Global views on the European Union

Amitav Acharya, Marcel F. Biato, Babacar Diallo, Francisco E. González, Toshiya Hoshino, Terence O’Brien, Gerrit Olivier and Yi Wang

Edited by Martin Ortega
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Vue d’Europe, l’affirmation de l’Union européenne comme acteur global est à la fois une aspiration relativement ancienne et une toute récente réalité. L’aspiration est confirmée par toute une série de sondages d’opinion qui témoignent, depuis longtemps, d’une très forte demande d’Europe de la part des sociétés européennes, renforcée encore par la crise transatlantique créée en 2003 par la guerre en Irak. La réalité nouvelle n’est autre que la revendication par l’Union elle-même d’un rôle global sur la scène internationale, tel que le postule la Stratégie européenne de Sécurité adoptée par le Conseil européen en décembre 2003. Une ambition certes difficile à mettre en œuvre, parfois contestée de l’intérieur, parfois dénigérée de l’autre côté de l’Atlantique, mais néanmoins constitutive des évolutions récentes acceptées par les États membres en matière de sécurité et de politique de défense commune.


Les essais réunis dans ce volume n’ont certes pas la prétention de constituer une étude scientifique et exhaustive de l’image de l’Union dans le monde. Réunis et dirigés par Martin Ortega, chercheur à l’Institut et spécialiste du droit international et des questions multilatérales, les auteurs de ce Cahier de Chaillot viennent d’horizons professionnels différents, témoignent d’expériences et d’attentes différentes à l’égard de l’Union, mais leurs analyses apportent un éclairage tout à fait intéressant sur ce que deviennent, vus de l’extérieur, l’identité et le « modèle » européens.

Le premier constat est plutôt rassurant : alors que la morosité, voire le doute, dominent souvent la scène intérieure européenne, l’appréciation chez nos lointains partenaires est largement plus positive, voire enthousiaste. Vus de loin, et en quelque sorte épurés de leurs difficultés quotidiennes, les réalisations et les progrès de l’Union au cours des dix dernières années prennent en effet l’allure de progrès historiques indéniables.

Le deuxième constat est plus surprenant. L’image extérieure de l’Union est, dans une très large mesure, positive – la perception dominante est celle
de l’Union comme modèle de réconciliation politique régionale – mais para-
doxalement décalée : alors que les Européens tentent désormais d’agir sur la
pacification de zones extérieures à l’Union, à travers notamment la PESC
et la PESD, c’est encore le processus d’intégration et de pacification intra-
européennes que retiennent essentiellement les essais réunis dans ce vo-
lume. La Stratégie européenne de Sécurité, l’action de l’Union dans le
monde, les opérations en Afrique, aucune de ces réalités n’est bien évidem-
ment ignorée et chacune d’elle fait l’objet d’une évaluation plutôt positive.
Certains auteurs vont même jusqu’à instrumentaliser simplement l’Union
dans leur propre évaluation de la stratégie américaine. Mais, pour l’essen-
tiel, la politique extérieure et de sécurité de l’Union ne semble pas encore
avoir atteint la masse critique pour faire l’objet, à l’extérieur, d’une vision
globale qui s’ajouterait à l’image traditionnellement véhiculée par la
dynamique économique de l’Union. Faute de cohésion politique suffisante ?
Sans aucun doute : les divisions européennes sur l’Irak ont été relevées par
les plus lointains de nos partenaires. Faute de stratégie de communication
adéquate ? Très certainement : nombre d’auteurs soulignent la méconnais-
sance des réalisations politiques de l’Union sur leur continent.

Enfin, les relations que l’Union entretient et tente de développer avec
l’ensemble des autres organisations régionales – Mercosur, Union
africaine, Asean, etc. – prennent souvent, vues de ces différents continents,
une valeur politique qui va bien au-delà de leur contenu commercial ou
économique spécifique : parce que l’Union européenne représente précisé-
ment la forme la plus achevée d’intégration et de réconciliation politique,
son dialogue avec les autres institutions régionales est, en lui-même, un fac-
teur d’influence majeur sur l’évolution de ces ensembles régionaux. Par ces
temps difficiles pour les principes et les valeurs du multilatéralisme, on se
plait à rêver que cette influence par l’exemple ira croissante.

Paris, novembre 2004
Introduction

Martin Ortega

Over the last 25 years, the European regional integration process has advanced very quickly on four different fronts. During the 1980s, the Common Market and its associated freedoms (free movement of goods and of persons, the right to establish and freedom to provide services) were completed. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 1992 added a second dimension, when it set up a monetary union and established a European Central Bank and shared budgetary rules – a development that was eventually confirmed by the introduction of the euro in January 2002. Also in the 1990s, as a result of the creation of the European Union, which was born on 1 November 1993, a third, political dimension was developed. The Union entailed inter alia a leading role for the European Council and the various councils of ministers, some coordination of member states’ foreign policies through a CFSP, and the growing importance of the European Parliament, which gradually enlarged its areas of competence.

Finally, a security and defence dimension has been added during the last five years. The Kosovo crisis of 1999, the need to stabilise the Balkans and the fight against international terrorism after the abhorrent attacks of 11 September 2001 and 11 March 2004 have led to the establishment of significant cooperation schemes within the EU, working hand in hand with NATO, for both internal and external security purposes. Although some EU members do not participate in all those developments and even if successive enlargements in the last 25 years have implied considerable challenges to the integration process, today the EU constitutes a unique experience of ‘region-building’ in the world.

This fourth dimension required the creation of common ESDP (European Security and Defence) structures, which are able to mount EU peacekeeping, peace support and police operations, as well as the definition of a European Security Strategy (ESS). In that strategy, prepared by Javier Solana and adopted by the European Council in December 2003, the Europeans have put forward

a common world-view and spelt out the EU’s possible contribution to the overall security of the European continent and to the improvement of world order.

In the opening paragraphs of the ESS, the EU declares, for the first time, its global vocation:

As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player . . . Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.

The conclusion of the same document contains a lofty declaration of principles:

An active and capable European Union would make an impact on global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.

Suddenly, unexpectedly, the European Union realised that it had an important role to play at a global level—not only in the commercial and economic fields but also in the security and political domains. Indeed, the EU’s declared global scope supplements and, in more than one way, transcends its member states’ respective global roles. EU member states continue to implement their own foreign policies but, in addition, they now share a sort of ‘super’ – albeit hesitant – foreign policy, which is possible only because they are united. They can now do, or at least plan to do, together, what they can hardly do alone. One cannot think of any member state, however powerful, that would be in a position to undertake by itself the ambitious programme contained in the European Security Strategy. Equally, one cannot imagine any member state, however small, making such ambitious pronouncements on the global order except via the Union. Through a long process of permanent dialogue and a myriad mutually enriching contacts, all EU member states have reached a broadly shared world perspective, which has allowed for the formulation of a common strategy concerning global issues. The ESS is thus the birth certificate of the EU’s global role.
The idea of publishing the present volume was born in the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in autumn 2003. After welcoming a first version of the strategy drafted by Javier Solana, the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 requested that a new version be submitted to the December council and suggested the organisation of a public debate to which experts, academics, diplomats, journalists, etc. from the members of the European family could provide their inputs. During the preparation of a seminar (which took place in Paris on 6-7 October 2003) to that end, we at the EUISS were surprised to find that experts and diplomats from other countries, including international actors very distant from the European continent, expressed an interest in participating. Bearing in mind that the whole exercise was public and open, the Institute therefore decided to invite participants from those countries.

It was at that moment that, in the same spirit of openness, we thought that it would be very relevant for the development of the EU’s new global role to know in detail how this role was perceived across the world. Indeed, the European Union was claiming a global projection and a share in the resolution of the problems, notably those related to security, afflicting the world, so it was important to explore whether the rest of the world agreed with that new role.

With this idea in mind, the Institute invited distinguished academics and diplomats from a number of countries to write short contributions to this volume. Given that the EU and its member states maintain strong political ties with the United States and other NATO members, and have established fruitful political dialogues with Russia and other former Soviet states as well as with Mediterranean partners, the objective of the project was to collect viewpoints from other regions. This collection deliberately did not include contributions from the EU’s allies, neighbours and more immediate partners, with which there exist more regular political exchanges, or from the greater Middle East because of the complexities of this part of the world. The editor of this volume selected the countries and names of the authors, trying to strike a geographical balance and include contributors with varied backgrounds. Authors from Africa (Senegal, South Africa), Latin America (Brazil, Mexico), Asia (China, Japan) and the Pacific (New Zealand), as well as one author who adopts an overall Asian perspective, have contributed to this volume.
The following questions, *inter alia* were put to contributors:

- How is the European integration process perceived in your country/region? Are there any lessons to be learned?
- What is your assessment of the current relationship between the EU and your country/region?
- What type of relationship, in your view, should the EU establish with your country/region in the future? Do you have any specific recommendations to make in this regard?
- What role should the European Union play in the pursuit of global order and the maintenance of international peace and security?
- What is your assessment of the European Security Strategy and the development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)?

Nevertheless, each author was free to interpret those questions as he thought fit and, in fact, each contribution has a different internal structure – although all are very pertinent in their response to the above-mentioned queries.

Contributors write here in a personal capacity and do not represent any organisation or institution. The editor has obviously revised and edited the manuscripts; however, he cannot take responsibility for the accuracy of affirmations and data, which remains the authors’.

In her letter of invitation to contribute to this volume, the Director explained that the Institute’s working languages are English and French. Two contributors decided to send their texts in French and six wrote in English. Chapters are here presented in their original languages.

The editor’s conclusion attempts to highlight the most salient aspects of each chapter and presents a framework for analysing the impact that the European Union might have on global order in the future.
South Africa
The EU, South Africa and the search for stability in Africa
Gerrit Olivier

South Africa’s connection with Europe dates back to the discovery of the sea route around the Cape by the Portuguese navigator Bartholomew Dias in 1488, and more particularly, the establishment of a Dutch settlement at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. From that time and up to the second half of the twentieth century, European involvement shaped the modern future of South Africa like no other single force.

This involvement had two main overarching and far-reaching dimensions: exploitative and developmental/modernising. It was exploitative in the sense that a high price was exacted from many generations of black South Africans through institutionalised and informal social, political and economic exploitation; developmental and modernising in the sense that South Africa’s status as a developed and modern nation reached an unparalleled level of sophistication in the broader African context. Today South Africa has, by a very wide margin, the greatest military, industrial and economic might on the African continent. After the Second World War, Europe’s influence in South Africa declined because of apartheid as issues like national self-determination, racial discrimination and human rights abuses acquired global saliency. South African policies went totally against the grain of international opinion. As a consequence, the longstanding kith and kin special relations between South Africa and European countries like the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands came to an end and a process of alienation set in. This only came to an end in 1994, when democratic rule was introduced in South Africa. As for Africa as a whole, Europe’s influence after the Second World War was redefined by factors such as the decline of the colonial powers; the proliferation of liberation movements in colonial territories; the end of colonialism; national self-determination; the Cold War and East/West competition; and the present North/South dichotomy. But in the end, European interest in and
influence over the African continent remained the highest of all countries or regions in the world.

The EU and the struggle against apartheid

The European Union and its antecedents (the EEC and then the EC) became involved in the South African apartheid issue at a fairly late stage. In fact, the issue was only taken up when South Africa’s pariah status in the world already constituted an indisputable reality, and for Brussels, at that stage, the choice of policy was inescapable and fairly clear cut: to follow the international trend, to support United Nations sanctions against South Africa and to implement its own particularistic sanctions regime. These sanctions, introduced in the mid 1970s against the South African government, were intensive and broadly targeted and were only lifted in the early 1990s when apartheid was scrapped and a democratic Government of National Unity was introduced in South Africa. Concurrently with the sanctions regime, the EU introduced a special programme to assist the victims of apartheid in 1984, spending 450 million ECU up to 1994 on the improvement of education, training, health, welfare, rural and agricultural development, community building, good governance, job creation and legal assistance. After the regime change, formal relations between the EU and South Africa were fully normalised. The EU entered into a Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa, the country became a qualified member of the Lomé Convention, presently the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, and the EU became South Africa’s single biggest trading partner and the biggest donor of development assistance.

How is the European integration process perceived in South Africa, the Southern African Development Community and the African Union?

Regional integration is an important dimension of African development and African security and foreign policy. Apart from the African Union (AU), which is a pan-African organisation, various subregional schemes exist in Africa: the Southern African Development Community (SADEC) and the Southern African Customs
Union (SACU); in West Africa the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), in North Africa the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), and in Eastern and Southern Africa, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

Although the integration processes in Europe and Africa have their own unique circumstances, conditions and dynamics, there are some overarching similarities, particularly as far as the teleological dimensions of integration are concerned. These aspects could be summarised as a quest for permanent peace, security and welfare for an entire geographical region. As the ‘idea of Europe’ has always been a strong historical, intellectual and emotional driving force behind the integration of Europe, so has been the ‘idea of Africa’ in the integration of Africa. This idea is reflected in Pan-Africanism, African unity and African solidarity, and finds institutional manifestation in the AU. While it took Europe many centuries of turmoil and conflict to come to the point where a new paradigm was introduced to ensure peaceful coexistence, prosperity and security, Africa started on a similar quest immediately after the demise of colonialism with the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Even so, while European integration produced a peaceful and prosperous security community, progress in Africa has been slow and erratic and the continent still has to transform itself into a zone of peace where democracy, human rights, good governance, economic prosperity and the rule of law prevail. Although the conditions and principles of voluntary regional economic and political integration are fairly universal, the success of European integration since the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 has rendered it the most successful experiment the modern world has yet witnessed, and for this reason it serves as a benchmark in the business of regional integration.

The reason for Africa’s slow progress can be ascribed to the uniqueness of African politics, particularly because of the enigmatic way in which interstate relations are conducted and the imperatives of African fraternity and African unity. In comparison to the European experience, one can only talk about limited integration in the AU and subregional organisations. In this context, the success of the integration process in Europe constitutes an attractive (and perhaps the only) example for Africa in its seemingly never-ending struggle against political conflict, poverty,
underdevelopment, instability and decay. During the establish-
ment of the African Union (AU), to supersede the largely dysfunc-
tional OAU in 2001, some African leaders made particular refer-
ence to the EU as the best example to follow.\(^1\) Similar sentiments
were expressed at the time of the formal approval of the AU’s plan

Although there are various superficial similarities between
African regional organisations and the EU, notably on the aspira-
tional, structural or institutional-bureaucratic levels, the political
dynamics and the normative bases are very different. Regional
integration in Africa follows the state-centric paradigm very
strictly, while EU integration reflects a syncretic paradigm, with
elements of both supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.\(^2\)

In African integration, there is minimal pooling of sovereignty:
member states, except in some extreme cases,\(^3\) are immune to
external interference by the AU or other subregional African bod-
ies. Moreover, because of the imperative of African unity and fra-
ternity, all states can easily join regional bodies. Only a simple
majority among the participating states is required. In the African
integration process, a notion similar to the EU’s *acquis communau-
taire*, or something equivalent to the 1993 Copenhagen criteria for
accession, do not exist as conditions for membership. The domes-
tic affairs of member states are regarded along strictly traditional
Westphalian principles of national sovereignty, rendering domes-
tic affairs of member states – however immoral, undemocratic or
destructive – sacrosanct. Although controversies about sover-
eignty are very much part of the debate on European integration,
much progress has been made to bring member states to follow
and respect common rules of behaviour, whether in the field of
human rights, economic policy, fiscal discipline, environmental
policy or good governance. In the African context conflict, human
rights abuses, maladministration, corruption and the like are not
regarded as disqualifications for membership of regional bodies.

With the introduction of the New Partnership for Africa’s Devel-
opment (NEPAD)\(^4\) in 2001, much hope was pinned on a Peer
Review Mechanism, to enforce common standards of moral, polit-
ical and economic behaviour on African states, but so far only a
small number of states (all of them with good or improving track
records) have acceded to the code of conduct, while those states
with the worst performances still prefer not to be judged by the
mechanism.

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1. Gerrit Olivier, ‘Regional integra-
tion and African Survival’, *Africa
Insight*, vol. 31, no.3, September
2001, p. 45.
European Integration* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 81 et seq.
4. Gerrit Olivier, ’Is Thabo Mbeki
Africa’s Saviour?’, in *International
Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 4, July 2003,
p. 818. See general information at
Assessment of the current relationship between South Africa and the European Union

The current relationship between South Africa and the EU can be characterised as mutually beneficial, substantial and amicable, but also businesslike and competitive. A special relationship does not exist, mainly because of the ideological predilections of the South African government towards Afro-centrism and Third World causes in the context of the North-South dichotomy. However, like the EU, South Africa views those relations as an important element of its overall foreign policy architecture, and for this reason it is committed to preserving and protecting them.

South Africa was never a beneficiary of EC overseas development aid programmes under the Yaoundé and Lomé Agreements and, because of apartheid, sanctions against the country were applied with increased severity from 1977 onwards. The EC’s ‘Special Programme to Assist the Victims of Apartheid’ distributed only through non-governmental organisations softened the blow of sanctions somewhat and, when the new democratically elected government took over in 1994, sanctions were lifted and a new chapter of EU-South African relations could begin.

While the EC’s assistance programme for the victims of apartheid was characterised by rather lavish spending and altruistic largesse, the new approach after 1994 was frugal, controlled and businesslike. From here onwards EU economic self-interest became more dominant and the relationship developed a strong competitive dimension. From the outset, the South African government was keen to enter into a Lomé-based trade agreement, particularly to get access to the general trade provisions enabling preferential market access to the EU market, rather than settling for a reciprocal free trade agreement. However, the EU suggested a twin-track approach, specially tailored to South Africa’s unique circumstances. In view of its higher level of economic development, it was not regarded as a ‘developing’ country like other African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) members of Lomé, and its textile and agricultural exports were also seen as posing a potential threat to sensitive EU sectors. The twin-track approach entailed qualified membership⁵ of Lomé and a bilateral trade, development and cooperation agreement (TDCA) between the EU and South Africa. After a long and at times acrimonious negotiating

⁵ Qualified membership included all benefits under Lomé (and Cotonou) but excluding non-reciprocal trade preferences and access to the European Development Fund financial resources. South African companies are allowed to tender for projects in ACP countries under the 8th European Development Fund.
process that started in June 1995 and concluded in March 1999, the TDCA was finalised, taking effect in January 2000.

The guiding principles of the trade part of the TDCA were asymmetry and differentiation, support for regional integration in Southern Africa, WTO compatibility, protection for sensitive sectors, and the integration of the South African economy into the global economy. The TDCA established a Free Trade Area between South Africa and the EU, liberalising about 90 per cent of the trade between them. In terms of the Agreement, 95 per cent of South African exports will enter the EU market duty-free within ten years and 86 per cent of EU exports will enter the South African market duty-free within twelve years. Apart from a Free Trade Area, the TDCA also provides for economic, development, political, cultural and scientific cooperation. The prospect of such an Area immediately and substantially stimulated bilateral trade between the EU and South Africa. In 2000, South African exports to the EU grew by 35 per cent, while EU imports into South Africa grew by 20 per cent. This trend continued over subsequent years, although by a smaller margin. The EU is currently South Africa’s biggest trading partner, accounting for 40 per cent of its imports and exports and 70 per cent of its foreign direct investment. The EU is also South Africa’s development aid benefactor, accounting for 40.81 per cent of total foreign aid coming into the country at a rate of €125 million per year.6

As summarised by the then Head of the European Commission Delegation in South Africa, Michael Laidler: ‘The prize is great for both sides: for Europe a privileged economic and political partnership with the powerhouse of the Southern African region; for South Africa, the strategic and economic medium to long-term advantages of a special relationship with the world’s largest economy.’ Taking into account the debilitating legacy of isolation and sanctions in a country blighted by the policy of apartheid, the EU’s contribution and role in the normalisation and reconstruction of South Africa’s external trade and economic relations has undoubtedly been significant. The fact that the EU directed substantial humanitarian and development aid to alleviate poverty and the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and to improve social services and education and good governance, was also a clear indication of the high premium it placed on good relations with the new democratic South Africa.

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With the legal architecture of the bilateral relationship between South Africa and the EU in place, it seems that a mutually beneficial relationship for the years to come has been firmly cemented. But it will not be a relationship of a special kind. The EU seems keen to develop such a relationship in view of South Africa’s importance as a trading partner, its new global status, its regional strength and Third World leadership, although the South African response has not been all that encouraging. For instance, while EU aid policy towards South Africa places fairly heavy stress on the do-good, benevolent-altruistic dimension of its commitment to the country,\(^8\) the latter’s response is somewhat muted. This has probably mainly to do with, firstly, the shift in the ideological focus of South African foreign policy under the new ANC government, and secondly the schizophrenic role the EU plays when it comes to trade and aid respectively. The utterly competitive way, sometimes bordering on pettiness,\(^9\) in which the EU conducted itself during the negotiations for a Free Trade Area came as a surprise to its South African negotiating partners. Moreover, while the TDCA represents a convergence of economic interests between South Africa and the EU, other overarching foreign policy or ideological interests influence the texture of their relationship. No doubt, self-interest, motivated mainly by domestic considerations particularly in the field of agriculture and trade advantages, strongly influences EU trade and development policies. On the South African side, the ANC government represents a shift of the centre of gravity away from Euro-centrism to Afro-centrism and South-South priorities. This is borne out by the high-profile role of South African President Thabo Mbeki’s championing of Africa’s case at meetings of the G-8 and the World Trade Organisation, as well as South Africa’s prominent role in the AU and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Government’s close ideological ties with Western bêtes noires like Cuba and Zimbabwe, and its giving succour to the discredited former Haiti President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.\(^10\) Of course, because of South Africa’s economic dependence on the EU, the Government will always be careful to keep relations with it on a sound, amicable level, although a special or warm relationship does not seem possible. The best way to depict the present relationship between the EU and South Africa is that it is probably as good as it can get, but not perfect.

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9. Negotiations for an EU-South African Free Trade Area were almost scuttled because of South African use of regional brand names like ‘sherry’, ‘Port’, ‘ouzo’ and ‘grappa’. The Financial Times editorial of 24 February 1999 referred to this as ‘commercial haggling by wealthy Europeans’.

The EU and sub-Saharan Africa

Stability in Africa is of global interest. However, this stability is threatened by conflict, underdevelopment, poverty, the HIV/AIDS pandemic as well as other diseases, and bad and undemocratic governance in many of Africa’s 53 states. The EU wants to play an important role in changing Africa into a better place, because it is also in its own interest to do so.

The EU’s Africa role is manifested mainly by way of the Cotonou Agreement, of which the majority of African states are members. The trade and developmental association dates back to the time of the Treaty of Rome and the conclusion of the Yaoundé Conventions (1963-74) and four Lomé Conventions (1975-2000), and the present Cotonou Agreement, which is in line with the aims of the EU development policy as restated in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties:

- sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries;
- smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy;
- combating poverty in the developing countries.

A parallel development was the launching of the NEPAD by African states under the leadership of Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa in 2001. Both NEPAD and Cotonou departed from the previous development paradigm by placing strong emphasis on democracy, good political economic and corporate governance as essential and necessary conditions for sustained development. From the very outset, the EU welcomed and supported NEPAD, regarding it as a basis for a productive partnership in its own efforts to make Cotonou more of a success than its predecessors had been. The overarching aim is to reach the UN target of halving the number of people in Africa living in extreme poverty and suffering by 2015.

Since NEPAD’s inception, the EU has established a dialogue with Africa to translate the NEPAD/Cotonou vision into concrete actions. Various G-8 summits have also enthusiastically endorsed the NEPAD idea, and ample financial support has been promised but parsimoniously distributed. Even so, great expectations were raised with the African initiative and the resolve to claim ownership of and responsibility for its own future development rather
than relying on hand-outs as in the past. The EU saw NEPAD as a bridge to overcome the deficiencies of its own development policies of the past. According to the Ambassador of the European Commission in South Africa: ‘NEPAD can now become the missing link in the EU development policies’.

Will these initiatives produce the required results in Africa? Of course, it is much too early to tell, but a word of caution should be raised against too high expectations. Grand plans to deliver Africa from its perennial decay and misery are nothing new. Since the 1960s there has been a proliferation of these ‘rescue plans’. So far, all of them have been nothing more than good opening moves, and their proliferation may seem to indicate a form of aspirational escapism – not knowing how to deal immediately and practically with the urgent and mundane present needs of the ever-suffering African masses. Only time will tell whether the Cotonou/NEPAD link-up will make a meaningful difference to the sorry plight of Africa’s poor and suffering peoples. The most obvious problem with the NEPAD and Cotonou initiatives is that they are too comprehensive, too bureaucratic, too amorphous, too sweeping, too inclusive and too far removed from the people on the ground. Moreover, Africa’s incapacity to deal with internal conflicts and aberrations like Zimbabwe discourage donor assistance from industrialised nations.

The successful model of European integration was based on a piecemeal, step-by-step approach, starting with six members and the European Coal and Steel Community. Africa could learn from this approach. It was probably a mistake not to focus on and utilise the various existing regional organisations in Africa as the basic building-blocks from which developmental spillover could take place. As is the case with the Africa Union, the law of the lowest common denominator will probably also dictate the future of NEPAD.

