hand matters over to the military, re-entering to settle the peace when the military issue is decided. Twice in the 20th century war took over from politics for a period of years. Similarly, expeditionary operations traditionally involved dispatching the force commander with the broadest of objectives and the freest of hands, requiring him only to report success when the job was done.

18. The all-seeing eye of the camera and the speed of modern communication have changed all that. All parties in modern conflicts realise that the political outcome will be determined not just by the achievement of military objectives, but by the manner in which operations are conducted or are perceived to be conducted. There seems always to be a video camera at hand, and a TV station ready to broadcast what it sees to global audiences. And the operation itself will be impacted by reactions of local actors and onlookers to breaking news (or rumours), even from the other side of the world.

19. The interplay between the political, the military and the mediatic is now continuous; and military success achieved in the wrong way can mean political failure.

20. With this 24/7 scrutiny has come, as noted above, an ever-increasing premium on issues of legitimacy and conformity with international law – a not always precise but certainly expanding corpus of constraining standards. This may include the interpretation of the Right of Self-Defence and the Threat to International Peace and Security as stipulated in the UN Charter (Jus ad Bellum), and the future balance between Intervention and State Sovereignty. The way force is employed is increasingly constrained by legal and policy considerations based on general international law and the law of armed conflict when applicable. It is likely that policy could become increasingly restrictive about the conditions in which military force is deemed legitimate. In addition, international criminal law comes into play with the establishment of the International Criminal Court and a variety of ad hoc jurisdictions. All these developments will create an increasing level of complexity for the political and military operators and planners.

21. Allied to this is the widespread perception that technology is putting into military hands the means to conduct operations with ever greater precision and restraint. Warfare has been described as a mixture of intelligence and kinetic energy. The opening campaigns
in Afghanistan and Iraq have confirmed beyond doubt that we are transitioning from the industrial age to the information age of war – that intelligence (or knowledge, or information) will become an ever more important resource for successful operations, whilst kinetic energy has to be applied in ever more precise and limited quantities.

22. In the Kosovo air war only 15% of munitions dropped were “smart”; by the 2003 Iraq war, the proportions between dumb and smart were reversed. Serious thought needs to be given to the future utility of unguided munitions (and of aircraft that cannot use smart weapons), as well as cluster bombs, mines and other weapons of indiscriminate effect. The environmental impact of military action will also come increasingly into focus, including concern for effects on our own troops – as with the crises over the use of depleted uranium ammunition in the First Gulf War and later in Kosovo.

23. Thus the focus of military efforts will shift to complementing diplomacy in preventing wars from occurring, containing those conflicts that do occur, and discouraging the emergence of parties whose objective it is to contribute to the generation of a crisis.

24. All this has reduced the plausibility of scenarios, at least in the European context and for the foreseeable future, involving traditional state-on-state warfare, with conventional forces pitted against comparable opponents. And it has simultaneously encouraged all but the most technologically dominant (for now the US and Europe) to seek out “asymmetric” strategies – ways of preventing sophisticated forces from using their technological advantage (e.g. by denying them clear targets), and adopting and exploiting against them their own technology (and media). The most effective practitioners of such asymmetric strategies will often be non-state actors.

25. In sum, the operations for which European forces should primarily prepare for the foreseeable future will require force to be applied in opaque circumstances, against an opponent at pains to conceal himself amongst civil populations, under tightly constraining rules of engagement and 24/7 media scrutiny.

Adapting to the technological revolution

26. Just as globalisation is altering our geo-political landscape and our familiar rule set, so science and technology continue to transform the world we live in at a pace which we have difficulty comprehending. The proliferation of technology and knowledge is proceeding outside the control of governments and with the commercial sector fully in the driving seat. Unilateral advantages do not last long. Information technology has been the main revolutionary driver and pushed forward globalisation and its overall effects.

27. Science and technology are playing a key part in driving the changing role of mili-
tary force; and exploitation of what they have to offer will be a key to successful adap-
tation to that changing role. Most of the technologies which may be the key determinants
of the military capabilities needed in 2025 are, according to the scientific consensus,
already known about today. There is little doubt that continued advances in microelec-
tronics (Moore’s law shows no signs of slackening) and in sensing and communication
technologies will support the increasingly dominant role of knowledge in military oper-
ations. Similarly, the precision, speed and safety of military operations should benefit
from rapid progress in bio- and material sciences (in these areas often associated with
nanotechnology, a generic descriptor of technological advance being pursued amongst
ever more minute elements). Developments in power sources will enable us to materi-
alise many of these other new opportunities into useable equipments.

28. The “dark side” is obvious, too. The risks of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction are well-known: while the difficulties of obtaining the materials act as some
brake on nuclear proliferation, protection against new forms of biological agents should
be a particular concern. Our own universal means of communication are already thor-
oughly exploited by opponents both as platforms for propagating ideas and ideologies
and as communication networks. Commercially available applications such as GPS and
Google Earth (high resolution satellite imagery on your home PC) are manifestly open to
abuse. And the more dependent we become on technology the more interest our oppo-
nents will have in attacking us via our technological infrastructure.

29. Science and technology will also raise false expectations about how far damage
can be eliminated from military operations. Just as increasingly any death in hospital
is ascribed to a failure by the medical profession, so it will be even more difficult in
future for publics to accept that casualties sustained are not the result of specific neg-
ligence.

30. As the stream of civil technological advance broadens and quickens, so the tradi-
tional role of defence R&T as a motor of wider progress is reversed; technology will be
“spun in” to defence more than “spun out”. Maintaining the military technological edge
will therefore require better exploitation of civil technologies – and ever more rapid
exploitation of technology, whatever its source, before the opponent works out how to
adopt or negate it.

31. The civil world of science and technology has another important lesson to offer -
that technological advance will increasingly come as much from combining technolo-
gies as from linear development in one particular field. Yet no one institute, still less one
person, can be competent across the broadening river of technology. Innovation will
increasingly depend upon networks of excellent researchers collaborating to combine
their expertise in different disciplines.
32. In sum, our Armed Forces can expect from future science and technology the universal availability of communication and knowledge as well as new levels of precision and protection against lethal effects. However, what they cannot expect are sustained unilateral advantages – be they measured against conventional opponents in classical state-to-state conflict or against asymmetric threats. The proliferation of knowledge remains endemic to open societies and a global economy.

III. Implications for the military contribution to ESDP operations

33. What do the changes in the economic, social and military world around us – and those at home – mean for the future of ESDP operations in, say, 2025?

34. The typical ESDP crisis management operation will be expeditionary, multinational and multi-instrument. The EU has recognised the need to be a global security actor. For such purpose it envisages a capability to project forces over strategic distances and to austere areas of operation. Interventions will be based on common objectives among Member States, thus sending a message of a shared EU commitment to resolve the crisis. Therefore, deployment of forces needs to be based on the principle of wide multi-nationality. Furthermore, the EU will increasingly utilise a comprehensive approach combining its hard and soft power instruments and coordinating civilian, military, governmental and non-governmental bodies to collectively achieve the necessary political effects.

35. Indeed interventions will not necessarily involve fighting battles. The presence of multinational forces, backed by, and indeed symbolising, the collective political commitment of the Union, may well prevent hostilities from breaking out. Or they may help to stabilise a country or region after a political accord. Indeed, the scope of ESDP missions requires military contributions to be appropriately tailored, trained and readied to conduct a broad range of operations, in potentially austere areas and against diverse threats. In cases of intervention by force the main task will be to gain control of the dynamics of conflict, reduce its destructive power and break the cycle of violence. The objective of interventions is not “victory” as traditionally understood, but moderation, balance of interests and peaceful resolution of conflicts – in short, stability. That said, the level of force required to achieve such outcomes may, in some scenarios, be substantial.

36. While the success of such interventions will be influenced by our military capabilities and actions, it will increasingly depend on our actions, or inaction, in a much broader range of domains such as the promotion of human rights, rule of law, security sector reform, good governance and the fight against international crime. It is unlikely that EU Member States’ forces undertaking a crisis management operation will be denied mili-
tary success – but we may be denied overall mission achievement because we have failed to understand and plan adequately in this complex environment, or to bring other crisis management instruments effectively to bear. Armed Forces are but one component of a wider, comprehensive and integrated approach to ESDP operations.

37. In the information age, knowledge will be the vital resource in armed conflict. Commanders will be able to exploit opportunities and manage operational risk in an informed manner. But network and knowledge systems only provide the opportunity for quicker decision-making – they are not a sufficient condition for better decisions. Moreover, the benefits and the costs of the information age also apply to the opposition. Today, not only has the most profound technological development occurred in information technology but the rate of diffusion has been even more surprising. New applications and continued convergence of IT products will arise and become quickly assimilated, at least by some in all societies. Such new IT products require minimum infrastructure, and their diffusion will also empower non-state actors – whether benevolent or malevolent.

38. Conceptually, the information age has created a new common environment that states and organisations aspire to access and control – analogous to the sea in previous centuries. Cyberspace is a much more complex environment, not simply represented by the internet. Like its predecessor, the sea, it has an international character where trade and intercontinental communication are conducted. However, its entry fee for access and influence is very low, and the space can be used by, almost literally, anyone. It is expanding non-linearly almost daily. Irregular enemies know they are able to maximise their asymmetric opportunities by creating their own networks; they will try to achieve their own information superiority and counter our attempts to do the same. The benefits of globalisation in the information age have provided them the opportunity.

39. Asymmetric warfare has become a familiar term in recent years. It designates high-tech against low-tech, Goliath against David, centrally-controlled and network-enabled operations against disruptive tactics of local or regional – and sometimes transnational – guerrilla groups. More relevant, however, for understanding asymmetry is the divergence of goals to be achieved and rules to be observed. Whereas one side strives to establish or re-establish its own concepts of stability, rule of law and democratic structures, opponents will often aim at a radically different political order. They will not play by the rules of the Law of Armed Conflict such as the proportionality of force or the protection of the civilian population. Nor will they necessarily refrain from terrorist tactics, or even use of weapons of mass destruction. And they will seek to deter or deflect interventions by exploiting perceived weaknesses in EU resolve.
40. In sum, the increasing complexity of ESDP operations – with the concurrent characteristics of multinationality, expedition and asymmetry – call for an integrated and comprehensive approach to the planning and conduct of interventions. The role of the military will be determined within a wider campaign plan that includes close consultation with other – civil – instruments of power and influence.

IV. Implications for Capability Development

41. What are the guiding lights of the development of future capabilities for ESDP operations as described above? Capability development will always try to balance two different approaches: one maintains that past experience is a reliable guide to the future ("learning from history"); the other suggests that the ever-increasing speed of change in our societies puts a high premium on the adaptability and flexibility of capability planning. In reality, both perspectives count. For example, reliance on well-trained and competently-led troops remains a constant in warfare. While that will not change, the characteristics that create new competitive advantages are changing. These characteristics are as valid at the tactical as at the operational and the strategic level. And they are as applicable in prevention, stability and reconstruction, and peacekeeping as they are in high intensity combat.

42. Which are these future force and capability characteristics? In general, such future forces and their capabilities must be founded on comprehensive and effects-based planning: it is not just equipment, but more comprehensively strategic concepts, doctrine, training and organisation that will, in their combination, yield the desired effects. In particular, four main characteristics need primary attention: Synergy, Agility, Selectivity and Sustainability.

43. Synergy. In the future, joint forces composed of land, air, space and maritime elements will increasingly use precision firepower, intelligence and focussed logistics in order to deliver military effects in a more discriminate way. And the capabilities of other agencies and actors, including non-governmental organisations, will contribute to the management of conflict. The media, with its increased reach and effectiveness, need increasingly to be taken into account. Synergy between these different capacities will create the effects necessary for mission accomplishment within acceptable levels of risk, while minimising undesired effects. Synchronisation across organisational, institutional and component boundaries moves the joint force from traditional de-confliction and coordination procedures to the integrated, comprehensively-planned operations required.

44. The traditional combined-arms warfare can be broadly considered as the employment of complementary weapon systems to achieve a synergistic effect. Its most important consequence is to bring about dominance over an opponent at critical time and in critical
space. The components of combined-arms warfare have already changed from the traditional infantry, armour and artillery mix to other force elements such as combat UAVs, precision weapons and, perhaps more significantly, an ever-increasing array of sophisticated sensors and command and control systems. However, the proliferation of technology will also accelerate how adversaries can develop technological and operational reactions to counter the weapons systems and tactics of European forces. Advanced technologies in areas such as stealth, signature reduction, thermal masking and their respective interdependencies require research and adaptable approaches to acquisition.

45. **Agility.** This refers to the ability to achieve rapidity of reaction, tailorable force packaging and deployability. Agility embraces concept, machine and mind. EU Member States’ military forces will need to operate in a multinational and multilateral environment, working with EU and non-EU Member States and with national and international organisations, including the UN and NATO, and even within ad hoc coalitions. They will need to demonstrate strategic reach (expeditionary operations) and strategic agility, being able to quickly move strategic distances and enter directly into the theatre of operations, readied and prepared. Inevitably there could be instances where very short lead times apply prior to deployment, as well as minimal infrastructure provided in theatre (e.g., few adequate ports or airfields, limited host nation support).

46. Forces may need to be responsive, reacting quickly, decisively and with precision, being knowledge-focussed and appropriately digitised. Such joint forces may need to be quickly tailored to meet a wide range of contingencies. Continued co-ordination between the Maritime, Land, Air, Special Forces and Logistics components will assist the trend towards jointness in smaller tailored units and task forces, if required. Such agile packages save lift, put fewer people in harm’s way, permit a higher operational tempo and the speedier application of combat effect. They will be able to show intent whilst maintaining sufficient combat power to prevail in contested operations. They will also possess the necessary command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C3ISR) to enable mission planning and rehearsal en route.

47. Future joint forces will need agility at the operational and tactical levels as well as the strategic. Once deployed, EU Member States’ joint forces may need to be able to operate at will within all domains and across the depth and breadth of the operational area, possessing combinations of stealth, speed, information superiority, connectivity, protection, and lethality. They may need to operate in complex terrain and inside cities. In all cases, forces must be capable of moving quickly in order to capitalise on fleeting tactical and operational opportunities, apply continuous pressure and set an operational tempo that suits own forces but, at the same time, degrades the enemy’s decision-cycle processes and operating concepts.
48. **Selectivity.** The selective use of kinetic and non-kinetic means to generate the desired lethal or non-lethal effects will be essential for future operations. Future forces need to be able to graduate and vary the application of force as necessary, and in accordance with legal and political constraints. Therefore, future capabilities may also effectively incorporate such non-kinetic capabilities as computer network attack, electromagnetic or directed-energy, offensive counterspace, military deception and psychological operations. Such capabilities should provide EU Member States’ forces with enhanced flexibility and allow them to better engage targets whilst constrained by concerns of collateral effects. They should be prepared to operate in less densely populated environments as well as in complex terrain and cities with discrimination, precision and minimal collateral damage.

49. Selectivity makes it particularly important to determine the overall effectiveness of force application. There is a need for the assessment of battle damage, munitions effectiveness, collateral damage and effects, consequence analysis, behavioural modification analysis and the overall reassessment of mission requirements. Future analysis, linked to a comprehensive (civilian & military) EU operational lessons learned process, may need to measure the effects on behaviour and attitudes of opposing leadership, forces and populations.

50. **Sustainability.** If an adversary can impede or deny access of European forces to needed facilities or to the local operational area, the potential impact on the crisis and its management may be decisive. The adversary gains time, extra latitude and a greater probability of success. If European forces are compelled to operate from distant areas, then their capabilities will be affected in scale, speed and endurance. The converse is that, to the degree that the EU can demonstrate an ability to deal with area denial threats, the deterrent is made more credible.

51. Multinational and agile sustainability will require building sufficient capacity into sustainment pipelines, and exercising sufficient control over the pipeline from end-to-end, to provide a high degree of certainty of supply to the forces in theatre. The results could provide a more timely and precise delivery of mission-ready forces, a reduced combat support and combat service support footprint in theatre and a more cost effective fighter-to-support ratio within overall force structures. Even if sustainment pipelines remain national, a high degree of interoperability, co-ordination and use of agreed standards will be vital to achieve a unity of effort and purpose. In any case, and although there may be the desire for short decisive campaigns, it will be essential to have a sufficient rotational base to sustain operations in long-duration contingencies.

52. In this context, reduced theatre footprints may require an emphasis on the sea as a sphere for manoeuvre and sustainment. This reflects the problems that civilian opposi-
tion and insurrectionary movements can pose for the land as a military base, the geopolitical shift away from historical bases and alliances, and political sensitivities over deployment and host nation support of troops in the territory of allies.

53. Finally, the political sustainability of ESDP operations will depend on a conspicuous and successful focus on force protection.

54. The characteristics of synergy, agility, selectivity and sustainability are translated for each of the six Capability domains of Command, Inform, Engage, Protect, Deploy and Sustain into the Future Capability Profile for ESDP operations (see Annex).

V. Key Issues For the Defence Planner

55. There has never been a more difficult time to be a defence planner. As described above, the role of force and the context for its employment is rapidly evolving – as are the technologies available to both sides of a conflict. Only a fully comprehensive planning approach with a long-term perspective can offer an opportunity to balance forces appropriately against ambition and resource, and to identify and manage risk, be it operational, technical or financial. Imbalances, shortfalls or risks will not be addressed through technology advances alone. Education and training will also be crucial to ensure that culture change parallels conceptual and technical advance. And the European industrial base will have to serve as a reliable and efficient fundament of all efforts to provide the needed capabilities in the long term. In this wider planning context a number of key issues, ranging from knowledge exploitation to industrial policies, will determine how Europe can meet its future defence needs.

56. Knowledge Exploitation. Knowledge has been argued to be a fundamental resource for future operational success. The term needs to be widely interpreted. It embraces the horizon-scanning and assessment functions that will enable us to identify and monitor gathering clouds, and to take properly-informed decisions about the risk-versus-opportunity balance of possible interventions. It also encompasses cultural awareness, to allow a proper understanding of the mindsets and motivations of actors in the theatre, and to facilitate effective engagement with them. And it includes situational awareness in the conduct of operations, from the operational headquarters to the street corner, as key to good decision-taking and the safety and effectiveness of deployed forces.

57. The objective of knowledge management is to turn data into actionable information – available at all levels of decision-making, to be shared and not hoarded. But in its more ambitious forms this objective will not come cheap, involving as it will the development of systems of systems. Dominance in this area is not built upon only computers or CIS architectures, sensors or innovative training. It is based upon all these and much
more – all welded together by agreed doctrine and common standards. Thus network-enabled capability must be a fundamental development priority for ESDP operations. It will be essential to ensure interoperability with the leading efforts of the US in this area, interpreted through NATO. But a more characteristically European approach may need to be developed, different in ambition and character (for example, with a stronger emphasis on civil-military interoperability, and on the tactical level), albeit nested within NATO conceptual frameworks and standards.

58. In order to realise the full potential of the information age, emerging trends from recent operations indicate that if money is saved on information technology, we could substantially pay many times more in other areas. “Uninformed” forces must ultimately resort to mass warfare. They must confront their opposition in contests of attrition rather than maintain the initiative and seize opportunities to achieve effects by speed, surprise and dislocation. Uninformed forces and their supporting organisations must constantly react, rather than capitalise on opportunity. To reduce own casualties as part of the overall political objective, they must spend enormous resources in securing themselves against the unknown, reserving little for achieving objectives. To achieve the necessary degree of information superiority, European forces will need to maintain an appropriate level of ISR persistence and fidelity. This will require a broad range of sensors and systems, including satellites, manned aircraft, the full portfolio of UAVs and land systems. But again, technology alone will not provide the capability. Human intelligence and the development of reliable local intelligence networks will become more fundamental as European forces operate amongst the people in theatre.

59. Interoperability. This needs to be at the heart of all European capability development work. Expeditionary, multi-national operations, with strong inter-action with civil instruments, require interoperability within national forces, between national forces, and with civilian actors. Just as equipment is only one element of capability, so the interoperability requirement relates to all other aspects of capability, from language to procedure to training.

60. The best form of interoperability for equipments and systems is commonality – using the same kit. This operational perspective matches the defence economic imperative to consolidate the demand side of the European defence equipment market. Experience shows that common acquisitions are most successful the further “upstream” they are started – attempting to harmonise technical requirements is difficult or impossible if the underlying thinking on conceptual requirements, and financial and timescale expectations, has not been converged from the outset.

61. But the quest for operational and economic efficiency through cooperation should not be confined to new equipment developments. It should, in the interest of enhanced
interoperability, embrace pursuit of mutually-advantageous opportunities for pooled purchase of off-the-shelf equipment; or taking shares in a jointly-owned capability; or moving towards role specialisation or integration in a coherent and complementary fashion. Identification of such potential opportunities will require Member States to educate each other on the content and priorities of their national forward defence plans and programmes.

62. **The Manpower Balance.** It is now conventional wisdom in Europe that there is a need to increase the proportion of defence budgets going on investment – which implies the need to reduce operating costs. A significant part of these, of course, can be the costs of deployments – which, if met from defence budgets, are particularly damaging to coherent capability development in that they are usually unpredictable and short notice. In some Member States, such costs are met from the central government reserve; wider adoption of that practice would be a powerful support to the development of the defence capabilities ESDP needs.

63. But the largest element of operating costs is for personnel – over 50% of collective EU defence spending. As armed forces professionalise, and as the falling birth-rate increases competition in the labour market for young men and women, personnel costs will in practice pre-empt more and more of defence spending unless manpower is reduced. With approaching 2 million men and women currently in uniform in Europe, there is scope to do this. Approaches include outsourcing; increased automation (from warships to robots); and reducing superfluous capability (do Europeans between them really need nearly 10 000 main battle tanks, and nearly 3 000 combat aircraft?).

64. But driving down personnel costs by manpower reductions needs to be managed with an eye to the demands of operations that could require numerous “boots on the ground” (for the widespread imposition of central authority immediately post-conflict in a failed state; or for the sustainment of longrunning stabilisation and reconstruction missions). Alternatives to maintaining an unaffordable permanent force structure may have to be considered, such as greater use of reservists.

65. **Rapid Acquisition.** Rapid exploitation of technology is vital. It has been argued that distinctions between defence and civil R&T will become increasingly blurred; that the latter will become increasingly important for satisfying defence needs; and that the pace of civil technological advance is constantly increasing. Defence needs to quicken the pace at which technological opportunities are exploited into fielded equipments, if only because the opposition will undoubtedly do so. And we need to adjust to an era in which major new equipment programmes become less and less frequent, with the capability edge maintained by technology insertion into older platforms. A key aim of effec-
tive capability development must be to radically shorten the timeframes involved in moving from innovation to practical embodiment.

66. To do this we must consider not only new equipment but also be clear on what aspects our legacy equipment will need to be modified and at what rate in order to maintain relevance. Some elements will remain relevant over a long period, perhaps the whole length of its in-service life, whereas other assets will need to be refreshed and replaced to maximize benefits drawn from emerging technologies – such may be the case in the areas of sensors and information management. Upgrading and updating to avoid obsolescence in capabilities which benefit from IT and other rapidly developing technologies will remain a challenge in both legacy management and new design. Access, modularity, plug-and-play architectures and a focus on network enabling capability would be examples of such flexibility.

67. **Industrial Policy.** Today, Europe retains a widely capable defence technological and industrial base (DTIB). But the prognosis is not encouraging. If Europe is to preserve a broadly based and globally competitive DTIB (which means competitive with the US, and, increasingly, producers in the Far East) it must take to heart the facts that the US is outspending Europe six to one in defence R&D; that it devotes some 35% of its defence expenditure to investment (from a budget more than twice as large as that of the Europeans combined), as against the European level of about 20%; and that it is increasingly dominant in global export markets.

68. Government has a very special relationship with the defence industry – as customer, regulator, and principal source of research and development funding. But less and less does it remain owner; and, as defence companies move progressively from government to private ownership, and as shareholder funds become increasingly prominent in the control of companies, so one may expect the normal laws of a globalised economy to apply; capital will migrate to optimise returns. This pattern of “industry following the money” is already apparent in, for example, BAE Systems’ significant acquisitions in the US, and the developing presence of other European companies in the UK market.

69. Un-arrested, the trends point towards a steady contraction of the European defence industry into niche producers working increasingly for US primes. A combination of counter-measures is necessary. Higher levels of European investment are essential (in the interests of military capability as much as industrial policy) – if necessary by rebalancing within constrained defence budgets. The need for this is particularly apparent in the field of R&T, where we are now living off the fat of investments made during the Cold War, and expenditure has fallen to a trivial 1.3% of overall European defence spending.

70. Increasing investment needs to be complemented by investing to better effect. In part this is a matter of ensuring that investment is directed towards future capability
needs; there is ultimately no future for a defence industry in Europe that does not supply what our future armed forces actually require, and what export customers may be interested to buy. But “better effect” also implies overcoming the notorious fragmentation of the European defence industrial scene, to eliminate wasteful duplications and achieve economically viable scale. The recent commitment of 22 Member States to the first introduction of competition in the European defence equipment market is a brave step in the right direction, provided that it is followed through. But redoubled efforts are also required to achieve consolidation on the demand side of the market, and to facilitate further progress towards supply side consolidation (where industry, facing these issues not just as an intellectual problem but as a matter of daily survival, have shown themselves typically more aware of the need to change than their sponsoring governments). The need, in short, is to accept that the DTIB in Europe can only survive as one European whole, not as a sum of different national capacities.

71. The European DTIB’s survival also depends on exploiting all the resources available in the enlarged Union. Pre-eminently, this means drawing on the advances of civil and dual-use technology, such as that funded by the Commission in the security sphere. It also means emulating the speed with which several industries (automotive, IT) have realised the benefits of cheaper production in Eastern Europe and, given the central importance of technology, it means exploiting the abundant human capital and sources of innovation to be found in universities, SMEs, and enterprises not traditionally regarded as “defence industries” across Europe – as well as the wealth of excellent engineers and researchers who have joined the Union with its last enlargement.

72. Finally, we must be realistic and selective; at the European level, we need to understand that even if we invest more, invest better, and harness all the potential that Europe has to offer, we may still be unable to sustain a European DTIB which matches in every particular the best that the rest of the world has to offer. In those circumstances, we need to take conscious decisions about what we wish to preserve and develop in Europe, and what we are content to source from the global market.

73. **Flexibility for the unforeseen.** Finally, since all we know for sure about the fog of the future is that it conceals things that we do not expect, or have not even considered, we must aim to build into our capability development sufficient flexibility and adaptability to cope with whatever may emerge. The deployment of military force presupposes an opponent – and that opponent will be actively seeking to frustrate our assumptions, plans and operational methods. There is a dilemma here: to identify the nature of the flexibility and adaptability that will be most efficacious against a range of risks that we cannot anticipate; and to decide how much resource should be invested in this form of insurance. The regular revisiting of this “living” Long Term Vision may help keep this in the forefront of our minds.
The following Future Capability Profile is presented within the 6 capability development areas associated with the EU’s Integrated Development Teams.

**Command**

a. Command and Control capabilities form the decisive element in the battle for information superiority and decision superiority. It is aimed at employing EU MS forces, assets and facilities commensurate with the mission and its demands, so that the desired effects can be achieved.

b. During the preparation and conduct of an EU led operation, command and control must be continuously ensured in near-real time and between all levels of command and bodies of the EU. This will need to be based upon a streamlined C2 organisation, clear and standardised C2 procedures and a secure and efficient command support. The command capability must support rapid decision-making. The EU MS need to generate joint and combined headquarters that are easily deployable and sustainable, with the capability to plan, conduct and assess multinational operations. The availability of planning, decision support and command instruments will be necessary for global multifunctional crisis management.

c. There will be a requirement to conduct operations, supported by network enabling capabilities as well as to establish, maintain and share real-time situational awareness. This command capability must be secure and flexible, and must minimize the constraints of distance, terrain and weather.

d. The Operation Commander will need the ability to exercise command and control authority over relevant EU instruments in a defined area and/or during a defined time period. The ability to communicate seamlessly with partners at all levels, as well as the ability to plug in to joint and combined headquarters will become priorities.

**Inform**

a. Future operations undertaken by the EU will rely on the capability to collect, process, select, share, disseminate, retrieve and store information. Information management systems should optimise this process, tailoring the desired output to the specific mission. The information needs to be inter-departmental, inter-agency and readily accessible.

b. The intelligence and findings gained through collection and reconnaissance efforts are both an indispensable contribution to ensuring an independent capacity to make judgements, take proper decisions and appropriate action, as well as representing common interests within an increasingly complex environment. This requires EU
MS to have available a broad spectrum of recognition and surveillance capabilities, including analysis of cyberspace with regard to military relevant information. It should be the aim to achieve a greater coverage than now, focussing on the areas of strategic interest for the EU.

c. Developing reliable strategic communication and intelligence capabilities and protecting them against physical and non-physical threats as well as having access to reliable navigation and geographic positioning data will be critical. Merging these capabilities, may provide the EU MS with the basis for common information dissemination and reliable and secure communications.

d. The result of this capability for obtaining and securely managing information might become apparent in a noticeable increase in the responsiveness of the decision making process of the chain of command, and making the manoeuvre of military forces progressively more effective.

Engage

a. To be effective forces may have to deny, or possibly control, limited in both time and space, the sea, land, air and information domains, to impair opponents’ capabilities, both on contact and remotely, while simultaneously achieving the desired effects on targets. This requires the ability to rapidly engage on the ground, in the air, and at sea. Precision, high speed, engagement capability is needed.

b. Within a joint environment the military capability as a whole takes priority over the capabilities of the single services. Therefore standoff engagement has to become an option for all services. All military capabilities should reflect the growing likelihood and relevance of fighting within complex terrain, such as urban and littoral areas. Forces need a range of capabilities from physical destruction to non-lethal. Future operations will necessitate capabilities for precise and selective targeting and engagement thereby optimizing commit-to-effect times and minimising collateral damage especially in urban areas.

c. The preparation and conduct of future EU led operations will require continued consideration of space related aspects, such as communication, and the detection and identification of potential threats in advance of an appropriate response.

d. Combat identification capabilities in order to reduce casualties amongst friendly forces, partners, civilians and local populations are increasingly important in the complex operational environment.

e. Where feasible, the EU MS must also aim to reduce the impact of military operations on the natural environment.

Protect

a. Good prior knowledge of the overall situation is a prerequisite for effective ESDP
operations. Hence, it could be advantageous for MS to have access to appropriate surveillance and advanced alarm capabilities.

b. It is critical to have the ability to detect, and then counter, those weapons which, for legal, moral or ethical reasons, are not available to EU MS forces (such as biological weapons) but which may be freely employed by an adversary. Thus it is important to protect our forces against the bio-hazards that they may face. High standards of casualty handling and the ability to recover stranded personnel become priorities, even in geographically remote areas.

c. Recognising the expanded nature of the future battlespace, EU MS may need increasingly to safeguard networks and the area of operations against both physical and cyber attack.

d. The consequences of Weapons of Mass Destruction attacks will be particularly difficult to manage. Preventing proliferation will be important as well as the ability to counter their subsequent employment. CBRN defence and protection capabilities may be essential for some ESDP missions.

Deploy

a. Deployability is the precondition for ESDP operations, including the reinforcement and sustainment of forces. EU MS should have at their disposal viable means for strategic deployability over long distances. Responsive Reception Staging Onwards Movement and Integration is required to maintain tempo during operations. This requires adequate, timely and securely available air, sea and land transport capacities and procedures.

b. Strategic deployment is planned and should be coordinated on a joint and multinational basis, using all modes of transport and available civilian resources. An ensured deployability forms the basis for a rapid, credible expeditionary capability, which should be one of the main efforts of the EU to manage crises and prevent conflicts. It will need to be based upon strategic air transport, on in-flight refuelling capabilities, and on strategic sea transport capabilities, as well as overland force projection assets.

c. For intra-theatre movements, capabilities of mobility and land mobility support, tactical air transport and air mobility is a requirement.

Sustain

a. The success of operations will also depend on the sustainability of deployed forces. Sustainability will encompass the provision, replacement and rotation of forces with the necessary means and facilities, according to operational demands. Even if the operational area is a long way from EU MS territories, sustainability must be ensured for the duration of the deployment, irrespective of the threat situation or availability of infrastructure and other factors in the operational area.
b. The joint/combined support arrangements should be capable of ensuring the required quality and quantity of support over long distances and protracted timeframes. This capability may be enhanced through the provision of accurate asset visibility and tracking. Beneath that, a multinational logistic component may allow the reduction of the overall logistic footprint. Any unit has to be capable of ensuring sustainability for a limited period of time by utilising organic assets. Harmonisation, and in the longer-term standardisation, of logistic requirements and procedures may ease multinational joint/combined logistics.

When we met in Vienna on 1 June, we agreed a far-reaching set of proposals that aimed to address international concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme and to provide the basis for long-term political and economic cooperation with Iran.

