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EU cooperative threat reduction activities in Russia

Kathrin Höhl, Harald Müller and Annette Schaper
Edited by Burkard Schmitt

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Preface

Nicole Gnesotto

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, the European Union and others have worked with the successor states of the Soviet Union to account for, secure and dismantle nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, agents, materials and infrastructure, as well as to help former weapons scientists and specialists reintegrate into civilian work. These cooperative threat reduction programmes have been successful, but much unfinished business remains.

In June 2002, leaders of the Group of Eight leading industrialised nations (G-8) announced a global partnership to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction and pledged to raise up to $20 billion over the next ten years to address these WMD threats.

Over the last year, a consortium of influential policy research organisations in Europe, Russia and Asia was created and led by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC), as part of a three-year project, primarily sponsored by the Nuclear Threat Initiative and Carnegie Corporation of New York, which is aimed at strengthening future threat reduction efforts. The consortium has concluded a major assessment, published in January 2003, which identifies gaps in existing threat reduction programmes, recommends future programmatic priorities and proposes coordination mechanisms that will improve the effectiveness of further efforts.

This Chaillot Paper *represents the contribution of the European Union Institute for Security Studies to the first phase of the project. Written by Kathrin Höhl, Harald Müller and Annette Schaper, and edited by Burkard Schmitt, it was first published as the chapter on the EU in* Protecting against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership, Volume 3: International Responses *(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2003).*

It is the first substantial analysis of EU activities in supporting non-proliferation activities in the Russian Federation. This publication presents an insightful overview of the evolution of EU policy in this area and the scale of EU involvement in Russia. The paper is also particularly timely as the EU considers the renewal of two key documents of European policy towards Russia: the 1999 Joint Action on Non Proliferation and Disarmament in Russia and the 1999 Common Strategy on the Russian Federation.

Paris, May 2003

Introduction

Burkard Schmitt

To strengthen the security structure of an erstwhile enemy, and a country that hard-nosed defence analysts and military planners - think of the last two US Nuclear Posture Reviews – still view as a potential threat, is quite an unorthodox and innovative way to address one's own security concerns. Yet cooperative threat reduction (CTR) has become part and parcel of Western security policy. A considerable number of NATO and European Union (EU) member states are involved in this sort of activity, as is the EU itself, including its most genuinely European actor, the European Commission (EC).

Examining the EU's own CTR programmes in the field of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles requires an appreciation of the EU as a very special political animal. All other CTR actors are nation states. The EU, in contrast, consists of a unique institutional set-up. Security policy is still largely exempted from the supranational decision-making of Pillar I, where the Commission has the authority to take legislative initiatives and disposes of executive and regulative competences, the Council votes according to qualified majority rule, and the European Parliament is involved. Rather, security policy remains embedded in the intergovernmental system of Pillar II, with the Council and its working committees dominating, the Commission only associated and competing with the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Parliament on the sidelines. If the Commission wants to operate in this field, it has to do so with caution and circumspection, lest its efforts raise the suspicion of member states, which could then block it on a constitutional basis.

Moreover, policy fields are neither exclusively divided among the pillars nor between the EU and its member states. Clearly, member states do not abandon their own particular policies once the EU becomes involved. As a consequence, EU and national policies coexist in a strange relationship somewhere between comple-

mentarity, competition, parallelism, and at times even contradiction. The restless ingenuity of European diplomats has created tools to embrace these complex relationships – chief among them, 'Common Strategies', 'Joint Actions', and 'Common Positions'.

This complex set-up makes allocating resources surprisingly difficult. At the national level, responsibilities are clearly assigned, and a given ministry knows that a particular plan has to be subsidised out of its budget. The question is then to what level. If there were a division of authority between two national ministries, they would compete in order to reap prestige or to relinquish a financial burden. In the EU context, however, funding always prompts the question of whether the Commission, with its significant budgets and flexibility (due to its discretionary authority), is intruding into areas that are the preserve of the member states.

These factors form a critical background to this study, since the EU's institutional structure and the purposes behind it shape the possibilities and preferences of those conducting CTR-related programmes. Without them, the course and content of policies cannot be wholly understood.

In the first chapter, we assess the proliferation threat as seen from Europe and seek to characterise some specifically 'European' ways of thinking about proliferation and the relationship to Russia. 'European' in this context is generally taken to represent middle-of-the-road thinking in the security debate within the EU. On most issues, there is no common doctrine that could clearly be identified as incorporating, with formal acceptance and incontestable proof, what 'the Europeans' think. Most of the time, a member state will have a national position that deviates from this middle-of-the-road thinking, as is likely to be the case for sectors of public opinion.

Following the analysis of threat assessment, we present the legal and institutional framework of European-Russian relations in which CTR programmes are embedded. The subsequent section is an analysis of the programmes. We first give a short list of the projects that exist in each sector (nuclear, biological, chemical) and then discuss some of them in detail. Since much of these efforts are quite recent, the conclusions are fairly tentative. We then close with a view towards the future, including policy recommendations based on our earlier analysis.

The EU joining the CTR effort

1

Development of an EU non-proliferation policy

Security and foreign policy were not initially part of the European integration project. However, nuclear non-proliferation was indirectly included in the Treaty of Rome by way of the EURATOM Treaty, which made it obligatory for all member states to submit civilian nuclear energy activities to EURATOM inspections. Beyond this particular rule, it was only after 1981 that a working group on non-proliferation was created within the framework of European Political Cooperation, a loose, informal, and largely arcane method of coordinating the foreign policies of member states.[1]

In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) became the legal basis for intergovernmental cooperation in the field of foreign policy. The working group quickly expanded its activities and developed into a consultative body covering the whole field of nuclear proliferation. Joint policy statements became routine in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) general conferences and UN sessions devoted to the issue. Disagreements in substance, while still existing, have diminished over the years (with the notable exception of the civilian use of nuclear energy). In 1990, the Council issued a substantial foreign policy statement on non-proliferation and, for the first time, caucusing took place during the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference.

In 1992, all member states adopted an export policy that excluded significant transfers to countries where not all nuclear activities were under IAEA safeguards ('full-scope safeguards condition'). In the following years, the EU developed initiatives for revamping the verification system of the IAEA and was also active in the revival and enhancement of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The EU approached the extension of the NPT in 1995 with the common objective of ensuring that the treaty's lifespan become indefinite and mounted a highly successful Joint Action to per-

1. There were two immediate reasons for tackling the non-proliferation problem. First, the Europeans felt that they needed some counterweight to what was seen as an increasing US tendency to impose unilaterally home-made non-proliferation rules or to reinterpret agreed ones in a rather idiosyncratic way. Second, the awkward situation of those members who had begun participating in the Nuclear Suppliers Group had to be resolved; these member states started committing themselves to export controls on some materials that, under the EURATOM Treaty, should circulate freely in the European Common Market.

suade other countries to support this position. Following the 1995 conference, the EU worked – despite the concerns of a somewhat reluctant United States – to realise the 'constructive dialogue' the conference had requested between nuclear suppliers and recipients. Finally, in 2000, the EU approached the NPT review with a fully developed Common Position, outlining a general policy for all fields of the NPT and agreeing on some substantial proposals, even in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Following the SEA, a working group on chemical and biological weapons was also founded. It provided a forum for consultation and policy coordination in these increasingly important and active fields. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the various working groups were drawn together in the Committee on Non-Proliferation (CONOP) that was charged with CFSP development in the whole area of WMD and missile proliferation.

The 'new' proliferation risks

Throughout this period of evolution, Europeans began developing their own assessment of the proliferation of WMD. Some member countries fall within the range of missiles and WMD from states at the southern and south-eastern periphery of the EU.[2] The threat would become graver should proliferators extend the range of the missiles or acquire more sophisticated weapons technology.[3]

From the European perspective, however, proliferation is understood predominantly in a regional context. Proliferating countries watch their neighbours with distrust and try to match their capabilities, with the primary objective of ensuring national and regime survival. There may also be the intention – in Iraqi pre-1991 thinking in particular – of employing WMD capabilities to ensure regional predominance.

This regional context is not an excuse for complacency, particularly in light of apparent Iranian efforts to extend the range of its missiles beyond anything that could be justified in a regional deterrence constellation. At the same time, it counsels some prudence in presuming that the present situation and the near-term future are times of clear and present danger.

Regional context motivates Europeans to put considerable confidence in the idea that leaders of proliferating states can be deterred from aggression towards Europe by the existence of overwhelming capabilities in the Western Alliance. In addition to

2. Greece – at least parts of it – is likely to be within reach of the Iranian *Shahab*-III missile. Parts of Italy - notably the southern islands - are within range of the Libyan *Scud*. Both countries are reportedly in possession of chemical weapons and working on biological weapons. No evidence is in the open domain whether chemical weapons (CW) capabilities have been successfully weaponised into warhead designs.

3.Alleged North Korean assistance to Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq is of concern in this context, as is the concept of an intermediate-range *Shahab*-IV missile for Iran that would cover a considerable part of Europe, including parts of Germany and France, and of course rumours about Iran's nuclear weapon ambitions. Wyn Bowen, *The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Federation of American Scientists, *Missile Proliferation Summary*, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/summary.htm> (accessed 17 June 2002).

deterrence, Europeans put strong emphasis on working through various multilateral regimes and bilateral relations to constrain countries that present a risk. Europe maintains quite viable relations with most Middle East actors.[4] This includes, *inter alia*, Italy's leading role in normalising relations with Libya and helping the ageing Colonel Muammar Gadaffi to find his way back to an acceptable international role, as well as the joint approach to Iran under the label of 'critical dialogue'. Relative to the United States, the European approach amounts to a more balanced position in the Middle East conflict, an attitude that in turn strengthens relations with Egypt and especially Syria.

Given these considerations, the sense of urgency and immediacy typical in US discourse is not characteristic of the European approach. Proliferation challenges from North Africa and the Middle East that would affect the security of European territory are viewed as real but remote. And though proliferation is seen as a general risk for regional stability and, by upsetting balances and enhancing tensions in crucial regions, for world order as well, Europeans think the diplomatic tools they have at hand are sufficient to address the various countries considered to be proliferators. They do not perceive any sense of hostility or enmity between themselves and any of the allegedly dangerous countries. Thus, active diplomacy that puts proliferation in a broader regional, political and economic context appears to be a viable road for the time being.

Obviously, this situation would change in the event of a sudden and rapid expansion of proliferators' capabilities. This seems extremely unlikely, however, unless additional help is offered from outside, beyond the North Korean and Chinese assistance reported in some of the countries in the region. It is, however, in this context that concern about the military complex of the Russian Federation enters European consideration. Given the vast resources of weapons, weapon materials, technology, and know-how in Russia, the smooth development of the European security environment depends on Russian success in controlling these dangerous resources. The reported assistance to the Iranian missile programme by Russian firms makes this point particularly salient,[5] yet Russian work on the Busheer nuclear reactor, for example, is viewed with more sanguinity in Europe than in the United States.