Some ideas on the type of relationship that the EU should establish with South Africa and the rest of Africa

The fact that the EU is politically restricted as an international actor, and that it must be contented to punch below its weigh in the world political arena, obviously creates the perception that it is a less weighty or serious role player in comparison with the major

powers in the world. From a South African perspective, the EU seems unable to translate its economic influence into diplomatic leverage the way it wants to. Trade, trade policies and practices and development aid constitute the essence of EU diplomacy. In the context of South Africa’s needs these are very important in improving national development. However, in spite of the EU’s major role and contribution, it cannot be completely satisfied with the returns it gets in terms of influence over policy and directions of change in South Africa and the rest of the region. The EU would like to see greater recognition for its present role in South Africa and the Southern African region, that its economic investment should translate into more influence on policy-making and directions of change in South and Southern Africa, that trade benefits should increase further, and that Cotonou live up to expectations.

The EU introduced the element of ‘political dialogue’ and partnership in the Cotonou Agreement, apparently in order to be more ‘hands-on’, effective and relevant in ACP countries. In South Africa’s case, ‘political dialogue’ forms part of the TDCA. The dialogue’s agenda includes human rights, democracy, rule of law, elimination of poverty and conditions for racial equality and minority rights. It is significant that NEPAD also introduced what is called a Peer Review Mechanism with a broadly similar agenda. However, this innovation is not welcomed by errant states in Africa who regard it as a post-colonial remnant. In fact, the staunchest supporters of the rigid application of the sovereignty rule and non-intervention in Africa are usually those governments which show little or no respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

This causes a serious dilemma for diplomacy in Africa. Well-intentioned diplomatic intervention against badly run, undemocratic and corrupt African states can often become utterly counter-productive. So, while the idea of political dialogue is a sound one, the test lies in its application. While in principle South Africa and the EU are ad idem concerning political review of some kind, both act tentatively, warily or not at all against worst-case scenarios in Africa. South Africa, for example, tolerates the political aberrations like those of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe with remarkable patience. An exception is the conflict in Africa’s Great Lakes area, where the EU contributes generously towards South Africa’s peacekeeping efforts. Also, EU, French-led forces conducted Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in
summer 2003, in order to contribute to the UN peacekeeping efforts there. Apart from its role in ending the Burundi conflict, the EU’s most incisive political intervention so far has been the imposition of soft sanctions on South Africa’s wayward neighbour, Zimbabwe. But this policy is neither here nor there, being neither popular in Pretoria nor effective in Harare. A wide gap still exists between aspirations and reality.

Similarly, the political dialogue between South Africa and the EU is a muted affair. Big and threatening issues such as the South African government’s controversial policy on the HIV-AIDS pandemic, the time bomb of South Africa’s huge unemployment situation and the abject poverty of the masses, and the very high level of criminality, seem to be the subject of only polite inconsequential diplomatic conversations. The priority or impact of these aspects and issues is usually played down in assessments of the total landscape of EU-South African relations. Both sides seem anxious to project an image of normality and ‘business as usual’ as far as their relations are concerned.

However, without upsetting the diplomatic balance, there are still some areas where the EU could consider raising its profile in South Africa. Adjustments could at least be made without putting at risk the existing general tenure or climate of bilateral relations. For instance, the EU’s style of diplomacy, the selection of targets and the way that the EU promotes its image in South Africa can be improved. The present EU style comes over as too technocratic, bureaucratic, elitist, generally abstract and removed from public participation. Mainly because of these circumstances, the good intentions and good work being done by the EU are not sufficiently noticed or appreciated by the broader sections of the population, civil society organisations and the local media, and therefore policy-makers need not concern themselves unduly with public opinion influence or pressure regarding EU relations. In fact, public awareness of the EU’s role in South Africa or elsewhere on the continent remains at a constant low level. Few universities in the region present full courses on European integration or relationships with the EU, while, for its part, the EU does very little to encourage such studies or to develop an intellectual interest in its existence. There is, for instance, no EU cooperative programme for training and education in European affairs aimed at Africa, and there exists only one Centre for European Studies in the entire southern African region. Also, the local press pays only sporadic


14. The Commission maintains cooperative programmes in education and training with Central and East European countries, the United States, Canada, Japan and ‘other industrialised countries’, but not with Africa; see http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/cooperation/cooperation_en.html.
attention to the activities or relevance of the EU. When European leaders visit South Africa, the EU is rarely, if ever, mentioned in discussions or communiqués, and senior South African leaders very seldom show up in Brussels. Moreover, when trade issues are raised, particularly EU policies on trade subsidies, the latter are generally depicted as the villain of the piece. This situation needs attention for the simple reason that the EU, because of its relative contribution to welfare and stability in South Africa, ought to be taken more seriously as an external player, apart from the fact that it deserves a better image than is presently the case.

The EU should also try harder to get more mileage out of its substantial development and humanitarian programmes in South Africa. It could, for instance, improve its cutting edge by selecting development aid targets more strategically and by monitoring and propagating the real impact of its programmes more carefully. Presently the EU spends considerable sums of ODA money on a vast array of projects in South Africa, but without noticeable or dramatic impact on the public mind. Questions could also be asked about the efficacy of some of these programmes. On the input side, the quantitative dimension of the development aid looks impressive and, in its annual reports and information publications, the emphasis is mainly on the magnitude and comparative ranking (vis-à-vis other donors) of the aid given. Very little is divulged, however, about what happens on the output side: in other words, about the real impact or contribution of the aid in terms of the goals to which it has been applied.

**Should the EU make a greater impact on global order and the maintenance of peace and security?**

As the biggest trading bloc in the world, representing 25 developed, generally prosperous and democratic countries and 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product, as is pointed out at the beginning of the European Security Strategy, the EU obviously has the potential to be a more powerful and influential role player than is presently the case. Defenders of the status quo will be quick to point out that the EU is indeed active in a number of areas such as combating terrorism, helping to stop the clandestine spread of weapons of mass destruction, playing an honest broker role in regional conflicts and building
security in its own neighbourhood. However, viewed from a broader perspective, this role is still inadequate and should be expanded and strengthened.

And yet the EU’s response to the Iraq crisis has demonstrated that on critical foreign policy and security issues it is still a house divided. Individual member countries like the United Kingdom, Germany and France, following their own preferences, seem to exercise more influence on their own on those issues than Brussels. This is, of course, far from a perfect scenario, and the debilitating effects of these divisions on the EU’s role in global peace and security are obvious. Neither France nor Germany could stop the United States and the United Kingdom from dealing with the Iraqi crisis unilaterally in their own way, while it was fairly obvious that a united Europe, being stronger than any of its individual members, could have played a meaningful role in avoiding the present disaster in Iraq.

Of course, the imperfections of EU diplomacy are self-inflicted, a situation which might only change if or when its new draft Constitutional Treaty is ratified by member states. But whatever happens in future, the axiomatic truth is that a united Europe as a single actor in world politics could act with far greater assurance, legitimacy and impact than any of its single members. A more united Europe would have the real potential to become a compelling countervailing force in the contemporary unipolar world and to play a meaningful role in helping to shape the future of the planet. As Javier Solana has pointed out: ‘No single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.’

The pity of it all is, of course, that in spite of convincing arguments in favour of a stronger EU’s global role, the unfortunate truth is that the 25 member states will probably never relinquish their monopoly on foreign policy-making. Although the present constitutional parameters may change in future, the ideal of the EU acting as a single actor in foreign policy matters will remain a remote one. It took the catastrophe of the Second World War to eventually convince Europe to unite and make a new beginning. However, the process that started with the Treaty of Rome will not be completed as long as states still jealously cling to the anachronistic Westphalian paradigm of sovereign nationhood. With an EU of 25, it will probably even be harder to move to the kind of ‘federal paradigm’ that will obviate the nationalism that still stalks the politics of some of the leading EU member states.
New realities that strongly and immediately impact on future peace and security are *inter alia* global terrorism, Third World poverty, the unpredictable behaviour of rogue states, fundamentalist ideological crusades and weapons of mass destruction. So far, international responses to these challenges have been far less than adequate, owing to: the division among key state actors as to the best remedies and strategies to apply; the seemingly inevitable prevalence of a debilitating ‘pax Americana’; high-cost, avoidable mistakes by key role players; and the current inadequate role of the United Nations, the EU and other regional organisations.

Now, a dangerous new crisis in world politics is playing out before our eyes. As time and again proven by history, state-centric policies driven by nationalism and patriotic fervour cannot resolve any major world crisis. The EU has a crucial role to play because it has most of the right ingredients, except political leadership and concerted political will. Without this leadership and willingness, the EU will be shaped by events rather than vice versa, and this could well be the harbinger of inevitable decline.

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18. Ibid., pp. 3-10.
Sénégal

La coopération euro-africaine, vue d’Afrique

Babacar Diallo

Malgré les liens historiques séculaires qui unissent l’Europe et l’Afrique, le dialogue formel au niveau continental entre les deux entités n’a été lancé qu’en avril 2000 au Caire lors du premier sommet UE-Afrique. Ce dialogue vise à bâtir un partenariat stratégique entre les deux continents, fondé sur des objectifs partagés et des valeurs communes, en complément des grands sommets UE-ACP. Les mutations profondes du contexte mondial imposent de repenser les relations entre l’UE et l’Afrique pour en mesurer les enjeux et leur permettre, avec une nouvelle ambition, de relever les défis géostratégiques actuels. La période post-coloniale et après-guerre froide est révolue. L’UE et les pays africains ont des intérêts communs à développer et une opportunité stratégique à saisir, dans une vision plus ambitieuse et plus prometteuse.

A un moment crucial des relations UE-Afrique, le moment est venu de se poser les questions suivantes : quelles perceptions a-t-on de l’intégration européenne depuis l’Afrique, quelles leçons le continent africain pourrait-il en tirer, quelle évaluation de la dynamique de la coopération euro-africaine et, enfin, quel partenariat pour la prévention et la résolution des conflits en Afrique pour le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité dans le monde ?

L’histoire de l’intégration européenne est étroitement liée à la problématique de la recherche de la paix en Europe. Le but premier des initiatives de l’unité européenne était d’établir une paix définitive entre les États de leur continent. Par l’intermédiaire de démarches lentes et pragmatiques, orientées vers la finalisation d’objectifs simples bien identifiés et correspondant à la profonde aspiration des populations des différents pays qui découvrent progressivement leur communauté de valeurs, l’intégration va se poursuivre jusqu’à la forme actuelle de l’Union européenne des vingt-cinq après des élargissements successifs.

Ce processus d’intégration est perçu en Afrique comme le modèle le plus achevé du point de vue de son excellence et des résultats tangibles qu’il offre au reste du monde. Du reste, la quasi-totalité
des pays des autres continents cherche à s’inspirer du modèle européen. L’Afrique, paradoxalement, tout en étant fascinée par le modèle européen, n’est parvenue qu’à mal l’imiter. En effet, toute l’Afrique s’est constituée en union, mais en utilisant la démarche totalement inverse de l’Union européenne (en commençant par l’union politique). Pour un continent aussi massif, quatre fois plus grand et deux fois plus peuplé que l’Europe, avec des problèmes d’une inextricable complexité, force est de se demander si la voie suivie est la meilleure. N’eût-il pas été plus judicieux, ainsi que le préconisait le président Senghor, de cheminer vers l’Union africaine (UA) selon la méthode des cercles concentriques, en renforçant et en s’appuyant sur les communautés économiques régionales, dont la fusion ultime et maîtrisée dans le temps et dans l’espace aboutirait à une forme d’union viable ?

**Bref rappel historique des relations euro-africaines**

L’Europe reste pour l’Afrique un point de référence à la fois positif et négatif. C’est un exemple d’intégration mais l’Europe est aussi la mémoire d’un passé colonial. Il faut rappeler et saluer ici les efforts continus des peuples d’Afrique pour défendre leur autonomie et leur dignité, tout en maintenant avec l’Europe des relations d’échange et de coopération exemptes de l’esprit de revanche qu’auraient pu induire les anciens rapports coloniaux.

Après le douloureux épisode de la traite négrière, le partage de l’Afrique par quelques pays européens aboutit, pendant la dernière décennie du 19ème siècle, à un nouveau découpage du continent qui affecta sensiblement ses relations économiques avec le monde extérieur, celles-ci s’effectuant jusqu’alors dans le cadre d’unités politiques locales de nature diverse (royaumes, cités-États, communautés lignagères, etc.), les espaces coloniaux étant réduits. À la veille de la Première Guerre mondiale, il ne subsistait plus de ces structures indépendantes que deux États : l’Éthiopie et le Libéria. Partout ailleurs, les gouvernements métropolitains avaient organisé les territoires à mesure qu’ils en effectuaient la conquête.

À partir de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, à l’influence européenne vont s’ajouter les influences des États-Unis et de l’URSS en Afrique. Mais, alors que la présence européenne dans le domaine militaire était fondée sur les États européens, les pro-
grammes d’aide économique vont de plus en plus se transformer par le biais de la Communauté européenne. La politique communautaire de coopération au développement trouve ses origines dans l’association des Pays et Territoires d’Outre-Mer à la Communauté dès 1957, à l’issue d’un compromis entre les Etats membres favorables à une approche mondiale du développement, et les Etats membres favorables à une relation Europe-Afrique privilégiée. L’association a été conçue comme une approche globale, couvrant à la fois le régime commercial et l’aide au développement.


Au milieu des années 1970, avec l’évolution du contexte international, le souhait de plusieurs États membres de développer une politique mondiale de coopération ainsi que l’adhésion du Royaume-Uni à la Communauté ont induit une profonde réorientation de la politique communautaire de coopération. Les préoccupations européennes liées au premier choc pétrolier, à savoir la peur de manquer de matières premières et le souci de préserver des marchés extérieurs privilégiés, se sont ajoutées aux intérêts géostratégiques et au sentiment de responsabilité découlant du passé colonial qui prévalait encore largement, pour motiver le premier accord de partenariat entre la Communauté et les pays ACP. C’est ainsi que la première Convention de Lomé signée en 1975 a été ouverte aux pays africains du Commonwealth, et à quelques pays des Caraïbes et du Pacifique, ainsi qu’à d’autres pays d’Afrique subsaharienne désireux de se joindre à cette première négociation de groupe à groupe, qui, au total, a concerné quarante-six pays ACP.

Un bilan mitigé de la coopération au développement et des préférences commerciales

Le bilan des accords d’association, d’assistance, puis de partenariat en vigueur depuis le Traité de Rome, avec les signatures successives des Conventions de Yaoundé, puis de Lomé, est à ce jour assez décevant. L’aide financière n’a pas eu l’efficacité escomptée, tandis que les avantages commerciaux consentis par l’Union européenne étaient progressivement érodés par la baisse généralisée des tarifs douaniers mondiaux.

Bien que la coopération représente un apport important pour un grand nombre de pays ACP, il est difficile d’en apprécier l’impact et l’efficacité en termes d’amélioration des conditions économiques et sociales dans les pays africains. Les performances au plan social restent largement invisibles, la pauvreté augmentant de façon alarmante. Même s’il existe certains facteurs exogènes et endogènes (gestion instable des politiques, économiques et sociales en Afrique), à laquelle l’aide ne saurait se substituer, l’efficacité des instruments de coopération au développement est largement mise en doute.
En ce qui concerne l’impact des préférences commerciales de Lomé, celles-ci n’ont en règle générale pas été suffisantes pour promouvoir la croissance et la diversification des exportations. Les performances des pays ACP en matière d’exportations et pour attirer les investissements étrangers directs se sont détériorées au cours de la période pendant laquelle ils bénéficiaient le plus de ces préférences. Au cours des Conventions de Lomé, les pays ACP n’ont pas réussi à augmenter ni même à maintenir leur part de marché dans l’UE, alors que des exportateurs ne jouissant pas de préférences sont parvenus à augmenter leur part de marché. Le marché de l’UE est resté relativement important pour les pays ACP qui dépendent encore de l’Union pour environ 40% de leurs recettes d’exportation. La dépendance commerciale vis-à-vis de l’Europe varie selon les régions ACP et est plus élevée pour l’Afrique (46%) que pour les Caraïbes et le Pacifique (respectivement 18% et 23%). Les ACP n’ont pas réussi non plus à diversifier leurs exportations de manière significative et la plupart d’entre eux se concentrent toujours sur quelques produits primaires.

**Vers un nouveau partenariat : l’Accord de Cotonou**

Selon des analyses, les faibles performances globales en matière d’exportations et de croissance des pays ACP, en dépit de l’ampleur et de la profondeur des préférences de Lomé, s’expliquent par une multitude de raisons. L’absence en Afrique de facteurs essentiels tels que l’infrastructure, l’esprit d’entreprise, les faibles niveaux de capitaux physiques et humains, les faibles niveaux d’épargne et d’investissement, ainsi que des secteurs financiers non développés, ont limité les profits qu’auraient pu générer les préférences. En termes généraux, les Africains se sont trop complaisamment laissé dépendre des préférences, négligeant tout effort de diversification des produits et de leur compétitivité. La dépendance élevée par rapport à un certain nombre de produits de base sujets à des fluctuations de prix importantes et la dégradation substantielle des termes des échanges sont également des facteurs importants.

Dressant le constat de ces insuffisances, le « Document vert » (*Green Paper* COM(96)570) publié par la Commission européenne en novembre 1996, a ouvert la voie aux négociations qui ont mené
à la signature, le 23 juin 2000, de l’Accord de Cotonou, entré en vigueur en avril 2003. Ce dernier, par les innovations apportées, marque un tournant dans le partenariat UE-ACP.

Dans le domaine commercial, l’Accord de Cotonou met progressivement fin au système de préférences non réciproques, devenues incompatibles avec les règles de l’Organisation mondiale du Commerce (OMC). Il renforce la dimension politique du partenariat et ambitionne d’y associer la société civile. L’Accord de Cotonou introduit, par ailleurs, une réforme de la coopération financière afin d’en renforcer l’efficacité et de responsabiliser davantage les États bénéficiaires avec une participation accrue des acteurs non étatiques. Les Accords de partenariat (APE) en cours de négociation avec les pays ACP regroupés au sein de blocs régionaux ont pour finalité la mise en place de zones de libre-échange entre les l’UE et ses partenaires ACP. Les négociations entamées en septembre 2002 devront se poursuivre jusqu’en 2008 et la mise en œuvre des APE sera établie entre 2008 et 2020. Les APE comprennent d’autres dimensions liées au commerce : les règles d’origine, les mesures sanitaires et phytosanitaires, les services, la concurrence, la propriété intellectuelle, les investissements, etc.

Cette nouvelle coopération euro-africaine suscite des avis partagés parmi les Africains, qui en soulignent, les uns, les aspects positifs, et, les autres, les limites et les incohérences.

Parmi les aspects positifs, il faut souligner que le nouvel accord définit clairement une perspective qui combine la politique, le commerce et le développement. Il se fonde sur cinq piliers interdépendants : une dimension politique globale, la promotion des approches participatives, une concentration sur l’objectif de la réduction de la pauvreté, l’établissement d’un nouveau cadre de coopération économique et commerciale, et une réforme de la coopération financière. La dimension politique inclut notamment un dialogue sur le respect des droits de l’homme, des principes démocratiques et de l’Etat de droit. Il existe aussi un engagement mutuel quant à la bonne gestion des affaires publiques et la lutte contre la corruption.

Par ailleurs, les apports financiers de l’UE constituent des compléments budgétaires significatifs pour les économies africaines. Dans le domaine politique et de la promotion de la démocratie, l’Afrique a bénéficié d’un transfert important des valeurs politiques et démocratiques européennes, sans oublier le transfert des technologies et de l’expertise scientifique européenne en Afrique.


En ce qui concerne les aspects négatifs de la coopération de l’UE, si l’on part du principe que l’Europe a une lourde responsabilité historique vis-à-vis de l’Afrique, l’appui de l’Europe au développement du continent noir n’est pas un simple acte de générosité, il est un véritable devoir. Or, pour l’Africain ordinaire, le système actuel de coopération avec l’Europe est insuffisant.

Le fonctionnement actuel du Fonds européen de développement (FED) est notoirement déficient : les lourdeurs procédurales et la méfiance des décideurs conduisent à des décaissements beaucoup trop lents et à l’accumulation des reliquats, ce qui constitue un des grands motifs d’insatisfaction de la politique d’aide de l’Union. Dans un discours prononcé en novembre 2002, Poul Nielsson, commissaire européen chargé du développement et de l’aide humanitaire, a exprimé sa préoccupation au sujet de la lenteur des décaissements des ressources FED et a mentionné le chiffre de 11 milliards de dollars engagés mais non décaissés. Le Commissaire Patten, dans son rapport sur les problèmes de gestion de l’aide communautaire, a lui aussi souligné des faiblesses similaires.

**Perception africaine de la coopération économique de l’UE**

D’une perspective africaine, l’on peut adresser les remarques critiques suivantes par rapport à la coopération économique de l’UE.

**Un système de ratification des accords qui allonge les délais.** L’accord de Cotonou signé en 2000 n’a été ratifié que trois ans plus tard. Le mécanisme de ratification des accords est très lent. L’accord n’est applicable que lorsqu’il est ratifié par la totalité des États européens et au moins deux tiers des États ACP. Le nombre d’États européens augmentant, il faut s’attendre à des délais encore plus longs de ratification.

**Incohérence de la politique commerciale européenne avec les spécificités des économies africaines.** Les APE tels qu’envisagés dans l’Accord de Cotonou suscitent de vives inquiétudes chez les Africains. D’abord, la perte des préférences qui sera préjudiciable pour les produits et les pays africains qui en dépendaient (Maurice, Sénégal, Côte d’Ivoire, etc.). Ensuite, l’ouverture totale des marchés des pays ACP aux produits européens et la mise en concurrence...
risque d’avoir des effets très négatifs pour les producteurs africains, compte tenu de leur faible niveau de productivité et des contraintes internes auxquelles ils doivent faire face (facteurs de production, infrastructures, instabilité économique et politique). Un partenariat suppose l’égalité des forces en présence. Ce qui est loin d’être le cas entre l’Europe, première puissance commerciale du monde, et l’Afrique qui ne représente pas grand chose sur le plan commercial. L’application des APE dans un délai immédiat mérite d’être logiquement revu.

La question de la subvention des produits agricoles européens, qui rend la concurrence plus redoutable pour les produits africains, constitue l’une des incohérences de la politique d’aide au développement de l’Europe en faveur de l’Afrique. La réduction de la pauvreté suppose aussi l’équité dans les termes de l’échange et des prix et rémunérations réalistes aux producteurs africains qui sont pauvres.

Incohérence entre une politique d’immigration trop restrictive et les accords de libre-échange (une libre circulation des biens et services doit s’accompagner d’une facilitation des mouvements des personnes). Comment peut-on défendre l’équité dans l’ouverture totale des marchés quand un opérateur économique européen peut facilement se déplacer vers l’Afrique alors que de multiples contraintes et mesures restrictives empêchent son homologue africain d’aller vers l’Europe ?

Exportations de produits parfois sans valeur commerciale vers l’Afrique. Souvent, les Européens laissent exporter vers les marchés africains des déchets alimentaires, parfois sans valeur commerciale, qui concurrencent fortement les produits locaux.

Pillage des ressources halieutiques. Les Accords de Pêche entre l’UE et certains pays africains ont des aspects qui contribuent au pillage des ressources halieutiques des côtes africaines. Les compensations financières versées souvent après de longues négociations ne sauraient atténuer les lourds dommages causés à l’environnement marin africain. Ces accords répondent souvent à des logiques commerciales qui ne respectent pas les conventions universelles de repos biologique de certaines espèces. Les États
africains n’ont aucun moyen de vérification des quantités et des qualités pêchées.

**Multiplicité des normes qualité et des mesures phytosanitaires comme barrière aux produits africains.** Ce ne sont pas les mesures phytosanitaires et les normes de qualité qui inquiètent les Africains, mais plutôt la vitesse à laquelle ces normes sont établies et surtout le fait qu’elles soient élaborées de manière unilatérale en tenant compte seulement des réalités européennes. A peine mis à niveau pour une génération de mesures, le producteur africain doit s’adapter à une nouvelle série de normes souvent conçues avec une imagination très fertile.

Sur un plan plus politique, la perception africaine de l’action européenne dans le continent noir estime qu’à certaines occasions, il existe un soutien aux régimes dictatoriaux et corrompus. La critique formulée contre certains pays européens concerne l’appui que ces derniers apportent à certains régimes corrompus en Afrique. Or la corruption a souvent été à l’origine du détournement de fonds destinés au développement. Réduire ce risque ne peut qu’avoir des effets positifs. L’existence de ces régimes fait que les populations concernées n’ont été que rarement consultées sur les priorités et les modalités de l’aide octroyée.

Par ailleurs, la vente et l’exportation d’armes en provenance d’Europe vers l’Afrique seraient à la base des foyers de tension et de conflit à travers tout le continent. Certains commentaires critiques souçonnent les Européens de se transformer en « sapeurs-pompiers » après avoir allumé et attisé le feu.

Enfin, en dépit de la réforme que constitue l’adoption de l’accord de Cotonou, la question se pose de savoir si les pays ACP constituent encore une priorité pour l’Union européenne : la mise en œuvre d’une politique étrangère européenne, l’élargissement (son coût et les relations des PECO avec le reste du monde), la nouvelle politique de voisinage permettent d’en douter. Par contraste avec les ACP, la plupart des autres régions du monde ont vu leur part de commerce, voire d’aide communautaire s’accroître dans les années 1990. Ce redéploiement géographique de l’aide communautaire traduit non seulement le changement d’échelle d’une politique désormais conçue comme « mondiale », mais aussi une adaptation qualitative aux mutations géopolitiques et
géo-économiques qui ont caractérisé l’environnement international de l’Europe ces dernières années.