Our proposals would give Iran everything it needs to develop a modern civil nuclear power industry and allow the Iranian people to enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy, through a long-term agreement which would satisfy the international community that Iran’s programme was exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Following the meeting in Vienna, and our subsequent meeting in Paris on 12 July, and, Iran’s response of 22 August, Javier Solana has on our behalf had extensive discussions with the Iranian representative Dr Ali Larijani to try to agree a framework for negotiations.

Today we met to review the situation. We commend Javier Solana for his tireless efforts to find a way forward, but we are deeply disappointed that he has had to report that Iran is not prepared to suspend its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as required by the IAEA Board and made mandatory in Security Council Resolution 1696. Accordingly, we will now consult on measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as envisaged in that Resolution.

In Vienna, we said there were two paths ahead. We regret that Iran has not yet taken the positive one. We will continue our efforts to find a negotiated solution. Our proposals of 1 June remain on the table.
SPEECH BY JAVIER SOLANA

Mesdames et Messieurs, chers amis,

C’est toujours avec le même plaisir que je vous retrouve à Paris pour notre Conférence annuelle. Pour débattre de l’état de l’Union, de son nouveau statut d’acteur global, de ses responsabilités, mais aussi de ses contraintes.

Pour discuter de tout cela, il faut partir du monde tel qui est aujourd’hui. Commençons par là si vous le voulez bien.

Vous tous ici présents êtes de vrais experts pour disséquer les évolutions du monde. Pour ma part, vous le savez, je suis un grand voyageur. Avec un passé de physicien certes, mais aussi de Ministre de la Culture.

Alors vous me permettrez, surtout ici à Paris, de citer Albert Camus et une certaine vision du monde qu’il livra dans le discours prononcé à Stockholm lorsqu’il reçut le Prix Nobel.

Voici ces lignes : « chaque génération se croit vouée à refaire le monde. La mienne sait pourtant qu’elle ne le refera pas. Mais sa tâche est peut-être plus grande. Elle consiste à empêcher que le monde se défasse. »

Comme l’écrivain français, j’appartiens à une génération qui sait que refaire le monde n’est pas aussi facile qu’on le souhaiterait, qui sait que l’on ne transforme le monde ni par les armes, ni par décret.

Une idée ou un concept ne suffit pas non plus. Très simplement parce que les réalités politiques sont toujours plus complexes et plus résistantes que les modèles théoriques. De même qu’une œuvre d’art, ou une caricature..., ne résume pas une civilisation, des élections ne font pas une culture démocratique.

Dès lors plutôt que de vouloir transformer le monde, je crois qu’il est plus important, plus urgent aussi, d’essayer d’empêcher notre monde de se défaire. Et croyez moi, l’Europe s’y emploie. Avec force et conviction.

En considérant qu’il faut d’abord trouver une solution entre Palestiniens et Israéliens. Et ainsi d’éradiquer les discours les plus radicaux et leur traduction terroriste.

En reconnaissant ses droits à l’Iran, mais en trouvant aussi les voies appropriées pour lui rappeler ses obligations les plus élémentaires. Et ainsi de contribuer à la paix et à la sécurité prescrites par la Charte des Nations Unies.

En établissant un dialogue franc avec les pays non-alignés. Et ainsi de mettre un frein à la rupture entre le Nord et le Sud.

En réussissant à convaincre la Chine de s’engager, au Liban par exemple. Et ainsi de...
préparer le continent asiatique à mieux assumer ses responsabilités au moment où l’un
de ses représentants s’apprête à reprendre le flambeau de Kofi Annan.
En acceptant d’écouter le nouvel acteur qu’est devenue l’opinion mondiale. Et ainsi
de ne pas rester sourd à ce que d’autres, mieux que moi, ont écrit comme la « respiration
du monde ».
En empêchant le monde de se défaire davantage.
Par le dialogue – je suis le premier à croire à la force de la diplomatie des mots. Mais
aussi par l’action – je suis aussi, vous le savez bien, le premier à défendre l’engagement
civil et militaire de l’Union européenne.
Pour agir de cette manière sur l’évolution du système international, comment évolue
l’Union européenne ?
Certains continuent de juger l’Union en crise. D’autres déclarent que l’Union a déjà
traversé bien des crises.
Permettez-moi, à ce stade de la discussion, de faire deux constats.
Premier constat: l’Europe est de plus en plus sollicitée. Il n’y a plus une crise, plus un
problème, pour lesquels on ne se tourne pas vers l’Union européenne. Formidable succès !
Surtout si l’on tient compte des imperfections institutionnelles du système actuel.
Mais cette situation nouvelle n’est pas sans poser un problème : celui des ressources,
qui ne sont naturellement pas inépuisables.
En clair, il est maintenant demandé à l’Europe de faire mieux et toujours plus.
Deuxième constat: malgré la contrainte des ressources, l’Europe répond présente.
Comment ? En agissant seule et avec les autres: aujourd’hui, avec les Nations Unies au
Liban ou au Congo, avec l’OTAN dans les Balkans, avec l’Union africaine au Darfour;
demain par exemple avec la Ligue arabe au Proche-Orient.
C’est cela le multilatéralisme efficace.
Permettez-moi ici de saisir l’occasion pour formuler une recommandation.
Il est évident qu’il est plus compliqué de décider et d’agir à 25 : on ne peut pas attendre
de 25 États, avec leur histoire et leur géographie respectives, de réagir comme un seul
homme lorsque survient une nouvelle crise internationale.
Faut-il dans ce cas décider d’agir à quelques-uns ? Oui, résolument j’en suis convaincu.
Faut-il pour cela s’affranchir du cadre commun offert par l’Union européenne ? Non, je ne
le pense pas.
Depuis l’origine, notre Union procède de la volonté de créer les mécanismes d’inté-
gration les plus utiles possible pour les États et les citoyens.
Mais ces mécanismes d’intégration ne sont efficaces que si trois conditions sont rem-
plies :
› que ces mécanismes soient basés sur de véritables solidarités ;
› qu’ils permettent à ceux qui le souhaitent de développer ces mêmes solidarités ;
› et enfin qu’ils permettent aux autres de rejoindre, lorsqu’ils le souhaitent, l’entreprise
des premiers.
Pour l’avenir, lorsqu’il y aura une nécessité ou une utilité d’agir à quelques uns quelque part dans le monde, il faudra l’assumer : que ceux qui le peuvent, agissent, en laissant aux autres, lorsqu’ils le souhaitent, la possibilité de joindre leurs propres efforts.

Ainsi l’Union des 25 Etats sera-t-elle en mesure de peser comme il se doit sur l’évolution du monde.

L’absence de Constitution européenne signifie-t-elle l’échec de cette ambition ? Je ne le crois pas. Tout simplement parce que déjà aujourd’hui l’Union a les moyens d’agir.

Faut-il pousser plus loin l’intégration ? Oui bien sûr ! Pour justement la rendre plus efficace. Pour justement permettre aux Etats, dans le cadre européen commun, de mieux agir. Quand ils le peuvent. Là où il le faut dans le monde.


Dear friends,

There is no need to tell this audience what we have been doing during the past 12 months. So no tour d’horizon. Let me just highlight three issues where our collective effort has made a difference.

The first is Iran.

For four months now I have been maintaining a dialogue with the Iranian authorities on the Iranian nuclear program.

The process started in early June when I travelled to Tehran to submit a proposal made by the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany. No need to highlight the importance for the EU that China, Russia and the United States tasked me with that mission.

The aim of the dialogue was clear: clarify whether a negotiation between these six countries and Iran could start on the basis of the proposal submitted.

Where are we now? We have negotiated endless hours. It has been my top priority because I’m convinced that this is a crucial subject for international security. With my Iranian counterpart, we have reached common ground in quite a number of subjects. But we haven’t agreed in what is a key point: suspension. As today, Iran has made no commitment to suspend.

The dialogue could not last forever. Now it is up to the six countries to decide whether time has come to follow the second track: referring the case to the UNSC. But the door to negotiations is always opened.

Indeed allow me some final comments. I’m convinced that the Iranian dossier can only be solved, and will be solved, through negotiations. We have the right framework and the right broad basis for that.
Iran may develop a civilian nuclear program, as many other countries in the world. But Iran will do it better and more efficiently if it is done in cooperation with us. From a political and technological point of view both sides have a lot to win. They, and we, know that.

Solving the problems posed by the Iranian nuclear program will mark a breakthrough in non-proliferation.

Iran is an old nation. A key player, and a potential partner in regional and world affairs. The nuclear issue is just an element, even if it is a key one, of a much broader relationship.

We want to cooperate with Iran in other subjects, not least the Middle East.

Lebanon now. Lebanon is another example of where Europe has heeded the call for action.

From the beginning, we have been united and steadfast in our approach: toward the Hezbollah’s actions and the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers; in our support for the Lebanese government and our solidarity with the Lebanese people, in our efforts in New York and elsewhere to bring about an end to the violence; in our firm belief that only a broader political effort can address the underlying causes for the conflict; and most of all in our willingness to provide the backbone of the reinforced UNIFIL.

I have spent the greatest part of the summer working on this crisis. I was in Lebanon and Israel just four days after the start of the violence. And I was back in August when the UNSC adopted Resolution 1701.

Expectations on Europe were very high – in the region, but also from our publics. I believe we are delivering. Let me be clear: without Europe yesterday, no expanded UNIFIL and without UNIFIL no hope for a more lasting peace; without Europe tomorrow supporting the Lebanese government, no hope for a genuine sovereignty.

Our actions on Lebanon have enhanced our regional standing. The time has come for a new push on the issue that lies at the heart of broader Middle East crisis: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The pieces of the Middle East are in flux.

In Palestine national unity efforts are not leading unfortunately to positive results at this stage. The Israelis are debating the lessons of the latest conflict, including on the effectiveness of unilateral disengagements.

But there is a consensus on the need for a two-state solution. That is positive but not enough.

Indeed as far as the Road Map is concerned, neither party has seriously tried to implement its central obligations under the Road Map’s first phase.

Against this background we still have to flesh out the concept and stress the need for the Palestinian state to be viable. This means talking about borders. The 1967 borders, with some negotiated amendments, should provide the way out.

Israelis and Palestinians need to start talking again directly. We also need a strong, more operational role for the Quartet. And we will deliver on it. And yes, at some point, we need an international conference, bringing all the players together.
I hope that we can get movement on this issue. Of course, this will be difficult. But it is imperative to try.

Thirdly, let me mention Africa, and Congo specially.

Indeed, Congo is another example of recent European engagement that has made a difference on the ground. As you know, the first round of Presidential elections took place at the end of July. They are a central part of the transition in this country that has been traumatised by war.

The elections themselves were a success. But there were violent incidents immediately afterwards during this summer also.

Tensions were rising. European troops together with UN forces stepped in quickly. We also passed clear political messages to the parties, in public and private. Calm has since been restored. And even if the situation remains fragile, the political process remains on track.

These three examples illustrate the conclusions I draw earlier. First, the call for Europe to act is there, every day. Second, we are responding, as Europeans, in a credible way. Diplomatically and with people on the ground.

In the months ahead we will have a lot of work to do. If we pull together, we can get great results. That, more than any paper or meeting, will convince our citizens – and the rest of the world.

Dear friends,

Let me conclude with some words on the relationship between identity and foreign policy.

Some say foreign policy is essentially about the defence of your material and security interests around the world. Others say that to explain how countries behave, you just need to look at their place within the structure of the international system.

There is truth in both points. First, we do have European interests to defend. Other countries defend theirs as well, so there is no need to be apologetic about this.

And second, given the power distribution of the world today, Europeans can only make an impact if they group together.

But this is not the whole story. These ‘realist’ and ‘structuralist’ accounts miss out on one crucial factor. And that is the impact of identity on foreign policy.

For what you do on the international stage is surely also a function of your identity. Of how you define yourself and the values you seek to promote abroad.

True, discussions on European identity sometimes degenerate into platitudes. But don’t forget that in 2003 we adopted the very first European Security Strategy.

I believe there is a core set of values, convictions and experiences that together form a composite European identity.

And there are, by now, enough elements of a European model on how we organise our societies and interact with the wider world. We all feel it when we travel around the world.
What are the elements? I would say compassion with those who suffer; peace and reconciliation through integration; a strong attachment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law; a spirit of compromise, plus a commitment to promote in a pragmatic way rules-based international system.

But also a sense that history and culture are central to how the world works and therefore how we should engage with it.

When Americans say ‘that is history’, they often mean it is no longer relevant. When Europeans say ‘that is history’, they usually mean the opposite.

Once again, these elements are not unique to Europe. And I don’t want us to define ourselves negatively, against ‘the other’.

But we probably do feel more strongly about these values than others. And certainly about the need to defend them as a legacy for future generations. Europe as a responsible power.

I believe the relationship between identity and foreign policy works in both directions. Foreign policy is a way to express your identity. But acting together on the world stage is also a way to progressively shape and enhance a common identity.

Identities are not static. They change with different experiences. So the more we act together; the more we have shared successes and the occasional failure; the more our reflexes will converge; the more this idea of a European identity will firm up and become less elusive.

It is well-known that, whenever asked, people across Europe insist on a stronger European role in the world.

I am convinced that they do so not just to promote our material interests or because we risk being squashed by big powers of today or of tomorrow. It is also to defend ‘a certain idea of Europe’ in a more fragmented world.

When I said Europe should halt a world tearing itself apart, I am not advocating a sentimental or conservative attachment to the status quo. We all know that the world is changing in many profound and multi-faceted ways.

The rise of China, India, Brazil and others; the role of 24 hour media, the come-back of identity politics; the new salience of energy questions and migration.

We have to understand these changes. Not to deny them but to manage them. Not to resist economic and political globalisation but negotiate its terms. Through its actions, the Union has to be able to respond to and channel these changes in a direction that serves our ideals and interests.

That is Europe’s calling. Europe should have the strength to accept the things which cannot be changed; the courage to change things which must be changed; but also the wisdom to distinguish one from the other.

Thank you very much.
North Korea

Brussels, 9 October 2006

On 9 October 2006 North Korea announced that it had carried out a nuclear test. According to the international monitoring system set up under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, a high-intensity explosion occurred in a northeastern province of the country. This test was unanimously condemned by the international community. Javier Solana issued a statement on the matter which is reproduced below.

JAVIER SOLANA CONdemns nuclear test by north korea

‘North Korea has carried out its first nuclear test. I firmly condemn this nuclear test, which is a totally irresponsible act. It seriously undermines regional security and stability. This test is also a matter of grave concern owing to its wider proliferation implications. The test is a further major violation by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) of its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has ignored the opposition of the international community. On Friday the UN Security Council warned North Korea against performing a nuclear test. Neighbouring countries, including Japan, China and South Korea, issued strong warnings as well.

I regret that once again DPRK has ignored advice from the international community and broken its word. The nuclear test reinforces DPRK’s isolation and goes against the fundamental interests of the North Korean people. It is a severe threat to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and of the world as a whole.

I will be consulting with our partners. I am in contact with the ministers of the region, including the Japanese and Chinese foreign ministers. We need to consider our response calmly but this response should be firm and clear.’
IRAQ – EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE OF THE EU INTEGRATED RULE OF LAW MISSION


The new joint action extends the mandate of the mission until 31 December 2007 (Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP expires on 31 October 2006).

EUJUST LEX, a mission conducted under the European security and defence policy, is designed to address urgent needs in the Iraqi criminal justice system by providing training in management and criminal investigation to be given to senior officials and executive staff in the judiciary, police and penitentiary sectors. The operational phase of the mission started on 1 July 2005.

SUDAN/DARFUR – EXTENSION OF THE EU CIVILIAN-MILITARY SUPPORTING ACTION

The Council adopted a decision extending until 31 December 2006 the EU civilian-military supporting action to the African Union mission in the Darfur region of Sudan (AMIS II) (13528/06).

This decision, which implements joint action 2005/557/CFSP, follows a decision taken by the African Union Peace and Security Council to extend the mandate of AMIS until 31 December 2006.

Pending transition of the African Union mission to a United Nations operation in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1706(2006), the EU will continue its civilian-military supporting action to AMIS II until the end of 2006. The EU supporting action, which was first agreed in July 2005, had already been extended by the Council in July 2006 until 31 October.

The EU civilian-military supporting action to AMIS II is aimed at ensuring effective and timely EU assistance to support the AMIS II enhancement. Respecting the principle of African ownership, it supports the AU and its political, military and police efforts to address the crisis in Darfur. It includes support to the AMIS Civilian Police Component, planning and technical assistance at all AMIS levels of command, the pro-
vision of military observers, training of African troops and observers as well as strategic and tactical transportation.

(...)

THE EU STRATEGY FOR AFRICA

The Council held an exchange of views on implementation of the EU’s strategy for Africa, on the basis of a report by high representative Javier Solana and commissioner Louis Michel. It requested member states to provide input for a comprehensive report be made, so as to enable the European Council to review the strategy’s implementation at its meeting on 14 and 15 December.

Established in December 2005, the strategy has allowed the EU to reaffirm its commitment to peace, stability and development with a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relations with the whole of Africa. It is the first European policy framework to address Africa as a single entity, also allowing coordination and consistency of the EU’s policies and instruments supporting Africa with those of its member states.

Under the strategy, the EU has pledged to concentrate its support in the areas of peace and security and good governance, economic growth, trade and interconnection, as well as social cohesion and the environment.

The European Council agreed to review the strategy’s implementation in December 2006 and at least every two years thereafter. Progress is also reviewed at the bi-annual EU/African Union ministerial troika meetings.

At a ministerial EU/Africa troika meeting in Bamako in December 2005, it was agreed to transform the strategy into a joint Africa-EU strategy and to develop an action plan for its implementation.

SUDAN/DARFUR – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘1. The Council expressed continuing deep concern at the appalling security, humanitarian and human rights situation in Darfur and called for an immediate end to the ongoing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, with a special focus on vulnerable groups, including women and children. It fully supports efforts undertaken in this regard by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as a part of a wider UN effort. The Council strongly condemned all violations of the 2004 N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and of the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005). The Council called on all parties in the strongest terms to halt
the violence, to protect civilians and to ensure full, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need in Darfur. Continuing hostilities undermine the possibilities of implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and threaten to further aggravate the already dramatic humanitarian situation in Darfur. The Council once again reminds the leadership of the Sudanese Government of its collective and individual responsibility to protect its citizens from all violence and to guarantee respect for human rights.

2. The Council again called on the non-signatories to the DPA to join in and to commit themselves to the peace process. It also emphasised the need to involve the non-signatories in the effective monitoring of the ceasefire and investigation of violations committed. At the same time, the Council highlighted the importance of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process with a view to promoting a forum for dialogue and reconciliation among the different civil society components in Darfur.

3. The Council reconfirmed its full support for UN Security Council Resolution 1706 of 31 August 2006 and again urged the Government of Sudan to give its unambiguous consent to the implementation of that Resolution, in order to ensure the protection of the civilian population and support the implementation of the DPA. The Council emphasised that a UN operation is the only realistic option for a sustainable, long-term peacekeeping operation in Darfur.

4. The Council welcomed the extensive efforts made by various international partners to convince the Government of Sudan of the need for a UN operation in Darfur to secure peace and called for all partners to continue to act together to this end. The Council expressed its support for the decision of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) to continue, together with the UN, consultations with the Government of Sudan on the transition to a UN mission, and hoped for an early positive result of these consultations. Underlining that Resolution 1706 fully respects Sudan’s sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity, the Council observed the need to address the Sudanese Government’s possible concerns in relation to the deployment of a UN mission in Darfur. In this context, the Council took note of the positive attitude towards a UN operation expressed by several key parties in Sudan.

5. The Council welcomed the decision of the AU PSC of 20 September 2006 to extend the mandate of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) until 31 December 2006, underlining the importance of avoiding a security vacuum in Darfur. The Council stressed the need to continue efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of AMIS in order for it to carry out its mandate. It appreciated in particular the assistance to be provided by the UN to this end and welcomed the support by the Sudanese President for this initiative, as expressed in his letter of 3 October 2006 to the UN Secretary-General.
6. The Council welcomed recent statements of the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States urging the members of the organisation to fulfil their pledges of support to AMIS.

7. Reaffirming its strong support to the AU, the Council confirmed the extension of the EU civilian-military supporting action to AMIS until 31 December 2006 and continued close coordination with the UN and other international partners providing support to AMIS.

8. The Council reiterated that the EU is ready to continue the preparation of the reconstruction programme of Darfur, and to contribute further to the reconstruction, once the peace process starts in earnest and the security situation so allows.

9. The Council welcomed the signing of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Eastern Sudan Front on 14 October, 2006, in Asmara, Eritrea, as a positive step towards a just, peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Eastern Sudan. The Council encouraged the parties to implement the Agreement fully and without delay, underlining its importance also in relation to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Council reaffirmed its support for the peace efforts in the whole of Sudan.

(...)

MIDDLE EAST – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

Middle East Peace Process

The Council welcomed the statement by the Quartet at its meeting in New York on 20 September and, in particular, the Quartet’s intention to reinforce its activity, including with the parties and regional partners. The Council recalled the urgent need to make progress towards a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, based on relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the Roadmap, and with a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at its core. It welcomed the consensus within the international community to that effect. The Council underlined that the EU would continue actively its efforts to this end.

The Council expressed its support to President Abbas and called on the Palestinians to join his efforts towards national unity and the formation of a government with a platform reflecting the Quartet principles and allowing for early engagement. Such a gov-
ernment would also be a key factor for allowing the EU to pursue its goal of strengthen-
ing the capacity of Palestinian institutions. The Council called on all Palestinian factions
to end their internal strife.

The Council underlined the importance of an early resumption of dialogue between
the two parties with a view to re-launching negotiations on the basis of the Roadmap.
The Council recalled the utmost importance of the full implementation of the
Agreement on Movement and Access, particularly the permanent opening of the Rafah,
Karni and other crossings. The Council reiterated its call for the immediate release of the
abducted Israeli soldier. It repeated its call for the immediate release of Palestinian
Ministers and legislators in Israeli custody. It called for an end to violence and for
restraint on both sides.

The Council welcomed the extension of the Temporary International Mechanism
(TIM) for a further three months and the expansion of this mechanism to an even greater
number of vulnerable people. It encouraged other donors to make full use of the mecha-
nism. The Council reiterated its call for an immediate resumption of transfers of with-
held Palestinian tax and customs revenues by Israel. The Council further called on Israel
to consider resumption of such transfers via the TIM to alleviate the deteriorating eco-
nomic and humanitarian conditions in Gaza and the West Bank.

Liban

The Council renewed its commitment to support the full implementation of UNSCR
1701. It welcomed the overall deployment in Southern Lebanon of the Lebanese Armed
Forces, supported by UNIFIL. It noted the almost complete withdrawal of Israeli troops
and called on Israel to withdraw also from the Lebanese part of the town of Ghajar in co-
ordination with UNIFIL. The Council stressed that Lebanon’s sovereignty over its land,
sea and airspace must be respected. The Council called for the immediate release of the
two abducted Israeli soldiers.

The Council reiterated the EU’s commitment to support the legitimate and demo-
cratically elected Lebanese government. The EU will continue to assist the Lebanese gov-
ernment in meeting its humanitarian and environmental needs and in the rehabilitation
and reconstruction process. The EU will support the Lebanese government in further
extending its authority throughout Lebanese territory, and in taking forward political,
security, economic and social reforms. The Council recalled that there will be no
weapons without the consent of the government of Lebanon. The Council called on all
sides to observe the requirement of authorisation by the Lebanese government of sales
and supply of arms. The Council called on all parties and neighbours to support this
process.

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The Council reaffirmed its full support for the UN International Investigation Commission into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri and other terrorist attacks as mandated by UNSCR 1595, 1644 and 1686. It commended the professional work made by Mr. Brammertz and his team under difficult circumstances, and welcomed the 5th report by UNIIC. It expressed its confidence that progress will be achieved in bringing the perpetrators of these crimes to justice. It underlined the importance of establishing a tribunal of international character, in conformity with UNSCR 1664.

**WESTERN BALKANS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

1. The Council welcomed the peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the International Election Observation Mission’s preliminary assessment that the elections were conducted largely in accordance with international standards. The Council congratulated BiH for the well administered general elections that were entirely managed by its own institutions for the first time after 1995.

2. The Council looked forward to the timely formation of new Governments. The Council stressed the need for the newly elected political institutions quickly to restore momentum on reform and agree and implement all the reforms necessary for the conclusion of the negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement as set out in the Council conclusions of 12 December 2005. The Council expressed particular concern over the lack of progress towards the implementation of the October 2005 agreement on police restructuring, and looked forward to fast removal of this obstacle. The Council reiterated its full support to the European perspective of BiH.

3. The Council emphasized the need for progress on constitutional reform to create more functional state structures that are better able to meet European standards. The Council encouraged the newly elected representatives to make this an early priority.

4. The Council welcomed the joint report by the SG/HR and the EU Commissioner for Enlargement on a reinforced EU Presence in BiH in the context of the envisaged closure of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The Council also welcomed the recommendations of the report and subsequently tasked relevant Council bodies to take preparatory work forward in order to ensure continuing timely preparation of the future EU role in BiH after the envisaged closure of OHR. International partners will be consulted as necessary.
Serbia

5. The Council welcomed the holding of the second EU-Serbia Troika meeting on 16 October. The Council expressed its readiness to continue enhanced political dialogue with Serbia in order to support its European course, including the resumption of the negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement as soon as full cooperation with ICTY is achieved.

Serbia/Kosovo

6. The Council urged the parties to engage constructively with the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari to bridge the gaps between their respective positions and to refrain from unilateral or provocative action. Recalling the statement issued at the Contact Group Ministerial Meeting on 20 September, the Council noted that striving for a negotiated settlement should not obscure the fact that neither party can unilaterally delay or block the status process from advancing. In this context, the Council reiterated its full support for SE Ahtisaari and his efforts in conducting the political process to determine Kosovo’s future status. It welcomed his intention to prepare a comprehensive settlement proposal as a basis for moving forward.

7. The Council took note of the report by the SRSG presented to the UN Security Council on 13 September. It noted the positive progress made in implementing the Kosovo Standards while recalling the crucial importance of and the need for further effective implementation of the standards. The Council urged Belgrade to encourage Serbs in Kosovo to participate in Kosovo’s institutions, in which they can most effectively advocate their own interests.

8. The Council also welcomed the important preparatory work underway for a possible ESDP mission in the broader field of the rule of law and for the EU component of the future International Civilian Mission in Kosovo. The Council agreed to extend the EU planning team regarding a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and possible other areas in Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) by three months until 31 March 2007.’

IRAN – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The Council discussed the situation concerning Iran’s nuclear programme. The Council commends the High Representative Solana’s intensive efforts since June to encourage
Iran to address IAEA Board and Security Council requirements and return to talks on long-term arrangements.

The Council recalled that the proposals presented by the High Representative on 6 June as a basis for a long-term agreement are far-reaching and would give Iran everything it needs to develop a modern civil nuclear power industry while addressing international concerns. They would open the way for a new relationship with Iran based on mutual respect and expanded cooperation in political and economic fields.

The Council expressed deep concern that Iran has not yet suspended its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as required by the IAEA Board and UNSCR 1696.

The Council recalled its statement on 17 July that if Iran did not comply with the Security Council’s requirements, the EU would work for the adoption of measures under Article 41 of the UN Charter. It also recalled that in Resolution 1696 the Security Council expressed its intention to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 if Iran did not comply. Accordingly, the Council believed that Iran’s continuation of enrichment-related activities has left the EU no choice but to support consultations on such measures.

The Council noted that the door to negotiations nevertheless remained open. It reaffirmed its commitment to a negotiated solution, and that such a solution would contribute to the development of the EU’s relations with Iran. It urged Iran to take the positive path on offer.

GEORGIA/RUSSIAN FEDERATION RELATIONS – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council reiterates the European Union’s grave concern at the recent escalation of tension in Georgia-Russian Federation relations. The Council emphasises the importance of toning down public rhetoric and calls upon both sides to reopen normal diplomatic dialogue in order to work towards a normalisation of relations.

2. The Council welcomes the useful efforts of the Foreign Ministers’ Troika, the High Representative, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE in helping to facilitate the return of the Russian detainees.

3. The Council expresses its grave concern at the measures adopted by the Russian Federation against Georgia and at their economic, political and humanitarian consequences. The Council urges the Russian Federation not to pursue measures targeting Georgians in the Russian Federation. It calls on both parties to act in a manner consistent with their international commitments and obligations.
4. The Council recalls the European Union’s wish to develop further its strategic partnership with the Russian Federation as well as its aim to deepen relations with Georgia in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. In this context, the Council reiterates the EU’s willingness to work with Georgia and the Russian Federation to facilitate mutual confidence building and contribute to a peaceful resolution of the crisis. The European Union also looks forward to work closely with Georgia and the Russian Federation in promoting prosperity and stability in the region.

5. The Council calls on both parties to focus on reaching a peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia with full respect for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Council calls upon the parties to comply fully with previous agreements and understandings regarding these conflicts, in compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1716.

**NORTH KOREA – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS**

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

‘The Council strongly condemns the test of a nuclear explosive device proclaimed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 9 October 2006. This test, carried out in disregard of appeals from the international community, poses a danger to regional stability and represents a clear threat to international peace and security. It is a further violation by the DPRK of its non-proliferation obligations. It reinforces the DPRK’s isolation and does nothing to help the miserable situation of the North Korean people. The EU will fully implement the provisions of all relevant UNSC Resolutions and notably of Resolution 1718 adopted on 14 October 2006 and of Resolution 1695 adopted on 15 July 2006. The Council shall immediately take the necessary steps to that end.

The Council strongly urges the DPRK, in compliance with UNSC Resolutions 1718 and 1695, to return immediately to the Six-Party talks, to work towards expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement of September 2005, in particular to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, and to comply with its obligations under the NPT, which include submitting all its nuclear activities to IAEA verification. The EU further calls on the DPRK to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, to refrain from conducting any further nuclear test or missile launch, and to re-establish its commitments to a moratorium on missile launching.

DPRK’s actions add to the risks of proliferation worldwide. The Council calls for redoubling of efforts to strengthen all aspects of the international system against proliferation of WMD.’
EUJUST LEX – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 17 October 2006

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION AMENDING AND EXTENDING JOINT ACTION 2005/190/CFSP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATED RULE OF LAW MISSION FOR IRAQ, EUJUST LEX

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) On 12 June 2006, following a review of the mission by the Secretary General/High Representative, the Council agreed to extend EUJUST LEX for another 18 months after the expiry of the existing mandate, until 31 December 2007.


(3) This Joint Action should provide the basis for the second phase of this extension, until 31 December 2007.

(4) Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP(2) should be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

Article 1

Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP is amended as follows:

1. Article 11(3) should be replaced by the following:
‘Given the particular security situation in Iraq, services in Baghdad shall be provided through the contracts entered into by the United Kingdom with the companies provid-

ing and invoicing for these services. The budget of EUJUST LEX shall cover these expenses up to a maximum of EUR 2.4 million. The United Kingdom shall, in consultation with the Head of Mission, report with adequate information to the Council on these expenses.’

2. The second subparagraph of Article 14 shall be replaced by the following: ‘It shall expire on 31 December 2007.’

**Article 2**

The financial reference amount intended to cover the additional expenditure related to the mission for the period 1 November 2006 to 31 December 2007 shall be EUR 11.2 million.

**Article 3**

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

**Article 4**

This Joint Action shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Luxembourg, 17 October 2006.

