Chaillot Paper

September 2005

n°82

EU-US burdensharing: who does what?

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ISSN 1017-7566
ISBN 92-9198-078-1
Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur. Graphic design by Claire Mabille (Paris).

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Préface

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Des Etats-Unis et de l'Union, qui fait quoi en matière de stabilisation internationale ? Quelles sont les contributions concrètes de chacun à la pacification de la planète ? Sur quelles bases fonder un partenariat politique adapté aux exigences d'une sécurité largement mondialisée ? Vieille question transatlantique s'il en est, la notion de partage du fardeau, entre Américains et Européens, méritait en effet d'être reconsidérée à la lumière des bouleversements politico-stratégiques intervenus depuis plus d'une décennie. Question éminemment difficile toutefois, ne serait-ce que sur le plan de la méthode, du choix ou de la lecture comparée des données disponibles de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique.

C'est pourtant ce défi que Gustav Lindstrom, chargé de recherche à l'Institut, a décidé de relever. Ce Cahier de Chaillot *est le fruit d'un très long et patient travail de collecte d'informations, d'établissement de critères comparatifs, de recherche pluridisciplinaire, avec comme objectif premier de pouvoir fonder sur les données les plus précises possibles les éléments traditionnels du débat politique entre Américains et Européens. Non que les chiffres permettent d'éliminer toute conviction, toute approche politique, voire toute idéologie dans le dialogue transatlantique. Mais au moins permettent-ils de cadrer le débat à l'intérieur de faits concrets et de comparaisons relativement homogènes. De cette étude extrêmement précise et la plus complète possible, je retiens pour ma part trois conclusions :*

- *La complexité de la question est l'une des caractéristiques majeures de la modernité internationale. Le critère des dépenses militaires est en effet nettement moins pertinent qu'il ne l'était durant la guerre froide, lorsque l'affrontement des deux superpuissances résumait le système international. Même s'il occupe encore très souvent le devant de la scène, le débat sur les dépenses de défense est un débat daté, insuffisamment révélateur de la contribution réelle des acteurs à la stabilisation internationale. Leur capacité d'influence se mesure en effet de plus en plus en termes de contributions globales aux politiques de prévention/stabilisation/reconstruction, lesquelles ne sont que marginale-*

ment fondées sur des aspects militaires. A ce titre, c'est moins l'OTAN que la relation bilatérale Union/USA qui sert de vecteur principal à la complémentarité transatlantique. L'Union européenne présente ainsi un bilan d'influence nettement plus proche de l'équilibre que celui de la puissance américaine : les Etats-Unis dépensent en effet plus de 450 milliards de dollars pour leur défense et 19 milliards pour l'aide au développement. L'Union européenne consacre de son côté 186 milliards de dollars aux dépenses militaires et 43 milliards pour l'aide au développement. En dépit de leurs différences, les deux acteurs restent toutefois dans un paradigme de puissance à dominante militaire : très nettement pour les Etats-Unis qui n'affectent à l'aide au développement que 4% de ce qu'ils dépensent pour leur défense ; de façon moins abrupte pour l'Union dont les dépenses d'aide au développement représentent 23% des sommes affectées à la défense.

- *La contribution collective des 25 Etats membres de l'Union à la paix et à la sécurité internationale est colossale. Pris isolément, aucun pays européen n'est certes capable d'atteindre les chiffres américains, qu'il s'agisse de dépenses militaires, d'aide au développement ou d'aide humanitaire. Mais, collectivement, l'Union européenne est le premier contributeur au budget de maintien de la paix des Nations unies (40% du budget contre 25% pour les USA), premier donneur d'aide internationale pour le développement, en volume (55% du total de l'aide) comme en pourcentage du PNB (0,36% contre 0,16% pour les USA) ; sa contribution au Fonds mondial de lutte contre le sida, la tuberculose et la malaria est le double de la contribution américaine ; elle fournit 10 fois plus de personnel aux opérations des Nations unies que les USA, et contribue pour près de 90% des forces de stabilisation déployées dans l'ensemble des Balkans. Si le partage du fardeau fonde le partage des responsabilités politiques, l'Union européenne est donc sans conteste un acteur international majeur.*

  Or elle ne le sait pas. L'absence de source européenne unique, condensant selon des critères identiques et donc comparables, l'ensemble des contributions, militaires, financières, civiles, humaines des Etats

membres et de l'Union au bénéfice de la sécurité internationale est en effet patente. En termes de transparence et de communication sur le rôle de l'Union dans le monde, ce déficit, doublement dommageable à la crédibilité de l'action européenne, mériterait d'urgence d'être comblé.

- *Aussi éclairante soit-elle, la comparaison brute de chiffres absolus ou de pourcentages est toutefois un critère insuffisant pour évaluer la contribution réelle de l'Amérique et de l'Union à la gestion du monde. Aucun chiffre ne permet en effet de mesurer la responsabilité politique de chacun dans les décisions qui affectent directement l'évolution de la sécurité internationale. Et complexes sont les critères qui permettraient d'évaluer, ex-post, l'efficacité réelle des contributions, militaires, financières et civiles, des deux acteurs dans la pacification de la planète. A quoi servent des dépenses militaires américaines de près de 500 milliards de dollars par an ? Quel est l'impact des 43 milliards de dollars que l'Union dépense chaque année pour l'aide au développement ? Considérée de façon technique, la question du* burdensharing *est donc incomplète. Abordée sous l'angle politique, elle devient souvent insaisissable, ou dévolue aux jugements futurs de l'Histoire.*

Paris, septembre 2005

Introduction

This *Chaillot Paper* examines burdensharing patterns between the United States and Europe, focusing in particular on the time period since the 9/11 attacks. It does so by analysing military and civilian burdensharing activities undertaken to address the high-priority challenges identified in the 2002 US National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). The four principal questions addressed in the paper are as follows:

1. What are the principal security challenges facing the United States and Europe?

2. Given these security challenges, what are the main military and civilian tools available to address them?

3. What are the patterns of transatlantic military and civilian burdensharing?

4. What lessons can we draw from these trends in burdensharing?

Prior to tackling these questions, this *Chaillot Paper* briefly reviews the evolution of the burdensharing concept since the beginning of the Cold War. Unlike previous studies that tend to focus on either the military or civilian aspect of burdensharing, it looks at both dimensions. Wherever possible, quantitative data is used to gauge patterns of burdensharing.

The report is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 describes how burdensharing has evolved since the Cold War. It then describes the global high-priority security challenges identified in the NSS and in the ESS. With these in mind, the chapter considers the tools and instruments available on both sides of the Atlantic to address today's global challenges. The chapter ends with a description of exogenous factors that can impact on burdensharing levels between the United States and Europe.

Chapter 2 analyses burdensharing in the defence field. The chapter evaluates frequently used indicators such as US and EU defence spending, US and EU participation in international military missions, and US and EU participation in UN peacekeeping missions. When analysing provisions made by the EU, consideration is given to both individual EU member state and collective EU contributions. Contributions are organised according to the security goals outlined in the security strategies of the United States and the European Union.

Chapter 3 examines burdensharing in the civilian field. It considers financial burdensharing indicators, such as official development assistance and humanitarian aid. As in the previous chapter, contributions are organised according to their relevance to the security threats identified by the NSS and ESS. The chapter also takes into account efforts made to address global challenges in the area of health.

Finally, the conclusion summarises the paper's principal findings. The chapter includes a discussion of future implications for burdensharing. The paper includes four annexes which provide additional data and information in support of many tables and figures presented in summary form in the main text. An overview of the organisation of the annex is visible in the report's table of contents.

This *Chaillot Paper* should be of interest to a wide audience, especially those interested in the evolution of US-European relations in the security field. In particular, it should appeal to analysts and academics on both side of the Atlantic monitoring burdensharing patterns and the collaborative measures taken to address present-day security challenges.

Needless to say, any error or omission is the author's responsibility alone. Corrections or suggestions for improvement are welcome as this publication represents an initial effort by the EU Institute for Security Studies to compare the US and EU contributions which aim to address today's security challenges.[1]

Comprehensive assessment of US-EU burdensharing is subject to certain limitations. This study is no exception. It is important to bear the following five limitations in mind when reading this *Chaillot Paper*.

- **Definitional issues:** Since the concept of burdensharing evolves over time and has no set definition, it is difficult to fully capture burdensharing trends. For example, some analysts may

1. Comments can be sent to g.lindstrom@iss-eu.org or to the Institute address under the author's name.

view certain military contributions, such as foreign military sales, as more consistent with national priorities than burdensharing objectives. Others might disagree with the inclusion of investments for improved global health outcomes as a burdensharing category. With burdensharing encapsulating both military and civilian contributions, it is difficult to compare the relative value of both forms of contributions. In this *Chaillot Paper*, there is no attempt to compare the relative value of military versus non-military contributions, as it would entail comparing 'apples with oranges'. Rather, both are considered to be critical ingredients in addressing present-day global challenges.

- **Measurement issues:** Capturing the scope of burdensharing is complex, even when individual elements are quantifiable. For example, frequent troop rotations on the ground make it difficult to gauge the total number of personnel engaged in an operation. Different results may be obtained depending on when data is collected. Frequently, such numbers will not include other elements associated with an operation, be they air support elements, maritime elements, or support troops. In addition, while the number of different national troops assigned to a particular peacekeeping mission can be compared, it is very difficult to assess the quality or capacity of the compared troops in order to accurately gauge burdensharing contributions. In other words, some aspects may not be appropriately captured when comparing commitments to burdensharing.
- **Quantification issues:** Related to the previous point, many burdensharing elements are not readily quantifiable – especially if their value is not available in terms of dollars, euros, or manpower. An illustration of hard-to-quantify contributions towards international security is participation in international agreements. Other examples include the value of contributions such as overflight rights and basing rights. While it is possible to calculate the monetary value of such rights, especially if taken in conjunction with the level of local host nation support, the military value of such rights is difficult to gauge.[2]
- **Data issues:** Quantitative data comparison across the Atlantic is also complicated by the use of different categorisations. For example, the US international affairs budget includes components that have no equivalent in the EU external affairs budget. The existence of multiple data sources, such as those deriving

2. With respect to basing rights, it is also difficult to gauge the positive economic spillover effects on the local economy produced by the establishment of bases in the host country.

from the UN, OECD, NATO and the EU, also affects the 'comparability' of data. Different time horizons used to present data also affect comparability: while the United States uses the fiscal year (running from October to September), Europeans tend to use the calendar year (January through December). Finally, most financial data available is typically not adjusted for inflation or currency fluctuations, requiring conversions before meaningful comparisons can be made. To maximise comparability, this report relies on a single source as much as possible to capture all available data for a particular category of comparison (e.g. defence expenditures).

- **Burdensharing issues:** Finally, gauging burdensharing across the Atlantic is complicated as it may take several forms. As this *Chaillot Paper* will argue, modern burdensharing can take on various guises. For example, 'temporal burdensharing' may take place when one partner contributes initially and then gives way to other partners. US and European involvement in the Balkans follows this pattern. 'Task-specific' burdensharing may occur when partners tackle different missions within a shared area of operations. The coexistence of Operation *Enduring Freedom* and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan exemplifies this type of burdensharing. Needless to say, the existence of these different forms of burdensharing introduces a certain degree of subjectivity when it comes to defining what constitutes burdensharing.

With these limitations in mind, this *Chaillot Paper* analyses burdensharing trends between the United States and EU member states in their efforts to address the high-priority security challenges identified in their respective security strategies. While the 2002 US National Security Strategy and 2003 European Security Strategy are relatively new and budgets have yet to be realigned to fully reflect the priorities identified in them, they serve as a basis for current and future planning. At present, many ongoing programmes and initiatives are being realigned to fit under the threat categories identified in the respective strategy documents of the US and the EU, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state failure, and regional conflicts.

The evolution of burdensharing

1

This chapter provides a brief overview of the evolution of the burdensharing concept and present-day global challenges. It begins with a discussion of burdensharing during the Cold War and proceeds to show how burdensharing mechanisms grew beyond the confines of NATO after the Cold War ended. The traditional model based on a regional focus (Europe) that relied on military might has given way to an increasingly global concept that requires both military and civilian power to manage the shared threats. Using the US National Security Strategy (NSS) and the European Security Strategy (ESS) as a guiding framework, the chapter then outlines these shared threats and the types of tools available to address them.

Burdensharing during the Cold War

The concept of defence burdensharing can be traced back to the inception of NATO in 1949.[3] However, the seeds for future burdensharing were probably planted in September 1950, not long after the initiation of the Korean War, when President Truman committed four US army divisions to Europe as an insurance policy against a potential Soviet invasion. The move caused conservatives in Congress to question the deployment's strategic and fiscal implications. After a series of debates, however, the Senate passed a resolution supporting Truman's deployment decision, but insisted that Europeans also take steps to enhance their own security. Specifically, Senate Resolution 99 (1951) called for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to certify that Europeans were taking appropriate steps to increase security levels.[4] The prospect of a European Defence Community (EDC) temporarily assuaged American concerns, but the defeat of the proposed EDC in 1954 reinvigorated concerns.[5] Ultimately, NATO would become the focal point for Cold War burdensharing.

3. 'Alliance Burdensharing: A Review of the Data', *Staff Working Paper*, Congressional Budget Office, June 1987. Accessible at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/62xx/doc6242/doc12a.pdf.

4. Stanley Sloan, 'The US and Transatlantic Burdensharing', ed. Nicole Gnesotto, Série transatlantique, *Notes de l'IFRI - n°12* (Paris: Institut français des Relations internationales, 1999).

5. EDC was a treaty signed in May 1952 by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries which provided a supranational framework for common European defence. The concept encountered a great deal of resistance in Europe, and France did not ratify the treaty. The concept collapsed in 1954.

During the Cold War, the concept of burdensharing was straightforward. For European allies, the priority was to contribute to the strength of NATO to ensure an adequate defence against the Warsaw Pact.[6] In the United States, the greater the European contribution to NATO, the more US resources could be channelled elsewhere to contain communism. The strong association between burdensharing, NATO and the Warsaw Pact meant that the concept was overwhelmingly measured in military terms. Measures included number of men under arms, the share of GDP slated to the armed forces, the number of military platforms available, etc. Indirectly, these served as indicators of potential instruments available for collective security provided by NATO.[7]

As far as Europe was concerned, burdensharing took place within the confines of the European continent. American contributions to other parts of the world, such as Korea and Japan, were viewed as 'additional' commitments assumed by the United States that were consistent with its global interests and reach. On the US side, Congress periodically raised concerns over European contributions towards collective security. The uneasiness was particularly acute when the United States faced financial or manpower limitations. In the late 1950s and 1960s, the United States faced considerable balance of payments pressures. Engagement in the Vietnam War drained resources and reinforced the need for greater contributions by Europe. In the late 1970s, the United States proposed a sustained increase in defence spending by European allies of three per cent per year from 1980 through 1985.[8] The European allies agreed to the programme but achieving this goal proved difficult, ultimately reinforcing the contentious nature of transatlantic burdensharing. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Cold War ended – but debates over burdensharing did not.

Burdensharing after the Cold War

The end of the Cold War forced a redefinition of NATO, the primary framework for US–European burdensharing. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO's primary role of countering a potential military attack in Europe had disappeared. But according to NATO's new Strategic Concept (1991), the world remained a dangerous place where NATO played an important role:

6. Note that the term 'burdensharing' has also been used to describe European economic redistribution among member states (M. Chambers, 'Paying for EU enlargement – can a new "burdensharing bargain" be sustained?', Paper for the Political Studies Association-UK 50th Annual Conference, 10-13 April 2000, London). Throughout this document, however, it is used only to refer to military and civilian contributions for regional and/or global security.

7. The yearly 'Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense' captures the focus on military contributions amongst NATO member states. For copies of the yearly reports from 1995 onwards see http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied.html.

8. Sloan, op.cit.

> In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved.[9]

These new types of threats did not take long to manifest themselves. Regional tensions in the Balkans erupted in several wars of secession starting in June 1991. The inability of European policy-makers to end the violence in what was considered to be their own backyard eventually led to the involvement of the United States and NATO. In 1995, NATO forces struck Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) with the initiation of Operation *Deliberate Force*. Burdensharing took another turn in 1999 with the initiation of Operation *Allied Force* targeting the Yugoslav Army in Kosovo. Capability constraints, particularly with respect to air power and precision munitions, forced the Europeans to acknowledge their limited defence capabilities in key areas.

The Yugoslav wars of secession had a profound impact in Europe. They reinforced the perception that Europe was not able to effectively handle security challenges arising from conflict in its immediate neighbourhood. It also signalled in a very dramatic way that the EU needed to improve its own military capabilities and needed to be able to deploy forces outside its borders. Unlike past assessments of burdensharing, scrutiny was placed not only on defence expenditures, but also on the defence capabilities needed to meet new, emerging security threats. The military intervention and subsequent peacekeeping efforts revealed that military, quasi-military, and civilian tools were all required to enhance regional stability and rebuild war-torn regions.

European policy-makers responded to these new challenges with the launch of the Helsinki Headline Goal in 1999, calling for the establishment of a European force of 60,000 men capable of deploying within sixty days for up to twelve months. Unlike NATO, this emerging EU capability – European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – was not to focus on collective defence. Rather, ESDP missions were to focus on the 'Petersberg Tasks', which emphasize humanitarian, peacekeeping, and crisis management missions.

Clearly the end of the Cold War redefined burdensharing. It brought about not only a redefinition of NATO's role, but also an

9. The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 8 November 1991. Available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm (accessed 9 May 2005).

expansion of NATO, the emergence of ESDP, and force modernisation in the United States, all with implications for burdensharing. NATO enlargement provoked questions of cost and who would pay for it.[10] ESDP led to debates about competition with NATO, discussions about how the burden of ensuring European security could and should be shared, and a new allocation of military resources. US force modernisation triggered concerns about a growing capabilities gap between the US and Europe, and concerns about countries' abilities to participate in burdensharing.

The concept of burdensharing would undergo yet another transformation in 2001, when new threats manifested themselves and the vestiges of the Cold War were erased. The attacks of September 11th 2001 placed terrorism at the forefront of these new types of threats. That a non-state actor could kill about 3,000 individuals while targeting the economic and military power centres of the United States reinforced the notion that a new set of actors and threats needed to be addressed rapidly. Sharing the burden would require new types of cooperation, defined in both military and civilian terms. Before examining these mechanisms, the next section provides a brief description of the shared threats.

Security challenges in a globalised world

To identify potential areas for burdensharing, it is vital to first identify the common security challenges facing the United States and Europe. If there are a substantial number of shared challenges, the likelihood and feasibility of burdensharing increases – especially if resources are limited or role specialisation is available as an alternative. By contrast, if there are few shared threats, the likelihood for burdensharing activities diminishes.

Many threats facing the United States and Europe today are shared. They are also different from those faced during the Cold War in key ways. First, threats were traditionally external in nature and military in character, creating a fairly clear boundary between internal and external security. Today, the lines between internal and external security have been blurred. As the US National Security Strategy notes, 'today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing. In a globalized world, events beyond America's borders have a greater impact inside them.'[11] The European Security Strategy offers a similar view, maintaining that 'in

10. Karl Heinz Kamp, 'Burdensharing in NATO: The German Perception', ed. Nicole Gnesotto, Série transatlantique, *Notes de l'IFRI - n°13* (Paris: Institut français des Relations internationales, 1999). Rosemary Fiscarelly, 'NATO in the 1990s: Burden Shedding Replaces Burden Sharing', *Foreign Policy Briefing No. 1* (Washington DC: Cato Institute, 26 June 1990). See also Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, 'NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 36, no. 6, 1999, pp. 665-680.

11. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, p. 31.

an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand.[12] Examples range from the risks posed by pandemics to international terrorist cells.

Table 1:
Comparison of traditional and current threats

Threat dimension	Traditional threats	Current threats
Threat origin	Mainly external	External and internal
Threat type	Primarily military	Military and non-military
Primary threat actor	State actors	State and non-state actors
Threat implications	Mostly direct	Direct and indirect

Second, some non-state actors have obtained the capacity to challenge the security of nation-states in ways that were unimaginable only fifteen years ago. In addition to access to new technologies and communication tools to facilitate the planning and execution of attacks, these groups are no longer deterred by the prospect of engaging in catastrophic terrorism. In the words of the NSS, 'enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.'[13] The European Security Strategy refers to these threats as 'new threats which are more diverse, less visible, and less predictable.'[14]

Third, the globalisation of economies and movement of people has greatly enhanced the implications of international disruptions. An attack on a critical infrastructure, for example, is likely to have both local and international ramifications. Globalisation has increased 'dependency – and so vulnerability on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.'[15] Moreover, with more individuals travelling across the world, the impact of an attack or natural catastrophe is likely to be felt indirectly in a greater number of countries. The tsunami in South East Asia in December 2004 painfully illustrated the direct and indirect consequences of large-scale events. Previously, the implications of an event were more likely to be contained within a specific sector or geographic area.

12. 'A secure Europe in a better world', *European Security Strategy*, December 2003, p. 11.

13. Op.cit in note 11.

14. Op.cit in note 12.

15. Ibid, p. 5.

Given these developments, what are the shared threats? One method for ascertaining and comparing the high-priority challenges across the Atlantic is to compare the 2002 NSS and the 2003 ESS. Both documents outline key threats and challenges that need to be addressed in order to promote global stability and security. While countries each view the strategic security environment somewhat differently, since September 11th, a relatively common view of the principal threats has emerged in the US and in Europe.

The NSS and the ESS identify the threats posed by terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and regional conflicts as high-priority threats. It should be noted that the December 2004 UN High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges, and Change shares a similar outlook, reinforcing the notion that these security challenges are shared on a global scale.[16]

Table 2:
Key threats and challenges identified in
the US National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy

US National Security Strategy (2002)		European Security Strategy (2003)	
Key threats	Challenges	Key threats	Global Challenges
Terrorism	Poverty	Terrorism	Poverty
WMD proliferation	Disease	WMD proliferation	Disease
Regional conflicts	Education	Regional conflicts	Rapid population growth
Rogue states	Hunger / malnutrition	State failure	Resource dependency
		Organised crime	Limited resources
			Global warming

Note: A fuller description of these and other challenges is available in the respective security strategies.

Both strategies also place particular emphasis on the danger posed by the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. According to the NSS, 'the gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology'. The ESS reflects a similar view, arguing that the 'the most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass

16. According to the report, the principal security challenges are: poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; conflict between and within states; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organised crime. 'A More Secure World', report of the Secretary General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2 December 2004. 'In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All', Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005.

destruction'. The only key threat not shared across the Atlantic is organised crime. Despite large-scale US contributions to several parts of the world to combat elements of organised crime (e.g. Colombia), it is not listed as a principal threat for the United States.

The strategies also identify global challenges such as poverty, disease, and lack of resources. They are linked to the key threats as they in many instances provoke or exacerbate security issues such as regional conflict and state failure. As root causes for potential security challenges, they require continual attention and resources. It is important to recognise that while perceptions of security threats may be shared, this does not necessarily translate to common solutions to address those challenges.

Addressing the high-priority transatlantic challenges

Addressing the key threats identified in the security strategies will often require the combination of military and civilian power. Examining both military and civilian power in the context of burdensharing is a departure from traditional analysis, which focused exclusively on the military dimension. Table 3 outlines several military and civilian options available to address the high-priority challenges identified by the NSS and the ESS. The table's right-hand column provides examples of programmes or actions that may be used to respond to a specific threat.

In addressing these security challenges, the EU and the United States rely, to a great extent, on their respective comparative advantages. Given its military might, the United States is more likely to explore military means to leverage its power to resolve global security challenges. The EU, on the other hand, gravitates towards its panoply of civilian tools and instruments to do the same. It is important to note that both approaches may play an important role in a specific situation and thus represent the building blocks for burdensharing.