Toute la difficulté consiste donc à mettre en œuvre une politique d’aide au développement dans un contexte qui ne s’y prête guère. La lutte contre le terrorisme international, menée par les Etats-Unis, oblige à trouver des alliances avec les Etats occidentaux. La mondialisation de l’économie oblige les Etats à chercher la position la plus compétitive, la plus rentable. Or les pays ACP ne présentent guère d’intérêt sur un plan strictement économique ou politique : inadaptés au nouveau contexte économique international, n’ayant pas su ou pas pu se sortir de la périlleuse situation dans laquelle ils étaient, ces pays se trouvent aujourd’hui « en marge » de l’économie et de la politique internationales.

Recommandations relatives au renforcement du dialogue politique et du partenariat Afrique-UE

L’Accord de Cotonou constitue un bon point de départ, mais il faut approfondir le partenariat inter-régional entre l’Europe et l’Afrique à tous les niveaux. D’abord, le dialogue Afrique-UE doit avoir pour objectifs principaux : (i) le renforcement des relations politiques, économiques et socioculturelles ; (ii) l’éradication de la pauvreté et la réalisation des objectifs de développement du millénaire en Afrique, ainsi que la mise en œuvre des engagements pris récemment dans le cadre des conférences internationales (Doha, Monterrey et le sommet mondial pour le développement durable) ; et (iii) la promotion des droits de l’homme, de la démocratie et de l’État de droit en Afrique.

Plus spécifiquement, le dialogue UE-Afrique doit s’articuler autour de huit thèmes prioritaires afin de parvenir à des résultats concrets :
- les droits de l’homme, la démocratie et la bonne gouvernance ;
- la prévention et la résolution des conflits ;
- la sécurité alimentaire ;
- le sida et autres pandémies ;
- l’environnement ;
- l’intégration régionale et le commerce ;
- la dette extérieure ;
- la restitution des biens culturels exportés illicite ment.

5. Les régions qui ont bénéficié d’un accroissement de l’aide communautaire sont l’Europe centrale et orientale, les États de la CEI et les pays de Méditerranée.
6. Ces thèmes sont le produit d’un large consensus, que partage l’auteur.
1. **Droits de l’homme, démocratie et bonne gouvernance.** Le dialogue dans ces domaines devra être articulé autour des droits de l’homme, de l’appui aux institutions africaines et de la lutte contre la corruption. Le partenariat devra contribuer au respect des principes de droit et de la bonne gouvernance. Par ailleurs, l’UE devra approfondir sa coopération avec l’Afrique dans le domaine des ressources humaines, en particulier la généralisation de l’enseignement primaire pour les garçons et les filles, qui est un élément essentiel de la promotion d’une bonne gouvernance.


Pour être beaucoup plus proche des réalités africaines en matière de prévention et de résolution des conflits, et pour optimiser son soutien, l’UE devrait créer en Afrique, en partenariat avec d’autres institutions qui existent déjà et œuvrant pour la même cause, un Institut de recherche sur la paix, la sécurité et la prévention des conflits en Afrique.

En outre, il apparaît prioritaire d’inclure des mesures visant à améliorer la bonne gestion des ressources naturelles dans le cadre du dialogue UE-Afrique sur la prévention des crises.
conflits. En effet, des guerres sont déclenchées pour s’assurer de la mainmise sur des ressources lucratives. De même, ces ressources naturelles, qui pourraient être exploitées pour rapporter de l’argent aux caisses publiques, ont souvent été utilisées pour financer et prolonger des conflits armés. Ce phénomène est aujourd’hui reconnu comme étant l’une des causes majeures des conflits en Afrique.


4. Lutte contre le sida et autres pandémies. L’Union et les pays africains devront s’accorder sur la nécessité de renforcer les systèmes de santé dans les pays africains au moyen d’un cadre complet de prévention, de traitement et de soins, et d’augmenter le financement des services de santé par les gouvernements nationaux et par la communauté et les donateurs internationaux. Ils s’entendront également sur la nécessité d’une approche conjointe en matière d’application de prix différentiels, de transfert de technologie et de production locale afin d’améliorer l’accès aux médicaments à des prix abordables.

5. Environnement. Le plus urgent est la lutte contre la sécheresse et la désertification. Mais il existe aussi d’autres priorités dans ce domaine :
- la gouvernance internationale en matière d’environnement ;
- la coopération pour la préparation de stratégies nationales ;
- le lien entre pauvreté et environnement ;
- la dimension régionale des questions d’environnement ;
- le renforcement de la capacité des pays africains à négocier et à appliquer les accords internationaux concernant l’environnement ;
la recherche commune des moyens d’améliorer la Facilité mondiale pour l’environnement ;
la gestion intégrée des ressources en eau ;
la prévention des catastrophes naturelles.
Le partenariat devra exploiter l’initiative européenne pour l’eau qui propose, notamment, la création d’un « Fonds européen pour l’eau » afin d’aider les populations des pays ACP à accéder à l’eau potable et à des conditions d’hygiène satisfaisantes. L’initiative de l’UE « Énergie pour l’éradication de la pauvreté et le développement durable » démontre l’engagement de l’UE en faveur de la mise en place de services énergétiques adéquats, abordables et viables. La prise en compte systématique des aspects environnementaux dans les actions de lutte contre la pauvreté devrait être une règle de base de la coopération Afrique-UE, en partant du principe que la protection de l’environnement n’est pas une contrainte qui limite le développement mais la condition même d’un mode de vie durable.


7. **Dette extérieure.** Le partenariat euro-africain devra veiller à ce que l’Europe puisse appuyer les efforts de réduction du fardeau de la dette des pays africains très endettés par un soutien significatif à l’initiative en faveur des pays pauvres très endettés (PPTE).

8. **Restitution des biens culturels exportés illicITEMENT.** Un ensemble de principes directeurs et de recommandations concrètes d’action a été formulé dans le cadre du dialogue UE-Afrique. L’Europe devra travailler à la mise en place d’un inventaire préliminaire de toutes les activités de coopération pertinentes en cours entre

Conclusion

Les crises politiques multiples, les guerres, les déchirements ethniques ont des effets désastreux pour les populations locales entraînées dans des aventures mortifères aux conséquences effrayantes tant pour leur bien-être que sur la déstructuration du tissu socioculturel et environnemental. Telles crises permanentes peuvent être interprétées comme les dérives absolues d’un continent devenu ingérable. Toutefois, la même notion de désespoir et l’histoire de la première moitié du 20ème siècle en Europe devraient aussi faire réfléchir Africains et Européens sur le fait que toute crise porte en elle les germes d’un devenir.

L’Europe, pour sortir de deux guerres fratricides, a eu besoin de toute l’énergie conjuguée des résistants antifascistes, des alliés extérieurs et de tous ceux que la lutte contre le racisme et la xénophobie pouvait mobiliser pour construire une société fondée sur un nouvel espace européen de citoyenneté dont l’Europe des 25 constitue aujourd’hui la belle illustration.

L’Afrique, pour sortir du marasme dans lequel elle se trouve aujourd’hui, a besoin du soutien de l’Europe. Les Européens et les Africains doivent définitivement prendre conscience qu’ils appartiennent à une même communauté de destin. L’Europe, pour prospérer qu’elle soit aujourd’hui, ne pourra jamais poursuivre son développement en ayant sur ses contreforts une Afrique en proie à la pauvreté et aux conflits de toutes sortes. Les flux migratoires illégaux témoignent de ce rapport incontournable. C’est la raison pour laquelle l’Europe doit renforcer son aide à l’Afrique tout en la rationalisant et en privilégiant l’approche régionale.

Bien que la voie empruntée pour la construction de l’UA nous semble aléatoire, les Européens doivent prendre en compte les demandes formulées par les responsables de cette Union, notamment en matière de prévention et de résolution des conflits qui
minent tous les efforts de développement du continent. La coopération pour la gestion des crises et pour le maintien de la paix serait une première démarche très utile.

En contribuant à ce que les Africains deviennent les acteurs autonomes de leur propre développement économique et social, et en les préparant à la gestion des crises, les Européens doivent comprendre que toute aide fournie à l’Afrique est une forme d’investissement à long terme qui doit jeter, pour les deux continents, les bases d’une stabilité et d’une prospérité durables.
2  Sénégal
Brazil

The European Union: a rising global power?

Marcel F. Biato

Under the government of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Brazil’s foreign policy has continued to focus on changing the international status quo in areas critical to achieving the country’s development goals. Two interlinked issues are essential in this regard: reform of the international trade and finance regime and the aggiornamento of global collective security arrangements. The growing assertiveness of the European Union on these issues is seen in Brazil as something to be welcomed and encouraged.

The gradual consolidation of the EU over recent decades has given new impetus to the longstanding ties Brazil maintains with EU member states.\(^1\) The sheer economic, commercial and political synergies that these countries can together bring to bear offer vast opportunities for cooperation that Brazil has been keen to explore. The Joint Declaration adopted in Brasilia in May 2002 set out a common vision of the way ahead, as the EU enlarged to complete and consolidate its unification. The possibilities for joint action are described in the Commission’s Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, which provides for activities totalling €64 million over the period.

EU cooperation programmes in Brazil provide financial and technical support in crucial fields such as public administration reform (examples include modernisation of state enterprises, tax collection, human rights protection). Equally important are technological partnerships in computer science, industrial development, job creation and telecommunications. Improving urban living conditions, sustainable development in poor communities and setting up micro-enterprises are additional goals focusing on social questions. Similarly research and development in bio- and space technology, and deforestation reduction are further examples of the wide range of bilateral cooperation projects coming on stream. Special mention should be made of the Pilot Project for the Brazilian Tropical Forests (PPG-7) in which a group of European nations provide vital financial support for ongoing

1. The European Union represents roughly a quarter of Brazil’s foreign trade, standing at approximately $26 billion in 2004 (Jan-Aug). In 2003, of the 20 countries with the largest stock of capital investment in Brazil, 9 were European.
programmes geared to the sustainable development of these strategic natural environments. Sustainable development – as well as avoiding climatic disasters – is also the motto behind Brazil’s and the EU countries’ decision to cooperate in bringing the Kyoto Protocol into force as soon as possible.

However, relations between Brazil and the EU have acquired a new strategic depth as a result of two defining forces moulding the beginning of the twenty-first century: the accelerating pace of economic globalisation, on the one hand, and the ushering in of a post-Cold War security framework, on the other.

International trade and finance: the road to a fairer globalisation

Mercosur was created by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in March 1991, with the objective of creating a common market between them. In 1994, the Treaty of Ouro Preto improved the institutional structure of Mercosur and initiated a new phase in the relationship between the participating countries, with a view to completing a transition phase (1995-2006) leading to the common market. The arrival on the scene of Mercosur has brought new dynamism to the commercial ties between its member states and those of the EU. Both groups are engaged in processes of deep integration based on close economic and political cooperation between member states, and even different forms of sovereignty sharing. Understandably, their common origin as trade blocs helps to explain that most of the attention has initially been focused on developing this side of the relationship (whereas the political side is more developed in the EU).

Negotiations on an Interregional Association Agreement to create the largest free trade area in the world between the EU and Mercosur are at an advanced stage. It is expected that tariffs on a large range of goods and services will be eliminated or strongly reduced, boosting investment opportunities and lowering costs and consumer prices. The end result will be higher productivity in both regions and generally more competitive economies in the global marketplace.

However, the partnership should go far beyond this. Despite differences, which were clearly on display at the 2003 Cancún summit of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Mercosur and
the EU have a pivotal role to play in paving the way for a more balanced international trade environment. A final agreement on liberalising trade between the two groups, once achieved, would provide a powerful incentive for other major players to display flexibility at the negotiating table. In fact, leading members of Mercosur together with the EU Trade Commissioner were instrumental in achieving a crucial breakthrough during talks last July, in Geneva. Hopes revived for a successful outcome to the Doha Development Round as a whole. With the added incentive of recent decisions handed down by WTO panels outlawing certain farm subsidies, the EU has shown an increased awareness that developing countries must be allowed to exploit their competitive edge in agricultural commodities if free trade and sustainable development for all are to be more than pious promises.

Brazil is confident that the EU will be equally open to progress in other areas crucial to empowering developing countries to help themselves. These include intellectual property rights, concessionary treatment for highly indebted countries, increased official development assistance (ODA) and support for achieving the UN Millennium Goals. European willingness to engage Africa through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) opens an avenue for joint action with Brazil. We are enthusiastic about the opportunities that this mechanism offers to Africans, in partnership with the international community, to disarm the vicious cycle of grinding poverty and endemic strife that has plagued the continent.

An additional area where the EU could play an important role is by helping to push through urgent reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions, including measures to make their decision-making more transparent and representative. Brazil is presently lobbying the International Monetary Fund on two specific proposals concerning its accounting rules and procedures vis-à-vis developing countries. Firstly, we believe that productive public sector investments should not be entered as expenditure on national accounts. This further restricts the already meagre resources available for growth stimulus to countries such as Brazil that have a proven track record in prudent economic management. Secondly, we propose that the IMF make available to fiscally responsible developing countries an emergency credit line that could be drawn on at very short notice. By avoiding the complex and time-consuming requirements normally demanded before
IMF disbursements, financial authorities in affected countries could better counter unforeseen threats to economic stability resulting from massive speculative capital flows that are a hallmark of global capitalism.

It would be hard to underestimate the influence that European unification has exerted on Latin American and the Caribbean endeavours to foster regional integration since the 1960s, culminating with President Lula’s proposal for a South American Community of Nations. There is, however, another side to the partnership between Mercosur and the EU that is just as important as their trade ties. Although these blocs have taken on a largely commercial persona, both were conceived as a means to overcome centuries of political and military rivalry between member states. Both came to life under the aegis of peaceful coexistence. It was rightly assumed that building up institutional and economic links between nations would generate such a degree of mutual interdependence that further warring would become politically inconceivable and economically irrational. The 1951 European Coal and Steel Community, under the leadership of France and Germany, was held up as model and inspiration for the 1994 Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Control and Accounting (ABACC) on nuclear materials. Following the European inspiration, ABACC was created with the purpose of institutionalising complementarity and dependency in sectors of fundamental economic and military significance. As in Europe, strategic rivalry between the two South American neighbours gave way to military cooperation on a scale that to this day is presented as a model for bringing détente to areas of conflict throughout the developing world.

**Collective security**

From this viewpoint, just as impressive as the EU’s achievements in the economic and trade fields are its increasingly ambitious moves on the way to becoming a major actor on the wider stage of international affairs, as enshrined in the European Security Strategy and the draft Constitutional Treaty. Signs that the EU is bringing to issues of international security its well-regarded prowess in forging multilateral dialogue and providing cooperation are to be praised. By giving the Union a legal personality and by designating

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3. It is hoped that on the foundations of the agreement being negotiated between Mercosur and the Andean Community a continent-wide free trade and investment area can be formed.

4. Under this agreement Brazil and Argentina voluntarily reaffirmed their renunciation of any attempt to develop explosive nuclear devices and put in place a system of bilateral inspections.
a Minister for Foreign Affairs, the draft Constitutional Treaty proposed this year will ensure that the institution has a sharper international identity. The new constitutional framework is a decisive step in overcoming the glaring failures on display during the humanitarian crises in the Balkans during the early 1990s. This spurred the European Union into acquiring the hard power capabilities required to become an effective force in conflict and humanitarian crisis management within the European continent.

The European preference for negotiated and consensual solutions is clearly visible in the strengthening of the EU’s deliberative bodies and their rule-setting procedures, especially as it seeks to meet the challenge of enlargement. A political and legal framework has been established that enables the Union to act in an increasingly wide and potentially controversial range of scenarios, which might even involve the use of force. Europe is preparing itself to answer many of the security challenges that increasingly affect us all. Globalisation has brought new values, ideas and goods to our doorstep – but it has done so at the cost of doing away with the protection that boundaries and border controls traditionally afforded. The attacks of 11 September 2001 forced many in the international community to come to grips with what Europeans have long learnt from having to tackle domestic terrorism: security is never absolute. We must learn to work together in providing global answers to the challenges of globalisation, albeit in differing forms. Yet we must do so without sacrificing fundamental beliefs and values.

As Brazil and its Latin American neighbours join the debate on global governance and world democracy, we should encourage Europe to redouble its efforts in favour of stability and peace within its borders and beyond. We join in welcoming a more assertive European Union as it moves outside its natural frontiers to engage constructively in a wider arena, beginning with Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the southern Mediterranean.

We fully share the EU’s vision of fostering international peace through multilateral diplomacy, dialogue and respect for human rights, as set forth most recently in the European Security Strategy. In particular we endorse the holistic approach to conflict prevention enshrined in the CFSP, which brings together humanitarian, political, economic and social perspectives.
Latin America and the Caribbean share this view of security as a continuum of evolving factors and conditions that play themselves out in the form of threats to orderly life at the local, regional and global levels. Security must not be divorced from the social instability and economic uncertainty that plagues the lives of millions. This is by no means to suggest that major threats, most especially international terrorism, can be reduced to an expression of poverty and/or political oppression. Yet we must be willing – as repeatedly underscored by the United Nations – to remedy the root causes of these phenomena if we are to deal effectively with the scourge of terrorism.

This complex set of issues that globalisation increasingly brings to the fore underscores the need to see security in terms of sustainable development, a notion that captures more precisely the seamless linkages between individual wellbeing and collective security.5

The Latin American experience

There is no better example of this inextricable link than the history, past and present, of Haiti. An unending sequence of social and economic disruption, aggravated by repeated bouts of foreign intervention, helps to explain the country’s present prostration in the face of continued rounds of political strife and natural calamities. A vicious cycle of failure has led to endemic instability for which no single cause – or response – is to be found. The challenge facing the international community is to develop an ambitious mix of economic, social and security policies to help the country and its stricken population gradually edge back towards sustainable development. For this reason, Brazil hopes to count on EU support for proposals to have the UN Security Council coordinate more closely with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in developing integrated policies to deal with the multipronged challenges besetting countries such as Haiti. Brazil’s decision to accept the challenge of leading the UN mandated peacekeeping mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH, from April 2004) – the first headed by Brazil – was motivated by a desire to help make such a multidimensional effort a reality. We count on the EU’s and its member states’ material as well as political support to prove the point that post-conflict nation building is not only possible but

5. We prefer this concept to that of ‘human security’ and its variations, which we believe carry undesirable military and interventionist undertones.
also inescapable if we are to avoid the failed 1994 intervention in Haiti. Otherwise, the barren hills that cover the Haitian countryside will continue to provoke catastrophic flooding in Gonaïves time and again. And illicit transnational activities that find in the political and economic chaos that is Haiti today a convenient staging ground will continue to pose an ever-increasing threat to the stability of the Caribbean region.

It is from this overarching perspective that Latin America has engaged in the challenge of defining and then engaging the threats before it. Like politics, all threats, no matter how global, are ultimately local. In the Americas, establishing a well-defined hierarchy of threats and risks is made almost impossible by the sheer variety in geography, historical background, ethnic mix, military strength and size of the countries involved. For this reason at the 2002 General Assembly of the Organisation of American States (OAS) and later at the 2003 Hemispheric Security Conference at Mexico City, the understanding prevailed that security in Latin America must be understood as a multidimensional phenomenon. Given the enormous variations in local conditions, it is left to individual states to define their perceived security threats and to develop appropriate responses to the motley combination of drug trafficking, terrorism, natural catastrophes, environmental degradation and political unrest that harasses much of the continent.

In determining appropriate responses to security issues, Latin America is heavily conditioned by its pioneering role in developing a coherent body of international law geared to non-intervention in the domestic affairs of neighbouring countries and to restraint in the use of force. While this is not to suggest that Latin America has not had its share of boundary disputes and military skirmishes, these have been mostly of low intensity and short duration, rarely leading to major interstate clashes.

This outlook was born largely of the struggle in nation building among the fledgling nation-states that emerged from the sudden and wholesale decolonisation of most of Latin America in the early nineteenth century. Imprecise boundaries and social and political unrest at home, as well as the gathering neo-imperialist forces, which would eventually converge on Africa, help explain the region’s distinct perspective on issues of security and defence. Latin America’s conscious renunciation of weapons of mass destruction\(^6\) and its low levels of expenditure on armaments rest

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\(^6\) The 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty enshrined the principle that Latin America and the Caribbean are a nuclear weapon-free zone.
not on a rose-tinted or starry-eyed vision of human nature and its foibles, but rather on the hard lessons of history—a long narrative of political unrest and endless boundary disputes that often served as a pretext for outside intervention. Security, we have learnt, can never rest on mutual fear, but rather must be the outcome of common purpose as expressed through the rule of international law.

While it is understood that development and improved standards of living are the ultimate guarantors of peace, peace cannot prevail outside the rule of law. Over the last 25 years almost all major border disputes involving Latin American countries, including the border disputes between Argentina and Chile and between Ecuador and Peru, have been settled through diplomatic channels and regional mediation efforts. No rigid framework was required, only a loose network of high-level summits, regional confidence-building mechanisms and a healthy awareness of the damage that political instability can wreck on efforts to foster regional economic integration and attract foreign investment. In fact regular conferences on security issues have been extremely useful in developing a shared understanding and providing a platform for regular dialogue on emerging and traditional threats. In contrast, the rigid framework for collective security set out in the Second World War-vintage Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) has proven unworkable.7

No doubt the most important confidence-building measure developed in the region is the so-called democratic clause, adopted by Mercosur in 1996,8 and included in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, adopted, ironically enough, on 11 September 2001. This, rather than terrorist attacks, was Latin America’s answer to the challenge of modernity. In both cases it is decreed that states where legitimate government has been unlawfully toppled will be suspended from the OAS until democratic conditions have been restored. This provides a powerful incentive for opposition forces to seek office or the settling of their political grievances through constitutional means. The threat of triggering widespread economic and political ostracism has shown itself to be highly effective in dissuading takeover bids in the region, sometimes at the behest of interested parties in neighbouring countries.9

Such regional arrangements seem much more effective in ensuring political stability than the setting up of rapid deployment forces for use within Latin America and the Caribbean.10
Intervention forces, i.e. military missions sent to member states without the full approval of local authorities, should be a measure of last resort preferably left to the purview of the UN Security Council, which holds ultimate legitimacy to authorise such operations.11

Similarly we see room for the OAS as well as the Inter-American Defense Council, at a more technical level, to develop as forums for discussion and cooperation on hemispheric security issues. The recent adoption of an inter-American terrorist convention is a good example. In more practical terms, Latin American armed forces regularly take part in joint exercises and operations, often with partners from outside the region. More to the point, coordination on regional threats is developing significantly, most particularly in dealing with transnational crimes such as drug and small arms trafficking. Brazil for its part is presently making its radar-based monitoring service of the Amazon basin available to its neighbours as part of a regional effort to eradicate these illicit activities.

The European experience in this context is invaluable in helping Latin America build on what it has already achieved. The lack of full-blown integration in the field of law and order has not hampered effective intra-European cooperation in dealing with common threats, including transnational illicit activities, in particular after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and 11 March 2004. Following in Europe’s footsteps, Latin America looks forward to creating its own region-wide ‘common space of liberty, security and justice’. Measures are being coordinated regionally to streamline judicial cooperation, especially as regards organised crime and terrorist activities. At the same time regional initiatives are being set up to exchange best practices in fostering greater social and economic inclusion.

Towards global governance

Brazil believes that the approach, as well as the underlying values, which guide this line of strategic thinking offer room for fruitful cooperation with the EU. This convergence of perceptions is on display in the various documents adopted in the dialogue that the EU maintains with both Mercosur and the Latin American and Caribbean region. The concrete commitments set out in the 2004
EU-Latin American and Caribbean Guadalajara summit concerning social cohesion, multilateralism and regional integration describe the range of shared goals and values uniting the two regions.

Past cooperation offers a useful framework for future joint operations. Through the Franco-German sponsored San José Dialogue, along with other European states’ efforts, Europe helped generate the necessary political momentum and economic incentives for a lasting solution to the Central American civil wars of the 1980s. In turn, Latin American troops took part in the UN peacekeeping operation that helped put an end to the conflicts in the Balkans. In 2003 two Brazilian C-130 Hercules transport planes helped airlift EU military cargo and troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo in a bid to restore order to the Bunia region. Brazil saw this invitation as recognition of its communality of purpose and of the potential for enhanced security cooperation in areas where it shares interests and capabilities. Brazil looks forward to new opportunities for cooperation. An idea to explore in this respect would be some kind of dialogue between High Representative Javier Solana, ESDP bodies and EU defence ministers with the Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas, whose sixth meeting took place in Quito, Ecuador, in November 2004.

Exchanges between the EU and Latin American authorities will also be an opportunity to better acquaint ourselves with European perceptions of global security issues in the post-11 September 2001 era. Latin American experts expect above all to gauge the practical implications of the European Security Strategy of December 2003. We look forward in particular to the European Parliament’s evaluation of this document in the expectation that it will help dispel misgivings that the debate on global security is being hijacked by a narrow focusing on the ‘unholy alliance’ of international terrorism, so-called failed states and weapons of mass destruction in the hands of non-state actors.

The EU’s apparent desire to come out from under NATO’s ‘shadow’ is significant in that it suggests a willingness to take on a full range of activities and responsibilities that must not be delegated to circumstantial coalitions of the willing. Most important of all is the assurance that, unlike NATO, it will only act under a UN mandate. This will ensure that the EU sees itself acting strictly in compliance with international law -never as a law unto itself. The answer to emerging threats is not to be found in pre-emptive
military strikes but rather in pre-emptive monitoring and active engagement at all stages to prevent a restive situation snowballing out of control. Brazil is confident that these are the principles that will guide the EU as it gains confidence and capabilities to enlarge its radius of action in the name of global security.