*For the Council*

*The President*

E. Tuomioja
European Parliament: European Security Strategy

18 October 2006

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ESDP (RAPPORTEUR: KARL VON WOGAU)

Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on the implementation of the European Security Strategy in the context of the ESDP

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the European Security Strategy adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003,
- having regard to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed in Rome on 29 October 2004,
- having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the European Councils of 16/17 June and 15/16 December 2005, and in particular to the Presidency reports on ESDP,
- having regard to its resolution of 14 April 2005 on the European Security Strategy,1
- having regard to the EU Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, endorsed by the Council on 9 December 2003,
- having regard to the report entitled ‘For a European civil protection force: europe aid’ presented in May 2006 by former Commissioner Michel Barnier,
- having regard to its resolution of 2 February 2006 on the annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP, including the financial implications for the general budget of the European Communities – 2004,2
- having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A6-0366/2006),

General considerations
A. whereas the European Security Strategy is part of the overall CFSP and ESDP, under which the full range of possible political action by the European Union – including diplomatic, economic and development policy measures – can be deployed,

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B. whereas opinion polls over the last 10 years have shown a consistently high level of approval as it has emerged that more than 60% of EU citizens are in favour of a common European Union foreign policy and more than 70% are in favour of a common European Union defence policy; whereas, moreover, other polls show that there is no support for increasing military expenditure,

C. whereas security and combating international terrorism are considered as a priority for the EU; a joint response and common strategy are needed in the ESDP,

D. whereas controls over arms exports must be tightened up by the European Union and also internationally,

1. Recognises that the European Security Strategy of December 2003, based on an initiative by the Greek presidency, contains an excellent analysis of the threats to the modern world and states the fundamental principles of the EU’s foreign policy; emphasises, however, the need to monitor its implementation on a regular basis, in order to be able to react to geopolitical developments;

2. Notes that, as stated in the European Security Strategy, international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime represent nowadays the main threats facing the European Union and its citizens; emphasises that meeting the geopolitical and geo-economic challenges of the increasing worldwide competition for sources of water and energy, as well as natural disasters and the security of the Union’s external borders, must be included as a strategic objective in the further development of the European Security Strategy; is concerned about the prospect of renewed arms races at global and regional levels and the ongoing proliferation of conventional arms;

3. Recognises that the fight against international terrorism cannot, however, be pursued by military means alone, and that the prevention and repression of terrorism require a whole range of non-military measures such as intelligence-sharing and police and judicial cooperation, for which full interinstitutional and inter-pillar cooperation is needed, and that the building of democratic institutions, infrastructure and civil society in failed or failing states is required; stresses that one of the EU’s greatest contributions to preventing international terrorism is its capacity to be effective in the building or rebuilding of democratic institutions, social and economic infrastructure, good governance and civil society and in successfully combating racism and xenophobia;

4. Points out that the task of the European Foreign and Security Policy is to protect the citizens of the Union from those threats, defend the justified interests of the Union and promote the objectives of the Charter of the United Nations by acting as a global
responsible actor for worldwide peace and democracy; strongly supports the idea of the European Security Strategy that the best means of attaining these objectives is “effective multilateralism”, meaning international institutions and international law;

5. Reiterates its position that the Union, through the ESDP, must fulfil its tasks by peaceful means in the first place and by military means only if all avenues for negotiation have been thoroughly explored and found to be a dead end; in carrying out these legitimate tasks, the primary consideration should be unequivocal respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of citizens within and outside the EU’s borders;

6. Considers that the geopolitical challenges have evolved considerably since the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003, making its revision necessary in 2008 at the latest; is of the opinion that the Strategy should be revised every 5 years and that it should be debated in the European Parliament and the parliaments of the Member States;

7. Points out that it is of the utmost importance to effectively coordinate the civilian and military elements of the international community’s response to a crisis; considers that, in this context, the EU should in particular build on its strategic partnership with NATO and seek to strengthen means for cooperation with NATO in operations and missions on the basis of intensive political dialogue on a wide range of issues;

8. Urges the Member States to support the parliamentary dimension of the ESDP in which developments at the institutional and financial level go hand in hand with an extension of parliamentary rights of control; recalls that responsibility for parliamentary monitoring of the ESDP is shared between the parliaments of the Member States and the European Parliament on the basis of their respective rights and duties under relevant treaties and constitutions;

9. Advocates initiatives for closer relations and an intensified exchange of information between the parliaments of the Member States and the European Parliament in relation to questions concerning the ESDP, in order to make more structured and regular dialogue between the parliaments possible;

10. Stresses that the European Union must be in a position to make a major contribution, in order to:
(a) defend itself against any real and unequivocal threat to its security;
(b) secure peace and stability first and foremost in its geographical neighbourhood and in other parts of the world, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter;
(c) carry out humanitarian interventions and rescue operations;
(d) prevent and manage conflicts and promote democracy and respect for human rights;
(e) promote regional and global disarmament;
11. Emphasises that, in the event of an attack by the armed forces of a third country on the territory of the Union, NATO remains the guarantor of collective defence; welcomes NATO’s increasing capability of playing a role in out-of-theatre operations; also regards NATO as the appropriate forum for transatlantic dialogue on security issues;

12. Recognises that the capabilities of the Member States’ armed forces and their availability to the EU are influenced by the fact that most Member States are members of both the EU and NATO and maintain one set of armed forces at the disposal of both organisations; demands, therefore, that the European Union should continue to work intensively with NATO, especially in the area of capabilities development;

13. Warns against unnecessary duplication of effort between NATO and the EU, and between the Member States of the EU;

14. Considers that the ESDP currently has at its disposal limited resources for civilian and military operations; therefore demands that the European Union – in order to develop its credibility as a global actor – concentrate its capabilities on its geographical neighbourhood, particularly the Balkans;

**Integrated civil-military cooperation**

15. Welcomes the European Union’s emphasis upon strengthening civil and military cooperation in crisis management and recognises that the development of civilian crisis management capabilities has been a distinct feature which provides added value in the PE development of the ESDP and across the spectrum of responses to conflict prevention, humanitarian intervention, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building;

16. is encouraged by recent attempts under the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 to redress the previous lack of emphasis on developing civilian capacities and capabilities; is further encouraged by the potential for the Civilian and Military Cell and the Operations Centre to play an important role in developing the Union’s approach to integrated civil-military cooperation and coordination; recommends, therefore, that the Civilian and Military Cell and the Operations Centre be upgraded to become a European Headquarters for carrying out civil-military missions;

17. recognises that the key enabling capabilities in the area of satellite-based and airborne intelligence systems, integrated telecommunications systems and strategic sea and airlift are essential to both civilian and military crisis management operations; calls for integrated research and development processes to be initiated by the European Defence Agency together with the Commission in areas that reinforce integrated and coordinated civil-military approaches, and in particular in the areas of satellite-based and airborne intelligence systems and integrated telecommunications systems;
Crisis management

18. Welcomes the setting-up of the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System, which has been funded by the Commission in close cooperation with the United Nations; points out that this system should considerably improve the European Union’s capacity to react;

19. Notes the activities of the Health Emergency Operations Facility set up by the Commission; stresses the importance of this facility with regard to both its stock of information and data and its ability to provide warnings about pandemics and epidemics, and also biological and chemical threats; therefore calls on the Council and the Commission to make the requisite arrangements whereby the Commission will be involved in coordinating measures in the event of health emergencies and cross-border bio-terrorist attacks;

20. Welcomes the Commission’s efforts to set up a Community procedure for disaster protection, including the case of a serious terrorist attack; notes that this procedure is based primarily on the information in a database which holds details about national resources available to provide help; notes that the time-saving effect of this database, which also promotes synergies, could be substantially improved if it took over the content of the database set up by the EU Military Staff, which contains details of all the resources available for crisis management; therefore calls on the Council and the Commission to hold the necessary talks and adopt the requisite measures to enable this take-over to take place;

21. Welcomes the Council’s efforts to ensure the speedy and effective deployment of the many ESDP resources available in the event of a disaster; in this connection, stresses how urgent it is to fill the gaps with regard to strategic (air) transport coordination; therefore urges the Member States to make the funding needed to resolve this problem available as soon as possible; also calls on the Council to examine very seriously the proposals made in the report presented in May 2006 by former Commissioner Michel Barnier;

22. Considers that the development of the ESDP has contributed to the emergence of ‘grey areas’ regarding the powers of the Council and the Commission relating to the performance of primarily civilian missions; expects that the adoption of the Stability Instrument will provide some clarification, without this having a negative effect on the flexibility in crisis management which has been demonstrated to date in practice;

23. Welcomes the progress made in connection with the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 and, in particular, the development of the plans for the use of civilian response teams and integrated police groups; also notes the development of expertise relating to the fight against organised crime and human trafficking; likewise welcomes the setting up of a cri-
sis platform at the Commission, which has set itself the goal of speeding up the startup phase of on-the-spot ESDP missions; calls on the Council and the Commission to coordinate their efforts and therefore proposes that a joint training programme be set up for all staff who work on planning missions;

Homeland security
24. Points out that the first task of any security policy is to secure one’s own territory; acknowledges that Europe’s citizens expect from a European defence policy, first and foremost, a major contribution to the protection of their personal security, accompanied by respect for their fundamental human rights;

25. Points out that the EU has to secure its external borders, protect its vital infrastructures, eliminate international terrorist funding networks and fight against organised crime; in this regard, calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a system of integrated management of the Union’s external borders, without limiting respect for human and fundamental rights, as well as humanitarian law, especially with regard to refugees;

26. Points out that the EU has to:
   - secure the free flow of supplies for industry and individual consumers, and of hydrocarbons in particular, which entails the security of shipping, flights and pipelines;
   - defend itself against a cyber attack which may disrupt vital communications, financial or energy systems;

Rapid action on the basis of the UN Charter
27. Endorses the fact that the European Security Strategy, while assuming that the Union, in the light of new threats, must be ready to act before crises break out and take early preventive action to deal with conflicts and threats, bases itself in doing so unrestrainedly on the United Nations Charter, as the fundamental framework for international relations;

Rules of conduct/training
28. Notes that the behaviour of personnel in all ESDP operations is governed by a range of guidelines and general rules of conduct which are set out in documents; welcomes the initial signs in these guidelines and rules of their observance of human rights standards and rules; also takes favourable note of the efforts to ensure that the gender dimension will enjoy a higher profile in the various ESDP policies, programmes and initiatives in future;

29. Takes note of the Council’s efforts to develop further the targeted ESDP training programmes – both strategic and operational – for diplomatic, military and civilian per-
sonnel; expects it to be made possible for European Parliament experts to participate in these programmes; endorses the approach of establishing minimum standards for the training of personnel on on-the-spot ESDP missions, and calls on the Council to work together with the Commission and the Member States towards standardising all training measures at all levels;

30. Is of the opinion that soldiers will be exposed to unnecessary risks if their chain of command, equipment or armaments do not meet the requirements of the operation; considers it particularly important, therefore, to ensure that the units to be placed under EU command are adequately equipped;

31. Is of the opinion that the effective use of military capabilities will not be possible without serious enhancement of European’s power projection capacity, including air and sea lift; in this context, acknowledges the efforts of different countries to increase their air transport and amphibious capabilities as well as plans to acquire more aircraft carriers;

32. Takes note that, in multinational operations, the use of different – and often incompatible – equipment and armaments by the participating units leads to extra costs and reduced efficiency; therefore considers that the EU should promote measures to harmonise equipment and armaments with a view to optimising resources and the effectiveness of multinational operations;

**Intelligence**

33. Criticises the particularly serious fact that the battle groups currently under development do not all have the same access to airborne and space-based intelligence, and regrets that the output of the national satellite intelligence-gathering systems Helios, SAR-Lupe and Cosmo-Skymed are not available to all Member States on a common basis;

34. In order to meet these shortfalls:
   (a) strongly requests that the battle groups under development receive common or at least compatible equipment in the fields of intelligence and telecommunications;
   (b) demands that the next generation of satellite intelligence-gathering systems be integrated into a European system whose output would be available for military, police and disaster management purposes using the satellite centre in Torrejon;

35. Points out that NATO is currently developing the airborne intelligence-gathering system AGS (Airborne Ground Surveillance) in addition to the national systems that already exist or are under development; insists that this system be made available for all EU Member States, especially in the EU battle groups context;
36. Considers that, in the telecommunications field, it is necessary to develop a joint system for the command of multinational units; therefore expresses the view that the equipment used by the military, police and emergency services should comply with the same technical standards, as is the case, for example, in Finland;

**Border surveillance**

37. Remains particularly concerned about the incompatibility and quality of border surveillance equipment and reiterates its demand for industry to present a coherent proposal to remedy this situation;

**Transportation**

38. Considers that, since transportation, in particular strategic lift, is an essential shortfall in any EU crisis management action, a European self-standing arrangement ensuring access to conventional civil multi-modal transport, building on an integrated civilian/military approach and ensuring economies of scale for all European actors in crisis management for both ESDP and disaster relief purposes, would be of great interest;

**Weaknesses in the ESDP decision-making procedure**

39. Considers that the political decision-making procedure preceding the decision to carry out an ESDP mission displays a number of weaknesses, as was seen in the case of the mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo; therefore calls on the Council to review the various stages of that procedure and, if appropriate, to take steps to eliminate those weaknesses; in this connection, reminds the Council and, in particular, its Political and Security Committee, of its obligation to report to the European Parliament;

40. Reaffirms its demand for unrestricted involvement and also its right to be consulted annually, in advance, on forthcoming aspects of and options for the CFSP, as provided for in the existing Treaties; calls emphatically on the Council to pursue a much more open and transparent information policy, vis-a-vis the European Parliament, with regard to the CFSP and the ESDP; in this connection, criticises the current procedure for access by the European Parliament to the Council’s ‘confidential documents’, which in most cases contain only very general information;

41. Demands that expenditure on military equipment and armaments be adopted in budgets which are subject to parliamentary control; is therefore of the opinion that parallel budgets and mechanisms, which cannot be effectively supervised either by national parliaments or by the European Parliament, should be avoided;

42. Notes that the European Union budget contains various headings with security aspects such as appropriations for crisis management, the security of external borders
and vital infrastructures, security research and implementation of the Galileo and GMES programmes;

43. Urges, in particular, that the budget available for crisis management missions, external border security, security research and Galileo be further increased; in the long term, the area of security research should be geared to the funding requirements determined by the High-Level Group on Security Research;

44. Demands also that military crisis-management operations be financed from the European Union budget and that, for that purpose, additional EU resources be made available by the Member States;

45. Criticises the fact that, due to the ATHENA mechanism and other ad hoc mechanisms financed by the Member States or even the European Development Fund, the European Parliament is not in a position to exercise any budgetary scrutiny over ESDP military operations; points out that there is also a need for transparency in civil-military operations (such as police missions) which fall within a grey area between ad hoc arrangements and CFSP budget financing;

46. Consequently, calls for a new budgetary methodology to enhance transparency in ESDP spending and to support the development of the military and civilian capabilities needed to fulfil the aims of the European Security Strategy: 
(a) in an initial phase, which should start in 2007 and not exceed two years in duration, the Council should draw up a budgetary document reflecting the commitments made by the Member States to fulfil the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 and the Military Headline Goal 2010 and based on the existing catalogues (requirements catalogue, force catalogue and progress catalogue);
(b) in a second phase, the Member States should commit themselves to the ESDP through a virtual ‘budget’ in which they would commit funds on a multi-annual basis to finance the equipment and personnel needed for ESDP operations. This document, whilst not legally binding, would nevertheless become an important political document next to the EU/EC budget, and would indicate what the Member States are prepared to spend on the ESDP. It should facilitate “burden sharing” between the Member States by securing greater transparency as regards military spending, and should be jointly debated by the European Parliament and the parliaments of Member States on an annual basis;

47. Is of the opinion that, in order to develop a truly integrated European defence equipment market, it is necessary to make less extensive use of the defence-related dero-
gation contained in Article 296 of the EC Treaty; looks forward to the Commission’s interpretative communication on the application of Article 296 and to a proposal for a specific directive on defence procurement; welcomes the EDA’s Code of Conduct on defence procurement and calls on all Member States to subscribe to it; insists that the practice of offsets and ‘juste retour’ should be abolished; considers it necessary for the work of the European Defence Agency to be stepped up in the context of the ESDP;

48. Recognises the importance of cooperative research for the competitiveness of the European industry; demands therefore greater complementarities between the work of the Commission and the EDA, through more effective dialogue on civilian, security and defence-related research in Europe; emphasises that the provision of dual-use technologies and multifunctional capacities, and also overcoming the division separating research for civilian and defence purposes, should be EU aims and objectives; considers it necessary, given the diversity of company structures in this sector by comparison with other areas of research, to adjust the definition of small and medium-sized businesses in the area of European security research;

49. Calls for the 1998 Code of Conduct on Arms Exports to be given the force of law in all Member States and also to be efficiently applied and implemented; is of the opinion that the decision as to which countries of destination meet the criteria of the code of conduct should be taken on a common basis; in addition, requests that intra-Community transfers of defence equipment be simplified; urges the Commission to speed up its efforts in this field;

WMD/Iran
50. Realises that there can be no guarantee of success with the attempts to stop Iran producing weapons-grade enriched uranium; considers, however, that the joint negotiating offer made by the EU Three, the United States, Russia and China represents the most promising course; welcomes the multilateral approach underpinning this offer; is pleased to note Europe’s part in bringing it into being; welcomes the willingness of the United States to take part in the same negotiations with Iran;

Towards a Security and Defence Union
51. Points out that the EU is on the way to developing into a Security and Defence Union as well, covering external security as well as various aspects of internal security, combating terrorism in all its forms and natural disaster management with the following elements:
(a) the commitment of the Member States to be able to:
   • deploy 60,000 soldiers within 60 days and sustain them for one year for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations as decided at the Helsinki European Council, and to build up 13 battle groups deployable at short notice, with two permanently on
standby from 2007;
- develop capabilities for civilian crisis management in the area of police operations, the rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection, as decided at the Feira European Council;
(b) a European structure of command consisting of a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee, a Military Staff (all of which have been operational since 2001) and a Civilian and Military Cell with a nascent Operations Centre;
(c) the European Gendarmerie Force with its Headquarters in Vicenza, which should be used for the future police mission in Kosovo;
(d) the European Defence Agency proposed by the European Council, which has been operational since 2004;
(e) Europol and the European arrest warrant;
(f) common rules for arms procurement and arms exports;
(g) European security research as a free-standing thematic priority under the 7th Framework Research Programme;

52. Is of the opinion that this process should be strengthened by means of the following elements:
(a) the establishment of a common market in the field of defence, as a means of creating a truly integrated European defence technological base in accordance with the principles of interdependence and specialisation among EU Member States;
(b) a common system of satellite and airborne intelligence and common telecommunications standards, to be at the disposal of the military, the police and the disaster management services;
(c) the setting up of a European standing naval force in the Mediterranean sea in order to demonstrate a European presence and enhance the EU’s crisis management potential in this region of utmost importance for its security interests;
(d) a European budget covering not only the civil but also the military aspects of security;
(e) a European deputy foreign minister in charge of security and defence policy;
(f) more frequent meetings of the EU’s Defence Ministers;
(g) a European civil protection force as proposed in the report of Michel Barnier of May 2006, as well as a European Civil Peace Corps and the Peace Building Partnership;
(h) an available European capability for air and sea transport in cases of disaster relief, rescue operations and defence operations (multimodal transport combining the most appropriate assets);
(i) adequate parliamentary scrutiny by the parliaments of the Member States and the European Parliament;

53. Stresses the importance of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which will bring about major progress towards a Security and Defence Union, in particular through:
(a) the office of a European Foreign Minister who is at the same time Vice-President of the Commission;
(b) the solidarity clause, for cases in which a Member State is affected by a terrorist attack, a natural disaster or a man-made disaster;
(c) a clause on mutual assistance between Member States in the event of armed aggression against a Member State’s territory;

54. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Parliaments of the Member States and the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, NATO, the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

(...)
EU concept for strengthening African capabilities – Council conclusions

The Council took note of an EU concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.

The EU strategy for Africa was agreed by the European Council in December 2005 as a basis for closer cooperation between the EU and Africa. Cooperation is based on a strategic partnership between the EU and the regional organisations on the continent, and in particular the African Union (AU), covering a whole range of policy issues, including governance, migration, peace and security, agriculture, research, health and education.

Key to the strengthening of the relationship is the provision of support for the capacity building of the AU Commission and the sub-regional organisations to enable them to implement their agenda.

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. “The Council welcomes that the Council General Secretariat and the Commission have jointly prepared a European Union concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The concept is intended to provide a coherent and comprehensive EU framework for the implementation of key aspects of the Peace and Security cluster of the EU Strategy for Africa, adopted by the European Council on 15 and 16 December 2005 (“The EU and Africa: towards a strategic partnership”, 15961/05 ).

2. The Council confirms that the EU stands ready to step up its support for the efforts of the African Union (AU) and African sub-regional organisations to promote security and development on the African continent. The Council stresses that this needs to be a demand-driven process, based on intensified dialogue with African partners, in full respect of African ownership. Measures and initiatives proposed in the concept would directly support the AU’s ongoing establishment of an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including the creation of the African Stand-by Force (ASF).

3. The Council underlines the importance of strengthening the consistency of EU policies and actions in this field in order to provide more effective and comprehensive
support for African programmes and priorities and to develop a stronger partnership with African partners, including through reinforced dialogue and interaction.

4. The Council notes that the EU, collectively and through individual Member States, has already made a substantial contribution in this area through capacity-building, support for the AU’s APSA policy development process, training and material assistance. The EU is also currently supporting the AU and African sub-regional organisations in undertaking a comprehensive long term needs assessment.

5. The Council draws in this context particular attention to the Union’s ongoing engagement in support of AU/AMIS in Sudan/Darfur, EU missions in the DRC, as well as its assistance so far in the establishment of the ASF. The Council underlines the need to draw lessons learned from these activities.

6. The Council recalls the recent EU decision to strengthen and replenish the African Peace Facility (APF) with substantial, long-term, flexible, sustainable funding. APF support has already made a key contribution to the development of African capabilities. There is a continuing need for activities financed under the APF to be complemented by and coherent with activities undertaken under other appropriate EU instruments, including the EU’s CFSP/ESDP instruments. Member States’ bilateral contributions should also be taken into account.

7. The Council recognises that the broader international community is also committed to the development of African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and underlines the importance of co-operation in this respect.

8. The Council looks forward to proposals by the Council General Secretariat and the Commission for the speedy implementation of the concept, in light of the recommendations given by the relevant Council bodies and taking into account consultations with African partners and the Member States, as well as with other relevant international actors. In this context, the Council also encourages further progress towards the holding of the second Europe-Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007, where a Joint EU-Africa Strategy should be adopted."

**Gender equality and gender mainstreaming in crisis management**

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. “The Council underlines the importance of promoting gender equality and gender mainstreaming in the context of CFSP/ESDP at all levels. The Council expresses its determination to put in practice the decisions taken to promote gender equality in the
context of ESDP and the related checklist, which seek to ensure gender mainstreaming and implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) from the early planning to the conduct and evaluation of ESDP missions and operations.

2. The Council emphasises the importance of effective monitoring to ensure a systematic follow-up of the commitments made. Also the Generic Standards of Behaviour, inter alia, against sexual exploitation and prostitution should continue to be fully implemented by all ESDP missions and operations. Where not already in place, national measures, such as action plans for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 by Member States as well as third states participating in ESDP operations, should also be encouraged.

3. The Council underscores the importance of improving gender balance in the ESDP operations, also at the senior-management level. The Council therefore invites the Member States to ensure that they nominate more female candidates for upcoming CFSP/ESDP assignments, including the posts of EU Special Representative and Head of Mission. The Member States are also invited to pursue active recruitment strategies and to identify and address specific obstacles limiting women’s participation. Mission reports should include relevant statistics in this respect.

4. The Council stresses that gender equality and human rights should be fully integrated in the planning and conduct of all ESDP missions and operations, including fact-finding missions. Gender awareness and sensitivity contribute generally to the operational effectiveness and situational awareness in standard assignments. Regarding certain tasks, such as checkpoints and outreach activities, it is of particular importance to include in the mission personnel both men and women. A gender adviser or a gender focal point should be appointed for all ESDP missions and operations. In this context, the Council welcomes the work of the gender adviser appointed to the EU’s military operation EUFOR RD Congo. The Council notes that support for improved gender sensitivity must be assured throughout the chain of command.

5. The Council emphasizes the importance of training activities, tailored to the needs of the military and civilian personnel taking part in the ESDP operations, in particular on gender equality and human rights as well as gender-based violence, and encourages the Member States to intensify these training efforts. Such training should include those highest in command. A particular emphasis should be put on mission specific training. The Council encourages the development of public information campaigns and public material on women’s and men’s involvement in the security sector, including the military and police, in order to change stereotypes regarding women’s participation, assignments and tasks.
6. Gender perspective needs to be fully integrated in peace building. All reconstruction efforts should draw on the knowledge and expertise of women’s groups and networks within the community. The Council encourages the development of targeted EU activities to promote gender equality and the role of women in post-conflict situations. In this context, the Council stresses the importance of actively supporting women’s participation in civic education and political processes, including right to vote and stand as candidates in elections.

7. The Council underlines that policies aimed at the protection and reintegration of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) / refugees should take gender issues into account.

8. The Council emphasises that gender perspective should be incorporated in the EU’s policies and activities on Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). DDR programmes should ensure that female combatants are identified and registered early and that both sexes can participate equally in these programmes. Women need to be ensured equal access to the assistance package to which they are eligible under the DDR programme and to be involved in economic reintegration activities.

9. The Council underlines the importance of addressing gender perspective in the context of rule of law activities. Gender equality could also be promoted in post conflict situations through legal reforms in the justice sector, inter alia through revising discriminatory laws, such as laws concerning inheritance, family relations, property and employment, and through empowering women to access rule of law and economic and social justice institutions.

10. The Council emphasises the importance of including measures against sexual and gender based violence in transitional justice mechanisms. All peace building and reconstruction plans should include comprehensive victim-protection and support mechanisms. The Council notes that the mandates of ESDP missions and operations could also address the possibilities to assist, if so requested, the ICC or other specialised courts and accountability mechanisms (e.g. truth commissions) in carrying out their work, including in cases relating to systematic sexual exploitation and gender based violence. In this context, the Council recalls that on 10 April 2006 the EU and the International Criminal Court (ICC) concluded an agreement on cooperation and assistance. The Council also highlights the responsibility of all states to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for sexual and gender based violence.”

(...)
Meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers

Brussels, 13 November 2006

COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council held its six-monthly review of developments under the European Security and Defence Policy, in the presence of defence ministers. They discussed operations, including the following:

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ministers were briefed by the High Representative and the Commander of the EU military operation EUFOR Althea. The High Representative, underlining the EU’s continued commitment to Bosnia and Herzegovina, indicated that a decision to reduce troop strength was under consideration, which would be based on an evaluation of the security situation in BiH. He recommended that the decision in principle to start the transition towards a reduction of the level of forces be taken in December but that the actual implementation of the transition starts in February, subject to confirmation by the Council at that time.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Ministers were briefed by the High Representative and the EUFOR Operation Commander, General Viereck, on the state of play regarding the EU military operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, EUFOR RD Congo, as well as on the security sector reform mission EUSEC RD Congo, which, together with the police mission EUPOL Kinshasa, will continue to work in the DRC after the redeployment of EUFOR.

Ministers highlighted EUFOR’s important contribution towards a satisfactory conclusion of the DRC transition process, including its crucial and successful intervention during the August incidents. They looked forward to a conclusion of the operation in an equally successful manner.

Ministers acknowledged the crucial role played by EUSEC in the framework of the overall approach to Security Sector Reform that is being developed and discussed the mission’s prospects for the future.

Sudan

Ministers were briefed on the situation regarding the African Union mission in

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1 See also Council conclusions on the DRC, page 13.
Sudan/Darfur (AMIS) and EU support therefore, as well as on prospects concerning a UN supporting package.

The Council adopted the following conclusions on ESDP developments:

“Civilian Capabilities
1. The demand for civilian ESDP missions continues to grow. The Council therefore attached great importance to the continued efforts under the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 to enhance and update the EU civilian ESDP crisis management capabilities. In this context, the Council noted with satisfaction the Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference and its Ministerial Declaration and welcomed the Progress Report 2006.

Military Capabilities
2. The Council noted with satisfaction the progress achieved in the qualitative approach to capability planning called for by the Headline Goal 2010.

3. The Council noted the Force Catalogue 2006 (FC 06), which presents the Member States’ contributed forces and capabilities against the required capabilities as defined in the Requirements Catalogue 2005 (RC 05).

4. Acceding States’ contributions are presented in a supplement to the FC 06. The Council looked forward to their scrutinised contributions being incorporated as MS contributions in a revised version of the FC 06. It also looked forward to the contributions of non-EU European NATO members, and of other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU. These contributions will be presented in another supplement to the FC 06.

5. The Council looked forward to the further steps implementing the Scrutinising, Assessing and Evaluating (SAE) methodology, including the Assessment process based on the agreed Assessment Handbook which will examine the totality of MS scrutinised contributions for the year 2010 and identify capability shortfalls in qualitative and quantitative terms. Further steps will also include the Evaluation process, based on an Evaluation Methodology which is being developed.

6. The Council looked forward to the finalisation in 2007 of the Progress Catalogue which will contain a comprehensive assessment of the EU military capabilities and capacity needed to fulfil the requirements set in the Requirement Catalogue 2005.

7. The Council noted the Single Progress Report on military capabilities. Concerning the European Capabilities Action Plan, the Council noted the continued migration of former ECAP Project Groups into a more integrated process associated with the EDA.
8. The Council noted that the EU-NATO Capability Group had continued to address issues of coherent and mutually reinforcing development of military capabilities in the EU and NATO where requirements overlap. All EU Member States were informed of these issues.

9. The Council noted the clarification on the release of NATO Unclassified Information to all EU Member States.

Rapid Response
10. By January 2007, the EU will have the Full Operational Capability to undertake two battlegroup size operations of rapid response, including the ability to launch two such operations nearly simultaneously. The Council welcomed the Seminar “Approaching EU’s Battlegroups Full Operational Capability – State Of Play And Way Ahead” organised by the Presidency on Battlegroups on 19-20 October in Helsinki, and the successful outcome of the Battlegroups Co-ordination Conference on 27 October. The Council noted with satisfaction that Member States have fulfilled the required commitments up to and including 2008 and looks forward to additional offers, in particular to solve the vacant slot in the first half of 2009.

11. The Council welcomed the introductory workshop on the Study for the Rapid Response Air Initiative in ESDP held on 25 and 26 October. This workshop aimed at elaborating the scope of the study and conducting initial discussions on a successful use of air power for Rapid Response within the whole spectrum of EU crisis management tasks.

12. With regard to the Maritime Dimension in ESDP, the Council noted the ongoing work on the contribution of EU maritime forces in ESDP missions/operations and their use in a rapid response capacity. Beyond the framework of Rapid Response, the Council welcomed the ongoing work on the interlinked issues of mission spectrum and future structures and tasks of maritime forces in the context of ESDP missions/operations and looks forward to the conclusions of the Maritime Dimension Study to be issued by the end of the year.

European Defence Agency
13. The Council noted the report submitted by the Head of the Agency on its activities and welcomed the results achieved.

14. In particular, the Council welcomed the achievements in the areas targeted in the Council guidelines for the EDA 2006 Work Programme, noting:
   - the endorsement of ‘an Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs’ – established with strong contributions from the EUMC and the ISS (extensively discussed with and broadly supported by participating Member
States, but without word-for-word agreement) – as a reasonable foundation for the Agency’s medium-to-long term agendas;

- the inauguration of the voluntary regime on defence procurement and its successful implementation, including the Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain – notably with the launch of the Electronic Bulletin Board; and the decisions on Security of Supply between subscribing Member States in Circumstances of Operational Urgency, and Security of Information;

- the agreed description of characteristics of a strong future European Defence Technological and Industrial Base;

- the adoption of a Defence R&T Joint Investment Programme on Force Protection;

- the good progress on the Agency’s management of a growing number of collaborative ad hoc projects, including those successfully taken over from the WEAO Research Cell. In particular, the Council welcomed projects in relation to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Armoured Fighting Vehicles.

15. The Council also took note of progress in the area of Command and Control, in particular Software-Defined Radio and the project on a Tactical Imagery Exploitation System (TIES) demonstrator for EU Battlegroups. It also noted the positive work on developing a cooperative process designed to encourage possibilities for collaboration in development and procurement of systems and components.

16. The Council noted with satisfaction efforts to ensure good coordination and complementarity between the EDA and the Commission. The Council also noted the importance of achieving coordination with NATO, OCCAR and the Loi Framework, in accordance with the provisions of the Joint Action on the establishment of the European Defence Agency.

17. The Council agreed to postpone by another year the setting of the Agency’s three-year financial framework and adopted by unanimity the Agency’s budget for 2007.

**Strengthening Civil-Military Co-ordination**

18. The Council welcomed the ongoing work, building on the work carried out under previous Presidencies, on improving effective co-ordination of the civilian and military crisis management instruments the EU has at its disposal. The Council noted recent work on improving situational awareness in theatre, and recalled that the PSC had noted a document on improving information sharing in support of EU crisis management operations. The goal is to achieve a high degree of common situational awareness among EU actors as this constitutes an important element in ensuring that EU crisis management efforts are coherent and effective. The Council underlined the importance of ensuring a comprehensive approach with regard to the work on the Information Exchange Requirements. Taking account of the importance of CMCO to ensuring that
the EU achieves maximum impact with the resources at its disposal, the Council underlined the need to continue work on improving civil-military co-ordination. In this regard, effective practical co-operation with other actors, as appropriate, is also important.

Using military assets in support of EU disaster relief: getting assistance quickly where it is needed

19. The Council welcomed work to improve the EU’s ability to respond to disasters, notably on military support to EU disaster response. This work is taking place in the context of the Hampton Court follow-up and the proposals put forward by the SG/HR in March 2006.

20. The Council recalled that helping citizens in an emergency, crisis or disaster, whether natural or man-made, requires rapid and effective delivery of assistance. Military means may be essential to complement civilian capabilities in order to save lives and allow for speed of action.

21. In this framework, the Council noted the document on “Military support to EU disaster relief – Identification and coordination of available assets and capabilities” (doc. 9462/3/06 REV 3) as a living document, and agreed on its way ahead. The arrangements set out therein are designed to enhance the rapidity and effectiveness of the EU’s response to disasters with military support. They will be subject to review, as necessary, in the light of experience gained”.