Table 3:
Sample matrix of military and civilian contributions to achieve security objectives

Key Threat	Military options	Civilian options	Examples of US and/or EU military and civilian tools
Terrorism	- Military operations - Monitoring - Intelligence gathering	- Police and judicial cooperation - Crisis management operations	- Operation *Active Endeavour* - US/EU Mutual legal assistance - Container Security Initiative
WMD proliferation	- Interdiction of WMD shipments - Monitoring - Consequence management	- Securing WMD - Information sharing - Monitoring - Negotiation	- Cooperative threat reduction activities - Proliferation and Security Initiative
Regional conflicts	- Military operations - Military support ops.	- Official Development Assistance (ODA)	- Peacekeeping operations (e.g. KFOR, ALTHEA)
State failure	- Military operations - Military support ops.	- ODA - Judicial assistance	- Peacekeeping missions (e.g. ISAF) - Humanitarian assistance
Organised crime	- Interdiction - Monitoring	- Police and judicial cooperation - Harmonised legal structures	- Police missions (e.g. EUPM) - Counter narcotics programmes

Factors impacting on burdensharing

Although the NSS and ESS identify similar threats, multiple factors affect the prospects for transatlantic collaboration. Key among them are divergences in political outlook and constraints with respect to capabilities. The following section provides a brief overview of these and other factors that may impact on burdensharing. The list is not all-inclusive, but rather aims to illustrate key considerations.

View of the security environment

A shared outlook of the security environment is an essential ingredient for collaboration and burdensharing. With the end of the Cold War, the number and character of threats has multiplied. They may originate from state or non-state actors. They can have

an internal and/or external dimension. These different types and permutations of threats affect decision-makers' perception of the global security environment. Even slight changes in perceptions can have significant implications.

While the NSS and the ESS are similar in many ways, there are both subtle and substantial differences in how the US and the EU each define and address security challenges. For example, the United States and the EU both underscore the need to deal with states facing internal challenges that impact their ability to function properly at the international level. However, whereas the United States uses the term 'rogue states' to describe these players, the EU refers to them as 'failing states'.[17] While the discrepancy may seem purely semantic, it is significant to the extent that it impacts on the means chosen to address a situation. The idea of a failed state implies that the state has lost much of its ability to ensure governance and adequate security. Assisting a country labelled in this way may result in direct assistance – either in terms of economic or peacekeeping assistance – and other 'carrots' as a means of stabilization. A rogue state, on the other hand, implies that the country still maintains much control over the state apparatus but has chosen a path that will put it on a collision course with international norms and practices. Isolation and the use of sticks rather than carrotsare likely to be a preferred choice of action.

Another difference is also visible in how both sides frame terrorism. While the United States calls for a 'war on terrorism', Europeans refer to it as a 'fight' or 'struggle' against terrorism. The notion that it is engaged in a 'war' heightens a reliance on military power.[18] While European policy-makers are also preoccupied by terrorism, they consider themselves to be involved in a fight against terrorism. As a result, largely civilian tools are used to address terrorism, ranging from information sharing to judicial cooperation. While one could argue that both sides are simply relying on instruments which represent their comparative advantage – military power in the United States and civilian tools in Europe – different perceptions affect the choice of instruments and actions, and burdensharing as a result. New forms of collaboration and burdensharing may emerge. For example, 'task-specific' burdensharing, where partners contribute according to political guidelines and capabilities, may become a preferred mode for interaction.

17. Analysts within think tanks and academia sometimes use the reference 'irresponsible states' to find common ground. See Henry Kissinger, Lawrence Summers, and Charles Kupchan,'Renewing the Atlantic Partnership: Report of an Independent Task Force', The Council on Foreign Relations, 2004. See also Chester A. Crocker, 'Failed and Failing States: A Core Challenge to Global Security', in *Conflict and Cooperation in Transatlantic Relations* (ed. Daniel Hamilton), (Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2004).

18. US officials recently reconsidered the phraseology 'war on terror', preferring to label it as a 'struggle against global extremism' to tone down the military dimension. Kim Holmes, 'What's in a Name? "War on Terror" Out, "Struggle Against Extremism" In', WebMemo #805, The Heritage Foundation, July 2005. http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm805.cfm

Geography also impacts on the view of the security environment. For many years, European policies primarily focused on security issues in their vicinity. While this is largely still the case, Europeans recognise that events far from Europe's vicinity can have an impact on its security. This change in perspective, leading to a more global European outlook, increases the prospects of burdensharing with the United States, which traditionally has had a global foreign policy outlook.

Political support

Political support on both sides of the Atlantic is one of the fundamental elements for a strong transatlantic partnership. If there is limited political support for a particular military or civilian operation on either side, the prospects for burdensharing dwindle – even if all other necessary elements for cooperation are available.[19] The 2003 war in Iraq illustrates this situation well. Both before and during the war, it was neither a lack of resources nor capabilities that fundamentally affected burdensharing; rather, political (dis)agreements on the merits of going to war determined levels of participation.

At the EU level, political will plays a particularly important role concerning CFSP and ESDP related engagements. Moreover, the intergovernmental nature of the Union has implications for the pace at which the EU moves forward. The 'no' votes on the EU constitution, and to a lesser degree, the inability to agree on the next EU budget (2007-2013) at the June 2005 European Council meeting are likely to impact on the conduct of EU foreign policy. While it is too early to tell what the ramifications will be – some contend the EU will become more inward looking while others think it will focus even more on external affairs – it is clear that these events will impact on EU burdensharing choices.[20]

Ability to contribute

A partner's ability to contribute affects prospects for burdensharing. Such constraints can take on a variety of forms, the most common being financial or capability limitations. Manpower shortages, legal limits on the number of deployable personnel, interoperability constraints, and military transport limitations all have implications for military burdensharing. During Operation

19. It should be noted that political support not only affects military collaboration, but also has strong implications for cooperation in the civilian domain. While these may not always fall into the classic definition of burdensharing, they strengthen the notion that differences in political support impact on prospects for international projects such as the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court.

20. Likewise, it is important to recognise that events such as the recent terrorist attacks in London (and previously in Madrid) impact on the political outlook of decision-makers.

Allied Force, European performance in the air war was severely constrained by limitations in all-weather aircraft capabilities and a small number of precision-guided munitions. These constraints were also felt in other, lesser-known areas. For example, the United States ended up flying almost 90 per cent of all aerial refuelling and combat air patrol missions in support of the aerial missions.[21] Burdensharing was thus constricted by disparities in capabilities. This factor continues to be a source of contention between the United States and Europe.

For the United States, manpower constraints materialised with the initiation of Operation *Iraqi Freedom* in 2003. The operation put additional pressure on US deployments elsewhere, including those in the Balkans, where the US was already scaling down its presence, and Asia (South Korea). Not only can manpower constraints affect military options, but they may also impact on future courses of action. For example, substantial US commitments in Iraq may have narrowed the range of options available to address challenges in North Korea and Iran, while simultaneously increasing the importance of diplomatic burdensharing.

Assuming that there is political agreement for a particular mission, military capability constraints affect not only what each partner contributes, but also when they contribute. Analysts such as Robert Kagan capture the 'when' dimension of burdensharing when they contend that the United States does the cooking (or high intensity operations) while Europeans do the cleaning (follow-on peacekeeping operations).[22] Under such a scenario, limitations may nevertheless allow for 'temporal' or 'task-specific' burdensharing.

Constraints may also manifest themselves in civilian operations. For example, this may occur during peacekeeping or nation-building operations that require specialised personnel such as military police, law enforcement personnel, civilian administrators, or rule of law experts.

Military organisation and its interface with civilian tools

Military organisation also affects the prospect for burdensharing. In particular, efforts at military organisation between countries may enhance prospects for burdensharing. Examples of such projects include the EU's move towards battlegroups and NATO's evolving Response Force (NRF). Both of these force packages,

21. John E. Peters et al., 'European Contributions to Operation Allied Force', RAND MR 1391-AF (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001).

22. Robert Kagan, 'Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order' (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2003).

currently under development, serve to boost burdensharing between participating states.

The establishment of the battlegroups is an important building block of the Headline Goal 2010 that will give the EU the ability to address the range of tasks identified by the European Security Strategy and the Petersberg tasks listed in the Treaty of the European Union under article 17.2.[23] In addition to stimulating intra-EU burdensharing, this form of military organisation should give the EU an enhanced capability to contribute to burdensharing operations with the United States.

The NRF's missions are consistent with the global challenges identified in the NSS and the ESS.[24] Among the principal tasks assigned to the NRF are: non-combatant evacuation operations, support consequence management (e.g. in the case of a non-conventional attack), crisis response operations (including peacekeeping), support to counter-terrorism operations, and embargo operations.[25] Thus, the synergy achieved by these military force packages will both encourage burdensharing and enhance capabilities to address today's global security challenges.

The potential for burdensharing is also affected by the ease with which military and civilian tools can be combined either simultaneously or consecutively to tackle today's security challenges. As noted earlier, addressing today's threats will often require a mix of military and civilian instruments. The more seamlessly the two types of tools can be put together, the greater the potential for some form of burdensharing.

Both the United States and the EU are currently taking steps to enhance the complementarity of their civilian and military assets. The EU, for example, has established a Civilian Headline Goal for 2008 to complement the battlegroups and other objectives established under the Headline Goal 2010. In September 2004, several EU member states created the EUROGENDFOR (the European Gendarmerie Force). Consisting of approximately 800 gendarmes, it will have an initial reaction capability of thirty days to address different aspects of crisis management.[26] The United States established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation with the State Department in August 2004. One of its principal roles is to boost the United States' institutional capacity to 'respond to crises involving failing, failed, and post-conflict states and complex emergencies'. In other words, the

23. The EU aims to have thirteen battlegroups ready by 2007 – with an initial operational capability in 2005. Each battlegroup will be based on 'a combined arms, battalion sized force and reinforced with Combat Support and Combat Service elements.' Military Capability Commitment Conference, 'Draft Declaration on European Military Capabilities', General Affairs and External Relations Council, 22 November 2004.

24. The NRF reached initial operational capability in October 2004. When it reaches full operational capability in October 2006, it will provide a brigade-size land component with a forced-entry capability, a naval task force composed of one carrier battle group, an amphibious task group and a surface action group, an air component capable of 200 combat sorties a day, and a Special Forces component (http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/).

25. NATO MC 477, Military Concept for the NATO Response Force, 2003.

26. www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/defense/base/breves/eurogendfor_la_force_de_gendarmerie_europeenne, French Ministry of Defence (accessed June 2005).

office will aim to streamline the transition process between military and civilian operations.[27]

Summary

The concept of burdensharing has been at the forefront of the transatlantic debate since the establishment of NATO. Over time, the concept has evolved as the international security landscape changed. Turning points came with the end of the Cold War and the wars of secession in the Balkans in the early 1990s. Europe's inability to effectively address regional conflicts in its neighbourhood eventually led to greater efforts to build European capabilities through a Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). These constructs and a greater global outlook provided Europe with greater possibilities to actively engage in foreign policy decisions. It also meant that burdensharing could occur through new mechanisms, not only through NATO.

The 9/11 attacks reinforced the notion that the world faced a host of new threats – including those posed by non-state actors. It also underscored the view that the security environment had changed. This new category of threats increasingly blurred traditional distinctions between different realms: civilian and military; domestic and international; state and non-state. In response, the US National Security Strategy and Europe Security Strategy identified the main threats and potential means to address them. The identification of similar high-priority threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, and state failure demonstrate that the potential for continued and enhanced burdensharing is substantial. Ultimately, however, differing priorities, capabilities, levels of political support, financial constraints and the like all shape the nature of burdensharing: what is contributed, when, and how much.

27. For more information, see http://www.state.gov/s/crs/. Fact Sheet, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 11 March 2005, Washington DC. http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/43327.htm (accessed May 30th 2005).

2

Burdensharing in the defence field

Military contributions play an important role in addressing the key threats identified in the NSS and the ESS. While military tools will often be used in combination with civilian assets to address security threats, the focus in this chapter is on traditional military indicators, such as defence spending, and personnel contributions to ongoing operations.[28] The chapter also reviews contributions towards peacekeeping operations and UN missions. It begins with an overview of financial burdensharing indicators and then looks at personnel contributions to the different missions consistent with the objectives highlighted in the security strategies of the United States and the EU.

Financial burdensharing indicators

Military burdensharing is frequently gauged by comparing financial indicators. Statistics such as the proportion of GDP spent on defence across a range of different countries can shed light on which countries contribute the most towards defence and which lag behind. However, it is important not to take these figures out of context. There is no 'right number' for how much should be spent on defence. Decision-makers who set national priorities make choices that invariably change over time. Moreover, it is frequently more useful to analyse how defence funding is *used* as opposed to how much is *spent*. This provides information on priorities, capabilities, and future investments. Finally, we need not assume that there is a direct relationship between GDP and defence spending. An economy that grows over time does not necessarily imply that defence spending should or will automatically rise to represent an equivalent proportion of GDP. With this in mind, the following section reviews key financial indicators relating to defence.

28. With the focus on personnel contributions, there is limited space devoted to materiel contributions such as aircraft, ships, or other equipment.

Defence spending

Both during and after the Cold War, defence spending has been one of the principal yardsticks used to measure and compare transatlantic burdensharing. A current comparison of aggregate defence spending on both sides of the Atlantic shows that the United States spends substantially more than EU member states. This is especially true in the wake of the September 11th attacks in 2001.

Since 2001, the United States has increased its defence spending, dramatically widening the gap with Europe (Table 32 in Annex 2). By contrast, defence spending within the EU has remained fairly stable over the same time frame, with some countries injecting marginal increases and others cutting their defence spending. While the EU-15 defence budget was approximately $126.8 billion in 2001, the EU-25 figure in 2004 was $186.3 billion.[29] Adjusting for inflation and currency fluctuations, the real increase in defence spending is practically zero. What increase there was can partially be attributed to the contribution made by the ten new EU member states in 2004 ($10.2 billion). As a result, the gap between the United States and Europe is quite large: $453.6 billion (FY04) compared to $186.3 billion (2004).[30]

Defence spending as a percentage of GDP reinforces the lopsided picture. As shown in Table 4, the US figure increased substantially between 2001 and 2003, with defence spending rising from 3.0 per cent of GDP to 3.7 percent. By contrast, EU members spend a smaller proportion of GDP on defence, and the figures have remained fairly stable over time. In 2003, all but four EU-member states contributed less than 2.0 per cent of GDP towards defence. Greece, with the highest proportion spent on defence – 4.1 per cent in 2003 – dedicates a large portion of its defence budget to territorial defence to mirror high spending in neighbouring Turkey. Overall, collective EU defence spending as a proportion of GDP dropped from 2.0 per cent in 1997 to 1.7 percent in 2003.

Not surprisingly, the data indicates that US spending represents around 70 per cent of total EU/US defence spending, a proportion that rose between 2000 and 2004. The EU proportion declined from a high of 31 per cent in 2000 to 28 per cent in 2003 (Table 33 in Annex 2). The finding is consistent with a United States that places greater emphasis on military options in comparison to EU member states vis-à-vis foreign policy objectives.

29. *The Military Balance*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001-2002 and 2004-2005.

30. US figure represents National Defence budget outlay. *The Military Balance 2004-2005*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Exchange rate US $ = € 0.81.

Table 4:
US and EU defence spending
as a percentage of GDP: 1997-2003

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
European Union –15							
Austria	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	0.9%	0.8%	0.8%	1.0%
Belgium	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%	1.4%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%
Denmark	1.7%	1.6%	1.6%	1.5%	1.6%	1.6%	1.6%
Finland	1.6%	1.5%	1.4%	1.3%	1.2%	1.4%	1.4%
France	3.0%	2.8%	2.7%	2.6%	2.5%	2.5%	2.6%
Germany	1.6%	1.5%	1.6%	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%
Greece	4.6%	4.8%	5.0%	4.9%	4.6%	4.3%	4.1%
Ireland	1.0%	1.0%	0.9%	0.6%	0.5%	0.6%	0.5%
Italy	2.0%	2.0%	2.0%	2.1%	2.0%	1.9%	1.9%
Luxembourg	0.9%	0.9%	0.8%	0.7%	0.8%	0.9%	0.9%
Netherlands	1.9%	1.8%	1.8%	1.6%	1.6%	1.6%	1.6%
Portugal	2.3%	2.3%	2.2%	2.1%	2.1%	2.3%	2.1%
Spain	1.4%	1.3%	1.3%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%
Sweden	2.5%	2.5%	2.3%	2.0%	2.1%	1.9%	1.8%
United Kingdom	2.8%	2.8%	2.6%	2.5%	2.5%	2.4%	2.4%
EU average	**2.0%**	**1.9%**	**1.9%**	**1.8%**	**1.8%**	**1.7%**	**1.7%**
United States	**3.4%**	**3.2%**	**3.1%**	**3.1%**	**3.0%**	**3.3%**	**3.7%**

Source: The Military Balance, multiple years (2004·2005, 2002·2003, 2000·2001, 1999·2000), The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Individually, the greatest contributors within the EU are France, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

Burdensharing can also be assessed from the perspective of 'fair share' that takes into account a country's *ability to contribute*. The 'fair share' is the ratio of a country's *contribution* expressed as a share of the total (in this case defence spending) to its *ability to contribute* (expressed as a share of GDP).[31] Table 5 provides an overview of the fair share with respect to defence spending from 2000 to 2004. Supporting data tables are presented in Tables 32 to 35 (Annex 2).

A country is considered to be doing its fair share if its proportion of total defence spending is in balance with its share of total GDP. A ratio close to 1 indicates that a country's contribution is in balance with its ability to contribute. A ratio greater than 1 suggests that a country is contributing more than its fair share, while a ratio under 1 implies that a country is contributing less than its fair share.

31. The fair share calculations used here replicate the methodology used by the analysts responsible for producing the yearly report on 'Allied Contributions to the Common Defense'.

Table 5:
'Fair share' contribution with respect to defence spending

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Austria	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4
Belgium	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Cyprus	--	--	--	--	0.4
Czech Republic	--	--	--	--	0.7
Denmark	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5
Estonia	--	--	--	--	0.7
Finland	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5
France	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7
Germany	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4
Greece	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.8	0.7
Hungary	--	--	--	--	0.7
Ireland	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2
Italy	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4
Latvia	--	--	--	--	0.6
Lithuania	--	--	--	--	0.5
Luxembourg	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3
Malta	--	--	--	--	0.7
Netherlands	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
Poland	--	--	--	--	0.7
Portugal	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
Spain	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3
Slovakia	--	--	--	--	0.7
Slovenia	--	--	--	--	0.5
Sweden	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7
UK	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9
EU average	**0.6**	**0.6**	**0.6**	**0.5**	**0.5**
United States	**1.3**	**1.3**	**1.3**	**1.4**	**1.5**

Note: For 2004, data for the EU-25 is provided.

Source: The Military Balance (various years), The International Institute for Strategic Studies. GDP figures used are from EUROSTAT.

The results confirm that EU member states are contributing less than their fair share towards defence. The only exceptions are Greece and the United Kingdom. The EU average between 2000 and 2004 is 0.56. The United States, on the other hand, contributes more than its fair share on defence spending. Its fair share ratio is consistently over 1, with an average of 1.36 for the time period examined.

Again, while there is no 'right' level of defence spending, the growing gap between the United States and the EU has implications for burdensharing – especially if all other necessary criteria for cooperation (such as political agreement) exist. These range from a negative impact on interoperability (a more technically advanced US military may complicate joint operations with European forces) to discrepant abilities to transform the military services so as to effectively address key threats.

Defence spending on Research & Development

Acquiring the necessary capabilities to address current and future security challenges requires investment in Research and Development (R&D). Recent military operations reinforce the notion that troop numbers alone are not as critical as the capabilities of individual troops and units. In Afghanistan, network centric operations based on smaller units on the ground coordinating with air and naval assets demonstrated the multiplier effect arising from integrated communications.

Investment in military R&D can also produce positive spillover effects for the civilian sector through dual-use technologies. For example, technological advances to enhance force protection against weapons of mass destruction can lead to improved civilian detectors and decontamination equipment against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats.[32] Such tools may be utilised in civilian operations in response to attacks or accidents.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) divides Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) into seven different accounts. They are: Basic Research, Applied Research, Advanced Technology Development, Demonstration and Validation, Engineering and Manufacturing Development, Management Support, and Operational Systems Development. The first three categories are frequently grouped together as Science and Technology (S&T). Large industrial firms usually perform the remaining R&D categories, which focus on the development and testing of specific weapons systems. Collectively, these programmes lay the foundation for R&D.

Table 6 summarizes US research spending in Science and Technology and total RDT&E during the fiscal years 2001-2004. Approximately $10 billion is spent on Science and Technology research each year. Overall, RDT&E has increased from $41.75 bil-

32. It should be acknowledged that civilian R&D likewise can produce positive spillover effects vis-à-vis military equipment capabilities.

lion in FY01 to $64.37 billion in FY04. It represents about 14 per cent of overall defence spending over the last few years.[33]

Table 6:
US spending on Science and Technology
(6.1+6.2+6.3 and total RDT&E) $ in current billion

	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04
Basic research	1.29	1.35	1.37	1.36
Applied research	3.67	4.09	4.27	4.35
Advanced Tech. Dev.	3.97	4.43	5.09	6.18
Total S&T	8.93	9.87	10.73	11.89
Total RDT&E	41.75	48.62	58.31	64.37

Note: For examples of actual programmes within these categories see http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2006/fy2006_r1.pdf

Source: RDT&E PROGRAMS (R-1), Department of Defense Budget, FY2006 (Feb. 2005), FY2005 (Feb. 2004), FY2004/05 (Feb.2003), FY2003 (Feb. 2002). Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

European spending on defence R&D is smaller. According to Nick Whitney, Director of the European Defence Agency, the United States outspends the EU 5 to 1 in the area of defence R&D.[34] At present, the United States spends about three times as much as the combined military R&D of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.[35] Since French, German, and British defence R&D on average represents 67 per cent of EU R&D investment between 2003 and 2005, the gap between the United States and the EU is particularly large.[36]

Nonetheless, it is difficult to provide a clear indication of how much lower EU spending is as official R&D data is not available at the EU level. Although the European Defence Agency is currently in the process of collecting such data, R&D estimates exist only at the national level. Differing R&D definitions between EU member states, coupled with different methodologies for collecting such data, complicate the task of assessing EU-wide spending on military R&D.[37]

Table 7 provides defence R&D figures for individual EU member states in 2004. The R&D figure for the United States is included to allow for comparisons using a single source. As seen,

33. Based on defence budget figures provided in *The Military Balance*.

34. Judy Dempsey, 'EU's quest: A leaner and meaner military', *The International Herald Tribune*, 29 June 2005.

35. Philip Gordon, 'The Transatlantic Alliance and the International System', in Daniel Hamilton (ed.), *Conflict and Cooperation in Transatlantic Relations* (Washington D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2004), p.78.

36. Data for 2005 represents an estimate. *L'économie de la défense 2005*, Conseil économique de la défense, ministère de la Défense, June 2005.

37. Based on discussions with analysts at the European Defence Agency and the European Commission.

EU spending is about a fifth of that of the United States. Also notable is the variation in spending within the EU. France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom are the greatest contributors in terms of R&D expenditures as a percentage of the defence budget.[38] Together, these countries account for 95 per cent of total defence R&D spending within the EU. Thus, there is both a discrepancy in defence R&D across the Atlantic and across EU member states.

Table 7:
EU and US spending on defence R&D in 2004

	€Millions (PPP)[1]	As % of Defence budget[2]	As % of GDP
Austria	--	--	--
Belgium	7	0.2	--
Cyprus	--	--	--
Czech Republic	26	1.0	--
Denmark	12	0.6	0.01
Estonia	--	--	--
Finland	38	1.9	0.03
France	3,908	12.1	0.24
Germany	1,050	4.7	0.05
Greece	4	0.1	--
Hungary	--	--	--
Ireland	--	--	--
Italy	393	2.3	0.03
Latvia	--	--	--
Lithuania	--	--	--
Luxembourg	--	--	--
Malta	--	--	--
Netherlands	59	0.9	0.01
Poland	--	--	--
Portugal	23	0.8	0.01
Spain[3]	1,791	21.9	0.20
Slovakia	16	1.2	0.02
Slovenia	--	--	--
Sweden	497	10.5	0.22
UK	4,136	11.5	0.25
Total EU	**11,960**	**6.3**	**0.10**
US	**61,594**	**17.6**	**0.58**

Notes: (1) Purchasing power parity. (2) Defence budget figure does not include 'maintien en condition opérationnelle' (maintenance in operational condition). (3) Spanish Defence R&D is partially financed by its Ministry of Industry.

Source: *L'économie de la défense 2005*, Conseil économique de la défense, ministère de la Défense, June 2005, p. 153.

