Enter the EU Battlegroups

Gustav Lindstrom
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Gustav Lindstrom
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e tous les projets lancés par les Européens depuis la création de la PESD, les battlegroups (groupements tactiques) ont été et restent parmi les plus populaires. Tous les Etats membres ont voulu en être. Certains ont entrepris de réels efforts de modernisation militaire afin de remplir leurs engagements en la matière. Les calendriers ont été respectés, à un rythme que ne connaissent pas à l’inverse les différents objectifs de forces (Headline Goals), civils ou militaires, également sousscrits par les Etats membres. Si bien que les battlegroups sont devenus autant un outil de la transformation militaire européenne qu’un instrument opérationnel à l’égard des crises en cours.


Telles sont quelques-unes des questions qui structurent le présent Cahier de Chaillot, rédigé par Gustav Lindstrom, senior research fellow à l’Institut, sur la base d’un long et patient travail d’enquête auprès des acteurs et responsables concernés. Par la somme et la qualité des informations qu’elle contient, par la pertinence des analyses qu’elle propose, cette étude sur les battlegroups constituera sans aucun doute un ouvrage de référence, aussi bien sur le plan technique qu’au regard des différents enjeux stratégiques et politiques soulevés par un tel outil.

Au moins deux d’entre eux méritent ici d’être soulignés. Le premier concerne le niveau d’adéquation entre l’outil et le besoin. Depuis
quelques années, aussi bien l'Union européenne que l'OTAN ont insisté sur la création d’outils militaires de réponse et d’intervention rapide, les battlegroups d’un côté, la Force de réaction de l’OTAN de l’autre. Or la gestion des crises réelles, qu’il s’agisse de l’Afghanistan, du Liban, de l’Irak, du Kosovo, montre que ce qui manque surtout aux responsables militaires ce sont les hommes : des effectifs, civils et militaires, nombreux, capables d’être déployés sur un temps long dans une théâtre donné, pour des missions de longue haleine de maintien de la paix et de stabilisation, toutes choses prévues moins par le concept de groupements tactiques que par un autre projet de la PESD, le Corps européen de 60 000 hommes envisagé dès 1999 à Helsinki.

La deuxième question concerne la relation entre le niveau national et le niveau européen dans la mise en œuvre de la PESD. Chacun sait que le contrat de base de la PESD reste, aux yeux de tous les Etats membres, la primauté d’un niveau national de contrôle et de coopération. Tout ce qui pourrait donc impliquer un niveau d’intégration militaire européenne effective et permanente – qu’il s’agisse d’entraînement des unités, de réserve stratégique, de formation militaire, de planification et de conduite des opérations, reste donc exclu. Les groupements tactiques n’échappent pas à cette règle : ce sont les Etats parties prenantes de tel ou tel battlegroup qui assurent ou fournissent l’entraînement, la certification, la réserve, la planification, le quartier général d’opérations. Cette structuration de la PESD fut et reste sans doute l’une des conditions majeures de son acceptabilité politique à 27. Qu’elle soit aussi la condition de son efficacité militaire reste toutefois à démontrer.

Paris, février 2007
Introduction

This Chaillot Paper analyses the origins and evolution of the EU Battlegroups. Its objective is twofold: to give readers an overview of the EU Battlegroup (EU BG) Concept and to highlight some of the EU BGs’ main challenges and prospects. To date, surprisingly few studies have been dedicated to the EU BGs. The four principal research questions are:

1. What are the origins of the EU Battlegroups?
2. What is the EU BG Concept?
3. What are the main challenges and prospects facing the EU BGs?
4. How are the EU BGs likely to evolve over the next few years?

To answer these questions, the report is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 provides an account of the origins of the EU BGs. It considers relevant political meetings that laid the foundation for the EU Battlegroups such as the Helsinki Council Summit held in December 1999. It also takes into account the operational experiences acquired during Operation Artemis that provided the operational template for the EU BGs. The chapter ends with a description of the EU BG Concept – covering elements such as force structure, mission spectrum, and planning processes.

Chapter 2 analyses the principal challenges facing the EU BGs. It first considers ‘operational’ challenges such as strategic reserve and deployability requirements. It then analyses those challenges that are more ‘political’ in nature, such as EU BG employability prospects and the impact of rotation schedules on deployment patterns. In the light of these, the chapter discusses potential solutions as well as their respective merits and drawbacks.

Chapter 3 considers EU BG prospects beyond Full Operational Capability (FOC). The chapter provides an overview of the drivers that are likely to impact on the future evolution of the EU BGs. Among them are force transformation processes and increasing...
civil-military coordination requirements. The chapter also analyses exogenous factors that may affect the employability of the EU BGs. Examples range from budgetary pressures to the growth in private military companies.

Finally, the conclusion summarises the main findings of the research paper and offers recommendations. This study contains three annexes that provide additional information on initial EU BG commitments, the Headline Goal 2010, and the EU BG roster.

The information used to write this Chaillot Paper stems from a variety of sources. To the extent possible, all official open source documentation on the EU BGs was consulted. The same applies to information accessed from relevant research reports from the academic or think tank world. The author has also benefited from extensive access to policymakers and planners directly involved with the development of the EU Battlegroups. Among them are EU Member State officials, staff in the Council General Secretariat (DG E VIII), and military personnel within the EU Military Staff (Policy & Plans Division; Logistics & Resources Division). The author is particularly indebted to EUMS and Council General Secretariat personnel who kindly agreed to review the document. Their input has been invaluable during the writing process. Needless to say, any error or omission is the author’s responsibility alone.
The origins of the EU Battlegroups

This chapter describes the origins of the EU Battlegroups. It begins with an overview of the rapid response objectives laid down at the Council Summit held in Helsinki in 1999 and in subsequent bilateral and trilateral meetings between EU Member States. It takes into account the operational experience acquired during the EU’s first autonomous military operation (Artemis) and how it provided a reference for the EU BG Concept. The chapter ends with a description of the EU BGs’ generic composition, the potential missions, and the decision-making process – identifying some of the challenges that are analysed in greater detail in Chapter 2.

Historic background

The initial seeds for the concept of the EU Battlegroups can be traced back to the European Council Summit meeting held in Helsinki on 10-11 December 1999. While the establishment of the Headline Goal 2003 and its associated catalogue of up to 50,000-60,000 personnel was the principal outcome of the summit, the Helsinki Presidency Conclusions note that special attention will be given to a ‘rapid reaction capability.’ Within the Helsinki Headline Goal obligations it is specified that EU Member States should be able to provide ‘smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness.’ These and similar statements would serve as the political underpinning to the future battlegroups.

The concept of a small-sized rapid response element was revisited at the Franco-British summit meeting held at Le Touquet on 4 February 2003. The Summit Declaration highlights the need to further improve ‘European capabilities in planning and deploying forces at short notice, including the initial deployment of land, sea, and air forces within 5-10 days.’ The achievement of such a

2. The term ‘autonomous’ means ‘without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities’.
rapid response capacity is considered a ‘European priority’ and an essential component of the rapid response elements described in the Headline Goal 2010.5

However, it would not be until the execution of military operation Artemis in 2003 that the viability of such capabilities was considered more practically. Artemis provided EU policymakers and planners with a real-life template for future rapid response deployments. In many ways, it mirrored the model provided by UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) in the former Yugoslavia in 1992 for the rapid response elements under the Headline Goal 2003.

Following a request by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Artemis was launched in June 2003 with the objective of stabilising security conditions in parts of the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The EU deployment – engaging approximately 2,000 personnel – gave the UN time to strengthen its numbers on the ground and pass to a Chapter VII mandate.6 EU personnel were rapidly assembled with the expectation to remain deployed for a period of approximately three months.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 10</td>
<td>Request by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to President Jacques Chirac regarding a possible deployment to Bunia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 19</td>
<td>GAERC tasks SG/HR Solana to initiate a Crisis Management Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution 1484 authorises the deployment of an Interim Emergency multinational force Bunia until 1 September 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 5</td>
<td>EU Council Joint Action – authorising Artemis and approving logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6</td>
<td>1st elements arrive in the area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 12</td>
<td>EU Council decision approves operation plan and launch of Artemis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 6</td>
<td>Artemis reaches full deployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Table 1, work on the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) – in which the political-strategic parameters for an operation are initially set – began on 19 May 2003 at the request of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC). About two weeks later, on 5 June, the EU adopted a Joint Action launching the operation. On 8 June, the Operation Commander issued the Operation Plan (OPLAN) outlining required military

5. Ibid.
7. Some of the rapidity can be attributed to prior French planning and preparations undertaken by the Centre de planification et de conduite des opérations (Operation Mamba).
elements to execute the operation. Since UN Secretary General Annan had initially consulted with French President Chirac concerning a potential deployment, a French reconnaissance team arrived on the ground as early as 20 May 2003 – with forward elements reaching Bunia on 6 June 2003.\(^8\)

Overall, the EU went from a Crisis Management Concept to a Council decision to launch the operation in approximately three weeks. It took approximately twenty days for the EU deployment to arrive in substantial numbers after the launch of the operation. The successful outcome of the operation, coupled with the demonstrated ability to deploy quickly, gave EU policymakers confidence that the EU could execute rapid response missions via framework nations.

The positive impact of *Artemis* is discernible in the final declaration of the Franco-British Summit held in London on 24 November 2003. The declaration, which describes ways to strengthen European cooperation in security and defence, notes that the ‘EU should be capable and willing to deploy in an autonomous operation within 15 days to respond to a crisis.’\(^9\) Furthermore, consistent with the experiences gained via *Artemis*, the forces should be ‘deployed in response to a UN request to stabilise a situation or otherwise meet a short-term need until peacekeepers from the United Nations, or regional organisations acting under a UN mandate, could arrive or be reinforced.’\(^10\) The declaration also calls for ‘battlegroup size forces’ of around 1,500 land forces personnel, offered by a single nation or through a multinational or framework nation force package.

Three months later, on 10 February 2004, the UK, France and Germany unveiled a ‘food for thought’ paper outlining a ‘Battlegroup Concept’. Referring to Operation *Artemis*, the document proposes that the EU develop a ‘number of battlegroup sized forces available to undertake autonomous operations at short notice, principally in response to requests from the UN.’\(^11\) Echoing the earlier Franco-British Summit held in November 2003, it calls for a ‘catalogue of high utility force packages that can be tailored rapidly to specific missions.’ In addition, it suggests that such packages include approximately 1,500 personnel who are capable of deploying within 15 days.\(^12\) With respect to the force’s sustainability, the paper envisages that the battle-

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\(^10\) Ibid.
\(^12\) ‘The battlegroups concept – UK/France/Germany food for thought paper’, op. cit.
group concentrate on bridging operations – i.e. sustaining operations until relieved by UN peacekeepers or regional organisations acting under a UN mandate. They should therefore be sustainable for ‘30 days initial operations extendable to at least 120 days.’

**The EU Battlegroup Concept**

The trilateral proposal made by France, the UK and Germany contains specific proposals concerning missions, deployability, sustainability, and command and control arrangements for an EU BG. As a basis for the EU BG Concept, it was favourably received by the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 22 March 2004 in which participating Member States ‘welcomed the proposal made by some Member States on a ‘Battle Group Concept’ as a useful contribution to the ongoing work on rapid response and to the development of the structure and organisation of the rapid response capabilities of the EU.’ In the same month, the EU Military Committee tasked the EU Military Staff to develop the EU BG Concept.

A few weeks later, at the informal meeting of defence ministers held on 6 April 2004 in Brussels, additional support was lent to the Battlegroup Concept. At the meeting, defence ministers approved the establishment of several battlegroups by 2007. At the GAERC meeting held on 17 May 2004, representatives approved the Headline Goal 2010 (Annex 2 of this paper) – in which battlegroups would play a ‘key element’. On 17-18 June 2004, the European Council endorsed the Headline Goal 2010, giving another push for future EU BGs. The EU BG Concept was agreed by the EU Military Committee on 14 June 2004. Finally, at the November 2004 Military Capability Commitment Conference, EU Member States made their initial pledges towards the establishment of the EU BGs. Overall, thirteen EU Battlegroups and associated niche capabilities were pledged at the conference (Annex 1).

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13. Ibid., p. 13
16. Two of the four initially pledged niche capabilities were subsequently withdrawn.
What constitutes an EU BG?

The term ‘battlegroup’ is likely to have varying connotations depending on the context and audience. To the uninitiated, it may conjure up a picture of a large formation likely to engage in major theatre war (MTW) conditions – an inaccurate picture. However, even the initiated can be confused by the word. To someone with a naval background, the term may designate an aircraft carrier battlegroup consisting of an aircraft carrier and a fleet of supporting ships. The size of such a battlegroup is around 7,500 personnel. With substantial air power at its disposal, it has significant power projection capacity. To someone with an army background, the term is usually part of agreed Army tactical terminology and refers to a combined arms grouping, slightly above the strength of an infantry battalion or armoured regiment. Frequently known as a ‘task force’, its size is around 1,500 personnel. In comparison to a carrier battlegroup, it has limited power projection capacity. It is this latter representation which is the more accurate when thinking of an EU BG.

Specifically, an EU BG ‘is the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger
operations. This formulation, which is frequently employed in official EU documentation, means that the EU BG represents the smallest force package capable of stand-alone operations, including the ability to contribute to an initial entry force.

With respect to decision-making, the EU aims to be able to take a decision to launch an operation within five days of the Council’s approval of the Crisis Management Concept. Concerning deployment, the goal is to have forces implementing mission objectives on the ground within ten days after an EU decision to launch an operation. To enable deployments at such short notice, an EU BG package should be held at a readiness level of 5-10 days. An EU BG can be formed by a single EU Member State or by a framework nation with the support of other contributing countries. For example the Nordic Battlegroup (NBG), which will be on standby for six months commencing in January 2008, includes contributions from Norway (150), a non-EU European NATO country. In line with the Nice European Council Conclusions, Member States are welcome to include the non-European NATO countries and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU in their Battlegroups. In such cases this will be done without prejudice to the rights of any Member State. Member States are also welcome to consider including other potential partners in their Battlegroups.

In January 2005, the EU BGs reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC). During this period lasting until December 2006, a minimum of one EU BG was on standby for a period of six months before it was replaced. In the first half of 2005, the United Kingdom and France each contributed a battlegroup while Italy made a battlegroup available for the second half of 2005.

Full Operational Capability (FOC) was reached on 1 January 2007. From that point onwards, the level of ambition for the EU is to have the ‘capacity to undertake two concurrent single Battlegroup-size rapid response operations, including the ability to launch both such operations nearly simultaneously.’ The first two battlegroups in FOC are formed by Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland while France and Belgium provide a second (Table 3).

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20. Ibid.
The origins of the EU Battlegroups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>BG Point of Contact</th>
<th>Other contributors</th>
<th>Pre-identified OHQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan - Jun</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Netherlands, Finland</td>
<td>Potsdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul - Dec</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Hungary, Slovenia</td>
<td>Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus</td>
<td>Larissa (Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan - Jun</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Finland, Norway, Estonia, Ireland*</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Germany, France, Portugal</td>
<td>To be determined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul - Dec</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain</td>
<td>Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Ireland’s participation in the NBG is quite likely although it still needs to be formalised. See for example Conor Lally, ‘Army to join its first EU battle group in 2008’, The Irish Times, 27 December 2006.

Force composition

The EU BGs committed by EU Member States have a generic composition of approximately 1,500 troops. It is based on a combined arms, battalion-sized force package with appropriate combat support and combat service support. The whole EU BG package will include operational and strategic enablers and will therefore surpass the 1,500 figure.

A ‘standard’ EU BG is likely to include a headquarters company, three infantry companies, and corresponding support personnel. Types of specific units may include mechanised infantry, combat support units (e.g. a fire support unit), and combat service support elements (e.g. a medical facility). The combination of these different categories of personnel permits an EU BG to act independently and to take on a variety of tasks. It should be noted, however, that it is up to contributing countries to decide on the exact composition of their EU BG – both in terms of personnel and equipment. Since there is no fixed battlegroup structure, participating countries have much flexibility regarding its assembly and special features. Figure 1 provides an outline of a generic EU BG.
Since the initial EU BG pledges made at the Military Capability Commitment Conference in November 2004, contributions are announced twice a year through Battlegroup Co-ordination Conferences (BGCC). These are usually held in May and November, with the first BGCC organised in May 2005. During a BGCC, EU Member States indicate the composition of potential contributions and when they could be placed on standby. At Full Operational Capability, there are EU BG offers going beyond 2010. The BGCCs have a planning horizon of five years, with evolving detail depending on the proximity of the standby period (Annex 3).