(...)

DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES: THE FORCE CATALOGUE 2006

Today, 13 November 2006, the EU Council notes the Force Catalogue 2006 (FC 06), which presents the forces and capabilities contributed by member states against the required capabilities as defined in the Requirements Catalogue 2005.

Background

At the Cologne European Council (3 and 4 June 1999), EU leaders stated their determination that “the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding common European policy on security and defence. (...) the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO”1.
Headline Goal 2003

In December 1999, at the Helsinki European Council, the EU set a military target known as the Helsinki Headline Goal. The MS agreed to put at the Union’s disposal, on a voluntary basis, forces capable of carrying out the tasks as set out in Article 17.2 of the Treaty on European Union, by 2003, in operations up to army corps level (50/60,000 troops) with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. This force should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days and sustainable for a year.

- **Operational capability**
  The 2001 Laeken European Council stated that the “Union is now capable of conducting some crisis-management operations”. This position was confirmed at the May 2003 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) which declared “the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls”.

Headline Goal 2010

Following the adoption of the EU Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003, the EU decided to set a new **Headline Goal 2010**. Based on the Headline Goal 2003, it envisions that MS “be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union”. The Headline Goal 2010 plan was endorsed by the June 2004 European Council meeting.

The process of developing EU military capabilities towards the Headline Goal of 2010 is thorough. The first step was to identify strategic planning assumptions. **Five illustrative scenarios** were prepared, which encompassed a wide spectrum of military operations. These were:

- **Separation of parties by force**
- **Stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice to third countries**
- **Conflict prevention**
- **Evacuation operation**
- **Assistance to humanitarian operations**

From these, **focused military options** were developed as to how best to deal with the relevant crises. These options led to a planning framework from which was deduced a **detailed list of required capabilities** that the EU would need. **Generic force packages**

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2. The HLG 2010 was adopted in 2004.
were compiled which identified the type of force groupings that the EU would require to solve the crises and these resulted in a list of reference units. All of this information was fed into a requirements catalogue which listed in detail the actual types of units, resources and assets that were required in order to fulfil the EU’s needs.

It was now the task of the EU to ask the Member States to what extent they could offer assets and resources to fill the total force requirement, which is listed in the requirements catalogue. This was done by means of the Headline Goal questionnaire, which was distributed to Member States and through which they could make their “bids” or offers. As these offers were received, these Member States’ contributions were compiled into the Member States compilation of contributions. Additionally a scrutinising methodology was developed and the scrutinising handbook established, which enabled Member States to conduct the necessary self-assessment of their contributions.

In order to have a better view of the capabilities contributed clarification dialogue was held. These steps lead to the development of the EU Force Catalogue, that describes the capabilities made available by Member States in qualitative and quantitative terms. It provides a view of the military capabilities available by 2010.

It will also be the basis for EU shortfall identification. The identified shortfalls and the possible operational risks because of these shortfalls will be reflected in progress catalogue, which will be due by the end of 2007. The remaining tasks for the achievement of the Headline Goal 2010 will be to solve the identified shortfalls, while maintaining a credible EU operational capability.

Throughout the whole process, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) has cooperated and will continue to cooperate with the European Defence Agency (EDA) in many areas, particularly in the integrated development teams (IDTs) and the Project Teams (PTs), which are intended to support and enhance Member States’ efforts in solving the identified shortfalls. In addition, the EUMS will supply all necessary support to the EDA in order to continue the progress towards the objective of shaping the EU’s Long Term Vision, and the follow-on work involved.

With regard to Rapid Response, during the last Battlegroup co-ordination conference, Member States have committed the required number of Battlegroup packages for 2007, 2008 and 2009. Indications have been given that the first half of 2010 will be completely filled. The Member States providing Battlegroups in the first half of 2007 have decided to provide naval enablers for these Battlegroups. From January 2007 onwards the EU will have the full operational capability to undertake two Battlegroup-sized rapid response operations nearly simultaneously. (See Council Secretariat factsheet on EU Battlegroups).

A milestone in the improvement of the strategic airlift capabilities was achieved with the formal approval of the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) by 15 EU Member States plus Canada and Norway, thereby ensuring timely availability of an additional capability to deploy outsized cargo. It was recognised that SALIS has further growth potential and will also in the future remain open to participation by other EU Member
States and NATO nations. SALIS is a good example of the fruitful co-operation in finding effective and efficient solutions to overlapping capability shortfalls of the EU and NATO.

Regarding the global approach on the deployability, it was recognised that improving strategic mobility was crucial, in order to enable the Headline Goal 2010, and specifically the full operational capability of the EU Battlegroups in 2007, to be realised. In view of the known shortfalls in strategic lift assets (both in NATO and the EU), focusing on the more effective use of all available means for transport co-ordination was seen as the key to improving strategic transport capability.

Five tasks were identified concerning the co-ordination, interaction, roles and responsibilities of transportation enablers, and these tasks were undertaken by the EUMS under the auspices of the EU Military Committee and the Political and Security Committee. Most of the remaining tasks within the framework of the global approach on deployability have been completed.

Work has continued with regard to the maritime dimension in ESDP, on investigating the contribution of EU maritime forces in ESDP missions/operations and their use in a rapid response capacity.

In line with the “EU Military rapid response concept”, consideration is being given to a “rapid response air initiative” for further development within the framework of the Headline Goal 2010. This initiative aims at enhancing the generation of air rapid response elements and proposes a draft concept for a European deployable air station.

(...)
well as in Rafah. In addition, very substantial challenges are approaching, notably with the prospect of a major civilian ESDP mission in Kosovo.

2. Ministers welcome the opportunity to meet in a Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference in Brussels, 13 November 2006, and review progress made in the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 process. The Conference takes place at a time when the European Union is planning for a possible ESDP mission in the wider area of the Rule of Law in Kosovo. This would be the most complex and demanding civilian mission that the European Union has ever been asked to undertake. Ministers therefore attach great importance to the continued efforts under the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 to enhance and update the EU civilian crisis management capabilities. They welcome the Progress Report 2006 as a relevant and timely contribution to such efforts.

3. Ministers note with satisfaction progress on new rapidly-deployable capabilities, notably the establishment of a pool of experts deployable in Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) and the implementation of a CRT training program, as well as the development of standard structures for Integrated Police Units and Formed Police Units. By the end of 2006, the European Union will have established a CRT pool of almost 100 pre-identified and trained experts, deployable within 5 days. Ministers note that work is being undertaken on, i.a., the further refinement of procedures for the actual deployment of rapidly deployable police elements and CRTs.

4. Ministers consider that the work undertaken so far on capability shortfalls and surpluses provides a useful picture of the availability of Member States’ civilian resources. At the same time it also provides important indications on civilian capabilities that require enhancement, especially in some key categories urgently to be addressed in view of the future ESDP missions, e.g., the one being planned for Kosovo. These key categories are:
   - Judges and Prosecutors;
   - Prison personnel;
   - Police officers;
   - Border Police officers.

5. Further efforts to remedy the identified shortfalls will be guided by the Civilian Capability Implementation Plan for 2007. Elements for such a plan are set out in the Annex.

6. The Civilian Headline Goal 2008 process should draw on the European Union’s experience on civilian crisis management, rigorously learning lessons from the missions in order to improve the EU’s civilian impact, building inter alia on the results of the work based on illustrative planning scenarios.
7. Ministers note that in 2006 the Civilian Headline Goal process has yielded a set of recommendations and guidelines on the raising of personnel for EU civilian crisis management. Ministers agree that the guidelines and recommendations will contribute to guiding Member States’ efforts in achieving the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. The General Secretariat of the Council will undertake implementation of the recommendations and guidelines within its remit. An updated list of recommendations and guidelines, taking account of progress achieved as well as possible new challenges, should be submitted with a view to a Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference by the end of 2007.

8. Ministers consider that, as early as possible in the planning process, Member States should be informed of personnel required for upcoming civilian ESDP missions. The Council Secretariat’s early notification of Member States will enable competent national authorities to identify qualified personnel at an early stage for deployment as needed. A crucial factor for pre-planning and early notification would be the availability of standard descriptions of the personnel which Member States may be asked to deploy. The Civilian Headline Goal process has, across the six agreed priority areas for civilian crisis management (Police, Rule of law, Civilian Administration, Civil Protection, Monitoring, Support to EU Special Representatives), generated a solid basis for such descriptions. Further work on the standard descriptions of civilian personnel should be carried out, bearing in mind lessons learned in civilian ESDP as well as the experience of international organisations such as OSCE.

9. The link between training and recruitment should be further reinforced. Early notification should include early indication of training requirements and opportunities, as much as possible with clear and focused reference to relevant training courses and institutions at national and EU level in line with the agreed programs and concepts.

10. With regard to recruitment for civilian ESDP mission personnel, Ministers underlined the importance of gender and Human Rights mainstreaming. They stressed that improving gender balance contributes to operational effectiveness of a mission and noted that efforts are being undertaken to further raise gender and Human Rights awareness.

11. Ministers consider that all key national actors involved in civilian crisis management, as well as the general public, should receive accurate and updated information on ESDP civilian crisis management, with special attention to upcoming challenges. Such information should be broadly accessible and understandable.

12. Ministers welcome the work on improving effective civil-military co-ordination carried out under the UK, Austrian and Finnish presidencies. The goal is to ensure a max-
imum degree of coherence among EU actors, including in the area of situational awareness which constitutes an important element in ensuring the effectiveness of EU crisis management efforts. Ministers also stress the importance of an appropriate use of the civilian crisis management instruments the EU has at its disposal.

13. Ministers welcome the work done on mission support, notably the initial concept and list of required capabilities, and encourage further developments as outlined in the concepts’ way ahead. They note that, in the framework of the Civilian Headline Goal process in 2006, the assessment of Member States’ civilian mission support capabilities is ongoing and that the result is due to be submitted to the GAERC in December 2006.

14. The European Union needs to pursue its objectives in civilian crisis management both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors. Ministers welcome the possible contributions which non-EU States have indicated in the framework of the Civilian Headline Goal process, and express their appreciation to the Governments of the countries concerned for their support in supplementing the EU civilian crisis management capabilities.

15. Ministers also recall the value of experience, expertise and early warning capacity of non-governmental organisations and civil society, in accordance with the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP and welcome the dialogue in this field. Further exploration of the use of the non-governmental actors’ and civil society’s capabilities in the Civilian Crisis Management should be encouraged.

ANNEX – ELEMENTS OF A CIVILIAN CAPABILITY IMPROVEMENT PLAN

1. Action to Address the Capability Requirement

a) Action at Member States’ level:
The Civilian Capability Improvement Plan should include steps to:
- Facilitate the raising of sufficient personnel, taking account of concrete requirements such as the possible future ESDP mission in Kosovo;
- Continue the effort of addressing the highest priority shortfalls;
- Contribute to a system to facilitate early and possibly focused indication of personnel likely to be required for upcoming civilian ESDP missions;
- Improve the link between recruitment and training;
- Contribute to a system to facilitate early and possibly focused indication of training requirements and opportunities for this personnel, as much as possible with clear and focused reference to relevant training courses and institutions at national and
EU level in line with the agreed programs and concepts.
- Implement the recommendations and guidelines concerning the raising of personnel noted in 2006;
- Encourage the sector ministries to share best practice aimed at facilitating the mobilisation of resources for civilian crisis management and the liaison with the EU and international organisations;
- Encourage better use of non-governmental organisations’ and civil society’s expertise and capabilities in training and recruitment.

b) Action at EU level:
The Civilian Capability Improvement Plan should include steps to:
- Implement the appropriate recommendations and guidelines concerning the raising of personnel noted in 2006;
- Address the issue of early notification of personnel likely to be required for upcoming civilian ESDP missions, including of related training requirements and opportunities in line with the agreed programs and concepts;
- Further the work on mission support capabilities on the basis of Member States’ replies to the related Questionnaire;
- Take forward the work on a comprehensive Lessons Learned process;
- Share best practice and expertise in consultation with other international actors engaged in the field of civilian crisis-management, respecting EU agreed procedures and modalities;
- Follow up on the contacts with non-EU States established in the framework of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008;
- Encourage better use of non-governmental organisations’ and civil society’s expertise and capabilities in training and recruitment.

2. Rapidly Deployable Capabilities

a) Civilian Response Teams (CRTs)
Work will be taken forward to:
- develop relevant procedures for the actual deployment of CRTs;
- analyse and act upon lessons learned in CRT training and possible deployments in 2007;
- propose a way ahead, including follow-up proposals on future training, maintenance of the CRT pool of experts etc.

b) Rapidly-Deployable Police Elements
- develop relevant procedures for the actual deployment of rapidly deployable police elements.
The Civilian Headline Goal process will continue to be co-ordinated with the military Headline Goal 2010. International organisations, in particular the UN and the OSCE, will continue to be consulted.
European Defence Agency – Steering Board

Brussels, 13 November 2006

JAVIER SOLANA – OPENING REMARKS

1. We’ve had an extremely productive meeting of the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency, demonstrating that European defence is on the move.

2. First of all, 19 governments have agreed to participate in a ground-breaking new Research & Technology initiative and pledged a budget of more than 55 million Euros.

3. The Joint Investment Programme will look into how new technologies could help to provide better protection for our armed forces. Nothing is more important than ensuring that our troops have the best possible chance of returning home safely from operations where, as we can see almost every day, they face a variety of new and unpredictable threats.

4. Just as important as the substance of the programme is the innovative form it takes, which could serve as a model to give Europe’s defence R&T effort the boost it badly needs.

5. In the past, when governments have collaborated they have argued over how to pay for and share the benefits of every individual project. This time they are committing to a budget for the whole programme in advance and will share responsibility for allocating the funds to each project. Furthermore, all of the projects are specifically tied to the capabilities which we know Europe will need for its crisis-management operations in the future.

6. I’m also very pleased about the new initiatives announced today for software defined radio, a new technology which will have important civil and military applications.

7. Five governments have agreed a joint research initiative called ESSOR which aims to strengthen European technical capability in this critical area while also ensuring interoperability with the U.S. and NATO. This initiative will be managed in association with the EDA. We have also agreed to fund a specific Agency study into the longer term military specifications for SDR.

8. Both of these activities complement the WINSTEC project announced by the European Commission in October, which will study wireless interoperability for civil
security purposes. This is an excellent example of how we can reduce waste and maximise the return from our investments thanks to governments, the EDA and the Commission working closely together.

9. We have been saying for a long time that Europe must spend more on defence R&T, spend more together and spend the money better. Today’s announcements demonstrate that we are starting to do just that.

COUNCIL GUIDELINES FOR THE EDA’S WORK IN 2007

The Council noted with satisfaction the progress made so far by the EDA in 2006 and the number of positive developments in areas contained in its 2005 guidelines, as presented in the Head of the Agency’s report.

In particular, the Council welcomed the endorsement by the EDA Steering Board of ‘an Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs’ (extensively discussed with and broadly supported by participating Member States, but without word-for-word agreement), established with a strong contribution from the EUMC and the ISS, as a reasonable foundation for the Agency’s medium-to-long term agendas. It noted the inauguration of the intergovernmental regime on defence procurement and its successful implementation, including the agreement on the Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain. In particular, the Council welcomed the growing mutual confidence and readiness to accept interdependence reflected in the agreed framework arrangement on Security of Supply and in the decision on Security of Information. The Council also noted the Agency’s efforts to encourage the participating Member States to spend more, spend better, and spend more together on Defence R&T, with a view to the adoption of a Joint Investment Programme on Force Protection. It noted good progress on the Agency’s management of a growing number of collaborative ad hoc projects, including successful take-over of WEAO Research Cell projects.

The Council encouraged the Agency to adopt a twin-track approach focussing on longer-term strategies where national plans and priorities could converge, while also seeking to identify where participating Member States could advantageously pool their efforts and resources.

The Council agreed that much of the Agency’s work next year should focus on developing longer-term strategies. The Agency should initiate work based on the Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs in the medium-to-long term in three main areas of capabilities, research and industry:

- Start developing, in close cooperation with the EUMC, taking into account its role as stated in its Terms of Reference, a Capability Development Plan, with a coherent analysis of future capability needs beyond the Headline Goal 2010, and mutual disclosure by participating Member States of their medium-and long-term planning, in
order to identify opportunities for cooperation; participating Member States will decide on the way ahead in this process;

- Developing an initial European Defence R&T Strategy covering ends – listing the key technologies which should be preserved or developed in Europe for capability or Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB) reasons – and means – how to maximise the efficiency of the European collective defence R&T expenditure – identifying longer-term R&T goals and projects;
- Developing essential components of a European DTIB strategy, which identifies the nature and characteristics of the « ideal » EDTIB of the future, suggests its essential content and proposes policy approaches to get from here to there.

Efforts of EDA in the areas of R&T and European DTIB should, as and when appropriate, be developed respectively in liaison with the Community research activities or in consultation with the Commission.

The Council also encouraged the Agency to pursue work for progress in the shorter-term and to support initiatives aiming at early results. It recognised the need for continuation of Agency’s activities already under-way. In particular, the Agency should further develop and make best use of the cooperative process designed to encourage collaboration in the development and procurement of systems and components, making the most of the full potential of the enlarged Union. The Agency should continue to develop, strengthen and embed the regime on defence procurement and facilitate national efforts in this regard. It should also support all collaborative proposals notably for ad hoc projects volunteered by pMS. Such proposals should include R&T Joint Investment Programmes as well as projects and initiatives holding promise for short- and medium-term capability improvements.

In pursuing its tasks, the Agency should work towards achieving coordination and mutual reinforcement with NATO, OCCAR and the Loi Framework, in accordance with the provisions of the Joint Action on the establishment of the European Defence Agency. The Council invited the Agency to present a report to the Steering Board on the implementation of the Joint Action on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, with a view to its possible review by the Council.
ANNUAL REPORT BY THE HEAD OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY TO THE COUNCIL: NOVEMBER 2006

In its second year, the Agency has begun to deliver substantial results from an agenda addressing concurrently the immediate and the longer-term. Notable results include a fledgling Defence Equipment Market; a well-received Long-Term Vision; and a new programme for joint investment in R&T. But progress in filling capability gaps depends on Member States’ readiness to adjust and converge their defence spending plans.

1. The Agency’s work in 2006, its second year of operation, has been framed by the guidelines adopted by the Council on 21 November 2005 (ref. doc. 14804/05); by the 2006 Work Programme agreed by the Agency’s Steering Board on the same date; and by the « Hampton Court agenda » flowing from the informal EU summit of 27 October 2005. The year has seen delivery of the Agency’s first substantial results, most noticeably in relation to the European Defence Equipment Market; to the generation of a Long-Term Vision for ESDP Capability and Capacity Needs; and to preparation of the first European Defence Research & Technology Joint Investment Programme.

European Defence Equipment Market

2. In November last year the Steering Board agreed a Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, intended to introduce intra-European competition, on a voluntary and reciprocal basis, into most of those areas of defence procurement which traditionally have been handled on a national basis under Article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. Bringing the new regime into operation on 1 July required: development and agreement of an associated Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain (intended to drive the benefits of competition down to subcontractors, including small- and medium-sized enterprises); agreement on the necessary reporting and monitoring regime; and establishment on the Agency’s website of an Electronic Bulletin Board through which all new relevant contracting opportunities can be notified to suppliers across Europe.

3. All these steps were accomplished in time to allow the regime to come into operation as scheduled, with 22 of the 24 participating Member States (pMS) subscribing to the regime. The Electronic Bulletin Board now carries details of over 60 contracting opportunities, with an aggregate value which we estimate at over €3bn.

4. Subsequently, the 22 subscribing Member States arrived at mutual agreements on Security of Information, and Security of Supply in circumstances of operational urgency. These two agreements are important steps to facilitate the fair operation of a competitive
market within Europe, by addressing concerns which might have prompted discrimination against non-national suppliers. The agreement on Security of Supply is additionally an important step forward in terms of solidarity between the Member States involved, and supports the consensus on the need for less duplication, more specialisation and more interdependence in the European Defence Technological and Industrial base (EDTIB), as well as less dependence on non-European sources for key technologies. This consensus was captured in Steering Board agreement on a description of the characteristics of a strong EDTIB.

The Long-Term Vision

5. This 25-page document, endorsed by the Ministerial Steering Board on 3 October, is the distillation of a year-long effort by the Agency to identify and analyse the key trends shaping the future, and particularly the future nature of ESDP operations, for which we must prepare. The work was carried out in particularly close collaboration with the EU Military Committee and the Institute for Security Studies – but with help and assistance from a wide range of other experts and organisations from across Europe. The analysis has been widely praised – but its real value will be as a foundation upon which to build the Agency’s future agendas, and particularly an ESDP Capability Development Plan, as described below.

Defence Research & Technology

6. The Hampton Court impulse, the EDA’s first major conference, and two Ministerial Steering Board discussions in March and May, all helped forge the consensus that we are under-investing in Defence R&T in Europe, and need to find ways to ‘spend more, spend better, and spend more together’. Defence Ministers agreed that current levels of R&T investment, at less than 1.3% of overall EU defence spending, are simply inadequate if we are serious about maintaining a globally competitive defence technological and industrial base in Europe.

7. Intensive efforts have accordingly been made with pMS to develop a new ‘Joint Investment Programme’ initiative, intended to provide a more efficient alternative to the traditional project-by-project approach to R&T collaboration in Europe. The work has involved the design of the necessary ‘vehicle’ (the administrative, financial and managerial arrangements) and definition of the first ‘cargo’ to be carried in this vehicle (a programme of joint R&T work in the force protection area, systematically derived from analysis of agreed capability challenges).

8. I expect the Steering Board meeting of 13 November to launch this enterprise, with a majority of the Agency’s pMS contributing, and a pooled budget of over €50m.
Other positives

9. Beyond these three major developments, a series of other advances are worth noting:
   - promising capability development work in the Command, Control and Communication area, primarily concerning Software-Defined Radio and in-theatre exploitation of imagery for EU Battlegroups;
   - development of an interesting agenda in maritime surveillance;
   - launch of the first two feasibility studies into key technologies for future Armoured Fighting Vehicles;
   - emergence of a ‘cooperative mechanism’ to assist the pMS and industry in taking forward joint armament-related projects;
   - agreement of a Standardisation Policy to increase the transparency and commonality of standards used in defence;
   - conclusion of the Agency’s first Administrative Arrangement, with Norway;
   - final transfer of the portfolio of collaborative projects from the WEAO Research Cell, allowing that organisation to close (with savings to pMS concerned of over €2m per annum);
   - development in the Agency’s new CapTech networks of a further 20 new R&T ad hoc collaborations;
   - agreement of Agency standard framework conditions for such collaborations; and
   - collection, for the first time, of a comprehensive set of data on defence input and output of the pMS.

Some negatives

10. There have also been disappointments to set against these encouraging developments. Principally, we still lack evidence of real readiness on the part of pMS to take significant steps towards repairing the now familiar capability gaps in any early time-frame. Thus the Hampton Court-inspired efforts to progress Air-to-Air Refuelling and Strategic Lift made no real progress, in the absence of any sign of Member States’ preparedness to find ways to fund the significant investments that these capabilities will require.

11. Though the Agency will try to generate ideas and proposals in such areas, serious progress on repairing Europe’s capability shortfalls will require that pMS themselves bring their own inventiveness and energy to the endeavour. Certainly, realisation of the Agency’s full potential will require a degree of commitment and engagement by national staffs that is not yet always apparent. It may also require a shift of focus towards the medium-term, when convergence of national defence planning may be more easily achieved. The Capability Development Plan will be an important vehicle for that.
Looking ahead

12. As noted above, the Long-Term Vision now provides a foundation upon which more detailed work across the Agency’s different agendas can be taken forward. In particular, we can now address an ESDP Capability Development Plan (CDP). The CDP will provide a framework of agreed capability priorities well beyond the Headline Goal 2010 horizon, so that guidance is available for those who wish to use it. It must provide a way in which Ministers collectively can achieve a proper understanding of collective progress to providing ESDP with the tools it needs. It should facilitate continuation of pMS’ dialogue on defence planning and investment. And it must be a vehicle for providing mutual transparency amongst the Member States of what their medium- to long-term defence planning looks like, so that opportunities can be identified and pursued for joint investment and collaborative projects; for pooled acquisition of capabilities; for coherent role specialisation; or for anything else where the pooling of efforts and resources promises better value for money from constrained defence budgets. The Capabilities Steering Board will take this forward in December.

13. The EDTIB looks set to be another major theme for the year ahead. Building on the initial consensus achieved (para. 4 above) on the characteristics of a strong future EDTIB, we need to focus also on what it should contain (initially, through an analysis of what key technologies should be prioritised at the European level) – and to develop the strategies and policies needed to help the DTIB evolve in the right direction.

14. Linked to this will be work to define a European Defence R&T Strategy, covering both prioritisation of technologies and also systemic issues such as the role of competition, the exploitation of synergies with dual-use R&T, etc.

Conclusion

15. The Agency is now showing its worth, in relation both to short- and longer-term agendas. At this stage of the enterprise, it is perhaps not surprising that it seems easier for pMS to agree on policies and strategies than on pooling their efforts and resources. But the challenge now – and work on the CDP should help – is for pMS to follow through the logic of agreed assessments into how they actually choose to spend their national defence budgets. This will not happen overnight. But it is the only way in which our capability deficiencies will be met.
COUNCIL JOINT ACTION AMENDING AND EXTENDING JOINT ACTION 2005/889/CFSP ON ESTABLISHING A EUROPEAN UNION BORDER ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR THE RAFAH CROSSING POINT (EU BAM RAFAH)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,

Whereas:


(2) The Agreed Arrangement between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority specifies that the initial 12-month mandate of the mission may be renewable for a further period of six months unless all Parties agree to bring the Mission to a close.

(3) On 15 September 2006, the Council reiterated its continued commitment to the EU BAM Rafah.

(4) Both Palestinian and Israeli parties expressed their approval to the extension of EU BAM Rafah, in line with Article V of the Agreed Arrangement on the European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point on the Gaza-Egypt Border.

(5) Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP should be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

Article 1

Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. Article 3 shall be deleted;

2. Article 13(1) shall be replaced by the following:
   ‘1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mission shall be EUR 1 696 659 for 2005 and EUR 5 903 341 for the period from 1 January 2006 until 24 May 2007.’;

3. the second subparagraph of Article 16 shall be replaced by the following:
   ‘It shall expire on 24 May 2007.’;

4. Article 17 shall be replaced by the following:

   ‘Article 17

   This Joint Action shall be reviewed by 31 March 2007 at the latest.’

Article 2

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Article 3

This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 13 November 2006.

For the Council
The President
E. Tuomioja
TAMPERE CONCLUSIONS (EXTRACTS)

I. Political and security dialogue:

1. One year after the Barcelona Summit and eleven years after the Barcelona Declaration, the Foreign Ministers of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership meeting in Tampere, under the Presidency of H.E. Erkki Tuomioja Foreign Minister of Finland, considering the current challenges, reaffirm their commitment to the objective of achieving a common area of peace, stability and shared prosperity in the Mediterranean region.

   This objective requires a comprehensive approach to achieving peace, security and stability, strengthening democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and exclusion, including wider access to education and the strengthening of social security systems, and the promotion of greater dialogue and better understanding between cultures and peoples. Ministers express their renewed commitment to implement the Five-Year Work Programme adopted by the Heads of State and Government in November 2005.

2. Bearing in mind that the Barcelona Process is not intended to replace the other activities and initiatives undertaken in interests of peace, stability and development of the region, but that it will contribute to their success.

   Partners reaffirm their commitment to achieve a just, comprehensive and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict consistent with the terms of reference of the Madrid Conference and its principles, including land for peace and based on the relevant UNSC resolutions and the Road Map. Ministers take note of the importance of recent regional developments and initiatives. Partners also call for the reinvigoration of efforts to promote progress in the Middle East Peace Process on all its tracks.

   Ministers welcome the positive role played by the EU in the Middle East, particularly during the latest escalation in the region. They also encourage the parties to continue on the path of direct dialogue and negotiation in the fulfillment of the vision of two states, a safe and secure Israel and a viable, sovereign and democratic Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. Final status issues, including border issues, have to be agreed by the two parties.

3. Ministers reiterate their will to continue promoting dialogue and co-operation on political and security issues, conflict prevention, partnership building measures, crisis
management activities, as well as implementation of and compliance with the relevant existing international obligations under multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation agreements to which Euromed Partners are party. They also welcome the principle of organizing in 2007 an ESDP orientation course with the European Defence and Security College open to participation to Mediterranean countries willing to participate.

4. They emphasise the importance of co-ownership and co-responsibility of the Process, which remains the cornerstone of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. In this spirit, they agree to strengthen the Partnership and invite the Senior Officials to put forward recommendations to improve the working methods of the Barcelona Process by enhancing co-ownership, increasing efficiency and ensuring visibility. As a measure to reinforce the Partnership they agree to hold a regular Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at the end of each year. The Foreign Ministers’ Meetings will aim, inter alia, to agree on the priorities of the Euromed activities for the following year in the implementation of the 5-year Work Programme adopted by the 2005 Barcelona Summit. Futhermore, the Ministers note with appreciation the work of the Study Committee aiming at improving the working methods of the Barcelona Process. They also encouraged the Euromed Committee to achieve progress in this regard.

5. Ministers consider the European Neighbourhood Policy as an important tool which contributes to reinforcing and complementing the Barcelona Process through the implementation of the Association Agreements and the Action Plans. It further enhances relations between the EU and Mediterranean Partner Countries, promoting and supporting reform based on a common commitment to universal principles and shared values, in accordance with national priorities and building on their national reform programmes in political, economic, institutional and social sectors. In order to support the partner countries in the implementation of the Barcelona 5-year Work Programme, Association Agreements and Action Plans, and in coherence with other relevant development strategies, the Community will provide appropriate financial and technical assistance specially through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, which will succeed the MEDA-programme in 2007.

6. Ministers stress the importance, in accordance with their internationally agreed obligations, of strengthening democracy, political pluralism, expanding participation in political life, public affairs and decision making, and further strengthening the role of women in society, as well as enhancing respect and promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression. In this context, Ministers also stress the importance of promoting respect for all religions, other beliefs and cultures. They are also committed to maintaining and ensuring the independence of the judiciary and expand access to justice to all.
7. In this respect, the EU will establish a substantial financial Facility to support willing Mediterranean Partners in carrying out their reforms taking into account that successful reforms must develop from within the societies of the region.

8. Ministers recognize the importance of fostering the role of civil society in accordance with national legislation, as appropriate, and enhance its capability through improved interaction with governments and parliaments, including through the promotion of dialogue between Parliamentarians within the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, contacts between civil society associations, youth, trade unions, business and professional associations and cooperation between regional and local administrations.

9. Ministers take note of the contribution of the Civil Forum, which met in Marrakech on 4-7 November 2006, and look forward to further strengthening the ties with the non-governmental Euro-Mediterranean community in the spirit of deepening an open and mutually fruitful dialogue to the benefit of overall objectives of the Barcelona Process. They also welcome the continuing work of the Euro-Med and the Media initiative during 2006 as an added dimension to the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. They look forward to the further progress of this initiative in 2007.

10. Ministers, keeping in mind the importance of political and security cooperation, underline their support to the ongoing partnership building measures notably the EuroMed Malta seminars, the EuroMeSCo network of foreign policy institutes and the cooperation on civil protection in particular in the framework of the EuroMed Intermediate Bridge project. In this context, Ministers take note of the extension of activities under the current Euromed Bridge Programme on Civil Protection (March 2007 to March 2008). They welcome this regional programme as an important political measure to strengthen trustful relationships by promoting cooperation and interaction between regional and local authorities, civil population and civil society. Ministers take note with satisfaction of the preparatory work undertaken to establish a Long Term Programme aimed at fostering an effective, sustainable Euro-Mediterranean system for the mitigation, prevention and management of natural and man-made disasters, with a specific focus on sub-regional cooperation open to all interested parties.

11. At the Barcelona Summit, Euromed partners were committed to meet internationally agreed standards in the conduct of elections. They also agreed to discuss the possibility of developing, on a voluntary basis and upon request of the country concerned, joint co-operation and exchange of experience in the field of elections. In this context, Ministers mandated Euromed Senior officials to launch a discussion to take these issues forward.
II. Implementation of the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism:

12. Ministers reaffirm their commitment to fully implement the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism in order to enhance the security of all citizens within a framework that ensures respect of the rule of law and human rights, particularly through more effective counter-terrorism policies and deeper co-operation to dismantle all terrorist activities, to protect potential targets, to manage the consequences of attacks. They emphasize the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations without qualification, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes. In this context the Ministers welcome the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in September 2006. They also reiterate the complete rejection of attempts to associate any religion or culture with terrorism, and confirm their commitment to do their utmost effort with a view to resolving conflict, ending occupation, confronting oppression, reducing poverty, promoting human rights and good governance, improving intercultural understanding and ensuring respect for all religions and beliefs.