Regarding the risks of Russian involvement in WMD proliferation, Europe received a loud wake-up call between 1992 and 1995,

4. Philip Gordon, *The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

5. Robert Einhorn and Gary Samore, 'Ending Russian Assistance to Iran's Nuclear Bomb', *Survival*, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 51-70.

when numerous cases involving the illegal trafficking of fissile and radioactive material were reported.[6] Most of these cases involved radioactive materials like strontium, cadmium, or osmium; more than 20 involved fissile material.[7] Most of that was natural or low-enriched uranium, obviously fuel for power reactors. In around ten cases, small volumes of weapons-grade material were found, ranging from milligram amounts of plutonium (Pu) to several kilograms of highly enriched uranium. In no case was there enough material for a nuclear weapon.[8]

The fight against WMD terrorism took on new and unexpected intensity after 11 September 2001, and will certainly now strengthen the arguments for CTR in the European context.[9] Al-Qaeda's interest in WMD and its incipient efforts to obtain the necessary ingredients and weapons concepts have been noted with great concern.[10] Again, the risk that disgruntled weapons experts from the former Soviet Union could be induced to assist Islamic terrorists in their endeavours, or that weapons, materials or technology could pass from Russian territories to al-Qaeda camps and laboratories – wherever they may exist after their assets in Afghanistan were lost – adds urgency to CTR projects, meriting enhanced funding and acceleration.[11] Over the last few years, the EU has put in place the framework within which these projects can be successfully pursued.

Entering the scene

The nuclear trafficking events in the first half of the 1990s nudged European governments into action. The EU entered the CTR area in the mid-1990s, although the European effort has remained far below the level of that in the United States.

The European Commission had already developed a programme of Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) that could serve as the framework for CTR activities. Moreover, under the provisions of the EURATOM treaty, two specialised agencies of the Commission, the EURATOM Safeguards Office (ESO) and the EURATOM Supply Agency (ESA) bear authority over, and responsibility for, all fissile material circulating in the civilian fuel cycle in the EU, and has taken on the function of the State's System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC).[12] In addition, the EURATOM treaty stipulates the aim of fostering cooperation on

6. Really reliable statistics are hard to obtain. The IAEA and EURATOM as well as individual countries keep records, but not all cases are reported to both organisations; a huge number of cases involve unproven rumours and hoaxes. Annette Schaper, 'Nuclear Smuggling in Europe-Real Dangers and Enigmatic Deceptions', paper presented at the Forum on Illegal Nuclear Traffic: Risks, Safeguards and Countermeasures, Villa Olmo, Como, 11-13 June 1997; William Potter, 'Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Leakage from the Post-Soviet States', *Arms Control Today*, October 1995, pp. 9-16.

7. These substances pose considerable health hazards to those that have been exposed to them, but they were treated in a relatively dismissive way in the public discussion, because the main concern was the possibility that weapons-capable material could also enter the black market. From today's vantage point, however, concern must certainly be greater because radioactive materials could also be used for terrorist purposes, exploiting the negative health effects of radiation. The term 'dirty bomb' defines a device where radioactive material is spread over a larger area through igniting conventional explosives.

8. It is noticeable that Germany accounted for the largest number of cases by far, and after 1995, the number of trafficking incidents reported decreased sharply. Both circumstances are subject to different interpretations. It is unclear yet whether the decline in incidents signals enhanced security and competence in the nuclear sector of the former Soviet Union, or smarter strategies by the criminals, or the choice of alternative, less well-controlled routes than those through Western Europe. A lot of cases could be explained by rumours among criminals that nuclear smuggling could earn them a fortune; the rumours were reinforced or encouraged by certain press articles. The resulting 'smuggling boom' faded after 1996.

nuclear safety (though operative authority lies with the member states). The Commission therefore has, via EURATOM, a legitimate interest in the field of radioactive materials.

The Pillar II institutions became involved in CTR as nuclear trafficking was put on the agenda of international organisations such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the G-8, the IAEA and even the nuclear non-proliferation review conferences. Because all these forums come under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, CONOP has had to deal with CTR regularly since about 1994. For example, the drafting of the Joint Action on CTR, as well as a political evaluation, took place mainly in that committee. Member states report on their own initiatives in this area, and European positions for international events such as conferences on nuclear trafficking or nuclear terrorism or G-8 meetings on CTR issues are coordinated and developed by CONOP. Coordination with the Commission is ensured by the regular presence of a Commission representative as a CONOP member.

Two areas of CTR were particularly suitable for EU involvement. The first was the International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC), the main instrument for providing employment to scientists who have been working in the WMD and missile programmes of the former Soviet Union. Support is given for projects that promise interesting contributions to civilian science engineering or appear to hold commercial promise. The Commission, with its technical expertise, financial flexibility and back-up from nuclear research centres (which can help evaluate incoming research proposals), was an ideal partner for this endeavour and assisted and co-funded the ISTC from the beginning.

The second area where the EU became 'naturally' involved is the civil nuclear sector. The EU not only had long experience in nuclear safety, it also had a keen interest in preventing a second Chernobyl catastrophe that might again unleash radioactive clouds over Western Europe. Consequently, the EU, led by the Commission, has become the leading provider of assistance for nuclear safety in the former Soviet Union.[13]

Of course, safety is only indirectly related to proliferation and terrorism concerns. Nevertheless, it has some direct impact. Measuring instruments aimed at detecting or preventing radioactive leaks may also serve the purpose of physical security, as can reliability checks, even when designed with safety in mind. Regulations addressing the accounting of materials and the safe storage of

9. Michael Barletta, After 9/11: *Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation* (Monterey, Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002).

10. Stefan Leader, 'Osama bin Laden and the Terrorist Search for WMD', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June 1999, pp. 34-7.

11. Jon Wolfsthal and Tom Collina, 'Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control in Russia', *Survival*, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 51-84.

12. IAEA safeguards in non-nuclear weapon states require the establishment and maintenance of a SSAC, whose correctness is verified by the IAEA. It is a legal function of a national authority, based on technical material control and accountancy measures. Normally, an SSAC is run nationally.

13. The matter is never far from controversy, however, particularly as some staunchly antinuclear governments – led by Austria and, since 1999, Germany – object to safety measures seen as motivating, encouraging, and facilitating the further use of nuclear energy.

non-fissile radioactive material and spent fuel also help to deny unauthorised persons access to these materials. Moreover, the supply of technology and equipment to enhance the inherent safety of nuclear plants tends to make the sabotage of nuclear facilities more difficult. From this vantage point, TACIS has extended, since 1992, into some programmes that were more directly geared towards nuclear non-proliferation and threat reduction.

In the nuclear field, EU involvement has been facilitated by the fact that the EURATOM Treaty defines (civil) nuclear energy as an integration priority and establishes specialised organisations (ESA and ESO) that are part of the Commission's responsibility for this. Involvement in other WMD-related areas, where no comparable legal and institutional basis exists, has been less evident.

In the biological and chemical field, the Commission could use its competence in regard to dual-use goods to gain influence over materials, equipment, and technology related to biological and chemical weapons development (though dedicated weapons agents and ready weapons do not, of course, fall within the purview of the Commission). Since missile technology is less dual-use and more military oriented, only minor parts of it come under Community law and Commission authority. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that no CTR activity concerning missiles has been recorded so far by the EU.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) have provided the forum in which ideas for CTR projects could evolve. Regular caucusing by the EU permanent representatives to the OPCW took place in The Hague, and CONOP coordinated national policies. As it became obvious in the late 1990s that Russia lacked the technical and financial means to destroy its chemical weapons according to the schedule prescribed by the convention, the EU and its member states started to develop projects that would help accelerate the process. Again, the Commission's TACIS programme became the vehicle for the EU's activities.

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) lacks both a verification system and an organisation charged with operating it and watching over the other aspects of the BWC. CFSP has therefore remained focused on preparing review conferences and coordinating positions for negotiations on a compliance protocol. It took

the additional impetus of the Council decision on a Common Strategy on Russia and its implementation through the EU-Russian agreement, to get some minor activities, beyond ISTC support, off the ground.

2 The legal framework

Russia is of overriding importance in the foreign relations of all EU countries. However, member states' geography, history and preferences differ, and therefore their political priorities may vary as well. Given the Russian inclination to play geopolitical games, this could lead to a widening gap in the approaches the EU member states take towards Russia, with detrimental consequences for the cohesion of CFSP and the European project as a whole. For this reason, it is wise to have a common framework that informs both EU policies and national policies of member states towards Russia.[14]

The EU's legal and institutional framework for threat reduction activities has evolved slowly. It started in 1994 with the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia, and became more specific through the Common Strategy on Russia in June 1999. Only the December 1999 Joint Action Establishing a European Union Cooperation Programme for Non-proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation gave the EU as a whole clear guidance in the specific field of threat reduction. Together, these three elements provide the normative setting within which CTR projects are designed.

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signed in 1994 but took more than three years to come into force. In the view of the EU, it has strengthened mutual understanding and a perception of common interests,[15] even though the priorities differed slightly among the partners. For the EU, the political aspects of the agreement were deemed most important, while Russia put stronger emphasis on the economic ones.[16]

The agreement contains several provisions related to threat reduction through the rules guiding political dialogue and the creation of new institutions. These fields are closely interrelated, since the new institutions are designed to foster and intensify dia-

14. The authors wish to thank Quentin Michel of Liège, Belgium, for his comments and explanations on the EU's structure, history, and processes.

15. For an overview, see European Union, 'EU's Relations with Russia: Overview, the Institutional Framework, 2002', <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm> (accessed 2 August 2002).

16. Christian Meier, 'EU-Rubland: Von pragmatischer Zusammenarbiet zu strategischer Partnerschaft?' [EU-Russia: From pragmatic cooperation to strategic partnership?], in Klaus Schubert (ed.), *Die Europäische Union als Akteur der Weltpolitik* [The European Union as an actor in world politics] (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 2000), p. 106.

logue.[17] The advantage of this concept is the firm institutionalisation of continuous dialogue on various levels:[18]

- at the EU-Russia summit, the presidents of Russia, the EU-Council, and the Commission meet twice a year;
- in the Cooperation Council, members of the Russian government, members of the EU Council, the Commission, and if needed the present and future presidencies meet at ministerial level once a year, additionally if necessary;
- members of the European Parliament and the Russian Duma meet once a year in the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee;
- senior officials of the Russian government work regularly with representatives of the European Troika;
- both sides have expressed their willingness to intensify and optimise diplomatic interactions in general and to facilitate cooperation between experts wherever useful.