The EU Member States offering an EU BG are responsible for generating the forces for the whole BG package including the operational and strategic enablers. This generation process is done on a multinational basis with their Battlegroup partners and is normally out of sight of the EU bodies. The Operation Headquarters is not part of the package.

Note: The Operations Headquarters is not part of the EU BG package. The specific types of combat support, combat service support, and operational/strategic enablers will depend on the characteristics of the operation. * Coy = Company.

Missions
An EU BG is expected to be capable to respond with rapid and decisive action in support of the tasks listed in Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union (often referred to as the ‘Petersberg Tasks’) as well as those identified in the European Security Strategy (Table 4). The combined range of missions is consistent with the objectives identified by the GAERC at its 17 May 2004 meeting.

Table 4: ESDP tasks and missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Petersberg Tasks</th>
<th>Tasks from the European Security Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian and rescue tasks</td>
<td>Joint disarmament operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Support for 3rd countries in combating terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform (SSR) operations as part of broader institution building</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The tasks identified in the European Security Strategy were also introduced in the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.

As shown in Table 4, the scope of ESDP missions is wide ranging. According to planners, battlegroups have utility across the full range of these tasks. However, given their limited size, their full potential should be best realised in tasks that are of limited duration and intensity. In line with the requirements outlined in the Trilateral Proposal, the EU BGs are sustainable for 30 days with the possibility of an extension of up to 120 days if properly re-supplied.

Additional guidance on the type of potential EU BG missions might be derived from the five illustrative scenarios used for the 2005 Requirements Catalogue. The scenarios and possible examples of missions are listed in Table 5. The scenarios stem from the Petersberg and European Security Strategy Tasks even though they are more specific in nature.

22. ‘Declaration on European Military Capabilities’, Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, op. cit.
The examples of potential missions listed in Table 5, just like the Petersberg Tasks, could be highly variable and require different amounts of personnel and specialised equipment. The scenarios are nonetheless valuable as they evoke specific types of missions.

Another way to gauge potential EU BG missions is to consider under which situations they might be employed. At least three categories are identifiable:

- **Bridging operations** – An EU BG could be employed as a bridging force in support of troops already on the ground provided that it is deployed in an EU operation. Examples of specific objectives might be to reinforce existing troops or take operational responsibility for a specific geographic sector while other forces regroup. Under both scenarios, the EU BG would be employed for a limited duration. If employed in support of forces already on the ground, the EU BG would remain under the strategic direction and political control of the EU. The use of an EU BG for bridging purposes can be traced back to the EU’s successful support of the UN’s MONUC forces during Operation Artemis.

- **Initial entry rapid response operations** – Given their rapid response capability, an EU BG can be employed as an initial entry force in advance of a larger follow-on force.

### Table 5:

**Illustrative scenarios**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Potential missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Separation of parties by force</td>
<td>Securing key areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict prevention</td>
<td>Preventive deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice to 3rd countries</td>
<td>Initial entry point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation operations in a non-permissive environment</td>
<td>Non-combatant evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to humanitarian operations</td>
<td>Deliverance of humanitarian aid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These scenarios are not tailored to the capabilities of an EU BG; rather, they aim to cover the whole range of the Headline Goal.


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Stand-alone operations – For operations of limited scale requiring rapid response.

These scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is possible that a potential EU BG mission include characteristics from different categories.

There are no limits to where outside Europe an EU BG can be employed. However, there is a frequent reference to a deployment radius of 6,000 kilometres from Brussels as a planning baseline. It is worthwhile to point out that the implicit 6,000-kilometre range is consistent with the assumptions embedded in the 2003 Touquet Declaration. The Declaration’s focus on operations in the African continent – a suggestion which is dropped in subsequent declarations – reinforces the notion of a 6,000 km planning horizon as it represents the approximate distance from Brussels to the Great Lakes region in Africa.

Strategic and military planning process

This section provides a general description of the decision-making process for crisis management operations. It serves as a basis to understand the likely process to be employed for the EU BGs (described at the end of the section).

Several steps are required prior to a force deployment (see Figure 2 overleaf). First, a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) is needed. The CMC details the general EU objectives for the execution of the operation. The Council General Secretariat prepares the CMC with input from the Secretary General/High Representative and the EU Presidency among others. The process is coordinated with the European Commission. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) evaluates the CMC based on advice from the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management before it is forwarded to the Council for approval. Once approved, the CMC forms the basis for an EU Joint Action.

Second, a set of Military Strategic Options (MSOs) is developed. The MSOs outline different military options – including the risks, force requirements, and control and command structures associated with each option. The PSC requests the EUMC to task the EU Military Staff to develop the MSOs. If an operation involves civilian aspects, the appropriate competent bodies...
forward separate Civilian Strategic Options or Police Strategic Options for the related civilian mission. The PSC evaluates all strategic options, recommending its preferred choice to the Council. The PSC also suggests possible headquarters and Operation and Force Commanders based on the advice from military planners.

After the Council selects a specific MSO, the PSC requests the EUMC to formulate an Initiating Military Directive (IMD) to give the Operation Commander specific military guidelines. The EU Military Committee tasks the EU Military Staff to draft the directives. Before the EUMC can authorise it to the Operation Commander, the IMD is approved by the PSC. At this stage, the operational planning process begins. Due to specific time constraints, this overall iterative process may be shortened.

The operational planning phase, just like the CMC process, contains multiple steps involving a variety of stakeholders. As illustrated in Figure 3, the process begins with the Operation Commander drafting – in collaboration with the EU Military Staff – a Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Once completed, the EUMC gives its advice before the documentation is evaluated by the PSC and forwarded to the Council for approval. Upon approval, the PSC requests the EUMC to task the Operation Commander to execute a force generation process.

The Operation Commander then develops an Operation Plan and ‘Rules of Engagement Request’. Consistently with previous steps, the EU Military Staff provides military advice based on EU Member States’ input. It is up to the EU Military Committee to agree on the recommendations before they are presented to the PSC for evaluation. After the PSC provides its opinion, the
documents are forwarded to the Council for approval. Once the Council approves the Operation Plan and authorises the rules of engagement, the operation can be launched. Some steps in the operational planning phase could be skipped or shortened, possibly based on EUMC advice and depending on the situation.

Figure 3:
Basic outline of the operational planning process

For an EU BG operation, some phases might not be needed or consolidated. For example, since the EU BGs are on standby, there is no need for a force generation process. MSOs may not be developed separately if the decision-making process is accelerated and the relevant elements of the MSO are already attached in the CMC. Accelerated decision-making to facilitate rapid response also places a premium on the phase prior to the approval of the CMC. During this pre-phase, some planning elements (e.g. CONOPS) might potentially be elaborated in parallel to the CMC. These could then be formalised once the CMC is agreed. It is important to underline that it is not possible to decide a priori which stage could be shortened. Most likely, this will be assessed on a case-by-case basis by the appropriate Council bodies.

Note: * During the CONOPS stage, an Initial Statement of Requirements is likewise developed. ** MS = Member States. *** The Rules of Engagement Request is done during the OPLAN stage.
Headquarters

The EU’s generic command and control (C2) concept lays down that an EU military chain of command typically contains three levels of headquarters: an operation headquarters, a force headquarters, and component headquarters (Figure 4). The Operation Headquarters (OHQ) oversees the execution of an ESDP operation at the strategic level. It is activated on a case-by-case basis through a Council decision and receives strategic direction from the Political and Security Committee. With support of a parent headquarters and dedicated primary augmentees from EU Member States, the OHQ should be ready for planning within five days.

Figure 4:
Headquarters associated with an EU-led operation

Most EU BGs have pre-identified a preferred OHQ. To date, five national OHQs have been made potentially available to the EU within the context of the Headline Goal Process and the establishment of the EU Force Catalogue (Table 6).

In theory, the selection of SHAPE or the EU Operations Centre for an EU BG OHQ cannot be excluded. For example, when no national OHQ is available, the Council could decide to designate the Operations Centre in Brussels that reached an Initial Operating Capability in January 2007. Under normal conditions, it
houses approximately eight permanent staff, not including those responsible for maintaining communication and information systems. When activated, the Centre can be augmented to about eighty staff. However, the likelihood of an EU BG relying on the Operations Centre is slim since all pre-identified OHQs to date are national.

At the operational level, a Force Headquarters (FHQ) typically functions as a base of operations, providing command and control over troops on the ground. For example during Operation Artemis, the main FHQ was based at Entebbe some 400 kilometres from the area of operations and a forward FHQ element was deployed at Bunia. In accordance with the EU BG Concept, a battlegroup needs to be associated with an FHQ and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers such as logistics. The size of the FHQ will vary according to the needs of the EU BG, but is likely to number slightly under 100 personnel.

At the tactical level, a Component Headquarters (CC HQ) might be used to accommodate EU component commanders deployed to the area of operations. Depending on the nature of the operation, these can represent air, special forces, maritime and other specific function commanders. Since there is no prescribed option for how to command an EU BG operation, there may only be an EU BG headquarters at the tactical level and it may not necessarily be called a CC HQ. Depending on requirements, one could also envisage that headquarters are merged or co-located.

Table 6: National Operation Headquarters available to the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Northwood, London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Mont-Valérien, Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Potsdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Centocelle, Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Larissa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Certification and training

The certification process allows military planners to evaluate whether assigned troops have the required background, equipment and training to fulfil mission objectives.\(^{29}\) To inform the certification process, the EU has developed ‘BG standards & criteria’ applicable to the whole Battlegroup package.

Where EU Member States consider the EU standards and criteria to be too broad, there are three principal ways to further develop the standards, certification processes and training requirements for the EU BGs:

1. Rely on pre-existing standards, certification processes and training guidelines – these could exist at the national level or at a multinational level (e.g. NATO).
2. Develop more detailed EU BG-specific standards, certification processes and training programmes at the EU-level. There is, however, no consensus amongst EU Member States on the actual need.
3. Leave it up to EU BG contributing countries to set more detailed standards, certification processes and the training needs applicable to their respective EU BGs.

As things currently stand, components from each of these options are used in the EU BG certification and training process – even though the emphasis is on option three (leaving it to the EU BG contributing countries). At a general level, the EU provides guidance on nine categories of standards, criteria, and recommendations for the EU BGs. These are:\(^{30}\)

1. Availability
2. Flexibility
3. Employability
4. Deployability
5. Readiness
6. Connectivity
7. Survivability
8. Medical force protection

Second, it is up to the EU BG contributors to interpret the EU Military Committee agreed standards. In the case of a multinational EU BG, the contributing Member States are responsible for

\(^{29}\) It should be noted that the Operation Commander, who is appointed once there is a Crisis Management Concept, can tailor the Command and Control (C2) structure, as well as the BG package, to the specific requirements of the operation. Ron Hamelink, ‘The Battlegroups Concept: A Versatile Force Package’, Impetus (Bulletin of the EU Military Staff), Brussels, Spring/Summer 2006.

\(^{30}\) Erik Lindberg, op. cit.
defining and ensuring certifiable standards. In many cases, however, it may be perceived as the primary responsibility of the framework nation.\(^{31}\) In other words, while contributing countries are responsible for certifying their contributions at the unit level, it is up to the framework nation to certify the EU BG as a ‘whole’. In the case of the Nordic Battlegroup, for example, the Swedish Armed Forces are responsible for certifying that the battlegroup meets the standards and criteria provided by the EU by no later than 30 November 2007.\(^{32}\) In addition, the EU Military Committee oversees the BG certification process with the assistance of the EU Military Staff at the EU level.\(^{33}\)

Third, to the extent possible, planners recommend that EU BG contributors rely on already existing NATO standards and criteria to encourage interoperability and avoid duplication: ‘wherever possible and applicable, standards, practical methods and procedures’ should be ‘analogous to those defined within NATO (NRF) ... as Member States may commit their assets and capabilities ... to both the BG and the NRF’.\(^{34}\)

With respect to training, ‘Member States (MS) are free to shape BG package training according to their needs as long as it leads to successful certification and fulfilment of the BG Standards and Criteria.’\(^{35}\) As a result, different exercises are organised to provide training under realistic conditions consistent with the EU BG mission spectrum. Examples include ‘Exercise European Endeavour 06’ that was held between 11-24 November 2006 in support of the German-led EU BG, Exercises EVROPI I/II (both to be held in May 2007) in support of the EU BG headed by Greece (2nd half 2007), and ‘Exercise Illuminated Summer 07’ to be held in July 2007 in support of the Nordic Battlegroup.\(^{36}\)

**Costs**

For military operations involving an EU BG, standard practices associated with military ESDP operations apply. Under such circumstances, the *Athena* mechanism would administer the common costs of the operation.\(^{37}\) On the other hand, individual costs – such as transporting troops from participating countries to the area of operations – would be the responsibility of contributors according to the principle of ‘costs lie where they fall.’

All other costs, including preparations to stand up and place an EU BG on standby, ‘lie where they fall.’ Thus, the more personnel

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31. Generally speaking, the framework nation has overall responsibility for the formation, certification and training of an EU BG.
32. Erik Lindberg, op. cit.
33. Ron Hamelink, op. cit.
37. Examples of common costs include the incremental costs associated with operational headquarters, local administration, transportation within the OHQ area, and lodging infrastructure. For more on the *Athena* mechanism, see ‘Council Decision establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications’, Council of the European Union, doc. 5770/04, Brussels, 17 February 2004.
and equipment a participating country contributes, the higher its expected participation costs. For example, Swedish authorities calculate that the costs associated with leading the Nordic Battlegroup are 2.2 billion Swedish Crowns (approximately €240 million) covering the time-period 2005 to 2008. This figure includes certain costs that would be incurred anyway – such as the provision of basic training to personnel recruited to the battlegroup. The costs associated with the standby period (no deployment) are estimated at approximately 350 million Crowns (€38 million) – a number that could reach roughly 1.55 billion Crowns (€169 million) in the event of a deployment.

Summary

The origins of EU Rapid Response elements go back to the Helsinki Council Summit (1999) and the Headline Goal 2003. Operation Artemis, the EU's first autonomous military operation conducted in 2003, provided the Rapid Response elements with an operational template, paving the way for an EU BG Concept in mid-2004. Characterised as a force package at high readiness, the EU BGs represent a 'key element' of the 2010 Headline Goal.

Two key attributes make the EU BGs stand out. First, they are expected to carry out a wide range of missions requiring a rapid response. These may range from elements contained in the Petersberg Tasks to those listed in the European Security Strategy. Second, the EU BGs require quick decision-making to ensure rapid response. With respect to deployment, the EU BG ambition is substantially quicker than that achieved during Operation Artemis. With this background in mind, Chapter 2 discusses some of the principal challenges facing the EU BGs.

38. Mika Kertunen, Tommi Koivula and Tommy Jeppsson, op. cit.
39. Based on discussions with personnel within the Swedish Ministry of Defence.
Challenges facing the EU Battlegroups

This chapter analyses the principal challenges facing the EU Battlegroups – organising them into two categories. The first looks at the practical challenges – such as further detailing standards (if required), ensuring a strategic reserve and fulfilling deployability requirements. The second category considers challenges that are more ‘political’ in nature, including the likelihood that an EU BG be employed. In the light of these challenges, the chapter discusses potential options that may be available to address some of them, considering their respective pros and cons. Recommendations in response to these challenges are presented in Chapter 4.

Operational challenges

Standards, certification and training

In order to reach standby status, an EU BG first needs to be certified according to predetermined criteria. The certification process determines whether an EU BG can successfully meet the range of tasks and demands it may be tasked to do. As noted earlier, a set of performance measures – known as standards – is used to gauge whether or not an EU BG meets identified criteria.