As it moves into the uncharted waters of the twenty-first century, Brazil hopes that the unfolding chaos in Iraq, as well as ominous signs that nuclear proliferation is gaining momentum (in direct proportion to the lack of any movement on the larger issue of general nuclear disarmament), will give pause for thought. Brazil is confident that the EU will find in a sober analysis of these worrisome trends the strength and the common purpose to overcome internal divisions and assume its rightful place at the head of a concerted alliance to rekindle long-held multilateral principles and core values of international coexistence. In these times of heightened terrorist alert, we must forge ahead on an international agenda that promotes collective security through what the Solana document calls ‘effective multilateralism’.

At the core of this agenda must be the reinstatement of the United Nations as the cornerstone of global governance. To this end Brazil – and Latin America and the Caribbean – looks forward to working with the EU on building what some have called a form of multi-regionalism that reinvigorates the UN’s global reach and effectiveness. Joint action is called for in strengthening respect for international law, in particular by upholding the need for full observance of human rights and by combating all forms of impunity by inter alia ensuring the effectiveness of the International Criminal Court. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a case in point where Brazil believes the United Nations should be more actively engaged in developing a lasting solution. The meeting that Brazil’s Special Envoy to the Middle East held with Javier Solana in October 2004 provided an opportunity to explore how the international community can work together to enforce the UN resolutions that help to implement a ‘road map’ towards lasting peace in the region.

Equally crucial is the reform of the UN system if our collective security regime is to regain credibility and effectiveness. The express support for Brazil’s candidature for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council from the two EU member states that are permanent members of the UNSC paves the way for constructive coordination at the highest level on defence and security issues.
Conclusion

Be it at the national, Mercosur or regional level, Brazil wishes to further develop its relations with the EU. The opportunities for cooperation are vast but two fields stand out because of the possibility they offer to forge a strategic alliance in the shaping of the new ‘security’ paradigm ushered in by the winds of economic globalisation, the global security challenges and the unstable solipsism of the remaining superpower.

On the one hand, Brazil is at present intensely involved in negotiations on a free trade agreement between Mercosur and the EU, in the expectation that these will add momentum to global efforts to push through a more equitable international trade regime, one that helps leverage development among the world’s poorest populations. There is no greater global challenge than eradicating poverty. After all, what stake does a small-scale farmer in a developing country have in a world that denies him the dignity of making an honest living from his work? What use does he have for a system that makes a mockery of the rhetoric of free trade and self-improvement?

On the other hand, the search for a fairer and therefore more effective global economic system is at the centre of present-day collective security efforts to deal comprehensively with large-scale outbreaks of political oppression, social unrest and economic deprivation throughout the world. The willingness of the EU to take on a prominent role both at home and abroad in promoting the rule of law and in conflict prevention in the international arena commensurate to its economic clout is an auspicious watershed.

Brazil will continue to engage with the EU, in the expectation that Europe really wishes to contribute to building a truly global governance, one that is centred on a strengthened multilateralism that fosters a more balanced and legitimate use of power, be it military or economic.
Mexico

Mexico’s future international orientation: the European Union as a model and influence

Francisco E. González

A part of Mexico’s modern character is European. Between the sixteenth and the mid-nineteenth centuries, wars, trade, immigration, arts and science predominantly of European provenance forged Mexico’s heritage. This does not mean, however, that Mexico enjoys a special historical relationship with Europe, because similar claims can be made about the other 25 independent republics of continental Latin America and the Caribbean. Thus, in the words of the late Brazilian intellectual and diplomat José Guilherme Merquior, Latin America as a whole is ‘the other West’.¹ Two remarks can be added in this context. Firstly, the Western (European) world was transformed by its contact with the indigenous cultures of the New World. Secondly, the Iberian pedigree of Latin America can be distinguished from the English (and to a lesser extent the French) pedigrees that came to dominate North America.

Today the Europeans are perceived differently in Latin America. Thanks to the great process of European integration that has taken place since the end of the Second World War, the differences between the Iberian, British, French, Dutch and other European countries’ experiences in the New World have been at least partly subsumed under a broader ‘European’ perspective. This broader perspective has its institutional basis in the European Union, from which flow across the Atlantic Ocean new ideas, as well as human, financial, technical and cultural resources of great importance for Latin America. Unfortunately, a similar process of constructive trans-national integration, capable of bringing the security, peace, prosperity and higher chances of a better future for successive generations that the European Union has created for its members’ populations, will not occur in the Americas in the near future. The main reason for this is the presence of deep intra- and international economic, social, ethnic, and political cleavages in the American continent. Even though perfect homogeneity is not in theory a strict prerequisite for bringing together and assimilating populations successfully, the magnitude of polarisation (be it

¹ José Guilherme Merquior, ‘El otro Occidente (un poco de filosofía de la historia desde Latinoamérica)’, Cuadernos Americanos, 15, 1989, pp. 9-23.
between individuals or groups in the same country or between different countries) is such in many parts of the New World that it is hard to imagine how they could emulate the transnational European experiment.

One of the deepest and most problematic cleavages in the American continent is the one highlighted by Merquior himself. It is represented physically by the 3,000-km border between Mexico and the United States, and its historical significance lies in its being the fault line where Latin and Anglo America meet. I argue in this essay that Mexico and the EU’s mutual interest lies first and foremost in this fault line. Both need to cooperate with the United States in such important areas for their future as the military, technology, the economy, diplomacy and politics, and therefore cooperation between the EU and Mexico is also crucial.

First, for Mexican leaders the European Union will remain the ideal that the much humbler North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) should aspire to. Second, Mexico is keen to strengthen its ties with the EU, as was evinced by the Third Summit of heads of state and government of Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union (ALCUE), which took place in Guadalajara, Mexico, in May 2004. However, it was also evident that more good intentions and pronouncements than concrete positions and commitments resulted from this and previous summits. Third, and as a consequence of last point, Mexico remains keen to activate strong ties with the EU and with its leading nation-states in areas such as trade (after all, the free trade agreement that both parties signed, and which came into effect on 1 July 2000, has been one of the most comprehensive ever negotiated by the EU), postgraduate education, and science and technology. Finally, Mexican as well as most other Latin American leaders strongly believe that the EU has (and should have) a strong impact on the international order through the promotion of multilateral diplomacy, the strengthening of the United Nations system, and the championing of peaceful conflict resolution and the maintenance of international peace. Mexico has supported these positions consistently since the creation of the UN. As a leading country in Latin America, it can cooperate with the EU by garnering and strengthening support for such shared positions throughout the subcontinent and in international forums.

What the coming together of European countries means in Mexico

Ideally, for Mexican and Latin American leaders European integration means the possibility of spreading peace, security, development and prosperity across national borders. In practice, the transnational European experiment has shown to both governments and intellectuals of developing nation-states the possibility of transcending borders between unequal partners. It is important to see that the countries of the continent that instigated and was the main theatre of two World Wars in the twentieth century have managed to transform their domestic and international orientation, prioritising peace, security, cooperation, and political and economic integration in less than fifty years.

Mexicans of the time were very conscious about conflictive, war-torn Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. In turn, today’s Mexicans admire and aspire to the high living standards (in such different areas as peace, security, rule of law, democratic governance, economic growth and social justice) seen in the EU’s ‘old’ member countries – or for that matter in the neighbouring United States. During the First World War, Mexico was acutely aware of the destruction of Europe, the country being in the grip of a decade-long revolution that destroyed it economically and killed more than 10 per cent of its population. It was not only European international conflicts that captured Mexicans’ attention, but also civil wars, above all, the Spanish Civil War. The Mexican government under Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40) supported the Spanish Republic and welcomed a host of transterrados, an apt concept used by Spanish philosopher José Gaos to refer to exiled Spaniards’ capacity to develop two national identities. Gaos and many others made Mexico their second patria, settling there for good. It would be difficult to quantify the enormous benefit that Mexican society, particularly Mexico’s universities, publishing houses, medical and legal professions, and arts’ scenes have derived from welcoming thousands of exiled Spaniards. Subsequently, Mexican leaders were aware also of the horrors of the Second World War and the destruction, once again, of Europe. The country’s government was firmly behind the Allies’ cause, and it promoted and participated in the founding of the United Nations. Since then, Mexican leaders and public opinion have come to admire the progressive expansion of European integration. If

there was ever need of a historical example of past conflict, destruction and human misery followed by apparently irreversible peace, progress and human development, this surely is Europe’s twentieth century history. And if the historical model is valid, then Mexicans would like to emulate it.

This is where their most important international relationship, that with the United States, comes into play. Mexicans would have found it difficult to believe one of its presidents calling for Mexican/United States integration along EU lines. However, that unlikely call has become a real policy line since the signing and coming into effect of the NAFTA agreement in 1994 with the United States and Canada. Thus it happened that Mexico’s President Vicente Fox (2000-06) began one of his early visits to the United States in 2001 by affirming his government’s interest in developing NAFTA more widely and deeply by following the example of the EU. Despite the fact that many commentators in both Mexico and the United States highlighted the point that Europe’s integration success since the 1950s had been due in large measure to the relative equality and common interests of the countries involved, this is an argument that has to be qualified. After all, first, the EU has been successful in integrating politically and economically, in successive waves, countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, which started well below the human development average of the Community’s early members. Second, the great Eastern expansion of the European Union in 2004, which increased the number of member nation-states from 15 to 25 (and the prospect of Turkey’s accession in the future), encompasses economic, social and political asymmetries that are not very different in magnitude and complexity from those that would entail the wider and deeper integration of Mexico, Canada, and the United States under NAFTA.

In the light of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC on 11 September 2001, and subsequent international realignments, American foreign policy changed from the apparent early interest of president George W. Bush in addressing the massive problem of migration that exists between the two countries to benign neglect since then. President Fox’s proposal went unheard, which was unfortunate particularly given his emphasis on one key feature of the EU’s legal arrangements that would transform the Mexico-US bilateral relationship: the free movement of persons across national borders (and not only of goods
and services, as is the case with NAFTA). This is a measure that cannot be overemphasised. The two countries are in desperate need of a new migratory regime (the last one they had was the so-called Bracero Program for temporary agricultural workers between 1942 and 1964). Fox’s proposal, based on the European example, was an attempt to engage the United States bilaterally. In turn, the Bush government only committed itself to, on the one hand, the establishment of a Border Partnership, whose aim is to secure the Mexico-US border from potential terrorist incursions into American territory and, on the other, a unilaterally defined temporary worker programme (whose ratification in the US Congress seems unlikely). The United States has thus kept its migratory policy vis-à-vis its southern neighbour as an internal, unilateral rather than a shared, bilateral concern. Successive Mexican governments will most likely keep voicing and supporting the more liberal, progressive alternative as seen in practice between the EU’s member states. Thus, the free movement of persons will remain one of the fundamental arrangements that the European model of integration offers to Mexican leaders and policy-makers in their constant dealings with their counterparts in the United States.

**EU-Latin America summits**

Latin American/Caribbean heads of state in general, and Mexican ones in particular, have embraced enthusiastically the three regional summits they have had with their European counterparts (Rio de Janeiro, 1999; Madrid, 2002; Guadalajara, 2004). The purpose of these summits has been to strengthen the political, economic and cultural bonds of both regions with the aim of creating a ‘bi-regional strategic association’ capable of responding to the challenges of globalisation. The first two summits produced documents whose intentions were the establishment of the ‘bi-regional strategic association’. These documents were ratified last May in Guadalajara. An important document on shared values and positions between the two regions was also drafted and adopted. Fifty-eight heads of state and government (or their personal representatives) participated in the Guadalajara summit. It was the first international event in which the 25 heads of state and government of the enlarged EU participated. Notwithstanding the great effort that has gone into the organisation of these summits, Mexican and

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other Latin American countries’ leaders, the regional media and public opinion have thus far concluded that these encounters have only produced good intentioned pronouncements and declarations without any great substance.

In fairness, rhetoric has not been the only output of the summits. After all, as a consequence of the Guadalajara summit the 58 representatives pledged to condemn the abuse, torture and inhumane treatment (a propos the abuses committed by US soldiers against Iraqi prisoners of war) of people wherever they occur; to support the International Criminal Court; to come out strongly in favour of the strengthening of the UN; and to advise and cooperate in fostering a process of economic integration in Latin America and the Caribbean. Even though the representatives of both regions found important common interests, key differences remained. For Mexican and other Latin American leaders one of the most important differences with their European counterparts was the issue of immigrants’ human rights. Whereas Latin America is and will remain a region one of whose key exports is human labour, the European Union is and will remain a net importer of human labour and exporter of capital. Given the problems derived from illegal immigration into EU countries (i.e., human smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal weapons’ sales, prostitution), EU leaders in Guadalajara were reluctant to include references to this issue, being wary that they might soften conditions for these types of activities to keep flourishing. In contrast, Latin American leaders are keen to create international guarantees for their emigrant citizens, millions of whom leave their countries annually for, first, the United States, but also increasingly for European Union countries such as Spain, Italy, France and the United Kingdom. The summit concluded with a joint declaration about the importance of an approach that should be ‘integral’ to the problem of immigration, but without proposing concrete measures.

Despite the Mexican government’s effort in the promotion of the third summit, in Guadalajara, it was clear to the Mexican media that important differences continued to exist between the level of energy, resources and intelligence devoted to this summit vis-à-vis summits with the United States. Mexico’s main interests lie north rather than across the Atlantic. If Mexico was capable of strengthening its links with the EU, no doubt this would be used also to gain leverage vis-à-vis future negotiations with the United States. On the other hand, as was visible during the Guadalajara
summit, Mexico aligned with the European mainstream concerning the endorsement of multilateral diplomacy and the peaceful solution of international conflicts. Although the Europeans were split between countries that supported and those that opposed the US-led war against Iraq in 2003, it was particularly important for two Latin American countries, namely, Mexico and Chile, to have some European support in the UN Security Council. In the run-up to the war, these two non-permanent members of the UN Security Council did not agree with the attempt by the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain to pass a resolution that would have given international legal sanction to the armed intervention.

Strengthening the EU-Mexico relationship in the twenty-first century

The Guadalajara summit showed that Mexico is interested in strengthening and deepening its relations with the EU. Mexican leaders would like Europe to look on Mexico as the Latin American gateway to the United States. Mexican leaders, who had been sceptical until the early 1990s about the United States’s contribution to the country’s development, changed their tune, and now prioritise that relationship. It would be a positive development if EU-Mexican cooperation could enhance their efforts in strengthening their respective key relationships with the United States.

The questions that arise are: how might EU-Mexican relations be strengthened in the near future, and can concrete recommendations be made? One area in which both parties have put in place legal instruments and expertise since the year 2000 is the promotion of free trade. The European Union is Latin America’s second trading partner (it is the main trading partner for Mercosur, Chile and the Andean Group, but not for Mexico). Despite the publicised endorsement of the Mexican free trade agreement with the EU by the then Mexican government under President Ernesto Zedillo, concrete results thus far have been disappointing. This is particularly the case if the trading profile of Mexico with the EU is contrasted with NAFTA. Tables 1 and 2 show the percentage of Mexico’s imports/export with both blocs since 1994 (the year NAFTA came into effect).
Table 1: Mexico’s imports from NAFTA and the EU 1994-2003 (percentages)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA total</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU total</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the world</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>25.5</td>
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</table>

Table 2: Mexico’s exports to NAFTA and the EU 1994-2003 (percentages)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>89.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA total</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU total</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the world</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
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</table>
An overwhelming proportion of Mexico’s trade has been conducted with the United States during the last decade. Out of Mexico’s total imports, between two-thirds and three-quarters have come from that country. Even more, out of Mexico’s total exports during the last decade, between 85 and 90 per cent have been placed in the United States. Whereas there is no clear trend for Mexican imports, the proportion of exports going to the United States has increased. In marked contrast, Mexico’s commerce with the EU has been frustratingly low. Not more than 11.4 per cent of Mexican annual imports have come from the EU, while not more than 5 per cent of Mexican annual exports have been placed in Europe.

The existence of the EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement since July 2000 should have created incentives to increase bilateral trade. It is still probably too early to make a serious judgement about the success or failure of that agreement. Trade benefits from cumulative experience whereby partners improve and find new opportunities as they engage with each other, gather information, build trust and establish links that can then be deepened. Given that the legal instruments, the expertise and some infrastructure are already in place, increasing EU-Mexico trading links appears to be a concrete possibility for mutual gain.

Other practical areas in which a deepening relationship can be established between Mexico and the European Union are higher education, science and technology. Compared with developed countries, Mexico’s annual expenditure on science and technology as a percentage of its GDP is low. For example, in 2001 Sweden spent 3.8 per cent of its GDP on science and technology, the United States 2.8 per cent, Germany 2.5 per cent, France 2.2 per cent, Britain 1.8 per cent and Spain 1 per cent. In contrast, Mexico spent only 0.4 per cent.7

This does not mean that Mexico is not interested in strengthening its science, and in cooperating with more advanced countries to enhance its and their international position in the world. Mexico’s Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT) has established both bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements with governments and scientific institutions around the world. In particular, it has established bilateral cooperation programmes with nine EU member countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom)8 and multilateral cooperation programmes

with international scientific institutions located in EU countries such as Italy, Spain and Sweden.\(^9\)

An area of strategic importance for the strengthening of economic, cultural and political links between Mexico and the EU is postgraduate education. CONACYT has financed thousands of young Mexicans to do postgraduate studies abroad since the early 1970s. While the largest proportion of these students used to choose universities in the United States to complete their education, since the second half of the 1990s Mexican students’ demand for universities in European countries has increased. Whereas CONACYT financed 1,261 postgraduate students to go to the United States in 1997, these numbers dropped to 1,087 in 2000 and 927 in 2002. In contrast, CONACYT’s financing of Mexican students to European universities increased steadily in the same period. The largest recipients of Mexican postgraduate students have been universities in Britain (491 in 1997, 674 in 2000 and 764 in 2002), France (287 in 1997, 386 in 2000 and 425 in 2002), and Spain (297 in 1997, 332 in 2000 and 387 in 2002).\(^{10}\) Several reasons account for these trends. For instance, the United States has tightened all its visa procedures as a consequence of 9/11, and Mexican students are facing much higher entry costs to the United States than to EU countries.

**EU-Mexico cooperation in strengthening multilateral diplomacy and international peace**

Mexico has been a long-term advocate of national self-determination, non-intervention, multilateral diplomacy and the peaceful resolution of international conflicts. During the League of Nations years, Mexican diplomat Genaro Estrada formulated a doctrine – which subsequently came to be known as the *Doctrina Mexico* or *Doctrina Estrada* – whose basic tenet was the non-recognition of foreign governments. From this perspective, foreign governments’ recognition amounted to intervention in the domestic affairs of a nation-state. Such intervention curtailed national governments’ self-determination and sovereignty. Since then, Mexican governments have not recognised any governments. Rather, they have simply sent or recalled ambassadors and diplomatic staff without pronouncing on the legality or legitimacy of particular governments worldwide. Among other things, this doctrine


allowed successive Mexican governments to navigate successfully the treacherous waters of international affairs during the Cold War.

Since the year 2000, Mexico has embraced a more active role in international affairs by, for example, holding a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council and making formal pronouncements against the domestic political practices of some countries, most prominently state-sponsored human rights abuses in Cuba. Even though to many domestic and international observers this new stance means that Mexico has dumped the Estrada doctrine, this view has to be qualified. The Mexican foreign affairs establishment keeps supporting (and will continue to support) national self-determination, multilateral diplomacy and the peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Given the country’s turbulent international history and its geopolitical position, these principles will continue to be the backbone of Mexican foreign policy.

Unfortunately, Mexico’s accent on non-intervention has led successive governments to a rather lukewarm attitude vis-à-vis contributing to peacekeeping operations – although this might change in the future.

Most Latin American governments opposed war in Iraq without UN sanction. The perceived unilateral military strategy of the United States divided Europe much more than it did Latin America. After all, five leading European countries split into opposing camps (Britain, Italy and Spain vs. France and Germany), whose differences could not be reconciled. Latin American nations, particularly since the wave of democratisation that swept the subcontinent in the 1980s and 1990s, have embraced multilateral diplomacy and the peaceful resolution of international conflicts. The large Latin American contingent of nations will probably continue to come out in support of these positions in international forums. This should be good news for those leading European countries (and the EU authorities) which are trying to do the same.

Mexican and Latin American authorities in general agree with the European Security Strategy (ESS) launched by Javier Solana at the end of 2003. Such agreement includes both broad points contained in the EU’s new global security strategy, such as a renewed emphasis in the use of effective multilateralism, and more focused and specific points such as the assessment of risks and challenges derived from international terrorism since 2001. With respect to
the broader point, democratically elected Latin American governments of both the right and left have consistently supported the use of multilateral initiatives to solve international conflicts since the end of the Cold War. A measure of how little official support there was for unilateral intervention in Iraq was not only the negative vote by Mexico and Chile in the UN Security Council, but also the fact that out of the 23 independent republics in Latin America and the Caribbean only 4 small ones joined the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’; Thus, 361 Salvadoran, 367, Honduran, 115 Nicaraguan and 302 Dominican troops joined the Spanish military contingent of 1,300 in Iraq. The fact that it was among the smallest and most economically dependent countries in the region that support for the US invasion of Iraq originated, stressed how marginal backing for unilateral action was, and how broad and unanimous were the repeated calls in support of effective multilateralism by the governments of the larger countries in the region.

It is more difficult to generalise about the level of agreement by Mexican and Latin American authorities with respect to the risks and challenges posed by international terrorism. As pointed out above, authorities throughout the subcontinent agree with the ESS’s assessment of international terrorism as a key challenge to the contemporary international system. Most authorities would welcome the coordination and sharing of information, as well as the discussion of complementary tactics and strategies to combat this problem. However, each Latin American country faces a particular geopolitical challenge as well as specific domestic circumstances, which might not be easy to accommodate within a grand transnational strategy. For example, neighbouring countries such as Colombia and Venezuela have very different positions with respect to the persecution and eradication of terrorism. For the former country this has meant welcoming the full cooperation and support of the US government and military in combating left-wing guerrillas, while in the latter country American intervention in the name of the fight against terrorism or any other goal is perceived suspiciously and as part of a neo-imperialist strategy. The current governments in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay, though not as radical as Venezuela’s, also remain suspicious of the ‘war on terror’ and its potential for sanctioning unilateral interventionism. Mexico’s policy, though not as clear-cut as Colombia’s, also comes closer to a strategy of cooperation
with the United States. As noted above, at the insistence of the Bush government, both governments signed the Border Partnership, whose aim is to secure the 3,000-km Mexico-US border from potential terrorist incursions into American territory. With news and political sources in Washington currently repeating the assertion that the United States’s southern border is a ‘soft spot’ in the ‘war on terror’, we can expect the pressure on Mexican governments for closer cooperation with Washington on this point to remain high.

It should therefore not come across as surprising that Mexican authorities believe that the European Union is one of the only international actors capable of throwing its weight against unilateral and military solutions in international affairs. The EU, and its defence of effective multilateralism, is a key counterweight to the growth of the bilateral Mexico-US (though clearly driven by the United States) relationship with respect to security and terrorism. In this light, it is also important to emphasise the fact that national interests and bilateral agendas sometimes keep trumping the support of principled international positions by all or most of the countries of Latin America and the European Union.

A recent illustration during the Guadalajara summit was disagreement over the case of Cuba. Even though in principle all participants were in favour of issuing a joint declaration against the unilateral and extraterritorial application of national laws (a practice that hurts, among other things, international law and international trade), differences arose when the Cuban delegation and supporting delegations from other countries tried to include an explicit reference to the Helms-Burton law, through which the United States has hardened a long-term economic embargo (a blockade according to Cuba) against the island. The end result was that the, in principle, honourable condemnation of extraterritorial application of national laws had to be dropped due to individual countries’ positions vis-à-vis the United States.

Despite this and other instances of international policy differences, Mexico is strongly in favour of cooperating with and supporting a strong EU presence in international forums, particularly when this presence translates into the reaffirmation of Mexico’s most cherished international principles such as national self-determination, multilateral diplomacy, and the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.
Conclusion

Mexico’s future international orientation will be crafted primarily according to how its relations with the United States evolve. However, Mexicans recognise that an important part of their heritage is European, and that the great process of European integration is something worth emulating. Thus, the European Union will remain a very strong model, whose economic, cultural, diplomatic, and technological influence on Mexico, and vice versa, will depend on the political willingness of both parties’ authorities to deepen the relationship. The formal mechanisms that keep Latin American/Caribbean and European leaders in touch are already in place through the ALCUE scheme and through bilateral meetings of individual or groups of Latin American/Caribbean countries with EU delegations. Within the Latin American concert of nations, Mexico would like Europe to see it as the gate to the United States. If this were the case, then both parties might work together to cultivate their most important international relationship in a mutually supportive way.