The PCA is thus not just an expression of good intentions, but it has spurred creation of tangible structures to ensure that good intentions are actually pursued. The multilayer institutional network means that issues can be delegated to the appropriate body as they arise. This enables the highest levels to focus on the most important decisions rather than having to grapple with unnecessary detail.

This approach has succeeded in enhancing cooperation on security policy, as documented in the Joint Declaration on Strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation.[19] Foreign and security policy, including non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control, has become a regular agenda item for meetings up to the highest level.[20] Although it is difficult to measure the impact of the PCA's institutional setting and its security dialogue on specific CTR projects, one can assume that it has facilitated agreements.

Common Strategies

Common Strategies serve as linkages between the Commission and Council. Their purpose is, on the one hand, to provide a legal framework for areas not covered by community law and the authority of the Commission, namely security and defence and, on the other, to coordinate the policies of both pillars in order to produce synergy and enhance efficiency.[21] Adopted by the EU-Council on 4 June 1999, the Common Strategy on Russia was the first since the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force. Its specific pur-

17. European Union, 'Partnership Cooperation Agreement between EU and Russia,' 1 December 1997, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/pca/pca_russia.pdf> (accessed 2 February 2002).

18. Ibid., Arts. 6, 7, 8, 90 and 95.

19. European Union, 'Joint Declaration on Strengthening Dialogue and Cooperation on Political and Security Matters in Europe', 30 October 2001, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_30_10_00/stat_secu_en.htm> (accessed 4 April 2002).

20. European Union, 'EU-Russia Joint Statement', 17 May 2001, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit17_05_01/statement.htm> (accessed 2 August 2002), Arts. 9, 12.

21. Marc Gottschald, *Die GASP von Maastricht bis Nizza: Die Ergebnisse und Beschlusse der Gemeinsamen Aussen-und Sicherheitspolitik der EU seit ihrer Entstehung bis zum Vertrag von Nizza* [CFSP from Maastricht to Nice: Results and decisions of CFSP from its beginning to the Treaty of Nice] (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001), p. 119.

pose was to implement the PCA.

The Common Strategy is essential for the purpose of threat reduction, because it creates binding obligations and prevents abstention or deviation. This was exactly the reason why member states initially disagreed as to the way the Common Strategy should be framed. France and the United Kingdom would have liked the draft to be more specific, while Belgium preferred to keep it more open and flexible. Facing the need to find a common denominator between member states and to satisfy Russia's interests as well, it was unsurprising that the outcome was a rather vague and general document, which 'lacks agreement on the most important issue areas and lacks a definition of clear priorities within those areas that are singled out as being important'.[22]

This points to a more general problem related to CFSP. Since member states still tend to give priority to their own national interests vis-à-vis those of the EU as a whole, they 'will almost certainly continue to try to keep the formulation of the Common Strategy as broad as possible, so as not to see their hands tied subsequently in a decision'.[23]

The need to take into account the interest of an external partner is another complicating factor. Given these general weaknesses, it will be essential to evaluate the practical implementation of the EU's Common Strategies thoroughly. A fundamental review is currently being prepared, 'so that the Council can make appropriate recommendations to the European Council before the first of the present Common Strategies expires (Russia, June 2003)'.[24]

Joint Action

The Joint Action establishing a European Union Cooperative Programme for Non-proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation was adopted by the EU Council on 17 December 1999, on the basis of the Common Strategy. It declares the EU's readiness 'to promote cooperative risk reduction activities and the safe and secure dismantlement of WMD-related resources in Russia [and] to provide a legal and operational framework for an enhanced European Union role in cooperative risk reduction activities in the Russian Federation through project-orientated cooperation'.[25]

22. Hiski Haukkala, 'The Making of the European Union's Common Strategy on Russia', in Hiski Haukkala and Sergei Medvedev (eds.), *The EU Common Strategy on Russia: Learning the Grammar of the CFSP* (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2001), p. 50. Haukkala describes the negotiation process as the 'Christmas Tree Method'. 'Once the general principles, the bulk of the tree, were in place the member states were allowed to add their own decorations to the strategy . . . The . . . method has, however, proven unsatisfactory in reality.'

23. Stephan De Spiegeleire, 'The Implementation of the EU's Common Strategy on Russia', op. cit. in note 22, p. 106.

24. This review will be based on the SG/HR's report of 21 December 2000, on the General Affairs Council conclusions of 26 January 2001, the Joint Report by SG/HR and the Commission of 28 January 2002. See European Union, 'Annual Review of the Effectiveness of Common Strategies', 28 January 2002, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/gac.htm#cs280102> (accessed 4 June 2002). In addition, the experiences of the two other Common Strategies (on Ukraine and the Mediterranean) will also be taken into account. On these two strategies see op. cit. in note 21, p. 120.

25. European Union, 'Joint Action of December 17, 1999: Establishing a European Cooperation Programme for Non-proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation', <http://www.eur.ru/eng/neweur/user_eng.php?func=rae_disarmament> (accessed 17 April 2002), Preamble (2), and Arts. 1, 2.

The Joint Action will last as long as the Common Strategy, unless the Council decides otherwise.[26] It is conditional on Russian cooperation and can be suspended if Russia fails to implement the programme as agreed or refuses EU requests for monitoring, external evaluation, or audits.

The Joint Action is the result of a determination by the member states to give the EU its own profile in this particular field and to link their individual activities to a common framework. Given the limited budgetary resources foreseen for the Joint Action, the EU's approach is to support existing national projects instead of setting up its own independent projects. This allows the EU to be more than just one minor actor among many and to be closely involved in the most important projects – which increases EU visibility and ensures that the EU is involved in relevant international CTR-related negotiations. Another, very practical advantage is that the EU can operate under the roof of existing bilateral agreements and does not need to conclude extra-legal arrangements with Russia for its projects.

Projects adopted under the Joint Action complement those undertaken exclusively by the Commission or by the member states. The Joint Action of December 1999 explicitly mentioned two projects to which it would contribute in the first phase: a chemical weapons pilot destruction plant in Gorny and a set of studies on plutonium transport, storage, and disposition.[27] In June 2001, five additional projects were launched when a Council decision was passed implementing the Joint Action of 1999:[28]

- support to the Russian Nuclear Safety Authority (Gosatomnadzor) for developing the regulatory basis and documents for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium;
- support for studies and experimental studies for mixed oxide fuel (MOX) demonstration and licensing;
- cooperative feasibility study for immobilisation of Russian waste containing weapons-grade plutonium;
- support to the Russian Ammunition Agency (RAA) to fulfil the Russian Federation's responsibilities under the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- support for infrastructure building related to the destruction of nerve gases at the Shchuch'ye site.

For the sake of coherence and simplicity, the technical implementation of the Joint Action project is delegated to the member state running the project. The financial benefit for the member

26. The Common Strategy shall endure for an initial period of four years. Published in June 1999, it will end in June 2003 with an option to be prolonged, reviewed, or adapted by the Council.

27. Op. cit. in note 25.

28. European Union, 'Council Decision (CFSP 2001/493): Implementing Joint Action 1999/878/CFSP with a View to Contributing to the European Union Cooperation Programme for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation', 25 June 2001, <http://www.eur.ru/eng/neweur/rae/attach/council_decision.pdf> (accessed 18 October 2002).

state is rather limited, but there are other advantages to linking national projects to the Joint Action. First, the projects gain greater visibility and become part of a broader effort based on commonly defined standards and values. Second, the multilateral framework gives the projects greater stability (something that is of great importance for the partner state, Russia). And third, smaller EU member states can participate in projects that would otherwise be too big and costly.

The biggest advantage, however, is the possible link between projects of the first and second pillar. The Gorny case illustrates this linkage: because of its military connotations, the construction of a chemical weapons (CW) demolition plant would not be permissible as a first-pillar activity; it is thus realised as a second-pillar work. The project is managed under a bilateral German-Russian agreement and implemented by a German governmental agency.[29] The EU supports the bilateral project by financing certain elements - such as the installation of German-delivered equipment – from the CFSP chapter of the community budget. A first-pillar project, TACIS ENVRUS 9705, complements this work. However, it is focused on non-military aspects of the project, such as construction of a monitoring system and disseminating public information. Together, these activities render important assistance for empowering Russia to implement its undertakings under the CWC.[30]

It is true that the combination of Pillar I and Pillar II instruments in Gorny is more coincidence than the result of a strategic decision. However, since Gorny is supposed to become a model for other projects, the cross-pillar approach could – and should – become systematic for future EU activities. This would create a synergy of bilateral and multilateral cooperation that serves not only Russia's interests but also those of Russia's neighbours and the EU member states.

29. Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung (BWB) [Federal Office of Defence, Technology and Procurement], <http://www.bwb.org> (accessed 23 February 2002).

30. For the exact conditions see Article IV, and Annex IV of the CWC Treaty. The Chemical Weapons Convention, January 1993, <http://www.cwc.gov/treaty/> (accessed 16 May 2002).

3

The decision-making environment

'The EC is the first organisation which rests on fully integrated, powerful and sovereign nation-states and yet has acquired an increasingly cohesive, flexible and corporate structure of its own.'[31]

The budgetary procedures relating to CTR programmes of the EU vary, depending on whether the activities to be funded belong to the first or second pillar. Although the Commission is involved, the Council is the most important actor in the decision-making process as regards the projects and their budgets. Since this body works behind closed doors, external influence on its decisions is relatively limited.[32] All the more important is the role of member states. The new Troika (the present and succeeding presidency together with the High Representative for CFSP and a commissioner, normally the one in charge of external relations) pursues a regular dialogue with Russia,[33] which provides the opportunity to discuss current and potential CTR projects and to incorporate Russia's view in the EU's internal decision-making bodies. The exception is the ISTC, where the authority for decision-making rests with the ISTC Governing Board.

First pillar

Within the realm of the first pillar, the programme relevant to CTR is TACIS, which is under the purview of the Directorate General[34] (DG) for External Relations. TACIS programmes and projects are designed and financial and personal resources are allocated in the framework of this DG. Implementation, however, is the mission of the EuropeAid Cooperation Office, created in 2000 to improve project management, accelerate project completion, guarantee optimal conformity with international standards and enhance the EU's influence in the area of development.[35]

The office is responsible for the realisation of the projects in all their phases, as well as their evaluation. It divides its managerial tasks according to regional and issue-related principles; the

31. Jakob Rösel, *The European Union: A Short Introduction to Its Background, Legislation and Policies* (Freiburg: Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institute, 1999), p. 53.

32. Ibid., p. 58.

33. European Union, 'Council of the European Union: Order of the Presidencies', <http:// europa.eu.int/en/summ.htm> (accessed May 17, 2002); see also, European Union, 'External Relations: The EU's Relations with Russia', <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/> (accessed 17 May 2002).