The main advantage of the current system – whereby it is up to contributing and framework nations to further detail standards, certification processes and training cycles – is that it maximises flexibility. Contributors can rely on standards that they are familiar with – provided that they are consistent with EU guidelines and military requirements for the mission. Another benefit may be the gradual creation of a set of best practices as contributing countries get to compare their experiences during the certification process.

However, there are also some drawbacks with the present approach. First, a high degree of flexibility in the certification and standardisation process may adversely affect levels of interoperability within and across force packages. It may also inhibit efforts
to overcome certain interoperability challenges that are sometimes associated with European forces in general.\textsuperscript{40} One example is differing approaches to Command, Control, and Communications (C3) that tend to be national in scope and involve little multilateral dialogue.\textsuperscript{41}

Second, ‘credibility gaps’ may surface should there be limited transparency among participating countries regarding the preparedness of pledged units. This applies particularly to EU BGs made up of contributions from several countries. Although the framework nation can question the certification procedures used by another contributor, the credibility of the entire EU BG may be questioned if such concerns are not adequately addressed. To limit this possibility, EU BG contributors will ideally agree on a common procedure.

Third, while standards need to be consistent with EU criteria, there may be instances in which such criteria are difficult to assess. For example, the requirement that forces have the ‘ability to adapt’ has no clear-cut criteria for measurement – complicating the certification process.\textsuperscript{42}

Fourth, the current EU BG training system makes no provisions for EU-led exercises. This is a direct consequence of the EU exercise policy and has possible implications. For example, the lack of training at the EU-level may impact on the choice of an EU BG reserve force – making it more likely that countries opt for a national solution. Although this is not a problem \textit{per se}, it might limit other options available to policymakers.

\textbf{Decision-making process}

There are at least two principal challenges relating to the EU decision-making process. The first is the need to balance planning and decision-making procedures with the requirement to have an EU BG (or parts of it) on the ground implementing mission objectives within ten days after the launch of an operation. As detailed in Chapter 1, there is a lengthy process involved with the formulation of military strategic options, military directives, concept of operations, the operation plan, and rules of engagement that can compromise the ability to have an adequate footprint in the area of operations within such a short timeframe. To date, the quickest response was achieved for Operation \textit{Artemis}. As SG/HR Solana observes, the EU BG deployment ambition of ten days is ‘twice as
quick’ as what was achieved during Artemis, highlighting the importance of quick decision-making.43

The many steps required in the strategic and operational planning process have caught the attention of several policy- and decision-makers. For example, at the request of the GAERC, SG/HR Solana presented a report in May 2004 outlining specific ways in which the current process might be shortened. The report recommends the use of advanced planning to the extent possible to shorten the planning cycle. Among specific ideas is to have standard documents such as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and Status of Mission Agreements (SOMAs) drafted before the CMC is being prepared.44 Another possibility is to have some steps in the planning process omitted to speed up the overall process.

Another closer look at the strategic planning process took place at the EU Battlegroups Seminar held in Prague on 3-4 November 2005. Hosted by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it considered ways to shorten the planning and decision-making processes. Participants noted several limitations with the existing system, resulting in several recommendations. Examples include:

- **Increasing levels of information sharing**: Several calls were made for more extensive information sharing on national procedures and limitations concerning the deployment of military staff attached to an EU BG.
- **Streamlining the planning process**: A number of proposals were discussed to simplify the planning process. The majority of recommendations focused on the possibility to shorten, remove, or integrate certain planning steps. Participants noted that an accelerated planning cycle did not need to be the rule; rather, it could be used in exceptional cases when justified to meet required deadlines.
- **Securing SOFA agreements early on**: Echoing Solana’s earlier recommendations from 2004, seminar participants suggested that Status of Forces Agreements be signed as early as possible in the preparatory stages of an operation.

Since these suggestions were made, some steps have been taken to simplify or shorten the decision-making process. For example, the EU can now rely on a standard model text for SOFAs that was finalised in May 2005. In June 2006, a model text was drafted for Status of Missions Agreements (SOMAs). Moreover, a cursory

44. Mika Kertunnen, Tommi Koivula and Tommy Jeppsson, op. cit. See also Jan Joel Anderson, op. cit.
overview of the decision-making process in recent military ESDP operations reveals that planners and policymakers are flexible when timelines are tight. As shown in Table 7, it is only for Operation Althea – which had a year-long lead-time – where all planning products in the decision-making process were agreed.

In contrast, for Operation Artemis, ‘only’ a CMC and an operation plan (including the rules of engagement) were agreed prior to the launch of the operation. The short timeframe available, coupled with previous planning products carried out by France, are probably among the key factors for the shortened crisis management procedure.

A second challenge concerns the relationship between domestic decision-making processes across countries contributing to an EU BG and its impact on deployment schedules. This issue is more likely to affect multinational EU BGs where the constraints of one or more contributing countries can affect the deployability of the entire EU BG. Among the more obvious elements to consider are domestic legal requirements, national caveats and the duration of the decision-making process. Examples include whether or not parliamentary approval is required in advance of a deployment and the types of national mandates that would have to be agreed to before a battlegroup is deployed.45 A related challenge – which was

Table 7:
Planning products agreed for recent military ESDP operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning product</th>
<th>Concordia (FYROM)</th>
<th>Artemis (DRC)</th>
<th>Althea (BiH)</th>
<th>EUFOR (RD Congo)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crisis management concept?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military strategic option directive?</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military strategic options?</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiating military directive?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of operation?</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation plan / rules of engagement?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A checkmark indicates that the product was agreed. A hyphen does not mean that the ingredients of those products were not addressed, but only that they were not agreed in the prescribed form.

Source: Discussions with personnel within the Council General Secretariat.

45. This latter issue was discussed at the EU BG Seminar held in Prague in November 2005.
highlighted by SG/HR Solana in late 2005 – is ensuring that national decision-making processes are synchronised with the EU’s decision-making process to the extent possible.46

The scope of this challenge is hard to predict in the absence of an actual EU BG deployment. An EU Exercise Study (EST 06) was held in Brussels on 27-28 November to consider planning processes and accelerated decision-making for EU Rapid Response operations.47 Since it is presumed no contributing country would want to be in a position where its domestic decision-making process hampers the ability of an EU BG to deploy on time, workarounds are likely to be employed. An example might be to intensify politico-military consultations prior to a standby period or deploy forces to the vicinity of an area of operations while awaiting a formal approval. The next section analyses the issue of deployability in greater detail.

Deployability
Ensuring adequate EU BG deployability is one of the principal challenges facing EU BG planners. Factors such as distance, destination, deployment demand (including the volume of required equipment), and duration represent key elements to determine logistics requirements.48

Strategic lift
According to the initial food for thought paper presented by the UK, France and Germany in February 2004, the deployment of an EU BG to a central African theatre requires up to ‘200 C 130 / 30 C17 (outsized) aircraft sorties.’49 This estimate was partially based on the assets employed for Operation Artemis. In support of Artemis, planners relied on the Antonov An-24 (50 sorties), Airbus 300 (20 sorties) and C-130 Hercules (72 sorties) to airlift 1,500 troops and their respective equipment to Entebbe in Uganda. An additional 276 C-130 sorties were used to transport personnel to the area of operations in Bunia. Overall, some 2,410 metric tons were transported for the operation.50 The deployment pattern for Artemis confirms the need for so-called oversized/outsized transport aircraft. These include aircraft such as the C-17 Globemaster and the Antonov An-124 which have larger cargo bays and weight-bearing capacities than medium-sized lifters such as the C-130 Hercules.

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47. The Exercise Study was initially slated to be an exercise (CME) but was turned into a seminar when the Potsdam OHQ was assigned to the EUFOR RD Congo operation.
48. There are several other elements that have nothing to do with transport capacity that can impact on unit readiness and thus deployability. An example is vaccination requirements associated with a deployment. An inability to address this aspect, either intentionally or unintentionally, can delay deployment schedules.
49. ‘The battlegroups concept – UK/France/Germany food for thought paper’, op. cit.
50. Mika Kertunnen, Tommi Koivula and Tommy Jeppsson, op. cit.
As shown in Table 8, the EU has a large number of small- to medium sized transport airplanes. Of the close to 600 transport aircraft listed in the table, approximately half consist of C-130s and C-160s. The table also shows that the EU has very limited access to large transport aircraft such as the C-17. This has a wide range of implications for the type of equipment that the EU can airlift to the area of operations.

Table 8:
EU military airlift capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Payload* (mt)</th>
<th>Maximum Troop Capacity</th>
<th>Range (km)</th>
<th>Total EU-25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-310 MRTT</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-319</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-340</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>13,200</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A400M</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>3,150</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-26</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-28</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-124 (lease)</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130B/E/H</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130J</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-160</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-17</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>8,700</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-222</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-212</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-295</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN-235</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tristar</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu-154</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total all types</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>591</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *For several aircraft, the payload capacity is greater for shorter distances. Troop capacity refers to fully equipped personnel. Range is given at the maximum payload. The table does not include rotary wing aircraft such as the Ch-47 Chinook, Mi-8/Mi-17 Hip, and AS-532 Cougar.


51. The four C-17s that are currently available are leased by the United Kingdom.
First, comparing the weight-bearing capacity of the Antonov An-124 with the C-130 reveals that an An-124 can carry up to seven times more weight than a C-130 (all else equal). In the case of the C-17, it can carry double the weight of a C-130. However, its capacity is about thrice as large (75 metric tons) as that of a C-130, and twice that of an A400M, if the distance is shorter than 2,400 nautical miles.

Second, aircraft capacity is limited by the physical dimension of its cargo doors. As shown in Table 9, while the C-130’s cargo door cross section is 9 feet high (2.74 metres) and 10 feet wide (3.05 metres), a C-17 offers a cargo door that is 13.5 feet high (4.11 metres) and 18 feet wide (5.49 metres). A larger cross section of the cargo door allows for bigger items to be fitted into the aircraft. Coupled with a longer cargo floor, this allows aircraft such as the C-17 to carry helicopters, boats and other items that cannot fit into a C-130.

To illustrate, a C-17 can carry three Bradley infantry fighting vehicles in a single load. At ten feet, six inches wide, a single Bradley or any equivalent-sized infantry fighting vehicles would not fit into a C-130. The future A400M should be able to transport oversized equipment such as a helicopter (Super Puma/Cougar) or light armoured vehicles (e.g. two LAV-III vehicles in a single plane).

Table 9: Selected transport aircraft: Cargo hold dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft type</th>
<th>Cargo door height (in metres)</th>
<th>Cargo door width (in metres)</th>
<th>Cargo hold length, including ramp (in metres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A400M</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-124</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-17</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL-76</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>20*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Some measurements were converted from feet. There is frequently a limit on the amount of weight that can be placed on the ramp. For example, the weight limit for the C-130 ramp is approximately 2,270 kilos while that of the C-17 is 18,150 kilos (although the ramp can hold the same weight as the cargo floor during flight). Data for the Illyushin does not include ramp space.

It should be noted that the state of physical infrastructure in the airport of debarkation or area of operations impacts on the type of strategic lift that can be used. Larger aircraft, such as the An-124, require longer airfields to land (Table 10). Many countries have limited if any airfields that can accommodate such aircraft – especially if other factors such as runway width and weight-bearing capacity are taken into account. For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, of the twenty-five airports with paved runways, only four are over 3,047 metres in length. The majority (16) are between 1,524 and 2,437 metres in length and are thus unable to host aircraft such as the An-124 and the C-17. Likewise in Sudan, two out of fifteen airports with paved runways are over 3,047 metres long.

Table 10:
Runway requirements for select transport aircraft (in metres)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft type</th>
<th>Minimum runway length (landing) a</th>
<th>Minimum runway length (takeoff) b</th>
<th>Minimum runway width c</th>
<th>Ramp space required d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A400M</td>
<td>680 c</td>
<td>1,150 c</td>
<td>NA f</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-124</td>
<td>3,000 d</td>
<td>2,520 e</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-5</td>
<td>1,525</td>
<td>3,720</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>5,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-17</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>2,285</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>1,905</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1,442</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: For several aircraft, distances have been converted from feet to metres. a Minimum distance required for a landing with full load. b Minimum distance required for a take-off with full load. Distances will be shorter for take-off with zero payload (e.g. 2,600 feet for a C-130 and 3,500 for a C-17). c Refers to tactical take-off and landing distance using the assumption of aircraft weighing 110 tons. d 2,420 metres are needed for the An-124-210. e 2,050 metres for the An-124-210. f Data not found.


Potential solutions to airfield constraints include finding alternative airports in the vicinity of the area of operations. However, this raises other sets of challenges. If certain equipment can only be transported by road to the area of operations, the availability and state of such infrastructure is critical. In many countries, the lack of asphalted roads can complicate logistics.
Table 11 provides data on amount of paved/gravel roads in several countries where UN or European personnel have operated or are operating. It also provides reference data for three other countries. As the table shows, the Democratic Republic of Congo has 2,800 kilometres of paved roads and approximately 7,000 kilometres of stabilised earth roads across its territory spreading 2.3 million km². In comparison, Belgium – at 30,230 km² or 0.1 per cent the land size of the DRC – has 129,600 kilometres of paved roads and 8,300 kilometres of gravel roads.

EU Member States have taken a host of measures, which are not mutually exclusive, to alleviate strategic lift challenges. The United Kingdom leased four C-17s in 2001 from Boeing to ensure access to long-range strategic lift. A fifth plane will be added to the lease in 2008. This option is not available to all EU Member States given the cost of the C-17. At around $200 million per plane (approximately €155 million), it is out of reach to most European air forces.

In response, some countries have explored the viability of pooling resources and sharing the capacity of a number of C-17 aircraft. In mid-September 2006, thirteen NATO countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Size (Km²)</th>
<th>Paved Roads (Km)</th>
<th>Gravel/earth roads (km)</th>
<th>Ratio paved roads/km²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>51,129</td>
<td>11,425</td>
<td>10,425</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>25,650</td>
<td>1,099</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>318,000</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sample reference:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>30,230</td>
<td>129,600</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>545,630</td>
<td>747,750</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>294,000</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: NA stands for not available.


61. For some time, Sweden considered the purchase of two C-17s to support the lift requirements associated with the Nordic Battlegroup.
published a letter of intent expressing their interest in opening negotiations on the purchase of C-17s. The intention is to initially acquire three C-17s. Presently, fifteen NATO members plus Sweden are negotiating with Boeing via the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency. The aircraft would be available for rapid response deployments and would operate from Ramstein in Germany. An Initial Operating Capability is planned for the third quarter of 2007, with Full Operational Capability reached in 2009. Flight hours would be at the disposal of NATO, the EU, and international organisations such as the UN.

The main advantage of this option is that it allows medium-to small-sized nations to access needed but frequently out-of-reach capabilities. With stagnant or decreasing defence budgets across many European countries, it is also consistent with the European Security Strategy’s call for greater pooling and resource sharing. On the downside, the collective solution is not particularly attractive to countries that already have strategic lift capabilities but nonetheless participate in the programme for solidarity purposes. Another point of contention might arise concerning the disincentive to invest in the acquisition of national airlift capabilities.

A number of EU Member States have also reached a collective solution to gain access to the Antonov An-124. To date, fourteen EU Member States are part of the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS). Under the arrangement, participants have the option of leasing strategic lift through the purchase of An-124 flying hours. Between five and six An-124 aircraft are permanently available in support of SALIS. The purchased flight hours can be used for EU, NATO or national deployments.

A potential drawback with the SALIS arrangement is the rigidity of its surge provision. With around 800 hours available to participating countries, it is difficult to predict whether the amount is sufficient to cover requirements associated with one or two major operations. If a deployment requires fifty An-124 sorties – as was the case for Artemis – and each sortie requires sixteen hours, the entire 800 hours would be required. Moreover, the full activation of the provisions of SALIS can only be done once a year over a time period of twenty consecutive days, affecting follow-on EU BGs within the same calendar year. Given the fact that these hours are available to a number of organisations within participating states (for example to rescue service organisations), the total could be used up quickly. A potential workaround is the abil-
ity for participating countries to buy or sell hours from each other if needed.