The European Union can also engage Mexico, a country with 105 million inhabitants, more closely in concrete future-enhancing areas such as free trade, science and technology, and postgraduate education. In all these cases, the legal arrangements, expertise, infrastructure, and mutual interest already exist. Good and improving results have been seen, for example, in the increasing number of Mexican students who choose European universities to complete their education at the postgraduate level. This growing relationship is precisely the type that could yield the solid, new understanding and long-term cooperation which both Latin American and European leaders and intellectuals keep advocating as an antidote to the pitfalls and dangers of globalisation.11

Finally, Mexico’s continuing support for national self-determination, multilateral diplomacy, and the peaceful resolution of international conflicts cannot be overemphasised. Successive Mexican governments and public opinion admire the capacity of the concert of European nations in putting their long-term, destructive differences behind them and embracing peace, security and prosperity in less than half a century. Mexicans believe that the EU, particularly after the development of its common foreign, security and defence policy and the publication of the European Security Strategy, is a key international actor capable of...
utilising its weight in support of multilateral diplomacy and the maintenance of international peace. From their own position, on the northern fault line of 'the other West', Mexicans will continue to support these principles and the countries and international actors that do so too.
La Chine et l’UE : vers une coopération stratégique

Depuis 1975, l’établissement de relations officielles entre la Chine et la Communauté économique européenne a servi les intérêts de chacune des deux parties. Lors de leur premier sommet en 1998, la relation sino-européenne pour l’avenir a été définie comme « une relation de partenariat constructif stable et à long terme face au 21ème siècle » ; cinq ans plus tard, cette relation se développait à grand pas, et entrait dans une nouvelle période de coopération stratégique.

Les caractéristiques de la coopération stratégique


La notion de « coopération stratégique » a été acceptée par la Chine et l’UE

Dans son cinquième document, A maturing partnership : shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations, qui a été rendu public le 10 septembre 2003, l’UE a proposé : « The EU and China have ever-greater interest to work together as strategic partners to safeguard and promote sustainable development, peace and stability » 1. Le 12 octobre 2003, le gouvernement chinois a publié son premier document sur sa politique vis-à-vis de l’UE, dans lequel il entend « renforcer sa coopération globale avec l’UE en faveur d’un développement régulier et durable des relations sino-européennes ». A la fin du même mois, alors que les dirigeants

chinois rencontraient les représentants de l'UE venus participer au sommet sino-européen, le président chinois Hu Jintao a approuvé la proposition européenne de développer le partenariat global de la stratégie sino-européenne ; une relation jugée mûre, solide et stratégique par le premier ministre chinois Wen Jiabao.

Dans la Stratégie européenne de Sécurité intitulée « Une Europe sûre dans un monde meilleur », la Chine était considérée comme l’un des principaux partenaires stratégiques². L’établissement de la notion de la coopération stratégique par les dirigeants des deux parties signifie qu’ils ont fait le choix juste qu’imposaient les besoins du développement et la situation internationale.

Le contenu de la stratégie est précis et concret

Ces dernières années, la Chine et l’Union ont trouvé de nouveaux thèmes de coopération dans le domaine de la « sécurité étendue », c’est-à-dire, la sécurité de l’économie, des finances, de l’environnement, des ressources, de la lutte contre le SRAS ainsi qu’en ce qui concerne la sécurité traditionnelle telle que la lutte contre le terrorisme, la lutte contre les immigrations illégales et la prévention de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive. La Nouvelle Conception de Sécurité chinoise lancée en 1996 et fondée sur la confiance mutuelle, l’intérêt réciproque, l’égalité et la concertation³, le Livre blanc sur sa politique ainsi que les mesures sur la prévention de prolifération récemment prises par le gouvernement chinois ont été largement appréciés par l’UE. La Chine attache, quant à elle, beaucoup d’importance à la Stratégie européenne de Sécurité.

L’accord de coopération sur Galileo et l’accord de coopération spatiale signés par la Chine et l’Union sont des initiatives stratégiques et technologiques visant à se débarrasser du contrôle américain sur le système GPS. La Chine et l’Union ont beaucoup de points communs sur les grands problèmes internationaux : l’une et l’autre sont favorables à la coopération multilatérale sous le leadership de l’ONU, à la démocratisation des relations internationales et à la multipolarisation mondiale ; elles préconisent toutes deux la résolution pacifique des conflits, une « gestion intégrée »⁴ des affaires mondiales grâce au soft power, une consultation stratégique accrue ainsi qu’une liaison téléphonique, ou « ligne rouge » sur les crises internationales les plus graves.

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4. Différente de la gestion par le hard power des États-Unis, la « gestion intégrée » demande, pour mieux gérer les affaires internationales, une gestion globale à travers tous les moyens nécessaires, y compris politiques, diplomatiques, économiques, culturels, policiers, juridiques et, enfin, militaires.
Les bases de la coopération stratégique ont été définies

Mise en œuvre de la coopération stratégique
La Chine et l’Union ont commencé à utiliser la coopération stratégique aux niveaux aussi bien bilatéral que multilatéral. Dans le premier domaine, pour des questions sensibles telles que les droits de l’homme, Taiwan, le Tibet, la vente des armes à Taiwan, etc., les deux parties ont réglé les problèmes à travers le dialogue et la consultation, choisissant l’échange plutôt que l’affrontement, et s’accordant mutuellement plus de compréhension et de tolérance. Au niveau des Etats européens, la Chine a renforcé sa coopération avec l’UE, ainsi qu’avec la France, l’Allemagne et le Royaume-Uni sur les questions régionales et internationales ; les différentes parties s’appuient mutuellement et coordonnent même leurs efforts sur d’importants dossiers internationaux, du jamais vu dans l’histoire sino-européenne. Au début de la crise irakienne, la Chine, la France, et l’Allemagne ont, à travers une consultation étroite, joué un rôle important à l’égard de la résolution 1441 du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU sur l’Irak.5 Avant l’attaque des Etats-Unis contre l’Irak, la Chine s’est résolument rangée aux côtés de la France, de l’Allemagne et de la Russie pour déjouer l’intention des Etats-Unis et du Royaume-Uni de voter une motion à l’ONU en vue de

5. Grâce aux efforts de la Chine, de la France et de la Russie, le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU a adopté à l’unanimité la résolution 1441 en novembre 2002. Cette résolution réaffirme la souveraineté et l’intégrité territoriale de l’Irak du Koweït et des États voisins, décide d’accorder à l’Irak une dernière possibilité de s’acquitter des obligations en matière de désarmement, demande au gouvernement irakien de fournir, dans un délai de 30 jours, une déclaration exacte et complète sur tous les aspects de ses programmes de développement d’armes chimiques, biologiques et nucléaires, et rappelle enfin que, si l’Irak continuait à manquer à ses obligations, il aurait à faire face à de « graves conséquences ».

**Une nouvelle coopération stratégique**

C’est à cause de profonds changements de la situation internationale et bilatérale que la Chine et l’UE ont décidé de renforcer leur coopération. Les raisons qui poussent la relation sino-européenne vers une nouvelle coopération stratégique sont les suivantes :

*Premièrement, les points communs entre les deux parties se multiplient.* Sur les problèmes internationaux et stratégiques, tels que la construction d’un monde multipolarisé, le rôle essentiel de l’ONU et des autres institutions multilatérales, la sécurité et la lutte contre le terrorisme, la « gestion intégrée » des affaires mondiales, et la diversité des civilisations, la Chine et l’UE ont des positions et des points communs. Ayant un siège permanent au Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, la Chine étendra son influence dans les affaires internationales et jouera un rôle plus responsable et plus mûr. Tandis que l’Union, grâce à sa puissance, à sa position traditionnelle et à son influence internationale, avec deux pays (France et Royaume-Uni) membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, jouera sans doute un rôle indépendant dans les affaires mondiales.

*Deuxièmement, le besoin de la lutte en commun contre l’unilatéralisme.* Après le 11 septembre 2001, les Etats-Unis ont successivement lancé la notion « d’axe du mal » et promu une politique de préemption, afin de casser le système multilatéral actuel et le cadre du droit
international, de réorganiser l’ordre mondial sous leur contrôle à travers le hard power, sous prétexte de lutter contre le terrorisme. Face à ce nouveau défi, aucun pays seul ne parvient à endiguer le pouvoir de l’unilatéralisme américain ; ce n’est qu’à travers la coopération internationale et le soft power qu’on peut former une force de « contrainte légère » pour contrebalancer l’hégémonisme et l’unilatéralisme. Dans ce contexte, la Chine et l’Union, deux grandes puissances ayant des points de vue différents sur la gouvernance globale avec les États-Unis, empruntent la même voie.

La crise et la division de la communauté internationale engendrées par l’attaque militaire des États-Unis contre l’Irak au début de l’année 2003 a été une épreuve de force entre la multipolarité et l’unipolarité, entre le multilatéralisme et l’unilatéralisme. Aujourd’hui, embourbés entre le Tigre et l’Euphrate, les Américains sont obligés de se tourner vers l’ONU. Grâce à l’action de la Chine, de la France, de l’Allemagne et de la Russie, qui ont fermement soutenu les principes mêmes et le rôle de l’ONU, et encouragé l’action multilatérale, la communauté internationale a pu restreindre le hard power de l’Amérique en osant dire non à son hégémonisme et à son unilatéralisme.

Troisièmement, les divergences entre les deux rives de l’Atlantique ne cessent de s’accroître. Que l’Europe et l’Amérique croisent le fer à propos du fromage, de la banane ou de l’acier comme ce fut le cas autrefois, ou qu’elles s’opposent au sujet du veto, de questions diplomatiques ou de l’ordre mondial comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui, leur partenariat traditionnel se heurte aux intérêts stratégiques de l’autre partie. La France et l’Allemagne, pays moteurs de l’Union, prônent inlassablement la multipolarité contre l’unipolarité des États-Unis. Ces derniers, considérant que l’intégration européenne met en question leurs intérêts, voire les menace, renoncent à soutenir l’Union et s’efforcent de mettre des bâtons dans les roues en allant jusqu’à fabriquer une « nouvelle » et une « vieille » Europe pour nuire au processus de l’intégration européenne. En même temps, l’UE ne se satisfait plus de jouer un rôle secondaire sur la scène internationale, d’avoir le porte-monnaie généreux et de jouer les balayeurs une fois terminée la guerre menée par les États-Unis. En accélérant l’Union politique et de la défense, d’une perspective chinoise, elle a l’ambition de jouer un rôle particulier dans les affaires internationales et de se retrouver sur un pied d’égalité avec les Américains. Il est inévitable que l’émergence de l’Union, qui
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Obstacles dans la relation

Toutefois, étant donné leurs différences traditionnelles qu’il s’agisse de leur histoire, de leurs traditions culturelles, de leurs régimes politiques et de leur développement économique, la relation entre la Chine et l’Europe n’est pas exempte de désaccords et de facteurs négatifs. Certaines questions, depuis longtemps en suspens, ne correspondent plus à l’atmosphère stratégique d’aujourd’hui.

1) Les divergences qui opposent le Royaume-Uni, la France et l’Allemagne, les petits et les grands pays, la « nouvelle » et la « vieille » Europe (et le sabotage sous-jacent opéré par l’Amérique) limitent la construction d’une politique étrangère commune et d’une défense autonome. À l’intérieur comme à l’extérieur, l’Union ne parvient ni à parler d’une seule voix ni à former une politique étrangère unifiée. La France, la Grande-Bretagne et l’Allemagne ont chacune leur politique mondiale propre. À certaines occasions, la Chine se trouve dans une situation gênante et ne sait pas quel comportement adopter vis-à-vis
de l’UE et de ses pays membres ; sa politique de développement des relations avec ces derniers a du reste été considérée comme « une tentation persistante de traiter en priorité avec les États membres, voire d’opposer ceux-ci entre eux »6.

2) Les principaux problèmes économiques sont les suivants : a) alors que l’économie de marché est très développée en Chine, l’Union refuse de lui accorder un « statut d’économie de marché à part entière » alors qu’elle l’a fait pour d’autres pays moins avancés dans ce domaine ; b) après l’adhésion de la Chine à l’Organisation mondiale du Commerce (OMC) et l’augmentation de l’exportation des marchandises chinoises vers l’Union, les cas d’antidumping de l’Union à l’égard de la Chine se multiplient ; c) l’introduction officielle de l’euro et l’élargissement de l’Union induisent une forme de protectionnisme ; si la Chine est exclue, cela risque de porter atteinte à l’économie chinoise et au commerce sino-européen.

3) La relation sino-européenne peut-être gênée sur le long terme par les questions des droits de l’homme, du Tibet, de Taiwan et autres sujets sensibles ; les discussions sur les résultats « formels » et « substantiels » faisant suite aux débats concernant les questions sensibles et les pressions exercées de temps à autre par le Parlement européen montrent qu’il existe une ombre sur la relation sino-européenne.

4) La sanction prise après le 4 juin 1989 par l’Union à l’encontre de la Chine (l’interdiction de ventes d’armes à la Chine) n’est pas encore levée. En réalité, cette sanction, qui n’a plus de raison d’être, renforce l’intérêt de l’adversaire de la concurrence, et porte grandement atteinte aux intérêts de l’UE.

5) La relation sino-européenne est asymétrique : la Chine entretient parallèlement une relation bilatérale avec les pays membres et une relation multilatérale avec l’Union, et l’Europe en profite pour s’octroyer plus de droits et se dérober aux actes. Actuellement, sous prétexte que certains pays n’acceptent pas d’accorder à la Chine un statut d’économie de marché à part entière et de lever l’interdiction de ventes d’armes à Pékin, l’Union continue de laisser ces deux problèmes en suspens. Cette asymétrie et le rejet mutual des responsabilités entre l’UE et les pays membres

réduisent en réalité l’autorité et la confiance de la politique européenne sur la Chine, et entravent la mise sur pied d’une relation stratégique sino-européenne.

Dans un contexte de mutation de la situation internationale, la relation sino-européenne doit s’accommoder des points forts et des points faibles qu’elle comporte, tout en maintenant les points faibles au niveau le plus bas possible afin de garantir que la coopération stratégique des deux parties occupe une place dominante.

**Perspectives d’avenir**

Les dix prochaines années seront, aussi bien pour la Chine que pour l’Union une période de développement accéléré et d’influence grandissante. Compte tenu de la mutation qu’elles traversent toutes deux, elles se sont fixé des objectifs stratégiques ambitieux et ont entrepris chacune un processus de réforme et de réajustement, fournissant davantage d’espace et d’opportunités à la coopération sino-européenne. Le « facteur chinois » et le « facteur européen » joueront des rôles décisifs sur le futur échiquier international.


L’importance du facteur européen pour la Chine

Le gouvernement chinois considère les vingt prochaines années comme une période d’opportunité stratégique. « Les deux premières décennies du XXIème siècle constituent pour notre pays une période importante et pleine d’opportunités stratégiques que nous devrons saisir à tout prix, de manière à en tirer grand profit », annonce le rapport du Parti communiste chinois en novembre 2002. Promouvoir la relation avec l’UE correspond aux intérêts en question, qui nécessitent à l’extérieur un contexte et une atmosphère internationale favorables à la Chine.

L’UE n’est pas les États-Unis, le Japon, la Russie ou l’Inde. Entre la Chine et l’Union, il n’existe ni problème géopolitique, ni contradiction en ce qui concerne la sécurité stratégique, ni conflit d’intérêt majeur ; maintenant que la rétrocession de Hong Kong et de

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Macao à la Chine a été réglée pacifiquement, il n’existe plus de contentieux. Tout en s’élargissant, l’UE accélère son processus d’approfondissement. Cette intégration suit la voie de la multipolarisation. A travers l’élargissement à l’extérieur et l’approfondissement à l’intérieur, l’UE réalise des progrès considérables en matière d’intégration politique, économique, de sécurité et de défense. Surtout après la guerre contre l’Irak, les Européens, confrontés à une expérience douloureuse, ont tranché dans le vif en accélérant le rythme de l’Union et l’établissement d’une défense autonome. C’est ainsi qu’ont vu le jour la Stratégie européenne de Sécurité et le projet de la première Constitution européenne. Avec son élargissement du 1er mai 2004, l’Union a pris une dimension nouvelle, en regroupant des États venant aussi bien d’Europe orientale que d’Europe occidentale, avec une superficie de 4 millions de km2, une population de 450 millions d’habitants et un PIB franchissant le cap des 10.000 milliards de dollars américains. Grâce à son influence et à son attrait, l’Union constitue une puissance politique, économique, financière, scientifique et technique qui rivalisera avec les États-Unis.

L’importance de la Chine pour l’Union

Ces dernières années, des actes terroristes, des guerres et des conflits ont touché presque toutes les régions du monde entier, sauf la Chine. Après vingt ans de réformes et d’ouverture, celle-ci est parvenue à stabiliser sa politique et à développer rapidement son économie : elle devient aujourd’hui la « Terre promise » et un véritable paradis économique pour les Européens. Les pays d’Europe sont conscients de l’importance de la Chine tant pour sa nombreuse population que pour son immense potentiel commercial, et pensent que l’Europe ne devrait pas jouer la politique de l’autruche envers la Chine. Bien que les mesures concernant cette dernière diffèrent d’un pays à l’autre, leur conscience de l’importance de la Chine est la même. L’Europe s’oppose depuis longtemps à l’isolement de la Chine, espérant influencer le développement de ce pays à travers des contacts étroits. De plus, la Chine en tant qu’énorme marché potentiel est très attrayante pour l’Europe. Son influence grandissante dans l’économie mondiale incite les pays d’Europe à la regarder d’un œil neuf, même si, comme dans la plupart des pays d’Europe, son économie a connu une période de stagnation ces deux dernières années. En outre, l’Europe a hautement apprécié la participation de Pékin aux actions de maintien de la paix et sa façon
de traiter la crise nucléaire coréenne. La Chine est maintenant un membre responsable de la communauté internationale. L’Europe espère que la Chine deviendra un partenaire important de la lutte antiterroriste, de la non-prolifération et dans d’autres domaines.

Depuis le 11 septembre 2001, le sens de la coopération, de l’engagement et de la responsabilité s’est renforcé en Chine, devenue moins susceptible, moins méfiante et renonçant à sa politique de prévention vis-à-vis de l’extérieur. Dans les vingt ou trente prochaines années, la Chine pourrait occuper à l’échelle mondiale la 2e ou 3e position économique. L’émergence d’une telle puissance économique demanderait de s’engager davantage sur la scène internationale dans les domaines diplomatique et politique, et de jouer un rôle responsable et important. Comme Chris Patten, Commissaire européen chargé des relations extérieures, l’a expliqué au mois de septembre 2003, à l’occasion de l’adoption par la Commission d’un nouveau document sur la Chine, « les relations entre l’UE et la Chine avaient connu une croissance dynamique au cours des dix dernières années et s’étaient développées bien au-delà des domaines traditionnels que sont le commerce, les investissements et l’assistance technique. Ces changements se sont traduits par une nouvelle maturité dans les relations qui se caractérisent par une coordination de plus en plus étroite de la politique dans de nombreux domaines. La transition réussie de la Chine en un pays stable, prospère et ouvert attaché à la démocratie, aux principes de libre-échange et à la primauté du droit présente pour nous un intérêt politique et économique majeur ; nous déploierons tous les efforts nécessaires pour soutenir ce processus de transition ».

Les piliers de la relation

C’est dans ces conditions que le contenu de la relation de partenariat stratégique sino-européenne a besoin de s’enrichir et de se perfectionner sans cesse. En évitant la superficialité et l’exagération, l’encadrement de la relation stratégique doit comprendre les trois éléments suivants.

Tout d’abord, une relation d’interdépendance fondée sur l’intérêt général et la connaissance commune. Compte tenu de l’évolution des relations sino-européennes, il faut un contexte stabilisé et sûr à l’extérieur comme à l’intérieur. La Chine et l’Union estiment que la coexistence pacifique peut assurer la paix et le développement. Elles tentent de réaliser l’Union (de l’Europe) et la
réunification (de la Chine) grâce au développement économique et non par des moyens militaires. Elles recommandent la multipolarité et la diversité du futur échiquier mondial ainsi que le renforcement de l’autorité de l’ONU. Elles s’opposent aux politiques unilatérales et militaires de l’Amérique, en développant chacune aussi une relation avec les États-Unis. Elles recherchent un partenariat stratégique actuel et potentiel qui corresponde à leurs propres intérêts. Enfin, en acquérant un profil et un langage similaires dans les domaines politique, économique et commercial, elles visent à une coopération stratégique plus pragmatique et significative. Autant de caractéristiques qui forment un fondement solide pour la relation d’interdépendance sino-européenne. En ce qui concerne les difficultés générées par les différences, il est nécessaire de rechercher les points communs tout en laissant de côté les divergences, à travers un dialogue spécifique et durable.

Ensuite, la relation sino-européenne doit être basée sur un mécanisme de coopération stratégique fondé sur le soutien et l’aide mutuels. Comme l’a déclaré l’ancien ministre français des Affaires étrangères, Dominique de Villepin : « Sur toutes les questions, nos deux continents ont un rôle essentiel à jouer. Aux antipodes l’un de l’autre par la géographie, ils convergent par leur vision marquée par l’histoire et le souci de prendre en compte la complexité du monde. A nous de transformer aujourd’hui une fascination mutuelle, une curiosité mutuelle vieille de plusieurs siècles en une force de cohésion et de paix pour le monde, une force de proposition et d’action »

La Chine, la France et le Royaume-Uni sont membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU ; l’Union, en tant qu’entité, jouera un rôle majeur dans les futures affaires internationales. Occupant dignement les deux extrémités du continent Asie-Europe, une fois que les deux puissances pacifiques se seront serré la main et auront établi un mécanisme de consultation spéciale, tout en se soutenant mutuellement et en adoptant des actes communs à travers la consultation et le consensus, la Chine et l’UE mettront un frein puissant à l’hégémonisme et à l’unilatéralisme, et contribueront largement à la paix, à la stabilité et au développement du continent Asie-Europe et du monde entier.

Enfin, la coopération stratégique sino-européenne exige le respect mutuel, la non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures, un jeu d’avantages réciproques où l’on gagne à tous les coups, dépassant ainsi les différences sociales et idéologiques. Le rapport du discours de l’ancien ministre français des affaires étrangères, Dominique de Villepin, à l’Université Fudan de Shanghai, Chine, le 10 janvier 2003.
Parti communiste chinois de novembre 2002 a déclaré : « Nous sommes d’avis qu’il faut préserver la diversité du monde, démo-
kratiser les relations internationales et assurer la multiplicité des
modes de développement. Le monde où nous vivons est à mille
facettes. Les différentes civilisations, de même que les différents
systèmes sociaux et voies de développement existant dans le
monde devront se respecter et se compléter mutuellement par le
biais de la concurrence et de la comparaison, afin de profiter tous
de l’essor en recherchant les points communs et en laissant de côté
les divergences. C’est au peuple de chaque pays qu’il appartient de
résoudre ses propres affaires ; les problèmes mondiaux doivent
être réglés par les différents pays à travers des consultations
menées sur un pied d’égalité »\textsuperscript{11}.

\textbf{Conclusion}

La Chine, qui s’efforce de mettre sur pied une société jouissant d’un
bon niveau de vie, souhaite contribuer à la création d’un environ-
nement international favorable. L’Union est une grande puissance
daus le monde. La coopération stratégique sino-européenne est née
lors de la démocratisation des relations internationales et de la
mondialisation économique. Cette relation stratégique sera
dynamique et durable parce qu’elle s’est construite sur l’inter-
dépendance, le besoin mutuel et l’intérêt réciproque. « La Chine
espère pour sa part maintenir des relations stables et durables avec
l’UE », a affirmé le Premier ministre Wen Jiabao pendant sa visite
officielle en Europe au mois de mai 2004. « Les relations bilatérales
ne doivent pas être affectées par un événement unique à un certain
moment, ni se diriger vers une tierce partie »\textsuperscript{12}. En renforçant les
aspects positifs et en diminuant les aspects négatifs d’une relation
stratégique fondée sur des systèmes, des cultures, des voies et des
niveaux de développement différents, on influencierait de manière
constructive la relation sino-européenne et l’évolution des
relations internationales dans leur ensemble.

\textsuperscript{12} www.xinhua.org, 7 mai 2004.
Japan

A Japanese view on the global role of the European Union

Toshiya Hoshino

When the war in Iraq broke out in March 2003, Japan immediately found itself in a difficult situation. Clearly, Japan had its own policy priorities and politico-economic interests in this troubled part of the world. But, in determining its policies vis-à-vis Iraq, Japan had to take into consideration many factors, both international and domestic. Stability in Iraq was a prerequisite for peace in the Middle East as a whole, and the steady flow of oil from the Persian Gulf area largely depended on it. The need to stop the spread of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was a key interest that Japan shared with the rest of the world. In addition, how the relationship with the United States should be factored in was one of the most critically important aspects to be considered.

As a strong ally of the United States, Japan wanted to demonstrate a shared sentiment and showed unequivocal support for America’s action – this time essentially unilateral in nature – against Iraq. But as a nation that has long strived for, and has had a strong faith in, multilateral solutions to international issues, it was obvious that Japan would have preferred a more multilateral approach in dealing with Iraq’s rogue government in that strategically important part of the Persian Gulf region.

It was indeed a classic dilemma for Japan. But this time, having witnessed the serious rift between the United States and key European powers, mainly France and Germany, Japan appeared to be caught in between two different security visions; namely, those theoretically articulated in President George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy (NSS), published in September 2002, on the one side and the European Security Strategy (ESS), approved by the European Council in December 2003, on the other. The episode was the litmus test for Tokyo to find the best way to maximize its resources in helping to resolve the issue while making full use of its ties with the United States and EU member states, as well as its commitment to multilateralism through the United Nations. Was Japan able to pass this test?
Combining available international expertise and resources is the essence of diplomacy. Its significance cannot be stressed too much in today’s world when the wave of globalisation is expanding rapidly and security threats easily become transnational and borderless. What was found in the case of Iraq, however, was the enormous difficulty of taking sides vis-à-vis a collective action by the West, when there was a gap in the various levels of threat perception even if interests were shared.