34. European Commission, 'Commission's Directorates-General and Services', <http:// europa.eu.int/comm/dgs_en.htm> (accessed 7 May 2002).

35. European Commission, 'Improving External Aid Management - A Key Component of the Commission Reform', <http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/general/mission_amel_en.htm> (accessed 14 May 2002).

TACIS project ENVRUS 9705 discussed below belongs to Division A4 (Energy, Transport, Infrastructure) within the relevant regional department (Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia).[36] This division holds authority over the project throughout the time of its realisation and for the subsequent evaluation.

For each fiscal year, available funds are divided under different headings to cover operative costs.[37] An extra budget is provided for administrative positions. The planning for a given fiscal year is completed within the preceding year; the Commission prepares the draft budget and conveys it during the first half of the year to both the Parliament and the Council. The decision-making procedure usually consumes the second half and is completed by mid-December.[38] For the current year (2002), administrative costs of all EU institutions amount to 5.2 per cent of the total budget, while the remaining 94.8 per cent is invested in operative expenditures.[39]

These funds are then distributed among eight different headings and numerous subheadings.[40] Under the heading External Action, the EU has set a maximum ceiling for 2002 of 8.3 billion, 8.4 per cent of the total EU budget. The relevant subheading for TACIS is Cooperation with Partner Countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which received 473.9 million in 2002.[41] For 2000-06, the EU has agreed to pay 3.138 billion for TACIS in general.[42]

TACIS projects can be proposed either by the Commission or by delegates of the member states. The Council decides in coordination with the Parliament; Council sessions for this purpose are scheduled as needed. In preparing the decision, the opinions, comments, and suggestions of the recipients of the funds are solicited and taken into account; in this regard, the EU budgetary process is interactive and has broad participation. The TACIS management committee makes the final decision.

Ideally, the Council accepts all supplements and amendments suggested for the proposal. Once a project is adopted, a call for tender, issued by the Commission or a contracting authority of the recipient country follows to solicit proposals from persons or organisations from the EU member states or from the recipient countries on how to implement the project. From the tenders, the final project partner is selected by the Commission or by the contracting authority of the recipient country.

36. European Commission, 'EuropeAid Organigramme', <http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/general/struct_en.htm> (accessed 22 May 2002).

37. As a guideline for budget distribution, a framework for the period 2000 to 2006 has been set with ceilings that shall not be exceeded. See 'EU-Haushalt und Mittelfristige Finanzplanung', 11 July 2001, <http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Europa-und-internationale-Beziehungen/Haushalt-und-Finanzen-der-EU-.554.htm> (accessed 15 May 2002).

38. For the schedule of the budget process see, Carl-Gustav Siuts, *Die öffentlichen Finanzen der Europäischen Union: Status, Frunktionen und Perspektiven* (Berlin: Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 2001), p. 45.

39. European Union, 'General Budget of the European Union for the Financial Year 2002', <http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/budget/syntchif2002/en.pdf> (accessed 15 May 2002).

40.http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/budget/syntchif2002/en.pdf.

41. The general budget makes a distinction between commitments and payments. The average value for this subheading is about 1.3 billion. For further explanations of commitments and payments see, European Union, 'Financial Framework of the European Union', <http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/financialfrwk/index_en.htm> (accessed 30 April 2002).

ISTC programmes are a special case within TACIS. They are administered and funded by the EU, but neither drafted nor designed by it. ISTC covers research projects only. Individual scientists, working groups, research institutes, or governmental institutions or non-governmental organisations are entitled to propose projects. The ISTC Governing Board in Moscow determines the feasibility and relevance of these proposals and their conformity with the principles of ISTC. If their assessment is positive, the proposals are forwarded to the funding partners; aside from the EU, this group includes the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea and individual member states of the EU.

In other words, the ISTC Governing Board decides about the worthiness of a project, and the funding partners decide about their own participation. The EU as such has set a budget ceiling for ISTC within the framework of the TACIS budget; this ceiling cannot be breached. It is the board's responsibility to distribute the project proposals in a reasonable way among potential funders. The board is the central decision-making body; the EU takes the position of partner.

Second pillar

Activities under the second pillar that are relevant to CTR in Russia are embedded in the Joint Action of 17 December 1999, for non-proliferation and disarmament in Russia. Joint action projects are funded from the CFSP budget line of the Community budget. Some operational expenditures are directly covered by the member states. In any case, the funding modalities must be clarified at the outset and are specified within the text of the Joint Action. The payments will endure as long as the Joint Action does.

Joint action projects can be proposed either by a member state or the Commission. The latter is in charge of preparing the project, whereas the decision to adopt it lies with CONOP, the Council's working group for non-proliferation. The Commission is then entrusted with implementation and supervision; it makes a budget commitment and finalises a financial agreement with the member state to which technical implementation of the project is delegated. The latter designates an implementing agency that ensures coherence between the Joint Action project and the national project and organises a call for tender (if there is one). Transferring the money through successive instalments, the Com-

42.This budget will be divided up for all TACIS partner countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) in the framework of national programmes. It will also provide the funding for the multi-country programmes (Cross-border and Regional Cooperation, Nuclear Safety, Small Projects, and Tempus Programme), which is divided by topic, not by country. See European Union, 'TACIS in Russia', March 2000, <http://www.tacis-info.ru/en/newslet/ticp/ticp01/> (accessed 12 June 2002); European Union, 'TACIS Programme Overview,' <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/tacis/intro/> (accessed 12 June 2002).

mission can supervise the implementation process of the Joint Action project.

The Commission reports on its activities to the Council, which will conduct an annual review. Independent audits might also take place. The Commission and the Council are both charged with providing coordination of the various projects, as well as projects outside the Joint Action and by non-EU actors, in order to avoid duplication. As a special administrative feature, a unit of experts including a task force in Moscow acts as a liaison office. Among other duties, the office assists member states in identifying suitable projects and monitors the proper allocation of assistance funds.

4

Quantitative assessment

The EU is the largest provider of economic and technical assistance to Russia: between 1991 and 2000, Russia received €2,281 billion in EU assistance. The bulk of this comes from the TACIS programme: between 1991 and 2001, €1,489 billion were allocated to Russia within the framework of the TACIS National Action Programmes (€90 million for 2002 and 2003).[48] To that must be added approximately €890 million that Russia has received from TACIS regional programmes.[49] For nuclear safety alone, TACIS committed almost 800 million between 1991 and 2001.[50] In addition, the EU contributes to coordinated measures supported by other donors: the ISTC in particular receives more than €20 million each year from the EU (approximately €130 million since the beginning), which represents about a third of the total funding.[51] On top of that, the EU granted to its Joint Action programmes a total of €8.9 million for 1999 and 2000, and in 2001, €6.08 million. These considerable fundings go to a large variety of projects.

Nuclear weapons

EU projects on nuclear non-proliferation in the former Soviet Union (FSU) concentrate mainly on the disposition of excess weapons plutonium (category 'Warheads – pits'); safeguards and material protection, control and accountancy (MPC&A) of nuclear materials (category 'Facilities – production reactors'); and civilian projects for former nuclear weapons production staff (category 'People – technical specialists'). In the latter category, this review lists only those projects relevant for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. There are several additional projects with various civilian purposes that serve the goals of the ISTC and one project that specifically deals with the destruction of submarines.

48. European Union, 'EU assistance to Russia', 2002, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/ass.htm> (accessed 12 June 2002).

49. Ibid.

50. European Union, 'Nuclear Safety Strategy Paper 2002-2006', 2002, <http://europa.eu.int/ comm/external_relations/nuclear_safety/rsp/index.htm> (accessed 17 October 2002).

51. European Union, 'TACIS Regional Cooperation', 2002, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/rsp/index.htm> (accessed 17 October 2002).

List of EU projects

- TACIS R5.01/94: Establishing Russian methodology and training centre, Phase 1
- TACIS R5.01/94: Equipment for safeguards training centre, Phase 2
- TACIS R5.01/96: Obninsk: Nuclear materials accountancy and control training centre [52]
- TACIS R5.02/96 and R5.02/96B: Design and set-up of three laboratories at VNIINM-Bochvar Institute [53]
- TACIS R5.03/96: Development of Russian instrumentation for state safeguards and NMAC system in the Russian Federation[54]
- TACIS R5.04/96: Methodological and training centre for the Ural-Siberian region (Snezhinsk) feasibility study[55]
- TACIS R5.01/98: Enhancing safeguard system on a pilot plant; development of analytical and metrological capabilities, instrumentation and training[56]
- ISTC Project 1410: Plutonium oxide microspheres[57]
- ISTC Project 0371-2: Pu-utilisation in light-water reactor (LWR) experiments
- ISTC Project 2267: Creation of subcritical assembly driven by proton accelerator (SAD)
- ISTC Project 1606: Molten salt loop for waste and plutonium disposition
- ISTC Project 1731: Water-jet cutting for submarine dismantlement
- ISTC Project 1058: Optimum strategy for nuclear fuel cycle development in Russia
- ISTC Project 1341: Infrasound method for nuclear tests detection
- ISTC Project 1823: Software for CTBT inspectors training
- EUJA (EU Joint Action):[58] EU-Russia nuclear weapons-related action - studies and experiments in the field of ex-weapons plutonium disposition
- EUJA: Support to the Russian Nuclear Safety Authority (Gosatomnadzor) for developing the regulatory basis and documents for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium
- EUJA: Support for studies and experimental studies for mixed oxide fuel (MOX) demonstrating and licensing
- EUJA: Cooperative feasibility study for immobilisation of Russian waste containing weapons-grade plutonium

52. European Union, 'TACIS R5 01/96', <http://sic-www.jrc.nl/tp/nrtp/ details.html?projects_nr=291> (accessed 6 June 2002).

53. European Union, 'TACIS R5 02/96 and R5 02/96b', <http://sic-www.jrc.nl/tp/nrtp/details.html?projects_nr=292> (accessed 12 June 2002).

54. European Union, 'TACIS R5 03/96', <http://sic-www.jrc.nl/tp/nrtp/ details.html?projects_nr=293> (accessed 12 June 2002).

55. European Union, 'TACIS R5 04/96', <http://sic-www.jrc.nl/tp/nrtp/ details.html?projects_nr=767> (accessed 12 June 2002).

56. European Union, 'TACIS R5 01/98', <http://sic-www.jrc.nl/tp/nrtp/ details.html?projects_nr=836> (accessed 12 June 2002).

57. All ISTC projects are available on request by number at <http://www.tech-db.ru/istc/db/ projects.nsf/> (accessed 12 June 2002).

58. For descriptions of the projects under the Joint Action framework, see European Union, Council Decision, 25 June 2001. See also, European Union, Council Joint Action, 17 December 1999.

- EURATOM Safeguards Office: Technicus exchanges on safeguards.