38. The figure for Spain includes funding provided by the Ministry of Industry.

While the EU does not need to replicate US levels of investment in defence R&D, divergences are likely to have an impact on burdensharing in the medium- to long-term as new defence technologies are introduced.[39] However, in the short term, traditional gaps, such as those in the area of strategic lift, will continue to define differences between US and European capabilities.

Cost sharing within the NATO Alliance

NATO's role has changed dramatically over the last fifteen years. With the end of the Cold War, the organisation found itself at a crossroads with respect to future operations and goals. Options ranged from obsolescence to reinvention. US Senator Richard Lugar captured the sentiment succinctly, arguing in 1993 that NATO could either 'go out of area or out of business.'[40] Twelve years later, NATO is actively pursuing out-of-area missions. It is engaged in Afghanistan through ISAF, provides limited training support to Iraqi police forces at different locations, and provides logistical assistance to the African Union to ameliorate the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan. NATO has changed in other ways too. It has enlarged to 26 members – 19 of which are EU members.[41]

NATO's new activities and missions are consistent with the security objectives laid out in the NSS and the ESS. Thus burdensharing within NATO is still relevant today, even though NATO no longer represents the sole vehicle through which burdensharing takes place. One way to estimate burdensharing within the Atlantic Alliance is to analyse costs. There are two principal types of costs associated with NATO operations, common costs and individual operational costs. There are three categories of common costs: civil budget, military budget, and the Security and Investment Programme.[42] These are borne by NATO members collectively according to contributions calculated through a cost sharing formula loosely attached to each NATO member's relative GDP.

Individual operational costs refer to the costs incurred by countries participating in a specific mission. Those costs are usually borne by the participants under the principle of 'costs lie where they fall'. For example, France's participation in operations in the Balkans cost about €230 million in 2003, with €163 million going towards expenditures associated with KFOR and €67 million for SFOR.[43] UK operating costs in the Balkans in 2003/04

39. Although it should be acknowledged that EU member states can use their procurement budgets to directly acquire latest generation equipment.

40. Richard G. Lugar, 'NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business: A Call for US Leadership to Revive and Redefine the Alliance,' Remarks delivered to the Open Forum of the US Department of State, August 2, 1993, Press Release, p. 1.

41. Overall, 23 of the 25 EU member states are either full NATO members or part of the Partnership for Peace (PFP).

42. The civil budget mainly covers operational costs at NATO headquarters and the execution of approved and civilian programmes. The military budget is dedicated to operating and maintenance costs, including operating costs of the NATO command structure for peacekeeping activities. The NATO Security and Investment Programme covers the infrastructure costs needed to 'support the roles of the NATO Strategic Commands'. See the NATO Handbook for additional details on the three common costs categories: http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm#CH9.

43. 'Les opérations extérieures ont entraîné un surcoût de 620M pour la France en 2003'. armees.com, 25 April 2004. Accessible at http://www.armees.com/breveimp.php?id_breve=599. (accessed June 2005).

came to approximately £103.6 million.[44] The US Defense Department estimates that its military costs in Afghanistan are about $900 million per month or $10.8 billion annually.[45] Clearly, these costs tend to be much higher than the common costs but data are hard to come by.[46] Usually, either budgetary or parliamentary information at the national level will contain some indication of a country's operational costs associated with an operation. Given the difficulty in gauging individual operational costs, the focus here is on the common costs.

Table 8 provides a snapshot of NATO common costs between 2000 and 2002. The table shows the gross contribution by each NATO member state (in nominal terms) and the proportion it represents of the total.

Table 8:
NATO Common Costs: 2000-2002

Country	NATO Common Costs in nominal $ millions Nominal Exchange Rates			NATO Common Costs as % of total for each Alliance Member		
	2000	2001	2002	2000	2001	2002
Belgium	40.7	44.4	48.9	3.6%	3.7%	3.5%
Canada	53.0	51.2	64.9	4.7%	4.2%	4.6%
Czech Republic	8.8	11.3	13.6	0.8%	0.9%	1.0%
Denmark	28.7	31.3	34.8	2.6%	2.6%	2.5%
France	77.3	74.8	111.8	6.9%	6.2%	8.0%
Germany	223.8	242.7	268.6	19.9%	20.1%	19.1%
Greece	7.8	8.3	10.0	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%
Hungary	6.4	8.2	9.8	0.6%	0.7%	0.7%
Iceland	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Italy	83.4	88.4	103.6	7.4%	7.3%	7.4%
Luxembourg	1.6	1.7	1.9	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Netherlands	43.2	47.2	52.1	3.8%	3.9%	3.7%
Norway	23	25.3	27.8	2.0%	2.1%	2.0%
Poland	24.2	31.2	37.4	2.2%	2.6%	2.7%
Portugal	5.9	6.4	7.4	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%
Spain	36.0	44.0	51.3	3.2%	3.6%	3.7%
Turkey	15.9	16.9	19.6	1.4%	1.4%	1.4%
United Kingdom	164	173.3	200.2	14.6%	14.4%	14.3%
Total EU[(1)]	**712.4**	**762.5**	**890.6**	**63.3%**	**63.2%**	**63.4%**
United States	**281.1**	**299**	**340.9**	**25.0%**	**24.8%**	**24.3%**
Grand total[(2)]	**1,125.1**	**1,205.9**	**1,404.9**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Notes: (1) EU member states in NATO between 2000-2001 and between 2001-2002. (2) Grand total includes contributions by all NATO members.

Source: Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, July 2003, p. II-14.

44. UK Ministry of Defence, 'Annual Report and Accounts 2003-04', 12 October, 2004.

45. 'Observations on Post-Conflict Assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan', Statement by Susan Westin, Managing Director of International Affairs and Trade, before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, GAO Testimony, GAO-03-98T, 18 July 2003.

46. For cost information on less recent NATO operations, such as *Allied Force*, see Carl Ek (Coordinator), 'NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo: A Preliminary Report', CRS Report for Congress, 3 January 2000.

The United States is the single largest contributor towards NATO common costs. The US contribution is consistently around one quarter of the common costs. In 2002, it provided approximately $341 million or 24.3 per cent of the total. The next largest contributor, Germany, provided $269 million or 19.1 per cent. However put together, the EU member states within NATO collectively accounted for $890.6 million of the total $1,404.9 billion budget. This figure represents 63.5 per cent of all common costs. From a different perspective, the top five EU/NATO contributors accounted for over half the common costs (52.5 per cent).

While the common costs are very small compared to the operational expenditures associated with NATO operations, the value of each contribution should not be downplayed as it represents an important form of burdensharing. While contributions are driven by GDP, they provide a symbolic representation of burdensharing within the Alliance.

Cost sharing within ESDP

Since January 2003, the EU has carried out a number of military and civilian ESDP missions focusing on humanitarian, peacekeeping, and crisis management tasks. As of September 2005, eleven separate missions have been completed, are underway, or in the planning phase. While these missions have distinct objectives they all aim to enhance regional stability in their area of operations.

As is the case with NATO operations, ESDP costs typically fall into two categories: common costs and individual operational costs that are covered by the participating nations according to the principle of 'costs lie where they fall.'[47] The common costs refer to the incremental costs associated with the execution of the operation. These include the costs of maintaining a force headquarters, lodging costs, hiring local staff, etc.[48] Individual operational costs include expenditures associated with the deployment of troops and equipment to areas of operations. These costs tend to be greater than the common costs.

Ascertaining cost sharing within a particular ESDP mission is complex for a number of reasons. First, cost-sharing patterns may vary from operation to operation. For example, in the case of

47. For more, see Antonio Missiroli, '€uros for ESDP: financing EU operations', *Occasional Paper* n°45, EU Institute for Security Studies, June 2003.

48. The participating states' contributions to cover the common costs are determined in accordance with the gross national product scale as specified in Article 28(3) of the Treaty on European Union and consistent with Council Decision 2000/597/EC, Euratom of 29 September 2000 on the system of the European Communities' own resources. In February 2004, the EU set up ATHENA, a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of EU operations with military or defence implications. Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP establishing a 'mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications', 23 February 2004.

Operation *Concordia*, participating states were asked to cover both their individual operational costs as well as a percentage of total common costs (€6.2 million). As such, participating EU member states bore 84.5 per cent of the common costs, based on a GDP scale, while non-EU participants accounted for the remaining 15.5 per cent.[49]

Second, individual operational costs borne by participating states are infrequently publicised. Since these costs tend to be much greater than the common costs of an operation, a lack of such figures makes it difficult to gauge total contributions made by each participating state. For example, in the case of Operation *Artemis*, France's individual contribution to the mission was €46.58 million, a figure that greatly surpasses the €7 million in common costs.[50] While one could estimate the individual costs for each participating state based on the number of personnel attached to an operation (be it military, police, or civilian), such figures would provide a rough approximation at best – especially if deployment costs are not included.

Third, a scenario where a large number of states are participating in an operation means that multiple contributions need to be tallied. For example, for the EU's first military operation under the auspices of ESDP, *Concordia*, twenty-six countries took part in the mission. Gauging total costs for the operation would thus require the compilation of cost data for all participating states. For France, the largest personnel contributor to the operation, individual costs added up to €2.03 million.[51] With these limitations in mind, Table 9 provides an overview of the common costs for finalised and ongoing ESDP missions.

The table shows that common costs for ESDP operations since January 2003 surpass one quarter billion euros.[52] *Althea*, the successor mission of SFOR, entails the highest common costs with a reference amount of €71.7 million.

49. See Gustav Lindstrom in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), *EU Security and Defence Policy - The first five years (1999-2004)*, (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004), p.118.

50. Legislative report n°1267, National Assembly, 2 December 2003. Accessible at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/rapports/r1267.asp (accessed June 2005).

51. Legislative report n°1267, National Assembly, 2 December 2003. Accessible at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/rapports/r1267.asp (accessed June 2005).

52. Figure includes known start-up costs and projects EUPM costs up to December 2005.

Table 9:
Common costs for ESDP missions: 2003 – May 2005

Mission Name	Type	Common Costs (€millions)
EUPM (Sarajevo)	Police	38/yr (1)
CONCORDIA (FYROM)	Military	6.2
PROXIMA (FYROM)	Police	23.5 (2)
ARTEMIS (DRC)	Military	7.0
THEMIS (Georgia)	Rule of law	2.0
ALTHEA (BiH)	Peacekeeping	71.7
EUPOL-Kinshasa	Police	4.3
EUSEC-RD Congo	SSR (4)	1.6
EUJUST LEX (Iraq)	Rule of law	10
Total		256 (3) (approx.)

Note: (1) Does not include €14 million in start-up costs in 2002 and €1.7 million in start-up costs in 2003. About €18 million of the €38 million figure is borne by participating member states with the remaining €20 million covered by the Community budget. (2) Includes start-up costs. (3) Total figure reflects only common costs. Figure includes start-up costs for EUPM and projects its costs up to December 2005. (4) SSR = Security Sector Reform.

Sources: General Secretariat of the EU, mission fact sheets, and mission personnel.

Cost sharing within the UN

The EU and the United States currently contribute about ten per cent of all UN peacekeeping troops and they also cover a substantial portion of the costs associated with peacekeeping operations. Historically, US contributions hovered around 30 per cent of the UN total. In November 1994, Congress limited the amount the United States would contribute to 25 per cent of total costs, starting in FY1996.[53] In 2004, the UN's peacekeeping operations budget was $3.87 billion.[54] Collectively, the US and EU covered more than half the amount – with the United States covering 25 per cent while the EU provided about 40 per cent.[55] Table 10 below provides a breakdown of US and EU contributions to UN peacekeeping costs between 2000 and 2003.

As can be seen, the United States is the single largest contributing country to the UN peacekeeping budget. As a collective body, the EU surpasses the US contribution.

53. UN Peacekeeping – Estimated US contributions, Fiscal years 1996-2001, General Accounting Office, GAO-02-294, February 2002. 'The EU at the UN – Overview', accessible at www.europa-eu-un.org/documents/infopak/en/EU-UNBrochure-1_en.pdf. (accessed 3 January 2005). In spite of this, the UN continued to bill the United States at its historical assessment rate of 30 per cent of total costs, leading to sizeable arrears for the United States. UN members agreed to lower the proportion to 27 per cent in 2000. http://www.stimson.org/fopo/?SN=FO20020227316 (accessed July 2005) and the United States Mission to the UN: http://www.un.int/usa/iofact3.htm (accessed July 2005).

54. For comparison, UN peacekeeping spending in nominal terms averaged $164 million per year between 1975 and 1980. The figure rose to $210.8 million between 1981-1988. With more missions involving peace building, average yearly costs rose to $1.75 billion during the 1989-1996 period. For more on UN mission costs and contributors see Hirofumi Shimizu and Todd Sandler, 'Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994 – 2000', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 39, no. 6, Sage Publications, November 2002.

55. Philippe Mouche, 'Qui paie le prix de la paix ?', *Le Monde*, 19 March 2005.

Table 10:
US and EU collections, credits, and outstanding sums
to the UN peacekeeping budget: 2000 – 2003 (in $ millions)

	2000	2001	2002	2003
EU member states				
- Collections	687.2	1,009.0	931.0	851.8
- Credits	18.1	60.8	127.4	106.2
- Outstanding (arrears)	161.3	299.6	98.1	23.8
United States				
- Collections	498.0	745.7	644.4	560.8
- Credits	15.3	51.4	91.1	72.5
- Outstanding (arrears)	388.3	409.2	274.2	263.8
Total approved UN peacekeeping budget[(1)]	N.A.	3.0 billion	2.6 billion	2.17 billion

Notes: Complete data for 2004 not available (N.A.) at time of writing. (1) Approved budgets run from 1 July to 30 June (year after). Does not include contributions towards the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi (Italy). Totals are based on individual country contributions to ongoing operations for the relevant year.

Sources: Status of contributions as at 31 December 2000, United Nations Secretariat, ST/ADM/SER.B/570, 16 January 2001. Status of contributions as at 31 December 2001, United Nations Secretariat, ST/ADM/SER.B/585, 31 January 2002. Status of contributions as at 31 December 2002, United Nations Secretariat, ST/ADM/SER.B/600, 23 January 2003. Status of contributions as at 31 December 2004, United Nations Secretariat, ST/ADM/SER.B/619, 20 January 2004. Total budget data for 2003 is from UNDPKO. 'General Assembly adopts peacekeeping budget of $2.17, financing 11 active missions for 2003/04', 57th General Assembly Plenary, UN Press Release GA/10139, 18 June 2003. Total budget data for 2001/02 and 2002/03 is from www.un.org/Depts/dpko/faq/q6.htm.

Operational burdensharing indicators

The following section analyses burdensharing in recent and ongoing military operations. The operations analysed are organised into categories that are consistent with those used by the security strategies. They are:

1. burdensharing operations whose aim is to enhance regional stability;
2. contributions towards UN peacekeeping operations;
3. burdensharing targeting state failure and counter-terrorism;

4. burdensharing in the fight against weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

While the focus is on manpower contributions, data on other types of assets are listed when appropriate. It should be noted that manpower contributions to operations vary over time due to troop movements, rotations, and reinforcements. As a result, within-year fluctuations for some operations may not be adequately captured. Historical data are provided for some missions, such as SFOR and KFOR, to take into account fluctuations over time. For UN operations, monthly figures are averaged over the entire year to produce a representative figure.

Burdensharing operations to enhance regional stability

Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and Operation Althea

As the successor to the NATO-led Implementation Force, the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) was initiated in December 1996 to ensure a safe and secure environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH).[56] With respect to burdensharing, the picture has changed over time. An initially large US presence was eventually replaced by troops from EU countries. At the outset of the SFOR mission, the United States was the largest individual contributor, providing about 14,000 troops. However, this was somewhat less than the collective EU contribution of 18,500. Within the EU, the UK was the largest single contributor with 5,400 troops on the ground.

Table 11:
Personnel contributions to SFOR: 1997-2004

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
EU	18,504	18,096	17,920	15,456	12,166	11,032	8,701	7,184
United States	14,028	12,810	12,350	8,590	7,180	2,350	2,150	839
Other	8,575	7,724	7,766	6,501	4,113	4,969	4,598	3,128
Total	**41,107**	**38,630**	**38,036**	**30,547**	**23,459**	**18,351**	**15,449**	**11,151**

Note: EU data for 2004 represents the EU-25. The table does not include most countries' personnel deployments to Italy as part of the air component of the mission. Data most likely representative of actual figures for the month of August for each of the years covered.

Source: The Military Balance (various years), The International Institute for Strategic Studies .

56. SFOR is sometimes referred to as Operation *Joint Guard* / Operation *Joint Forge*.

As the situation on the ground improved, the number of personnel was drawn down over time. By 2000, the number of personnel attached to SFOR was down to 30,500. The United States still remained as the largest single contributor on the ground. By 2002, with the war on terrorism gathering steam, the United States decreased its presence considerably. As shown in Table 11, the US contribution to SFOR was down to about 2,400 troops in 2002. The EU contribution did not shift dramatically, providing about 11,000 troops in the same year. Among the EU member states, France contributed the largest contingent with about 2,200 personnel. By late 2004, the EU provided 64 per cent of all troops to the mission. The United States had withdrawn most of its troops, maintaining about 800 or 8 per cent of the total share. Other partners stood for the remaining 28 per cent.

In December 2004, the SFOR mission was handed over to the EU. The EU-headed Operation *Althea* was formally launched on 2 December 2004. As an EU operation, EU troops currently make up the majority of all personnel on the ground, representing 87 per cent of the total (Table 12). As of April 2005, Germany was the largest single contributor to the operation, providing 1,227 of the total 6,688 troops.[57] *Althea*'s mandate includes both a stabilisation and a counter-terrorism dimension, widening the burdensharing potential of the operation.

Table 12:
Personnel contributions to *Althea* in 2005

	Personnel	% of total
EU-25	5,802	87%
Non-EU	886	13%
Total	**6,688**	**100%**

Note: Figures fluctuate over time and the above figures should be considered as a general guideline. Troop strength reflective of April 2005.

Source: www.euforbih.org/organisation.strength.htm. (accessed 29 April 2005).

While not taking part in Operation *Althea*, the United States maintains some personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina – for example a helicopter presence in Tuzla. In addition, NATO keeps a residual presence in Bosnia, carrying out missions in the areas of security sector reform, searching for war criminals, and combating terrorism.[58]

57. For a complete breakdown, see Table 38 in Annex 2.

58. 'EU takes over from NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina', *Atlantic News*, 1 December 2004.

The SFOR/*Althea* operation represents a good example of 'temporal' burdensharing. Over time, large numbers of US troops were replaced by European troops as the situation on the ground stabilised and requirements for the redeployment of US troops arose in other parts of the world. US troops stationed in Bosnia were shifted to other theatres such as Iraq. The transition to an EU force through *Althea* means that European troops currently make up the bulk of peacekeepers in the region. A more stable situation on the ground also allowed the EU to initiate a separate police mission in Sarajevo to train local law enforcement personnel in 2003.

NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)

Established in June 1999, the NATO Kosovo Force represents a second large-scale mission in Europe's neighbourhood. As its name implies, KFOR's purpose is to maintain regional stability in Kosovo. KFOR's burdensharing pattern is different from SFOR's, as EU member states have consistently contributed more troops to the mission than the US. In 2000, at the early stages of the mission, Italy was the largest individual troop contributor with 6,400 troops on the ground. The United States provided about 6,000 or 14 per cent of the total while the EU accounted for 63 per cent of all personnel.

Table 13:
Personnel contributions to KFOR: 2000-2004

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
EU	27,344	28,268	25,826	19,721	18,054
United States	5,950	7,180	5,360	2,310	2,060
Other	9,985	8,529	6,354	5,907	3,270
Total	**43,279**	**43,977**	**37,540**	**27,938**	**23,384**

Note: EU data for 2004 represents the EU-25. Some personnel associated with the mission are deployed in neighbouring countries. For example in 2004, 260 US personnel are stationed in the Former Yugoslav Republic and 34 personnel from Armenia are based in Serbia Montenegro.

Source: The Military Balance (various years), The International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Over time, the KFOR contingent has decreased in numbers. It went from a high of around 44,000 personnel in 2001 to 23,400 in 2004 (Table 13). During that time, the United States' contribution gradually declined. In 2004, US troop strength was 9 per cent of the total or close to one third of its 2000 level. The EU also decreased its presence in Kosovo. However, it saw its share of total contributions increase. In 2004, the EU share stood for 77 per cent of all troops – 14 percentage points higher than in 2000. The largest individual contributor in 2004 was Germany with 3,900 troops on the ground.

ESDP Missions

ESDP operations contribute towards burdensharing in different ways. First, ESDP missions allow the EU to address important security challenges in its neighbourhood independently.[59] Second, ESDP missions can provide burdensharing support during operational gaps. For example, Operation *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo gave the UN time to regroup and reinforce its MONUC operation.

Likewise, ESDP missions can provide follow-on support to high-end NATO operations. Operation *Concordia* was a follow-up operation to NATO's *Allied Harmony*, and was subsequently followed by an EU police mission (*Proxima*) when the situation on the ground called for law enforcement assets.[60]

Finally, ESDP missions can induce burdensharing as they usually accept contributions from non-EU member states. Most ESDP operations consisting of a sizeable contingent tend to have non-EU contributions. For example, in the case of the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Sarajevo, non-EU support comes from Bulgaria (5), Canada (7), Iceland (1), Norway (8), Romania (9), Russia (3), Switzerland (4), Turkey (12), and the Ukraine (5).[61]

59. The EU is also able to launch small-scale operations with very specific mandates. Examples of small-scale civilian operations include the rule of law mission in Georgia (EUJUST Themis) and the Security Sector Reform mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC-R.D. Congo).

60. Concordia relied on member states' assets as well as planning and logistical support from NATO through the 'Berlin Plus' arrangement. Berlin Plus was established in 2002 at the NATO Prague Summit, and provides for support between NATO and EU missions and operations.

61. As of 5 August 2005, EUPM website at http://www.eupm.org/Mission%20overview.asp?lang=eng.

Table 14:
ESDP civilian and military operations: January 2003 - July 2005

Mission			Personnel	
Name	Type	Date	EU-25	Non-EU
EUPM (Sarajevo)	Police	Jan. 2003 – present	435[1]	54[2]
CONCORDIA (FYROM)	Military	March 2003 – Dec. 03	308[3]	49[3]
PROXIMA (FYROM)	Police	Dec. 2003 – present	145	17[4]
ARTEMIS (DRC)	Military	June 30 – Sept. 3 [2003]	1,800 (approx.)	0[5]
THEMIS (Georgia)	Rule of law	July 2004 – July 2005	10 (approx.)	0[6]
ALTHEA (BiH)	Peacekeeping	Dec. 2004 – present	5,802	886
EUPOL-Kinshasa	Police	April 2005 – present	30 (approx.)	0[6]
EUSEC-RD Congo	SSR[7]	June 2005 – present	8	0[6]
EUJUST LEX (Iraq)	Rule of law	July 2005 – present		
Total			8,500 (approx.)	1,006

Notes: DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo. (1) As of April 30, 2005. Includes 53 civilians. (2) As of April 30, 2005. Includes 8 civilians. Troop strength varies. Figure as of 7 April 2005. (3) Figures as of 4 May 2005. It does not include approximately 100 Macedonian nationals working for the mission as interpreters, assistants, etc. (4) Does not include approximately 140 staff hired locally. (5) Canada, Brazil and South Africa provided assistance until 5 July 2003. (6) Some local staff involved. (7) SSR = Security Sector Reform. The list does not include other activities which, while resembling ESDP missions, are not classified as such. An example is the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support established in April 2004. For additional information see: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/ en/declarations/84603.pdf.

Sources: General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, mission fact sheets, and correspondence with mission personnel.

Table 14 provides an overview of civilian and military EU missions since 1 January 2003. Collectively, about 8,500 EU personnel have been attached to these missions. About 1,000 personnel have been provided by non-EU member states. If we constrain the figures to include only military operations, the number of EU personnel is closer to 7,900. As can be seen, the size of the operation varies greatly according to needs and objectives. While Operation *Althea* engages about 7,000 personnel, Operation EUSEC-RD Congo has eight advisors.