A future workaround is the A400M strategic transport aircraft. Several EU Member States are waiting for the A400M to become available so they can replace their ageing fleets of C-130s and C-160s. Overall, seven countries contributing to the EU BGs – Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain and Turkey – are vying to buy 180 A400Ms. Once the A400M is available, the SALIS arrangement is expected to cease.

There are three important considerations concerning the A400M to keep in mind. The first concerns its delivery date. While the first test flights are scheduled for 2008, actual aircraft delivery is not planned until October 2009. At that time, the first aircraft will be delivered to the French Air Force, marking initial operational clearance. Although full operational clearance is expected around April 2010, Airbus Military has limited delivery positions in 2010 and 2011. Only starting in 2012 will A400Ms be delivered at a rate of 30 per year – five years after the EU BGs reach Full Operational Capability (Table 12).

Table 12: A400M delivery schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of A400Ms ordered</th>
<th>Initial delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Does not include orders by Malaysia, South Africa, and Chile.*

*Sources: [http://www.airbusmilitary.com/pressrelease.html#182001](http://www.airbusmilitary.com/pressrelease.html#182001) and [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A400M](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A400M) (both accessed 26 October 2006).*

Second, as is the case for all aircraft, the A400M’s operational range is limited when fully loaded. With a 20-ton payload (the equivalent to the maximum of a C-130), the A400M can reach
slightly over 6,000 kilometres or 3,450 nautical miles. However, with a full payload (37 tons), the A400M’s operational range drops to nearly 3,150 kilometres or 1,700 nautical miles – substantially lower than the operational planning figure of 6,000 kilometres.

Third, in spite of payload and range limitations, the A400M is expected to provide some distinct advantages. The principal of these will be its ability to land on airfields of limited size and quality. With a tactical runway landing and takeoff requirement close to 1,200 metres, it should be able to operate from relatively small-sized airfields. An additional advantage is the ability to land on soft surfaces such as grass fields over low plasticity clay.

Another EU BG deployability option is to rely on a mix of already existing transport assets. Units requiring rapid deployment would lean most heavily on the combined use of C-130s and C-160s. This option would most likely put a substantial emphasis on other modes of transport (e.g. sealift) to the extent possible. It also calls for greater airlift coordination among EU Member States.

France and Germany, which are involved in almost half of all EU BGs (7 out of 22) scheduled to date, aim to increase their cooperation in the area of air transport to encourage the establishment of an European airlift command based on the current European Airlift Centre.

This option’s primary limitation is the constrained transport capacity of the C-130 and C-160. An overview of the transport aircraft inventories of the countries participating in the EU BGs in 2007 shows a fairly limited number of C-130s. For example, the EU BG headed by Germany during the first half of 2007 has access to only two C-130s (Table 13). It makes up for this low number with numerous C-160s (83). However, this number may overstate the total amount of available aircraft, as some are likely to be engaged in other missions or temporarily unavailable. Considering the EU BGs on standby during the second half of 2007, there are few aircraft with a range beyond 3,000 kilometres. The EU BG headed by Italy will have access to a maximum of around 22 C-130s. As a result, the EU BGs on standby are likely to rely extensively on complementary options such as SALIS, the C-17 Initiative, obtaining suitable transport aircraft from the spot charter market (e.g. Illushyn 76, Airbus Beluga), and seeking charter-enabling contracts.

70. According to Airbus Military, however, the A400M should not be hampered by such limitations. In one of its planning scenarios, the aircraft is simulated to transport a force package weighing over 17,000 tons a distance of 3,000 nautical miles (about 5,500 kilometres, essentially reaching the Great Lakes region of Africa) within 15 days through fifty A400M transports. Each one-leg flight would take approximately seven and a half hours. See http://www.airbusmilitary.com/handling.html (accessed 10 October 2006).


72. The EU currently has an EU movement planning cell within the EU Military Staff.

73. ‘France and Germany hope to develop EU naval and space observation capacities’, Atlantic News, no. 3762, 23 March 2006. The French and German EU BG participation data provided in the article (11 of 17) is inaccurate. The figure here is correct although it takes into account an unconfirmed BG pledged for the second half of 2009.

With existing assets, transporting approximately 2,400 metric tons – based on the Artemis requirements – is a challenging proposition. A ‘back of the envelope’ calculation shows that between 150 and 180 C-130 sorties would be required to transport up to 75 per cent of total mission payload (using the Artemis figure of 2,400 tons). The number changes to between 99 and 119 sorties if 50 per cent of total mission payload is airlifted. The actual number of sorties would depend on the volume – bulk versus oversize – of the payload.

The sortie rates would increase if there were a need to transport more weight. According to estimates by some national experts, the
total weight associated with an EU BG may be closer to 8,000 metric tons / 6,000 linear metres of freight.\textsuperscript{77} Table 14 provides some indication of the C-130 sortie numbers associated with a greater weight requirement. As seen, moving fifty percent of an 8,000 ton load would require somewhere around 328 to 396 sorties. Given the large number of sorties required, lift planners would need to consider using larger sized aircraft or use sealift to a greater extent.

**Table 14:**

C-130E sorties needed to move varying weight loads 2,500 nautical miles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transport weight</th>
<th>Notional number of C-130 sorties required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent of weight airlifted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,400 tons</td>
<td>59 – 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 tons</td>
<td>123 – 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000 tons</td>
<td>197 – 238</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures are rounded upwards. Calculating the number of sorties requires dividing the average payload (tons/mission) by the move requirement. See also footnote \textsuperscript{76}.

**Strategic sealift**

Like airlift, the use of sealift provides distinct advantages and disadvantages. Generally speaking, sealift offers an attractive solution since it can accommodate oversized and heavy equipment over long distances. Examples of sealift options include:\textsuperscript{78}

- Container ships
- General cargo ships
- Landing craft, including landing platforms (dock)
- Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ships

The carrying capacity of sealift is substantial. For example, it took NATO a mere 16 ships to move 829 containers and 1,667 vehicles to the Cape Verde Islands in support of Exercise Steadfast Jaguar 06. While this does not include the troops that were airlifted, it gives an illustration of the substantial transport capacity of ships.\textsuperscript{79} Moving an entire EU BG via sealift is estimated to require approximately 17,000 m\textsuperscript{2} of deck space and 150 sea
At least two Roll-on, Roll-off (Ro/Ro) ships are needed to transport the core of an EU BG.

Another important advantage of sealift is its cost effectiveness. Under most circumstances, relying on strategic sealift is substantially cheaper than using strategic airlift. According to a Center for Strategic and International Studies report, the use of airlift to transport 72,000 tons of cargo over 36 days to a theatre at a distance of 4,000 nautical miles would cost approximately $20 million. Using sealift, the same money would enable the transport of 55 times that amount (3.96 million tons of cargo) over the same time period. On the downside, sealift is significantly slower than airlift, a limiting factor during rapid response deployments over long distances. The fact that some areas of operations are land-locked can likewise hamper the relevance of sealift.

There are two main options – that are not mutually exclusive – with respect to sea-based rapid response operations. The first is to pre-deploy personnel and equipment to a region once a potential conflict is identified. Although there is no formal decision to engage in an operation, ships can be brought close to the area of operations – for example under the guise of a training mission – effectively ‘buying time’ in the event an operation is required. However, while pre-deployments can cut back on the deployment time, they can turn out to be costly – especially if the assets are not employed.

A second option is to rely on sealift to the extent possible once an operation is launched – recognising that supplies are unlikely to arrive within the first few days. With average speeds of 20 knots (37 km/h) for cargo ships and 12 knots (22 km/h) for tankers, it would take anywhere between 7 and 13 days to transport an EU BG the equivalent of 6,000 kilometres or 3,240 nautical miles. This distance is the approximate equivalent of navigating from the port of Rotterdam to the port of Alexandria (Egypt). However, the timetable does not include the preparatory work to get ships loaded and offloaded. It also does not take into account the distance between the seaport of debarkation (SPOD) and the area of operations that would result in additional total deployment time. Table 15 overleaf provides additional examples of distances and the amount of time required to reach different ports using the African continent as a sample destination.

80. Mika Kertunnen, Tommi Koivula and Tommy Jeppsson, op. cit.
82. Based on software-based simulations using two input speeds: ten and twenty knots (nautical miles per hour).
83. This similarly applies to airlift that can be likewise constrained by the unavailability of airfields near the area of operations.
As seen, several ports on the African continent are unlikely to be reached by sea within fifteen days, especially if we assume an average speed of ten knots, an originating point near to Brussels, and include a few additional days to take into account on-loading and off-loading requirements. It should be acknowledged that the time requirements could change dramatically if some assumptions are changed. For example, while it takes approximately thirteen days to reach Alexandria from Rotterdam at an average speed of ten knots, only two days would be needed if departing from Athens. The distance travelled would diminish from 3,159 nautical miles (5,850 kilometres) to 512 nautical miles (948 kilometres). As this example shows, the deployment situation may change dramatically from EU BG to EU BG depending on the location of the framework nation with respect to the area of operations.

This begs the question whether pre-positioning equipment in strategically located countries such as Greece (Athens) and Spain (e.g. Canary Islands) could provide planners with a means to shorten deployment times. However, such pre-positioning could result in certain side effects – for example impacting on training, lodging, and financing schemes (among others).

### Table 15:

Distance from Rotterdam to select ports in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port of destination</th>
<th>Distance (Nautical miles)</th>
<th>Duration days (At 15 knots)</th>
<th>Duration days (At 10 knots)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abidjan, Ivory Coast</td>
<td>3,730</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandria, Egypt</td>
<td>3,159</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algiers, Algeria</td>
<td>1,773</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town, South Africa</td>
<td>6,163</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casablanca, Morocco</td>
<td>1,386</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakar, Senegal</td>
<td>2,582</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freetown, Sierra Leone</td>
<td>3,070</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libreville, Gabon</td>
<td>4,545</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luanda, Angola</td>
<td>4,977</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matadi, Zaire</td>
<td>4,924</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>6,784</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogadishu, Somalia</td>
<td>5,765</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

- a The port of Rotterdam is used as the point of reference to simulate a distance close to Brussels. No specific criteria were used for the selection of ports in Africa except the need to ensure wide geographic representation.
- b Assumes an average travel speed of 15 knots. Figures are rounded to the nearest day.
- c Assumes a travel speed of 10 knots. Results are based on distance software calculations. Figures are rounded to the nearest day. For reference, one nautical mile equals 1.852 kilometres.
An overview of sealift assets held by countries contributing to the EU BGs in 2007 shows a wide range of vessels – among the more common platforms are landing craft, landing platforms (dock), and tankers (Table 16).

Table 16: EUBG potential sealift availability (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st half 2007</th>
<th>2nd half 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU BG 1</td>
<td>EU BG 2</td>
<td>EU BG 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework nation</td>
<td>Germany + Netherlands</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributor(s)</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo ship</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing platform dock</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing ship</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker with helo capacity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport ship</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition carrier</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc., auxiliary ship</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replenisher oiler light</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stores ships</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker b</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanker c</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water tanker</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious assault ship</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing craft</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data is based on *The Military Balance* and may not capture all assets in the different categories.
a Some types of ships, such as tankers with helo capacity, could be listed in a different category (‘support’ in the case of the tankers with helo capacity). b Tanker with the capacity to replenish at sea. 
c Capacity less than 2,000 tonnes. d Include 36 (Finnish) smaller sized landing craft for personnel. e Include 20 (Italian) rapid raiding craft. f Include 31 (Greek) landing craft for vehicles and personnel and 4 (Greek) air cushion vehicles. The numbers presented in this table do not reflect operational status. For example, some vessels may not be available due to repairs. Likewise, the table does not reflect the possibility offered by commercial options such as leasing.

The table also shows that the 2007 EU BG formations have access to numerous transport and supply ships. However, some formations have limited access to specific types of ships. For example, the EU BG headed by Italy during the second half of 2007 may have limited access to tankers with the capacity to carry helicopters.

It is important to recognise that the transport capacity and speed of the ships listed in Table 16 vary widely. For example, the German tankers with helicopter-carrying capacity (Berlin class) to be on standby during the first half of 2007 have a displacement of approximately 20,000 tons each. They can carry two Sea King or NH90 helicopters. With a speed of around 20 knots (37 km/h) they represent a fast combat supply ship. Other types of tankers pledged by Germany have a displacement of less than 2,000 tons.

Differences are also visible across different types of landing platform docks (LPDs). As shown in Table 17, they can carry substantial personnel and equipment. With cruising speeds around 20 knots (37 km/h), they also provide a rapid means for sea-based transportation.

The recognition that current military sea assets may not be sufficient in some situations has led some countries to explore access to commercial shipping options. For example within the NATO context, Norway is leading an 11-nation consortium to expand NATO’s access to commercial sealift. The aim is to gain assured access to 12-14 commercial ships that could be used for operations.
France and Germany have also expressed an interest in developing the naval aspect of the European rapid response capacities. A naval group (MTG) may be available to support the EU BGs in which they participate in the first half of 2007. The MTG can be considered as a possible reference for the development of an EU maritime rapid reaction concept that would serve to complement land operations. At the GAERC meeting held in May 2006, the Council took note of ongoing work to ‘investigate the contribution of EU maritime forces in ESDP missions/operations and their use in a rapid response capacity.’

Lastly, a Sealift Co-ordination Centre – co-located with the European Airlift Centre in Eindhoven – declared its services available to the EU in late 2004. Its main function is to ‘maximise the utilisation of sealift capability.’ In the same vein, the Greek Sealift Co-ordination Centre in Athens declared its services and available assets to the EU. Its main focus is to ‘co-ordinate, charter and monitor’ sealift capability.

Political-strategic challenges

The EU BG – NATO Response Force (NRF) relationship

Twenty-one of the EU’s twenty-seven Member States are also members of NATO. Of the six EU Member States not participating in NATO, four are members in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP). Only two EU Member States – Malta and Cyprus – do not have formal links with NATO.

In spite of the close membership overlap between the organisations, there are periodic debates concerning their respective roles in the security arena. Frequent topics include concerns over duplication and the status of non-EU NATO members in EU activities. Another ongoing question is the working relationship between the EU BGs and the NRF. Is it a case of duplication or will they complement each other? If so, what is their division of labour? According to the UK/France/Germany ‘food for thought paper’ from February 2004, the EU BGs ‘and NRF should be complementary and mutually reinforcing, with both providing a positive impetus for capability improvement.’

The following sections take a closer look at the EU BG – NRF relationship.

88. ‘The battlegroups concept – UK/France/Germany food for thought paper’, op. cit., p. 15.
EU BG – NRF similarities

Proposed in September 2002 by then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the NATO Response Force resembles the EU BGs in several ways.\(^{89}\) First and foremost, both force packages are expected to deploy at very short notice. The guiding principle for the NRF is that its core elements be able to start deploying after five days notice – very similar to the objective of the EU BGs.\(^ {90}\) In terms of sustainability, the NRF should be able to sustain itself for 30 days, just like the EU BGs. The time horizon for both forces can be extended if they are adequately re-supplied. Furthermore, both forces rely on six-monthly rotation systems (land component for the NRF).\(^ {91}\)

Second, both the EU BG and the NRF are expected to be able to take on a range of missions, suggesting that there is a potential overlap between the two. While there is speculation that the NRF is slated for missions at the higher level of the intensity spectrum while the EU BGs are geared to lower intensity missions, a review of the NRF and EU BG mission range shows a certain consistency between the two.

For example, the NRF is not only targeted to high-intensity missions such as combat operations. It can also be used for humanitarian relief operations. To illustrate, the NRF deployed over 1,200 soldiers to Pakistan to help local authorities in the aftermath of the earthquake that hit Bagh in October 2005. The NRF also established an air bridge to ensure a steady flow of relief supplies to the area.\(^ {92}\) Components of the NRF have also been activated in support of specific events such as the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens.\(^ {93}\) On the other hand, EU BGs could be used as part of an initial entry force in EU higher-end operations.

The NRF’s principal objective is to serve as the ‘first force in, first force out.’ The missions it is designed to handle include the following:

- **Crisis response operations** – these include a range of mission profiles such as evacuation missions, consequence management (including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear events), humanitarian crisis operations, and counter-terrorism operations. The NRF is expected to operate as a stand-alone force under these circumstances that can cover both Article V and non-Article V situations.