13. Implementing the Euromed Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism, Ministers agree to hold a Euro-Mediterranean Seminar in 2007 on the role of the media in preventing all forms of incitement to terrorism through effective and professional communication. Existing frameworks of dialogue and co-operation in this field, such as the ‘Euromed and the Media’ initiative, can be used as an input for the planned seminar. Ministers also stress the need of preventing the use of all means of communication, including the Internet, for terrorist purposes, without prejudice to freedom of expression.

14. In line with the shared value of the respect for Human rights and the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism, Ministers also agree to hold a regional Euro-Mediterranean Seminar in 2007 on ensuring respect for human rights in the fight against terrorism in accordance with international law aiming at reaching common ground for future cooperation in this field.

(...)
Energy Ministerial Conference in 2007 with the aim of agreeing on the priorities for energy cooperation in the period ahead.

22. In this context, Ministers emphasise the need to further reinforcing co-operation in securing energy supplies in the Euro-Mediterranean region. To this end, the Ministers emphasize the importance of examining means aiming at the diversification of energy resources, including renewable energy, as well as promoting energy efficiency and conservation measures, institutional capacity building, the development of new technologies, Research & Development activities and studying ways for enhancing the financing opportunities for energy projects of common interest in the Euro-Mediterranean region, including the participation of private finances, and promoting well functioning markets and stable legal conditions for investments.

23. Ministers endorse the results of the first Euro-Mediterranean Transport Ministerial conference that took place in Marrakech in December 2005 and take note of the priorities agreed by the Ministers that are based on the Blue Paper on Transport in the Mediterranean Region and on the Final Report of the High Level Group on the extension of the Trans-European Transport Priority Axes to neighbouring countries. They also welcome its recommendation to hold in the coming months of the Euro-Mediterranean Transport Forum with a view to adopting a Regional Transport Action Plan for the next five years.

24. Ministers encourage the Partners to cooperate on issues relating both to energy security and to the prevention of global warming through, inter alia, broad based collaboration on developing advanced scientific and technological solutions.

(...)

IX. Dialogue between cultures:

36. Ministers underline the need to further strengthen the intercultural dialogue, including through the work of the Euro-Mediterranean Anna Lindh Foundation for dialogue between cultures and through the development of the Cultural Heritage programme. They agree to intensify efforts by launching a series of initiatives for combating discrimination, racism and xenophobia, as well as rejecting extremist views, preventing all forms of incitement to hatred, violence and terrorism, which divide peoples across the Mediterranean. They also undertake to promote the culture of dialogue, ensuring a better knowledge, mutual understanding, freedom and respect for all religions, other beliefs and cultures among Euro-Mediterranean peoples, embracing their cultural diversity. The 35 networks of the ALF (which now include more than 1000 organisations) and the Euromed Heritage Programme should play an important role in this regard.
37. Ministers take note of the ideas/proposals put forward at the meeting of Heads of Networks. The ALF is invited to contribute in the preparations of the ‘2008 EU Year of Intercultural Dialogue’. Ministers invite Euromed Ministers of Culture to hold a meeting in Greece, to discuss the Barcelona Process intercultural agenda, examine the results of the first 3 years of the Anna Lindh Foundation as well as the possibility of creating synergy with other initiatives such as the follow-up to the adoption of the UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions and the UN Alliance of Civilisations. Furthermore, Ministers invite Euromed Partners to reflect on the possible creation of a Euromed Youth Parliament, which could hold its first meeting in 2007. Ministers also take note of the designation of Algiers as the capital of Arab culture in 2007.

38. Ministers also give their support to the need to strengthen youth exchanges, e.g. the launching of a scholarship scheme for the academic year 2007-2008, as a valuable tool to realise these objectives as well as to the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue to take place in 2008. It is most beneficial for mutual understanding that such exchanges take place between all Euromed countries.

39. Ministers also take note of the Alliance of Civilisations initiative co-sponsored by Turkey and Spain and of the report issued by the High-Level Group on the Alliance of Civilisations on 13th November 2006 to the Secretary General of the UN.

40. Euromed and the Media initiative will continue its work in exploring ways of, inter alia, enhancing the role of the media for the development of intercultural dialogue. To this end the task force will meet again in 2007 to analyse the work done in the national media consultations. They will prepare practical proposals on this subject, and others in the fields of assisting independent information providers and increasing access and quality of information for Euromed citizens. These results will be presented and discussed at the Senior Officials level in preparation to a Euromed conference on the media in 2007.

X. Migration, social integration, justice and security:

41. Ministers underline the need to strengthen the management of migratory flows in a comprehensive and balanced manner beneficial to the peoples in the whole Mediterranean region while respecting migrants’ rights, and to intensify cooperation on all aspects of migration between all parties concerned, including the fight against trafficking in human beings and negotiations of different kinds of readmission agreements. In a spirit of partnership and on the basis of the Barcelona 5-year Work Programme the Ministers stress the need to increase cooperation in the fields of legal migration, migration and development, and illegal migration. The Ministers take note of the work of the FRONTEX agency.
42. Ministers welcome Euromed Partners’ contribution to the preparatory work of the Euromed Ministerial meeting on migration due to take place in 2007 in coordination with the Commission, aiming at agreeing on a series of further measures to promote cooperation on all issues pertinent to migration. In this context, an overview of existing bilateral and Community funded projects in the areas of migration and development, legal and illegal migration have been compiled on the basis of information provided by all Partners. Ministers also take note of the contributions from other international initiatives such as the EU-Africa Ministerial meeting on Migration and Development held in Tripoli on 22-23 November, as well as the Rabat Euro-African Ministerial meeting on migration. They also remind of the need to develop cooperation in social integration, justice and security issues as agreed at the Barcelona Summit.

43. Expressing their renewed commitment to implement the 5-year work programme adopted by the Heads of State and Government in November 2005, Ministers commit to work towards the objectives contained in these Ministerial conclusions.

Summary of initiatives for 2007

- Orientation course on ESDP of the European Defence and Security College open to Mediterranean countries willing to participate.
- Euromed Senior officials will launch a discussion on joint cooperation, best practices and exchange of experience in the area of elections in order to take these issues forward.
- Euro-Mediterranean Seminar on the role of the media in preventing all forms of incitement to terrorism through effective and professional communication.
- Euro-Mediterranean Seminar on ensuring respect for human rights in the fight against terrorism in accordance with international law.
- Pursue negotiations on the progressive liberalisation of trade in services and the right of establishment, progressive liberalisation of trade in agriculture, processed agricultural and fisheries products, the establishment of a dispute-settlement mechanism. Invite Euro-Mediterranean Trade Ministers to envisage a Ministerial meeting in the second half of the year.
- Programmes and activities conducted in the EU to promote innovation to the participation of Mediterranean partners and start technical assistance in order to accelerate reforms and regulatory convergence with particular emphasis on the approximation of technical legislation.
- First meeting of the Investment ad hoc group during the first half of the year.
- Euro-Med ECOFIN/FEMIP Ministerial meeting is planned for May 2007 in Cyprus.
- Euro-Mediterranean Energy Conference.
 Euro-Mediterranean Transport Forum and its working groups.
 The implementation of the Horizon 2020 initiative for the de-pollution of the Mediterranean. A steering group will be established to coordinate the Horizon 2020 initiative.
 Euromed workshop on employment policy.
 Euromed workshop on surveillance, control of communicable diseases and health systems.
 A Euromed ad hoc meeting at expert Senior Officials level on the role of women in society.
 The Anna Lindh Foundation will launch a series of visible initiatives.
 First meeting of the Euromed Youth Parliament.
 Euro-Mediterranean conference to discuss proposals from ‘Euromed and the Media’ initiative.
 Euromed Ministerial meeting on migration.

(...)
EUMM – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 30 November 2006

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION EXTENDING AND AMENDING THE MANDATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION MONITORING MISSION (EUMM)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) On 25 November 2002, the Council adopted Joint Action 2002/921/CFSP extending the mandate of the European Union Monitoring Mission (1) (‘the EUMM’).

(2) On 21 November 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/807/CFSP (2) extending the mandate of the EUMM until 31 December 2006.

(3) The EUMM should continue its activities in the Western Balkans in the support of the European Union’s policy towards that region, with the principal focus on political and security developments in Kosovo and Serbia, and neighbouring areas that might be affected by any adverse developments in Kosovo.

(4) The EUMM presence in Albania should end by the end of 2006.

(5) The presence of the EUMM in Montenegro should be reduced to 2 monitors by the end of 2006 and its presence in Montenegro should end by mid 2007.

(6) The entire EUMM should close down by the end of 2007, and the Council Secretariat should present a full report on the implementation of the EUMM exit strategy by mid 2007.

(7) The mandate of the EUMM should therefore be extended and amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

Article 1

The mandate of the EUMM, as set out in Joint Action 2002/921/CFSP, is hereby extended until 31 December 2007.

Article 2

Joint Action 2002/921/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. Article 2(2)(a) shall be replaced by the following:
   ‘(a) monitor political and security developments in the area of its responsibility, with a particular focus on Kosovo and Serbia, and neighbouring regions that might be affected by any adverse developments in Kosovo’.

2. Article 3(3) shall be replaced by the following:
   ‘3. The Secretary-General/High Representative shall ensure that the EUMM functions flexibly and in a streamlined manner. In that context, he shall regularly re-examine the functions and the geographical territory covered by the EUMM so as to continue to adapt the internal organization of the EUMM to the priorities of the Union in the Western Balkans. The Commission shall be fully associated. In view of the agreed closure of the entire EUMM by the end of 2007, a full report on the implementation of the EUMM exit strategy shall be presented by mid 2007.’.

3. The second paragraph of Article 8 shall be replaced by the following:
   ‘It shall apply until 31 December 2007.’.

Article 3

The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the EUMM between 1 January 2007 and 31 December 2007 shall be EUR 2 318 000. This amount shall also cover expenditure relating to the closing-down of the EUMM.

Article 4

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
Article 5

This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 30 November 2006.

For the Council
The President
L. Hyssälä

CORRIGENDUM TO COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2006/867/CFSP OF 30 NOVEMBER 2006 EXTENDING AND AMENDING THE MANDATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION MONITORING MISSION (EUMM)

On page 48:

for: ‘Article 3

The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the EUMM between 1 January 2007 and 31 December 2007 shall be EUR 2,318,000. This amount shall also cover expenditure relating to the closing-down of the EUMM.’,

read: ‘Article 3

The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the EUMM between 1 January 2007 and 31 December 2007 shall be EUR 3,863,583. This amount shall also cover expenditure relating to the closing-down of the EUMM.’
EUPOL Kinshasa – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 7 December 2006

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION AMENDING AND EXTENDING JOINT ACTION 2004/847/CFSP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICE MISSION IN KINSHASA (DRC) REGARDING THE INTEGRATED POLICE UNIT (EUPOL ‘KINSHASA’) – EXTENSION INTO 2007

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and, in particular Article 14 and Article 25, third subparagraph, thereof,

Whereas:


(2) By Joint Action 2005/822/CFSP of 21 November 2005 (2), the Council amended and extended the mandate of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ for a first phase until 30 April 2006. By Joint Action 2006/300/CFSP of 21 April 2006, the Council amended and extended the mandate of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ until 31 December 2006 (3), which notably provided for a temporary reinforcement of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ during the electoral process in the DRC.


(4) The overall mandate of EUPOL ‘Kinshasa’ should be adapted and extended for a further period of six months, and the temporary reinforcement should be extended for a further period of three months.

(5) This Joint Action should be revised, if necessary, once the Council has decided on future EU actions in the field of Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

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(2) OJ L 305, 24.11.2005, p. 44.
HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

Article 1

Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. Article 1(3) shall be replaced by the following:

   '3. EUPOL "Kinshasa" shall be temporarily reinforced during the electoral process and in the immediate period thereafter in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in accordance with the provisions set out in Article 3. This reinforcement shall end on 31 March 2007 at the latest.'.

2. Article 3 shall be replaced by the following:

   'Article 3

   Mission Statement

   The European Union shall conduct a police mission in Kinshasa (DRC) in order to monitor, mentor and advise the setting up and the initial running of the IPU in order to ensure that the IPU acts following the training received in the Academy Centre and according to international best practices in this field. These actions shall be focused on the IPU chain of command to enhance the management capability of the IPU and to monitor, mentor and advise the operational Units in the execution of its tasks.

   EUPOL "Kinshasa" shall continue to monitor, mentor and advise on the development of the IPU, and shall help ensure the proper integration of the IPU in the National Congolese Police (PNC). EUPOL "Kinshasa" shall also strengthen its advising capacity to the Congolese police with a view to facilitating the Security Sector Reform process in the DRC together with EUSEC RD CONGO.

   For the purposes of the temporary reinforcement of EUPOL "Kinshasa" during the electoral process, EUPOL "Kinshasa" shall establish, as an integral part of EUPOL "Kinshasa" and under the overall security framework for the elections, a police coordination support element in order to ensure an enhanced and coordinated response of the PNC crowd control units in Kinshasa, in case of disturbances during the electoral period, with particular focus on the election of the of the DRC president. The area of responsibility shall be limited to Kinshasa. The police coordination support element, as part of EUPOL "Kinshasa", shall not have executive powers.

   For the purpose of the temporary reinforcement of EUPOL "Kinshasa" during the electoral process, EUPOL "Kinshasa" shall be authorised to use dedicated bilateral financial contributions in order to procure additional equipment for PNC crowd control units in Kinshasa.'.
3. Article 4 shall be replaced by the following:

'Article 4

Structure of the Mission
The Mission will be composed of a Headquarter (HQ) and police monitors. The HQ will consist of the office of the Head of the Mission and an administration support branch. All IPU monitors, mentors and advisors, as well as the trainers, will be co-located in the IPU operational base.

For the purposes of the temporary reinforcement of EUPOL "Kinshasa" during the electoral process, EUPOL "Kinshasa" will include a dedicated coordination element in charge of the specific tasks assigned to the mission during this period'.

4. In Article 14 subparagraph two shall be replaced by the following:

'It shall expire on 30 June 2007'.

Article 2

The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to the mission for the period from 1 January 2007 until 30 June 2007 shall be a maximum amount of EUR 2 075 000.

Article 3

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Article 4

This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 7 December 2006.

For the Council
The President
E. Tuomioja
ENLARGEMENT – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

“Bulgaria and Romania

The Council looks forward to welcoming Bulgaria and Romania as Member States on 1 January 2007 and notes with satisfaction that the process of ratification of the Accession Treaty is close to completion. In line with the Council conclusions on Bulgaria and Romania of 16-17 October 2006, the Union institutions will cooperate with both member countries and verify progress in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime after accession. This and other accompanying measures will ensure that Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession to the European Union will be a success.

Turkey

The Council takes note of the Commission’s report of 8 November 2006 and welcomes the findings and recommendations contained therein.

Council welcomes the continued progress made by Turkey in the reform process, but regrets that the pace of reforms has slowed down in 2006. It is essential that Turkey undertakes determined efforts to intensify the reform process and to implement it with determination, so as to ensure its irreversibility and sustainability. The substantial and technical preparation of the negotiations have progressed well. The Council recalls that, in line with the Negotiating Framework, the advancement of the accession negotiations continues to be guided by Turkey’s progress in preparing for accession. In this context the Council notes that further significant efforts are required to strengthen freedom of expression, freedom of religion, women’s rights, minority rights, trade union rights and civilian control of the military. In line with the Negotiating Framework, Turkey also needs to commit to good neighbourly relations and to the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, including, if necessary, jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

The Council recalls the declaration of the European Community and its Member States of 21 September 2005 and notes that Turkey has not fulfilled its obligation of full non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement.
The Council welcomes the Commission’s recommendation of 29 November. In this context the Council agrees that the Member States within the Intergovernmental Conference will not decide on opening chapters covering policy areas relevant to Turkey’s restrictions as regards the Republic of Cyprus until the Commission verifies that Turkey has fulfilled its commitments related to the Additional Protocol.

These chapters are: Chapter 1: free movement of goods, Chapter 3: right of establishment and freedom to provide service, Chapter 9: financial services, Chapter 11: agriculture and rural development, Chapter 13: fisheries, Chapter 14: transport policy, Chapter 29: customs union and Chapter 30: external relations.

The Council agrees that the Member States within the Intergovernmental Conference will not decide on provisionally closing chapters until the Commission verifies that Turkey has fulfilled its commitments related to the Additional Protocol.

The Council will follow up and review progress made on the issues covered by the declaration of 21 September 2005. The Council invites the Commission to report on this in its forthcoming annual reports, in particular in 2007, 2008 and 2009, as appropriate.

The Council emphasises that the screening process will now continue and chapters for which technical preparations have been completed will be opened in accordance with established procedures, in line with the Negotiating Framework.

The Council looks forward to speedy progress on these issues.

Croatia

The Council takes note of the Commission’s report of 8 November 2006 and welcomes the findings and recommendations contained therein.

The Council commends Croatia for the progress it has made in the past year. The accession negotiations have begun well and first results have been obtained. Croatia is now required to build on the progress made. The Council recalls that, in line with the Negotiating Framework, the advancement of the accession negotiations continues to be guided by Croatia’s progress in preparing for accession. Particular attention should be paid to accelerating the pace of reforms in the areas of judicial and public administration reform, the fight against corruption, and economic reform. Rigorous implementation of Croatia’s obligations under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, in particular in the areas of state aid and real estate acquisition, will be essential to maintain Croatia’s positive momentum on the path to EU membership. The Council welcomes Croatia’s full cooperation with ICTY and emphasises that Croatia needs to maintain it. Croatia also needs to pay due attention to good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation, including making the necessary efforts towards finding solutions to outstanding bilateral issues, in particular border disputes”.

(…)

Croatia
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Bosnia and Herzegovina – Operation ALTHEA – Council conclusions

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

“The Council reviewed Operation ALTHEA and welcomed the positive contribution of the operation to the safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The Council approved the SG/HR’s recommendations for Operation ALTHEA in the light of the advice received from relevant Council bodies and underlined the continued need for an EU military presence to provide reassurance and to react to any possible security challenges.

The security situation in BiH has evolved enough to permit the Council to decide in principle on a transition of Operation ALTHEA. The implementation should go ahead in accordance with the agreed concept for transition, subject to a definitive decision (revised OPLAN) by the Political and Security Committee set to be taken by the end of February 2007, taking into account the security situation in the country as well as the impact on that, of the regional security situation.

The decision to proceed to the subsequent steps of the transition will be taken by the Council in due time.

The EU remains committed to BiH and through its military presence will continue to contribute to the maintenance of the safe and secure environment.

The Council noted that cooperation with NATO continues to work well in respect of Operation ALTHEA, in Brussels as well as in BiH, in the context of the “Berlin Plus” arrangements.”

EU crisis management operation in Kosovo

The Council adopted a joint action amending and extending the mandate of the EU planning team in Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) as regards a possible EU crisis management operation there (14875/06).

The joint action extends the EUPT Kosovo mandate until 31 May 2007, or until the launching of an EU crisis management operation, whichever occurs earlier. It also adapts the mandate in order to take forward the planning process and to take action to ensure a smooth transition between selected tasks of the United Nations interim administration mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the possible EU operation relating to the rule of law and other areas that might be identified by the Council in the context of the Kosovo status process.

The financial allocation for the extension of the action amounts to EUR 10.5 million, in addition to EUR 3 million already committed for the initial phase of the establishment of EUPT Kosovo from 10 April to 31 December 2006.
The Council established EUPT Kosovo last April by means of joint action 2006/304/CFSP (see press release 7938/1/06, page 12).

Civilian headline goal 2008

The Council approved a civilian capabilities improvement plan, covering the civilian headline goal process in 2007.

On 13 November, ministers of foreign affairs meeting within a civilian capabilities improvement conference adopted a ministerial declaration. Its annex contained elements of a civilian capability improvement plan (14981/06).

(...)

EU-CHINA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP – COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

“1. The Council is strongly committed to the maturing of the EU’s comprehensive strategic partnership with China. For this partnership to develop to its full potential, it must be balanced, reciprocal and mutually beneficial. The partnership is increasingly focused on addressing global challenges, and China plays a key role in the effective international response to these issues. The EU and China have important international commitments and responsibilities, and must both work hard to deliver them, in the interest of wider international security and stability and to strengthen an effective, fair, just and rules-based multilateral international system, with the United Nations at its centre.

2. The Council welcomes the Commission communication “EU-China: closer partners, growing responsibilities” and the Commission working paper “Competition and Partnership” and broadly endorses their recommendations. They are an important contribution to the continuing development of an integrated and coherent EU policy towards China, confirming that the EU should actively support China’s emergence as a successful and responsible member of the international community. Taken together, these conclusions, the communication and the working paper constitute a comprehensive review and restatement of EU policy towards China. The Council also welcomes the Commission’s communication on Hong Kong and Macao.

3. The Council welcomes the agreement in September 2006 to launch negotiations on a single and over-arching Partnership and Co-operation Agreement as the practical basis for the comprehensive strategic partnership. This agreement must encompass
the full scope of the bilateral relationship, including further strengthening of coopera-
tion in political, trade and investment issues, and should be forward-looking and
reflect priorities outlined in both these conclusions and the communication. The
Council looks forward to the timely conclusion of negotiations of the new comprehen-
sive agreement.

4. The Council reaffirms the great value provided by ongoing dialogue with China at
many levels, covering an increasing range of bilateral and international issues, and
endorses the recommendation that the Member States and the Commission take stock
of existing sectoral dialogues. Dialogues must be focused and deliver practical results,
with bench-mark setting and with follow-up mechanisms.

5. The Council expresses its appreciation for China’s constructive role in regional
security and dialogue organisations, as well as its increasing commitments to UN peace-
keeping operations. The Council also appreciates the positive role assumed by China on
the DPRK nuclear issue, especially China’s instrumental role in the resumption of the
Six-Party Talks. It welcomes the association of China to the diplomatic efforts initiated
by the EU to resolve the nuclear issue in Iran.

6. The Council reaffirms the EU’s significant interest and stake in East Asian stability,
security and prosperity. It encourages regional dialogue, cooperation and integration in
East Asia as conducive to stability and prosperity, as well as further steps towards resolu-
tion of the territorial disputes remaining in the region. The Council also welcomes steps
taken to lower military and security tensions in East Asia and believes that further secu-
ity-related confidence building measures might include greater transparency in equip-
ment development and acquisition, doctrine and planning and wider participation
in/observation of military exercises. The Council welcomes deepening dialogue and co-
operation with China aimed at supporting stability in East Asia including through mul-
tilateral arrangements like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Europe
Meeting (ASEM), including China’s role as the host of ASEM7 Summit.

7. The Council notes the importance of China as an emerging donor, and of its inte-
gration into the international donor community and underlines the need for coordi-
nated action to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and to implement the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and other relevant multilateral agreements.

8. The Council intends to begin as soon as possible the structured dialogue on Africa
with China as agreed at the September 2006 Summit. This is an area of key strategic inter-
est to both the EU and China, demonstrated by the EU’s strategy on Africa and the China-
Africa Cooperation Forum in Beijing in November 2006. In support of our common inter-
est and Africa’s own commitment to poverty reduction and sustainable development
underpinned by peace and security, human rights, good governance, democracy and sound economic management, the EU looks forward to increased cooperation together with China to create new positive realities on the ground. This means working closely with African partners on the basis of national poverty reduction strategies and in accordance with the African Union and New Partnership for Africa’s Development principles.

9. Energy security, climate change and protection of environment are top priorities for the EU in achieving sustainable development and are key elements in its relations with China. Collaboration on energy security should be intensified, with a view to creating a stable, secure, efficient and clean energy environment and to promoting open and competitive energy markets. The EU attaches the highest importance to its climate change partnership with China, which should develop its full potential based on the work plan agreed on 19 October 2006. The EU looks forward, in particular, to speeding up cooperation with China on Near Zero-Emissions Coal technology and is committed to intensifying cooperation on other environmental issues, including international cooperation to address illegal logging. China and the EU should also collaborate as closely as possible on multilateral climate change issues, in particular on the further development of the multilateral climate change regime ensuring a broad participation of countries, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. The EU also looks forward, as part of UN reform, to continue constructive discussions with China in the process to reinforce international environmental governance, including the possible transformation of UNEP into a UN agency for the environment.

10. The Council recognizes the Chinese government’s success in developing the economy and reducing poverty substantially. Noting the important proposals made by the Chinese Government to advance the concept of “harmonious society” and balanced social development, the Council will continue to encourage and support China’s internal political and economic reform process. The EU will strengthen cooperation to support social rights, corporate social responsibility and sustainable development including through sustainable production and consumption patterns and more efficient use of natural resources. The EU will also help China to implement its international commitments, including to the ILO and under the Kyoto Protocol. The EU will work with China to combat corruption and transnational crime. Furthermore, the EU encourages China to ratify the UNESCO convention on the Protection and Promotion of Diversity of Cultural Expressions. The EU is convinced of the importance of civil society and its freedom of action to the development of China and will continue to provide support to this important sector.

11. The Council reaffirms the high importance the EU attaches to its exchanges with China on human rights, including through the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue. The
Council welcomes progress made by China in giving effect to the economic rights of its citizens and the commitment made to reform its criminal justice system. It also appreciates the commitment made by China to fulfil international human rights obligations and to cooperate with UN human rights mechanisms, in particular the UN Human Rights Council. The Council looks forward to strengthened communication and coordination with China within the UN Human Rights Council, with a view to supporting its work. However, the Council continues to have serious concerns about the human rights situation in China and deeply regrets the fact that there has been little progress in a number of areas. The EU urges China to release political prisoners, ensure fair trial provisions, to reform the administrative detention system, to lift severe restrictions on freedom of expression, association and religion as well as on access to information, to respect the rights of persons belonging to the Tibetan, Uighur and other minorities. The EU welcomes proposals to improve judicial oversight of death penalty cases but continues to be concerned about widespread application of the death penalty. The EU urges China to enact its commitment to ratify the ICCPR and accede to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court at the earliest possible opportunity. The EU will continue to monitor the human rights situation in China and to work with China for positive change through continued and improved dialogue and cooperation. To further strengthen this dialogue, the EU Member States confirm their willingness to share with China their experiences in relation to promoting and protecting human rights.

12. The Council remains committed to its One China policy. The Council is convinced that stability across the Taiwan Straits is integral to the stability and prosperity of East Asia and the wider international community. The Council welcomes initiatives by both sides aimed at promoting dialogue, practical cooperation and increased confidence building, including agreement on direct cross-strait flights and reductions in barriers to trade, investment and people-to-people contacts. The Council encourages both sides to continue with such steps, to avoid provocation, and to take all possible measures to resolve differences peacefully through negotiations between all stakeholders concerned. The Council encourages both sides to jointly pursue pragmatic solutions related to expert participation in technical work in specialised multilateral fora.


14. The Council welcomes ongoing and increasingly close cooperation and coordination with China on non-proliferation, on the basis of the EU-China Joint Declaration on non-proliferation and arms control agreed at the 2004 EU-China Summit. The Council also appreciates China’s ongoing commitment to fighting terrorism, and China’s public commitment to respecting, in its counter-terrorism actions, the purpose and principles of the United Nations Charter and the norms of international law, in particular interna-
tional human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law. The Council reaffirms its willingness to enhance cooperation with China to promote effective implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted by consensus by the UNGA in September 2006.

15. The Council welcomes the Commission’s approach to trade and economic relations with China as set out in the Communication and the Working Paper. The Council supports the Commission’s strategy of developing the relationship on the basis of open markets, fair competition and compliance with rules. The Council welcomes the fact that the strategy takes into account the different aspects of the relationship, including not only the balance of trade, or exchange rates, but also the comparative advantages available to each side, and social and environmental costs and benefits.

16. The Council acknowledges that trade and economic relations are an increasingly important element of the larger relationship between the EU and China and bring benefit to both. The extraordinary growth of Chinese exports, imports and investments of the past few years is most likely to continue for the foreseeable future. This is a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge for the Union, and also for China, is to manage and deepen the relationship in a sustainable, predictable and balanced way. This is best achieved in partnership, through cooperation, common rules and mutual agreements. The Council emphasises that, building on achievements in the WTO, and in order to remove obstacles to trade and investment, further work on a comprehensive agreement should include ambitious liberalisation of investment and government procurement, facilitation of trade, strong rules on intellectual property, binding commitments to remove technical, sanitary and phytosanitary barriers to trade and the effective protection of geographical indications.

17. The Council reiterates that the rights and obligations of the WTO remain the cornerstone of the EU-China trade relationship. The WTO framework remains the basis for the development of bilateral relations and for solving disputes. Likewise, it is important for China to continue to be engaged in the WTO, implementing fully its obligations and strengthening its support for the multilateral trading system including the Doha Development Agenda, contributing in line with the undoubted benefits it derives from world trade.

18. The Council supports a strong and ambitious European trade policy which will benefit both the EU and China. The Council underlines the need for reciprocity in the EU-China trade and investment relationship. The answer to growing competition with China cannot be to protect the EU from fair competition. Instead the EU should continue to pursue an active policy of openness at home while demanding a similar effort from China. The Council acknowledges that while Chinese access to European markets
increases economic growth for both parties, it also brings the need for special attention to help European citizens and business to adapt to these changes. This makes it all the more urgent to make further progress on the Lisbon reform agenda and to pursue the right competitiveness and adjustment policies at home.

19. The Council underlines that reciprocity needs to be achieved by addressing technical, sanitary, phytosanitary, legal and administrative barriers to trade, by addressing non-tariff barriers, notably in goods, services, investment and government procurement. The Council emphasises the importance of actively promoting international environmental, social and safety standards and sustainable development. The Council shares the view that for European access to the Chinese market to be effective, the EU must tackle a wide range of issues, from ensuring sustainable and secure supply of raw materials and energy to distorting subsidies, from lack of access to Chinese government procurement to transparency and the concrete implementation of regulations, from discriminatory industrial policies to the adoption of international standards.

20. The Council emphasises that effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights is an important priority for enabling fair competition in open markets that need protection against piracy and counterfeiting. In current conditions where innovation is a key factor in the success of new business, violations of intellectual property rights, non-payment of royalties and forced technology transfers deprive European as well as Chinese innovators of their rewards for investment and risk-taking.

21. The Council considers that concrete actions on the ground can also help create opportunities for European exporters. Trade policy should not only address trade barriers but also be broadly based and look at the whole operating environment in which European companies operate in China. In this respect the Council takes note of the Commission’s aim of providing advice to European enterprises, in particular small and medium sized enterprises, regarding in particular intellectual property rights.

22. The Council reconfirms that facilitating people-to-people exchange, inter alia through tourism, is a priority in EU-China relations. The Council welcomes progress in the implementation of the tourism agreement (Approved Destination Status, ADS) and encourages the further intensification of cooperation at the appropriate levels. At the same time, combating illegal migration, including human trafficking, remains an EU priority. The Council emphasises the importance of progress on the readmission negotiations between the EU and China, as well as concrete cooperation on readmission, which would contribute to continued dialogue with China on visa facilitation.

23. The Council endorses the recommendations of the Commission regarding the importance of greater expertise and knowledge of China in the EU, inter alia to enable
better policy formulation and decision-making. The Council also encourages greater people-to-people links and supports efforts to give greater visibility in China to EU policies and activity.”

(...)
6. Reconstruction and development assistance will remain an important element of EU support to Afghanistan with the aim of fostering tangible improvements for the Afghan people in their everyday lives and contributing to stability and security in the country. The Council welcomes the Commission’s intention to continue support for rural development, the health sector and the Afghan National Police through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) by building on the current programme of assistance. Monitoring of ongoing programmes should enable the incorporation of lessons learnt into future projects. Progress with the reconstruction process in Afghanistan will also require flexibility in implementing assistance programmes. In coordination with other international actors, the EU should improve the impact of its assistance, through greater coordination, flexibility, coherence and more vigilant monitoring and ensure that assistance reaches all parts of the country.

7. The Council underlines the importance of increasing EU engagement in the rule of law sector. Progress on the rule of law, including police and justice both at central and at provincial level, is essential to the security and long term stability of Afghanistan. The Council notes that a Fact-Finding Mission is currently in Afghanistan to examine the opportunities and conditions for a potential civilian ESDP mission in the field of policing with linkages to the wider rule of law. The Council looks forward to considering options for the future of the overall EU engagement, taking into account the mission’s findings.

8. The Council welcomes the Commission’s intention to increase contributions for justice reform and local governance under the planned Country Strategy for 2007 – 2013. The Provincial Reconstruction Facility in support of provincial governance will be launched in early 2007. It will provide funding for some civilian activities conducted by Member States, such as governance and small scale infrastructure, through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) led by or with substantial assets from EU Member States. It should provide a valuable contribution to the stabilization of Afghanistan, in particular at provincial level.

9. All EU efforts need to take place within an integrated and comprehensive approach. A stronger focus on governance and the rule of law should complement and reinforce action in other inter-linked areas, such as security-sector reform, human rights and democratisation, anti-corruption, counter-narcotics, rural development, budget support for the Afghan State and support for regional cooperation.