National operations

Transatlantic burdensharing may also take place in the context of individual military operations, especially if the objectives meet international strategic interests. Medium- to large-sized powers with a colonial past or specific regional interests are more likely to carry out such operations. They may be initiated if social unrest or violence breaks out in a specific country or region, especially if the international community cannot act quickly and there are substantial numbers of citizens from the intervening nation living in the area. Historically, such operations have occurred in Africa. As the burdensharing 'value' of such operations is subjective, no exhaustive or authoritative list is possible. Below are a few potential examples to illustrate these types of operations.

In May 2000, the UK deployed its 1st Battalion, Parachute Regiment to Sierra Leone in response to a breakdown in the peace agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and rebels. Known as Operation *Palliser*, the UK deployment reached a peak of 4,500 personnel. The force carried out several missions, whose objectives were to stabilise the capital of Freetown, secure the airport to help facilitate the evacuation of British nationals, and reinforce UN forces operating under the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). At a later stage, British troops provided training to Sierra Leone's armed forces to help them defend against future rebel threats.[62]

A more recent example is France's standing force in Africa. Consisting of 6,000 – 8,000 personnel, it is spread over five different nations to contribute towards regional stability. Since late 2002, the French contingent has been concentrated in Ivory Coast to enforce a truce in a civil war conflict.[63]

On the US side, several large-scale commitments are ongoing since the end of World War II. They include substantial troop commitments to South Korea (34,500) and Japan (43,500).[64] While these contributions are not generally considered as burdensharing operations, especially since they do not involve NATO or the European theatre, they play an important role in ensuring regional stability.[65] They are consistent with today's concept of global security challenges which acknowledges that instability originating from distant places can impact on the United States and Europe. As such, measures to enhance stability in those regions are consistent with the post-Cold War concept of burdensharing.

62. 'Defence Secretary Statement on Sierra Leone', UK Ministry of Defence, 23 May 2000. http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=586. (accessed June 2005).

63. J.A. Lewis, 'Full power ahead', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 6 April 2005, p. 22.

64. T*he Military Balance 2004-2005*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, London, October 2004.

65. Moreover, since there was no expectation that other countries take part or contribute to these missions, besides the host nation, the perception that such operations were outside the scope of burdensharing took hold over time.

The United States has also carried out smaller scale operations to enhance regional stability. For example in June 2003, US forces where deployed to Liberia as a Joint Special Operations Task Force to carry out evacuation operations. As humanitarian conditions deteriorated on the ground, the United States decided to boost its presence in Liberia. It deployed a Joint Task Force consisting of over 3,800 personnel. As noted by General James Jones, Commander in Chief of United States European Command, the efforts 'went a long way toward mitigating a humanitarian crisis in Liberia and preventing it from becoming a source of regional instability by helping international organisations respond effectively.'[66]

Contributions towards UN peacekeeping operations

UN operations are a means of global burdensharing although they are not always considered as such. The security objectives of UN operations – usually the promotion of stability or security in volatile countries or regions – are consistent with the security objectives outlined in the US and European security strategies.

Several UN peacekeeping operations are ongoing each year. Since 2000, the annual average number of missions has fluctuated between nineteen (2000) and fifteen (2003 and 2004). The total number of personnel engaged in these missions varies throughout the year reflecting rotations and the requirements of each mission. During 2004, the monthly totals ranged from 48,590 in January to 64,720 in December. Table 15 provides a breakdown of US and EU contributions of civilian police, military police and troops to UN operations between 2001 and 2004.

Over the last few years, the United States and the EU together have provided between nine and fourteen percent of overall UN peacekeeping manpower. However, of the two, the EU member states provide the vast majority. For example in 2004, EU member states provided 4,781 personnel towards UN missions; the US equivalent was 451. With respect to the type of manpower contributed, the bulk of US contributions consist of civilian police while those of EU member states are military troops. As shown in Table 15, EU troop contributions in the last few years tend to surpass 2,100 per year while US civilian police contributions

66. Testimony by Gen. James Jones before the House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, 24 March 2004.

Table 15:
Average annual EU and US personnel contributions
to UN peacekeeping operations 2001-2004

	2001	2002	2003	2004
EU member states				
Civilian Police	1,806	1,645	937	949
Military Police	330	314	263	316
Troops	3,420	2,266	2,177	3,516
Total EU	**5,556**	**4,225**	**3,376**	**4,781**
United States				
Civilian Police	750	664	508	426
Military Police	42	32	16	19
Troops	1	1	1	7
Total United States	**792**	**697**	**525**	**451**
Total EU and US	6,348	4,922	3,901	5,232
Overall UN Total	45,815	44,515	38,951	57,327
EU/US as a % of total	13.9%	11.1%	10.0%	9.1%

Notes: Figures for 2001 are for May through December. Data points represent averages calculated from monthly data. The EU figures for 2004 are for the EU-25 (eight data points were used for the new member states - May through December). Between 2001-2004, the number of ongoing yearly UN operations ranged from fifteen to seventeen. Overall UN totals are based on 12-month averages.

Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), Status of Contributions data.

fluctuate between 500 and 800. The EU's smallest contribution is in the category of military police (about 300 per year) while the US troop contributions to UN operations average less than three per year between 2001-2004.

Another way to assess intra-UN burdensharing levels is to compare where European and US contributions to UN peacekeeping operations are deployed, or 'geographic burdensharing'. While such deployments are based on operational requirements on the ground, certain trends can be noted over time. Table 16 gives a breakdown for the time period between 2001 and 2004.

The figures show that the majority of US and EU personnel contributed to UN peacekeeping operations are concentrated in the European theatre (UNMIK in Kosovo). We find that EU member states tend to provide relatively equitable contributions to regions such as Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. By contrast, US

contributions have overwhelmingly been provided to the Balkans. A notable observation is the contribution pattern to Africa, where both partners have increased their presence in 2004. However, a look at the raw numbers shows that the EU has a substantially larger UN contingent in the continent: 1,310 versus 84 in 2004. With respect to Asia, there has been a gradual decrease in EU and US contributions to the region since the termination of UNTAET (UN Transitional Administration in East Timor) in 2002 and the steady drawdown in its follow-on mission UNMISET (UN Mission of Support in East Timor).

Table 16:
US and EU member state personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping operations by region (percentage of contributed troops)

	2001	2002	2003	2004
Africa				
EU	12.0%	11.9%	16.8%	27.4%
United States	2.8%	1.9%	1.9%	18.6%
Americas				
EU	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	2.0%
United States	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.6%
Asia				
EU	21.9%	21.5%	21.4%	5.9%
United States	9.5%	9.8%	7.2%	2.7%
Europe				
EU	38.2%	47.4%	40.2%	35.5%
United States	86.0%	86.4%	89.9%	76.5%
Middle East				
EU	27.7%	19.0%	21.6%	29.2%
United States	1.8%	2.0%	1.0%	0.7%

Notes: Numbers may not add up to 100.0 % due to rounding. Figures for 2001 are calculated using nine data points (April through December). Underlying totals used to calculate the percentages consist of yearly figures based on monthly averages. For 2004, contributions made by the 10 new EU member states are based on data spanning May - December 2004.

Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), Status of Contributions data.

Burdensharing with respect to peacekeeping can also be assessed from the perspective of 'fair share.' Again, the fair share is the ratio of a country's *contribution* (expressed as a share of the total

Table 17:
'Fair share' contribution with respect to personnel contributions to UN and peacekeeping operations

Manpower Contributions				
	2001	2002	2003	2004
Austria	1.5	1.1	1.6	1.4
Belgium	1.7	1.4	1.0	0.9
Denmark	2.9	2.3	2.9	1.4
Finland	1.9	1.2	1.8	2.0
France	1.2	1.5	1.8	1.2
Germany	1.0	1.3	1.4	1.4
Greece	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6
Ireland	3.1	1.8	1.8	3.1
Italy	1.3	1.4	2.1	1.3
Luxembourg	1.1	1.0	3.6	3.2
Netherlands	2.6	2.3	2.0	1.1
Portugal	1.7	1.3	1.7	1.0
Spain	0.7	0.9	1.0	0.8
Sweden	0.8	1.1	1.6	1.8
UK	1.7	1.5	1.0	0.8
EU average	**1.6**	**1.4**	**1.7**	**1.5**
US	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.8

Note: Data includes figures for the following major non-UN led operations: *Amber Fox* (Macedonia), Operation *Southern Watch* (OSW-Iraq), Operation *Northern Watch* (ONW-Iraq), SFOR (BiH), KFOR (Kosovo), *Concordia* (Macedonia), *Artemis* (Congo), ISAF (Afghanistan) and OEF (principally Afghanistan). Data for OSW and ONW are provided for 2001-2002 and not 2003 given the initiation of Operation *Iraqi Freedom* in March 2003. Figures for the *Althea* ESDP mission are not included as the operation began in December 2004. Data in 2004 is for the EU-25. OEF data in the table spans 2002-2004 and is based on several different sources given the unavailability of a central source.

Sources: The Military Balance (various years), The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), *EU Security and Defence Policy – The first five years (1999-2004)*, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004 (for ESDP missions). Data for OEF comes from UK Ministry of Defence (Operation *Veritas*), French Ministry of Defence (Operation *Hercules*), German Ministry of Defence, CENTCOM, US Department of Defense ('International Contributions to the War Against Terrorism', Fact Sheet 22 May 2002), US Department of State, Federation of American Scientists (US personnel data for OSW), The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism's Terrorism Knowledge Base (www.tbk.org), armees.com: http://www.armees .com/article548.html (July 2005) and Global Security: www.globalsecurity. org/military/ops/enduring-freedom_orbat-03.htm.

– in this case personnel contributions) to its *ability to contribute* (expressed as a share of active duty personnel).[67] Table 17 provides an overview of the fair share with respect to manpower contribu-

67. It should be recognised that the number of active duty personnel are set according to domestic requirements, thus potentially affecting the objectivity of this particular measure. For example, a country that chooses to maintain a small contingent of military personnel (as a proportion of the total population eligible to serve) is likely to obtain a higher fair share value.

tions to peacekeeping operations from 2001 to 2004.[68] Supporting data tables are presented in Tables 43 to 47 (Annex 3).

With respect to manpower contributions, the EU average between 2000-2004 is 1.55, signalling that EU countries collectively provide more than their fair share towards peacekeeping and UN missions. The United States, however, provides less than its fair share. Its share was under one, even after the initiation of Operation *Enduring Freedom* in late 2001/early 2002.[69]

Burdensharing targeting state failure and counter-terrorism

Operation Enduring Freedom and International Security Assistance Force

Operation *Enduring Freedom* was the military response to the 9/11 attacks. Launched on 7 October 2001 in Afghanistan, initial operations consisted of a mix of air strikes and Tomahawk cruise missiles against al-Qaeda and Taliban contingents. Unlike previous large-scale operations, NATO was not engaged at the outset of OEF for a variety of reasons. These ranged from the need to act quickly (the NATO decision-making process was considered a liability) to concerns over interoperability as the United States introduced concepts of network centric warfare. The international presence on the ground was generally limited to Special Operations forces working together with their US equivalents.

With the ousting of the Taliban regime, an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was set up. ISAF was to assist the Afghan government and the international community in maintaining security within its area of operation. Coupled with other forms of assistance, such as economic and humanitarian aid, ISAF would indirectly ensure that state failure did not occur. ISAF missions were initially coordinated by volunteer nations. The United Kingdom ran the first ISAF mission starting in January 2002. Consisting of about 5,000 personnel, the operation included contributions from several EU member states, including Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Turkey assumed command of the second ISAF mission on 20 June 2002, followed by a joint German-Dutch contingent for the third ISAF mission (ISAF-III).

Initially, ISAF was configured as an 'international' mission', organised into six-month rotations with different countries

68. The calculations take into account personnel contributions to UN operations and major non-UN peacekeeping operations such as *Amber Fox*, Operation *Southern Watch*, Operation *Northern Watch*, SFOR, KFOR, CONCORDIA, ARTEMIS, ISAF, and OEF (Afghanistan).

69. Clearly, the US figure would change if the numbers for Operation *Iraqi Freedom* were included. However, the personnel contributions towards OIF are not included, as the operation is not considered a peacekeeping operation.

assuming a leadership role. It wasn't until the end of the German-Dutch mission that NATO assumed command of ISAF in August 2003. For NATO, conceived in the context of European-based burdensharing, ISAF represented its first out-of-area mission and signalled a change in orientation. As of February 2005, thirty-six countries contributed about 8,200 troops to the mission. Of these, about 70 per cent hail from the EU-25. The United States contributes about 90 personnel or 1 per cent of ISAF forces.

While these figures suggest that transatlantic burdensharing is limited in the region, ISAF does not tell the entire story. US contributions in Afghanistan occur largely in the context of Operation *Enduring Freedom* (OEF), which is part of the global war on terrorism and entails deployments to different parts of the world.[70] In 2004, approximately 20,000 troops were engaged in OEF in Afghanistan or its vicinity. Of these, about 18,400 or 91 per cent came from the United States. EU member states collectively contributed about 1,300 or 6 per cent of the total (Table 18).

Table 18:
Troop contributions to Afghanistan: ISAF (2005) and OEF (2004)

	ISAF	(% of total)	OEF	(% of total)
EU-25	5,738	(70%)	1,268[(1)]	(6%)
United States	89	(1%)	18,400 [(2)]	(91%)
Other	2,377	(29%)	623 [(3)]	(3%)
Total	**8,204**		**20,291**	

Notes: For complete breakdown by country see Tables 40 and 41 in Annex 2. OEF figures do not include contributions outside Afghanistan unless specifically noted. (1) Number includes 75 Danish personnel in Kyrgyzstan. Does not include approximately 340 German troops based in Djibouti, Kenya, and Kuwait. Does not include 600 maritime French forces patrolling routes along the Horn of Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Strait of Hormuz. (2) 400 US personnel are based in Pakistan. (3) 205 personnel from the Republic of Korea are based in Kyrgyzstan.

Sources: The Military Balance 2004-2005, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2004. UK Ministry of Defence. French Ministry of Defence. 'La France en première ligne pour sa guerre anti-Al-Qaeda'. armees.com, July 2005. http://www.armees.com/article548.html. OEF order of battle at GlobalSecurity: www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom_orbat-03.htm.

The different distribution across the missions can to a large degree be traced to the mission objectives of the two operations. OEF's mission objectives emphasises counter-terrorism, which stands in contrast to ISAF's stabilisation mandate.[71] The United

70. According to the July 2003 Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, 69 countries gave support to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in 2002.

71. Counter-terrorism exercises are also carried out under the auspices of OEF. For example, in January 2002, the US Task Force 510 (about 1,300 personnel) was deployed to the Philippines to conduct company-level training with 25 field companies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 'Operation *Enduring Freedom* – One year of Accomplishments', Policies in Focus. The White House, available at http://www.whitehouse. gov/infocus/defense/enduringfreedom.html.

States, spearheading the war on terrorism, is placing its emphasis on OEF while the EU, mainly concerned with stability in the region, represents the bulk of efforts within ISAF. While capabilities also play a role in contributing to this role specialisation, it is difficult to gauge its overall impact vis-à-vis national contributions. Currently, a form of 'task-specific' burdensharing best represents the type of transatlantic collaboration taking place in Afghanistan. This may change somewhat should OEF and ISAF be merged, a possibility that is currently under discussion.

Operation Active Endeavour

Operation *Active Endeavour* (OAE) is a NATO-led counter-terrorism operation initiated in October 2001 to monitor traffic in the Mediterranean Sea. In April 2003, the North Atlantic Council strengthened the mandate of the operation, deciding to allow ship boarding. Since February 2004, escorting tasks through the Strait of Gibraltar are also part of the mission to enhance security in the area.[72] As of May 2005, 488 ships have been escorted, 90 boarded, and 64,553 hailed.[73]

With respect to country-level contributions to the operation, most nations currently participate with a frigate and maritime patrol aircraft (Table 19). Some countries, such as Germany, provide additional assets such as submarines or patrol boats. Collectively, EU member states contribute about twenty vessels of varying size to the operation. The United States, like most participating nations, provides one frigate and maritime patrol aircraft to the mission. In the future, it is likely that other nations will take part in the operation. Both Russia and the Ukraine have exchanged letters with NATO opening the way for their prospective incorporation.[74] A couple of countries in the Mediterranean region have also indicated their interest in supporting the operation.[75]

Through its surveillance missions in the Mediterranean, OAE has resulted in several unintended benefits outside the scope of terrorism. Among the most notable are a drop in illegal immigration and a drop in drug smuggling coming through the Mediterranean.

72. AFSOUTH website at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/Endeavour/Endeavour.htm (accessed June 2005).

73. 'Defence against Terrorism', Presentation by NATO military staff at a seminar ('The Role of International Organisations in the Fight Against Terrorism') held at the Belgian Senate on 17 May 2005, Brussels.

74. Russia and NATO exchanged letters in December 2004; the Ukraine and NATO in April 2005.

75. Correspondence with NATO military staff, May 2005.

Table 19:
Ship commitments to Operation *Active Endeavour*: July 2005(1)

Country	Ship/aircraft type	No of ships/aircraft
Germany	Frigate	1
	Replenishment tanker	1
	Supply Ship	1
	Submarine	1
	Patrol boat	4
	Maritime patrol aircraft	N.A. (2)
Greece	Frigate	1
	Missile craft	1
Italy	Maritime patrol aircraft	
Netherlands	Frigate	1
Portugal	Frigate	1
	Maritime patrol aircraft	N.A. (2)
Spain	Frigate	1
	Submarine	1
	Oiler ship	1
	Fast patrol boat	>1
	Helicopter	>1
	Maritime patrol aircraft	N.A. (2)
Turkey	Frigate	1
	Maritime patrol aircraft	
United States	Frigate	1
	Maritime patrol aircraft	N.A. (2)

Notes: (1) The NATO Standing Naval Force Mediterranean and Standing Naval Force Atlantic rotate on a three-monthly basis in Operation *Active Endeavour*. Other countries that periodically contribute to OEF include Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom. (2) = Not Available

Source: NATO military staff.

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-Horn of Africa)

There are two commands in the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, one at Camp Lemonier and the other at Marine Forces-Djibouti. CJTF-HOA is part of the global war on terrorism and thus a part of Operation *Enduring Freedom*. Coalition Task Force 150 works alongside CJTF-HOA to monitor, inspect, and board suspect ships in the region. The mission's mandate includes:

- detecting, disrupting and defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region;

- countering the re-emergence of transnational terrorism in the region via civil-military operations and support from non-governmental organisations; and
- enhancing long-term stability of the region.[76]

In geographic terms, CJTF-HOA's area of operations encompasses the total airspace and land areas of Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen and Ethiopia and the coastal waters of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean.[77] In total, nine countries contribute personnel and equipment towards the mission, including the United States, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Unfortunately, an accurate breakdown of all national contributions towards CJTF-HOA is not available, making it difficult to gauge burdensharing levels among contributors.[78]

CJTF-HOA carries out aspects of its counter-terrorist mission in non-traditional ways which are not very well known. For example, a large part of its daily activities involves making contact with local populations and the provision of basic services through infrastructure projects, medical services, and other outreach activities.[79] While these activities are thought to stem the recruitment of terrorists, they also have a stabilising effect in areas served. It also underscores the importance of combining military and civilian activities to address the root causes of present-day global challenges.

Burdensharing in the fight against weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a high-priority objective for both the EU and the United States. Burdensharing in this area mainly takes place through civilian programmes working to secure known WMD stocks. Military assets are also available to contain the spread of WMD (covered in Chapter 3). The Proliferation Security Initiative is the best-known initiative to date.

The Proliferation Security Initiative

President Bush formally launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) during his visit to Poland on 31 May 2003. The Initiative promotes the creation of international agreements and partnerships to 'impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state

76. CJTF-HOA Background Fact Sheet: http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/factsheet.asp (accessed April 2005).

77. Ibid.

78. To give some indication of the size of the operation, about 1,400 US personnel are engaged in the operation. CJTF-HOA Background Fact Sheet: http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/factsheet.asp (accessed April 2005).

79. For additional examples of such activities see http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/home.asp.

actors of proliferation concern.'[80] As of 26 May 2005, over 60 countries had indicated their support for PSI, and about twenty countries participate in related activities or exercises.[81] Among the eleven founding core participants are eight EU member states: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.[82]

Table 20:
International participation in PSI exercises:
September 2003 – October 2004

Operation name	Location	Countries involved	Date
PACIFIC PROTECTOR	Pacific/Eastern Australia	Australia, France, Japan, US (1)	Sept. 03
SANSO 03	Mediterranean	France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, UK, US (2)	Oct. 03
BASILIC	Mediterranean	France, Italy, Spain, US (3)	Nov. 03
SEA SABER	Arabian Sea	Australia, France, Italy, Singapore, Spain, UK, US (4)	Jan. 04
AIR BRAKE	Italy	Not available for this air interception exercise	Feb. 04
HAWKEYE	Germany	Not available for this customs led exercise at Frankfurt airport	Mar. 04
CLEVER SENTINEL	Mediterranean	France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, US	Apr. 04
SAFE BORDERS (5)	Poland	Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, US (6)	Apr. 04
TEAM SAMURAI	Sea of Japan	Australia, France, Japan, US (7)	Oct. 04

Notes: (1) Plus military observers from Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland Portugal, Spain and the UK. (2) Plus military observers from Australia, Japan, the Netherlands and Poland. (3) Plus military observers from Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Poland, Portugal and the UK. (4) Plus military observers from Denmark, Germany, Japan, Netherlands and Turkey. (5) Ground interdiction exercise. (6) Plus observers from Australia, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. (7) Plus military observers from eighteen other countries.

Sources: The Military Balance 2004-2005, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2004. Globalsecurity.org (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/psi.htm).

While the PSI does not incur common costs – there are no headquarters, secretariats, or annual budgets – it frequently executes

80. Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative, available at http://www.state-gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm.

81. In addition to the eleven core participants, this group also includes Canada, Denmark, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Singapore, Thailand and Turkey. 'The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)', US Department of State, Bureau of Non-proliferation. http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/46858.htm. (accessed 30 May 2005).

82. The remaining founding core states are Australia, Japan and the United States.

multinational exercises to practise and test interdiction procedures. At the end of December 2004, thirteen multilateral exercises had been carried out under the auspices of PSI.[83] These exercises range from maritime manoeuvres in the Sea of Japan to air exercises over the Mediterranean. For all exercises in which data on participating states was available, the United States and at least one EU member state – usually France or Italy – were present. Transatlantic burdensharing within the PSI is thus fairly well developed.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Operation *Iraqi Freedom* (OIF) was initially labelled by the United States as an operation to stop Iraq's alleged WMD programme, including the possibility that it provide WMD to non-state actors. Despite the non-proliferation classification attached to it, transatlantic disagreements over how to best handle the situation in Iraq ensured that the operation would not become a traditional burdensharing operation. Instead, OIF was launched as a 'coalition of the willing' operation in which several EU member states participated.

Transatlantic burdensharing in Iraq has increased slowly over time. According to the Pentagon, about half of the EU's member states were taking part in Operation *Iraqi Freedom* in January 2005, even though the United States provided the overwhelming majority of troops (approx. 148,000 or 85 per cent). The EU-25 accounted for 8,300 or about 10 per cent of the total. All other nations provided the remaining five per cent.[84]

In July 2004, NATO established a Training Implementation Mission to train and mentor middle and senior level personnel from the Iraqi security forces in Iraq and outside of Iraq.[85] The initial NATO presence in Iraq, about 50 personnel in August 2004, is expected to grow to about 360 personnel. At the NATO Heads of State and Government meeting in 22 February 2005, decision-makers outlined the objective of training about 1,000 Iraqi officers in the country, and about 500 outside of Iraq per year. Besides EU member states' participation in the mission, the EU launched a rule of law mission for Iraq in July 2005 (EUJUST LEX).

Despite these contributions, European participation in Operation *Iraqi Freedom* remains hesitant. With the military phase over, an insurgency movement has emerged that threatens the stability

83. Excluding PSI Operational Experts Meetings (nine held between July 2003 and December 2004). Source: US State Department: http://www.state.gov/t/np/c12684.htm (accessed 30 May 2005).

84. 'Iraq Year in Review: 2004 Fact Sheet', US Department of Defense. Figures are current as of 21 January 2005. The higher than average contribution by the United States is associated with the reinforcements present in January 2005 in relation to the elections held during that month.

85. http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq-assistance/.

of the country and the region. This bodes poorly for shoring up political support needed to commit manpower to the region. Yet there are fears that Iraq could prove a prime terrorist haven unless the security situation is improved. Such an outcome would not just be a blow for the US, but also for Europe.