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89. Ministers of Defence of NATO countries approved the NRF concept in Brussels in June 2003.
90. Depending on the elements to be deployed, some assets may be on a 30-day alert status.
91. The NATO Maritime and Air components are on standby for 12 months at a time. See: http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_q_a.htm (accessed 30 August 2006).
93. For more examples, see http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/nrf_q_a.htm (accessed 30 August 2006).
Initial entry force operations – these are foreseen in situations where there is an urgent need for personnel on the ground. The NRF would provide an initial entry force until the arrival of a larger follow-on force.

‘Demonstrative force’ – this involves employing NRF elements ‘as a demonstrative force to show NATO’s determination and solidarity to deter crises (quick response operations to support diplomacy as required).’

A comparison of the missions listed above with the EU’s five illustrative scenarios suggests that there is potential for overlap between the possible mission profiles that can be assigned to the respective force packages.

Third, both the NRF and EU BGs serve as conduits for force transformation and modernisation. In the case of the NRF, one of the arguments for its establishment was that it would encourage NATO members to fulfil the modernisation objectives set at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit and the 2002 NATO Prague Summit. For example, under the Prague Capabilities Commitments, NATO members agreed to improve capabilities in over 400 specific areas organised into eight major fields deemed necessary for the successful conduct of military operations such as air-to-air refuelling and deployable combat support units. A particularly heavy burden for such transformation lies on the European allies that are still making the adjustment from a territorial defence system to expeditionary forces. Since many of the contributors to the NRF are also participating in the EU BGs, both force packages face similar shortfalls. These include strategic airlift and effective logistics.

Lastly, and related to the point above, the EU BGs and the NRF rely on a similar pool of personnel to fill their ranks. For example, during Exercise Steadfast Jaguar, an NRF exercise held on the Cape Verde Islands, the majority of troops were European. As part of NRF-7, Germany contributed 2,000 personnel, followed by Spain (1,530), the United States (1,200) and France (1,060).

EU BG – NRF differences

Although the EU BGs and the NRF share a number of similarities, there are several important differences. The most evident is their

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respective size, and the participation of the US in the NRF. With regard to size, while the EU BGs are based on battalion-sized packages of approximately 1,500 personnel, the NRF’s land component is brigade-sized, amounting to around 9,500 troops.\textsuperscript{98} Fully operational, the entire NRF package comprises roughly 25,000 troops.\textsuperscript{99}

Related to the size of the forces is their composition: the EU BG consists of land forces that can be supported by air-based or maritime strategic enablers. However, these enablers are not defined in detail in the EU BG Concept. The NRF, on the other hand, is a joint force consisting of a land, maritime and air component. The maritime component is likely to number around 6,300 troops when fully deployed. The package may include an aircraft carrier, surface and subsurface combatant units, amphibious forces, and auxiliary support vessels.\textsuperscript{100} When fully deployed, the NRF’s air component will be in the 5,500 personnel range, enabling it to oversee 200 sorties per day. The air component is responsible for a full range of missions including early warning, air interdiction, close air support, and electronic warfare.\textsuperscript{101}

Lastly, there are differences in the certification and training processes. In the case of the NRF, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is responsible for setting standards and developing training, readiness, and certification programmes to be met by NATO Response Forces and headquarters.\textsuperscript{102} Thus, there is only one set of procedures stemming from one source that are applicable to all components. For the EU BGs, it is up to the contributing or framework nations to further detail training and certification standards. While it is encouraged that NATO standards be applied to the extent possible to enhance interoperability, there is no formal obligation to do so.

\textit{EU BG-NRF challenges}

At least two challenges face the EU BG-NRF relationship. The first concerns the issue of ‘double-hatting’. With both force packages placing premium value on rapid response, it is essential that there are no overlaps in terms of personnel or headquarters committed to both forces. Thus, force rotations need to be coordinated across EU BG and NRF requirements. Since this task is up to the contributing countries themselves, it should be fairly straightforward. However, given training, certification, and rotation requirements,
achieving this goal may not always be easy – especially for contributors with a small set of available forces. The NRF land cycle runs for at least eighteen months. Thus, forces committed to the NRF are unlikely to serve on an EU BG formation for two years. On the contrary, forces pledged to an EU BG also require a preparation phase (of flexible length), a six-month standby period, and time off.

The timing challenge is partially illustrated when considering the situation of the EUROCORPS. It represents contributions from five nations – France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg – and was responsible for the NRF land component until 10 January 2007. In the same timeframe, France, Germany and Belgium were responsible for troop contributions to two EU BGs. While countries are currently able to juggle contributions to multiple formations, manpower limitations might become more visible in the event of a deployment.103

Second (although this is a low-probability-scenario), it remains to be seen whether and how EU BG and NRF formations could relieve each other in a rapid response situation. Synchronising the two operations would require close collaboration between the OHQs (including SHAPE), FHQs, EU Military Staff, NATO international military staff, the PSC, and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). A number of elements would also need to be coordinated in advance, including deployment schedules and the impact on strategic (air)lift, replacement rates, communication systems and infrastructure rotation (e.g. operational headquarters).

To address these and other challenges, a number of mechanisms are available to facilitate EU and NATO exchanges. Among the better known are the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements, the EU-NATO Capability Group, the NAC-PSC meetings, and periodic exercises. The Berlin Plus arrangements lay down the cooperative protocols for crisis management operations and the exchange of classified information. It makes it possible for NATO assets and planning resources to be made available to the EU. The mechanism was activated for two EU military operations, Concordia (2003) and Althea (2004).

Established in March 2003, the EU-NATO Capability Group acts to ‘ensure the transparent and coherent development of capabilities’ across the EU and NATO.104 It provides a forum for exchanging information, enabling better coherence between specific and proposed commitments, targets and priorities within both organisations. One of its responsibilities is to ensure infor-

103. However, it is important to remember that EU BGs do not last. They can ‘disappear’ after the standby period and never be formed again.
information exchanges pertaining to the coherence and complementarity between the EU BGs and the NRF. The group is also responsible for presenting respective progress of capability improvements within both organisations. The outcomes of the EU-NATO Capability Group meetings are not public, making it difficult to judge its impact.

At the political level, PSC and NAC meetings provide a forum to discuss security-related issues. For example, in the run-up to operation Althea, meetings between the two groups were used to facilitate the transition from SFOR to Althea. However, the PSC-NAC meetings are limited in scope and frequency. Only a few meetings have been held over the past year and the topics for discussion have been constrained given the lack of appropriate security clearances for Malta and Cyprus – the two EU Member States without official links with NATO.

At the operational level, the EU and NATO have the possibility to carry out joint exercises under the CME/CMX (crisis management exercise) banner. These are held roughly every three years to test unused procedures. Theoretically, such exercises could also be used to test operational links between EU BG and NRF elements. The first-ever joint EU/NATO crisis management exercise at the strategic politico-military level was held in November 2003. Known as CME/CMX 03, it simulated an EU-led operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.105 A partially declassified evaluation of the exercise suggests that while the exercise was successful and the objectives were achieved in general, there were pockets of concern regarding the duration of the exercise, the exercise planning process, and the preparation phase. For example, the evaluation stresses the importance of ‘timely staff-to-staff contacts’ and appropriate time planning to elaborate Exercise Specifications.106

EU-UN crisis management relations

Beyond the EU’s relationship with NATO, there are links with several other international organisations that have a remit in the security domain. Examples include the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the African Union.107 This section focuses on the EU-UN relationship given the possibility that an EU BG be activated in response to a UN request. In September 2003, the EU and the UN concluded an

agreement to enhance their collaboration in the field of crisis management. Signed in September 2003, the ‘Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management’ establishes a joint consultative mechanism at the working level to enhance coordination in three specific areas:\textsuperscript{108}

- **Planning** – to facilitate reciprocal assistance in assessment missions. The agreement calls for greater interaction between EU-UN mission planning units to focus on questions of logistics and interoperability.
- **Training** – to encourage joint training standards, procedures, and planning for military and civilian personnel. The agreement also calls for the ‘institutionalisation’ of training seminars, conferences and seminars.
- **Communication** – to stimulate cooperation between the situation centres of the EU and the UN. Related measures include the exchange of liaison officers whenever required and the establishment of desk-to-desk dialogue through respective liaison offices in New York and Brussels.\textsuperscript{109} Finally, both sides are expected to share lessons learned and best practices on a systematic basis. Such information extends to information on mission hand-over and procurement.

The Council approved a separate document on EU/UN cooperation in military crisis management operations on 14 June 2004.\textsuperscript{110} It outlines two main directions for EU support for UN operations:

1. The provision of national military capabilities in the framework of a UN operation;
2. An EU operation in answer to a request from the UN.\textsuperscript{111}

In April 2005, the UN and EU held a joint Exercise Study (EST 05) focussing on the modalities for practical cooperation during a crisis management operation. Among others, the exercise considered how an EU BG could be used in support of the UN in a crisis situation requiring rapid response. The findings of the exercise serve as a basis for follow-on documentation on EU/UN cooperation in the event of a crisis management situation.\textsuperscript{112}

Given these institutional links, what are some of the main issues concerning the possible use of an EU BG in response to a UN

\textsuperscript{108} Based on the text in the ‘Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management’, Council document 12510/03 (Presse 266), New York, 24 September 2003.

\textsuperscript{109} As of early 2006, the EUMS has a military liaison officer (colonel) posted at the DPKO.

\textsuperscript{110} ‘EU/UN co-operation in military crisis management operations’, Council of the European Union, doc. 9638/1/04 REV 1, Brussels, 9 June 2004.

\textsuperscript{111} ‘EU/UN relations in military crisis management - Elements on the Battlegroups’, Council of the European Union, doc. 5660/1/05, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
request? At least three aspects stand out. First, while there is a ‘link’ between the EU BGs and the UN, the exact circumstance under which an EU BG would be used in support of the UN is wide open. Initial documentation points out that an EU-led battlegroup could be employed in a crisis management operation in response to a request by the UN and under a UN mandate. However, the need for a UN mandate, although politically desirable, may not be feasible in certain situations requiring rapid response.

Under such circumstances, would an ‘invitation’ by the host country and a request by the UN Secretary General suffice for the deployment of an EU BG as has been the case for certain ESDP operations? If an urgent situation resembling crimes against humanity materialises, would a request by the UN Secretary General be enough? The issue of a UN mandate has been a sensitive point for many years in the EU internal debate. While several EU Member States point to the need for a UN or OSCE mandate prior to engaging in a significant military operation, others highlight the drawbacks such as time delays and the implicit subjugation of EU foreign policy to non-EU countries represented in the UN Security Council.

Second, in spite of increased desk-level interactions between EU and UN staff, there are still misconceptions concerning core concepts and terminology used by each organisation. Terms such as ‘stabilisation tasks’ are not properly defined in advance, making it more challenging to gauge potential UN requests. In addition, staff are not always familiar with the structures of the other’s organisation, even at the technical level. This increases the likelihood for misunderstandings and slower interactions. Lastly, the lack of a formal UN OHQ in New York compounds the challenge of finding adequate channels of interaction in the run-up to an UN-EU collaborative mission.

Third, there exists limited practical experience on how an EU BG would operate alongside a UN force during a crisis-management operation. While there are prior experiences from non-EU BG operations such as Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo, and Concordia, the EU BGs bring their own sets of issues that may not be properly addressed by previous experiences. The ‘lessons identified’ from Operation Artemis suggest that there is room for improvement. Although several of these lessons have been learned, it is instructive to recall some of the principal ones identified by the UN’s Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit:
Lack of initial liaison contacts – While the French reconnaissance team that reached Kinshasa in May 2003 established early contact with UN Staff, there was no further direct communication between Artemis’s evolving operational headquarters and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) during the pre-deployment phase. As a result, MONUC forces were not warned of the landing of the first Artemis troops.

Limited length of deployment – UN forces on the ground were concerned by the short deployment period of Artemis. According to evaluators, the adherence to a limited timeframe signalled to armed belligerents the ‘transitory nature’ of the EU’s contribution, placing the follow-on MONUC deployment under pressure. UN personnel also considered the EU deployment period to be less than three months as it took the EU several weeks to build up and draw down the forces. According to the UN evaluation report, Artemis ‘risked failure in establishing such a strict exit date.’

Reluctance to double-hat – UN forces noted that no EU personnel ‘were willing to re-hat with MONUC.’ UN Forces were hoping some EU personnel would double-hat to strengthen their credibility by providing access to some of the special capabilities brought by EU forces (e.g. special forces, intelligence, and over-flight capacity). Coupled with the prospect that no EU forces could stay beyond the September return deadline, UN forces noted the difficulty of maintaining operational continuity.

In spite of these perceived drawbacks, there were several positive results stemming from the MONUC-Artemis cooperation. Most importantly, the ‘different mandates, competencies and command chains of the two forces did not present significant difficulties.’ And although the pre-deployment liaison between the two forces was limited, cooperation was fluid once Artemis was established on the ground.

Reserve force requirements
While most planners recognise that an EU BG needs a strategic reserve force to provide it with back-up in case of need, there is no formal reserve force requirement. Instead, a variety of options have been proposed, highlighting different approaches and visions.
Five general options for a reserve force are distinguishable:

1. Relying on the second EU BG on standby to serve as a reserve force
2. Requiring the framework nation of the EU BG needing back-up to provide national reinforcements
3. Referring to assets listed in the Force Catalogue (having other EU Member States contribute)
4. Creating a standing reserve force
5. Requesting assistance from other sources, e.g. NATO.

Each option offers distinct advantages and disadvantages. Under the first option, the second EU BG on standby would function as the strategic reserve force for the deployed EU BG. Since two EU BGs are on standby on a rotating basis, one EU BG would always be available to support the other. The main advantage of such a set-up is the ability to quickly deploy reinforcements in times of need. However, there are some drawbacks.

If both EU BGs become engaged in a single operation, it would deprive the EU of the ability to take on two distinct missions ‘nearly simultaneously’ – an objective specifically attached to the EU BGs. Moreover, if the second EU BG has niche specialties that are not applicable to the area of operations of the first EU BG – for example an EU BG specialised in amphibious capacity needed in a landlocked country – it may have implications for the value added provided by the reserve. Given the limited size of an EU BG, some may also argue that a more robust force package could be needed to reinforce an EU BG requiring support. Relying on the second EU BG may also raise questions concerning command and control (C2), especially if they have their own C2 structure and rely on a different operation headquarters. A variation of this option would be to use a BG that has already completed the standby period, making it possible to maintain the ability to take on two missions at the same time.

Under the second option, the framework nation of the EU BG needing assistance would be responsible for providing reserves. For example, if the French-Belgian Battlegroup on standby between January-July 2007 were deployed and needed assistance, France would be responsible for the strategic reserve. The principal advantage of this option is the ease with which reinforcements could be integrated into the EU BG needing assistance. Using per-
sonnel and equipment from the main EU BG contributor would ensure rapid interoperability at all levels. Another advantage would be the possibility to tailor the support package to fit the needs on the ground – provided that those are available in the contributing/framework nation. Using reserves that speak the same language as the majority in the EU BG contingent may likewise facilitate cooperation on the ground.

This option might be of most interest to contributing states with large pools of available forces. For example, the UK has the capacity to assign troops to up to four different task forces simultaneously – giving planners a certain degree of operational flexibility. France is earmarking two companies from its Guépard modules to establish a credible reserve force.

The principal disadvantage with this option is the possibility that a contributing/framework nation does not have the necessary manpower or assets available or at a state of readiness that will allow them to be used effectively. While this could be partially overcome by pre-planning a potential reserve force during the force generation process, it would entail significant expenditures that few if any participating states would accept.

A third option forwarded by some military planners is to consult the content of the Force Catalogue – effectively reaching out to other EU Member States. This could be done around day 60 of an extended EU BG deployment that seems likely to need reinforcements. The Force Catalogue 2007 (FC 07) includes a range of equipment at different states of readiness. The potential advantage of FC 07 is that it contains a variety of platforms that can support robust needs. In addition, the catalogue lists assets spanning air, land, and sea elements – making it possible to identify additional strategic enablers. On the downside, FC 07 consists of pledged assets. Since they are not ‘automatically available units’, it is unclear whether certain assets would be readily deployable. For example, some elements may already be engaged in other operations or otherwise not available for quick deployment. Moreover, some argue that the assets in FC 07 are not pledged for force generation but rather for capability development needs.