10. The EU encourages the development of regional cooperation through political dialogue, increased economic links and confidence-building measures between
Afghanistan and all its neighbours, including Central Asian States. The EU calls on Afghanistan and Pakistan to deepen relations and to cooperate closely to deal with insecurity in border areas, while urging Pakistan to build on current efforts to prevent the use of its territory by the Taliban.

11. The EU will continue to support the central role of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in coordinating donors’ civilian efforts and will, together with UNAMA, NATO and other key actors, including the international financial institutions, work towards effective cooperation and coordination within the international community and with the Government of Afghanistan. In this context the Council underlines the importance of an effective and well functioning Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). The Council follows with interest the idea of creating a Contact Group.

12. The EU will work to enhance internal coordination on the strategic objectives of its engagement, including on new initiatives, with a view to strengthening the coherence, synergy and visibility of increased EU engagement in Afghanistan. The Council stressed the importance of close coordination between the EU Special Representative (EUSR), the European Commission and the Member States on the ground and supported a strengthened role for the EUSR.

13. The Council will regularly review the implementation of EU policy towards Afghanistan.”

(...)
EUPT Kosovo – Council Joint Action

Brussels, 11 December 2006

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION AMENDING AND EXTENDING JOINT ACTION 2006/304/CFSP ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EU PLANNING TEAM (EUPT KOSOVO) REGARDING A POSSIBLE EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF RULE OF LAW AND POSSIBLE OTHER AREAS IN KOSOVO

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 14 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) On 10 April 2006 the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/304/CFSP(1) establishing an EU Planning Team (EUPT Kosovo) regarding a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and possible other areas in Kosovo. This Joint Action expires on 31 December 2006.

(2) On 11 October 2006 the Political and Security Committee recommended that EUPT Kosovo be extended and agreed that the mandate of EUPT Kosovo should be adapted.

(3) Joint Action 2006/304/CFSP should be extended and amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS JOINT ACTION:

Article 1

Joint Action 2006/304/CFSP is hereby amended as follows:

1. In Article 1(2), the first indent shall be replaced by the following:

‘ – to take forward planning and take action to ensure a smooth transition between selected tasks of UNMIK and a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of

the rule of law and other areas that might be identified by the Council in the context of
the future status process;’.

2. Article 2(5) shall be replaced by the following:
‘5. Identifying the needs of the possible future EU crisis management operation regard-
ing its required means of support, including all equipment, services and premises and
drawing up related terms of reference or technical specifications. Proposing actions to
procure the required equipment, services and premises and conclude those actions, tak-
ing into account the possibility to take over suitable equipment, premises and material
from available sources, including UNMIK, where relevant, feasible and cost efficient.
Launching tender procedures and awarding contracts shall be done where appropriate
under suspensive clause and/or framework contracts. Recruiting personnel that would
constitute the core of the possible future ESDP crisis management operation, in view of
its rapid deployment. Issuing a deployment plan for the future possible EU crisis man-
agement operation.’

3. Article 4(7) shall be deleted.

4. Article 9(1) shall be replaced by the following:
‘1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUPT
Kosovo from 10 April 2006 to 31 December 2006 shall be EUR 3 005 000.
The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUPT
Kosovo from 1 January 2007 to 31 May 2007 shall be EUR 10 545 000.’

5. The following paragraph shall be added to Article 9:
‘6. In duly substantiated exceptional cases, notably in relation with suppliers offering
particularly advantageous terms, the Commission may grant exceptions to the rules of
origin applicable to procurement.’

6. Article 14 shall be replaced by the following:

‘Article 14

Review
By 15 April 2007 the Council shall evaluate whether EUPT Kosovo should be continued
after 31 May 2007, taking into account the necessity of a smooth transition to a possible
EU crisis management operation in Kosovo.’

7. Article 15(2) shall be replaced by the following:
‘2. It shall expire on 31 May 2007 or on the date of the launching of the EU crisis man-
agement operation, whichever is earlier.’
Article 2

This Joint Action shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Article 3

This Joint Action shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 11 December 2006.

For the Council
The President
E. Tuomioja
European Council

Brussels, 14-15 December 2006

PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS

(...)

2. The European Council warmly welcomes Bulgaria and Romania as members of the European Union on 1 January 2007. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania will mark the successful completion of the fifth enlargement.

Pursuing reform: the Constitutional Treaty

3. As agreed by the European Council at its meeting in June 2006, the Union has followed a two-rack approach. It has focussed on making best use of the possibilities offered by the existing treaties to deliver concrete results while preparing the ground for continuing the reform process. The Presidency provided the European Council with an assessment of its consultations with Member States regarding the Constitutional Treaty. The outcome of these consultations will be passed to the incoming German Presidency as part of its preparations for the report to be presented during the first half of 2007. The European Council reaffirms the importance of commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome in order to confirm the values of the European integration process.

I. Enlargement strategy

4. As agreed at the June 2006 European Council and on the basis of the Commission communication on the enlargement strategy and its special report on the EU’s capacity to integrate new members, the European Council held an in-depth debate on enlargement. The European Council agrees that the enlargement strategy based on consolidation, conditionality and communication, combined with the EU’s capacity to integrate new members, forms the basis for a renewed consensus on enlargement. The EU keeps its commitments towards the countries that are in the enlargement process.
5. Enlargement has been a success story for the European Union and Europe as a whole. It has helped to overcome the division of Europe and contributed to peace and stability throughout the continent. It has inspired reforms and has consolidated common principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law as well as the market economy. The wider internal market and economic cooperation have increased prosperity and competitiveness, enabling the enlarged Union to respond better to the challenges of globalisation. Enlargement has also enhanced the EU’s weight in the world and made it a stronger international partner.

6. To sustain the integration capacity of the EU the acceding countries must be ready and able to fully assume the obligations of Union membership and the Union must be able to function effectively and to develop. Both these aspects are essential for ensuring broad and sustained public support, which should also be promoted through greater transparency and better communication.

7. The European Council confirms that the EU keeps its commitments regarding the ongoing accession negotiations. The recently enhanced rules governing the accession process provide for strict conditionality at all stages of the negotiations. The European Council agrees with the improvements suggested by the Commission concerning the management and the quality of the negotiations. Accordingly, difficult issues such as administrative and judicial reforms and the fight against corruption will be addressed at an early stage. Furthermore, the results of the political and economic dialogues will be fed into the accession negotiations. The pace of the accession process depends on the results of the reforms in the negotiating country, with each country being judged on its own merits. The Union will refrain from setting any target dates for accession until the negotiations are close to completion.

8. The European Council reaffirms that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the European Union. It reiterates that each country’s progress towards the European Union depends on its individual efforts to comply with the Copenhagen criteria and the conditionality of the Stabilisation and Association Process. A country’s satisfactory track-record in implementing its obligations under the Stabilisation and Association Agreements, including trade related provisions, is an essential element for the EU to consider any membership application.

9. The European Council stresses the importance of ensuring that the EU can maintain and deepen its own development. The pace of enlargement must take into account the capacity of the Union to absorb new members. The European Council invites the Commission to provide impact assessments on the key policy areas in the Commission’s Opinion on a country’s application for membership and in the course of accession negotiations. As the Union enlarges, successful European integration requires that EU insti-
tutions function effectively and that EU policies are further developed and financed in a sustainable manner.

Turkey

10. The European Council endorses the conclusions on Turkey adopted by the Council (GAERC) on 11 December 2006.

Croatia

11. The European Council endorses the conclusions on Croatia adopted by the Council (GAERC) on 11 December 2006.

Western Balkans

12. The European Council notes that the candidate country status of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was recognition of the country’s reform achievements. The European Council calls for accelerating the pace of reforms in key areas and for the implementation of the priorities identified in the European Partnership in order to progress towards the goal of moving ahead in the accession process.

13. The European Council welcomes the launch of visa facilitation and readmission negotiations with all the countries of the region with a view to concluding the negotiations as soon as possible. The conclusion of such agreements will promote people-to-people contacts between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and will increase the opportunities for travelling, especially for the younger generation. Recalling the Thessaloniki Agenda, the European Council also acknowledges the importance the people of the Western Balkans attach to the perspective of visa free movement. Furthermore, the European Council underlines the desirability of promoting people-to-people contacts by also making available more scholarships for the students of the region.

14. The European Council welcomes progress made in the Central European Free Trade Agreement, which will be signed in Bucharest on December 19, and looks forward to a regional and inclusive trade agreement. The new CEFTA will be a substantial step forward both economically and politically.

15. Serbia remains welcome to join the European Union. Recalling its Declaration on the Western Balkans of June 2006, the European Council reaffirms its continued engagement with and support to Serbia’s European course. In this context, it encourages the Serbian authorities to accelerate their efforts to meet the necessary conditions, notably full cooperation with ICTY. In view of Serbia’s considerable institutional capacity, the
European Council is confident that Serbia will be able to accelerate its preparations on the road towards the EU once the SAA negotiations are resumed.

(…)

**IV. External relations**

44. The European Council welcomes the Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Strategy “The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership”, to reflect a step change in Europe’s relationship with Africa, and calls for the implementation of the priority actions for 2007 identified in the report. The Progress Report outlines a comprehensive way forward for strengthening the EU partnership with Africa in consolidating peace, democracy and good governance, growth, investment in people and supporting broad-based sustainable development on the continent.

The European Council reaffirms its commitment to working towards a Joint EU-Africa Strategy to be adopted at the second EU-Africa Summit in the second half of 2007 in Lisbon.

The Council will continue to monitor progress towards the EU’s commitments to Africa, including increasing EU aid to 0.56% of EU GNI by 2010, and ensuring that 50% of the additional aid goes to Africa, as set out in the Council Conclusions of 24 May 2005. The European Council also recalls the objective of reaching 0.7% of EU GNI by 2015, as set out in the Council Conclusions of 24 May 2005.

45. The European Council expresses its full support to the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his efforts in conducting the political process to determine Kosovo’s future status. The future status settlement must promote a multi-ethnic and democratic society based on the rule-of-law with a future for all of its citizens and contribute to increasing regional stability. The settlement must also ensure that Kosovo can develop in a way which is both economically and politically sustainable, and set a vision which provides for the realisation of Kosovo’s European perspective.

The EU stands ready to play a significant role in the implementation of the status settlement. The European Council emphasises the importance of taking forward the preparations for the future EU and international presence in Kosovo in coordination with other international actors. The European Council stresses the importance of clarity in the future status settlement, to allow for an timely and unified response from the European Union. In this context, the European Council emphasises the need to ensure the necessary funding for the EU’s comprehensive engagement in Kosovo.

46. The European Council reaffirms its resolve to strengthen the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in order to consolidate a ring of prosperity, stability and
security based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the Union’s neighbour- 
hood. In this context, the European Council welcomes the recent adoption of the ENP Action Plans for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, as well as the jointly agreed ENP Action Plan with Lebanon and the progress in negotiations with Egypt. Referring to the latest Commission communication on the ENP, the European Council endorses the conclusions of the GAERC of 11 December 2006 and invites the incoming Presidencies and the Commission to take the work forward.

47. Encouraged by the prospects for closer cooperation and political dialogue with Central Asian States the European Council invites the incoming German Presidency to take forward the work on an EU strategy on Central Asia with a view to its adoption at the European Council meeting in June 2007.

48. The European Council stresses the importance of the multilateral trading system and the need for an ambitious, comprehensive and balanced agreement on the Doha Development Agenda and calls on key partners to act in the same spirit of constructive commitment in order to bring the negotiations to a successful close.

49. Measures have been developed with view to enhancing strategic planning, ensuring coherence in the use of different external relations policy instruments, improving coordination in international organisations, including the United Nations, and furthering cooperation between the EU institutions and between the latter and the Member States.

The European Council welcomes the progress made and invites the future Presidencies to take work forward together with the Secretary-General/High Representative and the Commission to ensure the continuity of the process.

Concrete steps to improve the coherent integration of development objectives are to be continued, along the lines of EU’s Policy Coherence for Development commitments. The European Council is looking forward to the joint EU’s Aid for Trade Strategy as an important component in fostering the trade and development agenda.

ANNEX I – DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

The European Council noted with concern that the Middle East is faced with one of the worst crises in years. The Israeli-Arab conflict is at the heart of this crisis. The EU is committed to overcoming the current impasse in the peace process and to easing tensions in the broader region.

The ceasefire in Gaza is an important first step. Violations of the ceasefire must end and it should be extended to the West Bank. For the ceasefire to be meaningful and sustainable it must be consolidated through a political process. In this respect the
European Council noted Prime Minister Olmert’s address of 27 November. The EU welcomed the readiness of President Abbas and PM Olmert to resume dialogue, and urged them to meet soon. The European Council also invited the other members of the Quartet and the regional partners to intensify common efforts aimed at reinvigorating the peace process.

The European Council commended the efforts of President Abbas over the last six months to form a government of national unity. The EU stands ready to work with a legitimate Palestinian government that adopts a platform reflecting the Quartet principles. If such a government is formed, the EU undertakes: to resume partnership with the Palestinian government and encourage Quartet partners to do likewise; to continue, with other donors, providing financial support and to prepare, in cooperation with the new government, a long-term plan on capacity building, border management and unified and effective security forces, as well as a functioning administration.

The European Council called for the immediate release of the abducted Israeli soldier and commended efforts including by partners in the region to that effect. The European Council also called for the immediate release of Palestinian ministers and legislators detained in Israel.

The European Council noted the vital role played by the Temporary International Mechanism in providing essential relief to a large part of the Palestinian population since its launch in June 2006. The increased assistance provided by the Community Budget and by Member States bilaterally this year, and the contributions by other donors to the Mechanism are deeply valued. In view of the protracted deterioration of the socio-economic situation of the Palestinians, the European Council endorsed a further three-month extension of the mechanism until March 2007. The European Council calls for the release of Palestinian customs and tax revenues withheld by Israel.

The European Council reiterated the need for full and speedy implementation of the Roadmap. As a first step, the following priorities should be pursued, following a calendar agreed between the parties and monitored by the Quartet: full and speedy implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access; full implementation of the Sharm-el-Sheikh understandings, including the release of prisoners and resumption of security cooperation between the parties; parallel implementation by the parties of the obligations they have committed to under the first phase of the Roadmap.

These, though important, are only initial steps, and must lead to meaningful negotiations on the final status, the ultimate goal of which is an end to the occupation that began in 1967 and the creation of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state, living side-by-side with Israel and its other neighbours in peace and security. In that context the parties have to take concrete and immediate measures to put an end to all acts of violence, and to all activities which are contrary to international law, including settlement activities and the construction of the barrier on Palestinian land, that constitute an obstacle to the achievement of that goal. The EU will not recognise any changes to the pre-1967 borders other than those agreed by both parties.
The European Council invited the Quartet to stand ready to lead an effort by the international community to build on the outcome of successful negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians in order to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict, including peace agreements with Syria and Lebanon and full normalisation of relations between Israel and the Arab countries. This will require an inclusive approach involving all relevant actors; all need to engage constructively in the region to support these efforts. In accordance with the Roadmap, the Quartet, in consultation with the parties, should in due course convene an international conference to realise these goals.

ANNEX II – DECLARATION ON LEBANON

The European Council is concerned by the deterioration of the situation in Lebanon, and underlines its determination to reinforce Lebanon’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. A solution to the current political deadlock should be sought only through dialogue and with full respect for the democratic institutions of the country. The European Council confirms its full support to the efforts of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and the legitimate and democratically elected government, aimed at maintaining dialogue with all political actors in Lebanon and at tackling the important challenges it is facing, in particular fully implementing UNSC Resolution 1701 and reconstructing the country.

The European Council calls on all parties in the region to comply with the resolution, notably the arms embargo. It urges Israel to stop violations of Lebanese airspace by the Israeli Air Force.

The European Council unreservedly condemns the assassination of Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel and any attempt by internal or external forces to destabilise Lebanon through political assassinations or other terrorist acts. It expects those who committed such crimes to be identified and brought to justice. In this context, the European Council welcomes the endorsement by the Lebanese Council of Ministers of the draft status of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in accordance with UNSCR 1664, and looks forward to the early completion of the remaining steps necessary for the establishment of the Tribunal.

The European Council reaffirms its support for the efforts aimed at the reconstruction and the prosperity of Lebanon. It reiterates the willingness of the EU to actively contribute, in close coordination with the Lebanese government, to the full success of the International Conference in support to Lebanon due to take place in Paris on 25 January 2007. The European Council recognises the need for urgent financial backing in order to lay a sound foundation for the future economic and social development in Lebanon.

The EU and its Member States by their prominent role in the new UNIFIL have demonstrated their commitment to the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1701
with a view to reaching a long-term solution to the questions that led to last summer’s confrontations. The European Council welcomes the recent report by the UN Secretary-General and his intention to consider the possibilities for a greater UN role on the Shebaa farms issue including the suggestion by the Lebanese Government to place the area under UN jurisdiction until permanent border delineation and sovereignty over them is settled. The European Council calls for the immediate release of the two abducted Israeli soldiers.

The European Council calls upon all Lebanese and regional actors to show responsible leadership and full respect for Lebanese democratic institutions. Syria must end all interference in Lebanese internal affairs and actively engage in the stabilisation of Lebanon and the region. Syria needs to do so to be in a position to develop normal relations with the international community, including with the EU. Syria should recognise, and cooperate with, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

ANNEX III – DECLARATION ON IRAN

The European Council expresses its concern about the negative impact of Iranian policies on stability and security in the Middle East. The European Council underlines that Iran needs to play a responsible role in the region.

In particular, the European Council deplores Iran’s failure to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council, and agrees that this could only have negative consequences for relations between the EU and Iran.

The European Council reiterates its full support for efforts to find a negotiated solution to the nuclear issue and regrets that Iran has not engaged seriously with the far-reaching proposals presented to Iran by the High Representative on 6 June. These could serve as a basis for a long-term agreement, which would give Iran everything it needs to develop a modern civil nuclear power industry while addressing the concerns expressed by the IAEA Board and the UN Security Council.

In the absence of action by Iran to meet its obligations, the European Council supports work in the Security Council towards the adoption of measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The European Council expresses deep concern at the Iranian government’s recent statements concerning the EU and individual Member States, as well as its threats towards Israel, and the continuing deterioration of human rights and political freedoms of its citizens. In this context, the European Council regrets that Iran cancelled the meeting of the EU-Iran human rights dialogue scheduled for December 2006.

The EU condemns any denial of the Holocaust as a historical fact, either in whole or in part, and therefore firmly rejects the underlying premise and the objectives of the conference on the Holocaust organised by the Iranian authorities.

The EU will keep all of these issues and its policies under close review and will calibrate its approach in the light of Iran’s actions.
ANNEX IV – DECLARATION ON AFGHANISTAN

The European Council reaffirmed its commitment to the people and Government of Afghanistan and its strong political engagement in favour of the stability and development of the country. Afghanistan has made very significant progress since 2001, with the establishment of representative political institutions, a free media, building of security sector institutions, improvements in the health and education sectors, human rights and the status of women, the appointment of a functional Supreme Court and the decision to establish of an advisory panel for senior appointments. But Afghanistan is at a critical juncture. The Afghan Government, supported by the international community, is invited to take further urgent, coordinated, action.

The European Union is already playing a key role, having contributed € 3.7 billion since 2002. Within the framework provided by the Afghanistan Compact and the 2005 EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration, it is working to promote Afghan leadership, responsibility and ownership and to foster the development of a democratic, secure and sustainable Afghan State. The EU stands ready to intensify its efforts. The European Council welcomed the Commission’s intention to remain strongly committed to assist reconstruction in Afghanistan over the 2007-13 period. The EU will work to ensure that its development assistance reaches Afghans in all parts of the country.

Security and development in Afghanistan are mutually inter-dependent. A stronger focus on governance and the rule of law should reinforce action in other areas. The Commission will build on programmes for rural development, the health sector and governance, including justice, and will support the Afghan National Police through the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA). The Commission will also support financially some civilian activities conducted by Member States through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). In addition, the EU will examine ways of strengthening its engagement, including by looking at opportunities and conditions for a potential civilian ESDP mission in the field of policing, with linkages to the wider rule of law.

The European Council called upon Afghanistan and Pakistan to deepen their relations and to cooperate closely to deal with insecurity in border areas.

Together with United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), NATO and other key actors, including the International Financial Institutions, the EU will work towards effective cooperation and coordination within the international community and with the Government of Afghanistan. The European Council underlined the importance of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) for the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact, and follows with interest the idea of establishing an international Contact Group.
ANNEX V – DECLARATION ON AFRICAN ISSUES

Sudan

The European Council expresses its deep concern about the appalling security, humanitarian and human rights situation in Darfur, as well as the recent outbreak of violence in South Sudan, in violation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The European Council reconfirms its full support to the CPA and calls on all parties to refrain from any actions that could jeopardise its effective implementation.

The European Council is alarmed at the escalation of violence within Darfur, which has a detrimental impact on humanitarian operations and has led to many humanitarian staff being evacuated. It calls for immediate cessation of hostilities, and underlines the obligation of all parties to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, the existing ceasefire accords and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. The European Council expects the Sudanese authorities to fulfil its responsibility to provide effective protection to all the citizens from all violence and to put an end to impunity in Darfur.

The European Council welcomes the outcome of a Special Session of the Human Rights Council on the situation in Darfur and urges that the agreed assessment mission be appointed and dispatched as soon as possible.

The European Council welcomes the decision by the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council on 30 November to endorse the conclusions of the High Level Consultations in Addis Ababa on 16 November. It strongly urges the Government of Sudan to give its unequivocal consent to the implementation of the UN support package for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in its entirety. The European Council calls on the Sudanese government in consultation with the UN and the African Union to pave the way for the implementation without delay. Time is of the essence in a dire humanitarian situation. Recalling UNSCR 1591 the European Council urges the government of Sudan to fulfil its obligations, and invites the Council to review the position at its next meeting. The European Council reiterates the EU’s commitment to support peace efforts in Darfur. It will continue supporting AMIS, in close coordination with the UN and in burden sharing with other international partners. The European Council urges all international partners to fulfil their pledges of support to AMIS.

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is the only basis for a political process to achieve sustainable peace in Darfur. The European Council urges all parties to enter immediately into dialogue with the objective of making the DPA an all-inclusive peace agreement. It supports the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) as a necessary complementary process to the political negotiations.

The destabilising effects of the Darfur conflict in the wider region, in particular in Chad and in the Central African Republic, are of great concern to the European Council. It reiterates that any further tension poses a serious threat to peace and the stability of the...
entire region. Underlining the importance of an international presence along the borders of Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic, as set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1706, the European Council welcomes the recent UN technical evaluation mission to Chad and the Central African Republic and looks forward to its recommendations.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

The European Council warmly welcomes the successful conduct of the first democratic elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in more than 40 years and congratulates the Congolese people, all parties and candidates as well as the Independent Electoral Commission. It congratulates the new President of the DRC, Joseph Kabila, who is entrusted together with all political parties and the new Congolese institutions with the task of pursuing the stabilisation and the reconstruction of the DRC in a spirit of national reconciliation. It calls on all political players to engage constructively in this post-transition process.

The European Council recalls the substantial efforts the EU has undertaken in support of the DRC at political level as well as through ESDP instruments, the EU Electoral Observation Mission and the assistance provided through the European Development Fund and bilaterally by EU Member States. It highlights in particular the successful completion of Operation EUFOR RD Congo, whose timely and robust contribution provided deterrence and maintained peace during the electoral process. It also underlines the essential role of the United Nations and calls for the extension of the mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, MONUC, and for the development of an objective-based exit strategy.

The EU remains fully committed to continuing its support to consolidate stability and reconstruction. It is essential that the future cooperation will be based on the new authorities’ strong commitment to good governance and to the strengthening of the rule of law. Appropriate flexible mechanisms will need to be developed with the new Congolese government to ensure effective coordination of support and political dialogue.

The European Council underlines the importance for the Congolese government to engage fully in the reform of the security sector. The EU continues to contribute in this field in a comprehensive and coherent way, building on the EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo missions, through an enhanced ESDP engagement and increased support by the European Community and Member States. The EU has confirmed its readiness to assume a coordinating role in international efforts in the security sector, in close cooperation with the United Nations, to support the Congolese authorities.

The European Council recognises that a democratic and prosperous DRC is essential to the stability and development throughout the Great Lakes Region. It welcomes the progress achieved within the framework of the International Conference on the Great Lakes.
Lakes Region, and urges all the core participating countries to continue work to foster closer cooperation and dialogue within the Region.

**Somalia**

The European Council underlines the seriousness of the situation in Somalia and stresses the strategic importance of peace and stability in Somalia. It reconfirms the EU’s support to the implementation of the Transitional Federal Charter through effective, broad based and representative Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). The EU remains committed to working for a political solution through an inclusive political dialogue. The European Council calls on the TFIs and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) to sustain the negotiation process initiated in June 2006 in Khartoum by the League of Arab States, and urges the parties to enter into substantive negotiations. The EU is ready to continue its assistance to this process.

The European Council urges the TFIs and the UIC to refrain from any action that could imperil the dialogue, and in particular, to respect the commitments made in the framework of the Khartoum talks. It calls on both parties to take immediate steps to reduce existing tensions and especially on the UIC to refrain from any measure aiming at expanding the territory under its control.

The European Council also calls upon all states, particularly those in the region, to seek a peaceful solution to the situation in Somalia, to refrain from acts which could endanger the cease-fire and the political process, and to fully observe the arms embargo.

The EU is working with international and regional organisations to promote peace and reconciliation in Somalia. The European Council welcomes the UN Security Council Resolution 1725 (2006) of 6 December, which authorises the establishment of a protection and training mission in Somalia, supporting peace and stability through an inclusive political process.

**Côte d’Ivoire**

The European Council expresses its concern at the delays in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1721 and the continuing obstacles to the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire. It recalls that the Resolution, which sets the framework of the final extension of the transition, is binding on all Ivorian parties. It calls on all Ivorian parties to give full support to Prime Minister Konan Banny so that he has the real effective powers enabling him to implement the mandate entrusted to him to organise free and fair elections by 31 October 2007.
PRESIDENCY REPORT ON ESDP

(...) 

1. In line with the mandate defined by the European Council in June 2006, the Presidency hereby submits this report on ESDP.

2. In presenting this report, the Presidency has noted that Denmark has drawn attention to Protocol No 5 on the position of Denmark, which is annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty.

I. Operational Activities

Western Balkans

3. The EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Operation ALTHEA, continued with the operational focus on maintaining a safe and secure environment, on the fight against organized crime and on reducing the amount of surplus weapons and ammunition in the country. Cooperation with NATO continues to work well in respect of Operation Althea, in Brussels as well as in BiH, in the context of the “Berlin Plus” arrangements.

4. The Council reviewed Operation ALTHEA in December and welcomed the positive contribution of the operation to the safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The Council approved the SG/HR’s recommendations for Operation ALTHEA in the light of the advice received from relevant Council bodies and underlined the continued need for an EU military presence to provide reassurance and to react to any possible security challenges.

5. The security situation in BiH has evolved enough to permit the Council to decide in principle on a transition of Operation ALTHEA. The implementation should go ahead in accordance with the agreed concept for transition, subject to a definitive decision (revised OPLAN) by the Political and Security Committee set to be taken by the end of February 2007, taking into account the security situation in the country as well as the impact on that, of the regional security situation.

6. The decision to proceed to the subsequent steps of the transition will be taken by the Council in due time.

7. The EU remains committed to BiH and through its military presence will continue to contribute to the maintenance of the safe and secure environment.
8. The **EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)** continued to operate in accordance with its refocused mandate. EUPM was actively engaged, through the Police Head of Mission, in the EU efforts on police reform. Under the direction of the EUSR, EUPM has taken since October 2006 the lead in the co-ordination of policing aspects of ESDP efforts in the fight against organised crime. EUPM continued to mentor and advise local authorities in order to strengthen the links between the police and the judicial sector. The Mission also produced a comprehensive organised crime situation assessment to guide further work in this field.

9. EUPM has continued to follow the implementation and finalisation of projects launched during 2003-2005 and to support SIPA (State Investigation and Protection Agency), SBS (State Border Service) and other police services in their efforts towards efficiency and accountability. In this regard, EUPM has developed an inspection methodology that has helped to strengthen internal and external control of local police across BiH.

10. The EU has continued its preparations for a future civilian ESDP crisis management mission in Kosovo after a status settlement. Following the Council decision to set up an **EU Planning Team for Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo)** in April 2006, the team has deployed successfully and advanced in its planning tasks. On 11 December 2006, the Council decided to reinforce and extend the EUPT Kosovo until May 2007.

11. On the basis of the preparatory work done, the Council approved on 11 December 2006 a crisis management concept for the future ESDP mission in Kosovo, thus allowing planning to proceed to the next step with the development of a concept of operations. During the autumn, initial contacts were made with third states that could contribute to the future ESDP mission. Cooperation with all relevant international stakeholders in Kosovo was undertaken both on the ground in Priština and in Brussels.

**Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus**

12. The **EUSR Border Support Team in Georgia**, following EU’s experiences in the ESDP mission EUJUST THEMIS and within its current mandate in force until the end of February 2007, has continued to assist the Georgian Border Guard and other relevant government institutions in Tbilisi in preparing a comprehensive reform strategy and to advise the Georgian authorities, at both strategic and operational level. On 25 October 2006 a high level working group was established to elaborate the strategy for the reform of the Georgian border guard system.

13. The **EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova/Ukraine (EUBAM)** continues since June 2006 as a TACIS project for a period of 18 months, staffed to a large
extend by seconded experts from EU Member States. The Mission was reinforced in July 2006, allowing greater operational targeting of EUBAM resources. The Head of EUBAM is also carrying out the function of Senior Political Advisor to the EUSR for Moldova whose mandate will continue until 28 February 2007, including a Border Team.

### Middle East

14. Since July 2005, at the invitation of the Iraqi government, the EU has been running an Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX) aimed at promoting collaboration between the actors of the Iraqi criminal justice system, through training courses in the EU. More than 800 senior Iraqi officials from the police, the judiciary and the penitentiary have been trained so far in an integrated fashion in EU Member States. The current mandate of the Mission continues until the end of December 2007. The courses offered by the Mission have been restructured in order to enable new specialised courses for Iraqi senior officials. In September 2006, it was decided to reinforce the Baghdad Liaison Office by one additional EU senior penitentiary expert to work with the Ministry of Justice on specific strategies in the field of prison reform, as requested by the Minister of Justice. The Mission will also, for the first time, organise a number of secondments of Iraqi officials to EU Member States. The first such secondment began in November 2006.

15. The EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) continued its third party presence role based on relevant agreements between the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel. Following the deterioration of the situation in Gaza in June 2006, the terminal has been able to open only sporadically, thus dramatically reducing the number of people passing through the crossing point. The EU and its Member States have made sustained efforts with the parties to enable the border to open whenever possible, which has helped to alleviate in part the humanitarian situation of the people living in the Gaza Strip. On 13 November 2006 the Council agreed on a six-month extension of the EUBAM Rafah mandate.

16. The EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) was launched on 1 January 2006 with a three-year mandate in order to assist the Palestinian Civilian Police in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements. Given the outcome of the Palestinian legislative elections of early 2006 and subsequent Quartet statements, the Mission has scaled down its active involvement with the Palestinian Civil Police. However, the Mission still keeps contacts at working level and monitors the upkeep of EU investments made in the past. Following the six-monthly review of the mission, the size of the mission has been adjusted accordingly.
Africa

17. EU Military operation in the DRC EUFOR RD Congo reached full operational capacity by 30 July 2006, the date of the first round of the elections. The operation was conducted under the UN Security Council Resolution 1671 and carried out in full agreement with the authorities of the DRC and in close co-ordination with them and with the MONUC. The deployment of the force, which consisted of troops from 17 Member States and from Turkey and Switzerland as third states, took place in a rapid and smooth manner.

18. In concert with a broad range of EU initiatives, EUFOR RD Congo showed the full commitment of the EU to ensure the smooth conduct of the electoral process in the DRC and contributed to security and stability during the election process. The force played a positive role in support of MONUC inter alia through its decisive and successful intervention during the August incidents. After the successful conclusion of the operation on 30 November 2006, EU will remain committed to the continuing effort to support the development of the DRC.

19. The EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa) has continued with its mentoring and advisory task regarding the Integrated Police Unit (IPU). In addition, EUPOL Kinshasa has been reinforced since June 2006 in order to support the coordination of the Congolese police crowd control units in Kinshasa during the electoral process in the DRC. Two new third states, namely Angola and Mali, have joined this temporary reinforcement element of the mission, in addition to Canada and Turkey participating as third states in the main component of EUPOL Kinshasa. This is the first time that African states have participated in a civilian crisis management mission within the ESDP framework. The reinforcement has been extended until March 2007 to further support the Kinshasa police during a short period after the electoral process. The current strength of the coordination support element may be reduced in light of possible positive security developments in the DRC capital up to March 2007. On 7 December 2006 the EUPOL Kinshasa Mission itself has been extended until June 2007 in order to ensure the proper integration of the IPU within the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC) and to strengthen its advisory role in support of the PNC in the field of security sector reform (SSR) in the DRC.