Notwithstanding the Iraqi crisis, the European Union has continued its process of enlargement and deepening. The EU is a major experiment of historic significance that attempts to go beyond the traditional boundaries of the Westphalian state system. And the process of regional integration, particularly after the end of Cold War in the European theatre, is groundbreaking in terms of its pace, depth and width. It is certainly a regional effort. But its perspective is admirably global. Viewed from Asia, where consciousness of sovereignty, historical animosities, and the remnants of Cold War still affect the choices of individual states in the region, the state of affairs in Europe is not comparable to that in Asia. Although ‘community-based’ initiatives are being discussed in Asia, they are still at an embryonic stage. None the less, Japan’s policy is to promote a community-building initiative, based on what is called the ‘ASEAN (the Association of South-East Asian Nations) + Three (Japan, China and South Korea)’ mechanism, while maintaining a strong alliance relationship with the United States and solid support for the activities of the United Nations.

Against this background, it is important for Japan to watch developments in Europe closely so as to explore potential areas of cooperation in resolving common issues of concern at a global level. In this chapter, I would like to discuss the future of EU-Japan relations by way of answering the four questions posed by the editor of this volume. Through this intellectual exercise, I would like to explore EU-Japan collaboration mainly in the area of maintenance of international peace and security.

How is the European integration process perceived in Japan?

The process of integration in Europe can be perceived either positively or negatively, depending on which theoretical standpoint
one wishes to adopt. From the realist perspective, which views the world as a set of balances and struggles among powers, European integration may symbolise the formation and strengthening of one additional bloc that can challenge the existing power structure. For those who want to maintain the status quo in international order, the combined power of European countries may therefore pose a threat, since the appearance of a new rival is not usually welcomed. On the other hand, from an institutionalist perspective, which looks positively at the process of international institution-building not just as a tool to enhance national powers but as a key avenue to increasing predictability and ending the anarchic nature of international relations, integration is a natural step forward.

It is a basic tenet of the Japanese to look at international institutionalisation from a positive standpoint. Therefore, the European integration process is taken as a step in the right direction, or even a model that Japan might envy, because of the total absence of such a process – regional integration – in the region of Japan today. This does not mean that an integrated Europe does not pose any rivalry or threat to Japan. In fact, no one can deny that, most of the time, manufacturing industry in EU member states is in strong competition with that of Japan, although US dominance in the global market tends to be more keenly felt. Also, the growing rise of China’s economic power is important for Japan. Recalling that China has been the largest recipient of its ODA (Official Development Assistance), Japan views China with mixed feelings particularly at a time when there is a stark contrast between its prolonged economic recession and the rapid rise of China’s power.

In retrospect, Japan’s affinity for multilateralism was essentially a post-Second World War product. Before that tragic war, Japan took a highly realist, and in fact imperialistic position, viewing the world through the traditional balance of power perspective. Japan left the League of Nations in 1931 in the wake of Manchurian incident and then, in 1940, became an Axis power by concluding the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. There is no need to explain how these misguided policies caused unbearable suffering among the peoples of Japan and the rest of the world, and also defined an image of Japan which lingers even today. As a result, the return to Asia and to the international community, particularly through international institutions, as a peace-loving country, was given a high priority in postwar Japan. By departing from a power-centred view to a more institutionalist one, Japan
gained admission to the United Nations in 1956, which took over five years in the tense Cold War environment, following ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, owing to the Soviet bloc’s opposition.

Obviously, any regional integration process has two aspects: the internal dynamics within the region and relations with other regions. Japan can learn lessons from the European integration experiences in both respects.

Internally, Japan needs to learn how to overcome historical animosities and become reconciled with neighbouring countries. The transformation of the Franco-German relationship, for instance, and the ongoing enlargement process of EU towards Central and East European countries speak eloquently for integration’s intraregional reconciliation effect. When in January 2002 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi presented a vision of an East Asian ‘community that acts together and advances together’, he intended to: (1) best utilise the framework of ASEAN+Three; (2) deepen Japan’s cooperation with China and the Republic of Korea; and (3) strengthen economic partnership in the region (such as the initiative for Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area). The proposal was specifically designed to obtain the support of Japan’s East Asian neighbours.

In fact, it was the first time that a Japanese prime minister had openly presented the bold idea of forming a regional community since the end of the Second World War. Japan was, in fact, in the frontline of those establishing the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) forum in the 1980s and the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) in the early 1990s, but in both cases Japan opted not to take the role of direct initiator in order to counter any suspicion that Japan might be interested in re-instituting its prewar (1940) ambitious imperialist vision of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Prime Minister Koizumi’s decision to propose a new East Asia community was based on a judgment that the time was becoming ripe for Japan to envision a form of solid regional integrative initiative without invoking an unnecessary territorial ambition.

As to the external side of the equation, regional integration processes are based on the notion of obtaining economies of scale by combining intraregional resources to compete with others. But it is important to point out that contemporary efforts at regional integration cannot and should not be isolated. In this era of glob-
alisation, this is true in the economic sense. But it is also true in the field of international peace and security. For this reason, it is highly appropriate that the ESS calls the transatlantic relationship 'irreplaceable' and seeks 'an effective and balanced partnership with the USA', and the development of a 'strategic partnership' with Russia, Japan, China, Canada and India, among others. Likewise, the above-mentioned Koizumi initiative stressed the 'indispensable' role of the United States for both security and economic reasons, the importance of cooperation with South and West Asia (including India), and the importance of cooperation with the Pacific nations through APEC, and with Europe through ASEM (the Asia-Europe Meeting).

An assessment of the EU-Japan relationship

Japan and the European Union have enjoyed a positive working relationship over the years. An annual dialogue with the then European Community was officially launched in July 1991. In that year, both parties concluded a Joint Declaration in which they ‘firmly endeavour to inform and consult each other on major international issues, which are of common interest to both Parties, be they political, economic, scientific, cultural or other’. They agreed to ‘strive, whenever appropriate, to coordinate their positions’ and to ‘strengthen their cooperation and exchange of information both between the two Parties and within international organisations’. As the preamble effectively summarised, both Japan and its European counterpart were, among others, ‘conscious of their common attachment to freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights’, and affirmed ‘their common attachment to market principles, the promotion of free trade and the development of a prosperous and sound world economy’, as well as ‘affirming their common interest in security, peace and stability of the world’.

That original spirit was passed on and deepened with the formation of the European Union. One major product of mutual collaboration was ‘An Action Plan for Japan-EU Cooperation’, which was made public at the Japan-EU summit in Brussels in December 2001. The world had changed considerably in the 10 years between the end of the first Gulf War and the aftermath of the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the EU-Japan relationship needed to be deepened, Annual summits, troika ministerials and various other
official meetings have been held regularly to discuss a wide range of issues of mutual concern.

The Action Plan recognised the considerable progress made in bilateral relations since the adoption of the Joint Declaration in 1991 and agreed to pursue action in four main areas: promoting peace and security, strengthening the economic and trade partnership, coping with global and societal challenges, and bringing together people and cultures.

More detailed subjects of cooperation include: peace and security (United Nations reform; arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation; human rights, democracy and stability; conflict prevention and peace-building), economic and trade (encouraging the bilateral trade and investment partnership; information and communication technology cooperation; multilateral trade and economic issues; strengthening of the international monetary and financial system as well as development and poverty eradication), global and societal challenges (aging society and employment; gender equality; education; new challenges; science and technology; energy and transport; terrorism, transnational crime, drug trafficking and judicial cooperation) and people and culture (in the academic world; for young people; civil society links and interregional exchanges).

By designating the first decade of the twenty-first century as a decade of Japan-European cooperation, various consultations, mutual visits and joint events have been planned and conducted. Additionally, extensive preparation is currently under way to make 2005 the EU-Japan Year of People to People Exchange to encourage and promote direct contacts between Japanese and European peoples and civil society.

**Recommendations in the security field**

As mentioned above, the relationship between Japan and the EU has been extensive and fruitful. Based on a mutual sense of admiration and respect, economic-business and socio-cultural ties are noteworthy. But if I had to recommend one area that I would like to see reinforced, it would be cooperation in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. As a nation that experienced the effects of atomic bombs, Japan recognises the urgency of tackling these issues, however difficult that may be.
In fact, a ‘Joint Declaration on Disarmament and Non-proliferation’ by the EU and Japan was released on 22 June 2004. The document recognised that ‘the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery poses a serious threat to the peace and stability of the international community.’ The issue was with us for many years, but it became a more immediate concern first in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and, second, by the revelation of the Khan network that illicitly traded WMD and highly sensitive nuclear equipment and technology. Moreover, both sides should pay close attention not just to clandestine activities of the so-called ‘rogue states’ but also to non-state actors.

According to the Declaration, Japan and the EU, by reaffirming their own commitment to the international treaty system (expressing their will to promote the ‘universalisation’, implementation, and strengthening of the treaties and norms in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation, such as the NPT, BTWC, CWC, CTBT, CCW, MBT, HCOC, and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements and Additional Protocols), demonstrated their strong intent to engage in dialogue and cooperation with other countries and international organisations to achieve their goals and intensify regional activities to that end. In dealing with these difficult matters, it is important to recognise that both parties stressed the critical importance of duly addressing the root causes underlying proliferation as well as emphasising the need to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education. Detailed steps and priority areas for specific EU-Japan cooperation have been identified, so it is to be hoped that both partners will jointly take the lead in actually implementing those principles wherever possible.

The EU, Japan and the global order, including the maintenance of international peace and security

Today, the world is faced with crises of governance and civil strife in a number of countries. It is therefore of great encouragement to see the EU’s willingness to proactively engage in crisis management even outside its geographical region. The European Union has conducted major crisis management operations in such places as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and has been expected to play a more active role in Bosnia and Sudan’s Darfur region, for example.

Japan, for its part, has also developed its own policies of international peace cooperation, although it is largely restricted by its Constitution, which strictly prohibits Japan from conducting combat operations and the utilisation of the military, called Self-Defence Forces (SDF). In 1992, Tokyo implemented the International Peace Cooperation Law to enable its SDF troops to support UN peacekeeping operations (as in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights and East Timor) or international humanitarian assistance (as in Zaire to help Rwandan refugees). When US and British-led forces started Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan to counter the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation and the Taliban regime in October 2001, Japan passed an Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law to facilitate the dispatch of the Maritime SDF’s tankers to the Indian Ocean to provide fuel to the coalition’s vessels. And finally in 2003, when the postwar reconstruction of Iraq became a critically important international issue, Prime Minister Koizumi’s government made a major political decision to send Ground, Air and Maritime SDFs to Iraq to engage in humanitarian activities, invoking the Iraq Humanitarian and Reconstruction Special Measures Law. All these missions were non-combat type, mainly logistical support operations in non-combat areas.

None the less, these changes during the past ten-plus challenging years were the most significant in Japan’s history of international security policy since the Second World War. The Government is currently contemplating preparation of a totally new permanent law (and even a reform of the Constitution) that would cover the various contingency situations in which Japan’s SDFs will have to operate effectively and in a timely fashion, without obtaining authorisation through ad hoc special laws.

As the challenges in postwar Iraq and Afghanistan show, one of the most important missions in conflict-ridden societies is the stabilisation of local situations. These missions are commonly called ‘peacebuilding’ activities: the Japanese government uses the term ‘peace consolidation and nation building’ when it refers to these types of missions, which are comprehensive in nature in that they combine military and non-military assets to stabilise societies. Such operations were needed in the Balkans and in many
other parts across the world form East Timor in Asia to Haiti in Latin America and to Liberia and Sudan in Africa. These are not necessarily combat missions, but a more robust presence and cooperation with local governments and regional organisations are called for.

Unlike the EU and its member states, Japan’s capabilities and experience in conducting such missions are still very limited, but Japan would be ready to work shoulder to shoulder with its European friends to achieve sustainable peace in troubled parts of the world. In this regard, the EU’s newly demonstrated interest in contributing to international peace and security in various regions of the world is a welcome development.

Japan and the EU share a number of basic norms and principles. And if I had to point out one crucial shared value, it would be their common interest in ‘effective multilateralism’, to use the term coined in the European Security Strategy.

Today’s United Nations is no perfect organisation. And its reform, including both the structure and decision-making procedures of the Security Council, is indeed an urgent matter to be dealt with on the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of the UN in the year 2005. It is very important for both Japan and the EU to strengthen the international authority vested in the UN, working closely to make it even better.

The underlying ‘issue’ in this regard is the United States: what options will the US administration choose and how will Japan and the EU deal with them? Japan’s ‘double bind’ situation between US power and UN authority can be well understood by EU member states. The EU’s and its member states’ dilemma of how best to collaborate with NATO implies similar dilemmas, as long as the United States maintains the unilateral stance that became conspicuous after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It is in the best interest of both Japan and the EU, and in fact in the interest of the United States itself, to persuade Washington of the benefits of multilateralism. Contrary to the Bush administration’s tendency to define its national interest in narrow terms, it is illuminating to find, according to the regular opinion poll conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, that a large majority of the American public agrees that ‘the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the UN even if this means the United States will have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice’.1
In conclusion, for the better management of international peace and security, it would be very useful to combine the EU's new global role with Japan's more proactive international peace cooperation, and a renewed - and most desirable - US recognition of the utility of multilateralism.
An Asian perspective

Regional security arrangements in a multipolar world: the EU’s contribution

Amitav Acharya

What role can regional institutions such as the European Union play in managing peace and security in today’s world? This chapter analyses the contribution that regional security arrangements make to global security and offers some ideas for reinforcing that contribution. The European experience, and more specifically the role of the EU in this respect, is used as the central example, and Asia is introduced as the most challenging test case for building regional security structures.

During the Second World War, Winston Churchill saw regional security arrangements as the basis of a multipolar world order, which could ensure the balance of power and prevent another global conflagration. Today, however, we live in a unipolar world, and regional institutions are constrained by this reality. But the breakdown of international cooperation over Iraq and the growing anti-Americanism around the world create doubts about the prospects for a stable and legitimate international order under American hegemony. Hence a return to multipolarity has become not just a strategic aspiration of some major states, but also a normative one.

In the contemporary international system, two types of actors are seeking a return to a multipolar international order. One is China, whose dramatic ascendancy poses the most serious challenge to the post-Cold War balance of power. Another country seeking multipolarity is France, which asserted its independence from the United States by refusing to endorse the Bush administration’s plans to invade Iraq. There are differences between these two multipolarity-seeking powers though. Both see American hegemony as a grave threat to world order, challenging the possibility of achieving both peace and justice. But China is a rising power, while France by itself is not. China’s desire for multipolarity is hence motivated to a greater degree by its perception of American dominance as a threat to its own regional power ambitions. And while China’s is largely a national quest for multipolarity,
France’s is framed within a ‘Euro-nationalism’, which calls for the EU to become an independent actor in the world stage to counterbalance the United States. Despite its growing interest in regionalism, Beijing has not embraced regional cooperative security to any comparable extent, although its quest for multipolarity may subsume a long-term quest for a regional sphere of influence.

**Strategic multipolarity and normative multipolarity**

But can regional arrangements contribute to multipolarity? Here, I propose to make a distinction between multipolarity as a strategic pursuit and multipolarity as a normative quest. The differences between the two international orders are threefold. First, strategic multipolarity is closely linked to the distribution of material power. The status of being regarded as a ‘pole’ is determined mainly by one’s military and economic resources. Normative multipolarity, on the other hand, depends largely on one’s ‘ideational’ resources, such as a forceful adherence to, and advocacy of, international law and institutions, and a strong sense of collective identity (national or regional). Second, and related to the above, states operating within strategic multipolarity maintain a strong preference for balance of power approaches to international relations. States in normative multipolarity, by contrast, accept and pursue the principles and mechanisms of cooperative security, and seek to maintain international order through the vigorous exercise of what Joseph Nye has called ‘soft power’. Third, within strategic multipolarity, the ‘polar’ power usually seeks out weaker partners (especially its neighbours) in order to develop a sphere of influence. This is absent in normative multipolarity, in which the dominant power co-opts weaker states through shared rules and institutions with a view to enhancing the capacity for collective action of all of them (and not just the ‘polar’ power) in pursuit of common goals at the global level, including goals other than deterrence or defence, which are usually the chief motivations behind spheres of influence.

To judge by their historical experience, regional organisations are poor instruments of strategic multipolarity. Some regional organisations have been better at reflecting hegemony, rather than challenging it. Today, regional power blocs of the kind Churchill or Walter Lippmann envisaged may seem impractical.
and even immoral (in the sense that they would challenge the authority of the United Nations as much as the United States). The experience of Europe and Asia in building regional institutions, despite being marked by differences, shows common barriers to building multipolarity through regional institutions.

In Asia, regional multilateral security arrangements were practically non-existent during the Cold War, although the multipurpose subregional group ASEAN operated under the conditions of bipolarity while trying to carve out a measure of regional autonomy in the management of local conflicts.4 The 1990s saw the emergence of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Asia’s first continent-wide regional security grouping. But from a realist point of view, the purpose of the ARF was not to strategically challenge American dominance, but to keep the United States engaged at a time when there was some chance of a precipitate US military withdrawal from the region. Today, however, China, once a somewhat reluctant player in multilateralism (especially in the early 1990s), has taken an unprecedented level of interest in multilateral economic and security approaches at the regional level. Realists see China’s new-found interest in regional security arrangements as a way of countering US power and influence in the region. China’s ‘new security concept’ promotes the notion of multipolarity while espousing regional security cooperation in Asia. Although China has not linked the two in an ends and means relationship, its ‘charm offensive’ in East Asia provides one example of how regionalism could be turned into an instrument in pursuit of strategic multipolarity. But neither China nor the EU is in a position to create a multipolar world order through counter-hegemonic regional security arrangements. And despite its initial impact, China’s charm offensive is already being confronted with Japan’s economic and diplomatic counter-postures and the ultimate reluctance of South-East Asia to bandwagon with Beijing at the expense of the United States. While Asian regional organisations would be meaningless without Chinese involvement, too much Chinese ‘leadership’ would also spell their doom.5

The European experience of regionalism has been different from that of Asia. Cold War Europe participated in two main kinds of ‘security’ arrangements. The principal regional security arrangements, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, were a form of ‘hegemonic regionalism’ in the sense that they were created and maintained by the two superpowers. Today, such hegemonic regional

security arrangements are neither popular nor relevant. The Warsaw Pact collapsed with the end of the Cold War. While NATO has confounded predictions of its demise by neo-realist scholars like John Mearsheimer, it has had to embrace roles, such as peacekeeping, that had more in common with cooperative security organisations than collective defence systems in the classical sense. And even then, NATO is facing a severe test of its resilience as a result of the unilateral US decision to invade Iraq. But even if the United States’s interest in NATO declines further, reinforced by its global force restructuring, it will not result in a ‘Europeanised’ NATO that would create a multipolar world order.

The second European regional security arrangement, the CSCE/OSCE, was conceived primarily as a mechanism to dampen Cold War polarisation and rivalry, rather than as a challenge to superpower dominance. To be sure, its underlying principle of ‘common security’ and its confidence-building and arms control agenda helped to lessen the strategic importance of hegemonic regional security arrangements that sustained bipolarity in Europe. The OSCE today remains an important vehicle for managing security issues in Europe. But its days of glory may be behind it, not least because both NATO and the EU have converted to the principles of common security and adopted many of the instruments that the OSCE developed. In any case, to describe it as an agent of multipolarity would be misreading its normative purpose and overstating its current or potential strategic clout.

Hence the most credible European force for multipolarity today is neither the OSCE, nor NATO, but a subregional group created ostensibly for economic cooperation. The European Community evolved under conditions of bipolarity and was supported by the Cold War US security umbrella. However, in the 1990s the EC was transformed into a political entity, the European Union, closely associating sovereign states. More recently, the EU has started to develop a security and defence dimension. There has been periodic recognition from the intellectual and policy-making community of the EU’s potential to be a regional superpower combining economic might and strategic purpose. As The Economist recently put it, ‘European federalists – the heirs to Monnet and Schuman – . . . believe that a new impetus for European unity can be provided by trying to build up the EU into a new superpower – a global force that can equal the United States.’

In reality, such a quest within the EU may seem closer to the realist-strategic
vision of Churchill and Lippmann than the liberal-pacifist vision of Monnet and Schuman. But it has become a legitimate quest in the wake of the divisions produced by the Iraq war, and the diminishing legitimacy of American security dominance in Europe as well as the declining US military presence there.

Hence, a poll conducted by the German Marshall Fund found strong support in Europe for the idea that ‘the European Union should become a superpower like the United States’. Yet, such aspirations come at a time when membership expansion has created greater diversity within the EU and made consensus on its strategic role even less likely than before. The discord between, on the one hand, France and Germany, and, on the other, the United Kingdom and Spain, over Iraq undermined the credibility of the common European foreign and defence posture regionally or globally. Moreover, a global superpower role for the EU in the conventional sense requires a willingness and capability for global power projection, whereas European societies seem less and less inclined to resort to force to settle international problems, and defence spending in Europe is declining. The Kantian aspirations of the EU intraregionally are not easily reconciled with the possible Hobbesian assumptions of strategic multipolarity globally.

**Security through regional arrangements**

Looking beyond Europe and East Asia, regional security arrangements geared to collective defence and operating under the security umbrella of a great power were never very popular. The experience of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) attests to this. Even collective security and defence frameworks created under the auspices of large multipurpose regional bodies such as the Arab League and the Organisation of American States (OAS) have never been credible and effective. In the Third World, the term ‘regional security arrangements’ has invariably meant mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes undertaken by multipurpose regional groups, rather than for alliances geared to defence against common threats. As such, their ability to alter the global power structure has been, and remains, minimal.

Regional security arrangements are thus poor instruments of strategic multipolarity. But can they help realise a normative
multipolarity? Compared to their limited strategic dimension, normative multipolarity is a more pragmatic goal for regional security arrangements. Under certain conditions (such as when faced with a common threat or a common neglect) regional security arrangements have on occasion been able to achieve a degree of autonomy from superpower dominance. This requires a robust role in regional pacification through measures of cooperative security and community-building – of which the EU has been the most accomplished regional entity – which ensures that their intramural problems do not become sources of a wider international conflict inviting the intervention of outside powers. Both Western and Third World regional organisations today may seek such autonomy by undertaking a variety of peace and security roles. And it is in this context that some of the most important changes in the purpose and role of regional security arrangements in the post-Cold War era have taken place. The following are noteworthy.

First, there has been an expansion of the purpose and role of ‘original’ regional organisations, such as the OAS and African Union (formerly the OAU). The end of the Cold War has seen their role extending beyond peaceful settlement of disputes to peacekeeping and peace building, and the promotion of human rights and democracy. Regional organisations today face the need to develop capabilities for complex tasks that combine elements of peacekeeping, peace building and humanitarian assistance. This role of regional security arrangements has been recognised and encouraged by the United Nations under the so-called ‘subsidiarity’ principle.

Second, entirely new regional security organisations have emerged. Asia created its first macro-regional security grouping with the founding of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994. The ARF is to some extent unique as a regional security arrangement, for it is the only regional group to bring together all the major powers of the contemporary international system. Yet, it is at the same time led by ASEAN, a group of its weaker members. While realists see this as a structural flaw, institutionalists see it as a vindication of the role of soft and ‘ideational’ power in the making of security arrangements that can promote regional and international order.

Third, in a related vein, regional organisations which in the past dealt primarily, if not exclusively, with economic integration,
are now developing a peace and security role. The European Union, the mother of all regionalisms, is now recognising that economic integration cannot be separated for too long from political and security cooperation. Because of its original normative underpinnings and predominantly economic evolution, the EU’s peace and security role would hopefully be guided by normative concerns rather than the imperatives of power politics. For the time being, the EU has begun to play such a role in the Balkans. In the Asia-Pacific region, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), originally created to advance trade liberalisation and manage regional economic interdependence, has seen its economic role undermined by, among other factors, regional suspicions of American dominance. It is now quietly developing a role in security management – but only as a venue for consultation on neighbourhood conflicts (such as East Timor) and as a framework for promoting the idea of human security and cooperatively addressing the danger of transnational terrorism.

Fourth, existing multipurpose regional organisations are reorienting and retooling themselves in order to respond to new transnational challenges. This is especially evident in the Asia-Pacific region, although the trend is by no means confined to it. The Indonesian proposal for an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) is partly a response to transnational dangers such as financial meltdowns, terrorism, and infectious diseases which have bedevilled South-East Asia since 1997. APEC’s role in transnational security issues has already been noted. The ARF has undertaken a programme for suppressing terrorist finance and promoting maritime security cooperation in East Asia. ‘New regionalism’ in Latin America and East Asia, combining economic and security cooperation, are challenging the ‘Washington Consensus’, which many see as a tool of American hegemony and blame for creating the conditions for the Asian financial crisis in 1997.

Security partnerships between the EU and other regional organisations

While many of these projects involve the United States, they are not necessarily led or dictated by it. The agenda expansion and reorientation of regional organisations enhances the prospects for the development of alternative ideas and approaches to world order.

And the EU can play an important role in furthering these trends and using them to project a legitimate global security role for itself.

The EU’s unfolding security role beyond the European continent has included a recent peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. To its credit, the EU’s role in Africa accepts the principle of ‘African ownership’. While the EU is developing an ESDP and its own rapid deployment capability, unlike the United States under President George W. Bush it categorically rejects pre-emption and accepts the ‘subsidiarity’ principle (while NATO clings to the more self-serving ‘coalition of the willing’ formula proposed by the Bush administration), recognising the ultimate authority of the UN Security Council. The EU agrees to keep its peace and security missions out-of-area ‘open’, i.e. subject to participation by other regional and extra-regional states. But to give meaning to ideas such as ‘African ownership’ and ‘open coalitions’, the EU needs to channel more resources and expertise to regional organisations in the developing world.