Exemplary discussion

Collaboration on safeguards

Since 1993, the EU has actively cooperated with the Russian Federation on topics related to safeguards. A major actor is the Joint Research Centre (JRC), charged with conducting and promoting scientific research efforts. One-third of the JRC's budget is devoted to nuclear research, much of which is dedicated to serving the technical needs of EURATOM and to cooperation with international organisations like the IAEA, NEA and CERN, as well as individual countries outside the Community.

Cooperation started under the auspices of the EURATOM Safeguards Office. The general objective in the safeguards field is to improve accountancy and control systems in CIS and other East European states such that they comply with IAEA safeguards requirements and, more specifically, to develop materials accountancy and safeguards for Russian needs and to organise exchanges to train Russian personnel as inspectors.

A remarkable aspect of this project is that it has made use of Russian technology and input as much as possible from its very beginning in February 1994. Thus, it avoided the bitter lessons of early US-Russian cooperative efforts that initially imposed US technologies on Russia in what was, from the Russian point of view, an unacceptably intrusive way.[59] Interaction always took place at the working level and consequently avoided bureaucratic overload. A major result of the collaboration has been the implementation of the safeguards training centre at Obninsk. Since 1993, the project has been funded by a total of 11 million (partly through TACIS, partly from other sources).

Disposition of excess weapons plutonium

Since the early 1990s, European countries have considered the management of Russian excess weapons plutonium to be a critical non-proliferation issue.[60] Initially, there were two national projects, one French-Russian and the other German-Russian.[61] These were combined in 1998. The resulting trilateral programme aimed

59. European Commission, *Communications from the Commission to the Parliament and the Council: Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Substances - Implementation of the Guidelines Laid Down in the Communication from the Commission, September 7, 1994* (Brussels: European Commission, 1994). See also, European Commission, Conclusion of the Essen European Council (Brussels: European Commission, 1996).

60. Marc Deffrennes, 'European Union Programs in the Field of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Summary Period 1992-2001', 1 March 2001. Document can be obtained on request via Mr Marc Deffrennes, head of sector non-proliferation and disarmament, European Commission, by emailing <marc.deffrennes@cec.eu.int>.

61. Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Siemens Aktiengesellschaft und Ministerium für Atomenergie der Russischen Föderation (MINATOM): 'Basisauslegung für eine Pilotanlage zur Produktion von Uran-Plutonium-Brennstoff aus waffengrädigem Plutonium und zum Einsatz dieses Brennstoffs in Kernreaktoren' [Basic design of a pilot production plant for the transformation of weapon-grade plutonium to uranium-plutonium fuel and its use in civil reactors], Abschlussbericht, 28 February 2002. Yegorov et al., 'The Aida-Mox 1 Program: Results of the French-Russian Study on Peaceful Use of Plutonium from Dismantled Russian Nuclear Weapons', in IAEA, *Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Reactor Strategies: Adjusting to New Realities*, Proceedings of an international symposium held in Vienna, 3-6 June 1997, p. 93.

to develop practical industrial solutions for the disposition of Russian excess weapons plutonium, taking advantage both of the European MOX experience and the available Russian reactor infrastructure.

Integrated French/German/Russian project teams produced several feasibility and basic design studies. These findings enabled another trilateral team to perform, in close contact with the corresponding body established under the 1998 US-Russian cooperative agreement, a cost assessment of the Russian plutonium disposition programme. Two technical scenarios for the disposition of 34 tons of Russian weapons-grade plutonium were assessed, including one corresponding to the AIDA-MOX project, which relies on the operating experience of European MOX-fuelled power reactors and would ensure an annual disposition rate of 2.2 tons of plutonium.

The trilateral programme gave important direction to the work of the G-8 Plutonium Disposition Planning Group established at the 2000 Okinawa summit. However, it ended formally in June 2002, and its future is still unclear. Germany has decided not to engage in further cooperation on plutonium disposition beyond the work completed so far. France intends to continue its cooperation with Russia on a bilateral basis if necessary (but in coordination with US-Russian efforts). A final organisational and financial solution will hopefully be found as part of the multilateral agreement that (potential) donor countries and Russia are currently negotiating within the framework of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.[62]

Several French-Russian activities in this field benefit from financial support of the nuclear part of the EU's Joint Action.

- Support for the Russian Safety Authority (GAN) in developing the regulatory basis and documents related to the production, handling, and use of MOX fuels made of weapons-grade plutonium. These activities are being performed in close cooperation with the United States, with each party financing one-third of the 39 regulatory documents to be developed by GAN to cover fuel cycle facilities, the use of MOX fuel in research reactors and in the VVER 1000 and BN 600 reactors, as well as the transportation and storage of MOX fuel.
- The so-called MOX-demonstration programme, whose scope is to irradiate in a Russian VVER 1000 reactor lead test assemblies

62. G-8 Information Centre, 'Statement by G8 Leaders: The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction', 2002, <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/g7/summit/2002kananaskis/arms.html> (accessed 23 August 2002).

fabricated in Russia from Russian W-Pu. In this project, the EU supports two studies and experiments for MOX demonstration and licensing, one involving reactor aspects, the other the testing of three LTAs in the Balakovo reactor.

- A study of the ways and means for transport and intermediate storage of the weapons-grade plutonium in existing and/or new installations. The objective is to make recommendations for the most effective and safest ways to transport and store the plutonium on an interim basis.
- A study on the medium-term perspective for plutonium disposition, focusing on the Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor (GT MHR), which is an advanced development based on proven technology. Its ability to work without uranium (only plutonium) makes it highly efficient as a plutonium burner. The objective is to define priorities for further projects and to support decisions on larger investments for future development.[63]

All Joint Action projects in the field of nuclear disarmament are performed under a financing agreement with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, signed in December 2000. The implementing agency is the Commissariat à l'Energie atomique (CEA). There is an ongoing consultation process between the EU Joint Action team and French authorities about the implementation of the project.

Biological agents

The EU's efforts in disarmament of biological agents (BA) are focusing on the work of the ISTC. The EU is subsidising certain projects, like the British programme for BA safety in Shchuch'ye and other sites, but there are few prospects for an EU Joint Action in this field.[64]

Chemical weapons

List of EU projects

- TACIS ENVRUS 9705:[65] The development of an environmental monitoring system (EMS) in connection with the destruction of the chemical weapons in the Saratov oblast
- EUJA:[66] EU-Russia chemical weapons destruction project in Gorny

63. For details see the various annexes of the Joint Action and the Council decision.

64. European Commission, 'Commission Services: Report on the Implementation of the Council Joint Action (CFSP 1999/878)', 17 December 2001. Document can be requested via Mr Marc Deffrennes, head of sector non-proliferation and disarmament, European Commission, by e-mailing <marc.deffrennes@cec.eu.int>.

65. European Commission, 'TACIS project', 2002, <http://www.sar-ecoinst.org/sem_goal_eng.htm> (accessed 28 August 2002).

66. For descriptions of the projects under the Joint Action framework see European Union, Council Decision, 25 June 2001; see also, European Union, Council Joint Action, 17 December 1999.

- EUJA: Support to the Russian Ammunition Agency to fulfil the Russian Federation's responsibilities under the CWC
- EUJA: Support for infrastructure building related to the destruction of nerve gases at the Shchuch'ye site.

Exemplary discussion

ENVRUS 9705

This project aims at developing a system of environmental monitoring for controlling environmental effects of CW destruction in the Saratov oblast. It is explicitly related to the Chemical Weapons Convention and stems from a Russian initiative.[67] Whereas the construction of the site is realised as a Joint Action project under German leadership (with some financial assistance from the Commission's budget), TACIS ENVRUS 9705 is a first-pillar project. The project started in January 2000 and was planned for a period of two years, but unforeseen delays have forced an extension until May 2002. The monitoring system has been developed by TACIS staff and by regional and Russian government institutions.

Gorny is located in the Saratov oblast, a rural area where wheat is the most important regional product. The potential environmental damage chemical weapons destruction could cause has provoked considerable public concern. Confidence building through information is therefore one of the overriding objectives of the project. The objective is to provide the Gorny citizens and the general public with reliable, transparent, trustworthy, and independent information on the state of the environment. This information has to be seen as the major output of the system. Moreover, the Saratov Oblast Committee of Natural Resources' capacity in environmental monitoring is strengthened by provision of the newly created environmental monitoring system and the relevant equipment. This in turn allows for stronger enforcement of the relevant Russian Federation legislation on state ecological control, which is also applicable to the chemical weapon destruction plant.[68]

For this purpose, two information centres have been built, one in Gorny and one in Saratov. Gorny will be the main site for collecting and disseminating information; Saratov will focus on data processing. For all three steps - data collection, data processing and information dissemination - material and equipment must be

67. 'Develop an environmental monitoring system for the region surrounding the Gorny CWD facility, Saratov Oblast, in the overall framework of assistance to the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction', European Union, 'TACIS project', <http://www.sar-ecoinst.org/new_page_3_eng.htm> (accessed 4 April 2002).

68. European Union, 'TACIS ENVRUS: Environmental Monitoring system', 2002, <http:// www.sar-ecoinst.org/new_page_1_eng.htm> (accessed 10 April 2002).

provided, staff must be trained, and know-how transferred. To coordinate these complex steps, the Commission contracted a company experienced in the management of this type of project, SOFRECO SA (France).[69]

The environmental monitoring system, or EMS, will rely on cooperation with the Russian government and is built on the Russian legal system. It also meets Russian standards, which the Government adapted to the CWC. In planning and implementation, the system is future-oriented to keep the system flexible for enlargement and to open the possibility of transfer to other sites and projects.

The elements of the information process are manifold. Alongside construction of the EMS, active efforts to involve the public have been made. At a youth camp, young people worked on regional ecological projects. Teachers were trained, the media informed, and seminars offered to interested citizens.[70] In this way, the EMS project began to fulfil its mission even before construction was completed. Before it could be implemented practically, however, the Commission had to analyse the legal basis of such a monitoring system and build a strategy that would allow the system to continue operating after the TACIS funding is phased out. For this purpose, material and equipment were procured, methods of analysis selected or developed, and personnel trained for the system's staff to ensure continuity.

TACIS has also done crucial work on mediation and coordination between the Russian government and non-governmental organisations.[71]

The Russian government participates in the development of the project on the basis of its own interests - fulfilling the undertakings under the CWC. The independence of the EMS from governmental inference, however, must be guaranteed; otherwise, credibility with the population will be compromised and an important objective of the project thwarted. This key goal is accomplished by having the system privately managed; the Government is a recipient of the information but has no influence on the quality and reliability of the information. The TACIS project is constructed in such a way as to maintain this independence even after the project has been completed.[72] A well-informed citizenry is part and parcel of the monitoring process, as is the EMS; the project takes the building of civil society consciously into account, thereby serving the overriding objectives for which TACIS was

69. European Union, 'TACIS Project', <http://www.sar-ecoinst.org/new_page_3_eng.htm> (10 April 2002); SOFRECO, <http://www.sofreco.com> (accessed 11 April 2002).