A fourth option is to establish a ‘standing’ reserve force that is available for both EU BGs on standby. The force could be made up of personnel from both the EU BGs on call or via contributions from other Member States. The main advantage of this option is the establishment of a pre-identified reserve. If it is needed, it can

120. Interview with MoD staff, London, November 2005.
121. All French land forces contribute units to the Guépard module for a period of two months at the end of their standardised 16-month cycle.
be deployed quickly and there is no need to rely on other steps such as a force generation conference. On the downside, the establishment of such a reserve would translate into additional monetary and personnel costs. Moreover, if one of the EU BGs requires a reserve, the second EU BG would effectively have no available reserve. Under such circumstances, other options would need to be considered.

A fifth general option is to request ‘outside’ assistance in support of an EU BG. Under this scenario, a request would most likely be directed to NATO. The most obvious advantage of this option is that it in some respects would absolve the EU from establishing its own reserve force for the EU BGs. Another advantage would be access to the benefits accorded by the Berlin Plus mechanism. To illustrate, if some EU Member States are able to assemble their own reserve force but do not have the needed assets to transport them to the area of operations, they could request strategic transport support through Berlin Plus.

There are several limitations with this option. For example, any request to NATO raises political considerations relating to the NATO-EU relationship. For example, should one force package potentially serve as the back-up of the other at short notice? From a different vantage point, an EU request for NATO support vis-à-vis reserve forces could affect NRF troop rotation schedules – possibly straining personnel tempos among countries contributing to both force packages. Lastly, with NATO forces stretched thin in places such as Afghanistan, it may be challenging to identify NATO troops not already occupied to assist an EU BG in need.

It is important to recognise these options are not mutually exclusive and that there may be other variations available. It is likely that elements from different options might be combined to address very specific needs on the ground. Moreover, it is important to remember that the EU BGs cannot provide a panacea of solutions to address all possible contingencies. For instance, the EU BGs would not be able to cope with three missions that arise in close succession – even if they are fairly small. Among other questions that need to be addressed are the potential size of the reserve force and their state of readiness.
Employability

One of the key questions concerning the EU BGs is whether or not they will be employed, and if so, under which circumstances. Besides the international security situation, there are other factors affecting the decision to use an EU BG, such as political considerations and perception of risks on the ground. To date, no EU BG has been activated in support of an ESDP or other crisis management mission – despite the availability of at least one EU BG since January 2005. The issue is particularly relevant considering two recent decisions to deploy EU Member States’ forces: in support of the elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in late July 2006 and in the aftermath of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in July/August 2006.

The case of the DRC

With respect to the DRC, there was early speculation that an EU BG might be used in support of the UN mission on the ground during the months prior to and after the July elections. The supposition was fuelled in part by indications that the EU troop contribution would be approximately 1,500 – consistent with the size of an EU BG. The initial signs that Germany might be one of the principal contributors, combined with the fact that Germany had one EU BG on standby, increased such speculation.

Moreover, the UN’s specific request for assistance to bolster UN forces on the ground drew parallels to Operation Artemis. The volatile situation in the DRC, and the difficulty predicting what might happen after the first electoral results were announced, also led some to think that an EU BG might be employed. In the eyes of many, an EU BG was the right instrument to place on the ground given the many uncertainties. Others, those predicting limited security threats, may have seen it as a good opportunity to test an EU BG in a ‘permissive environment’. However, no EU BG was activated for the operation. Instead, Operation EUFOR RD Congo, consisting of a package of European forces representing 21 EU Member States, was activated.

There are several factors explaining why an EU BG was not employed in the DRC. First, policymakers and planners did not regard support for the electoral process in the DRC as an operation justifying a rapid response requirement through an EU BG operation. Specifically, the planning process and operational

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123. A second EU BG was also on standby at the time. Led by Spain, it included contributions from Greece, Italy and Portugal.

assessment did not lead to the conclusion that an EU BG was the right tool for the job. Some felt hesitation about employing an EU BG for the first time in an arena that is largely unpredictable and might risk failure. Others perceived the security requirements not sufficiently high or urgent to justify the use of an EU BG.

Second, segments of the German parliament reacted against early indications that Germany might have to lead troops engaged in a DRC mission.\textsuperscript{125} Thus, domestic attempts in Germany to block its prominent role at an early stage immediately after the German elections reduced the likelihood of an EU BG being used – especially given the German-led EU BG on standby.\textsuperscript{126} This issue was magnified by Germany’s desire to contribute with about a third of the total troop strength.\textsuperscript{127}

Third, the operation raised a timing issue. The need to be on the ground prior to the elections at the end of July 2006, and the likely need to remain until the announcement of the second round results in November 2006, would require a deployment of approximately four to five months – going beyond the EU BG sustainability horizon. The use of a forthcoming EU BG as a replacement was probably not deemed attractive, as it would create the illusion of an EU BG serving as the ‘exit strategy’ of another. Moreover, unresolved positions concerning strategic reserves dampened the willingness to employ an EU BG.

The case of southern Lebanon

Armed skirmishes between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon began in the aftermath of a Hezbollah cross-border raid on 12 July 2006. There was a call for international troops after a UN-brokered ceasefire came into effect on 14 August 2006. The need for a rapid troop deployment, combined with indications that a sizeable portion of the personnel would come from EU Member States, raised the possibility of deploying an EU BG. While the boosted UNIFIL II (UN Forces in Lebanon) force was expected to reach close to 15,000 troops, greatly exceeding the troop size of an EU BG, an EU BG could potentially have served as an initial entry force in support of UNIFIL until a larger force package arrived.\textsuperscript{128} As an early entry interim force, the role of the EU BG would have been limited to a maximum of three months.\textsuperscript{129} Besides filling a sensitive security vacuum in the southern part of Lebanon, an EU


\textsuperscript{126} The EU BG made available by Spain (with contributions by Italy, Portugal, and Greece) was not considered a likely option since it was prominently geared towards amphibious tasks.

\textsuperscript{127} As of July 2006, France was the largest troop contributor with close to 1,100 personnel. Germany was second with slightly over 700 troops. Overall strength was nearly 2,400.

\textsuperscript{128} As of 1 November 2006, there were 9,509 military personnel engaged in UNIFIL. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/facts.html (accessed 10 November 2006).

\textsuperscript{129} As an aside, the theoretical air distance (great circle distance) between Brussels and Beirut is approximately 3,150 kilometres, well below the unofficial guidance distance of 6,000 kilometres for EU deployments.
BG would have addressed the initial difficulties in deploying European troops, especially as European forces were expected to make up the bulk of UN forces on the ground.

In the end, European troops were pledged to form a multinational coalition. In August 2006, France pledged 2,000 troops, Italy 3,000 troops, while Spain was preparing to send up to 1,200 personnel. In addition, other countries were considering sending troops, e.g. Poland (500), Belgium (400), and Finland (250). However, at the time that the contributions were made public, very few European troops were in southern Lebanon. In the immediate aftermath of the ceasefire, Europe’s contribution was limited to 200 French personnel – unleashing a call for more troops on the ground across several EU Member States. The amount of time it took to even put some soldiers on the ground raised questions concerning Europe’s ability and willingness to deploy forces to southern Lebanon.

An EU BG was not considered as an early entry force in Lebanon as envisaged European troops were to be deployed within the context of the existing UN-led operation (UNIFIL). Since an EU BG operation will always be conducted under the political control and strategic guidance of the EU, the circumstances did not dictate the deployment of an EU BG.

Implications
As the situations in the DRC and southern Lebanon demonstrate, conditions seldom align perfectly to facilitate the engagement of standby forces such as an EU BG. This may partially explain the inclination to tailor specific force packages on a coalition basis for each crisis situation. Besides making it possible to tailor the responding force, the process encourages cooperation among countries that share the politico-military inclinations for engaging in an operation.

This has implications for the EU BGs vis-à-vis their employability. There is a risk that EU BG packages remain on the sidelines as future operations continue to rely on intra-European coalitions established through a force generation process – especially for high-risk situations. In some ways, such a development would parallel the fate of the rapid reaction elements established under the Headline Goal 2003. While the EU met, albeit with some limitations and constraints, the capability objective to be able to deploy
50-60,000 personnel, such a collective force has never been activated in response to a single mission.\(^\text{131}\)

However, there is a big difference between the Headline Goal 2003 package and the EU BGs. The EU BGs consist of standby forces, resulting in an opportunity cost when they are not employed. Moreover, when committed to an EU BG, the troops are not available for consideration through force generation processes, effectively magnifying the opportunity cost.

Recent force deployment patterns suggest that there is no ‘one-size fits all’ package that can meet the entire spectrum of crisis management operations. EU policymakers are discovering this first hand through the Headline Goal process. With the Headline Goal 2003, the EU aimed for a large force package – consistent with the experiences gained in former Yugoslavia. As noted earlier, since its operationalisation in 2003, there has been no situation requiring a deployment near that size – with the possible exception of Darfur and Lebanon during the summer of 2006. The realisation that there would be few opportunities to employ such a large contingent, combined with the experiences from Artemis, gradually shifted the focus to small and rapidly deployable force packages. However, these too have yet to be employed since reaching Initial Operating Capability in 2005. While it is too early to evaluate the contribution of the EU Battlegroups to ESDP, questions may arise if they are not used within a few years of reaching Full Operational Capability.

The employability of an EU BG is also affected by the type of missions it can take on. While there is agreement on the types of missions, there seems to be less convergence on the battlegroups’ ability to tackle the full range of missions. Specifically, the use of an EU BG is likely to be more sensitive at the higher end of the operational spectrum. According to some analysts, the EU BGs may not be applicable to high-risk operations given their limited size and sustainability.\(^\text{132}\) Some planners suggest following a 4:1 force ratio to ensure that they not be overpowered. For an EU BG of approximately 1,500 to 3,000 personnel, this would suggest a maximum opposing force of 375 – 750 individuals. Additional parallels can be drawn with comparable sized units from other countries.

For example, an EU BG with corresponding support staff is similar in size to a US Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) consisting of about 2,000 – 3,000 personnel. According to one study,
while a MEU is expected to be able to carry out non-combatant evacuation operations, it might not be able to engage in peace enforcement operations or guarding an exclusion zone in a large geographic area.\textsuperscript{133} These types of operations could theoretically be assigned to an EU BG. And while situations are highly variable from case to case, recent European deployments suggest that high-risk situations or situations in which outcomes are unclear may encourage decision-makers to refrain from employing an EU BG.

Another factor that may affect the employability of an EU BG is the scheduling system. The current system relies on six-month rotations taking place at the end of July and December of each calendar year. While rotation criteria are necessary, they may affect EU BG employability in unforeseen ways. For instance, deploying an EU BG near or close to a rotation period may become difficult should one or several countries contributing to the EU BGs on standby look for ways to minimise the chances that they be deployed. Using tactics to either delay (or speed up) the process leading to a Crisis Management Concept, the countries could work to avoid having their EU BG on standby when a decision to deploy is taken. Several reasons could lead to such a situation. Some countries contributing to an EU BG may not share the politico-military objectives of engaging in an operation to the point of sending troops. Others may want to avoid a deployment due to a lack of pre-identified reserves.

What are some likely ways in which the EU BGs might be employed given these considerations? Over time, the political pressure to use the EU BGs may become such that their actual deployment is ‘diluted’. Some imagine a scenario in which a portion of an EU BG is employed in a low-risk scenario such as a non-combatant evacuation operation. Even if only about 100 personnel from the EU BG were employed, it would require the activation of an OHQ and an FHQ, signalling the use of an EU BG. Doing so would release the pressure to employ an EU BG. However, if pursued, such a strategy would represent a very expensive option to ensure the engagement of the EU BGs. In addition, it could impact on the EU BG Concept, including the notion that the battlegroups represent the ‘minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package available of stand-alone operations’.\textsuperscript{134} Questions would likely surface concerning the economic viability of maintaining pools of standby forces.

\textsuperscript{133} Colonel Ronald Harmsma, ‘Transatlantic Force Projection, What is the Best Solution: US, NATO, EU or a Coalition?’, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{134} EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, ‘EU Battlegroups’, EU BG 02, November 2006.
Summary

The EU BGs face two principal sets of challenges. The first set is associated with rapid response requirements. At the political level, the main challenge is to ensure that the decision-making process is streamlined to enable rapid deployment. At the operational level, deployability requirements represent the biggest hurdle. A variety of solutions have been identified to address these challenges; however, each brings with it specific advantages and disadvantages.

The second set of challenges is less tangible in nature. It includes issues such as the EU BGs’ relationship with other force packages (e.g. the NRF) and the likelihood that an EU BG is employed. Concerning the latter, the first few years post-FOC will be vital to gauge whether or not the EU BGs will become an active part of the ESDP crisis management toolbox.
Beyond Full Operational Capability

This chapter examines how the EU BGs might evolve over the medium- to long-term after Full Operational Capability is reached. It considers some of the key drivers – such as transformation requirements – that are likely to impact on the EU BGs over the coming years. It also identifies exogenous factors, such as the growing reliance on private military companies, and their potential effects on the EU BGs.

Key drivers post-FOC

At least four principal drivers are likely to shape the evolution of the EU BGs over the next few years. They are: (1) military transformation requirements; (2) consideration of joint (land, sea, and air) force packages; (3) coordination requirements with civilian and international organisations; and (4) exogenous factors. The following section covers these elements in greater detail.

Transformation process

The EU BGs are interlinked with the military transformation process. As noted earlier, the EU BGs facilitate military transformation given their goal of highly deployable force packages that can take on a variety of missions. Some may even argue that the EU BGs’ main purpose is to serve as a vehicle for force transformation. The ‘transformative’ effect of the EU BGs is particularly visible in some EU Member States. In Sweden, the preparatory process associated with the Nordic Battlegroup has reinforced the transformation from static forces focusing on territorial defence to deployable units that participate in international operations. Given its applicability to the EU BGs, this transformation process is likely to continue across European armed forces. As the European Security Strategy (ESS) notes, there is a need ‘to transform
our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces and to enable them to address the new threats.\(^\text{136}\)

The relationship between the EU BGs and military transformation also works the other way around; increasingly, the transformation process is likely to have an impact on the EU BGs. Investments in military technologies and platforms are partially justified by EU BG requirements in areas such as deployability, sustainability, survivability, etc. Examples include efforts to improve strategic lift capacity and enhance C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) architectures. To illustrate, efforts to develop a European Secured Software Defined Radio Referential (ESSOR) will eventually allow a single radio to communicate on different networks (e.g. national, European). Another example is the Tactical Imagery Exploitation Station (TIES) project spearheaded by the European Defence Agency. By 2015, the availability of A400M in substantial numbers among countries such as France, the UK and Germany will give EU BGs greater capacity.

The incorporation of these and other new technologies will affect the EU BGs in different ways. First, the operational effectiveness per soldier will increase as communication systems improve and become interoperable across EU Member States. This ‘multiplier effect’ should make it easier for policymakers to employ EU BGs in support of the entire spectrum of Petersberg and ESS Tasks if needed.

Second, as new technologies are introduced, it should be easier to sustain EU Battlegroups beyond 120 days on the ground if needed.\(^\text{137}\) This will give EU BGs greater operational flexibility as supply chain limitations are minimised. Sustainability constraints are more likely to appear as a result of limited pools of available personnel or rotation requirements.

Third, EU BGs may change in their basic configuration as a result of military transformation – especially as new technologies are incorporated into the EU BGs. Unmanned platforms, whether air, land, or sea-based, are likely to become part of future EU BGs – impacting on their operational capacity. Such changes may have ramifications for the types of missions, rules of engagement, and personnel assigned to an EU BG. For example, EU BGs might be more effective at executing extended monitoring missions (e.g. a


\(^{137}\) However, going beyond 120 days would require modification to the EU BG Concept.
ceasefire mission requiring rapid response) as a result of new technologies that can be tailored to such tasks. There may also be negative consequences. Greater ‘specialisation’ may make it more difficult for decision-makers to select an EU BG for a particular task that requires a broad range of capabilities. Likewise, it may affect interoperability levels with non-EU BG units – such as UN troops – making it more difficult to take on certain types of operations. As a result, the EU may need to agree on a fixed (minimum) Combined Joint Statement of Requirements to minimise potential differences.