20. The mission EUSEC RD Congo has continued to fulfil its mandate in the field of security sector reform and contributed to the integration of two new brigades for the new Congolese army, now totalling 14 integrated brigades. In further developing an effective relationship with the DRC institutions, the mission EUSEC RD Congo will play an even more crucial role in advising the new democratically elected government on the reform of the security sector. The ongoing technical assistance project on improving the chain of
payments of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the DRC also paves the way for the modernisation of the administration of this ministry and contributes to the effective payment of the salaries of the military. This will need to be further pursued in 2007. The end of the transition period will offer possibilities to further develop the potential of the mission.

21. The EU has announced that it is ready to continue its engagement in the field of SSR and that it would be ready to assume a coordinating role in international efforts in the security sector reform, in close coordination with the United Nations, to support the Congolese authorities in this field. The development of a comprehensive EU approach to SSR in the DRC has been initiated, and will be further elaborated in consultation with the Congolese authorities.

22. The EU has continued its civilian-military supporting action for the African Union (AU) Mission (AMIS) in the Darfur region of Sudan. Apart from financial support to the Mission under the African Peace Facility (242 MEURO in total), the EU is providing military assistance in the form of technical support and expertise throughout the AMIS command structure. Financial and logistic support has also been provided, including strategic air transport by EU Member States. The EU also provides the Vice President of the Cease Fire Commission and a number of EU military observers. EU police officers continue to play a key role in building AMIS civilian policing capacity through support, advice and training for the AMIS police chain of command and police officers on the ground. The EU is also continuing its support for the development of AU policing capacity and the establishment of a police unit within the AU Commission in Addis Ababa.

23. The EU has maintained close and effective co-ordination with institutional and bilateral donors and worked closely and effectively with the UN, as well as with NATO regarding military support in theatre. The EUSR for Sudan has played a key role in co-ordinating the EU’s support to the AU with other donors and actors in the region and continues to provide support for the AU in its efforts to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement.

Asia

24. The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) continued monitoring the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). This included monitoring the process of legislative change, in particular in relation to the law of governing Aceh (LOGA), which was adopted on 7 July 2006. AMM also continued monitoring the handling of amnesty cases until 15 August 2006, the date when the remaining disputed cases were solved as a result
of intense consultations between the parties. Furthermore, AMM continued monitoring the reintegration of active GAM members and the human rights situation in Aceh. AMM’s mandate was set to expire on 15 September 2006. However, in view of the local elections in Aceh to be held on 11 December 2006 and following the invitation by the Government of Indonesia (supported by GAM), the Council adopted on 7 September 2006 a Joint Action extending the Mission for a final three months. Accordingly, the Mission was terminated on 15 December 2006.

25. Building on its current substantial engagement in Afghanistan, the EU is considering ways to enhance its support for the Government of Afghanistan’s work in extending the rule of law in the country. In order to make the overall EU effort more visible and coherent, the EU is aiming at a comprehensive approach through enhanced coordination of all EU activities. A joint assessment mission to Afghanistan by the General Secretariat of the Council, Commission and Member States experts was carried out in September 2006, producing a report analysing the situation in the area of rule of law and identifying priorities for future engagement. Following up on this, a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan was conducted to explore further the feasibility of a potential civilian ESDP mission in the field of policing, linkages to the wider rule of law sector as well as the way coordination is handled. In December 2006 the Council discussed current and future EU actions in Afghanistan.

ATHENA Review

26. Agreement was reached on the second review of the ATHENA mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications.

II. Capabilities

Development of European Civilian Capabilities

Civilian Headline Goal 2008

27. Following the notation by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in July 2006 of a management plan for the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008) in the second semester of 2006, implementation of this process focused on the following main issues:

- Recommendations and guidelines on the raising of personnel for EU civilian crisis management;
- Development of an initial concept of mission support for ESDP civilian crisis management missions and the establishment of a list of required Mission Support capabilities;
- Rapidly deployable civilian elements; and
Possible contributions of certain non-EU States to the EU civilian crisis management capacity.

28. A set of recommendations and guidelines on the raising of civilian personnel was noted by the PSC in October 2006. Implementation has already started and currently focuses on:
- enhancing the involvement in civilian ESDP of key national stakeholders, notably in the areas of Police and Rule of Law;
- considering ways of how to anticipate the notification of civilian ESDP personnel requirements to Member States with a view to upcoming missions;
- improving the availability of information on training and recruitment; in this context, a website will be launched to facilitate the recruitment of personnel; and
- fostering the exchange of know-how, best practice and lessons learned among Member States and between the Member States and the Council Secretariat.

29. In the second half of 2006 the training of experts in the Civilian Response Team (CRT) pool was completed in accordance with the CRT Training Course Concept. Almost all experts in the CRT pool have now received comprehensive training in accordance with the agreed concept. The CRT training was carried out in the framework of the European Community project on training for civilian aspects of crisis management. The target of having an initial CRT capability by the end of year 2006 was achieved. An expert from the CRT pool was deployed to an assessment mission to the DRC. Rapid deployment of CRTs was also studied in the context of the EU Exercise Study 2006.

30. Further work was undertaken on rapidly deployable police elements (IPU/FPU). The police workshop POL06 in December 2006 studied the transition of those rapidly deployable police elements that are under temporary military responsibility into a civilian chain of command and the co-ordination between rapidly deployable Police elements (IPUs, FPUs, Specialised Element, HQ) and Rule of Law elements. Rapidly deployable police elements were also studied in the context of the EU Exercise Study 2006.

31. Non-EU States' replies to the CHG 2008 questionnaire provided an initial indication of their possible contributions to civilian ESDP. This initial indication was presented to the Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference held in the margins of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) in November 2006.

32. The progress made in the CHG 2008 during year 2006 was reviewed by the Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference held in the margins of GAERC on 13 November 2006. The Conference issued a ministerial declaration, approved by the Council, as part of which the ministers noted the progress made during year 2006, wel-
comed the possible contributions by certain non-EU States to civilian ESDP as well as identified elements for further work in the process during year 2007. Based on these elements, the civilian capabilities improvement plan 2007 was approved by the Council on 11 December 2006.

Mission Support
33. **The Initial Concept of Mission Support** for ESDP Civilian Crisis Management Missions, outlining an ambitious way ahead, was noted by the PSC in September 2006 as a living document. On the basis of the concept, a workshop on “Required capabilities in Mission Support for ESDP civilian crisis management missions” was held in the framework of the CHG 2008 process to discuss and amend the list of required capabilities in Mission Support and the draft recommendations on the raising of mission support personnel for EU civilian crisis management. The amended list of required capabilities, noted by the PSC in October 2006, served as the basis for the questionnaire on mission support capabilities that was submitted to Member States.

34. Member States reached an agreement on a new system for **per diems and allowances** for their personnel serving in civilian crisis management missions. Guidelines for allowances for seconded staff participating in EU civilian crisis management missions, where these are borne by the CFSP budget, were agreed in October 2006. They establish uniform and homogeneous criteria for determining allowances, including per diems, hardship and risk allowances.

Development of European Military Capabilities
35. **Within the Headline Goal 2010 process and following the agreed Roadmap to the Progress Catalogue, the Force Catalogue 2006 (FC06) – which presents Member States’ contributed forces and capabilities against the required capabilities as defined in the Requirements Catalogue 2005 (RC 05) – was finalised and noted together with its supplements by the Council, which also approved its transmission to NATO for information purposes.**

36. Bulgaria and Romania were integrated in the same bidding process as Member States. Their contributions are presented in the first Supplement to the FC 06. Following their accession to the EU, a **revised version of FC 06** will be produced in January 2007.

37. Contributions from non-EU European NATO members and the other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU are presented in the second Supplement to FC 06.

38. The methodology and procedures for assessing the totality of Member States’ con-
tributions for the year 2010 and identifying shortfalls in quantitative and qualitative terms have been developed in the Assessing Handbook. The methodology for the evaluation of the potential operational implications of the shortfalls is under development. This assessment and evaluation are the next necessary steps towards the establishment of the Progress Catalogue 2007 (PC 07).

39. The study regarding support for the EU Military Capability Planning Process with Operational Analysis (OA) tools and techniques as well as an Information Gathering Tool (IG) continues with EDA’s participation. EU requirements concerning OA tools and techniques have been defined and options for their possible use developed. Available data to enable decisions on potential future solutions are being collected from the Member States. Work on the second part of the study with regard to the OA-IG System has started.

40. The migration of the ECAP Project Groups (PGs) into a more integrated process associated with the EDA is almost completed. Nine ECAP-PGs have now migrated. In 2007, the EUMC will review the status of the remaining ECAP PGs.

41. By 1st January 2007, the EU will have the Full Operational Capability (FOC) to undertake two Battle-group (BG) size rapid response operations, including the ability to launch two such operations nearly simultaneously. The conceptual phase ended with the Editorial Review of BG Concept and the result now serves as the reference for the FOC. In view of the forthcoming FOC, the Presidency organised a seminar on EU Battlegroups in Helsinki on 19-20 October in order to take stock of the progress made and to reflect on future challenges. The BG Co-ordination Conference held on 27 October confirmed that Member States have committed sufficient packages up to and including 2008. Additional contributions, in particular to fill the vacant slot in the first half of 2009 are still needed. Issues related to EU Battle-groups were also studied in the context of the EU Exercise Study 2006.

42. Work on the Maritime Dimension in ESDP is ongoing, including a study comprising the contribution of EU maritime military capabilities within the ESDP mission spectrum, the use of EU maritime forces in a rapid response capacity and their future structure and shape.

43. The Mandate and Methodology, as well as the road map, for a study of the Rapid Response Air Initiative in ESDP have been agreed by the EUMC. A workshop in October allowed initial discussions to be conducted on the successful use of a military air capability for Rapid Response within the whole spectrum of EU crisis management tasks.
44. Work on the agreed way ahead for the on Global Approach Deployability (GAD), aimed at identifying the needs for the co-ordination, interaction, roles and responsibilities of transportation enablers, has progressed well. The Reception Staging Onward Movement and Integration concept was finalised and all major elements of the GAD follow-on work have now been successfully completed. Work has continued on the Multinational Co-ordination Centre Europe (MCC-E) in Eindhoven and the Athens Multinational Sealift Co-ordination Centre (AMSCC) that would allow a coordinated EU approach towards strategic lift. Work is ongoing to make the capabilities and processes identified within this study also applicable for EU Disaster Response.

45. In November, the Council noted the Single Progress Report on the Development of EU Military Capabilities, which in accordance with the Capability Development Mechanism records progress made in the development of EU military capabilities in the second half of 2006 and agreed to forward it to NATO, for information purposes.

European Defence Agency

46. The Council adopted the guidelines for the Agency’s work next year and took note of the SG/HR’s report on the Agency’s activities. As reflected in the Head of the Agency’s report noted by the Council on 13 November, in its second year the Agency has started to deliver substantial results, most noticeably in relation to the European Defence Equipment Market, the generation of an initial Long Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs, and Defence Research and Technology. The Council agreed to postpone to next year the setting of a three-year financial framework and adopted the Agency’s budget for 2007 (22,1 MEURO, including 5 MEURO for the operational budget).

47. Concerning the European Defence Equipment Market, the Agency brought the newly agreed regime on Defence Procurement into operation on 1 July and launched the Agency’s website of an Electronic Bulletin Board for the publication of contracting opportunities. At the same time, participating Member States agreed a Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain. Subsequently, the 22 participating Member States subscribing to the regime arrived at mutual agreements on Security of Information and Security of Supply in circumstances of operational urgency. A description of the characteristics of a strong European Defence Technological and Industrial Base was also agreed by the Steering Board.

48. An initial Long-Term Vision for ‘European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs’ – prepared in close collaboration with the EU Military Committee and the EU Institute for Security Studies – was endorsed by the EDA Steering Board on 3 October as a reasonable foundation for the Agency’s medium-to-long term agendas (the initial
Long-Term Vision was extensively discussed with and broadly supported by participating Member States, but without word-for-word agreement. This initial LTV provides a “reasonable foundation” for follow-on work in the field of future military capabilities, based on a possible “future capability profile” and industrial and technological capacities needed to support ESDP. As a first follow-on action, an **ESDP Capability Development Plan** will be elaborated with the involvement of relevant stakeholders.

49. In line with the Hampton Court agenda (October 2005) to “spend more, spend better, and spend more together” on Defence R&T, on 13 November the EDA Steering Board launched the first **Defence R&T Joint Investment Programme**, with 19 contributors – 18 participating Member States plus Norway - and a budget of over 54,23 MEURO in the area of force protection.

50. There has also been good progress **in the Command, Control and Communication area**. On 13 November the Steering Board welcomed the development of a collective European approach to Software-Defined Radio, involving EDA cooperation with the Commission, and five participating Member States launching a 100 MEURO cooperation. Other promising projects include: in-theatre exploitation of imagery for EU Battle-groups (Tactical Imagery Exploitation System); development of a substantial agenda in maritime surveillance; launch of the first two feasibility studies into key technologies for future Armoured Fighting Vehicles; emergence of a cooperative armaments process; final transfer of the portfolio of collaborative R&T projects from the WEAO Research Cell; development in the Agency’s CapTech networks of a further 20 new R&T ad hoc collaborations. Cooperation with Norway has been further developed on the basis of the Administrative Arrangement.

III. Civil-Military Cell and Operations Centre

51. The Civil-Military Cell continued its work in accordance with its terms of reference. Within the Civil-Military Cell further work has been undertaken on the development of the EU Operations Centre in the areas of manning, training, infrastructure, including CIS and procedures. By the end of 2006 the Operations Centre is ready to be set up rapidly for use in line with the agreed procedures. This will further enhance the capacity of the EU to undertake ESDP operations.

IV. EU Satellite Centre and EU Institute for Security Studies

52. The **EU Satellite Centre** (EUSC) continued to work in support of ESDP related activities such as support for ongoing EU operations and missions, in particular in DR Congo (EUFOR RD Congo) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (ALTHEA) as well as for EUMS and SITCEN counter-proliferation and contingency planning. It provided support for
the EU Member States’ peacekeeping forces for the UNIFIL in southern Lebanon. The EUSC has also continued its close cooperation with the UN, in particular in support of MONUC (DRC) and UNDOF (Golan Heights). In July, the SG/HR presented a report on the implementation of the Joint Action for the EUSC, following review of the first five years of its activities. Following the SG/HR’s report, the draft amended Joint Action on the establishment of the EUSC will be presented to the Council for adoption in December.

53. The EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) continued to develop its work on a wide range of global and regional priorities. The Institute’s role as a focal point for academic exchange, networking and monitoring of the European security agenda was further broadened and strengthened during 2006. In July, the SG/HR presented a report on the implementation of the Joint Action for the Institute, following review of the first five years of its activities. Following the SG/HR’s report, the draft amended Joint Action on the establishment of the EUISS will be presented to the Council for adoption in December.

V. ESDP and Space

54. The work on the actions identified in the Initial Road Map for the “European Space Policy: ESDP and Space” has progressed with a view to including the agreed ESDP requirements in the development of a global EU Space Policy.

VI. Civil-Military Co-ordination

55. Building on the work carried out during the previous Presidencies, the Finnish Presidency focused on improved situational awareness among EU actors in theatre. In view of this, the Presidency organised a working seminar in Brussels on 7-8 September, bringing together a variety of EU crisis management expertise from different operations. In November, the Council noted recent work on improving situational awareness in theatre. It recalled that the PSC had noted a document on improving information sharing in support of EU crisis management operations. The Council underlined the importance of ensuring a comprehensive approach with regard to the work on the Information Exchange Requirements.

56. An assessment was initiated on co-ordination and coherence between the EU Special Representative (EUSR) and the ESDP instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

VII. Border Mission Concept

57. Border related issues have become an increasingly important aspect of civilian cri-
sis management. Demand for EU engagement in border related tasks is likely to increase in the future, also building on ESDP experience so far. Taking this into account, a concept for ESDP border missions in the framework of civilian crisis management was noted by the PSC in December 2006.

VIII. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR)

58. The Finnish Presidency focused on the development of an EU approach to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). The Presidency, the European Commission and the Conflict Prevention Partnership organised a seminar on “the EU and DDR: Supporting Security and Development” in Brussels on 13 July 2006. Following a Presidency non-paper and subsequent discussions, the Commission and the Council respectively approved an EU Concept for support to DDR, jointly developed by the Council Secretariat and the European Commission.

59. Implementation of the EU Policy Framework on SSR continued. Regarding SSR work in the DRC, the Commission and the Council General Secretariat elaborated jointly a proposal for a comprehensive EU approach to SSR in the DRC.

60. Work continued to mainstream the Security Sector Reform into the EU assistance instruments that are associated with the Stabilisation and Accession Process in the Western Balkans. To this end, a seminar has been organised by the Finnish Presidency, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Institute for International Relations (IMO) in Zagreb, on 8 December 2006.

IX. Human Security, Human Rights and Gender Issues

61. On the initiative of the Presidency, PSC had informal discussions on how the EU can promote a human security agenda through the broad range of instruments at its disposal, including through ESDP instruments. Discussions drew on the Barcelona report of the study group on Europe’s security capabilities, published in 2004.

62. Work on mainstreaming of human rights into CFSP, including ESDP, continued. PSC noted the document “Mainstreaming of Human Rights into ESDP”. It addresses the comprehensive integration of Human Rights in the planning, conduct and evaluation of ESDP missions. The document recommends inter alia that human rights expertise should be included in ESDP missions and operations.

63. Work continued to implement the document on Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security in the context of ESDP and gender mainstreaming.
The PSC has endorsed a check list to ensure gender mainstreaming and implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the planning and conduct of ESDP Operations. The Council Secretariat has offered gender awareness training for civilian heads of mission. The Institute for Security Studies conducted a case study on the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 in the context of the EU presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first gender adviser to a mission was appointed to EUFOR RD Congo. In November, the Council adopted conclusions on promoting gender equality and gender mainstreaming in crisis management.

64. Work has continued to address the issue of children and armed conflict as a follow-up to the EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict. Based on the review of progress made towards the implementation of the guidelines, an implementation strategy has been developed and action has been taken to implement it, including through the application of the checklist for the integration of the protection of children affected by armed conflict into ESDP operations.

X. Conflict Prevention

65. Work continued to implement the European Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. To this end, a workshop on “Promoting Common Action in Conflict Prevention with International Organisations” organised by the Madariaga European Foundation, the Folke Bernadotte Academy and supported by the Finnish Presidency was held in Brussels on 16 November 2006. The focus was on the promotion of common action in conflict prevention, through cooperation between the EU and major international organisations and by creation of an informal network of experts in the field of conflict prevention.

XI. Co-operation with Non-Governmental Organisations

66. A Conference on “Enhancing Co-operation between Civil Society and EU Civilian Crisis Management” was organised in Helsinki on 27-28 September 2006. Based on the experiences so far and drawing on the results of the Conference, recommendations for enhancing cooperation with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the framework of ESDP Civilian Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention were endorsed by the PSC in November 2006, with a view to contributing to increasing the efficiency of ESDP missions.

XII. EU Emergency and Crisis Response

67. On 13 November, in the context of the Hampton Court follow-up and the proposals put forward by the SG/HR in March 2006, the Council noted the document “Military
support to EU disaster relief – Identification and coordination of available assets and capabilities” as a living document, and agreed on its way ahead. The arrangements set out therein are designed to enhance the rapidity and effectiveness of the EU’s response to disasters. They will be subject to review, as necessary, in the light of experience gained. These arrangements will follow international guidelines, notably the Oslo guidelines.

68. In line with the May 2006 Council conclusions on getting assistance quickly where needed and as envisaged by the “general framework for the use of Member States’ military or military chartered Transportation Assets and ESDP Co-ordination tools in support of EU disaster response”, the elaboration of the necessary standing operating procedures has been finalised. These set out detailed procedures for the EU Movement Planning Cell (within the EU Military Staff) interaction with the points of contact designated by Member States to deal with military or military chartered transportation assets in support of EU disaster relief. These also detail the service and information exchanges between the Council General Secretariat and the Commission services, as well as between the Council Secretariat and the Multinational Movement Coordination Centres in Athens and Eindhoven, which could support the EU, inter alia, in the identification of potential transportation capabilities for Member States consideration.

XIII. EU training in the field of ESDP

69. Efforts continued to implement the overall objectives identified in the EU Training Policy in ESDP to develop throughout the Union a common ESDP culture and to provide Member States and the EU institutions with knowledgeable personnel, diplomatic, civilian and military, able to work efficiently on all ESDP matters, including staff to work in the ESDP operations.

70. Following the review of the training requirements in the field of ESDP agreed in spring this year, the training programme has been designed including the training activities offered by the Member States, the ESDC, CEPOL, EDP and the European Community project on training for civilian aspects of crisis management. The EU Training Programme in the field of ESDP for the years 2007 to 2009 is being prepared.

71. As regards training for civilian crisis management, a workshop was organised in Brussels on 19-20 October 2006 in close co-operation with the Commission to address future training needs for personnel in civilian crisis management missions. The workshop helped draw up a list of essential elements for a standard non-mission specific core course for Member States experts who have been identified to potentially serve in an EU civilian crisis management mission as well as a list of essential elements for a pre-mission training course for a specific civilian ESDP mission. Moreover, on the basis of recommendations made in the workshop and taking full account of the different civilian crisis
management instruments the EU has at its disposal, a number of priorities for further work were identified.

72. The European Community project on training for civilian aspects of crisis management is currently the only EU-level mechanism training civilians for international missions. The current project expires at the end of February 2007 and its future is under consideration.

73. The European Security and Defence College (ESDC) started its second academic year with the conduct of the ESDP High Level Course 2006/2007. Course modules took place in Brussels, Paris and Athens and two other modules will take place in February and March next year in Madrid and Berlin. Nationals of candidate states, third states as well as representatives of international organisations were invited to participate in an ESDP Orientation Course hosted by the Finnish Presidency in Brussels.

74. A Pilot ESDP Course for Press and Public Information Staff was successfully conducted in November with the aim of promoting a better understanding of ESDP among national spokespersons/PIOs and potential spokespersons/PIOs for ESDP missions and operations.

XIV. Exercises

75. EU Exercise Study 2006 (EST 06), focusing on the accelerated decision-making and planning process for EU Rapid Response operations took place on 27 and 28 November 2006. It was conducted in the form of a seminar with participation of EU Member States, the Council General Secretariat and the European Commission. A summary of the discussions was subsequently presented to the Political and Security Committee. The Exercise Study considered questions related to enhancing EU’s ability to launch ESDP operations with civilian and military components in a rapid response context.

76. Preparations for the military exercise MILEX 07/CPX to be held in June 2007 have continued. Its objective is to exercise and to evaluate military aspects of the EU crisis management at the military strategic and operational level. It will focus on the interaction between the EU Operations Centre and an EU FHQ provided by Sweden in an EU-led crisis management operation, after having practiced the activation of the EU Operations Centre and the EU FHQ.

77. EU police workshop (POL06) took place on 5 and 6 December 2006, focusing on rapidly deployable police elements.
XV. ESDP and Africa

78. In November 2006, the Council welcomed that the Council General Secretariat and the Commission have jointly prepared an EU concept on **Strengthening African Capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts**. The Council confirmed that the EU stands ready to step up its support for the efforts of the African Union (AU) and African sub-regional organisations (SROs) in this field. The Council stressed that this needs to be a demand driven process, based on intensified dialogue with African partners, in full respect of African ownership, and in close cooperation with the broader international community. The concept is intended to provide a coherent and comprehensive EU framework for the implementation of key aspects of the Peace and Security cluster of the EU Strategy for Africa. Measures and initiatives proposed in the concept would directly support the AU’s ongoing establishment of an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including the creation of the African Stand-by Force (ASF).

79. In the light of the recommendations presented by the relevant working parties, the Political and Security Committee asked that work be taken forward on the proposed measures in the three areas identified in the Concept (increasing coherence at EU level, establishing a strong partnership with the African Union and the SROs and developing policies for the reinforcement of African capabilities) and invited the Council General Secretariat and the Commission to make concrete proposals for action. The PSC also invited the Secretariat and the Commission to develop practical options for enhancing the EU presence in Addis Ababa.

80. In this context, the Council has also encouraged further progress towards the holding of the second Europe-Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007, where a Joint EU-Africa Strategy should be adopted.

81. The EU, collectively and through individual Member States, continued to support the efforts of the AU and the SROs towards the establishment of the ASF. The EU has acted with African Peace Facility support as the leading partner in the Workshops on Doctrine and Standard Operating Procedures. In addition, the EU has contributed to the Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the ASF held in Accra in late August and in the Harmonisation Workshop held in Pretoria in late September / early October. A significant part of the Workshop process has been finalised with African Peace Facility funds.

82. EU personnel participated in the 5th Cycle of the French training initiative RECAMP. Consideration is being given to how future RECAMP cycles, and other bilateral programmes that Member States may wish to offer, might be used as means of delivering EU policies.
XVI. Co-operation with International Organisations, Mediterranean Partners and Third States

EU-NATO

83. The EU and NATO have continued to develop further their strategic partnership in crisis management. In Bosnia and Herzegovina their co-operation on operation Althea in the context of the Berlin Plus arrangements has continued to be smooth and efficient. The EU and NATO have moreover continued to co-operate, including through a joint airlift co-ordination cell in Addis Ababa, to ensure effective support for the AU Mission in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS).

84. Cooperation has been facilitated through the permanent EU cell at SHAPE and the permanent NATO liaison team at the EU Military Staff.

85. In the field of capability development, the EU-NATO Capability Group has continued to exchange information where requirements overlap, in accordance with the Capabilities Development Mechanism. The Group discussed inter alia EU Battle-groups and the NATO Response Force as well as some specific capability areas of common interest such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and 21st Century Soldier. Two meetings were devoted to the exchange of more detailed information on Software Defined Radio. All EU Member States were kept informed about these issues.

EU-UN

86. The EU-UN co-operation in the field of crisis management continued to develop, notably in the context of Operation EUFOR RD Congo in support of the MONUC during the electoral process in the DRC. During the active phase of the EUFOR RD Congo, co-operation in the field between the two operations was extensive.

87. The two organizations continued their close co-ordination regarding support to the AU Mission in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS), including the implementation of the UN support package to AMIS.

88. To support the implementation of UNSCR 1701, EU Member States made a significant contribution to the reinforcement and deployment of UNIFIL forces.

89. Meetings between representatives of both the EU and UN continued, inter alia through the consultative mechanism the EU-UN Steering Committee which took place in Brussels on 16-17 November 2006.
EU-OSCE

90. Under the Finnish Presidency, relations between EU-OSCE were further strengthened, with the support of the Belgian OSCE Chairmanship. Regular dialogue took place on the level of the PSC and the COSCE working group Troikas with OSCE. On a working level specific issues of training, mission support and recruitment continued to be discussed between EU and OSCE, and brought both closer in harmonising these tools in an exchange of best practices. Regular consultations and working meetings took place to address issues of common concern.

91. On 13 November 2006 an EU-OSCE Ministerial Troika discussed in particular Kosovo, frozen conflicts – e.g. Moldova, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh – as well as economic issues, i.e. transport and energy, related to conflict and security.

EU-AU and African Sub-Regional Organisations

92. EU has continued close co-operation with the African Union and the African sub-regional organisations inter alia through EU support to the AU mission in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS) and through assistance to longer-term capacity building measures, in particular the establishment of the African Standby Force (see section XV).

Mediterranean Partners

93. The 8th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs took place in Tampere on 27-28 November 2006. The meeting addressed ways in which dialogue on ESDP and security issues could be pursued with a view to strengthening co-operation. The Ministers welcomed the principle of organising in 2007 an ESDP orientation course by the European Defence and Security College open to participation to Mediterranean countries.

Third States

94. EU continued the close co-operation in ESDP crisis management with non-EU European NATO members, Canada and other third states.

Russia

95. In the framework of the Road Map for the Common Space on External Security, work continued to strengthen the dialogue with Russia on matters of practical co-operation in crisis management. A Seminar on the ESDP organised by the Presidency took place in Moscow on 27 September. It was followed by the second EU-Russia Experts
meeting in the framework of implementing the Road Map for the Common Space on External Security. Military contacts have also been intensified.

Ukraine

96. The 10th EU-Ukraine Summit that took place on 27 October in Helsinki welcomed the strengthening of EU-Ukraine Security and Defence co-operation. In the framework of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan work continued in order to enhance cooperation in foreign and security policy, including in crisis management. The EU Border Assistance Mission for Ukraine and Moldova (EUBAM) offers an example of successful co-operation, making an important positive contribution to creating conditions for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. The European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), in which Ukrainian police officers participate, constitutes another example of a successful EU-Ukrainian cooperation in crisis management.

XVII. Mandate for the Incoming Presidency

On the basis of the present report and taking into account the European Security Strategy, the incoming Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative and in association with the Commission, is invited to continue work on developing the European Security and Defence Policy, and in particular:

- To prepare and ensure the effective implementation of decisions related to present and future operations and missions, both civilian and military.
- To continue work on civilian capabilities, taking into account the results of the Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference in November 2006 and the Civilian Capability Improvement Plan (Civilian Headline Goal 2008).
- To continue work on the development of military capabilities in the framework of the Headline Goal 2010 on the basis of the agreed Roadmap, i.e. to start work on the Progress Catalogue, and furthermore to actively engage in the elaboration of the Capability Development Plan.
- To take forward work on military rapid response and to explore the scope for review of the EU Military Rapid Response Concept in a joint perspective.
- To further refine the procedures for the actual deployment of rapidly deployable police elements and Civilian Response Teams (CRTs).
- To continue implementing the EU exercise programme.
- To strengthen training in the field of ESDP, encompassing both civilian and military dimensions, including further work on training for civilian crisis management, taking into account Community instruments as well as national assets.
- To support the European Defence Agency in its work, in particular with regard to the Capability Development Plan.
- To take forward work on the improvement of civil-military co-ordination in the plan-
ning and conduct of operations/missions in the light of lessons learned, including on rapid response.

- To explore an improved use of the Civil-Military Cell in the light of lessons learned; to practise the activation of the EU Operations Centre and to test the Civil-Military Cell’s ability rapidly to generate an EU Operations Centre during the MilEx 07.
- To take forward work on the ESDP contribution to security sector reform (SSR) and DDR.
- To continue developing the EU-NATO strategic partnership in crisis management; to ensure mutually reinforcing development of military capabilities where requirements overlap; to ensure practical, effective coordination when the two organizations are engaged in the same theatre, including on Kosovo.
- To continue the EU engagement in the Western Balkans through its ongoing and future activities.
- To further intensify consultations and cooperation with the United Nations in crisis management.
- To continue promoting the effective implementation of relevant human rights related provisions in the context of ESDP crisis management activities, including the provisions of UNSCR 1612.
- To continue promoting gender mainstreaming in the context of ESDP crisis management activities, including the implementation of relevant provisions of UNSCR 1325.
- To continue close dialogue and co-operation with other key partners, in particular the OSCE, European non-EU NATO members, Canada, the USA, Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean countries engaged in the Barcelona process.
- To continue implementing coherent and coordinated support for African partners in line with the EU Africa Strategy and through the EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts.
- To draw lessons learned from the military operation EUFOR RD Congo.
- To enhance dialogue and exchange of information with NGOs and civil society.
- To continue the implementation of the European Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts and prepare the annual presidency report on Conflict Prevention for approval by the European Council in June 2007.
REINFORCING THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMERGENCY AND CRISIS RESPONSE CAPACITIES

Introduction

1. At its June 2006 meeting, the European Council stressed that improving the Union’s responsiveness to emergencies remained a political imperative. It accordingly agreed that particular attention should be given to:
   - further developing the Union’s rapid response capability based on means that Member States make available, including civil protection modules;
   - rapid implementation of steps already agreed, including EU Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements and the identification and coordination of military transport assets in support of disaster response;
   - exercising these procedures and capabilities and learning lessons from these exercises and actual operational experience to improve disaster response;
   - work for adoption by the end of the year of the necessary legal provisions to reinforce the Community’s civil protection capabilities;
   - and closer consular cooperation among EU Member States, including mutual consular assistance points in pre-identified regions.

2. The Finnish Presidency has taken work forward on all aspects of the EU’s emergency response. COREPER has regularly exercised oversight. This report reviews progress achieved across the board during the past six months and sets out the tasks ahead. Future Presidencies are invited to take work forward as a matter of priority on all aspects and report regularly to the Council on the progress made.

3. Improvements are needed in the current arrangements for coordinating all elements of the EU response to serious emergency and crisis, including coordination within and between the Commission and the Council Secretariat, liaison between EU institutions and Member States as well as cooperation between the EU and UN and the country affected.