Summary

The concept of burdensharing has long been discussed in the context of military cooperation. This chapter highlights some of the key components of contemporary EU-US burdensharing. Changes in the international landscape described in Chapter 1, such as the end of the Cold War, adjustments in relative military capabilities, and the identification of new global challenges, opened the door for a greater international engagement by the United States, NATO, and the EU. ESDP, in particular, has enabled the EU to assume a larger role in regional stability than it has in the past.

In summary:

- The United States continues to outspend the EU in terms of **defence spending**, a gap that has broadened since the 9/11 attacks. At $453.6 billion, the US national defence outlay for FY04 was more than twice the combined EU-25 defence budget in 2004. 'Fair share' calculations confirm this spending pattern, with the United States dedicating substantially more than EU member states. Its 'fair share' average for 2000-2004 was 1.36 versus 0.56 for EU member states.
- Regarding **defence R&D spending**, the US is estimated to be outspending the EU by 5 to 1. In 2004, US R&D spending was close to €62 billion compared to €12 million for the EU. Besides the US-EU gap in defence R&D spending, there is a similar gap among EU member states. Specifically, the contributions by France, Germany, and the UK represent 67 per cent of overall EU spending on defence R&D. While the accuracy of R&D data cannot be confirmed due to a lack of transparency and common definitions, the difference between the United States and the EU is significant as it may have implications for future burdensharing as armed forces on both sides of the Atlantic are modernised. While there are a number of

workarounds available to address current interoperability gaps, the demands of future security situations may not be able to accommodate them as well.

- Another important dimension of burdensharing, **operational costs**, is difficult to gauge. While there are specific formulas for covering certain costs, such as common costs, within organisations like NATO, the EU, and the UN, individual operational costs are borne by participating states on a 'costs lie where they fall' basis. Countries that tend to contribute more personnel to an operation therefore tend to bear a greater part of the burden. Concerning NATO common costs, the United States contributes about 25 per cent while EU member states cover approximately 63 per cent. Within the UN system, the US Congress has mandated that US contributions towards peacekeeping expenditures be a maximum of 25 per cent of the total. EU contributions, on the other hand, were 40 per cent in 2004. Thus, while the United States is the largest individual contributor, the EU contribution as a whole tends to be greater.
- The complexity of burdensharing is especially evident vis-à-vis **personnel contributions** to non-UN-led and UN-led peacekeeping operations. Manpower data suggests that burdensharing on the ground can take on a variety of forms. For example in the Balkan theatre, US and EU contribution patterns changed over time ('temporal' burdensharing). An initially heavy US presence gradually gave way to a larger EU contingent. In SFOR, the US personnel went from 34 per cent of the total in 1997 (14,028) to 7.5 percent in 2004 (839). In contrast, the EU saw its contribution go from 45 per cent to 64 per cent over the same time period.

  In Afghanistan, a form of 'task-specific' burdensharing is taking place. While EU member states focus their efforts to the NATO ISAF operation where they provide 5,738 or 70 per cent of the total in 2005 (1 per cent for the United States), the United States is carrying out the bulk of its contribution via Operation *Enduring Freedom* where it provides 18,400 or 91 per cent of all personnel (6 per cent for EU member states).

  An analysis of contributions to UN-led operations shows that EU member states provide at least six times more UN personnel than the United States for each year between 2001 and 2004. While both sides have seen declines in numbers between 2001 and 2004, the US decrease is 43.1 per cent while that of EU mem-

ber states is 13.9 percent. Burdensharing here tends to follow a 'geographic' pattern, with the United States focusing its UN personnel contributions on Europe (at least 75 per cent between 2000–2004) while EU member states dispatch their contributions more equitably across Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.

A tally of personnel contributions made to all UN operations and nine different non-EU-led operations between 2001 and 2004 shows that the EU provides a greater share of personnel towards peacekeeping operations. For example, in 2004, the total personnel contributed by the EU to these operations amounted to about 33,300. The US contribution was approximately 21,000, with the majority of personnel dedicated towards Operation *Enduring Freedom*. 'Fair share' calculations confirm that EU member states contribute more than their fair share towards peacekeeping while the United States provides less than its fair share. The EU average between 2001 and 2004 was 1.55 while that of the United States was 0.68. This is consistent with the American focus on 'warfighting' operations and the European focus on 'stability' operations. Currently, the United States is deeply engaged in Iraq, which although no longer officially a war situation, ties up about 140,000 personnel. Despite these different orientations and capabilities, an analysis of personnel contributions to different operations suggests that burdensharing can take on a variety of forms and undergo changes over time.

Civilian burdensharing

As discussed in Chapter 1, the global landscape has changed extensively since the Cold War – both in terms of key threats and the international security landscape. Whereas the concept of burdensharing traditionally emphasized military contributions, today civilian burdensharing is increasingly viewed as a vital ingredient for addressing global security challenges. Civilian contributions can take a variety of forms, ranging from official development assistance to efforts to eradicate global disease. This chapter examines various types of civilian burdensharing.

Defining civilian burdensharing

Defining civilian burdensharing is a complex task. First, while a lot of data is collected on a wide variety of civilian activities, as a general rule these indicators are not aggregated or summarised in terms of contributions to global security. Second, in many cases, common definitions for similar activities are difficult to come by, making consistent and accurate comparisons difficult – even for such long-standing activities as humanitarian assistance. Third, a large number of stakeholders involved in civilian activities make it difficult to estimate the size of the civilian contribution. For example, a significant portion of international assistance to developing countries comes from private assistance flows via foundations, corporations, religious congregations, private and voluntary organisations, as well as individual remittances. There are also many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that channel resources to countries and regions in need. According to the OECD, about $10.2 billion was provided by NGOs worldwide in net grants in 2003 – an increase of $1.4 billion from 2002.[86] Thus, counting only direct government assistance understates national efforts to resolve important policy problems.

86. 'Total Net Flows from DAC Countries by Type of Flow', Statistical Annex of the 2004 Development Co-operation Report, OECD 2004.

With these limitations in mind, this chapter summarises civilian burdensharing between the United States and the EU by comparing key indicators according to different threat categories. The key threat areas and related indicators are:

1. Burdensharing targeting regional stability and state failure
   (a) Official development assistance
   (b) Humanitarian assistance (including crisis response).
2. Burdensharing in the fight against WMD and counter-terrorism
   (a) Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme
   (b) G-8 Global Partnership Programme.

[*Readers who are not familiar with the US and EU external budgets and their main components may wish to consult the background information provided in Annex 1.*]

Burdensharing targeting regional stability and state failure

The primary civilian contributions for enhancing regional stability and precluding state failure can be organised into the following three categories: official development assistance, humanitarian aid, and crisis response. For the United States, foreign aid is clearly linked to global security. According to the US State Department, 'the events of September 11 represent a significant challenge to US foreign policy and demonstrate the necessity of a robust foreign assistance program.'[87] The EU's foreign aid programme is closely aligned with the UN Millennium Development Goals to reduce poverty.[88] While each may orient its aid programme differently, the assistance serves to enhance regional stability and reduce the likelihood of state failure. The following section reviews how the EU, its member states, and the US compare in terms of spending in this area.

87. 'Appropriations Subcommittees', US State Department website (accessed June 19, 2005). http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/iab/2003/7808.htm

88. Annual Report 2004 on the European Community's development policy and external assistance, DG Development, European Commission, 2004.

Official Development Assistance

The most common proxy for foreign aid is Official Development Assistance (ODA), which is defined by the Development Assistance

Committee (DAC) of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Its principal elements are bilateral grants (e.g. technical cooperation, developmental food aid, emergency relief, and debt forgiveness), bilateral loans, and contributions to multilateral institutions like the UN.[89]

In terms of sheer volume, the United States is the largest contributing country of net Official Development Assistance. In 2004, the United States provided $19 billion in ODA. However, collectively the EU member states and the European Commission contributed $43 billion – more than twice the US contribution. Together, the EU and the United States represented 79 per cent of ODA spending in 2004. The remaining six DAC donor countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland) provided the remaining 21 per cent. According to the OECD, DAC members account for at least 95 per cent of worldwide ODA disbursements.

Table 21:
US and EU Net Official Development Assistance
2000-2004 (in $ millions)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
EU	25,273	26,288	29,949	37,139	42,919
United States	9,955	11,429	13,290	16,320	18,999
Other	18,506	14,618	15,033	15,636	16,650
Total	**53,734**	**52,335**	**58,274**	**69,094**	**78,568**

Note: Figures for the EU do not include new member state contributions in 2004. In 2004, Poland contributed $124 million.

Source: OECD Data.

The relative contributions of the United States and the EU have changed somewhat over time. Between 2000-2004, the US share of total ODA increased from 19 to 24 per cent. During the same time period, the EU increased its share from 47 to 55 percent (Figure 1).[90] Offsetting these gains by the EU and the United States was a substantial drop in contributions by the remaining DAC donor countries. Their share of total ODA decreased from 34 to 21 per cent.

89. OECD website: http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,2586,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html.

90. An analysis of historical data going back to 1950 shows that the United States contributed a substantially higher proportion of ODA in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, the US contribution to overall ODA was over 50 per cent between 1950 and 1968. It was only 'overtaken' by the EU in 1973, when EU membership grew to include Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Based on author's calculations using OECD data.

Figure 1:
Proportion of total ODA covered by the EU, US and others: 2000-2004



	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
EU	47%	50%	51%	54%	55%
US	19%	22%	23%	24%	24%
Other	34%	28%	26%	23%	21%

Note: May not add up to 100 per cent due to rounding.

Taking into account inflation and exchange rate fluctuations, the EU ODA contribution increased from $37.1 to $38.2 between 2003 and 2004. This represents a 2.9 per cent increase.[91] The United States, on the other hand, experienced a 14 per cent increase over the same time period, going from $16.3 to $18.6 billion.[92]

Another way to gauge transatlantic ODA contributions is to compare US and EU member state contributions as a percentage of their gross national income (GNI). EU member states contributed about one third of a per cent of GNI towards ODA between 2000 and 2004. Over the same time period, the US figure ranged from 0.10 per cent to 0.16 per cent. By this metric, the EU countries have dedicated substantially more of their gross national income towards ODA, even if both sides have been increasing their contributions over time.[93]

91. Within the EU, some countries experienced greater changes than others. Portugal, for example, increased its ODA by 188 per cent between 2003 and 2004.

92. 'Net Official Development Assistance in 2004', OECD, 11 April 2005.

93. This difference is likely to grow over time as EU member states recently agreed to increase their thresholds for ODA for 2010-2015. The new objective is a collective commitment for a GDP threshold of 0.56 per cent by 2010. By 2015, the EU-15 member states are to dedicate 0.7 per cent of GDP towards ODA. The target goal for the new EU-10 member states is 0.17 per cent of GDP by 2010 and 0.33 per cent by 2015. 'Jean-Louis Schiltz believes the new EU collective commitment to a GDP threshold of 0.56% for official development assistance is "an essential breakthrough"', Luxembourg Presidency Press Release, 25 May 2005.

It should be noted that the figures for the EU represent an average. As such, there are a number of EU member states that provide an even higher proportion of GNI towards ODA. Figure 2 provides a snapshot for the EU-15 and the United States in 2004.[94] It shows that several EU member states – Denmark, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Sweden – provided in excess of the UN target set at 0.70 per cent of GNI in 2004. The US contribution of 0.16 per cent placed it near the bottom of all DAC donor countries.

Figure 2:
Net Official Development Assistance as a per cent of GNI: 2004



Source: OECD data, 11 April 2005.

A third way to evaluate burdensharing is to examine the relative 'fair share' of Official Development Assistance. The 'fair share' is the ratio of a country's *contribution* expressed as a share of the total (in this case ODA) to its *ability to contribute* (expressed as a share of total GDP).[95] Table 22 provides an overview of the fair share with respect to ODA between 2000 and 2004. Supporting data is provided in Tables 34 and 35 in Annex 2 and Tables 48 and 49 in Annex 3.

94. Data for the new member states is not available. The only figure provided by the OECD is a $124 million contribution by Poland in 2004. It should be noted that most of the new member states were formerly net recipients of ODA.

95. These fair share calculations entail replicating the methodology used by the analysts responsible for producing the Pentagon's yearly report on allied contributions to the common defence.

Table 22:
'Fair share' contribution with respect to
Official Development Assistance

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Austria	1.1	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.9
Belgium	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.5	1.6
Denmark	5.3	4.9	4.4	3.4	3.3
Finland	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.4
France	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.6
Germany	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1
Greece	1.0	0.8	1.0	0.8	0.9
Ireland	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.3
Italy	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.7	0.6
Luxembourg	3.2	3.5	3.0	2.9	2.9
Netherlands	4.3	4.0	3.7	3.3	2.8
Poland					0.2
Portugal	1.3	1.2	1.1	0.8	2.4
Spain	1.0	1.4	1.1	0.9	1.0
Sweden	3.8	3.5	3.3	2.9	3.0
UK	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.4
EU average	**2.0**	**2.0**	**1.9**	**1.7**	**1.6**
United States	**0.5**	**0.5**	**0.6**	**0.6**	**0.6**

Note: Data for EU-25 is provided only for 2004. DAC data was only available for Poland. A ratio close to 1 suggests that a country's contribution is in balance with its ability to contribute. A ratio greater than 1 indicates that a country is contributing more than its fair share, while a ratio under 1 implies that a country is contributing less than its fair share.

Sources: OECD (for ODA numbers) and EUROSTAT (GDP figures).

A country is considered to be doing its fair share if its proportion of total ODA contributions is in balance with its share of total GDP. In the table, values close to one indicate that a country is contributing a fair share taking into account its ability to pay. Countries contributing less than their fair share exhibit values that are less than one. Those contributing more than their fair share have values greater than one. According to the fair share criteria, the EU member states are contributing more than their fair share of ODA in comparison to the United States.

As the table shows, several small European countries such as Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden contribute more than their fair share towards ODA. The EU average over the last few years has oscillated between 2.0 and 1.6, translating into contributions that are in excess of their fair share – even if the proportion has decreased over time. Over the same time period,

the US contribution has been around 0.5 or under its fair share.

The fair share calculation does not attempt to answer the question 'what is an appropriate contribution level?' either at the national or aggregate level. Rather, it serves to compare individual contributions as a proportion of the total while taking GDP into account. Moreover, it does not provide any indication concerning the quality or value of the eventual aid furnished.[96] It also does not take into account to whom ODA is distributed.[97] Nonetheless, it provides an objective means for comparing contributions while taking into account the ability to contribute.

Humanitarian assistance

Humanitarian assistance (HA) aims to provide relief to areas struck by natural or man-made disasters. Such aid can play an important stabilising role in affected countries or regions. Humanitarian assistance is frequently used to enhance health, nutrition, and security levels in areas torn by conflict. For example, it may be used to provide resettlement assistance to populations affected by a disaster or conflict. It should be noted that HA represents a small portion of overall Official Development Assistance. Moreover, funding levels tend to vary according to the number of events requiring humanitarian assistance.

In terms of overall volume, US humanitarian assistance surpasses that of the EU member states and the European Commission combined. In 2004, US humanitarian assistance was about €2 billion while the EU contributed a little under €1.5 billion. However, the EU figure is understated as it is based on self-reported data to the European Commission. With the exception of 2003, the EU and US gaps have narrowed between 2001-2004, due in part to a weaker dollar and a substantial decrease in US contributions in FY04.

Evaluating humanitarian assistance as a percentage of GDP shows that the US contribution is slightly greater than that of the EU. If we take into consideration that the individual EU member state contributions are underreported, it is quite likely the true proportions of the EU are higher, diminishing the US – EU gap. While humanitarian disbursements are event-driven, it is nevertheless notable that no contribution on either side of the Atlantic has surpassed 0.03 per cent of GDP in the past few years.

96. For an alternative ranking of foreign assistance see 'Ranking the Rich, second annual CGD/FP Commitment to Development Index', *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2004.

97. For example, President Bush introduced the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) in 2002 as a mechanism to target US development assistance to nations meeting specific criteria (e.g. degree of economic freedom).

Table 23:
US and EU Humanitarian assistance 2001-2004
(in $ millions and € millions)

	2001 (€)	2002 (€)	2003 (€)	2004 (€)
EU member states	920.3	728.5	978.8	857.3.0
ECHO	543.7	537.8	600.3	570.3
Total EU	**1,464.0**	**1,266.3**	**1,579.1**	**1,427.6**
As a % of GDP	*0.016%*	*0.014%*	*0.017%*	*0.015%*
United States	**FY01 ($)**	**FY02 ($)**	**FY03 ($)**	**FY04 ($)**
IDFA [1]	299.3	421.5	431.9	544.0
MRA [2]	699.0	705.0	782.0	756.0
ERMA [3]	15	15	26	30
P.L. 480, Title II [4]	835.0	958.8	1,809.6	1,184.7
United States Total	1,848.3	2,100.3	3,049.5	2,514.7
United States Total (in €)	**2064.6**	**2,222.1**	**2,695.8**	**2021.6**
As a % of GDP ($ figure)	*0.018%*	*0.020%*	*0.028%*	*0.021%*

Notes: **EU data:** Data for the EU member states comes from the Commission's Humanitarian Office Local Information System (HOLIS 14 Points Query Database). According to Commission officials they are self-reported and thus understate total contributions by the EU member states. The 2004 figure for the EU member states includes the 10 new member states. **US data:** (1) International Disaster and Famine Assistance. (2) Migration and Refugee Assistance. (3) Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance. (4) Food Aid. IDFA figures for 2001-2004 levels include supplemental appropriations - respectively $137.7 million; $186.0 million; $143.8 million; $220.0 million. Combined supplemental for MRA and ERMA for 2002-2004 is $100.0 million; $106 million; and $157 million. The conversion from dollar to euro values was done using historical exchange rate values. The conversion factor was a yearly average value calculated from daily exchange rates provided by the European Central Bank. The EU budget for 2004 represents the EU-25 budget. Some figures are rounded.

Sources: HOLIS 14 Points Query Database. ECHO Annual reports, years 2000-2004. The US GDP comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US Department of Commerce). The EU GDP figures are from EUROSTAT.

One area of distinction between US and European humanitarian aid involves the actual recipients. Seemingly consistent with the notion of 'geographic' burdensharing, the United States and EU focus much of their humanitarian assistance on different continents. While the largest proportion of US aid was destined to the Middle East (39 per cent of total aid), the EU sent over half of its aid to the ACP countries (Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific).

Figure 3:
US and European distribution of aid, 2004



Note: Figures are rounded. The EU figure for the Middle East includes contributions towards North Africa. Contributions for the NIS countries also include Eastern Europe.

Sources: EU data source is the ECHO 2004 Annual Review ('When disaster strikes'), European Commission, 2004. The US source is Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels, 'Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of US Programs and Policy', CRS Report for Congress, 19 January 2005.

The United States pattern of economic aid is increasingly strategic in its nature. Historically, most US aid has been directed to the Middle East. But, to a great extent, considerations in the Global War on Terrorism drive current decisions on aid flows. For example, aid to Pakistan jumped from $1.7 million in 2001 to $275 million in 2004.[98] The EU, on the other hand, is placing its aid emphasis on alleviating poverty, responding to crises, and contributing to regional stability. For example, the European Commission is focusing its assistance on areas consistent with the goals of the Millennium Development Goals.[99]

Currently, a large part of economic aid is dedicated towards crisis response and reconstruction. For example, a substantial portion of EU contributions towards Africa is destined to ameliorate the situation in Darfur (Sudan). As of May 2005, the EU had mobilised €570 million in response to the Darfur crisis. The vast

98. Tom Barry, 'US Isn't Stingy, It's Strategic', International Relations Center, 7 January 2005.

99. For more, see the 'European Community's development policy and external assistance Annual Report 2004', DG Development, European Commission, October 2004 (pp. 18-27).

majority of that amount (€455 million) went towards humanitarian assistance and food aid.[100] The United States government has provided a little more or about $710 million for the Darfur emergency between FY03 and FY05. As of early August 2005, the United States had provided $451 million in FY05.[101]

In Asia, Afghanistan is a key recipient of aid and reconstruction assistance. Overall, the EU has contributed approximately €800 million in 2002 and just under €1 billion towards Afghanistan in 2003.[102] For the 2004-2006 period, the EU pledged $2.2 billion at the Berlin conference in the spring of 2004. A little over a third of that amount, or $774 million, was pledged by the European Commission. Since 2001, the United States has committed approximately $9.6 billion towards the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The figure, which spans 2001-2005, is more than double that of the EU ($4.2 billion), which represents EU contributions up to 2006 (Table 24).

Table 24:
EU and US pledges/payments to Afghanistan:
2001-2006 (in $ millions)

	Pledges since 2001	Pledge for 2004	Pledge for 2005	Pledge for 2006	3-year pledge total 2004-06
EU member states	2796.1	595.9	501.8	368.7	1466.4
EC	1421.3	294	240	240	774
Total EU[(1)]	**4,217.4**	**889.9**	**741.8**	**608.7**	**2,240.4**
United States[(2)]	**9,629**	**2,500**	**4,870**	**N.A.[(3)]**	**N.A.[(3)]**

Notes: (1) Pledges may range from 1-7 years in length depending on donor. Table includes contributions made at several international donor conferences such as Tokyo (January 2002), Brussels (March 2003), Dubai (September 2003), and Berlin (April 2004). (2) Actual payments for fiscal years 2001-2005. US figures are for fiscal years (as opposed to calendar years). US amounts include reconstruction assistance by all agencies. The figures are for reconstruction only and do not include military expenditures. (3) N.A. = Not Available.

Sources: Afghanistan Freedom Support Reports, Bureau of South Asian Affairs, US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/c8130.htm (accessed August 2005). US figures are from correspondence with the Bureau of South Asian Affairs, US Department of State, August 2005.

In the Middle East, Iraq is by far the biggest recipient of aid and reconstruction assistance. As of March 2005, a staggering $60 billion had been made available or pledged by US appropriations and

100. 'EU Response to the crisis in Darfur', EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, DAR/05, May 2005.

101. USAID Factsheet#45, FY05, 5 August 2005. http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sudan/darfur.html (accessed August 2005).

102. 'The EU and Afghanistan', EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, AFG/00 (initial), May 2005.

international sources – including Iraqi contributions – towards reconstruction and government operations. The United States, the biggest contributor, provided $24 billion between FY03 and FY05, mainly for reconstruction activities in security and essential services.[103] Internal donors have pledged about $13.6 billion in support of Iraqi reconstruction between 2004 and 2007, $10 billion in the shape of loans. The remaining sum, $3.6 billion, is in the form of grants to be provided multilaterally or bilaterally.[104]

Table 25:
Pledges made at the Madrid International Donors' Conference for Iraq
(in $ millions unless otherwise specified)

	2004	2005-2007	Unspecified by year	Total
EU member states	*379.20*	*369.04*	*272.54*	*1,020.79*
European Commission	235.63	0.00	0.00	235.62
Total EU	614.83	369.04	272.54	1,256.41
United States	0.00	0.00	18,649.00	18,649.00
Grand total (all donors)	2.16 bn	4.96 – 8.66 bn	25.12 bn	32.23 – 35.93 bn

Note: Grand total includes pledges by countries and international financial institutions. Grand totals are in billion of dollars.

Source: Worldbank, http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/Madird-Table2/$File/iraqsummarytable-2.pdf#search='international%20donors%20conference%20iraq'

EU Extra-Regional Cooperation Programmes

A distinct EU contribution towards regional security is its extra-regional aid programmes. These programmes assume different forms, including financial support and technical assistance. They make a contribution towards burdensharing by increasing stability, security, and development levels in specific parts of the world.[105] As such, they are consistent with a burdensharing paradigm in which 'preventative' measures to boost stability and development represent valuable means for addressing security challenges. This section gives a brief overview of EU contributions towards the CARDS, TACIS, and MEDA Programmes.

103. 'Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts', Report to Congressional Committees, General Accounting Office, GAO-05-876, July 2005, p. 2.

104. Ibid. The International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), composed of a trust fund run by the UN and another by the World Bank, is the mechanism for channelling multilateral assistance to Iraq.

105. This does not include other means at the disposal of the EU such as enlargement. The latest EU enlargement in May 2004 represented a significant step to boost European (and global) security and stability. The prospect of extending membership to other countries also gives the EU a powerful tool with which to shape developments in its neighbourhood.