Fourth, the introduction of new domain areas in the security realm – such as space – may affect the way EU BGs operate over the medium- to long-term. A variety of space-based security services are likely to appear over the next few years – making it increasingly important to consider their applicability to the EU BGs. The availability of earth observation systems (GMES) and positioning, navigation, and timing systems (Galileo) around 2010 may serve as a future strategic enabler to the EU BGs – even for ‘low intensity’ operations. Earth observation systems could be employed to identify possible waterways under the earth’s surface, for example if refugee camps need to be established close to waterways.\textsuperscript{138} Global positioning services could be employed to monitor the location of humanitarian supplies – making it easier to ensure that supply requirements are met in a timely manner.

While the military transformation process is likely to enable EU BGs to take on new tasks, its effects may not be so evident in support of ‘traditional’ tasks requiring rapid response assistance such as humanitarian operations. The value added of force transformation – especially in terms of new technologies – is less obvious for operations that require extensive interaction with local authorities and populations. The comparative advantage of advanced military technologies may also become less pronounced the longer an operation goes on and becomes a stabilisation/nation-building mission. Recent studies suggest that future operations will be less about achieving victory in the battlefield and more about stabilising volatile areas – placing a premium on a mix of civilian and military tools that can work together to fulfil desired effects.\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{138} This is possible through a combination of different imaging technologies (e.g. optical imagery, multispectral optical imagery, and data provided via synthetic aperture radar).

‘Going joint’

The prospect of joint EU BGs – i.e. incorporating sea and air elements into the battlegroup package – will garner greater consideration with the passage of time. Already now, the EU is studying the viability of air- and sea-based rapid response capabilities.

Concerning naval aspects, SG/HR Solana welcomed an initiative to ‘start a reflection about the maritime dimension of the Headline Goal 2010’ in May 2005. In November 2005, a terms of reference and methodology report was developed to guide ongoing work. Moreover, the EU military staff has finalised a study concerning the maritime dimension of ESDP. The EUMC has agreed to the development of a European maritime reaction concept. The concept would be based on NATO standards and aim to facilitate the rapid generation of naval force packages within a short period of time for EU missions.

With respect to air-based rapid response, the European Capability Action Plan introduced a General Approach on Deployability (GAD) in 2003. One of GAD’s principal aims is the ‘co-ordination of all strategic lift assets, mechanisms and initiatives in support of EU-led operations, in particular for the EU Battlegroups.’ Several coordination centres have been made available to the EU in support of GAD. Examples include the European Airlift Centre at Eindhoven, the Sealift Coordination Centre collocated at Air Base in Eindhoven, and the Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Centre in Greece.

In conjunction with GAD, EU planners are working on a Rapid Response Air Initiative (RRAI). The concept is consistent with land and maritime initiatives aiming to develop a minimum militarily credible air force package. In its current configuration, the RRAI is made up of two sub-components: a European Deployed Air Station and a European Combined Composite Air Component. Once operationalised, these two elements would provide a backbone for an air rapid response capability.

While planners are developing rapidly deployable maritime and air packages, it remains to be seen whether the EU BGs will ‘go joint’. In the medium term, such concepts are likely to evolve separately from the EU BG concept for two primary reasons. First, the EU BGs represent a relatively small force package. Adding on permanent sea- and air-assets would change the size, nature, and capacity of the EU BG – requiring a careful review of the EU BG.
Concept. This is unlikely to happen prior to their use or in the short term. In fact, a limited employment of the EU BG and/or strategic enablers might limit a movement towards joint EU BGs. Second, the EU BGs already have access to air- and sea-based strategic enablers. Thus, it would seem easier to incorporate new concepts such as RRAI into existing architectures rather than to create new permanent fixtures.

Over the long term, the issue of ‘going joint’ may become more prominent. As rapid response air and sea concepts mature, it will be easier to judge whether or not they should become part of the EU BG Concept and how it might be done. The decision will likewise be more relevant once the EU BGs have a history. At that point, policymakers will have a basis to determine whether or not there is justification for a joint force package at the EU level. To illustrate, if the EU BGs are employed with a certain frequency and require strategic enablers, the move towards a joint EU BG might seem a natural next step. On the contrary, if the EU BGs are not employed frequently and policymakers instead rely on coalitions, a more likely choice might be to keep the air- and sea-based packages separate from the EU BGs to ensure greater flexibility and availability.

If the EU BGs evolve towards a joint force package, the original EU BG Concept will need to be reformulated. The addition of naval and air units would result in a substantially larger force package. This might call for a larger land component to validate the addition of naval and air assets on a more permanent basis (e.g. to brigade size). Moreover, depending on the EU BGs’ level of employability at that point, decision-makers might consider ways to cut costs associated with maintaining EU BGs on standby. For example, policymakers might consider having one rather than two large joint EU BGs on standby at all times.\footnote{Needless to say, this would have an impact on the EU’s ambition to be able to take on two missions ‘nearly simultaneously.’}

\textbf{Coordination requirements}

There is growing realisation among policymakers that a mix of civilian and military assets are often key to successful crisis management operations. Three EU presidencies – those of Austria, the UK and Finland – emphasised the need for greater civil-
military co-ordination (CMCO) throughout 2005-2006. The recognition that civilian and military elements are likely to be needed on the ground has implications for the EU BGs – especially as the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 is reached.

Two of the five illustrative scenarios guiding the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 specifically call for coordination with military forces: \(^1\)

1. Conflict prevention
2. Civilian support to humanitarian operations

For the EU BGs, a potential partner on the ground might be a Civilian Response Team (CRT) or an Integrated Police Unit (IPU). \(^2\) While it is difficult to predict whether a CRT and EU BG might be assigned to an area of operations simultaneously, the wide range of tasks assigned to the CRTs makes it hypothetically possible. Among its tasks are to establish a rapid initial presence in the field and to support ongoing crisis management (principally under the EU Special Representative function). Having an EU BG work alongside an IPU is more likely, as these police units can be placed under military command should circumstances require it.

However, how civil-military coordination elements are applied to crisis management tools such as the EU BGs and the CRTs are still work in progress. Moreover, there are limited training exercises undertaken at the EU-level that incorporate contributions from military and civilian rapid response elements to practise such cooperation on the ground.

In the case of the EU BGs, there may be a need to refine certification and training processes to enhance the ability to operate alongside civilian personnel. Different requirements may be needed to operate with civilian ESDP packages such as the CRTs and IPUs and multinational packages such as the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF).

EU BGs may also have to consider how they fit into the crisis management cycle – especially when it contains a military and civilian phase. Recent ESDP operations suggest that military-civilian rotations are likely. For example Concordia, the EU’s first military operation launched in March 2003, was followed by a civilian police mission (Proxima) in December 2003. A Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) replaced Proxima in December 2005.

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1. The other missions include stabilisation and reconstruction (including substitution missions), stabilisation and reconstruction (civilian stand alone), and specialised institution building intervention (civilian stand alone).
2. The Civilian Response Team concept is being developed under the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. The objective of the CRTs is to deploy within five days of a decision and to be able to stay on the ground for up to three months.
How would EU BGs best position themselves to ensure a fluid transition between the military and civilian phases of an operation? Additional key questions that are not necessarily specific to the EU BGs include:

- Whether or not EU BGs need more liaison officers to facilitate the transition from a military to civilian operation?
- What type of cooperation should exist between the Force Commander and an EU Special Representative on the ground if one is assigned?

Exogenous factors

There are several other factors that can have an impact on the future direction of the EU BGs in the medium-to long-term. Examples include:

- **Size of military defence budgets** – Since the end of the Cold War, a majority of EU Member States have decreased their defence budgets. This trend has continued for well over a decade. Only in the last few years have investments increased in some European countries to adjust to a post-9/11 world. The expenditures associated with EU BGs on standby are likely to be felt over time. While many may argue that expenditures on public goods such as defence are justified even when they are not employed, some may object to the EU BGs’ focus on external operations (as opposed to defensive missions) – increasing political pressure to limit the EU BGs. On the other hand, it could also raise prospects for finding new ways to share costs or pool resources associated with the EU BGs.

  From another perspective, the deployment of an EU BG may also put a significant strain on contributing countries’ budgets. As noted earlier, the prospects of incurring such costs may lead contributing countries to look for ways to avoid the activation of their EU BG during a time of crisis. Should this phenomenon occur a few times, it would affect the viability of the EU BG Concept over the long run.

- **Interactions with other elements listed in the Headline Goals** – The EU BGs are not the alpha and omega of rapid response. There are other rapid response elements in the Headline Goal 2003 and
the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. Until the EU BGs are employed, it is difficult to gauge how other EU assets might be employed in tandem with the EU BGs. Nonetheless, it is clear that their use in support of the EU BGs could have an impact on the battlegroups’ future development – even if they are conceived as self-contained force packages.

- **Trends in operations** – What types of missions are likely to materialise in the coming few years? A surge in large-scale operations that require stabilisation and reconstruction elements may limit the scope for EU BGs. On the other hand, a greater need for rapid response (e.g. for initial entry) might place a greater emphasis on the EU BGs.

- **Rise in private military companies** – Given the multitude of deployments worldwide, there is a growing reliance on private military companies. These can take on a variety of roles ranging from the provision of support services to securing perimeters. To illustrate, the American company Brown & Root Services supplied US forces in Kosovo with ‘100 percent of their food, vehicle maintenance, and hazardous materials handling; 90 percent of their water; and 80 percent of their fuel provision.’

Like-wise, private military companies are already assisting international organisations such as the UN with tasks such as the provision of security for humanitarian assistance, operation of medical facilities, and de-mining services.

Given this trend, what is the possible impact of private military companies on the EU BGs – especially if they are increasingly employed in operations of medium- to low-intensity? A possible development is that some private military companies are employed to provide support functions currently assigned to EU BG military personnel. Over time, private military companies might be employed to take on additional tasks such as deliverance of humanitarian aid. These and other trends, if realised, would have a substantial impact on the EU BGs. For example, it could lead to a diminished role for the EU BGs or to ‘mixed EU BGs’ that include contracted personnel.

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150. James K. Wither, ibid.
Summary

A number of factors will affect the EU BGs beyond FOC. Among the most significant are continued pushes towards transformation and the gradual consideration of joint force packages. In addition, the need to operate together with other force packages, notably civilian ones, is expected to affect the future training, certification, and planning processes for EU BGs. A host of exogenous factors are also likely to impact on the future course of the EU BGs, including trends in defence budget allocations, coalition operations, and employability of private military companies.
Principal findings and policy recommendations

This chapter summarises the principal findings of the report. It also makes several recommendations for the continued development of the EU BGs. The recommendations are organised into two categories, covering political/strategic and operational aspects.

Several observations can be made regarding the EU BGs. First, they represent one of several rapid response elements in the ESDP toolkit. Thus, they should not be perceived as the single available tool to address future challenges with a military dimension. Given its limited size and sustainability, an EU BG is more likely to be deployed in the context of ongoing operations than operate independently. Thus, their potential contribution needs to be placed in context.

Second, important challenges still need to be resolved vis-à-vis the EU BGs. Specific examples include:

- Further detailing standards, certification, and training
- Accelerating the decision-making process
- Improving strategic transport capabilities
- Enhancing CMCO in the field.

While these are being addressed, another important challenge is becoming evident: the future employability of the EU BGs. Having reached Full Operational Capability, the political pressure to employ an EU BG is likely to increase with the passage of time. In spite of this pressure, policymakers are still likely to look for very favourable conditions on the ground prior to the activation of an EU BG – especially for the first time. Adding to the complexity might be individual contributing countries’ operational priorities and degree of political will to engage an operation. Needless to say, the first few years after FOC is achieved will be critical to gauge the employability of the EU BGs.
Regardless of the employability level of the EU BGs, it is important to recognise that contributing states will accrue several benefits through their involvement in the EU BG process. Among them are greater interoperability levels between EU BG contributing partners, the possibility to pool assets to obtain specific niche capabilities, and the ability to engage in military transformation. For large EU Member States that have frequently shouldered most of the burdens associated with crisis management operations, the EU BGs allows for greater intra-European ‘burdensharing’. In the event of a multinational EU BG being employed, the risks associated with the operation would be shared across several countries.

Third, there are several drivers that will affect the EU BGs post-FOC. These include military transformation requirements and the gradual consideration of joint force packages. In addition, a host of exogenous factors, such as the importance of private military companies, are likely to affect the future course of the EU BGs. As a result, the EU BGs are likely to continue evolving beyond FOC.

**Political and strategic level recommendations**

1. Streamline the EU BG decision-making process
Streamlining the decision-making process is essential to facilitate the capacity for rapid response. While several steps have already been taken, additional steps might be considered. Among them are:

1. Identify which steps in the planning process can be merged. One alternative might be to incorporate civilian/military strategic options directly into the Crisis Management Concept.
2. Engage in greater parallel planning, in particular prior to the formalisation of the CMC. One option is to give a greater role to the Civil-Military Cell to engage in pre-deployment planning in support of the future OHQ – provided that the results of this planning are then transferred to the designated OHQ.
3. Ensure that the criteria for activating an EU BG are as clear and transparent as possible to minimise the possibility of delaying tactics and shirking.

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151. Military planners have already identified several of these proposals. The author is indebted to many of them for their additional thoughts on these suggestions. Some of these elements have also been raised in the context of Exercise Study 06.
2. Increase the intensity and frequency of exchanges with UNDPKO personnel

The EU BGs are expected to carry out bridging and initial entry operations. Based on previous EU operations, it is likely that such operations will be done in support of ongoing UN operations. In spite of long-standing cooperation with the UN, there is room for additional exchanges. Evidence suggests that both organisations have strong corporate cultures with specific terminologies, concepts and planning processes. Harmonising these will require continued staff-to-staff contacts. European policymakers might also consider more frequent tabletop exercises to test decision-making processes across both organisations.

3. Establish a platform to facilitate information exchanges among EU BG contributing countries

EU-level interaction between planners involved in the EU BG process is usually limited to EU Presidency-sponsored seminars. Planners can sometimes also exchange information in the margins of the Battle Group Coordination Conferences. These platforms may not be sufficient now that the EU BGs have reached Full Operational Capability. In line with several planners’ recommendations, it might be worthwhile to consider ways in which such exchanges can be facilitated. Three options seem plausible: (i) extending the Battle Group Coordination Conference to include more time for information exchanges – especially between EU BGs that ‘relieve’ each other or share the same six-month slot on the rotation schedule; (ii) scheduling an EU BG seminar as a recurring agenda item for each presidency so there are regular opportunities to exchange information and engage a variety of participants; (iii) tasking specialised EU Member States’ Army bodies to produce commonly agreed doctrines and procedures for the preparation and commitment of EU BGs.

4. Consider whether the EU BGs should take on additional missions over time

As a standby arrangement, the EU BGs require significant
resources to remain operational on a permanent rotating basis. As such, could EU BGs be available in support of missions that are not explicitly listed in the Petersberg Tasks or the European Security Strategy? Depending on demand, it might be reasonable to consider how EU BGs could fit into different types of mission profiles to achieve specific effects on the ground. For example, could an EU BG be activated in support of a crisis arising out of a natural catastrophe? Could it play a role should energy supplies to Europe be interrupted through sabotage?

5. Around 2009, re-evaluate the ambition to be able to take on two operations ‘nearly simultaneously’ and/or to implement mission objectives on the ground within ten days from the decision to launch an operation

The first few years after the EU BGs reach Full Operational Capability will be critical to gauge their level of employability. Unless the EU BGs are employed extensively between 2007-2009, decision-makers should re-examine the requirement that EU BGs be able to take on two missions nearly simultaneously to ensure a more effective use of resources. Likewise, consideration should be given to timelines. If EU BGs are not employed in operations requiring short timeframes, it might well be worthwhile to introduce more flexibility concerning the number of days that can pass before forces need to start implementing mission objectives on the ground.