70. European Commission, 'TACIS Programme: Project ENVRUS 9705, Results and Outlook.' The document can be requested via the project's address: <http://sofreco_tacis@renet.ru>.

71. Ibid. Partners in cooperation are the Russian Federation Munitions Agency, Saratov CNR, Gos NIIENP, NIIX SGU, Russian Federation Ministry of Natural Resources, Saratov oblast government, Krasnopartisansky Rayon Adm.

72. See project results in ibid.

brought into life in the first place.

The collaborators in the Saratov Committee of Natural Resources (Saratov CNR) will be trained to assume CWC monitoring functions throughout Russia. TACIS supports enabling Russia to fulfil its commitments under the CWC independently. The role of Saratov CNR as an independent institute of experts is emphasised, and it is given a place not only in national society but also in the international civil community concerned with both the environment and disarmament. In this way, the project provides genuine support for democracy in Russia.

So far, basic data on the Gorny environment have been collected; the chemicals that are to be dealt with have been defined; the construction of a laboratory has begun; equipment has been ordered; existing probes and analytic records have been requested; and the Gorny information centre completed. A system for data analysis and processing is under development.[73] Future practical work will comprise the installation of laboratory facilities and the operation of a test phase for the laboratory. A certificate ('toxic agent') for Saratov CNR and the application of a GOST-certified analytical record are also envisaged.[74] These titles refer to standards given by the Russian government to fix safety norms and provide a legislative basis from which to work.

In sum, TACIS ENVRUS 9705 is a well-considered, well-designed project that fulfils some important auxiliary tasks for the construction and operating of a CW demolition facility. The focus on technical assistance for TACIS has been maintained, and the working concept does not affect the construction of the plant per se. The conduct of the project in collaboration with the Government, civil society and private organisations helps strengthen Russian democracy; governmental objectives are performed by private persons; and the observation of international commitments is supervised by non-state institutions. A wise investment in public education and information has been made.

TACIS practices, through this project, particularly its bottom-up and dialogue-focused approach, meet the most important objective of organisations involved in assistance: to make themselves dispensable. This is all the more important because the construction of the facility in Gorny is one of the first Joint Action projects in Russia and will serve as model for further CW demolition projects within the Russian Federation; similar projects are already under consideration for Shchuch'ye and Kambarka.

73. Ibid.

74. For more information about GOST, see <http://www.sgs.co.uk/globaltrading/gost/> (accessed 17 April 2002).

Joint Action

EU-Russia chemical weapons destruction project in Gorny. Activities in Gorny are focused on the provision of equipment like air filter boxes or a system to empty transport containers after their arrival from storage at the destruction site. The supply of equipment helps to ensure the smooth continuation of the project according to schedule.

- Support to the Russian Ammunition Agency to fulfil the Russian Federation's responsibilities under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The purpose of this project is to coordinate the different parties involved in the planning to fulfil the obligations of the CWC. The EU is focused on coordination, information and communication to open up new financial sources. The project is concentrated on information of external contributors and local actors.
- Support for infrastructure building related to the destruction of nerve gases at the Shchuch'ye site. The activities in Shchuch'ye are focused on building the necessary infrastructure. In particular, the EU financially supports a facility for the supply of electricity to the destruction facility.

Export controls

List of EU projects

- ISTC-Project 1292:[75] Chemical Tagging of Explosives

Exemplary discussion

ISTC 1292

This project was taken up by ISTC under the area of analytical chemistry. The researchers work on a subject that is directly related to the spread of conventional munitions – that is, to non-proliferation in a broader sense – and has gained additional urgency through the recent focus on preventing acts of terrorism. Tagging explosives enables the authority to identify their origin and might provide valuable clues to find perpetrators of bombings or to deter would-be assailants.

Within the framework of this project, a comparative analysis and a test of the various possibilities for tagging explosives will be

75. All ISTC projects can be requested by number via <http://www.tech-db.ru/istc/db/ projects.nsf/> (accessed 12 June 2002).

conducted. Researchers also calculate the costs of different taggants against their qualitative value with regard to sensitivity, selectivity, and information capacity.

The scientists and engineers employed by the project, interestingly enough, have been working previously not only in the chemical but in the nuclear weapons sector.[76] One major project goal is to integrate the participating scientists into the international scientific community. For this purpose, the Fraunhofer Institute of Chemical Technology (Karlsruhe, Germany) supports the three Russian institutes involved. The research may open up opportunities for the institutes, as well as allowing Russia to create security-enhancing marketing possibilities for a part of the military industrial complex.

The project strives for a balance between scientific saliency, relevance to the market, and the origins and expertise of the collaborators. This balance appears to have been achieved: In the year 2000, the EU invested 660,000 in the project, by far the largest sum in the chemistry area. The project is still running.

76. See project 1292, <www.tech-db.ru/istc/db/projects.nsf/htm/index.htm> (accessed 14 March 2002).

Lessons learned

5

TACIS is categorised under the European Commission's 'multilateral programmes', which means the Commission retains authority over planning and operation. Initially, the predominant criteria under which the projects were selected and shaped were (1) the needs of the recipient countries and (2) the interests of the European Union (as seen by the Commission). Over time, however, priorities have been reformulated, decision-making processes optimised, and structures improved. These changes are the result of a systematic evaluation process that involves the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament. The changes have been explicitly formulated and are now part of the standard operating procedures by which new projects are negotiated, formulated, and conducted.

As far as the Common Strategy and the Joint Action are concerned, the Commission reports regularly to the Council, but there has been no overall evaluation yet. It is evident that CTR agreements will have to be evaluated carefully and thoroughly if the broadest, most detailed lessons possible are to be both learned and taught. CFSP is still in its infancy, however, and the institutions concerned are too young to have any depth of experience in medium- and long-term projects. According to EU officials, the implementation of the Joint Action projects has been satisfying so far, with all schedules respected. The approach of contributing to national projects rather than setting up independent EU projects is generally considered successful by both the member states (which can share their financial burden) and the EU (which gains a relatively high degree of influence and visibility at relatively low cost). It has allowed the EU in particular to be 'on the right track' and to become a recognised player in the CTR arena.

Because an in-depth review of the second pillar's CTR activities is still missing, the following section focuses on TACIS, with brief

reference to its two special cases – TACIS in connection with Joint Action projects and ISTC.

TACIS activities with a bearing on CTR

TACIS was tailored to help the transformation process in the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Its objective has been to help establish a market economy, improve public institutions, and strengthen civil society.[77] This may seem beyond the scope of the much narrower aims of threat reduction, but it contributes to economic and political stabilisation and therefore to the security of Russia (and the other successor states).

Although non-proliferation and disarmament are not the original or primary objective of the TACIS programme, certain projects are aimed at enhancing the physical safety and security of nuclear reactors and fall, therefore, within the purview of CTR. These projects are fully compatible with the broader security concept that underpins TACIS.

Over time, the Commission has come to believe that a bottom-up approach is more likely to yield success with TACIS projects. During the first phase (1991-94), the basic orientation of the assistance was tailored to the needs of the recipients as defined in a centralised, authoritative way. In addition, the projects were primarily conducted in major cities. During this period, TACIS was focused on emergency assistance, management training, and exchanges.

In the second phase (1995-98), the focus shifted significantly. Smaller projects and activities in rural areas gained higher priority. Support for civil society became a key concern, and for this purpose, non-governmental organisations from EU countries were asked for their cooperation. A basic weakness persisted, however: the remoteness of the staff in charge of the programme from the reality on the ground. There were illusions as to how quickly the required reforms could be pushed through in the transition country and how speedily the Russian partners could adapt. It was less a lack of general knowledge than a lack of capability to apply this knowledge in specific circumstances. Project engineering, not project design, was the most nagging problem.[79]

It is this experience that motivated the much stronger orientation toward dialogue with the recipients and further attention to their social environment that is now characteristic of TACIS activities. In general, the EU has concluded that technical assistance

77. European Commission, 'An Evaluation of the TACIS Country Program in Russia: Final Synthesis Report', 2002, <europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/evaluation/evinfo/tacis/ 951500_ev.html> (accessed 19 March 2002), p. 13.

78. Ibid., p. 27.

79. Ibid. This shortcoming was very clear from the difficulties TACIS had in realising the innovations proposed in the PCA of 1994. TACIS succeeded in this objective only partially.

will not work in the Russian Federation under a top-down approach; the crucial condition for success is a framework that emphasises the common search for solutions.[80] Dialogue, interaction, and cooperation have therefore become the guiding principles for TACIS, as it works to create a situation in which Russia will no longer have to rely on foreign assistance. The EU deems influence more important than spectacular visibility. Investment is thus preferably directed at projects whose pay-off may not be immediately apparent, such as education. This applies to the threat reduction, non-proliferation, and disarmament sectors as well.

The focus of TACIS has been not financial assistance alone but technical aid to foster the development of a market economy and democracy. Meanwhile, however, TACIS has moved from being a pure aid programme to a strategic instrument in shaping the relationship between the European Union and the successor states of the Soviet Union.[81] This has happened partially through the development of European-Russian relations in general (and to a lesser extent relations with the other successor states) and partially through the development of TACIS itself.

The evaluation of TACIS and the ensuing actions taken prove that the Commission has the ability to learn from past mistakes. During the course of the 1990s, the link between TACIS and the PCA was strengthened considerably to transform the donor-recipient relationship between the EU and Russia into a two-way consultation.[82] Transparency and flexibility have also been improved.

On the other hand, bureaucracy remains a major problem, and the multiplicity of small projects still contributes to a lack of clarity, making effective management and coordination among the various projects difficult. According to the most recent evaluation, 'the main problem of any proposal for improving TACIS instruments seems to combine two apparently conflicting needs – strategic clarity and management simplicity vs. ownership by the beneficiaries and decentralisation'.[83]

The newest projects, and the documents that provide their legal framework, make a serious effort to address the criticism and suggestions from previous evaluations. The readiness to enter a genuine dialogue with the Russian partners as an integral part of the projects demonstrates marked progress and improves the chances that projects will achieve their overall objectives.

80. Ibid., p. 32.

81. European Commission, 'TACIS 2000-2006, TACIS Procedures, TACIS Overview, EU-NIS General Leaflet, Cooperation That Counts, TACIS Cooperation Text: TACIS Overview', 2002, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/tacis/> (accessed 21 March 2002).

82. European Press Agency (EuroPA), *Inside Russia and the FSU*, November 2000, p. 15.

83. European Commission, 'An Evaluation of the TACIS Country Program in Russia', 2002, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/evaluation/evinfo/tacis/951500_ev.html> (accessed 17 April 2002), p. 58.