Since 1991, the Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) Programme has provide grant-financed technical assistance to thirteen countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The goal of TACIS is to enhance development in each of these countries by supporting institutional, legal and administrative reform, economic and social development, infrastructure development, environmental protection, and nuclear safety.[106] The programme will provide €3.14 billion between 2000 and 2006.[107]

The EU's principal financial instrument for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is MEDA.[108] Launched in November 1995, MEDA offers technical and financial support measures to Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Funding for the period 2000-2006 amounts to €5.35 billion.[109] Since 2004, the MEDA partners are also included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). ENP, which provides guidance on the EU's relations with its neighbours, includes €15 billion in grants for ENP countries for the period 2007-2013.[110]

The Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) aims to promote stability and peace in the Western Balkans. The CARDS programme commenced in 2000, streamlining a number of programmes that had begun in 1991. The countries benefiting from the CARDS programme are Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Serbia Montenegro. The programme will provide €4.6 billion between 2000 and 2006 towards investment, institution building, reconstruction, and structural reform.[111] Taking into account US contributions to the region, burdensharing in the region has been robust for many years. According to a 2003 report by the US General Accounting Office, the United States military, civilian, humanitarian, and reconstruction assistance to Bosnia and Kosovo was about $19.7 billion between 1996 and 2002.[112]

Collectively, these three regional programmes involve EU payments exceeding one and a half billion euros per year. Overall, approximately €13.1 billion are committed to CARDS, MEDA, and TACIS between 2000 and 2006.

106. European Commission: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/tacis/ (accessed June 2005).

107. Council Regulation (EC, EURATOM) No. 99/2000, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 18 January 2000.

108. European Commission, Directorate-General External Relations, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed.

109. 'Financial Cooperation/MEDA Programme', European Commission. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/meda.htm. (accessed June 2005).

110. Javier Solana, speech at Man of the Year 2005 Award, *Gazeta Wybo*, Warsaw, S182/05, 11 May 2005.

111. European Commission: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/cards/index_en.htm (accessed June 2005).

112. 'Observations on Post-Conflict Assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan', Statement by Susan Westin, Managing Director of International Affairs and Trade, before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, GAO Testimony, GAO-03-98T, 18 July 2003.

Table 26:
EU commitments to select regional programmes:
2002 –2004 (in € millions)

Programme	2001		2002		2003		2004	
	Com. [1]	Pay. [2]	Com.	Pay.	Com.	Pay.	Com.	Pay.
TACIS	426	402	432	384	504	396	505	359
MEDA	709	488	762	707	782	700	1,003	1,125
CARDS	705	845	658	619	620	425	663	510

Note: Com.= Commitments. Pay. = Actual payments.

Source: Annual Report on the European Community's Development Policy and the Implementation of External Assistance in 2004. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. European Commission, COM(2005) 292 Final, 15 July 2005.

Burdensharing in the fight against WMD and counter-terrorism

Burdensharing on the civilian side also includes pledges of transatlantic funding to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the challenges posed by the proliferation of chemical and biological materials. The funding streams principally aim to secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union.

Cooperative Threat Reduction

In the United States, threat reduction programmes are conducted through the departments of Defense, Energy, and State. The Department of Defense (DoD) manages the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme, which aims to reduce the threats from weapons of mass destruction. It goes back to the Nunn-Lugar programme initiated in November 1991, known at the time as the 'Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act.' Today, the programme assists Russia and eligible states of the former Soviet Union with the storage, transportation, and dismantling of nuclear materials.[113] It is administered within DoD by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

CTR is funded through DoD, and has received over $4.4 billion through annual defence appropriations since 1991.[114] The

113. Nuclear Threat Initiative webpage: http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn_lug/overview.htm (accessed July 2005).

114. http://www.dtra.mil/press_resources/fact_sheets/display.cfm?fs=ctr.

request for the CTR programme for the fiscal year 2006 is $415.5 million, a slight increase over current spending of $409.2 million.[115] For FY 2006, all $416 million in DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction programmes will be counted towards the US contribution to the G-8 Global Partnership (discussed in the next section).

The Department of Energy contributes through its Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program. Its primary mission is to provide technical leadership to limit or prevent the spread of materials, technology, and expertise relating to weapons of mass destruction. Its funding for FY2004 and FY2005 was about $1.4 billion for each year, organised into eight major programmes. The FY06 request is $1.6 billion, of which $526 million will be counted towards the US commitment to the Global Partnership.[116]

Within the State Department, the US conducts non-proliferation initiatives 'to halt the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and conventional weaponry...[and to establish] verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.'[117] In FY 2005, non-proliferation efforts were funded at $195 million.

The EU started to interact regularly with the CTR in 1994. Two of the initial areas for collaboration were involvement in the International Science and Technology Centre and the civil nuclear sector programmes. Within the EU's first pillar, the TACIS programme became the main conduit for interaction. In the area of nuclear safety alone, the TACIS programme provided almost €800 million between 1991 and 2001.[118] The European Commission earmarked about €140 million for nuclear safety activities between 2002 and 2003.[119] According to the European Commission's Nuclear Safety Indicative Programme, the envisaged budget for the time period 2004-2006 is an additional €429 million.[120] Within the EU's second pillar, activities relevant to CTR in Russia are rooted in the Joint Action of 17 December 1999. Joint action projects are funded out of the CFSP budget line of the Community budget or directly by individual EU member states.[121]

Over time, EU involvement in CTR expanded. Examples of such work include projects aimed at the disposition of excess weapons plutonium; safeguards and material protection; control and accountancy of nuclear materials; and civilian projects for former nuclear weapons production staff.[122]

115. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_04/ThreatReduction.asp.

116. http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/06budget/Content/Volumes/Vol_1_NNSA.pdf.

117. 'US Foreign Assistance Reference Guide', US Department of State and US Agency for International Development, January 2005, p. 19.

118. Kathrin Höhl, Harald Müller and Annette Schaper, 'EU cooperative threat reduction activities in Russia', Burkard Schmitt (ed.) in *Chaillot Paper* 61 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, June 2003).

119. Nuclear Safety Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and Indicative Programme 2002-2003, European Commission, 17 January 2002.

120. Nuclear Safety Indicative Programme 2004-2006 including ISTC-STCU. Adopted by the European Commission on 7 November 2003. Accessible at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/nuclear_safety/rsp/index04_06.htm.

121. Op.cit in note 118.

122. Ibid.

It should be noted that EU non-proliferation activities are also taking place at the political level. An example is the EU's inclusion of non-proliferation clauses in international agreements. The EU has introduced such clauses in agreements with countries such as Syria, Albania and Tajikistan.

The Global Partnership

In early 2002, the United States formally proposed an expansion of its Cooperative Threat Reduction programmes, colloquially known as '10 plus 10 over 10.' The initiative calls for the G-8 to complement the $10 billion the United States was already planning to spend on CTR-related programmes with an additional $10 billion to be allocated by partners over ten years. At the June 2002 summit the Group of Eight (US, Canada, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan [G-7] plus Russia [G-8]) formed the *Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction*. Under this partnership, the United States, other members of the G-8 and the European Commission agreed to raise up to $20 billion over ten years for projects in parts of the Commonwealth of Independent States related to disarmament, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety. Global Partnership projects are funded bilaterally under government-to-government agreements with recipient countries.

In response to the United States' pledge to contribute half of the $20-billion target, the other G-8 countries and the European Commission have thus far pledged about $6.5 billion.[123] The national pledges of G8 members so far include commitments by Canada (CD$1 billion), France (€750 million), Germany (up to $1.5 billion), Japan ($200 million), Italy (€1 billion), United Kingdom ($750 million), the United States ($10 billion), and Russia ($2 billion). The European Commission has pledged €1 billion and Russia $2 billion.[124] Annex 4 provides a specific breakdown of these pledges and those made by non G-8 states.[125]

While it is still too early to judge whether all pledges towards the Global Partnership will be honoured on time, the programme represents an important mechanism for burdensharing in the area of non-proliferation. The programme's ability to organise a variety of national initiatives under one umbrella heading represents an important contribution in itself.

123. http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/34967.htm.

124. http://www.g8usa. gov/d_060904i.htm.

125. Finland, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland joined in 2003; Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand joined in 2004. http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/34967.htm (accessed June 2005).

Burdensharing in other priority fields – combating international disease

Although combating global disease is not identified as a key threat in either the NSS or ESS, it is identified as a global challenge that needs to be addressed. Both strategies also underline the relationship between international disease and some of the key threats such as regional stability and state failure. The presence of disease can aggravate a delicate situation on the ground. The ESS notes that 'AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats.'[126] The NSS underscores the economic implications resulting from international disease: 'in countries afflicted by the epidemics and pandemics like HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, growth and development will be threatened until these scourges can be contained.'[127]

Among the principal diseases on the radar screen of decision-makers are AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. In 2001, the Global Fund to Combat AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria was set up to channel international funding to combat these diseases. Among the principal donors to the international organisation are the United States and the EU.

The US contribution to the Global Fund cannot exceed 33 per cent of the total, a ceiling mandated by the US Congress. Thus, US burdensharing to the fund represents a third of total contributions. As shown in Table 27, the EU total contribution (including that of the European Commission) supersedes that of the United States since the establishment of the Fund. In 2005, EU total contributions are expected to reach nearly $750 million or 53 per cent of the Fund's total donor country provisions.

Besides yearly commitments to the Global Fund, countries also contribute to alleviate the effects of certain diseases through bilateral means or through other organisations such as UNAIDS. For example, between 2000-2002, EU member countries committed $335.2 million bilaterally. Over the same time period, the United States provided a substantially larger portion ($566.6 million). If we include those funds provided to multilateral organisations, except those of the Global Fund, the contributions rise to $874.6 and $710.2 million respectively (see Table 54 in Annex 3 for actual

126. 'A secure Europe in a better world', European Security Strategy, December 2003.

127. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002.

Table 27:
Contributions to The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (in $ millions)

	2001-2002	2003	2004	2005[1]
EU member states	327.0	372.1	459.6 [2]	672.6
European Commission	137.1	50.4	264.4	75.2
Total EU + EC	**464.1**	**422.5**	**724.0**	**747.8**
United States [3]	**300.0**	**322.7**	**458.9**	**435.0**
OTHER [4]	894.3	881.2	1,500.7	1408.8

Notes: (1) Figures for 2005 represent amounts pledged. (2) Includes a pledge by Italy ($129.7) which is not yet paid. (3) By Congressional mandate, the US government contribution cannot exceed 33 per cent of total contributions made by other donors. (4) Summarises country totals. It does not include contributions made by Foundations, NGOs, corporations, and funding provided through individuals, groups and events.

Source: Data from The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/files/pledges&contributions.xls (accessed 18 April 2005).

breakdowns). The EU figure reaches close to $950 million with the addition of the European Commission's contribution. [128]

One of the more profiled initiatives to date is the US launch of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Announced at the January 2003 State of the Union address, it consists of a five year $15 billion emergency plan to curb HIV/AIDS. So far, $5.2 billion have been provided under the plan. It should be noted that some of the US pledges have not been fulfilled – especially in the area of HIV/AIDS funding.

Summary

Civilian programmes represent an important avenue for addressing the global challenges identified in the security strategies of the United States and the European Union. A plethora of funding mechanisms exist to address state failure, regional conflict, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. As a result, it is difficult to obtain exact numbers on all types of contributions. A good approximation, however, is Official Development Assistance (ODA).

128. 'Analysis of aid in support of HIV/AIDS control 2000-2002', OECD Development Assistance Committee and UNAIDS, June 2004.

- In terms of sheer volume, the United States is the biggest individual contributor of **ODA**. In 2004, it contributed $19 billion towards ODA, about half of the EU total ($43 billion). The largest contributor on the EU side was France with $8.5 million, closely followed by Germany ($7.5 billion). Overall, the EU provides the biggest share of ODA. In 2004, the EU provided 55 per cent of total ODA while the United States accounted for 24 per cent.

  On average, EU member states provided about 0.34 per cent of GNI towards ODA between 2000 and 2004. The United States figure was 0.13 per cent. A fair share calculation of ODA contributions confirms that the EU gives more than its fair share towards ODA. The EU average for 2000-2004 was 1.84 while that of the United States was 0.6. Consistent with previous observations, it should also be noted that there are substantial differences in contribution levels amongst EU member states – suggesting that a form of burdensharing also takes place within the EU.
- With respect to **humanitarian aid**, US contributions tend to surpass those of the EU both in terms of sheer volume and as a percentage of GDP. In 2004, the US provided $2.5 billion (€2.0 billion) towards humanitarian assistance or 0.021 per cent of GDP. The EU figure was €1.4 billion or 0.015 per cent of GDP. Since the EU data is likely to be underestimated as a result of the self-reporting mechanism used to calculate the figure, contributions across the Atlantic are probably closer than the data suggest.
- Efforts to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction are spearheaded by the G-8's Global Partnership. With pledges reaching $20 billion over the next ten years, the programme involves the United States, twelve EU member states, the European Commission, and several third countries. If the pledges are maintained over time, the Global Partnership could become a model for burdensharing when specific objectives can be identified.

Conclusion

What have we learned about EU-US military and civilian burdensharing in the years since the September 11th 2001 attacks? A number of observations can be made, particularly with respect to the high-priority challenges identified in the US and EU security strategies.

First, the end of the Cold War transformed the concept of burdensharing for security. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO's primary role of countering a potential military attack in Europe disappeared. Burdensharing would no longer be something that exclusively took place in Europe within the confines of NATO. Likewise, the emergence of conflicts on Europe's doorstep forced European decision-makers to assess and adjust their security capabilities. In particular, the wars of secession in Yugoslavia during the 1990s highlighted the need for improved military capabilities. A direct result was the reinforcement of ESDP in the late 1990s. The military and civilian capabilities formed under the umbrella of ESDP gave the EU the ability to contribute towards burdensharing in new ways.

Second, the concept of security itself changed over time. Today's threats blur the lines of internal and external security. Policy-makers perceive a closer linkage between the root causes of global challenges, such as poverty, and security threats such as terrorism, regional conflict, state failure and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, it is increasingly clear that both military and civilian tools, and a strong interface between the two, are needed to address such threats.

Third, burdensharing is not a homogenous or static concept. There are many forms of both military burdensharing (e.g. temporal, task-specific, geographic) and civilian burdensharing (e.g. ODA, reconstruction assistance), which are likely to continue to evolve as the global security environment changes. In the military field, we may see a greater emphasis on niche capabilities – such as rapidly deployable special operations personnel – to provide

specialised contributions to increasingly complex operations requiring rapid action. A similar development is likely to arise in the civilian field where future operations may become smaller but more specialised. This trend is already emerging with the use of police missions, rule of law missions, etc. These developments highlight the fact that burdensharing does not require both sides to take on the same tasks or build the same capabilities.

Finally, measuring burdensharing is more an art than a science. Beyond the challenges associated with the collection of data, the vast number of avenues through which burdensharing takes place makes it difficult to gauge the size and scope of burdensharing accurately. Nonetheless, several points can be made:

1. The United States continues to outspend the EU in terms of defence spending and military Research and Development.
   - At $453.6 billion, the US national defence outlay for FY04 was more than twice the combined EU-25 defence budget for 2004.
   - 'Fair share' calculations confirm that the United States dedicates substantially more funds than EU member states. Its 'fair share' average for 2000-2004 was 1.36 versus 0.56 for EU member states.

2. EU member states collectively contribute a greater number of personnel to non-EU-led peacekeeping operations and UN-led operations.
   - In 2004, the total personnel contributed by the EU to these operations totalled about 33,300. The US contribution was approximately 21,000.[129]
   - With respect to UN contributions, the EU personnel provision was at least six times greater than that of the US for any year between 2001 and 2004.
   - The United States provides the bulk of its troops to high-end operations such as Operation *Enduring Freedom* and Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. This pattern reinforces the notion that the United States and European forces concentrate their efforts on different types of missions.

3. On the civilian side, the United States tends to be the single largest contributing country with respect to Official Development Assistance, humanitarian aid, and non-proliferation

129. The figures do not include contributions to Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.

initiatives. However, European support outpaces that of the US when contributions are evaluated relative to EU member states' 'ability to pay' (e.g. as a percentage of GNI) or as a percentage of total contributions.

- In 2004, the United States contributed $19 billion towards ODA, as compared to $43 billion by the EU-25. After the US, the second largest EU contributor was France, with $8.5 billion.
- Overall, the EU provided 55 per cent of total ODA while the United States accounted for 24 per cent in 2004.
- In the same year, the US provided $2.5 billion (€2.0 billion) towards humanitarian assistance or 0.021 per cent of GDP. The EU figure was €1.4 billion or 0.015 per cent of GDP.
- In 2004, the EU accounted for 48.6 per cent ($724 million) of total contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria while the United States provided 28.3 percent ($459 million).

4. Although not fully comparable, contributions across military and civilian domains show that an overwhelming amount of resources go towards military expenditures on both sides of the Atlantic.
   - In 2004, US contributions towards ODA represented 4.2 per cent of the US National Defense budget outlay. The EU ODA contribution represented 23 per cent of the total EU defence budget in the same year.[130]

130. From a different angle, the US contribution to ODA in 2004 was 14.3 per cent of funding appropriated to the Department of Defense in support of the global war on terror in FY04 ($65 billion). 'Military Operations: Fiscal Year 2004 Costs for the Global War on Terrorism Will Exceed Supplemental, Requiring DoD to Shift Funds from Other Uses', Report to Congressional Committees, General Accounting Office, GAO-04-915, July 2004.

Brief overview of the US and EU external budgets

The United States

In the United States, Function 150 of the federal budget covers all spending on international programmes. In FY 2004, the US dedicated $30 billion to international affairs; a figure that rises to $50 billion if spending on Iraq is included. Of that amount, approximately $22 billion went towards foreign aid (Table 28).[131] The most relevant budget categories within the 150 budget are: bilateral economic assistance, military assistance, multilateral economic assistance, contributions to international organisations, and food aid. The allocation of these funds is the responsibility of multiple government departments and agencies.[132] Principal agencies are the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department, and the Department of Defense.

The greatest proportion of US foreign aid goes towards bilateral economic assistance (Title II), accounting for over 50 per cent of the foreign aid budget. A substantial portion of these funds is distributed through USAID and through multiple programmes. For example in FY2004, $1.82 billion was provided to the Child Survival and Health Program Fund, $1.36 billion towards development assistance, $544 million for international disaster and famine assistance, and $55 million for transition initiatives through USAID.

Within Title II, the Economic Support Fund (ESF) represents the largest component of 'other bilateral economic assistance'. ESF contributions are usually based on consideration of US interests and special economic, political and security needs. Countries that receive ESF funding are often chosen for their strategic importance and not all funds are targeted on development. As such, Economic Support Funds 'somewhat overstates the total amount' of foreign aid.[133] However, it should also be acknowledged that certain ESF money goes towards initiatives, organisations, and agencies that deal with development issues. Examples include the Africa Regional Fund, Regional Women's Issues, and the Middle East Partnership Initiative. At present, primary recipients of ESF funds are Israel, Egypt, Jordan and countries in the

131. Not all aspects of Budget Function 150 are considered foreign aid. Some funds, for example, go towards the day-to-day operations of the State Department.

132. The House International Relations and Senate Foreign Relations Committees bear primary responsibility for the authorisation of foreign aid programmes. The House and Senate Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittees ensure that foreign assistance funds are appropriated.

133. Isaac Shapiro, 'Trends in US Development Aid and the Current Budget Debate', Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 9 May 2000. http://www.cbpp.org/4-25-00bud.htm (accessed 5 April 2005).

Table 28:
Foreign aid summary: FY 2001-FY 2004 (nominal $ in thousands)

	Actual FY 2001	Actual FY 2002	Actual FY 2003	Actual FY 2004
TOTAL FOREIGN AID	16,255,080	19,445,038	23,662,764	21,890,797
Title II - Bilateral Economic Assistance	8,570,111	10,915,749	12,642,461	12,445,576
US Agency for International Development	2,674,301	3,117,000	3,913,125	3,787,172
Other Bilateral Economic Assistance	3,797,452	4,868,000	6,078,729	4,315,074
Independent Agencies	295,502	308,549	329,733	1,337,088
State Department	1,349,855	2,383,700	2,307,894	2,892,914
Department of the Treasury	453,001	238,500	12,980	113,328
Title III - Military Assistance	3,752,842	4,497,000	6,285,364	4,837,427
International Military Education & Training (IMET)	57,748	70,000	79,480	91,159
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	3,568,373	4,052,000	5,991,632	4,621,810
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)	126,721	375,000	214,252	124,458
Title IV - Multilateral Economic Assistance	1,329,947	1,349,296	1,464,662	1,677,941
International Financial Institutions	1,144,356	1,174,796	1,295,781	1,383,042
International Organisations & Programs (IO&P)	185,591	174,500	168,881	294,899
International Organisations	1,713,056	1,724,173	1,529,702	1,694,886
Contributions to International Organisations	844,139	899,206	893,837	999,830
Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities	868,917	824,967	635,865	695,056
Agriculture Programs ('Food Aid')	835,159	958,820	1,740,575	1,234,967
Emergency Response Fund	53,965			

Note: Title II figures do not include agency operating expenses.

Source: Summary and Highlights, International Affairs Function 150, US Department of State.

front line on the war on terrorism such as Pakistan ($298 million), Indonesia ($64 million), and the Philippines ($35 million).[134]

Humanitarian assistance is divided among various sections of the budget, reflecting the fact that aid is distributed by multiple agencies. USAID manages several, including the International Disaster and Famine Assistance Program (IDFA), and the State Department manages Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)

134. 'Summary and Highlights: International Affairs Function 150, Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request', www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/2006/pdf/ (accessed August 2005).

and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA), all of which are captured under Title II. The Department of Agriculture provides a food aid programme, which is listed in the budget separately.[135]

Title III of the foreign aid budget is Military Assistance. Aid comes primarily in the form of foreign military financing, contributions to peacekeeping operations and international military education and training.

Title IV, or Multilateral Economic Assistance, helps to fund a wide variety of organisations that contribute to development – from the Asian Development Fund to the Inter-American Investment Corporation. This money is complemented by direct contributions to international organisations and international peacekeeping activities, which are listed elsewhere in the budget.

The European Union

The European Union provides foreign aid both through member states and at the EU-level. This section describes foreign aid in the latter category, focussing on the activities of the European Commission.

Within the European Commission, the external action budget covers spending on international activities, most of which can be considered foreign aid. Over the last few years, the EU has dedicated roughly €5 billion per year towards external action activities ranging from food aid and support operations to financing Common Foreign Security Policy (Table 29). The €5 billion represents approximately 5 per cent of the EU's yearly budget. However, the External Action budget does not capture significant sums of development assistance distributed by other key agencies, such as EuropeAid, because the European Development Fund (EDF) is omitted. While the EDF is the main instrument for Community aid, it does not come under the general Community budget. It is funded by the member states, covered by unique financial rules, and managed by a specific committee. It is funded in five-year cycles, the most recent of which allocated €1.3 billion for regional co-operation.

Most categories in Table 29 are consistent with traditional definitions of foreign aid – with the exceptions of CFSP and 'Other.' Overall, there are sixteen different external assistance pro-

135. Also known as the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust, it is a reserve of wheat, corn, rice, and sorghum that can be used to fulfil food aid commitments made by the US to developing nations. For example in December 2004, 200,000 metric tons of wheat was released from the reserve for Sudan.

grammes within the EU. They cover programmes aiming to boost trade between the EU and other countries to those aiming to alleviate poverty.[136] Most of the EU's aid is in the form of non-repayable grants. Each year the EU 'spends more than €1bn in aid and €2bn in soft loans.'[137]

Table 29: External Action Budget of the European Union 2001-2004 (in € millions)

	2001	2002	2003	2004
Foreign Aid				
Food aid and support ops.	455.0	455.0	425.6	419.0
Humanitarian aid	473.0	441.8	441.7	490.0
Coop. with third countries (1)	1,800.6	2,655.8	2,465.0	2,739.2
Assist. to countries in Eastern Europe & Central Asia	1,308.3	473.9	507.4	535.4
Other cooperation measures	389.5	419.6	505.5	519.4
European initiative for democracy and human rights	102.0	104.0	106.0	125.6
External aspects of certain Community Policies	71.8	78.7	79.9	91.2
Total Foreign Aid (excluding EDF)	4600.2	4628.8	4531.1	4919.8
Other Funds				
Common Foreign Security Policy	36.0	30.0	47.5	62.6
Other (2)	292.4	214.2	370.9	194.1
Total External Action Budget	**4,928.6**	**4,873.0**	**4,949.5**	**5,176.5**
Related Activities Not Included in External Action Budget				
European Development Fund (EDF)	p.m.(3)	p.m.	p.m.	p.m.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	p.m.	p.m.	p.m.	p.m.