This is essential because regional organisations in the developing world, despite their growing interest in regional peace and security in their own neighbourhood, face critical limitations of resources and institutional capacity. In Africa, lack of regional collective action in managing humanitarian disasters, civil strife and interstate conflict has less to do with the absence of political will than with severe resource constraints. The reverse situation obtains in Asia: the growing involvement of Japan and China brings in considerable new resources to peacekeeping and related operations, but the resilience of sovereignty and non-intervention concerns has made it difficult for Asia to undertake regional peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention operations.

Another obstacle to regional security arrangements in the developing world has to do with the fear and distrust of local hegemons. The role of such powers has been a source of both strength and fragility of regional security arrangements. Without South Africa, for example, the transition of the OAU to AU and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) might not have been possible, but South African dominance does have its critics, who see NEPAD as a ‘neocolonial’ project. Nigeria’s role was crucial to ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia, but it also attracted resentment from other West African states. Fear of Indian dominance has stymied the development of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), even if it is hard to imag-
ine any meaningful security or economic role for SAARC without Indian leadership. Hence, the involvement of a resource-rich extra-regional actor like the EU without the pretensions or ambitions of a global strategic superpower can ameliorate the distrust of local hegemons.

In developing its global security role, the EU can take note of the changing norms of regional security organisations in the developing world. While issues of sovereignty and non-intervention remain a barrier to regional security cooperation, there have also been noticeable shifts. African regional organisations are now more receptive to humanitarian intervention. NEPAD, strongly backed by South Africa, has sought to move beyond Westphalian sovereignty by adopting a ‘peer review mechanism’ which encompasses areas of peace and stability, democracy and political governance, and economic and corporate governance. The Inter-American Democratic Charter is an important example of the willingness of non-Western states to move beyond the Westphalian framework. The charter makes a normative commitment to the promotion of democracy, as opposed to the traditional defence of state sovereignty, and permits collective action in defence of democracy not only in the case of coups, but also in instances of anti-democratic and unconstitutional ‘backsliding’ by elected rulers. Even in South-East Asia, despite the persistence of the non-intervention mindset, the Indonesian proposal for an ASEAN Security Community calls for the non-recognition of unconstitutional ouster of governments (albeit without any enforcement or sanctions mechanism), and designates democracy as the normative goal of ASEAN members. Such ideas would have been inconceivable a decade ago. These developments create new opportunities for partnerships between the EU and other regional organisations in the developing world to foster cooperative human security and humanitarian assistance, as well as promoting growth and development.

But in pursuing a global role, the EU should accept diversity in regional security predicaments and mechanisms. It is important to note that the expansion of the regional organisations’ agendas towards new transnational threats and risks has not been a case of the simple diffusion of European models and approaches to the Third World. To be sure, the EU and OSCE have provided important ideas and mechanisms for regional groupings in Africa and Asia. Examples of the diffusion of the OSCE framework include

the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (which grew out of negotiations between China and the then Soviet Union, and featured many aspects of the OSCE), some aspects of the ARF’s confidence-building agenda, and proposed security frameworks for the Mediterranean and the Middle East. But adopting formal and legalistic CBMs in non-European theatres has proven to be difficult, and the OCSE approach has had to be adapted and localised. Similarly, the EU’s ideas and approach to peace and security are not likely to be replicated in other parts of the world. But accepting such variations is both necessary and healthy: the development of regional security cooperation need not follow a single model, derived only from the European experience.

**Conclusion**

Regional security arrangements such as the European Union remain imperfect agents of multipolarity in its strategic dimension, but they can be meaningful agents for multipolarity in its normative sense. The United States remains a powerful and influential actor in ensuring regional peace and security in many parts of the world. But with the UN in some disarray and the global distrust of US strategic intentions and policies growing, regional security arrangements have the potential to be an instrument of normative multipolarity that could offer better prospects for stability than a ‘desocialised’ American hegemony. When and where US power is exercised unilaterally and where US security guarantees are no longer credible, regional arrangements could have an important role in managing peace and security in their own neighbourhood. The European Union, which has started to play this role in the European continent, has the potential to support similar developments elsewhere by partnering regional organisations in the developing world.

New Zealand: Does distance lend enchantment?

Terence O’Brien

There is no country more physically distant from the European Union (EU) than New Zealand, whose perceptions of the European integration process date from the first enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC) to include the United Kingdom in 1973. The foundations were then laid for a mature, complex but visibly unequal David and Goliath relationship. The experience of the first enlargement permeated NZ attitudes. Successive enlargements of the Union ever since have magnified substantially the task for NZ of maintaining, let alone improving, a rewarding relationship with the EU, even as the revolution in communications technology has reduced distance and abridged the tyranny of NZ remoteness. Indeed, in a wired world confronted by terrorism and other transboundary scourges, NZ’s discrete geographical location offers it a strategic asset – and distance lends as well a certain perspective.

The United Kingdom’s accession to the EC

The stakes involved for New Zealand when the United Kingdom opted to negotiate accession to the EEC (subsequently the EC) were nothing less than its survival as a successful grasslands farm economy. Britain absorbed more than 50 per cent of total NZ exports but for certain key farm products (butter, cheese and sheep meat) the degree of reliance was 90 per cent or more. The ominous threats posed by European farm policies and by outright British acceptance of those policies as the price of European entry were readily perceived throughout NZ’s intimate society.

The British decision exercised a profound effect upon the NZ ‘sense of place’ in the world. There was an impression, in parts of the NZ community, of abandonment by Britain. New Zealand was compelled to intensify efforts to diversify markets and production over a relatively brief space of time. This process rapidly widened
NZ foreign policy horizons as trade and the flag marched in unison. It was a swift coming of age for NZ diplomacy, triggered by Europe’s venture. The practical lesson for NZ from the first EC enlargement confirmed that too many trade eggs in one basket constituted a source of real vulnerability. NZ strategic success in spreading its trade dependencies more or less evenly, over the next three decades, between Asia, Europe, North America, Australia and the remainder of the world has been part good fortune, part the tenacity of NZ diplomats and part proof of the genuine enterprise spirit of NZ producers and traders.

New Zealand adopted a position of judicious fatalism in regard to Britain’s entry bid. It expressed formal support for Britain inside a strengthened Europe, but stressed that there were certain vital NZ interests that must be safeguarded. That tactical approach of low-key but unrelenting diplomatic persistence in the pursuit and protection of vital interests devised as a response to Britain’s EC entry has more or less endured as a feature of NZ external policy conduct. The country’s absence of critical mass, along with limited negotiating leverage, means that New Zealand had and has, in reality, little choice. Some commentators deplored the tactics of emphasising NZ’s dependency and weakness in the enlargement negotiations. However, NZ negotiators viewed the tactics rather as classical small-country bargaining behaviour to leverage weakness and as the utilisation of ‘soft power’ to protect interests. Thus to support its claim for special treatment NZ employed arguments of shared values, of kith and kin with Europe, and of its European battlefield sacrifices in two World Wars. Appeals were made too to EC self-esteem. If Europe were unable to accommodate the interests of a small, responsible democracy, this would surely not bode well for the EC’s capacity to handle the much larger and important trade-economic challenges posed by the United States, Japan, etc. What strategic interests, moreover, were served by eviscerating a successful, efficient food producer in a world where malnutrition prevailed?

These ‘soft power’ arguments cut some ice in the context of the first enlargement negotiations. They retain some essential validity even today. But they did not earn New Zealand a reprieve from the consequences of British EC entry and, with the passage of time, their relevance to the NZ relationship with, and perceptions of, the contemporary EU is harder to detect. None the less, diplomatic rhetoric still reflects the positive language of shared aspirations,

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and NZ wisely strives to remain a visible and relevant partner. Its soft power, however, hardly registers with the newer EU members. Each succeeding enlargement has materially extended the challenge for New Zealand.

Security issues

New Zealand’s support of the United Kingdom’s original decision to join the EC stemmed from the conventional strategic wisdom of the time – that a strengthened Europe would constitute one pillar of Atlantic architecture in the Cold War. Enlargement would not consolidate an Atlantic monolith since, in economic terms at least, it was clear even to NZ that Europe and the United States would remain robust competitors. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent removal of the cement that supplied Atlantic cohesion increased the likelihood that differences would surface between the Atlantic Cold War partners. This was neither surprising nor necessarily, from a NZ standpoint, deplorable. How or where NZ positioned itself at times of Atlantic discord would depend entirely upon the issue and the interests at stake.

The complexion of NZ dealings with the EC was coloured by management of the actual solutions devised to mitigate the adverse trade and economic consequences for NZ of British entry. Yet the politics of international security intruded abruptly with the decision by a newly elected NZ government in the 1980s to adopt a policy of banning nuclear weapons (and nuclear propulsion) from its territory and harbours. This new policy amounted to a repudiation of nuclear deterrence as a doctrine for NZ itself.

In several EC capitals New Zealand was accused of threatening the seamless web of Western security by ill-considered action. There was some rich irony there. New Zealand, like most small states, conceives security in a rather comprehensive way, embracing economic wellbeing as well as political-military stability. It was decidedly paradoxical to be informed by European governments that the seamless web of Western political security was endangered by NZ irresponsibility, while those same governments had been denying absolutely the existence of any seamless web of economic security as they blithely strove to reduce NZ export trade opportunities in the cause of European unity. That was a straightforward lesson in European power politics for NZ.
The British government asserted that its advocacy on NZ’s behalf was all the more difficult to sustain as a consequence of NZ’s non-nuclear policy. But British enthusiasm for the NZ cause had in any case been substantially modified by the very fact that it was now inside the EC as a full member. It had, moreover, pursued, unsurprisingly, other priorities in particular the lightening of the financial burdens of EC membership which were, it was claimed in London, imposed as part of the price of securing a special deal for NZ during the enlargement negotiations. This was an arguable proposition but it was sufficient sign in itself that irrespective of the nuclear policy, NZ had increasingly to rely first and foremost upon its own efforts to maintain its relationship with Europe.

The French government’s sabotage of the Greenpeace flagship Rainbow Warrior in New Zealand in 1985 added another vivid dimension to the connection between international security and the NZ trade arrangements with Europe. Following NZ’s capture and indictment of the French agents involved, France threatened economic retribution. France’s European partners made it quite clear privately that they would never want to be placed in a position of having to choose between France and NZ. Prearranged mediation by the UN Secretary-General therefore permitted the prisoners to be returned to French custody, and the lifting of the French blockage of further extension of the NZ (butter) trade arrangement with the EU. This was another brisk lesson to NZ in European power politics. The conspicuous failure of any European government to condemn France’s action was denounced in NZ.

Improving EU-New Zealand relations

As has been argued above, the NZ ‘sense of place’ in the world was altered by the EC’s enlargement to include the United Kingdom. The period of adjustment to this major change, however, coincided fortuitously with the swift rise of those countries that comprise the East Asian rim of the Pacific – from Japan in the north-east to Indonesia in the south-east. The advance was not uniform and setbacks occurred, but the region recorded a rate of sustained progress unequalled in modern history. The opportunities which this opened up for NZ as a small country on the Pacific rim are consid-

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3. Interview with R. Denman, Historical Archives of EU, INT 569; http://www.arc.iue.it/webpub 1996.
erable, as are the challenges for NZ diplomacy if the country is to capitalise upon those opportunities.

For the first time in modern history, a region beyond Europe and North America without any extensive record of predominant European settlement emerged to pre-eminence. The challenge for NZ was, and is, to fashion strategic relationships with countries whose traditions, values and ideals differ from its own, and from those of the European-Atlantic states with which NZ consorted for much of its involvement with the international affairs of the twentieth century.

As East Asian countries adapted the rational choice theories of free market economics to their own circumstances, so unjustifiable expectations grew in Europe and North America that Asian ideas, values and world-view would inevitably change and converge with their own. Behind this presumption were imperious beliefs about the superiority of European-Atlantic models for international behaviour. It is risky to generalise about so diverse a region, but East Asian governments do not concede that models from elsewhere in the world necessarily apply in their circumstances. Nor do they acknowledge that their acceptability within the international community shall be decided by others from another region in the world.5

New Zealand foreign policy in East Asia will not therefore prosper if it strives to portray NZ as a ‘representative’ of the Atlantic-European world, or as a surrogate for political, economic, security, trading or cultural interests from beyond that require to be privileged in or by the East Asian region. The lesson for NZ in Asia, as it was at the time of the first European enlargement, is that there can be no substitute for hard campaigning by itself and for itself to promote vital interests. Already ten of NZ’s top 20 export markets are in East Asia (there are five European markets in that category) and total export earnings from East Asia ($NZ9 billion) are double those from the EU ($NZ4.5 billion).

This is not to belittle the vital place of Europe amongst NZ’s critical interests.6 The EU, taken as a whole, remains NZ’s second largest single market – accounting for 15 per cent of NZ exports and 20 per cent of imports. For certain key agricultural exports it occupies the first place. The EU is a significant source of technology and ideas. It is the second largest source of foreign investment and of tourists. It is an important source, too, of skilled migrants. In several areas of public policy, Europe is a relevant point of

reference for NZ. And the EU’s formidable critical mass confers a vital place in global institutions and multilateral negotiations. In no sense can East Asia’s regional voice or influence yet be considered comparable, although China on its own will undoubtedly increase its weight in the future.

However, it is a mark of the difficulty for NZ of capturing and maintaining Europe’s attention, that it took nearly 30 years after the first EC enlargement for the formalisation of the country’s ties with the EU by way of the 1999 Joint EU – New Zealand Declaration. The delay may also reflect the fact that NZ itself for too long viewed its relations with the EU through the single lens of agricultural trade. The framework declaration defines the nature of the relationship and establishes the official foundations for regularised consultation with the EU presidency. It builds upon a range of important consultation mechanisms at ministerial level between the two parties, developed over earlier years. But the length of time taken to finalise an overarching framework is testament to Europe’s self-preoccupation over the years with ongoing enlargement, with deepening the structures of the Union and with the understandable priority given to external relations with large and powerful governments beyond Europe. This inevitably relegated the nurturing of relationships with less significant countries to the periphery. The unsentimental conclusion must be that there are no convincing reasons for New Zealand to believe that this unpalatable fact will ever change. The international relations rule for small countries is that they must always try harder.

Had successive NZ governments been less miserly in the past about committing resources to support foreign policy, some of these challenges might have been surmounted in respect to Europe. For its part Europe (or more particularly the European Commission) has, at the time of writing, only recently established a resident diplomatic presence in New Zealand, 40 years after this country opened a mission in Brussels. Previously the EU had preferred to manage diplomatic ties with NZ from its diplomatic post in Australia, a country with a somewhat different history of relationships with the EU. Profile-building is of course a two-way street. The EU has contributed to the establishment of a European Studies Centre at a leading NZ university (Canterbury University).
Pacific regional context

Close to home, New Zealand interface with the EU includes the respective relationship each has inside the Pacific Islands Region (PIR), with those small, fragile, scattered countries, which comprise our ‘near abroad’. Cooperative relationships with developing countries are a long-established aspect of EU external relations. Colonial attachments and historical associations, including in the Pacific, define the influences that extend EU development policies and interests globally.

By contrast, New Zealand’s aid priorities focus heavily upon the PIR, where ethnic, cultural, historical and political links and a profound interest in a prosperous, well disposed and stable near abroad motivate NZ policy. The fact is, however, that various islands have, as from the last dozen years of the twentieth century, experienced increasing instability from stress between traditional governance and the demands of modernisation, from internal autonomy pressures, from manipulation by malign outside influences (crime, drugs, etc.) and from economic setbacks caused by fragile single-commodity economies that are, in several instances, marginally viable. The convergence of these vulnerabilities caught NZ, and Australia, somewhat unawares. New Zealand stops short, however, of viewing the PIR simply as one extensive ‘arc of instability’ (an Australian description), and believes that differentiated responses are required according to each island’s distinctive challenges.

Efforts over 40 years, led by New Zealand and Australia, to encourage collective regional responses to the challenges of economic and social development have confronted problems of insufficient capacity. Recommitment to fresh efforts at regional cooperation by all island leaders in 2004 may mark a new beginning but the absolute need remains for ownership by the Pacific island leaders themselves of indigenous ideas for greater regionalism, rather than ideas imposed from the ‘metropolitan’ countries, namely NZ and Australia.7

Given the complexities and indeed costs of sustainable development in the PIR, NZ has long welcomed European interest and involvement in the region. There is none the less a clear danger that NZ and the EU cross wires over strategies. The 2000 Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries envisages partnerships

with ACP countries who organise themselves on a regional basis, including by means of fully reciprocal trade agreements with the EU. There are allowable exceptions in the case of least developed ACP counties but the strategic objective is integral to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) objective of spreading democracy and good governance, and aims to integrate the recipients fully into the global economy. With that in view, acceptance by ACP recipients of IMF-IBRD structural adjustment remedies is an important component of the economic partnership arrangements that Cotonou envisages.

The single template proposed by Cotonou, essentially a ‘one size fits all’ prescription, could pose, in the view of NZ specialists, some complications inside the PIR. New Zealand development strategies accept inherent limitations preventing all PIR countries from embracing the full rigour of completely open markets. Accordingly, NZ has acknowledged the principle, in respect to the Pacific, of non-reciprocal trade arrangements. That is a clear difference with Cotonou. Equally, there are doubts over the complete suitability of IMF-IBRD structural remedies, which have come in more generally for serious informed criticism. The ambitious scope of Cotonou may therefore be unattainable, at least in the Pacific region. The judgement about whether recipients measure up to the accountabilities demanded of them as the price of an economic partnership with the EU will be hard to make, particularly as suspension from the agreement altogether is the ultimate sanction.

The global security agenda

In a world where WMD proliferation and the spread of missile technology together potentially pose one of the greatest threats to common security, New Zealand’s non-nuclear policy assumes a certain compelling logic as an act of non-proliferation. It reinforces, in our mind, the case for a strengthened arms control treaty system to constrain proliferation. Without this, direct preventive measures to punish transgressors who are determined none the less to acquire WMD, lack essential legitimacy and even clear purpose. A strengthened system implies restraint upon all countries and weapons producers, actual and potential. A double standard according to which WMD possession is considered acceptable in
some new hands (Israel, India, Pakistan) but not in others will simply perpetuate instability. The makings of such a double standard are readily observable in the Middle East, where Israel’s ambiguous position concerning nuclear weapons constitutes a substantial obstacle to durable peace.

From a NZ viewpoint, the EU has yet to punch its undeniable weight in the area of international disarmament and arms control. Despite a stated commitment to achieving universal acceptance of multilateral arms control regimes in the European Security Strategy and other EU documents, the diversity of security policy amongst EU members, which ranges from two of the acknowledged nuclear weapon states, France and the United Kingdom, to those EU members who choose to remain outside NATO, seemingly precludes a serious common security policy on arms control at least until a single European defence policy emerges with its own international security doctrine.

When the Cold War ended, the communist Warsaw Pact disbanded, which was entirely in line with historical experience, whereby military alliances dissolve when the original reason for their existence disappears. NATO, on the other hand, was retained and enlarged amidst some enduring doubts over its true role and actual purpose. NATO is in fact atypical. It is a fully endowed defensive alliance but without enemies. It provides none the less the continued foundations for the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and (largely at American insistence), therefore, for acceptance by European NATO members of the principle of nuclear first strike. Not all Europeans are comfortable about this, but it certainly places NZ and the EU members of NATO on different sides of the international security policy fence. Nevertheless, New Zealand works with two non-NATO EU members (Sweden and Ireland) as fellow members of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), which is dedicated to re-energising the core elements of the international nuclear disarmament agenda.

The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the prime piece of world arms control legislation. It strikes the basic bargain whereby countries without nuclear weapons undertake not to acquire them, and countries with the weapon undertake to rid themselves through a process of international negotiation. This explicit bargain has not been honoured by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and nuclear weapons states (NWS) which include France and the United Kingdom, even as
some devise coercive means, including unilateral military attack, against those other countries possessing, or merely suspected of possessing, such weapons (i.e. in Iraq 2003). In 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in response to a NZ request, issued a unanimous Opinion that NWS have a legal obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith and under international control.

Both France and the United Kingdom have from time to time modified their nuclear weapons posture for budgetary or other practical reasons, but neither country has ever placed its nuclear arsenal upon any negotiating table. Britain has argued that its arsenal is small and should therefore only become a negotiating factor once the major nuclear powers (the United States and Russia) have negotiated their arsenals down to where British action could help make a difference. This argument comes perilously close to a rationalisation for the existence of small nuclear arsenals in the age of proliferation.

It seems from a NZ perspective that the EU is unlikely to make the sort of contribution to improving the legal foundations for international arms control, which its importance in the world permits, unless or until its two nuclear weapons member states can be brought round to a different viewpoint. The end of the Cold War presented a vital opportunity to diminish the salience of nuclear weapons. But the NWS deliberately bypassed that opportunity. Yet it was (as India and Pakistan soon demonstrated) an essential conceit that the NWS could enforce an exclusive monopoly for themselves over such weapons without provoking others as well to seek the weapons for themselves. History will likely repeat itself given more recent moves to develop smaller, tactical, useable battlefield nuclear weapons by the United States as well as Israel (and, it seems, the United Kingdom too), which surely extends the risk that such weapons will also proliferate into other hands.

The fearsome potential link asserted between globalised terror and the acquisition of nuclear or other dangerous weapons by terrorists serves to obscure the vital requirement for more, not less international law. The production and export of missiles is not forbidden under any international law basically because the major powers themselves have never seen fit to pursue that objective seriously. This ensures their own missile development programmes are not proscribed by universal rules; but neither, of course, are the development programmes of any other state so proscribed. Con-
sequential armed coercion by major powers to halt missile proliferation in the absence of evenly applied law adds substantially to the destabilising predicament of proliferation.

**Mutilateralism**

New Zealand multilateral encounters with the EC after the first enlargement centred almost entirely around the international trade and economic institutions. Protocol 18 of the United Kingdom’s Accession Treaty to the EC arrangements envisaged that the full resolution of NZ problems arising from British entry to the EC would lie in international trade arrangements, still then to be negotiated, to which the EC, NZ and other interested countries would become parties. It was already clear that effective disciplines on the damaging impact of EC farm export subsidies were only likely ever to be secured by and through multilateral negotiation. Despite much effort over three decades, such export disciplines are still not in force, although the NZ bilateral access arrangements with the EU were successfully and advantageously folded into GATT/WTO multilateral provisions in 1993. In NZ eyes, the EU bears a lion’s share of the responsibility for the lack of progress on export subsidy discipline, up until the time of writing, but the United States and Japan are likewise strongly protectionist.

The impact of globalisation and the need to devise collective responses to a new generation of common challenges (the sustainable use of global resources, threats from pollution, population growth, illegal migration, uncontrolled spread of weapons, drugs and crime, human security, gender equality, social policy and the equitable application of international justice) materially extended the scope and importance of multilateralism over the last three decades of the twentieth century. No one country, or group, no matter how powerful, could meet many of these challenges alone. One launch pad for reinvigorated collective efforts was a series of summit conferences convened under the UN over that period, most notably the 2000 Millennium Summit. The practical results were and are, mixed. The vast multilayered process remains ‘business in progress’.

Two contrasting perceptions about the EU multilateral role emerged more clearly over that period. One, at the purely operational level, is of a weighty participant that is often an
obstruction to progress because of time-consuming internal policy coordination that produces inflexibility once negotiating begins at the conference table with other participants. The stories of frustration over major international negotiations, kept in a state of suspended animation whilst EU delegates hammer out or refine a common European negotiating position, are legion. By contrast, however, the inherent EU commitment to rules-based order is symptomatic of a belief in multilateralism, which in present times is profoundly important. International society owes the United States a considerable debt for American energy and ideas that (with European support) inspired the creation, in the mid-twentieth century, of a rules-based order, and key institutions to support that order. But as a new century unfolds it is clear that the United States has grown disenchanted with its own creation and with rules that are seen to constrain US freedom to act simply and, if necessary, coercively, of its own volition. Multilateralism is imperilled by such American disillusionment.

In these circumstances, the potential contribution of the EU to a revival of just and equitable multilateral order seems vital. The European Commission, with its responsibilities to defend the position of smaller states inside the Union, can bring a particular perspective to the challenges of global governance. All this presupposes consensus inside the EU itself, but there is as yet no common view about how to reform or improve the multilateral system. The challenges are complex. To reflect the international personality of an enlarged EU requires that individual positions occupied by individual EU member states inside the international system be subsumed into an EU entitlement. This may seriously test the magnanimity and statecraft of key EU members that are required to relinquish individual entitlements to the EU.

For New Zealand, the United Nations remains the primary source of legitimacy in international affairs. In an era when security may depend upon early action against emerging threats, legitimacy is more important than ever. The development of integrated deployable European defence forces, available to support or lead UN-mandated action, would provide vital additional strength for the integrity of the multilateral system. It would extend, in addition, the range of international policy security options that is now being diminished by unilateralism.

The failure to strengthen multilateral institutions and the role of international law following the September 2001 terrorist

attacks remains, at the time of writing, a grave omission. The UN suffered serious setbacks in and over Iraq. The EU has rightly stressed the need to understand and tackle the root causes of international terrorism, singling out poverty, economic failure, competition for resources and the remorseless Palestine-Israel crisis. These are undeniably crucial. But other political factors inside the Middle East itself, such as coercive persuasion to secularise political life, the increasing presence of foreign military bases, the manipulation of regimes to benefit outside interests (in which some European states have played a hand) and the existence of a nuclear-armed Israel, cannot be ignored. The Cold War mindset according to which the supervision of production and distribution of Middle Eastern oil is viewed as a perpetual zero-sum game involving the winning or losing of a battle for national survival, needs serious re-evaluation, given changed geopolitical circumstances, free-market stimulus of the international oil trade and the unsustainability of current energy utilisation.