As discussed above, TACIS projects can be combined with Joint Action projects. In so doing, the EU gains valuable experience in coordinating CTR activities between nation states and international organisations. It can also draw conclusions on the weaknesses and strengths of different models of assistance.

More leeway for the Commission in what it is permitted to support would be desirable, as it is relatively flexible (if slow) in directing its funds. The reluctance of member states, however, makes it unlikely that the Commission will gain greater authority over security issues. Furthermore, budget ceilings enforce limits, as the Commission is not authorised to obtain credits or to issue bonds like a nation state. (On the positive side, this encourages very precise economising of existing funds.)

TACIS combines broad political principles (fostering democratic and market structures) with specific objectives of the various projects. At the same time, TACIS programmes work as instruments of linkage between the EU and political institutions as well as private organisations, non-governmental organisations and the general public. This comprehensive approach seems well suited to building structures within which disarmament projects can be carried out.

One important lesson for future projects is that the attitude of the population towards disarmament activities is extremely important. According to an opinion poll organised in December 2001 in the Gorny and Saratov regions, health risks, the employment situation and mistrust of technology were the main hurdles between the project and public support.[84] TACIS reacted with plans for improved transparency and information. New communication channels with the public have been established, and public opinion polls will be organised regularly to obtain feedback from the people immediately affected by the programmes.

These insights have induced TACIS staff to focus more on developing a close relationship with civil society. In this context, experience in public relations and the transfer of knowledge collected in previous projects have proved useful. For example, TACIS is running a programme for the development of educational and professional links. One of the projects, DELPHI, aims to establish a link between schools, universities and vocational training programmes in order to improve education and business management.[85] These resources are being used to improve the opinion environment for ENVRUS 9705; in cooperation with Russian

84. The main concerns were: the public health situation and service; social economic conditions; infrastructure development; benefits for changing residence; employment at the CWDP; citizens' safety provisions; experimental/pilot technology; CW imports from other regions and countries; absence of conducted expertise results; protest mood. See Saratov CWD Environmental Monitoring System (EMS) in European Commission, 'TACIS Programme: Project ENVRUS 9705, Results and Outlook', p. 12.

institutions, information is being transferred and teachers and other surrogates are being trained to answer questions and help create an awareness of the problem that ENVRUS 9705 aims to solve.[86]

In addition, the Gorny Information Centre serves as a focal point for all questions and suggestions from the population. By making the process of CW demolition visible and understandable to a broad public, the centre will gain importance beyond the regions of Gorny and Saratov, since the plant and the monitoring system are designed to serve as models for other projects in this field.

The feedback circle between experience gained from established projects and the planning of new ones draws not only from the Commission's own work but also from the member states.

ISTC projects are, as we have seen, a special case within the TACIS programme. They are administered and funded by the EU, but drafted elsewhere. ISTC is devoted to a bottom-up approach: research projects are developed by the scientists themselves; their application then goes to an independent body of scientists (the ISTC governing board),which in turn gives an assessment of feasibility and worthiness.[87] If the scientific body's assessment is positive and the EU agrees to fund the project, the necessary budget requirements will be found. The Russian scientists involved in the project are the direct recipients of the money coming from the EU. They administer the funds themselves and can therefore decide how best to use them for their work. Bureaucracy, a real brake on efficiency in Russia, is bypassed. The scientists only need to present their identity card or passport at the bank to draw from their ISTC account. This bottom-up approach makes sure that nobody else can divert the money.

A weakness of the ISTC may be the spread of tasks over a multiplicity of increasingly complex research fields, such as biological science. The scientific community is characterised by rising specialisation in increasingly complex areas. Whether the distribution of the money according to the preferences of the applying scientists leads in all cases to support a level of specialisation that corresponds to current international standards is an open question; but, then again, that is not the primary objective of the programme.

85. For DELPHI, see *European Community, TACIS – Cooperation That Counts: A Look at Support from the European Union's TACIS Programme in Russia* (Brussels: European Union, 2001), p. 9.

86. Op. cit. in note 67, p. 8.

87. ISTC, 'Instruction for Proposal Preparation', 2002, <http://www.istc.ru/istc/website.nsf/fm/z03InstructPPE> (accessed 18 June 2002).

6 Comparative advantages

The European Union is a unique phenomenon in world politics. The combination of intergovernmental cooperation and coordination with supranational elements creates decision-making processes that can at times be difficult and frustrating. Complex negotiations can result in agreements founded on the lowest common denominator, a preponderance of red tape, and general overregulation. That said, the process can also yield a series of distinct advantages in addressing problems such as those related to threat reduction.

In describing these advantages, one has to make the distinction between those that derive from the EU as a whole and those that stem from the Commission as a supranational, functional body.

Advantages of the EU as a whole

Mobilisation. The EU can (in theory) mobilise the assets of 15 member states for a single political purpose. All the member states are relatively rich, well developed and well endowed with scientific and technical expertise. The EU can combine these assets with those of the European Commission, a flexible functional body with no singular constraining 'national interest' to interfere with the task at hand. Given the urgency of the situation in the former Soviet Union, this ability to channel funds and assistance in kind towards a single purpose is extremely valuable; it is doubtful whether all member states would have decided independently to devote resources to this task without the EU as a coordinating force. It is, however, deplorable that it took so long to use the most effective instrument available, the Joint Action, to bring about a strong and focused common effort.

Coordination. By embedding the activities of 16 actors (15 member states and the Commission) in a single programme, the

investments made will have greater positive effects than could be expected from uncoordinated parallel efforts by the actors individually. Coordination and the avoidance of unnecessary, costly duplication is one of the explicit objectives of the Joint Action. Well-established and frequently used review and evaluation processes should ensure that this objective is achieved. Installing critical scrutiny processes instead of ad hoc international bodies is a much more cumbersome and delicate endeavour, as states are often wary of submitting their activities to the criticism of their peers, not least because of possible domestic repercussions. In the EU, these procedures are matter-of-fact and routine, and do not arouse exaggerated concerns. Given that threat reduction is a completely new field and, to make matters worse, is taking place in a rapidly changing social, political, legal, and economic environment, the opportunity for a serious and unimpeded learning process is likely to be a necessary condition for success.

Variation. European integration has not eliminated the specific national style of the member states, but has created a new, tailored way of doing things by the Commission. This means that the task at hand is approached from a wide variety of perspectives. This may be of considerable advantage over national approaches, which lack the competitive comparison with other modes or ways of doing business. Because, as discussed above, a Joint Action involves continuous evaluation, Europeans can learn from each other and adapt their approaches accordingly.

Advantages of the European Commission as a CTR actor

Absence of geostrategic interest. The European Commission was created, and still operates, as a functional organisation with a mandate to fulfil a panoply of legislative, executive, and implementing tasks. It is not a national government and represents no classic territorial nation-state. This is not to say that the Commission has no distinct power interests, but these interests relate to battles for influence among the different bodies of the EU and between the Commission and member states. They also take place (as in all bureaucracies) between different parts of the Commission, but they do not extend – at least not as of now – into traditional geostrategic interests typically associated with nation-states. As a consequence, partners are less suspicious that the Commission might use assistance to pursue a hidden and sinister agenda,

or to induce a power struggle. Partners are also more open to cooperation than they are in traditional interstate relations. This is particularly helpful with regard to threat reduction, an area that directly relates to security policy and involves the most sensitive parts of the defence sector.

Project expertise from different fields. The Commission can draw on a broad range of technical and administrative expertise. Despite intra-bureaucratic turf wars, the interagency committee system (which the Commission has cultivated over 40 years) is a useful tool to derive coherence from the diverse expertise. Since threat reduction involves rather complex projects extending over several fields of science and technology and requiring considerable project planning and management skill, the Commission is in an excellent position to meet this challenge.

Experience in development and transition assistance. The Commission has, over the years, gained particular experience in assistance for economic and democratic development. Development assistance has, from the beginning, been one of the main fields of Commission work, in part due to the special relationship between the European Community and the former colonies of European countries. Extensive assistance funds, for which the Commission is responsible, have long been available. One of the basic aims of integration is to help underdeveloped regions in the EU. The management of the structural and regional funds has been an exercise in development assistance to industrialised countries, an experience that bears some resemblance to what has to be done in Russia. Also, the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain, all very young democracies recovering from dictatorships and with less well-developed economies, provided the Commission with first-hand experience in the difficult mission of assisting with stabilising democracy while developing a thriving market economy. Finally, German unification integrated a society in transition squarely into the EU; again, the Commission was able to gain some useful experience of the difficulties involved (even though the major part of this burden was borne, naturally, by Germany itself).

The specific features of the EU's threat reduction activities, as analysed in general and demonstrated through the examples of some individual projects, reflect these advantages. In particular, three features stand out: (1) the attempt to establish dialogue from project conception to project completion with all relevant

actors as well as the broader public, to design and conduct projects that meet the needs of the recipients and also have a good chance of being accepted; (2) embedding projects in the broader process of economic and democratic development to make them an integral part of the transformation process rather than isolated, ad hoc steps for a specific purpose; and (3) the inclusion of civil society as a key actor and the intention to strengthen and empower civil society through the course of the project.

These features should ensure that threat reduction, as understood by the EU, goes beyond narrowly defined national security interests to support a broader concept of societal and political security – and does so in a cooperative fashion that regards the development of a stable and democratic Russia as being in the security interests of all.

7 Future priorities

Future EU efforts to support CTR in Russia will evolve within the framework of existing agreements. It is conceivable that the area of CTR will receive stronger emphasis in the coming years, particularly if the current Joint Action programmes are successful. However, what will certainly not happen is member states' transference to the Commission of competencies that clearly belong to the realm of security and defence. Although Common Positions develop continuously under the second pillar and interests are increasingly formulated on a joint basis, ultimate authority and decision-making about budgetary questions will rest with the states. This puts limits on the efficiency and speed of preparation, adoption, realisation and completion of new and bold CTR initiatives, because decision-making involving many, partly competing, actors is by necessity complex and cumbersome.

With regard to the total volume of resources allocated to CTR, the enlargement of the EU will be a major challenge. Adding a group of new members whose gross domestic product is significantly below the EU average will claim considerable financial resources. The EU will have to set priorities, for which perceived needs and institutionalised partnerships will be prevalent criteria. This favours Russia, where diplomatic and organisational relations are well entrenched. Time-honoured links, forged through TACIS, are a factor that clearly favours EU-Russian projects. The geopolitical and strategic importance of the Russian Federation, as well as the urgency regarding the WMD sector in Russia for European security, will help to maintain CTR as a priority. Facing important enlargement costs, it is doubtful, however, whether the EU or its member states will significantly increase spending on CTR.