Notes: (1) Cooperation with third countries includes support to Asia, Latin America, Southern Africa, Mediterranean, Middle East, Western Balkans, Iraq (2004). (2) Other includes funding towards international fisheries agreements, pre-accession strategy for Mediterranean countries, and reserves for administrative expenditure. (3) p.m. refers to token entries.

Source: General Budget of the European Union for the Financial Years 2001, 2003, and 2004. European Commission, http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/furtherinfo/index_eu.htm#budget.

Multiple entities are responsible for external aid in the EU. Among the principal actors are the directorates-general associated with humanitarian aid, development, enlargement, external relations and trade. Within directorates, the principal Commission bodies handling foreign aid are EuropeAid and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), which are partially funded by the EDF.

136. David Cronin. 'Danger Money? Why Louis Michel wants to arm Africa's peace corps', *European Voice*, 10-16 March 2005.

137. Javier Solana, 'Europe's leading role in the spread of democracy', *The Financial Times*, 14 March 2005.

EuropeAid, established in 2001, oversees EU external assistance globally. Its activities encompass the European Development Fund for the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries as well as fifty other budget headings. Over the last few years, over 150 countries, territories or organisations have benefited from aid managed by EuropeAid. Table 30 provides a regional breakdown of its nearly €7 billion funding in 2004.

Table 30:
EuropeAid Funding 2004 (in € millions)

	Funding
Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP)	2,647
Middle East / Mediterranean	1,003
Balkans	663
Asia	611
New Independent States	504
Latin America	312
South Africa	133
Thematic programmes	1,040
Total	**6,913**

Note: Thematic programmes include contributions towards food security, NGO co-financing, the environment, and human rights.

Source: EuropeAid 2004 Performance, EuropeAid, European Commission.

It should be noted that EuropeAid funding does not contribute towards pre-accession aid programmes, humanitarian activities, macro-financial assistance, or the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

ECHO is responsible for providing humanitarian aid. Situated within the Directorate General for humanitarian aid, it is tasked to provide 'assistance, relief and protection operations on a non-discriminatory basis to...victims of natural disasters, man-made crises, such as wars and outbreaks of fighting' outside the European Union.[138] Since its establishment in 1992, ECHO has financed and coordinated humanitarian operations in more than one hundred countries outside the EU. During 2004, 570 million was committed towards humanitarian operations.[139]

ECHO receives funding from two principal sources: the European Commission budget and the European Development Fund which has a provision for humanitarian and emergency aid. ECHO expenditures have hovered around the €500 million figure

138. Article 1, Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid. *Official Journal* L 163 , 02/07/1996 P. 1 – 6.

139. 'European Humanitarian Aid: Values and Principles', ECHO, European Commission, 2005.

for the past few years (Table 31). About one-third of the budget is devoted to projects run by UN humanitarian agencies such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). ECHO can also call upon an emergency aid reserve to request financial mobilisation in case of unexpected events – such as natural disasters – requiring immediate resources.

Table 31:
ECHO Expenditures 2000-2003 (in € millions)

	2000	2001	2002	2003
Initial budget	471	473	442	442
Additional funds	18	50	80	145
Community budget	489	523	522	587
EDF	3	21	17	14
Total ECHO expenditures	**492**	**544**	**539**	**601**

Source: European Commission: www.europa.eu.int/comm/echo/finances/budget_en.htm. (accessed 25 January 2005).

ECHO may cover the full cost of an operation or co-finance it with other international organisations, funding agencies or EU member states. Its assistance typically takes many forms including assistance to support medical teams, provision of medicines, and the purchase of targeted food aid.

Supporting tables for Chapter 2

Table 32:
US and EU member state defence budgets ($ in billions)

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Austria	1.6	1.5	1.8	2.5	2.7
Belgium	2.4	2.2	2.8	3	3.3
Denmark	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.6	2.9
Finland	1.5	1.4	2.1	2.3	2.6
France	26.6	25.8	30.7	35.3	40
Germany	23.6	21.5	25.1	27.7	29.7
Greece	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.7
Ireland	0.651	0.789	0.781	0.803	0.859
Italy	15.7	15.9	14.5	15.7	17.5
Luxembourg	0.098	0.146	0.204	0.231	0.256
Netherlands	6	5.7	6.9	7.2	7.6
Portugal	1.3	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.1
Spain	6.9	7.1	6.7	7.1	8
Sweden	4.7	4.1	4.6	5.5	5.9
United Kingdom	34.8	33.6	36.6	42	49
Cyprus					0.148
Czech Republic					1.9
Estonia					0.203
Hungary					1.7
Latvia					0.226
Lithuania					0.31
Malta					0.102
Poland					4.4
Slovakia					0.717
Slovenia					0.458
Total EU	**131.1**	**126.8**	**140.3**	**157.4**	**186.3**
United States	**294.5**	**308.5**	**348.5**	**404.9**	**453.6**

Note: Figures for 2004 are for the EU-25.

Source: The Military Balance (various years), The International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Table 33:
Country level defence budget
as a proportion of total US/EU defence budget

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Austria	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%
Belgium	0.6%	0.5%	0.6%	0.5%	0.5%
Denmark	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%
Finland	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%
France	6.2%	5.9%	6.3%	6.3%	6.3%
Germany	5.5%	4.9%	5.1%	4.9%	4.6%
Greece	0.8%	0.8%	0.7%	0.6%	0.6%
Ireland	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%
Italy	3.7%	3.7%	3.0%	2.8%	2.7%
Luxembourg	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Netherlands	1.4%	1.3%	1.4%	1.3%	1.2%
Portugal	0.3%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%
Spain	1.6%	1.6%	1.4%	1.3%	1.3%
Sweden	1.1%	0.9%	0.9%	1.0%	0.9%
United Kingdom	8.2%	7.7%	7.5%	7.5%	7.7%
Cyprus					0.0%
Czech Republic					0.3%
Estonia					0.0%
Hungary					0.3%
Latvia					0.0%
Lithuania					0.0%
Malta					0.0%
Poland					0.7%
Slovakia					0.1%
Slovenia					0.1%
United States	69.2%	70.9%	71.3%	72.0%	70.9%

Note: The percentages are calculated by dividing a country's defence budget by the combined defence budgets of all EU member states and the United States. These figures serve to calculate 'fair shares'.

Source: Data provided in Table 32.

Table 34:
US and EU Gross Domestic Product (€ in millions)

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Austria	210,392.3	215,593.4	221,008	226,142.3	235,050.1
Belgium	247,924	254,153	261,124	269,546	283,752
Denmark	171,584.4	177,527.3	181,789.5	187,134.1	194,420.8
Finland	130,145	135,468	140,284	143,337	149,742
France	1,441,373	1,497,187	1,548,559	1,585,172	1,648,368
Germany	2,062,500	2,113,560	2,148,810	2,164,870	2,207,240
Greece	123,173.1	131,316.9	141,668.7	153,472.1	165,280.5
Ireland	103,065.1	115,432.5	127,992.1	134,786.1	146,202.4
Italy	1,166,548	1,218,535	1,260,598	1,300,929	1,351,328
Luxembourg	21,278.5	22,019.8	22,805.5	23,955.9	25,663.5
Netherlands	402,291	429,345	445,160	454,276	466,310
Portugal	115,548.1	122,549.9	128,458.3	130,511	135,034.9
Spain	630,263	679,848	729,004	780,557	837,557
Sweden	259,907	245,178.2	256,840.1	267,250.5	278,689.9
United Kingdom	1,559,626	1,598,902	1,660,457	1,591,272	1,709,750
Cyprus					12,402.3
Czech Republic					86,264.9
Estonia					8,893.3
Hungary					80,331.4
Latvia					11,063.5
Lithuania					17,926.3
Malta					4,332.4
Poland					195,205.5
Slovakia					33,118.9
Slovenia					25,895
Total EU	**8,645,619**	**8,956,615**	**9,274,558**	**9,413,211**	**10,309,823**
United States	**10,629,060**	**11,308,620**	**11,090,313**	**9,727,723**	**9,434,038**

Note: Data for 2004 represents the EU-25. The figures are in euros which explain why the US number declines in 2003.

Source: EUROSTAT.

Table 35:
Country level GDP as a proportion of total US/EU GDP

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Austria	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%	1.2%	1.2%
Belgium	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.4%	1.4%
Denmark	0.9%	0.9%	0.9%	1.0%	1.0%
Finland	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%	0.8%
France	7.5%	7.4%	7.6%	8.3%	8.3%
Germany	10.7%	10.4%	10.6%	11.3%	11.2%
Greece	0.6%	0.6%	0.7%	0.8%	0.8%
Ireland	0.5%	0.6%	0.6%	0.7%	0.7%
Italy	6.1%	6.0%	6.2%	6.8%	6.8%
Luxembourg	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Netherlands	2.1%	2.1%	2.2%	2.4%	2.4%
Portugal	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.7%	0.7%
Spain	3.3%	3.4%	3.6%	4.1%	4.2%
Sweden	1.3%	1.2%	1.3%	1.4%	1.4%
United Kingdom	8.1%	7.9%	8.2%	8.3%	8.7%
Cyprus					0.1%
Czech Republic					0.4%
Estonia					0.0%
Hungary					0.4%
Latvia					0.1%
Lithuania					0.1%
Malta					0.0%
Poland					1.0%
Slovakia					0.2%
Slovenia					0.1%
United States	55.1%	55.8%	54.5%	50.8%	47.8%

Note: The percentages are calculated by dividing a country's GDP by the combined GDP of all EU member states and the United States. These figures serve to calculate a country's 'fair share'.

Source: Data provided in Table 34.

Table 36:
NATO Common Funded Budgets 2002 (in $ millions)

Country	NSIP[1]	Military budget	Civil Budget	Total Budget	% of Total
Belgium	27.9	16.2	4.8	48.9	3.5
Canada	25.6	30.0	9.3	64.9	4.6
Czech Republic	6.8	5.2	1.6	13.6	1.0
Denmark	22.6	9.6	2.6	34.8	2.5
France	37.2	47.8	26.8	111.8	8.0
Germany	152.0	89.5	27.1	268.6	19.1
Greece	7.1	2.2	0.7	10.0	0.7
Hungary	4.9	3.8	1.1	9.8	0.7
Iceland	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.0
Italy	59.2	34.4	10.0	103.6	7.4
Luxembourg	1.3	0.5	0.1	1.9	0.1
Netherlands	31.1	16.2	4.8	52.1	3.7
Norway	19.2	6.7	1.9	27.8	2.0
Poland	18.7	14.4	4.3	37.4	2.7
Portugal	2.6	3.7	1.1	7.4	0.5
Spain	24.8	20.4	6.1	51.3	3.7
Turkey	7.6	9.2	2.8	19.6	1.4
United Kingdom	76.8	93.3	30.1	200.2	14.3
Total EU member states in NATO[2]	**442.6**	**333.8**	**114.2**	**890.6**	**63.5**
United States	**167.7**	**134.1**	**39.1**	**340.9**	**24.3**
Grand total[3]	693.1	537.4	174.4	1,404.9	100.0

Notes: (1) NATO Security & Investment Programme. (2) EU member states in NATO in 2002. (3) Grand total includes contributions by all NATO members.

Source: Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, July 2003, p. II-14.

Table 37:
Contributions to Operation *SFOR* (BiH)

Country	Number of personnel
EU member states	
Austria	2
Belgium	4
Czech Republic	7
Denmark	4
Estonia	1
France	1,500
Germany	1,000
Greece	250
Hungary	150
Ireland	50
Italy	979
Latvia	1
Lithuania	97
Luxembourg	23
Netherlands	1,000
Poland	287
Portugal	330
Slovakia	29
Slovenia	158
Spain	935
Sweden	7
United Kingdom	1,100
Total EU	**7,914**
Non-EU NATO	
Bulgaria	1
Canada	800
Norway	125
Romania	106
Turkey	1,200
United States	**839**
Total Non-EU NATO	**3,071**
EAPC Partner Nations[(1)]	
Albania	70
Non-NATO/Non EAPC	
Morocco	800
New Zealand	26
Total Non-NATO/Non EAPC	**826**
Grand total	**11,881**

Note: Troop contributions as of 29 November 2004. (1) EAPC= Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

Source: EU Council Secretariat Factsheet of 29 November 2004 on the European Union military operation in BiH. http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id =777&lang=en.

Table 38:
Contributions to Operation *Althea* (BiH)

Country	Number of personnel
EU member states	
Austria	265
Belgium	48
Czech Republic	61
Estonia	2
Finland	158
France	381
Germany	1,227
Greece	182
Hungary	119
Ireland	45
Italy	1,032
Latvia	3
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Netherlands	447
Poland	206
Portugal	167
Slovakia	4
Slovenia	165
Spain	538
Sweden	81
United Kingdom	669
Total EU	**5,802**
Non-EU nations	
Albania	70
Argentina	1
Bulgaria	192
Canada	112
Chile	24
Morocco	133
Norway	3
Romania	110
Switzerland	9
Turkey	229
Non-EU Sub-total	**886**
Grand total	**6,688**

Note: Troop strength reflective of April 2005.

Source: www.euforbih.org/organisation.strength.htm (accessed 29 April 2005).

Table 39:
Contributions to Operation *KFOR* (Kosovo)

Country	Number of personnel
EU member states	
Austria	535
Belgium	500
Czech Republic	408
Denmark	370
Estonia	98
Finland	820
France	2,900
Germany	3,900
Greece	1,700
Hungary	294
Ireland	104
Italy	2,530
Lithuania	30
Luxembourg	26
Poland	574
Portugal	313
Slovakia	100
Slovenia	2
Spain	800
Sweden	650
United Kingdom	1,400
Total EU	**18,054**
Non-EU NATO	
Canada	800
Norway	60
Romania	226
Turkey	940
United States	**2,060**
Total Non-EU NATO	**4,086**
EAPC Partner Nations(1)	
Armenia	34
Azerbaijan	34
Georgia	140
Switzerland	220
Ukraine	325
Total EAPC Partners	753
Non-NATO/Non EAPC	
Argentina	113
Jordan	99
Morocco	279
Total Non-NATO/Non EAPC	**491**
Grand total	**23,384**

Note: Troop contributions as of August 2004. (1) Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

Source: The Military Balance 2004-2005, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2004.

Table 40:
ISAF contributing nations (Afghanistan)

Country	Number of personnel
EU member states	
Austria	3
Belgium	616
Czech Republic	17
Denmark	122
Estonia	10
Finland	61
France	742
Germany	1,816
Greece	171
Hungary	159
Ireland	10
Italy	506
Latvia	9
Lithuania	9
Luxembourg	10
Netherlands	311
Poland	5
Portugal	21
Slovakia	16
Slovenia	27
Spain	551
Sweden	85
United Kingdom	461
Total EU	**5,738**
Non-EU NATO	
Bulgaria	37
Canada	992
Iceland	20
Norway	313
Romania	72
Turkey	825
United States	**89**
Total Non-NATO	**2,348**
EAPC Partner Nations(1)	
Albania	22
Azerbaijan	22
Croatia	45
FYROM	20
Switzerland	4
Total EAPC Partners	**113**
Non-NATO/Non EAPC	
New Zealand	5
Grand total	**8,204**

Note: Troop strength as of 21 February 2005. (1) Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

Source: www.nato.int: 'NATO in Afghanistan' factsheet.

Table 41:
Contributions to Operation *Enduring Freedom* (Afghanistan)

Country	Number of personnel
EU member states	
Denmark	175[1]
France	210
Germany	100[2]
Italy	256
Poland	87
Slovakia	40
Spain	400
Total EU	**1,268**
United States	**18,400[3]**
Other	
Republic of Korea	205[4]
Romania	418
Total Other	623
Grand total	**20,291**

Notes: Reflects figures in 2004. A number of other countries have contributed to OEF mission at different times. For example, the U.K. contributed approximately 1,700 personnel during the first half of 2002 (Operation *Veritas*). The table does not include OEF contributions outside Afghanistan. For example, France contributes approximately 600 personnel to the maritime portion of OEF who patrol routes along the Horn of Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Strait of Hormuz. The French personnel contribution listed here (210) is not listed in the Military Balance. It represents French special operations personnel based in Spin Boldak. (1) Includes 75 personnel based in Kyrgyzstan. (2) Does not include German troops participating in OEF based in Djibouti, Kenya, and Kuwait (approximately 340). (3) 400 personnel based in Pakistan. (4) Based in Kyrgyzstan.

Sources: The Military Balance 2004-2005, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2004. UK Ministry of Defence. French Ministry of Defence. 'La France en première ligne pour sa guerre anti-Al-Qaeda'. Armees.com, July 2005. http://www. armees.com/article548.html. OEF order of battle at Globalsecurity: www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom_orbat-03.htm.

Table 42:
Contributions to Operation *Iraqi Freedom*

Country	Number of personnel
EU member states	
Czech Republic	98
Denmark	392
Estonia	47
Hungary	301
Italy	3,359
Latvia	120
Lithuania	115
Netherlands	1,405
Poland	2,359
Portugal	135
Slovakia	103
United Kingdom	10,000
Sub-total	**18,434**
United States	**148,000**
Other	
Albania	72
Australia	335
Azerbaijan	151
Bulgaria	470
El Salvador	381
Georgia	161
Japan	565
Kazakhstan	30
Macedonia	33
Moldova	12
Mongolia	132
Norway	10
Romania	744
South Korea	3,597
Ukraine	1,587
Sub-total	**8,280**
Grand total	**174,714**

Note: Figures as of 21 January 2005. The higher than average contribution by some countries (e.g. the United States and the United Kingdom) is associated with reinforcements taken in conjunction with the January 2005 elections in Iraq. Since January 2005, several countries have indicated that they will modify or remove their troops from Iraq.

Source: Iraq Year in Review: 2004 Fact Sheet. US Department of Defense.

Table 43:
EU and US contributions to select non-UN led operations

Country	2002	2003	2004
Austria	560	553	540
Belgium	1,460	695	754
Denmark	1,172	1,130	598
Finland	970	879	867
France	10,180	8,455	5,775
Germany	10,093	7,029	7,403
Greece	1,980	2,001	2,077
Ireland	154	154	165
Italy	7,950	8,057	4,874
Luxembourg	23	60	58
Netherlands	3,000	1,683	1,153
Portugal	663	669	651
Spain	3,250	3,266	2,260
Sweden	838	828	676
UK	7,365	3,103	2,815
Cyprus			0
Czech Republic			441
Estonia			106
Hungary			578
Latvia			3
Lithuania			133
Malta			0
Poland			970
Slovakia			186
Slovenia			178
EU Total	**49,658**	**38,562**	**33,261**
US	**22,610**	**12,960**	**20,966**

Notes: Data includes figures for the following major non-UN led operations: *Amber Fox* (Macedonia), Operation *Southern Watch* (OSW-Iraq), Operation *Northern Watch* (ONW-Iraq), SFOR (BiH), KFOR (Kosovo), *Artemis* (Congo), *Concordia* (Macedonia), ISAF (Afghanistan) and OEF (principally Afghanistan). Data for OSW and ONW are provided for 2001-2002 and not 2003 given the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. Figures for the *Althea* ESDP mission are not included as the operation began in December 2004. Data in 2004 is for the EU-25. OEF data in the table spans 2002-2004 and is based on several different sources given the unavailability of a central source. US personnel data for OSW comes from the Federation of American Scientists.

Sources: The Military Balance, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, various years. Martti Ahtisaari, Michel Barnier, Carl Bildt et al., in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), *EU Security and Defence Policy* (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004). Data for OEF comes from UK Ministry of Defence (Operation *Veritas*), French Ministry of Defence (Operation *Hercules*), German Ministry of Defence, CENTCOM, US Department of Defense ('International Contributions to the War Against Terrorism', Fact Sheet 22 May 2002), US Department of State, Federation of American Scientists (US personnel data for OSW), The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism's Terrorism Knowledge Base (www.tbk.org), Armees.com: http://www.armees.com/ article548.html (July 2005) and Global Security: www.globalsecurity.org/ military/ops/enduring-freedom_orbat-03.htm.

Table 44:
EU and US personnel contributions to UN operations

Country	2001	2002	2003	2004
Austria	621	451	442	423
Belgium	19	17	15	15
Denmark	186	93	63	57
Finland	462	76	173	212
France	576	452	326	498
Germany	506	518	380	298
Greece	31	37	27	27
Ireland	632	337	200	489
Italy	318	318	174	175
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	434	64	92	40
Portugal	1,111	865	695	266
Spain	186	181	57	88
Sweden	138	119	141	314
United Kingdom	656	697	593	556
Cyprus				0
Czech Republic				32
Estonia				2
Hungary				147
Latvia				0
Lithuania				8
Malta				0
Poland				729
Slovakia				390
Slovenia				16
Total EU	**5,876**	**4,225**	**3,378**	**4,782**
United States	**815**	**697**	**525**	**451**

Note: Data for the EU-25 provided for 2004. For earlier years, data is given for the EU-15. Country level totals represent the average of twelve months worth of data for each year. Due to rounding, the EU totals for 2003 (3,378) and 2004 (4,782) are slightly greater than the 2003 and 2004 totals provided in Table 15 - 3,376 and 4,781 respectively.

Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Table 45:
Personnel contributed to select non-UN led and UN operations as a proportion of total contributions to both types of operations

Country	2001	2002	2003	2004
Austria	1.7%	1.3%	1.8%	1.6%
Belgium	2.2%	1.9%	1.3%	1.3%
Denmark	2.1%	1.6%	2.2%	1.1%
Finland	2.0%	1.4%	1.9%	1.8%
France	11.7%	13.8%	15.8%	10.5%
Germany	10.9%	13.7%	13.4%	13.0%
Greece	2.9%	2.6%	3.7%	3.5%
Ireland	1.1%	0.6%	0.6%	1.1%
Italy	10.4%	10.7%	14.9%	8.5%
Luxembourg	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%
Netherlands	4.3%	4.0%	3.2%	2.0%
Portugal	2.6%	2.0%	2.5%	1.5%
Spain	3.9%	4.4%	6.0%	3.9%
Sweden	1.4%	1.2%	1.7%	1.7%
UK	12.0%	10.4%	6.7%	5.7%
Cyprus				0.0%
Czech Republic				0.8%
Estonia				0.2%
Hungary				1.2%
Latvia				0.0%
Lithuania				0.2%
Malta				0.0%
Poland				2.9%
Slovakia				1.0%
Slovenia				0.3%
EU Total	**69.2%**	**69.8%**	**75.7%**	**64.0%**
US	**30.8%**	**30.2%**	**24.3%**	**36.0%**

Note: The percentages are calculated by dividing a country's personnel contributions (non-UN led and UN operations) by the combined personnel contributions towards both types of operations made by EU member states and the United States. These figures serve to calculate 'fair shares'.

Source: Data provided in Table 43 and Table 44.

Table 46:
Number of EU and US active duty troops

Country	2001	2002	2003	2004
Austria	34,600	34,600	34,600	35,000
Belgium	39,420	39,260	40,800	40,800
Denmark	21,400	22,700	22,880	21,180
Finland	32,250	31,850	27,000	27,000
France	273,740	260,400	259,050	259,050
Germany	308,400	296,000	284,500	284,500
Greece	159,170	177,600	177,600	170,800
Ireland	10,460	10,460	10,460	10,460
Italy	230,350	216,800	200,000	194,000
Luxembourg	900	900	900	900
Netherlands	50,430	49,580	53,130	53,130
Portugal	43,600	43,600	44,900	44,900
Spain	143,450	177,950	150,700	150,700
Sweden	33,900	33,900	27,600	27,600
United Kingdom	211,430	210,450	212,660	207,630
Cyprus				10,000
Czech Republic				45,000
Estonia				4,980
Hungary				323,00
Latvia				4,880
Lithuania				13,510
Malta				2,140
Poland				141,500
Slovakia				20,195
Slovenia				6,650
Total EU	**1,593,500**	**1,606,050**	**1,546,780**	**1,808,805**
United States	**1,367,700**	**1,414,000**	**1,427,000**	**1,433,600**
Grand total	**2,961,200**	**3,020,050**	**2,973,780**	**3,242,405**

Note: Data for 2004 represents the EU-25.