4. While Member States are responsible for managing emergencies on their territory or assisting their citizens in third countries, other Member States and the EU may, in a spirit of solidarity, play an important supporting role, when requested to do so. Following the report from the Court of Auditors on the Commission’s humanitarian aid response to the Tsunami, the Commission is taking measures to help affected governments manage donor coordination and to clarify roles and responsibilities between DG/ECHO and the Civil Protection Mechanism to improve synergies, while supporting the leading role of UN OCHA in coordinating the humanitarian response.
5. The Finnish Presidency has taken forward discussion on the roles and mandates of the relevant actors. The scope for developing common needs assessments has also been examined. Further work is required to identify ways and means to enhance the EU’s response to serious crisis situations in a concerted manner with efforts of relevant UN bodies.

Developing crisis coordination arrangements

6. Following the endorsement by the Council last June of the manual on crisis coordination, and the development of internal standard operating procedures (SOPs) for crisis coordination arrangements within the Council, an exercise testing these arrangements took place on 30 October. Coreper was immediately given a first evaluation of the exercise and a more elaborate report was submitted subsequently. From the perspective of the Presidency, the exercise successfully tested the mechanics of the CCA SOPs and gave ideas as to the areas where further improvements could be made. Further exercises wider in scope will be conducted in 2007, possibly one per Presidency. The SOPs will continue to be updated in the light of these exercises.

7. Work has continued on further developing the manual on EU emergency and crisis coordination, including extending it to all emergency situations. Consideration has been given to whether greater effectiveness would be ensured by identifying a single default contact point in all Member States, which can be used in all emergency and crisis situations that require operational engagement from neighbours, other Member States, EU structures or other organisations. The Presidency organised an expert meeting in Helsinki on 9/10 November 2006 which discussed the concept and the basic requirements for such a contact point.

8. With respect to experience gained by Member States in bilateral cooperation in emergency and crisis situations, experts have reviewed lessons learnt from bilateral cooperation in combating forest fires as well as from Community financed exercises. To continue this process, the incoming Presidency will host an expert meeting to exchange information and experience in the field of decontamination with a view to improving interoperability of rescue teams from different Member States.

Enhancing EU civil protection capabilities

9. As requested by the European Council, the Presidency has taken forward work on the Commission’s proposals on reinforcing the Union’s civil protection capabilities. The Council on 11 December 2006 reached political agreement on the Civil protection financial instrument.
10. As regards the recast of the Community’s civil protection mechanism, discussions have focused on the definition and organisation of civil protection modules as well as on the respective roles of the Presidency and the Commission in interventions outside the Community. These discussions will continue, also in the light of the European Parliament’s opinion.

**Using military assets in support of disaster relief**

11. On 13 November the Council noted the document “Military support to EU disaster relief – Identification and coordination of available assets and capabilities” as a living document, and agreed on the way ahead. That paper identified a range of potential military assets and capabilities which could support the overall EU disaster response efforts, and presented proposals for coordinating the use of Member States’ voluntary contributions of military assets and capabilities with a view to enabling an immediate response. These arrangements will be subject to review as necessary in the light of experience gained. Any use of Member States’ military resources in support of a coordinated EU disaster response will follow international guidelines, notably the Oslo and MCDA guidelines.

12. Identification and prioritisation of a list of relevant military assets and capabilities was based on an overview of recent disasters (2004 tsunami in South-East Asia, 2005 Katrina hurricane, 2005 Pakistan earthquake, 2006 Algeria (Tindouf) flood and 2006 Indonesia (Java) earthquake). Based on this examination, military assets and capabilities that were used and that would be likely to remain the main focus of potential military involvement in the future include: strategic transport (air/sea); tactical transport (e.g. in-theatre use of helicopters); medical units and/or field hospitals; and logistics. These arrangements will be subject to review as necessary in the light of experience gained.

13. Standing Operating Procedures have been finalised for matching transport needs and available military owned or chartered transportation capabilities from Member States which could be used to complement civilian means of transport. These detail the service and information exchanges between the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission, the Multinational Movement Coordination Centres (Athens and Eindhoven), and the points of contact designated by Member States to deal with military transport aspects for immediate response.

**Promoting consular assistance**

14. Improving consular protection of EU citizens remains a political imperative and EU citizens rightly expect their governments to be able to provide concrete and tangible assistance for them rapidly in times of crisis.
15. The crisis in Lebanon served to underline the strong sense of solidarity which exists in the EU. Member States are ready to cooperate closely together and to use all means available in order to respond rapidly and efficiently and ensure that no EU citizen is left behind. Mutual assistance during the evacuation operations proved exemplary, following to a large extent the common consular guidelines which were adopted last June. Also in this field, the Lebanese crisis demonstrated the importance of enhanced coordination efforts amongst capitals via teleconferences as well as the need to cooperate closely with third countries.

16. During the Finnish Presidency work has been taken forward to develop the concept of “lead nations” to enhance the effectiveness and coherence of consular crises mechanisms in third countries. Lead State(s) would provide a coordinating framework for all Member States with nationals in the third countries.

17. Member States have also taken practical steps in order to improve the exchange of information, EU consular visibility, and local coordination and cooperation among Member States’ consular staff.

18. The concrete implementation of ideas such as mutual consular service points will continue, and co-location possibilities are being examined, alongside possible solutions to the legal issues that may arise.

19. As requested by the June European Council, the SG/HR and the Commission have submitted a joint report on closer consular cooperation among EU Member States, including mutual consular assistance points in pre-identified regions. The Council is invited to examine the further general measures suggested in that report.
THE EU AND AFRICA: TOWARDS A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
THE WAY FORWARD AND KEY ACHIEVEMENTS IN 2006

I. The way forward

In 2006, substantive progress has been made in many areas of the EU Africa Strategy, showing that the European Union remains determined to honour all the pledges made in the EU Africa Strategy’s ten-year framework in view of helping Africa to reach the Millennium Development Goals. At the same time, more needs to be done. The EU needs to continue to implement its commitments with diligence and take new bold steps. To build on, and consolidate progress made in 2006, the European Council is therefore recommended to endorse the following priority actions for 2007:

1. Strengthen the strategic partnership with Africa:
   - Reinforce the Political dialogue with the African Union and the Sub-Regional Organisations and expedite the work towards the holding of the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in the second half of 2007.
   - Work towards a Joint EU-Africa Strategy, building on the principles of ownership and mutual accountability, to be worked out with the involvement of civil society and other stakeholders and to be adopted by the EU-Africa Summit.
   - Increase the coherence and effectiveness of all EU external policies and promote policy coherence for development on the basis of the rolling PCD work programme for 2007. As one concrete measure, enhance the EU presence to the African Union in Addis Ababa.
   - Implement and monitor the collective commitment in scaling-up of our aid to 0.56% of GNI by 2010 and 0.7% of GNI by 2015. Improve effectiveness of EU aid through aligning operations with African partner countries' policies, priorities and systems, using various instruments in a coherent, coordinated and flexible manner, including with other donors, and implement and monitor agreed measures such as joint multi-annual programming and division of labour building on existing processes whenever possible.
   - Launch the global Development Cooperation Instrument with almost 17 billion € and the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument worth over 11 billion € for the period 2007-13 to which Africa will remain an important beneficiary, in addition to the 22.7 billion € for the ACP countries agreed over the 2008-13 period under the 10th European Development Fund.
   - Pursue as soon as possible a structured trilateral dialogue on Africa with China as agreed in the 9th EU-China Summit, in support of common interests and Africa’s own

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1 The full text, accompanied by the relevant minutes statements, is set out in the Conclusion of the Council of 24 May 2005 (Ref. 9266/05).
commitment to poverty reduction and sustainable development underpinned by peace and security, human rights, good governance, democracy and sound economic management.

- Agree to review progress in relations with Africa in December 2007 and on an annual basis thereafter. This review should be based on an in-depth discussion in the relevant Council Working Groups on the implementation of the EU Strategy and on lessons learnt.

2. Support Africa’s quest for peace and good governance:

- Intensify dialogue, cooperation and partnership on the challenges of conflict and insecurity with the African Union (AU) and Sub-Regional Organisations (SROs).
- Step up support for African capacity building for conflict prevention, management and resolution, closely geared to further concrete progress in developing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). This will include targeted assistance to the African Standby Force, including structured and cohesive EU training assistance, and support for logistics requirements. This will be closely coordinated with the African side and other international partners. We will continue to provide financial and technical contributions to African peace support operations and will enhance overall coherence of EU support through greater co-ordination of activities undertaken by Member States individually or collectively, by the Commission and the Council General Secretariat.
- Continue to work towards a comprehensive peace in Sudan and work with the African Union to find a sustainable political solution in Darfur, including through support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and an increased role of the UN in line with the conclusions of the high level meeting in Addis Ababa on 16th November. Continue to engage in the Sudan as a whole, particularly as concerns support and evaluation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The regional dimension, especially Chad and Central African Republic, shall be taken into account.
- Work with African partners to consolidate stability and improved governance in the Great Lakes region, in particular with regard to the DRC and Burundi. Specific focus will be given to the envisaged EU coordinating role in the field of security sector reform and the follow-up to the transition in the DRC.
- Actively strive to prevent and combat the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in Africa.
- Support African efforts to strengthen the governance performance of African states and regions, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism, and promote civil society and other non state actors through bilateral programs and the Governance Initiative. Support the fight against corruption, human trafficking, illegal drugs and organized crime. Cooperate more systematically in the field of democracy promotion, human
and gender through a reinforced political dialogue. Collaborate with other international and regional organisations with experience in the field of governance. Remain strongly committed to the implementation of the UNSC resolution 1325 in post-conflict and reconstruction countries. Ensure the mainstreaming of gender issues in all EU policies and actions. Deploy European Union Election Observation Missions to key elections. Consider other forms of EU electoral support and monitoring where feasible.

- Improve governance in the field of environment and sustainable management of resources. In particular, conclude agreements under the EU Action Plan for *Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade* (FLEGT) with 6 African countries, continue the work of the *Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative* (EITI) to allow 5 more African countries to report against EITI criteria and implement the 'Kimberley Process Certification Scheme' for diamonds.

3. Boost broad-based economic growth and promote sustainable development:

- Encouraged by the recent re-starting of informal negotiations on the *Doha round* urge all countries to work hard and show the necessary flexibility for an ambitious, predevelopment outcome of the negotiations.
- Finalise in partnership with the ACP the formal and comprehensive *Economic Partnership Agreements* (EPAs) review in accordance with the joint ACP-EU declaration and the Cotonou Agreement. Conclude negotiations on EPAs as instruments for development that promote regional integration by the end of 2007. The institutional arrangements to be established should include the setting up of an appropriate and transparent monitoring mechanism.
- Strive to reach the target of €1 billion from Member States and €1 billion from the EC in support of the *aid for trade initiative*, by 2010. To this effect, agree on a Joint EU Aid for Trade Strategy as set out in the Council Conclusions of October 2006.
- Reach agreement on revised *Rules of Origin* under the Generalised System of Preferences as well as other preferential schemes of the EU, based on the principle that these be as simple, transparent and development friendly as possible, following the Review currently underway.
- Continue and accelerate the implementation of the comprehensive EU Action Plan on *agricultural commodity dependency* and the cotton action plan including on the Price Management operation.
- Note the Declaration adopted at the EU Africa *Business Forum* held on 16-17 November and the idea of the second Forum in the second half of 2007.
- Facilitate interconnectivity at inter-regional and continental level through bilateral programs and EC Aid, for example the EU-Africa Partnership on *Infrastructure*, including through the operationalisation of its Trust Fund. Promote clean energy,
energy efficiency, access to energy and sustainable use of resources, including through the implementation of the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund for Africa.

- Promote broad-based economic and pro-poor growth and opportunities for *decent work* for all.
- Pay increased attention to *food security* and agricultural productivity growth.
- Work with Africa to face the challenges of sustainable development and environmental degradation including desertification. Accelerate action on *climate change, including adaptation*, by building on the review of the EU Action Plan on Climate Change and Development that will take place in 2007. Support partner countries through clean development initiatives and capacity building on sustainable resource management. Increase the mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction and environmental issues in development programs.
- Accelerate efforts to provide clean *water* and adequate sanitation including by reinvigorating the 2002 EU Water Initiative.

4. Invest in people

- Support African partner countries to ensure that all children complete good quality primary schooling by 2015. Promote predictable financing to long term national education sector programmes. Foster regional centres of excellence for research and higher *education*, inter-alia through the Nyerere Programme, a new student exchange scheme across Africa.
- Provide further, also on a long-term predictable basis, robust financial and technical support to African countries in their efforts to deliver decent health care and to confront *HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis* noting the EU is likely to provide more than 65% in 2007 of the total contributions of the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria. Step up EU support to the development of new preventive technologies such as vaccines and microbicides and demonstrate strong leadership with respect to the need to reach out to vulnerable groups with prevention and care. Implement the EU action plan on recruitment of health workers. As concerns other communicable diseases, Member States will continue to provide considerable support to the WHO and also subscribe to the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, the African Programme for Onchocerciasis Control, the Medicines for Malaria Venture, the international finance facility for immunisation (IFFIm) and the International Drug Purchasing Facility (UNITAID).
- Make *migration* work for development while combating trafficking, minimising adverse effects such as brain drain and strengthening the protection of refugees, through the implementation of the declarations and actions plans adopted at the EU Africa Ministerial Meeting in Tripoli of 22-23 November and at the regional
Ministerial Euro-African Conference in Rabat of 10-11 July. The EU recognises the role played by migrants and diaspora communities in the development of their countries of origin and destination.

**II. Key achievements in the implementation of the EU Africa strategy**

Africa has remained at the top of the political agenda in Europe and the Strategy has proved to be a useful common framework for united European progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. The following summarises the key achievements in relation to the main objectives of the 2005 Strategy. (A report on the implementation of the Strategy by the Commission and the SG/HR has already been provided to the GAERC in October).

1. Dialogue and cooperation

One of the most positive developments since the adoption of the Strategy is the intensification of the EU’s cooperation and dialogue with the pan-African institutions, notably the African Union (AU). The EU Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting in Bamako in December 2005 welcomed the then newly adopted EU Africa Strategy and agreed to progressively develop a “Joint EU/Africa Strategy”. Preparatory work on this Joint Strategy has begun in July 2006. In addition to that, a consultation process, involving important stakeholders on both the European and African side has been agreed by the EU Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting in Brazzaville in October 2006. This process is set to start in January 2007. Taking into account the outcome of these consultations, a draft Joint Strategy will be prepared and submitted for adoption by a second EU/Africa summit to be held under the Portuguese Presidency of the EU in 2007.

There has also been progress in deepening the cooperation and partnership between the European Commission, the Council General Secretariat and the AU Commission as part of the EU/Africa dialogue. A third meeting of the two Commission Colleges was held on 2 October 2006 in Addis Ababa, with the participation of President Barroso and a number of other Commissioners as well as a senior level representative of SG/HR Solana. A concrete outcome of the meeting was the agreement on an institutional support programme of €55 million for the AU and the launching of an inter-institutional exchange programme for officials and trainees. A number of Member States have also provided significant assistance to further the institutional development of the AU and Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Discussions are currently underway concerning donor basket funding mechanisms once adequate financial systems are in place, and several Member States are willing to scale up support once progress has been made in this area.
2. Peace and security

One important topic for this dialogue is African capabilities and efforts to prevent, manage and resolve conflict and to keep peace in their own continent. The Presidency, SG/HR Solana and the Commission have been in regular contact with their AU counterparts, as have several individual Member States and the AU. Discussions and cooperation have focused both on crisis and conflict matters and on support for the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF).

In many cases this dialogue has led to common political approaches, strategies and actions. In some cases the EU has also provided direct financial support to African-led peace support operations. A key example is Darfur where the EU has provided a total of €242 million from the African Peace Facility (APF), as well as bilateral financing and a significant number of military and civilian police personnel, for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Many Member States as well as the Commission have also been heavily engaged in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction support including in the South. Together with other partners, four EU Member States recently opened a joint donor office in southern Sudan to coordinate this support. The APF has also been used to fund the CEMAC-led FOMUC-operation in the Central African Republic and to – complemented by a Member State’s bilateral support of €740,000 – support a short-term AU-led mission in the Comoros during the election period in the spring of 2006.

To allow for a continuation of the EU support to African-led operations, it was decided to increase the short term funding of the APF by €50 million and to provide an amount of €300 million for the APF from the 10th EDF for an initial three-year period.

In other conflicts and peace processes, AU/EU cooperation has taken place within the context of a UN framework. This was for example the case for the deployment of the military force EUFOR which was done at the request of the UN Security Council, and welcomed by the AU. EUFOR helped to protect the electoral process in Democratic Republic of Congo complementing the efforts of the UN’s MONUC mission. Several Member States were also heavily involved in this process, including through provision of military personnel, equipment and financial resources for MONUC and EUFOR, as well as through considerable support to the electoral process and reconstruction efforts, and involvement in the wider political process in the Great Lakes region.

In addition, the EU played a major role in the efforts to restore peace and stability in Somalia. The Commission and a number of Member States are members of the international contact group for Somalia and the EU as a whole has over the last year provided considerable development assistance focusing on governance, security, emergency humanitarian relief and assistance to service delivery, as well as de-mining activities. In the Ivory Coast, several Member States have provided humanitarian assistance and supported UNDP to carry out programmes for DDR activities. One Member State and the Commission have also provided financial support to the Office of the Special...
Representative of the UNSG for the elections. At EU level, cooperation took place within the framework of the International Working Group (IWG) tasked to monitor the peace process. The EU and also its Member States have invested in the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea. One Member State has reported a provision of €5 million to the UN Trust Fund for the Support of the Peace Process (2004-06) and another has provided €520,000 of non-operational support.

To strengthen Africa’s own capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, Member States remain active through bilateral instruments and programmes. Examples include targeted financial support for the implementation of the AU’s Peace and Security Agenda, assistance in the build-up phase of the African Standby Force and for the strengthening of the AU Commission’s Peace and Security Department. Many also assist the peace and security frameworks of regional organizations such as IGAD, ECOWAS and SADC. Several Member States conduct training courses for African officers and provide financial and technical support for African peacekeeping schools, including African Centres of Excellence. In some cases, the financial support is focused on vulnerable groups, such as programmes for child-soldiers in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC, while other programmes target women and children associated with fighting forces and groups and disabled ex-combatants.

As a response to the emerging African Peace and Security Architecture, the Council General Secretariat and the Commission in June 2006 jointly presented a proposed “European Union Concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts”. The Concept aims at better combining EU and Member States resources and instruments in a coordinated, coherent and consistent manner. This approach has already been successfully applied during the EU’s financial and technical support for the efforts of the AU and the SROs to draw up a concept for the future African Standby Force. To identify potential areas for further support under the capacity building envelope of the APF, the AU Commission, with the support of the Commission and the CGS, in 2006 launched an assessment of long-term African needs in the field of peace and security. The needs-assessment should lead to a comprehensive support programme for the AU and relevant SROs.

Progress has also been made in the area of post-conflict reconstruction and considerable attention and resources have been devoted to the strategically important area of Security Sector Reform (SSR). The EU has now adopted a policy framework for support to SSR that combines to the extent possible the potential of Community and CFSP/ESDP instruments (Council Doc 9967/06). ESDP involvement with SSR in Africa has taken place in the DRC through the EUSEC and EUPOL missions. The Commission has also provided support to SSR in 26 African countries through capacity assistance to the building of law enforcement agencies and key ministries in the areas of justice reform, rule of law and civilian oversight. Finally, in 2006 the Finnish Presidency launched an initiative of defining the role of the EU in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).
Human rights and good governance

Human rights issues are integral to the EU’s work with individual countries in Africa, covering dialogue and support programmes for human rights, children’s rights, democracy and governance. For the ACP countries these issues are addressed through the political dialogue, in accordance with Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, supported by practical approaches such as support to the consolidation of civil society, the strengthening of parliaments, and decentralisation. Much attention has also been paid to reinforcing public administration structures, with many Member States focusing their bilateral aid programmes on strengthening local authorities and improving public financial management.

EU Election Observation missions (EOM) have been deployed in the DRC, Uganda, Zambia Mauritania and EU electoral experts were sent to Madagascar. Member States have supported targeted interventions in related areas such as providing voting material, civic education and encouraging freedom and independence of press in partner countries, notably through support to local media, and programmes to strengthen national parliaments.

Where political dialogue has failed to prevent or adequately address situations of serious violations of human rights, the rule of law or democratic processes, such violations have continued to be addressed through consultations under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement with Liberia, Guinea, Mauritania, Togo and Zimbabwe. Following consultations, normal political dialogue and full cooperation was resumed with Liberia, while progress was observed in Guinea, Togo and Mauritania.

The EU Strategy places specific emphasis on the management of natural resources as a specific aspect of good governance, notably because of the close link between this and peace and stability in many countries. Key actions in 2006 included active participation in the Kimberley Process and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI); the implementation of the 2003 EU Action Plan for Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT), and support to the Diamonds for Development (D4D) initiative in Liberia. One Member State was engaged in the programmes for sustainable use of resources in the fisheries (NAUTA Programme) and energy (oil and gas) sectors, and provided €1 million to UNEP for the generation of sustainable forestry in Kenya.

Last but not least, the Commission has adopted the Communication “Governance in the European Consensus on Development – towards a harmonised approach in the EU” (COM 2006(421)). This “Governance Initiative” includes an incentive mechanism that will give ACP partner countries access to additional funding according to their commitments to achieve concrete results in their democratic governance reform programmes. €2.7 billion from the 10th European Development Fund will be reserved for such incentives, which also will include political and financial support for the African Peer Review Mechanism. On 16 October 2006 the Council adopted Conclusions to welcome this approach, to emphasise that governance is a central element in the EU relations with partner countries, including development cooperation, and to guide activity forward.
4. Regional integration, trade, private sector development and interconnectivity.

Negotiations for *Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA)* have progressed with the four African EPA regions. A lot is at stake in these negotiations for both sides, and a number of important issues still need to be addressed. However, the EU is confident that solutions can be found and that the deadline for the conclusion of the agreements by the end of 2007 will be met. A number of Member States have financed studies to further support the EPA process. Several are also in the process of developing specific regional programmes to address cross-border challenges and provide targeted support directly to RECs to be able to better engage in the negotiations. Member States are also committed to provide further support for *Aid for Trade*, in addition to the existing programmes financed with EDF resources. The target is €1 billion from Member States and €1 billion from the EC by 2010, of which a substantial share should be devoted to ACP countries.

Member States remained engaged in *infrastructure development* via numerous international initiatives, including the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa. In particular, assistance was provided for the water sector, where several Member States are key players in the global sector dialogue taking place for example in the Global Water Partnership, the World Bank Water and Sanitation Program-Africa (WSP-AF), the UN Water Board and the UNEP Dams and Development Project. Several Member States also support cooperation between regional river-basin organizations. Other bilateral support programmes for infrastructure development included technical assistance to the African Development Bank, support for the program for Biomass Energy Conservation in Southern Africa and support to the World Bank (e.g. to the West African Program for Traditional Energy (RPTES) and the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program).

The Community will set up an EU-Africa *Partnership on Infrastructure* (COM(2006) 376 final, 13 July 2006). The Partnership, a joint EU effort, responds to the development goals of the AU and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). It aims at substantially increasing the EU’s investment in African infrastructure and to support programmes that facilitate interconnectivity at a continental and regional level: identify and address missing links in existing networks, harmonise transport policies, develop integrated water management, develop cross-border and regional energy infrastructure and promote efforts to bridge the digital divide. A total amount of up to €5.6 billion from the 10th EDF will be allocated to support the African Infrastructure. Efforts will be supported by a *new financial fund for infrastructure in Africa*, implemented jointly with the European Investment Bank (EIB). This Fund is an innovative way for the Community and interested Member States to co-finance projects with the EIB and other European and African financial and development institutions. On 16 October 2006 the Council adopted Conclusions on the EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructure, wherein it has underlined the EU’s belief that infrastructure is a key driving force for economic and human development in Africa.
The EU Africa Strategy underlines the need of much more foreign investment to promote economic growth. Several Member States also support the Investment Climate Facility for Africa, and some operate bilateral investment funds and investment organisations, some of which have a particular focus on micro-finance while others focus on the promotion of public-private partnerships (PPPs). At EU level, the Investment Facility of the EDF (€1.2 billion from the 9th EDF) is a major source of financing for the private sector and for supporting the creation of PPPs. To give more visibility to the African private sector and to improve its chances of creating business opportunities, a first EU-Africa Business Forum, was organised in November 2006 in Brussels, demonstrating considerable interest by the private sector from both continents to engage further in this dialogue.

5. Migration and development

Migration has become one of the key topics of the EU/Africa dialogue. A regional Euro-African Conference was organised in Rabat on 10-11 July and an EU/Africa Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development took place in Tripoli on 22-23 November 2006. The Tripoli conference resulted into a joint EU-Africa declaration on Migration and Development which provides a strong basis for further cooperation between the two continents. Dialogue on Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement has been initiated with Mauritania, Mali and Senegal and will be extended to other countries. The EU aims to work in partnership to make best possible use of the opportunities that migration offers. Complementary measures of Member States in support of this policy included the signing of protocols of bilateral targeted cooperation agreements with selected African states, aiming at the training of officials as well as the support of the respective law-making processes on migration. Another measure is the establishment of an observatory of migration movements with these countries, to promote a better knowledge of the migratory realities in the countries involved, through legislative and statistical information, studies in the field of migration and asylum, and the creation of a contacts network. One Member State has developed a specific set of policies in place to address brain drain of key workers coming to its borders, including a code of practice on international recruitment, in particular for health workers.

6. Other key development issues

The Community and almost all Member States remained involved in the support to the education sector, at primary, secondary and tertiary levels. In primary education, many strongly support the Education for All initiative. Many also support networks between universities such as the Development Partners in Higher Education (DELPHE) initiative, research cooperation with European universities, support to the African Association of Universities and specific support to various African institutions with a
sub-regional task for tertiary education in various themes. Some Member States also provide scholarships for African students. At EU level, and in addition to substantive support via the bilateral aid programmes, discussions are taking place on modalities for Community support to the AU in setting up the Nyerere Programme (a student exchange programme between African universities and research institutions), and an “ACP window” in the Erasmus Mundus programme is likely to be provided for 2007 to enable more African students to take part in post-graduate courses in Europe.

As concerns the fight against HIV/AIDS and communicable diseases, Member States and the Community continue to be heavily engaged. At the global level, the EU action comes via participation in the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria. In 2006/2007 the EU is likely to provide more than 65% of total contributions, which represents a considerable increase. Not including Member States’ additional bilateral efforts, the EU contribution to the Fund in 2006 amounts to €90 million (out of which €62 million comes from the EDF and €28 million from the EC budget). Member States are also running targeted programmes with individual partner countries and with regional organisations such as ECOWAS and EAC. Examples are activities financed via the African Medical and Research Foundation (AMREF) and the Hope for African Children Initiative (HACI).

Many Member States and the Community were strongly involved in the food security sector, primarily as an integral part of country programmes and through support to the FAO and the WFP as well as for regional early warning systems. One Member State intends to establish a specific Hunger Task Force, drawing together its public and private sector expertise to support international efforts to reduce hunger. Several Member States provide support to agricultural and livelihood research, working closely with partners such as ASARECA (Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in East and Central Africa), CORAF (West and Central African Council for Agricultural Research and Development) and FARA (Forum for African Agricultural Research). The Commission is currently finalising the programming for 2007-2010 of its Thematic Programme on Food Security, with a special emphasis on Research and Technology on Global Public Goods, supporting continental and regional approaches to food security, promoting innovation to fight food insecurity, improving food security response strategies through better linking information and decision making and supporting advocacy, harmonisation and alignment.

In the field of environment Member States are providing support for the Global Environment Facility, the High Seas Task Force on illegal fishing, the implementation of the G8 commitment to help Africa benefit fully from the Global Climate Observing System and to the emerging strategic approach to international chemicals management. The Commission is closely involved in discussions with the AU on issues such as desertification, sustainable water and forest management, climate change, environmental security and environmental monitoring through observatories. The decision to fund the African Monitoring of the Environment for Sustainable Development (AMESD) programme (€21 million) that will be implemented and coordinated by the AU is a first step
in increasing the use of Earth Observation data in natural resource management and in moving towards a continental approach to cross-border issues.

The cooperation with African authorities regarding Avian Flu has been stepped up. During the Beijing conference, the Community and its Member States pledged a total of €210 million in response to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), out of which €10 million is financed from the MEDA programme and €30 million from the EDF. A further €30 million come from the 6th Research Framework Programme.

A dialogue is ongoing between the EU and African partners to identify mutual benefits and needs for cooperation in the area of Science, Technology and Research. In addition to numerous activities within previous framework programmes for research (in particular, the management of natural resources, food security, environment and the currently implemented "European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership, EDCTP, which is a research programme for development of new vaccines and drugs to tackle major communicable diseases like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria), the 7th EU Framework Programme for Research and Development (FP7), which will come into force in 2007, is open to participation by third countries for research activities in all areas of the framework programme.

As concerns the promotion of labour markets and decent work, the Commission hosted a major international conference on the subject in December, to promote further dialogue among key stakeholders. Efforts via bilateral channels include support to the Youth Employment Network (for example the establishment of a Youth Employment Unit for West Africa in Senegal) and to the ILO’s Decent Work Country Programmes which will link to national plans in Africa as well as financial support to trade unions and promotion of social dialogue.

7. More and better aid

The EU remains on track to achieve its initial collective 0.39% ODA target by 2006 and its intermediate collective 0.56% ODA target by 2010, and to ensure that half of the envisaged collective aid increases as of 2006 will be allocated to Africa. Today 51% of EU ODA is allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and seven sub-Saharan countries are among the top ten recipients of EU aid.

The bulk of the financial support provided by Member States and the Community was channeled through the regular and long-standing cooperation programmes with individual countries and regions. The Commission has in 2006 progressively sought to align its planning and tools for dialogue with partner countries with the principles and priorities of the EU Africa Strategy. The main vehicle is the 10th European Development Fund with €22.7 billion for the period 2008-2013, out of which approximately €20 billion will be allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa). The other main instrument for translating the Strategy into practice at EU level is the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The support under the ENPI for
partner countries in North Africa for the period 2007-2013 is currently being pro-
grammed. Africa will also remain an important beneficiary of other budget funded exter-
nal actions instruments covering the period 2007-2013 such as the new Development
Cooperation Instrument, the new Stability Instrument and the new Instrument for the
Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights. ECHO will also continue to provide
humanitarian and emergency aid. All in all, those instruments will add at least another
€4 billion to the Community’s support to Africa.

For Member States with a long-standing cooperation with Africa, the Strategy has
become one of several sets of commitments to Africa in addition to existing national pol-
icy and implementation frameworks. It is interesting to note that as concerns the
Member States who joined the EU in 2004, the EU Africa Strategy has greatly helped
shaping the emerging policy frameworks for cooperation with Africa and has encour-
aged these countries to intensify the cooperation with Africa. The EU Strategy has in this
context been seen as a helpful tool in selecting priority countries for aid programmes, in
linking aid activities to the Millennium Development Goals and in combining aid activ-
ities with political, economic and social relations with African countries. Several of the
new EU Member States have also, since the adoption of the EU Africa Strategy, placed
greater emphasis on addressing the security concerns of our African partners and assist-
ing them in development of pan-African regional instruments of crisis prevention, early
warning and crisis management.

Last but not least, the EU has fully endorsed the commitments on aid effectiveness set
out in the March 2005 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. In 2006 the EU has devel-
oped a number of concrete measures for immediate implementation of the commit-
ments such as a format for Country Strategy papers and principles towards joint multi-
annual programming and a mandate to make further progress on complementarity.
Joint programming is being prepared in countries such as Tanzania, Uganda, South
Africa, Somalia and Ethiopia.
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2006, another year in which ESDP has gone from strength to strength. Unfortunately, it is true that its dynamism is also a symptom of the continuing deterioration in the international security situation since 2003.

The civil war in Iraq, the nuclear issue in Iran, the war in Lebanon, the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock, the energy, Darfur, the disintegration of Somalia, tensions between Georgia and Russia: all these events have increased instability in the EU’s neighborhood in 2006, both to the east and to the south.

At the same time, ESDP’s rude good health also shows that the Member States, despite their major differences over the reform, purpose and budget of the European Union, now share a common vision of their strategic responsibility and of the overriding necessity for the Union to influence the political evolution of the world.

This Volume VII of the series of the Core Documents on European Defence offers a selection of the statements and of the decisions taken by the EU in 2006. Among them, the Operation EUFOR Congo and the deployment of European forces in Lebanon, the decisions and the preparatory missions set up regarding the police and rule of law mission in Afghanistan. With regard to the actual organisation of ESDP, the most memorable achievements in 2006 were the publication by the European Defence Agency of the Long-Term Vision report, the implementation of the Code of Conduct on weapons transfers, the finalisation of the EU Battlegroups, the reinforcement of civil capacities and especially the coordination between civilian and military crisis management instruments.