Operational recommendations

6. Encourage exercises at the ‘EU-level’

The EU BGs are unlikely to be used in complete isolation. To ensure successful interaction with other force packages, EU BGs going on standby need to engage in exercises with other types of rapid response packages. As a EU Member State responsibility, current EU BG exercises focus on testing links between the pre-identified OHQ and the FHQ as well as performing a live exercise prior to final certification. However, only at the EU level is there some opportunity to exercise with other force packages. An example is
the EU-NATO exercises that are held approximately every three years. Another critical dimension is to ensure adequate exchanges between the EU BGs and the EU’s civilian response packages such as the CRTs and the IPUs. Ideally, each EU BG should carry out one such exercise prior to standby status.

7. **Strengthen the EU’s ability to identify and apply lessons learned**

While there are established ‘lessons identified’ processes within the EU Military Staff and the Council Secretariat, these are not necessarily combined to produce a broad context of lessons learned. Policymakers should consider additional steps to encourage the streamlining of lessons gathered across different departments and institutions to facilitate the formulation of more general sets of lessons learned.

8. **Consider additional options to facilitate deployability**

Deployability represents one of the principal challenges facing the EU BGs. Depending on which EU BG is on standby, the distance to an area of operations can vary by several thousand kilometres. Policymakers should thus carefully consider ways in which deployment could be facilitated or sped up. These range from using land rail to transport equipment within the EU to strategic ports that are closer to the seaport of embarkation/debarkation to studying the potential value added provided by high-speed naval craft. For example, Australia has successfully used high-speed Catamarans to deploy personnel over long distances. The US has recently procured such ships. Its TSV-1X Spearhead is expected to deploy a ‘combat-ready brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours.’

Could a similar ship be procured by EU Member States collectively as a sea-based equivalent to the C-17 initiative of some EU Member States and NATO countries?

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**Initial EU Battlegroup commitments**
*(November 2004)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUBG commitments by country</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and potentially Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>France and Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany, the Netherlands and Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy, Hungary and Slovenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Latvia, and Lithuania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden, Finland and including Norway as a third state</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom and the Netherlands</td>
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*Note:* These do not accurately reflect actual EU Battlegroup formations. The information is provided for reference purposes.

Headline Goal 2010

approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004
endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004

(Council of the European Union, doc. 6309/6/04/ REV 6, Brussels, 4 May 2006)

A. The 2010 Headline Goal

1. The European Union is a global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for global security. With the adoption by the European Council in December 2003 of the European Security Strategy, it affirmed the role it wants to play in the world, supporting an international order based on effective multilateralism within the UN. In this context of new dangers but also new opportunities, Member States' strong commitment to give the enlarged European Union the tools to make a major contribution to security and stability in a ring of well-governed countries around Europe and in the world is stronger than ever. The EU has the civilian and military framework needed to face the multifaceted nature of these new threats. The availability of effective instruments including military assets will often play a crucial role at the beginning of a crisis, during its development and/or in the post-conflict phase.

2. Member States have therefore decided to set themselves a new Headline Goal, reflecting the European Security Strategy, the evolution of the strategic environment and of technology. Lessons learned from EU-led operations will also be taken into account. Building on the Helsinki Headline and capability goals and recognising that existing shortfalls still need to be addressed, Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union. This includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. As indicated by the European Security Strategy this might also include joint disarmament operations, the support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The EU must be able to act before a crisis occurs and preventive engagement can
avoid that a situation deteriorates. The EU must retain the ability to conduct concurrent operations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement.

3. Interoperability but also deployability and sustainability will be at the core of Member States’ efforts and will be the driving factors of this goal 2010. The Union will thus need forces, which are more flexible, mobile and interoperable, making better use of available resources by pooling and sharing assets, where appropriate, and increasing the responsiveness of multinational forces.

4. The ability for the EU to deploy force packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis either as a stand-alone force or as part of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases, is a key element of the 2010 Headline Goal. These minimum force packages must be military effective, credible and coherent and should be broadly based on the Battlegroups concept. This constitutes a specific form of rapid response, and includes a combined arms battalion-sized force package with Combat Support and Combat Service Support. Rapid reaction calls for rapid decision making and planning as well as rapid deployment of forces. On decision making, the ambition of the EU is to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council. On the deployment of forces, the ambition is that the forces start implementing their mission on the ground, no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation. Relevant air and naval capabilities would be included. The need for reserve forces should be taken into account. These high readiness joint packages (battlegroups) may require tailoring for a specific operation by the Operation Commander. They will have to be backed up by responsive crisis management procedures as well as adequate command and control structures available to the Union. Procedures to assess and certify these high readiness joint packages will require to be developed. The development of EU Rapid Response elements including Battlegroups, will strengthen the EU’s ability to respond to possible UN requests.

5. Member States have identified the following indicative list of specific milestones within the 2010 horizon:
   a. as early as possible in 2004, in conformity with the December 2003 European Council Conclusions and in line with the

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1. Interoperability can be broadly defined as the ability of our armed forces to work together and to interact with other civilian tools. It is an instrument to enhance the effective use of military capabilities as a key enabler in achieving EU’s ambitions in Crisis Management Operations. Similarly, deployability involves the ability to move personnel and material to the theatre of operations, while sustainability involves mutual logistic support between the deployed forces.
Presidency note annexed, the establishment of a civil-military cell within the EUMS, with the capacity rapidly to set-up an operation centre for a particular operation;

b. the establishment of the Agency in the field of defence capability development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency) in the course of 2004. This will also support, as appropriate, the fulfilment of the commonly identified shortfalls in the field of military equipment;

c. the implementation by 2005 of EU Strategic lift joint coordination, with a view to achieving by 2010 necessary capacity and full efficiency in strategic lift (air, land and sea) in support of anticipated operations;

d. specifically for Airlift the transformation of the EACC into the EAC by 2004 is welcomed, as is the intention on the part of some Member States who so wish to develop a European Airlift command fully efficient by 2010;

e. the complete development by 2007 of rapidly deployable battlegroups including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and debarkation assets;

f. the availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort by 2008;

g. to improve the performance of all levels of EU operations by developing appropriate compatibility and network linkage of all communications equipment and assets both terrestrial and space-based by 2010;

h. to develop quantitative benchmarks and criteria that national forces declared to the Headline Goal have to meet in the field of deployability and in the field of multinational training;

B. Process

6. This Headline Goal 2010 will generate the necessary analysis, adaptation and development of scenarios in view of the development of new Headline Goal Catalogues as required by the EU Capability Development Mechanism\(^2\) (including a clear categorisation of capabilities to tasks), incorporation of rapid response capability\(^3\) and further improvement of C2 capabilities on operations.
7. To achieve these objectives the EU will apply a systemic approach in the development of the necessary military capabilities, aiming at creating synergies between Member States’ forces in order to enhance the ability of the EU to respond more rapidly and effectively to crises.

8. This approach requires Member States to voluntarily transform their forces by progressively developing a high degree of interoperability, both at technical, procedural and conceptual levels. Without prejudice to the prerogatives of Member States over defence matters, a co-ordinated and coherent development of equipment compatibility, procedures, concepts, command arrangements and defence planning is a primary objective. In this regard, commonality of security culture should also be promoted. Deployability, sustainability and other crucial requirements such as force availability, information superiority, engagement effectiveness and survivability will play an immediate pivotal role.

9. Interoperability must be considered in a broad framework including military, civilian and civil-military aspects. The EU will further strengthen the coordinated use of its civil and military capabilities acknowledging that modern Crisis Management Operations typically require a mixture of instruments. Work will be undertaken to consider interoperability issues including between the military and civilian assets in civil protection operations.\(^4\) Moreover the EU will promote the principle of interoperability in the field of military capabilities with its partners, notably NATO and the UN, and its regional partners, in line with the European Security Strategy. The strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has also a particular significance for the EU.

10. Strengthening the United Nations is a European priority. Real world experience, with the successful termination of operation ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of Congo, has shown the potential for the EU to conduct operations in support of UN objectives. Work with the UN DPKO at an institutional level could also be beneficial in this respect and as a valuable means to strengthen the EU-UN relationship. The development of EU Rapid Response elements including Battlegroups, will strengthen the EU’s ability to respond to possible UN requests.

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\(^4\) Doc. 15564/03, para. 4.
11. As underlined by the European Security Strategy and demonstrated by operation CONCORDIA in FYROM, the EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in crisis management. The establishment of a small EU cell at SHAPE and of NATO liaison arrangements at the EUMS as early as possible in 2004 will improve the preparation of EU operations having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus arrangements. This will also enhance transparency between the EU and NATO embodying this partnership. Furthermore, promoting the further use of agreed standards\(^5\) will reduce unnecessary duplication and produce more effective forces for both the EU and NATO. In this framework the EU-NATO capability Group will continue to play a central role in accordance with its mandate as defined in the Capability Development Mechanism. Complementarity and mutual reinforcement of EU and NATO initiatives in the field of rapid response should be ensured.

C. Way Ahead

12. The relevant bodies of the Council and the European Defence Agency when established, will develop the necessary set of benchmarks and milestones in order to evaluate progress towards the achievement of these objectives notably in the field of interoperability, deployability and the other crucial requirements identified above. Work will proceed in the field of equipment, forces and command and control based on a systemic and coherent approach.

13. In the field of equipment, the 2010 perspective should allow Member States to harmonise their respective future requirements and calendars in order to achieve a convergent fulfilment of capability needs.

14. In the field of forces:

- all the forces contributed to the EU will be categorised on the basis of their combat effectiveness and operational readiness in relation to the range of possible tasks;

\(^5\) In line with para. 53 of the Capability Development Mechanism on consistent standards with NATO.
concerning Rapid Response, suitable force package requirements, taking also into account the agreed EU Battle-groups concept, should be identified at the beginning of the second semester of 2004 in view of allowing Member States to start contributing to the constitution of high readiness joint packages. In full respect with the voluntary nature of the process, the contributions should indicate when and for what period the force package would be available to the EU;

- from 2005 onwards the EU will launch an evaluation process in order to scrutinise, evaluate and assess Member States’ capability commitments, including Rapid Response;
- qualitative requirements, such as interoperability, deployability and sustainability, as well as quantitative ones for the forces will need to be identified in greater detail;
- forces available will be tested through HQ exercises as well as opportunities offered by national and multinational field exercises. In particular, Rapid Response elements will need to undertake regular realistic training, including multinational exercises;
- the collection of existing operational doctrines will be complemented with common concepts and procedures on the basis of work conducted in the framework of the European Capability Action plan and in coherence with NATO.

15. In the field of Command and Control, the ability to plan and conduct operations will be reinforced in the light of the December 2003 European Council Conclusions and by developments in the European Capability Action Plan. Specifically:

- the work of the ISTAR Information Exchange framework Project Group will contribute to the development of an EU information-sharing policy and associated framework for implementation by 2010, with an interim architecture by 2006;
- the work of the Space Based Assets Project Group will contribute to the development of an EU space policy by 2006.

16. Under the auspices of the Council and in the framework of its responsibilities for the political direction of the development of military capabilities the PSC, based on the opinion of the EUMC and in liaison, as appropriate, with the European Defence Agency,
will direct the necessary steps leading to the more precise definition of the Headline Goal 2010 based on the elements set out in this paper and of the milestones identified in para 5. Taking into account the comprehensive Spring 2004 military capability assessment (Single Progress Report, Capability Improvement Chart) further progress will also be required on the recognised shortfalls and deficits from the 2003 Headline Goal. Implementing this Headline Goal 2010 will include the following steps:

i  in 2004: by the beginning of the second semester, preparatory development work on high readiness joint packages requirements in the framework of EU Rapid Response should be finalised.

Under broad guidance of the PSC, the necessary planning assumptions and scenarios preliminary to the definition of the military requirements necessary to fulfil the 2010 horizon should be elaborated by the EUMC in an iterative process with the PSC. In this framework focussed military scenarios could be presented for political approval. Work should also start on the capability evaluation process, notably on the definition of the necessary benchmarks and criteria.

By the end of the year, framework nation or multinational high readiness joint packages should be contributed to the EU as an intermediate phase on rapid response development.

A Conference on military capabilities will be organised in the second semester of 2004:

i  by the beginning of 2005: establishment of a list of detailed capability target criteria;

i  by mid-2005: finalisation of the Requirements Catalogue 2005, including Rapid Response, in accordance with the EU Capability Development Mechanism. The capability evaluation process could be already launched;

i  by the end of 2005: a bidding process could be launched in view of the production of the Force Catalogue and Progress Catalogue. The database of military assets and capabilities relevant to the protection of civilian population against the effects of terrorist attacks, including CBRN, would be maintained in connection with the Force Catalogue, produced in accordance with the EU Capability Development Mechanism;

6. See in particular the relevant paragraphs of and the annex to the Capability Development Mechanism concerning ESDP information requirements and the interaction with NATO.
by 2007, complete development of rapidly deployable battlegroups including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and debarkation assets;

between 2006 and 2010 the normal iterations described in the Capability Development Mechanism will continue to take place with the involvement of the European Defence Agency\(^7\), as appropriate. Building on the Headline Goal 2010, a longer term vision beyond 2010 will be formulated with the objective of identifying trends in future capability developments and requirements and increasing convergence and coherence.

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\(^7\) Agency in the field of defence capability development, research, acquisition and armaments.
## EU BG Roster

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1st half</th>
<th>2nd half</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POC*</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary +</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>France +</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luxembourg +</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Germany +</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: *POC = Point of Contact. **Ireland's participation in the Nordic Battlegroup (with Sweden as the POC) is quite likely although it still needs to be formalised.

It is important to note that the EU BG planning is an ongoing process and that the data included has an indicative value only, except the committed EU BG packages. The EU BG roster is updated twice per year during the BG Co-ordination Conferences. The offers follow an increasing level of commitment, from initial offers to confirmed offers and then to firm commitments. At each BGCC, only the committed EU BG packages for the timeframe >6 months and <1.5 years are fixed in detail. Only this last group (>6 months and <1.5 years) can be taken as 'firm commitments'. The information contained in the timeframes 'commitments' (>1.5 years and <3.5 years) and 'initial offers' (>3.5 years and <5 years) should be handled with care and be updated every 6 months.

Source: European Union Military Staff.
**Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>BGCC</td>
<td>Battlegroup Co-ordination Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Communication Information Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis Management Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMCO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>CME/CMX</td>
<td>Crisis Management Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRT</td>
<td>Civilian Response Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>EGF</td>
<td>European Gendarmerie Force</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU BG</td>
<td>EU Battlegroup</td>
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<td>EU Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>FHQ</td>
<td>Force Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operational Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAD</td>
<td>General Approach on Deployability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMES</td>
<td>Global Monitoring for Environment and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMD</td>
<td>Initiating Military Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial Operational Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPU</td>
<td>Integrated Police Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSTARS</td>
<td>Joint Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>MSO</td>
<td>Military Strategic Option</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTG</td>
<td>Maritime Task Group</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NBG</td>
<td>Nordic Battlegroup</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operation Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PJHQ</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRAI</td>
<td>Rapid Response Air Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALIS</td>
<td>Strategic Airlift Interim Solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG/HR</td>
<td>Secretary General/High Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOMA</td>
<td>Status of Mission Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>UN Forces in Lebanon</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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Defence procurement in the European Union – The current debate
Report of an EUISS Task Force
Chairman and Rapporteur: Burkard Schmitt
This Chaillot Paper analyses the origins and development of the EU Battlegroups. It aims to give readers an overview of the EU Battlegroups and their prospective evolution. To do so, the study addresses four main questions: (i) the process leading to the creation of the EU Battlegroups; (ii) the main elements covered by the EU BG Concept; (iii) the principal challenges and prospects facing the EU Battlegroups; and (iv) how the EU Battlegroups are likely to evolve over the next few years. Taking these various aspects into account, the paper offers several policy recommendations as the EU Battlegroups move beyond Full Operational Capability.

This paper should be of interest to analysts and academics following developments in European Security and Defence Policy – in particular those concerned with the progression of EU Rapid Response elements.