On several parts of the global agenda, like issues of renewable energy and climate change, human rights, strengthening the world trade system, etc., New Zealand seeks to engage with the EU – as it tries also to broaden its bilateral links through such initiatives as visa-free entry provisions and reciprocal visits of parliamentarians. The scope for interaction between the EU and New Zealand is therefore real, even if the relationship is colossally unequal.
Conclusion
‘Region-building’ in Europe and across the world

Martin Ortega

The European Union’s newly asserted global role has not triggered negative reactions in the rest of the world. In the years to come, the EU might commission opinion polls in key third states in order to ascertain the evolution of public perception vis-à-vis the Union. But, for the time being, the EU does not appear to give rise to major concerns. If the collection of essays contained in this volume – written by knowledgeable academics and diplomats expressing themselves in a personal capacity – is a good sample of what the world thinks of the EU, the Union’s new international image is assessed positively. In other words, ‘more European Union’ in global affairs is welcome.

How the EU defines its global role

The European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003 claims a global role for the European Union, which has been confirmed by the draft Constitutional Treaty formally adopted on 29 October 2004. The ESS describes three EU strategic objectives: to tackle threats, build security in the EU’s neighbourhood and contribute to an international order based on effective multilateralism. All those strategic objectives have external implications and help to explain the meaning of the EU’s global role.

Firstly, when the EU declares that it is protecting itself against the key threats (i.e. fighting international terrorism and WMD proliferation, pacifying regional conflicts, stabilising failed states and fighting against organised crime), it obviously purports to act in the wider world. As the ESS puts it, ‘with the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad’. However, for the Europeans military means are not the instrument of choice to deal with the threats, since ‘none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a
mixture of instruments... The EU is particularly well equipped to respond to... multi-faceted situations'.

Secondly, the EU is contributing to building security in its neighbourhood, first of all in the Balkans. The EU's task is 'to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations'. In so doing, the EU recognises that its global role starts with good-neighbourly relations. Indeed, and logically enough, the EU is first focusing its foreign and security policy on its immediate partners and neighbours and therefore investing most of its energy and resources in stabilising its own region.

The third of the EU's strategic objectives, contributing to an international order based on effective multilateralism, intrinsically has a global scope. The vision depicted in the ESS includes well-functioning international institutions – especially the UN – promotion of rule-based international order and international law, reinforcement of regional organisations, as well as sponsorship of well-governed democratic states.

The draft Constitutional Treaty supplements the description of the EU's global role with a clear commitment to respect for international principles in the conduct of its external action. Articles I-3 and III-292 very eloquently state:

The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by, and designed to advance in the wider world, the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.

The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.¹

Moreover, Article I-41 of the draft Constitutional Treaty specifies the purpose of the new EU military dimension and EU-led military operations:

¹. The quoted text is from Article III-292, which develops paragraph 4 of Article I-3.
The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.  

It is here submitted that the very description of the EU’s new global role made so far is in itself one of the main causes why the rest of the world does not disapprove of that role. In describing the global scope of its foreign and security policy, the EU is at the same time implicitly saying what is not included in that policy. The EU is not attempting to compete with other world powers, the EU is not building up a military capacity independent of that of its member states, the EU is not trying to acquire WMD, the EU has no territorial claims to make, the EU does not intend to intervene militarily to change regimes and the EU is determined to work hand in hand with the United Nations.

This conclusion’s main leitmotif is, therefore, as follows: no state or international actor perceives the European Union as a strategic threat, because it represents a new approach to global politics. That approach implies renouncement of military competition, which is replaced by competition in the economic and commercial fields, as well as dialogue and partnership in the political arena. Furthermore, the new approach understands international relations to be a multilateral process in which diplomatic negotiation, the resolution of disputes and respect for international law and institutions are paramount.

A positive perception

This new approach explains the perceptions of the EU contained in the preceding chapters. All contributors to this volume underscore the dynamic nature of the European integration process, pointing out the rapid evolution from a common market and the European Community to the European Union during the 1990s. Indeed, authors note that the Union is defining a new global role, but they also observe that this role is incipient for the moment and is suffer-
ing from some serious problems, most notably lack of coordination between EU member states on critical issues, as was shown by the Iraq crisis in 2002-03.

However, all chapters present a fairly positive assessment of the EU’s new international aspirations and of recent political developments, such as the definition of a European Security Strategy. The following conclusions, all supported by two or more authors, can be drawn from the contributions to this volume.

- **The EU’s new global role is welcome.** The EU is gradually developing a capability to act with economic, diplomatic and military means, first in its neighbourhood and then in the rest of the world, and that is perceived as a vector for stability in international relations. This is recognised in most of the chapters, in references above all to the EU’s actions in development aid and peacekeeping.

- **The respective positions of the EU and its member states are a source of perplexity.** External observers find it difficult to understand the simultaneous – and sometimes contradictory – chorus of voices stemming from Europe. Some authors (Gerrit Olivier, Yi Wang) suggest that this characteristic of European foreign policy constitutes a weakness. In this respect, Gerrit Olivier affirms that ‘The EU has a crucial role to play because it has most of the right ingredients, except political leadership and concerted political will. Without this leadership and willingness, the EU will be shaped by events instead of vice versa, and this could well be the harbinger of inevitable decline’.

- **A global role requires more global presence.** Many authors point out that the EU’s presence in their countries and regions is insufficient; they therefore call for better representation and more investment on the part of the EU in the improvement of its own image. The apparent lack of interest in cooperation programmes in the fields of higher education and public diplomacy in developing countries is repeatedly mentioned.

- **External observers endorse effective multilateralism.** All contributors support multilateralism as the preferred method for conducting international relations in an interdependent world. Linked with this, more or less explicit criticisms of the US-led intervention in Iraq can be found in many chapters. Toshiya Hoshino describes the dilemma for Japan before the intervention, having both a strong alliance with the United States and a deep faith in multilateralism and the United Nations – a dilemma
that other countries also experienced. Francisco E. González, equally apropos the Iraqi crisis, underscores the well-known Latin American stance in favour of international institutions and against military intervention. On the other hand, the idea of ‘effective multilateralism’, first enunciated in the European Security Strategy, is widely shared. Terence O’Brien declares: ‘the potential contribution of the EU to a revival of just and equitable multilateral order seems vital’.

- **Can the European experience be a model?** While most contributors praise the success of the European integration process, they also note the specific circumstances in which this process has taken place. All authors refer to regional organisations and efforts towards integration in their respective regions, which have led to various degrees of cooperation in Africa, the Americas and Asia. They also acknowledge that the European experience has reached an unequalled level of economic and political integration. However, most authors are sceptical about the possibility of ‘replicating’ the European model: each region will have, thus, to find its own way to integration. Amitav Acharya affirms that, ‘in pursuing a global role, the EU should accept diversity in regional security predicaments and mechanisms’.

- **There exists great potential for interregional cooperation in security matters.** One of the most promising aspects of interregional cooperation is cooperation in building security and stability, and more specifically cooperation in peacekeeping operations. Marcel F. Biato, Toshiya Hoshino and Gerrit Olivier point out fresh Brazilian, Japanese and South African endeavours to contribute to peace missions and suggest that there is great potential for collaboration between those states and the EU and its member states in this field. Marcel F. Biato, for instance, mentions in this connection the Brazilian contribution to the EU-led Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the European contribution to the Brazilian-led operation in Haiti.

- **Trade issues.** Some contributors (for instance Francisco E. González) would welcome an increase in commercial exchanges between the EU and their countries and regions. But generally speaking, as far as trade issues are concerned, the EU is perceived as a protectionist bloc. Other industrialised countries, such as Japan and the United States, are also labelled ‘pro-
tectionist’, but in the case of the EU that criticism is linked to lack of consistency between the declared objectives of its foreign policy and reality. Authors from developing countries criticise, rightly or wrongly, some of the EU’s commercial practices – primarily the Common Agricultural Policy – which in their view are negatively affecting their economies. Babacar Diallo’s contribution, for instance, while acknowledging the EU’s aid to sub-Saharan Africa, affirms that neither that aid nor current trade agreements, including the Cotonou framework, are helping African countries to resolve their problems. Given the ‘historical responsibility’ of the Europeans stemming from the colonial period, EU involvement in Africa is not satisfactory according to that author.

The nuclear debate. Several authors (Toshiya Hoshino and Terence O’Brien are the most outspoken in this respect) present strong cases for deeper multilateral engagement on nuclear disarmament. In their view, the current debate on WMD proliferation tends to ignore the commitment, made by nuclear powers in the NPT in 1968, to negotiate measures for nuclear disarmament. On this issue, the EU is not making a very important contribution because its position is necessarily the lowest common denominator amongst its member states. In Terence O’Brien’s words: ‘the EU is unlikely to make the sort of contribution to improving the legal foundations for international arms control, which its importance in the world permits, unless or until its two nuclear weapons member states can be brought round to a different viewpoint’.

The EU and the future of ‘region-building’

Although it cannot be utilised as a ‘model’, the European integration process constitutes a source of inspiration for other regions of the world. Contributors to this volume pay tribute to the European historical experience of the last 50 years, where not only the EC/EU, but also NATO, the CSCE/OSCE, the Council of Europe and other institutions have contributed to long-lasting peace and stability in the continent. Cooperation and integration schemes in other regions are also introduced and analysed. In the Americas, free trade areas are quite developed thanks to NAFTA and Mercosur, while OAS and other regional institutions underpin sectorial
dialogues and regimes, including for the resolution of disputes and the definition of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. In Africa, continental dialogue and cooperation are taking place under the aegis of the African Union, and some more specific initiatives, such as NEPAD, and subregional organisations are engaged in pragmatic cooperation in the security field, most notably for peacekeeping purposes. In Asia, the situation is more complicated partly due to the size and the heterogeneity of the continent. However, some subregional organisations – ASEAN, for instance – are quite successful, and there exists a comprehensive regional forum, ARF, where all great powers, including Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan and Russia, as well as the EU and the United States, sit.

The existence of regional organisations in all continents introduces renewed complexity into international relations, since those relations are no longer simply ‘international’, in the sense of ‘interstate’, but rather can be divided into at least three types: (1) ‘interstate’, (2) mixed or ‘state-regional’, and (3) ‘interregional’ relations. In addition to EU member state relations with other countries in the world, the European Union – to give an example – has relationships with third states, on the one hand, and with other regional organisations, on the other. The EU relations with major powers, first of all the United States, Russia, and also Canada, China, India and Japan – to name a few states singled out as ‘strategic partners’ in the ESS – are crucial. However, interregional relations are increasingly claiming the EU’s attention.

The EU-Latin American political dialogue is well established through periodic summits – the third of these took place in Guadalajara (Mexico) in May 2004 – and contacts for the establishment of a free trade zone have started; Francisco E. González speaks of a possible ‘bi-regional strategic association’ between the EU and Latin America, the southern part of ‘the other West’. The relationships between Africa and the European Union are mainly based on the Cotonou framework, but the first ever Africa-EU summit, held in Cairo in April 2003, may well herald more ambitious interregional political exchanges. In his chapter, Babacar Diallo advocates the continuation of this kind of summit. Finally, at the fifth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) that took place in Hanoi in October 2004, it was decided to pursue interregional dialogue and cooperation in three fields: political; economic; and social, cultural and intellectual.
Interregional relations have great potential for expansion. Amitav Acharya suggests that the EU could establish partnerships with other regional organisations in order to enhance security and stability in those regions. Regional security arrangements have proved useful for peace-building purposes, particularly because they ensure the local actors’ sense of ownership. However, regional arrangements also face some obstacles, such as lack of resources and fears vis-à-vis regional hegemonic powers. Given the European experience, Professor Acharya points out, the EU can make a useful contribution to security in other regions by comparing notes and associating itself with various regional arrangements.

Nevertheless, the added value of interregional relations for the EU lies not only in dialogue, cooperation and summity, or even specific collaboration in peacekeeping and the security field, but also and above all in the promotion of the idea of ‘region-building’. By supporting interregional relations, the EU is recognising the inherent virtues of regional integration processes as an essential element in bringing peace and security to other regions. In the last fifty years, the European continent has transformed itself thanks to an historical process, proudly described in the opening paragraphs of the ESS:

The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.

The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions . . . Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent.

What was a heterogeneous display of rival states for centuries and up to the Second World War has been transformed into a Union of states through an integration process that can be broadly described as ‘region-building’. In the current international political discourse, there is much talk of ‘nation-building’ and ‘state-building’, both linked to the idea of failing or weak states. Unfortunately, similar attention is not paid to the idea of ‘region-building’, despite the fact that it is probably the most innovative element of world history in the last half-century. If ‘state-building’ is the answer to state failure, ‘region-building’
should be the answer to ‘region failure’. Although the term ‘region-building’ is not very frequently used in international relations literature, the notion of ‘regionalism’ has been examined since the 1980s, and it may well be used as a theoretical point of departure. Indeed, all regions in the world have attempted to establish or revamp their own regional structures in the last 30 years or so, which shows a widespread willingness to synchronise states’ efforts at regional level.

Contributors to this volume deem it very important to proceed with regional cooperation schemes and regional institution-building in their respective regions, utilising the European experience as inspiration. One of the lessons from this collection of essays might therefore be that regional integration is of such importance that the EU should include the promotion of region-building as one of its main global strategic objectives. In all regions, centripetal as well as centrifugal forces – including disputes and conflicts between states – can be observed. The EU should work to prevent the latter and encourage the former.

The ESS and the draft Constitutional Treaty make it clear that the EU is committed to effective multilateralism, which includes the reinforcement of international institutions and international law. This will surely entail reform of the United Nations, following the report of the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel of December 2004 – and the Europeans will have an important contribution to make to that reform. But effective multilateralism must also include the promotion of region-building. The proud declaration about the success of the European integration process contained in the opening paragraphs of the ESS should consequently be followed by a firm EU engagement to support similar integration processes in other continents. If, after centuries of wars, the Europeans have found a remedy to their misunderstandings, they should be ready to propagate the virtues of that remedy worldwide.

A new approach to ‘multipolarity’

Interestingly enough, even if letters of invitation and successive exchanges with authors of this volume did not mention either ‘multipolarity’ or the notion of global ‘strategic poles’, several authors have spontaneously analysed those issues. Some chapters

3. See a succinct bibliography on regionalism in the appendix to this conclusion.
4. In its section on ‘effective multilateralism’, the ESS briefly refers to regional organisations by saying: ‘regional organisations also strengthen global governance’. However, the ESS does not indicate how the EU can help to develop regional integration processes.
suggest that the appearance of the European Union as a global actor will sooner or later affect the current unipolar situation, whereby the United States is the only political and military superpower. Yi Wang is perhaps the most outspoken in this respect, since he suggests that China and the EU should work together to counter the US unilateralist stance on global issues.

However, the European Security Strategy does not refer to global ‘poles’ or ‘multipolarity’. The ESS vision is rather one of alliance and cooperation with the United States and dialogue and cooperation with other major powers that are called ‘strategic partners’. Nor do the draft Constitutional Treaty and other EU documents indicate that the Union intends to transform itself into a ‘pole’. True, some voices in Europe have proposed the emergence of a powerful European entity, with strong military clout, which would be able to implement its own foreign policy, based on its own world-view and wholly independent from that of the United States. This minority position, to a large extent limited to a part of the French élites, reached a high point during the debates prior to the intervention and occupation of Iraq. Indeed, some external observers at the time suggested that, following their opposition to the US-led Iraq war, France, Germany and Russia (and China) would create an ‘axis’ with the aim of counterbalancing the United States. According to these interpretations, certain European states (or some configuration of the EU) would be ready to play the traditional ‘balance of power’ game, in order to constitute an association of powers that could challenge the only remaining superpower.

In this author’s view, this is not a probable, or even conceivable, development. Even if there is a minority point of view in Europe backing that option, and although President George W. Bush’s re-election might lead to new US unilateral military adventures that would undoubtedly upset the Europeans, the EU – as we know it today and for the foreseeable future – will not define itself as a strategic ‘pole’ that could compete in the traditional sense (i.e. militarily) with the United States or any other great power. There are at least three arguments that support this assertion. First, most EU members deem their alliance with the United States, and NATO, to be irreplaceable. Second, the EU is a union of states, and these states’ governments are not willing or ready to create a centralised ‘super-government’ that would run the new superpower. Third, and perhaps most importantly, a majority of the European

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public considers the very idea of building up a European military superpower to be antiquated and useless. Given their rich but turbulent historical experience, the majority of Europeans simply prefer a different approach to global politics.

The emergence of the European Union as a global actor cannot be seen in terms of the old ‘balance of power’ theory; rather, it must be interpreted in a different light. In his contribution to this volume, Amitav Acharya introduces a very useful distinction in this respect: ‘strategic multipolarity’ designates the old notion of global military competition, whereas ‘normative multipolarity’ refers to a new kind of global balance, in which ‘the dominant power co-opts weaker states through shared rules and institutions with a view to enhancing the capacity for collective action of all of them (and not just the ‘polar’ power) in pursuit of common goals at the global level, including goals other than deterrence or defence, which are usually the chief motivations behind spheres of influence.’

He points out that China might be today the best illustration of a quest for strategic multipolarity – although he also recognises Chinese efforts, following its New Security Concept of the mid-1990s, towards regional cooperation and multilateralism. According to Professor Acharya, the main example of normative multipolarity is the European Union.

In a sense, the term ‘normative’ is well chosen, for it underscores the declared pre-eminence of international principles and institutions for the ‘normative poles’. However, in another sense, the adjective ‘normative’ is misleading because these ‘poles’ do not purport to uphold regional or ‘polar’ values and principles, but rather global or universal values and principles. In other words, ‘normative multipolarity’ does not entail a clash of ‘normative poles’ with opposing sets of rules and values – which would sooner or later lead to ‘strategic multipolarity’. The ‘normative poles’ underscore instead the existence of universal international principles and values that are valid for all sorts of poles.

Therefore, new terms might be introduced in the current debate on ‘multipolarity’. There are two options in this respect. First, given that the competition between the old ‘strategic poles’ and the new ‘poles’ is primarily commercial, the term ‘strategic multipolarity’ should be coupled with ‘economic multipolarity’. Both types of multipolarity can coexist. We would be then living in a ‘strategically unipolar’ but ‘economically multipolar’ world. ‘Economic multipolarity’ will never degenerate into ‘strategic
multipolarity’ if economic ‘poles’ choose not to develop substantial military strength. Second, given the importance of global principles and institutions for those new actors, as well as their cooperative approach to international relations, the question arises as to whether they can be described as ‘poles’ at all. Indeed, the nature of the well-known superpowers that are the basis of ‘multipolarity’ is quite different from that of the new regional centres such as the EU, which can be simply called ‘regions’ rather than ‘poles’. Thus, in addition to the traditional distinction between ‘unipolarity’ and ‘multipolarity’, we can speak of a ‘multiregional’ world or ‘multiregionalism’. The EU would not be promoting ‘multipolarity’; it would be one of the forerunners of a ‘multiregional’ world.

The preceding reference to global principles and values leads to a final reflection on the importance of regional actors for international relations. Regional entities such as the EU are better equipped than traditional powers or ‘poles’ to act in an interdependent world because they are multilateral by definition. Everyday multilateral endeavours to reach agreement and compromise within regional bodies help both regional organisations and their member states to understand the complexities of multilateralism at a global level. And this understanding is crucial at a time of building up international consensus – which is so much needed in the fight against the real global threats and challenges, such as global warming, and in the reform of global institutions.

The essence of power is very different from the essence of legitimacy. Power can be concentrated *ad libitum*, whereas legitimacy is the product of dialogue, negotiation and persuasion. Sheer power engenders fear and opposition. Conversely, a multilateral approach to international relations leads to positive external perceptions and legitimacy. The European Union has renounced the idea that the use of armed force abroad can improve the lives of European citizens. The European Union is a new international actor that has decided to cooperate with neighbours, partners and other regional actors to ensure security in Europe and, at the same time, work for a better world.
Appendix to the Conclusion

This is a succinct bibliography on ‘regionalism’ and ‘region-building’. Further information on this subject can be obtained from the webpage of UNU-CRIS, the United Nations University centre in Bruges on Comparative Regional Integration Studies.

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About the authors

Amitav Acharya is Deputy Director and Head of Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has held academic appointments at York University, Toronto; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore; Harvard Asia Center; the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the National University of Singapore. Professor Acharya has published extensively on Asian security, regionalism, and international relations. Among his latest books is Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (Routledge, 2001), and articles in International Security and International Organization. He sits on the editorial board of the journals Pacific Review, Pacific Affairs, European Journal of International Relations and Global Governance.

Marcel F. Biato entered the Brazilian diplomatic service in 1981. Between 1995 and 1998, he was adviser to the chief Brazilian negotiator during the Ecuador-Peru peace process. His overseas experience includes postings to the Brazilian Embassy in London (1987-90), the Consulate-General in Berlin (1990-94) and the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations (1999-2002), where he was legal adviser. Since 2003, he has been the assistant to President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva’s Foreign Policy Adviser. His academic background includes a Master’s Degree in Political Science from the London School of Economics. He has written articles on the settlement of disputes in South America, the International Criminal Court and the Law of the Sea.


Francisco E. González, Mexican, has been a member of the University of Oxford faculty since 2000. He is currently a British Academy Research Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford. He coordinates the project ‘Strengthening Democratic Institutions in Mexico’ at the Centre for Mexican Studies in Oxford. Dr González is also Professorial Lecturer in Political Economy at Johns Hopkins University’s Bologna Center, Italy, where he teaches Latin American Politics and Political Economy. His
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Toshiya Hoshino is Professor at the School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, Japan. BA (Sophia University, Tokyo), MA (University of Tokyo), and Ph.D. (Osaka University). Before taking up his present appointment, he was a Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo, a Visiting Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, and a researcher at residence at the Embassy of Japan, Washington, DC. His recent publications (co-authored) include *Cooperation Experiences in Europe and Asia* (Tokyo: DESK, University of Tokyo, 2004) and *Containing Conflict: Cases in Preventive Diplomacy* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2003).

Terence O’Brien is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS), New Zealand. He was Founder Director of the CSS and Teaching Fellow at graduate level in International Relations, Victoria University of Wellington. As a former NZ diplomat, he served as NZ Ambassador to the European Community (1983-86) in Brussels and earlier as deputy head of mission during first EC enlargement. He also served as NZ Ambassador to the UN Office at Geneva, including to GATT/WTO, and to the United Nations in New York, including to the UN Security Council. He has written and lectured extensively on NZ foreign policy and international relations.

Gerrit Olivier is Director of the Centre for European Studies in Africa, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg. As a career diplomat, he was Chief Director of Planning at the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Head of the South African Interest Office in the Soviet Union and South Africa’s first Ambassador to the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, a position he held until November 1995. Before entering the Diplomatic Service, Dr Olivier was Professor of International Politics at the University of Pretoria. He was a founder member and President of the South African Political Science Association, and the first editor of the South African Journal for Political Science, *Politikon*. Dr Olivier is author and co-author of 10 books on South African domestic and international politics, and numerous articles in scientific journals and newspapers. His present interests and research focuses are South Africa’s foreign policy, global interdependence, European integration and Russian foreign and security policy.
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Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABACC</td>
<td>Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Control and Accounting</td>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALCUE</td>
<td>Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ASEAN Security Community</td>
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<td>Association of South-East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
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<td>Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BTWC</td>
<td>Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention</td>
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<td>Confidence-Building Measure</td>
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<td>CCW</td>
<td>Convention on Conventional Weapons</td>
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<td>CEMAC</td>
<td>Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale</td>
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<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>CONACYT</td>
<td>National Council for Science and Technology (Mexico)</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>CSSDCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
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<td>G-8</td>
<td>Group of Eight leading industrialised nations</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HCOC</td>
<td>Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>Mercosur</td>
<td>Common Market of the South</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development</td>
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<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>National Security Strategy of the United States</td>
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<td>NWS</td>
<td>Nuclear Weapons State(s)</td>
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<td>NZ</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADDEC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defence Forces (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South-East Asia Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDCA</td>
<td>Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIAR</td>
<td>Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAM</td>
<td>See AMU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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The European Security Strategy of December 2003 and the draft Constitutional Treaty, adopted in October 2004, define the EU’s new global role. The European Union is determined to fight against major threats and challenges globally, strengthen security in its neighbourhood and contribute to an international order based on effective multilateralism.

In order to grasp external reactions towards that new global role, the EUISS invited a number of distinguished academics, experts and former diplomats from key partner countries to present their views on the EU. Authors from Africa (Senegal, South Africa), Latin America (Brazil, Mexico), Asia (China, Japan) and the Pacific (New Zealand), as well as one author who adopts an overall Asian perspective, have contributed to this volume.

The main conclusion is that the EU’s new global projection is perceived positively. External observers praise the EU’s efforts in development aid and peacekeeping, endorse the idea of effective multilateralism, and even desire an increased EU presence in their respective countries and regions.

Contributions in this volume lead to further reflection, as suggested in its conclusion. By rejecting the traditional military ‘balance of power’ philosophy, the EU rather favours a cooperative approach to international relations. Moreover, the EU constitutes the culmination of a successful regional integration process, which represents a useful example for other regions. The EU could therefore contribute to other ‘region-building’ efforts, and, in particular, establish interregional dialogues on security matters with a view to sharing the lessons of the European experience.