Source: The Military Balance (various years), The International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Table 47:
Country level active duty forces
as a proportion of total US/EU active duty troops

Country	2001	2002	2003	2004
Austria	1.2%	1.1%	1.2%	1.1%
Belgium	1.3%	1.3%	1.4%	1.3%
Denmark	0.7%	0.8%	0.8%	0.7%
Finland	1.1%	1.1%	0.9%	0.8%
France	9.2%	8.6%	8.7%	8.0%
Germany	10.4%	9.8%	9.6%	8.8%
Greece	5.4%	5.9%	6.0%	5.3%
Ireland	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.3%
Italy	7.8%	7.2%	6.7%	6.0%
Luxembourg	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Netherlands	1.7%	1.6%	1.8%	1.6%
Portugal	1.5%	1.4%	1.5%	1.4%
Spain	4.8%	5.9%	5.1%	4.6%
Sweden	1.1%	1.1%	0.9%	0.9%
United Kingdom	7.1%	7.0%	7.2%	6.4%
Cyprus				0.3%
Czech Republic				1.4%
Estonia				0.2%
Hungary				1.0%
Latvia				0.2%
Lithuania				0.4%
Malta				0.1%
Poland				4.4%
Slovakia				0.6%
Slovenia				0.2%
United States	46.2%	46.8%	48.0%	44.2%

Note: The percentages are calculated by dividing a country's number of active duty forces by the combined active duty forces of EU member states and the United States. These figures serve to calculate 'fair shares'.

Source: Data in Table 46.

Supporting tables for Chapter 3

Table 48:
Net EU-15 and US ODA in $ millions

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Austria	423	457	475	503	691
Belgium	820	866	1,061	1,887	1,452
Denmark	1,664	1,599	1,632	1,747	2,025
Finland	371	389	466	556	655
France	4,105	4,293	5,182	7,337	8,475
Germany	5,030	4,879	5,359	6,694	7,497
Greece	226	194	295	356	464
Ireland	235	285	397	510	586
Italy	1,376	1,493	2,313	2,393	2,484
Luxembourg	123	142	143	189	241
Netherlands	3,135	3,155	3,377	4,059	4,235
Poland					124
Portugal	271	267	282	298	1,028
Spain	1,195	1,748	1,608	2,030	2,547
Sweden	1,799	1,576	1,754	2,100	2,704
United Kingdom	4,501	4,659	4,749	6,166	7,836
EU Total	**25,273**	**26,288**	**29,949**	**37,139**	**42,919**
United States	**9,955**	**11,429**	**13,290**	**16,320**	**18,999**
Grand total (US + EU)	**35,228**	**37,717**	**43,239**	**53,459**	**61,918**

Note: Data for 2004 may potentially not include ODA figures for all member states that entered the EU on May 2004. A figure is provided only for Poland whose $124 million contribution is listed in the OECD data.

Sources: OECD data. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/34700392.pdf (accessed 13 April 2005); www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/61/31504039.pdf (accessed 3 January 2005); www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/2/22460411.pdf (accessed 3 January 2005).

Table 49:
EU-15 and US net Official Development Assistance (% of GNI)(1)

Country	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
EU member states					
Austria	0.23%	0.29%	0.26%	0.20%	0.24%
Belgium	0.36%	0.37%	0.43%	0.60%	0.41%
Denmark	1.06%	1.03%	0.96%	0.84%	0.84%
Finland	0.31%	0.32%	0.35%	0.35%	0.35%
France	0.32%	0.32%	0.38%	0.41%	0.42%
Germany	0.27%	0.27%	0.27%	0.28%	0.28%
Greece	0.20%	0.17%	0.21%	0.21%	0.23%
Ireland	0.30%	0.33%	0.40%	0.39%	0.39%
Italy	0.13%	0.15%	0.20%	0.17%	0.15%
Luxembourg	0.72%	0.76%	0.77%	0.81%	0.85%
Netherlands	0.84%	0.82%	0.81%	0.80%	0.74%
Portugal	0.26%	0.25%	0.27%	0.22%	0.63%
Spain	0.22%	0.30%	0.26%	0.23%	0.26%
Sweden	0.80%	0.77%	0.83%	0.79%	0.77%
United Kingdom	0.32%	0.32%	0.31%	0.34%	0.36%
EU-15 average	**0.32%**	**0.33%**	**0.35%**	**0.36%**	**0.36%**
United States	**0.10%**	**0.13%**	**0.13%**	**0.15%**	**0.16%**

Note: (1) GNI = Gross National Income. Data for 2004 may not include ODA figures for the newest EU member states. Poland's ODA/GNI share was 0.05 in 2004.

Sources: OECD www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/34700392.pdf (accessed 13 April 2005); www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/61/31504039.pdf (accessed 3 January 2005); www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/2/22460411.pdf (accessed 3 January 2005).

Table 50:
EU and US ODA contributions: top-3 recipients as a percentage of ODA distributed

Donor Country	1st Recipient	% of ODA	2nd Recipient	% of ODA	3rd Recipient	% of ODA
Austria	Serbia & Montenegro	10.0%	Egypt	3.5%	Tanzania	3.2%
Belgium	DRC	27.7%	Tanzania	2.8%	Serbia & Montenegro	1.9%
Denmark	Tanzania	4,5%	Mozambique	3,3%	Viet Nam	3.3%
Finland	Mozambique	3.3%	Afghanistan	2,8%	Tanzania	2.5%
France	DRC	8.9%	Côte d'Ivoire	5.6%	Cameroon	3.8%
Germany	Serbia & Montenegro	4.4%	China	4.1%	DRC	3.9%
Greece	Albania	15.4%	Serbia & Montenegro	10.1%	FYROM	7.6%
Ireland	Uganda	9.0%	Mozambique	7.7%	Ethiopia	6.5%
Italy	Mozambique	8.9%	DRC	8.7%	Tanzania	2.6%
Luxem-bourg	Cape Verde	5.1%	Viet Nam	4.6%	Burkina Faso	3.8%
Nether-lands	DRC	4.6%	Tanzania	3.1%	Indonesia	2.8%
Portugal	Timor-Leste	18.4%	Cape Verde	8.2	Mozambique	6.7%
Spain	Bolivia	3.4%	China	2.7%	Nicaragua	2.5%
Sweden	DRC	4.0%	Tanzania	2.9%	Mozambique	2.3%
UK	India	6.0%	Serbia & Montenegro	4.1%	Tanzania	3.6%
United States	Egypt	5.1%	Iraq	4.8%	DRC	4.6%

Note: Figures are for ODA only. For example, the top recipient of Austrian ODA was Serbia & Montenegro – receiving 10 per cent of total ODA distributed by Austria in 2002/03. DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo.

Source: OECD data. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/

Table 51:
EU and US pledges/payments to Afghanistan: 2001-2006 (in $ millions)

	Pledges since 2001	Pledge for 2004	Pledge for 2005	Pledge for 2006	3-year pledge total 2004-06
Austria	7.6	2.4	1.2	0	3.6
Belgium	33.8	4.3	5.6	6.2	16.1
Denmark	130	27.8	25.8	20.2	73.8
Finland	72.4	12	12	12	36
France	99.4	37.2	0	0	37.2
Germany	729.5	96	96	96	288
Greece	3.6	3.6	0	0	3.6
Ireland	18.9	6.9	3	0	9.9
Italy	263.8	56	56	56	168
Luxembourg	7.2	1.2	0	0	1.2
Netherlands	285.8	42	42	36	120
Poland	0.1	0.1	0	0	0.1
Portugal	1.2	1.2	0	0	1.2
Spain	147.7	50	5	5	60
Sweden	144.2	39.3	39.3	0	78.6
United Kingdom	850.9	215.9	215.9	137.3	569.1
EU member states	2796.1	595.9	501.8	368.7	1466.4
EC	1421.3	294	240	240	774
Total EU[1]	**4,217.4**	**889.9**	**741.8**	**608.7**	**2,240.4**
United States[2]	**9,629**	**2,500**	**4,870**	**N.A.[3]**	**N.A.[3]**

Notes: (1) Pledges may range from 1-7 years in length depending on donor. Table includes contributions made at several international donor conferences such as Tokyo (January 2002), Brussels (March 2003), Dubai (September 2003), and Berlin (April 2004). (2) Actual payments for Fiscal Years 2001-2005. US figures are for fiscal years (as opposed to calendar years). US amounts include reconstruction assistance by all agencies. The figures are for reconstruction only and do not include military expenditures. (3) N.A. = Not Available.

Sources: Afghanistan Freedom Support Reports, Bureau of South Asian Affairs, US Department of State. http://www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/c8130.htm (accessed August 2005). US figures are from correspondence with the Bureau of South Asian Affairs, US Department of State, August 2005.

Table 52:
Pledges made at the Madrid International Donors' Conference for Iraq
(in $ millions)

	2004	2005-2007	Unspecified by year	Total
Austria	1.94	3.53	0.00	5.48
Belgium	5.89	0.00	0.00	5.89
Cyprus	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.12
Czech Republic	7.33	7.33	0.00	14.66
Denmark	26.95	0.00	0.00	26.95
Estonia	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.08
Finland	5.89	0.00	0.00	5.89
Greece	0.00	0.00	3.53	3.53
Hungary	1.24	0.00	0.00	1.24
Ireland	3.53	0.00	0.00	3.53
Italy	0.00	0.00	235.62	235.62
Luxembourg	1.18	1.18	0.00	2.36
Malta	0.00	0.00	0.27	0.27
Netherlands	9.42	0.00	0.00	9.42
Slovenia	0.27	0.15	0.00	0.42
Spain	80.00	140.00	0.00	220.00
Sweden	0.00	0.00	33.00	33.00
United Kingdom	235.48	216.85	0.00	452.33
EU member states	*379.20*	*369.04*	*272.54*	*1,020.79*
European Commission	235.63	0.00	0.00	235.62
Total EU	**614.83**	**369.04**	**272.54**	**1,256.41**
United States	**0.00**	**0.00**	**18,649.00**	**18,649.00**
Grand total (all donors)	**2.16 bn**	**4.96 – 8.66 bn**	**25.12 bn**	**32.23 – 35.93 bn**

Notes: Grand total includes pledges by countries and international financial institutions. Grand totals are in billions of dollars.

Source: Worldbank, http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/Madird-Table2/$File/iraqsummarytable-2.pdf#search='international%20donors%20conference%20iraq'.

Table 53:
EU and US contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in millions of US $

Country	2001-02	2003	2004	2005[1]
EU member states				
Austria	1.1	--	--	
Belgium	12.2	7.2	10.3	6.5
Denmark	14.8	13.8	16.2	24.3
France	59.0	63.4	194.5	194.5
Germany	12.0	37.4	45.9	107.5
Hungary	--	--	0.1	0.1
Ireland	9.8	11.2	12.3	
Italy	108.6	106.5	129.7[2]	129.7
Luxembourg	1.0	2.3	2.2	1.6
Netherlands	8.1	43.6	54.3	59.7
Poland	--	(0.2)	0.1	
Portugal	--	0.4	0.6	
Slovenia	--	--	0.005	
Spain	--	35.0	15.0	15.0
Sweden	22.4	11.5	47.8	42.7
United Kingdom	78.0	40.0	60.3	91.0
Total EU member states	**327.0**	**372.1**	**459.6**	**672.6**
European Commission (EC)	137.1	50.4	264.4	75.2
Total EU MS + EC	**464.1**	**422.5**	**724.0**	**747.8**
United States[3]	**300.0**	**322.7**	**458.9**	**435.0**

Notes: (1) Figures for 2005 represent amounts pledged. (2) Amount has not yet been paid. (3) By Congressional mandate, the US government contribution cannot exceed 33 per cent of total contributions made by other donors.

Source: Data from The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/files/pledges&contributions.xls (accessed 18 April 2005).

Table 54:
EU and US bilateral and multilateral aid to HIV/AIDS control:
Average commitments in millions of US dollars (2000-2002)

Country	Bilateral	Possible additional bilateral HIV/AIDS amounts	Imputed multilaterals	UNAIDS	Total
EU member states					
Austria	0.2	0.4	6.6	0.0	7.2
Belgium	8.3	0.0	10.9	2.6	21.8
Denmark	8.2	11.9	15.3	3.1	38.5
Finland	1.0	9.5	6.8	3.3	20.6
France	21.9	0.0	46.3	0.3	68.5
Germany	38.8	14.2	62.5	1.3	116.8
Greece	0.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	3.5
Ireland	13.8	0.0	3.1	2.0	18.9
Italy	3.9	2.7	33.5	1.8	41.9
Luxembourg	3.1	1.9	0.7	0.5	6.2
Netherlands	62.2	53.3	29.1	17.7	162.3
Portugal	2.3	44.3	2.5	0.2	49.3
Spain	3.4	0.2	14.4	0.4	18.4
Sweden	21.6	0.0	21.2	5.3	48.1
United Kingdom	146.5	41.6	59.9	4.6	252.6
Total EU member states	**335.2**	**180.0**	**316.3**	**43.1**	**874.6**
European Commission (EC)	42.3	10.3	20.4	0.0	73.0
Total EU MS + EC	**377.5**	**190.3**	**336.7**	**43.1**	**947.6**
United States	**566.6**	**0.0**	**121.7**	**21.9**	**710.2**

Note: Does not include contributions to The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Multilateral organisations include UNFPA, UNICEF, IDA, and regular banks.

Source: 'Analysis of aid in support of HIV/AIDS control 2000-2002', OECD Development Assistance Committee and UNAIDS, June 2004.

Commitments to the Global Partnership

Table 55:
Country level commitments to the Global Partnership
(as of June 2005)

Country	Commitments to date
EU Member States	
Denmark €17.2 million	**Nuclear:** ▪ Nuclear safety: €1.9 million ▪ Securing nuclear waste: €100,000 ▪ Contribution to nuclear window of the Northern Dimension Environmental Programme (NDEP) Support Fund: €10 million ▪ Contribution to Chernobyl Decommissioning Fund: €2.5 million ▪ Contribution to Ignalina Decommissioning Fund: €2.7 million **Chemical:** ▪ Contribution to Green Cross public outreach programme: €100,000
Finland €15 million (2004-2014)	**Nuclear:** ▪ Contribution to NDEP Support Fund: €2 million over the years 2002-2006 ▪ Nuclear material safeguards: o Nuclear material safeguards: €430,000 o Waste management (2004-2005): €260,000 ▪ Nuclear safety o The Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant €2,073,000 o The Kola Nuclear Power Plant €1,272,000 o Emergency preparedness €300,000 o Regulatory cooperation €300,000 o Other non-specified international projects €630,000 o Chernobyl Shelter €500.000 (2003) and 350,000 (2005) Further contributions will be made in 2006-2007 **Chemical:** ▪ Chemical weapons destruction €739,000
France €750 million	**Nuclear:** ▪ Contribution to the nuclear window of the NDEP Support Fund: €40 million ▪ Plutonium disposition: €70 million ▪ Aida Mox 3 – plutonium disposition: up to €2 million ▪ Aida Mox 1 – dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons: €1 million ▪ Chernobyl Shelter Fund: €22.3 million ▪ Ignalina International Decommissioning Support Fund: €1.5 million ▪ Dismantlement of the Lepse tendership: €2.5 million ▪ Improvement of safety of the Kalinin nuclear power station: €1 million ▪ Remediation of Gremikha former naval base: up to €11 million (->2006) ▪ Refitting of nuclear waste at Severodvinsk incinerator: €7 million (2003-07) ▪ Dismantling of strontium thermoelectric generators: up to €3 million (2005) **Chemical:** ▪ Chemical weapons destruction: up to €6 million (-> 2007) **Biological:** ▪ Biosecurity and biosafety in Russian biological facilities: up to €5 million
Germany Up to $1.5 billion	**Nuclear:** ▪ Storage site for 120 submarine reactor components (and other tasks): €84 million (2003/2004) and €67 million in 2005. ▪ Upgrade in physical protection of nuclear material and facilities: €31.5 million ▪ Contribution to the nuclear window of the NDEP Support Fund managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD): €2 million ▪ Contribution to the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF) of the IAEA: €1 million

	Chemical: ▪ Support for chemical weapons destruction plants in Russia (Kambarka and Gorny): €78.5 million
Italy €1 billion over 10 years	**Nuclear:** ▪ Dismantlement of Russian decommissioned submarines and safe management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. Funding Commitment: €360 million between 2004 to 2013 **Chemical:** ▪ Chemical weapons destruction facility in Pochep: €360 million up to 2013 ▪ Construction of one portion of the gas pipeline in Schuch'ye: €7.7 million from the year 2001 to 2003 (completed) ▪ Completion of the gas pipeline in Schuch'ye: €5 million between 2005/06
Sweden €10 million and $20 million	**Nuclear:** ▪ Contribution to the nuclear and environmental window of the EBRD NDEP: €10 million (2002-05) ▪ Nuclear security in 2005: approximately $1.5 million (10.5 million SEK) ▪ Nuclear safety in 2005: approximately $5.7 million (40 million SEK) **Chemical:** ▪ Contribution to Green Cross project 2005-06: €222,000 **Biological:** ▪ Bio-safety and bio-security projects: approximately $136,000 (950,000 SEK)
United Kingdom $750 million	**Nuclear:** ▪ Andreeva Bay Tasks addressing spent nuclear fuel storage: £2.8 million ▪ Improvement of Storage Facility at Atomflot: £15.4 million ▪ Nuclear submarine dismantlement: £11.4 million ▪ Contribution to Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Agreement: £64,000 ▪ Contribution to NDEP: £10 million ▪ Nuclear security: £100,000 ▪ Contribution to IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund: £750,000 ▪ Nuclear safety: £16.9 million ▪ Chernobyl Shelter and associated decommissioning funds: £15 million **Chemical:** ▪ Chemical weapons destruction: up to £70 million **Employment of Former Weapon Scientists:** ▪ Closed Nuclear Cities Partnership: £6.6 million
Total EU member states	**Approximately €4.06 billion**
European Commission €1 billion	**Nuclear:** ▪ Submarine dismantlement and nuclear security in Northwest Russia: €40 million ▪ Fissile Material Disposition (in particular Plutonium): €6 million ▪ Fissile Material Safeguards: €28 million ▪ Physical Protection of Nuclear Installations: €8 million ▪ Nuclear Safety of Nuclear Installations: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Armenia: €474 million ▪ Chemical destruction: €12 million o Chemical weapons facilities decontamination and reconversion: €6 million **Employment of Former Weapon Scientists:** ▪ Contribution to International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) and Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine (STCU): €125 million **Export Control and Border Security:** ▪ Border security and export control in the Former Soviet Union: €78 million

EU + European Commission	€5.06 billion
United States $10 billion	**Department of Energy:** ▪ Accelerated material disposition (funds to be reprogrammed to other needs): $13.9 million ▪ Reducing Risk of Theft or Loss of Nuclear Weapons-Usable Materials: o Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production: $199.8 million o Fissile Materials Disposition: $158.2 million o HEU Transparency: $60.5 million o Material Protection, Controls & Accounting (Russia): $818.7million o Material Protection, Controls & Accounting (Ukraine): $ 7.9 million o Nonproliferation & International Security (Russia): $91.4 million o Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI): $74.7 million o Global Initiative for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP): $112.5 million **Department of Defense** ▪ Artic Military Environmental Cooperation: $7.3 million ▪ International Counter-proliferation Program: $7.7 million ▪ Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination in Russia: $178.9 million ▪ Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination in Ukraine: $1.1 million ▪ WMD Infrastructure Elimination Program: $4.9 million ▪ Nuclear Weapons Storage Security in Russia DOD: $179.9 million ▪ Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security in Russia DOD: $46.0 million ▪ Defense and military contacts: $21.5 million ▪ Program support: $35.6 million ▪ Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention: $226.2 million ▪ WMD prevention initiative: $109.1 million ▪ CW elimination program: $540.1 million **Department of State** ▪ Nuclear Reactor Safety: $56.3 million ▪ Export Control & Border Security: $122.3 million ▪ Nonproliferation of WMD expertise: $224.4 million
Total United States	**$10.0 billion**
Canada CD$1 billion	**Nuclear:** ▪ Nuclear window of the NDEP: C$32 million ▪ Bilateral cooperation with Russia on submarine dismantlement: C$120 million ▪ Nuclear Security and physical protection o Nuclear and radiological security: C$13 million o Multilateral Plutonium Disposition Program: C$65 million **Chemical:** ▪ Chemical weapons destruction: Schuch'ye Facility: C$43 million ▪ Support to Green Cross International: C$400,000 **Employment of Former Weapon Scientists:** ▪ International Science and Technology Center: C$90 million.
Japan $200 million	**Nuclear:** ▪ Dismantlement of a Victor III class nuclear submarine and improvement of infrastructure at Zvezda shipyard: completed in 2004 ▪ Dismantlement of other nuclear submarines: negotiations ongoing
Norway €100 million	**Nuclear:** ▪ Submarine dismantlement: €15 million ▪ Dismantling of radioisotope thermoelectric generators: €4.6 million ▪ Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation: €1.5 million ▪ Nuclear Safety o Safety improvements at Kola and Leningrad nuclear power plants: €4.8 million o Physical security projects at Andreyev Bay: €5.3 million o Contribution to the nuclear window of the NDEP Support Fund: € 4.5 million **Chemical:** ▪ Chemical weapons destruction: $500,000 ▪ WMD expertise: $350,000

Republic of Korea $2.79 million	**Nuclear:** ▪ Contributions to the International Science and Technology Center: $2.29 million between 2004-07. Remaining $500,000 to be allocated in 2005
Russia $2 billion	**Nuclear:** ▪ Submarine and nuclear support ship dismantlement: $263.5 million **Chemical:** ▪ Chemical Weapons Destruction: $988.3 million
Switzerland CHF 15 million	▪ Modifications to Kambarka electrical substation: CHF 4.9 million ▪ Sanitary and hygiene monitoring system in Schuch'ye: CHF 780,000 ▪ Financing of Green Cross offices: CHF 3.5 million

Note: Figures represent information provided on a national basis. The Netherlands provides funding for some activities listed in this table, e.g. destruction of chemical weapons carried out by the UK.

Sources: GPWC Annual Report 2005: Consolidated Report Data (Annex 1). G8 Gleneagles, July 2005. G8 Consolidated Report of Global Partnership Projects, June 2004. (http://www.g8usa.gov/pdfs/GPConsolidatedReportofGPProjectsJune2004.pdf). See also: http://www.sgpproject.org/Donor%20Factsheets/Index.html

Abbreviations

ACP	Africa, Carribean and the Pacific
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation
CFSP	Common Foreign Security Policy
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
CTR	Cooperative Threat Reduction
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DoD	Department of Defense
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EDC	European Defence Community
EDF	European Development Fund
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ERMA	Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESF	Economic Support Fund
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUPM	EU Police Mission
EUROGENDFOR	European Gendarmerie Force
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IDFA	International Disaster and Famine Assistance
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	NATO Kosovo Force
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MRA	Migration and Refugee Assistance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSS	National Security Strategy

OAE	Operation *Active Endeavour*
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
OEF	Operation *Enduring Freedom*
OIF	Operation *Iraqi Freedom*
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
R&D	Research and Development
RDT&E	Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
S&T	Science and Technology
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
TACIS	Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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This *Chaillot Paper* examines burdensharing patterns between the United States and Europe, focusing in particular on the time period since the 9/11 attacks. It does so by analysing military and civilian burdensharing activities undertaken to address the high-priority challenges identified in the 2002 US National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). Among the principal categories considered are burdensharing activities to enhance regional stability, to fight terrorism, to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and limit the potential for state failure.

This paper should be of interest to a wide audience, especially those interested in the evolution of US-European relations in the security field. In particular, it should appeal to analysts and academics on both sides of the Atlantic monitoring burdensharing patterns and the collaborative measures taken to address present-day security challenges.

published by
the European Union
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43 avenue du
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F-75775 Paris cedex 16
phone: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 30
fax: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 31
e-mail: institute@iss-eu.org
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€ 10