First pillar

First-pillar CTR projects will remain within the framework of the PCA, which was designed to help develop an intensified dialogue

between Europe and Russia, and to explore and create Common Positions related to security and stability.[88] In this sense, the core mission of CTR is also at the heart of the PCA and opens the door to expanded CTR activities. On the other hand, given that PCA encompasses the authority of both the member states and the Commission, security and defence issues are not addressed operationally, and CTR is not a point of emphasis. Although ISTC is mentioned in passing in one article,[89] the focus is generally on strengthening political dialogue and assisting both market and democratic development. CTR is only an indirect concern, although work on CTR is not excluded in the text of the PCA, and indeed promoters of stronger CTR activities could argue that the general objectives of the PCA are well served by fostering CTR projects.

TACIS programmes will remain an important element for EU assistance to Russia. The orientation of the programmes towards a dialogue with the partner has been shown and is to be further strengthened and expanded. Russia's interests as a partner have been retained as a priority by stating this intention, and Russia accepts and welcomes this orientation as well.[90] This opens up a chance for the Russian side to propose more activities in the CTR sector if it so wishes.

Concerning CTR, TACIS is increasingly seen as the link between national assistance and multilateral activities. The experiences gained through projects like ENVRUS 9705 will be used for further Joint Action projects. In this context – as a supporting measure with a focus on technical assistance –TACIS will remain a significant part of the EU's CTR programme.

Cooperation through the ISTC will be continued as well. However, as previously mentioned, EU decision-making hinges on a willingness to provide funding, while substantive decisions on the merits of the proposed projects rest with the ISTC staff. The budget line of the ISTC will remain fixed within the TACIS budget and under the authority of the DG responsible for TACIS. In other words, expanded support for ISTC activities will come at the cost of other TACIS projects unless the total TACIS budget is nudged higher.

Generally, TACIS was targeted toward a long-term partnership; cooperation between the EU and Russia will thus retain the institutionalised format that has developed, including a regular budget line. This helps continue EU support for CTR. Whether

88. European Union, 'Partnership Cooperation Agreement', 2002, <europa.eu.int/comm/ external_relations/ceeca/pca/pca_russia.pdf> (accessed 2 February 2002), Article 6.

89. Ibid., Art. 62.2.

90. European Union, 'Medium-term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010)', 2000, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/russian_medium_term_strategy/index.htm> (accessed 11 February 2002), 12.6, 2.1.

the support function of TACIS for clearly focused CTR activities continues, however, depends on the willingness of the member states to develop further projects to which TACIS can provide flanking support and/or on future Joint Actions, in which case this willingness is legally fixed within an EU context.

Second pillar

The Common Strategy adopted by the EU member states in the frame of the CFSP is valid for four years, so that it expires, or comes up for renewal, in June 2003.[91] Since mid-2002, the evaluation of the strategy has been a priority in order to draw conclusions for future Common Strategies. CTR non-proliferation activities are evaluated as well, with a particular focus on the forums for dialogue, the Joint Action, and the work of the ISTC.

The Council Joint Action is covered by the Common Strategy; that is, it will also be continued until June 2003 and also has an option for continuation. The objective of the programme – 'to support the Russian Federation in its efforts regarding arms control and disarmament' – remains dependent on implementation of the specific activities jointly adopted by the member states.[92]

Nuclear weapons

One obstacle to forceful EU activities in the nuclear field is the member states' different nuclear policies. Collaboration so far has concentrated on two fields – safeguards and plutonium disposition. Although the former is undisputed and mostly successful, the latter is slow because of a lack of will and financing shortages. Nevertheless, it should be a priority to enhance efforts in these two fields since they are key elements of nuclear disarmament.

With regard to safeguards, the EU is in a unique position regarding the success of its projects.

First, it has decades of experience on safeguards with EURATOM. It was EURATOM that initially had responsibility for the implementation of safeguards on the territory of its member states, before IAEA verification was established.[93] EURATOM's safeguards are more comprehensive and intrusive than those of the IAEA, and its legal authority extends much further. Many technical tools that are used by the IAEA originated from EURATOM. The Joint Research Centre plays a strongly supportive role and has

91. European Union, 'Common Strategy of the EU on Russia (CFSP 1999/414)', 1999, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/com_strat/russia_99.pdf> (11 February 2002).

92. European Union, Council Joint Action, 17 December 1999.

93. D. A. Howlett, *Commission of the European Communities: Report of the Operation of Euratom Safeguards, 1991-1992* (Brussels: European Commission, 1994); W. Gmelin, 'The Role of Euratom in International Safeguards', Proceedings of the International Safeguards Symposium, Vienna, 14-18 March 1994; S. Thorstensen and K. Chitumbo, 'Safeguards in the European Union: The New Partnership Approach', *IAEA Bulletin*, January 1995.

always been innovative in developing new techniques.

Second, in contrast to the IAEA, EURATOM does not discriminate between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states (NWS and NNWS) with regard to their obligations concerning civilian nuclear fuel cycles. EURATOM applies its safeguards in a similar manner to the civilian nuclear fuel cycles of all members, including France and Britain. Thus, a reprocessing plant that was formerly also used for military production has successfully been subjected to EURATOM safeguards. This is a unique experience that may also be of value as regards the conversion of Russian former production facilities.

Also because of this approach, the safeguards culture in the EU is different from that in the United States. As an NWS, the United States - like Russia - does not perceive itself as obligated to pursue international transparency. If, in the longer term, more nuclear disarmament is to become a common objective, this kind of self-perception must change. A different tradition exists in Europe, despite the fact that two members are also NWS. With these practical experiences and this different culture, the EU is well suited to engaging in pragmatic collaboration with Russia on safeguards and international standards on MPC&A.

Third, the objectives of EURATOM safeguards are twofold: regional control of non-diversion and the function of the SSAC. In NNWS, non-proliferation and security of fissile materials and installations are controlled in several steps: the first involves national physical protection measures; the second uses technical MPC&A measures at the individual facilities; the third is the SSAC, run by the state (or in case of the EU by EURATOM); and the fourth is additional verification by the IAEA.[94] In NWS like the United States and Russia, facilities can be placed on voluntary lists, but they must be capable of meeting IAEA safeguards criteria. Their operators must therefore follow IAEA accounting rules and procedures, and it would be beneficial for Russia to adapt its national authorities to similar standards. Safeguards cooperation with the EU provides a wealth of experience in this field. Consequently, it is clear that the EU should continue to place a high priority on safeguards-related cooperation.

With regard to plutonium disposition, Europe also offers advantages relative to other states collaborating with Russia. The major advantage is the experience of using MOX technology.[95] In several countries, MOX fuel has been produced and used in light-

94. Often the terms SSAC and MPC&A are used synonymously; more precisely, however, the SSAC is a legal body and an instrument that defines the technical and practical MC&A measures.

95. Annette Schaper, 'Using Existing European MOX Fabrication Plants for the Disposition of Plutonium from Dismantled Warheads', in William G. Sutcliffe (ed.), *Selected Papers from Global '95 Concerning Plutonium* (Livermore, Calif.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 1996), p. 197.

water reactors, or LWRs, including Germany, which is now engaged in a nuclear phase-out. German LWRs are still running on MOX. Notably, the technology of the facility in Hanau (that was never used) was offered by its owners for the disposition of plutonium.

For several years, plutonium disposition has been emphasised as a key element of nuclear disarmament, ensuring that technical irreversibility is part of the disarmament process. It is also a key element in thwarting the danger of nuclear proliferation. The EU and its members should therefore strengthen their efforts and afford a much higher priority to disposition, especially regarding the high level of funding that is needed. It would also give the EU more influence generally in the nuclear disarmament field. The EU members should therefore be encouraged to separate these endeavours from their domestic nuclear energy policies.

Chemical weapons

There is significant movement in the chemical weapons field. The basic project model is in place and experience is available; together these elements map out a clear route for action. In planning additional projects for dismantling chemical weapons, the EU has to respect the decisions taken by the Russian government. Moscow adopted a programme for Chemical Weapons Stockpiles Destruction in the Russian Federation in July 2001. Through this decision, the Government has renounced the prior objective of constructing seven CW demolition plants – one facility per storage area to destroy stockpiles on-site – in favour of two large, central demolition plants.[96]

The EU echoed this approach through its concentration on the three plants at Gorny, Kambarka, and Shchuch'ye. The facility at Gorny opened in December 2002; the two other plants supported by the EU are still in the planning stage.[97] The Gorny experience, however, will inform the future course of these projects. The coordination between multilateral and bilateral approaches is significant: in Shchuch'ye, the supporting states even include non-members of the EU. There is a considerable risk of duplication of efforts and loss of efficiency; hence the project could truly profit by learning from the EU experience at Gorny.

96. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 'Russian CW Destruction Programme (revised 2001), Introduction', 2001 <http://www.projects.sipri.se/cbw/research/cw-destruction.html> (accessed 22 May 2002).

97. 'Bundesminister Fischer traf russischen Komitee-Vorsitzenden für Chemiewaffenabrüstung' [Foreign Minister Fischer meets chairman of Russian committee of chemical disarmament], <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/ausgabe_archiv?suche=1&archiv_id=2694&bereich_id=15&type_id=2> (accessed 22 May 2002).

Biological weapons and export controls

In the short term, the prospects of developing a Joint Action for biological weapons (BW) disarmament are poor. There are few conceptual ideas, and it appears that relations with Russia in this sector might not be mature enough to push forward. However, a feasibility study is under discussion, and some preliminary consideration has been given to EU participation in such a study.[98] The EU should be encouraged by its record in regard to chemical weapons to move boldly into the BW field. It may be in a better position to acquire Russian trust and cooperation than the United States, as US-Russian relations in the BW sector have been tense. The BW field, given its increasing saliency for international security, may be where seizing the initiative is most advisable.

In the sector of nuclear and chemical non-proliferation, it is essential to conduct an evaluation to identify the type of project that the EU could undertake and to look into the compatibility of such activities with those of the IAEA and OPCW. It is also conceivable that cooperation with the Russian government in the area of export control could be undertaken. Practical expertise in export control is mainly available at the level of member states; however, one EU asset is its experience in devising a common system among states that have a free trade zone with no customs boundaries. If Russia develops closer trade relations with some of its fellow CIS countries, this experience could prove valuable.

98. 'Report on the Implementation of the Council Joint Action 1999/878/CFSP of 17 December 1999 establishing a European Union cooperation programme on non-proliferation and disarmament in the Russian Federation', October 2001.

8 Final thoughts

It appears that the main improvement needed for EU CTR assistance to Russia is, bluntly, more money. The framework is there, the organisation has proven its ability to do useful work, and the division of labour between the Commission and the member states, despite all the difficulties, has developed a positive synergy. Given the importance of the field for security, enhanced efforts - and that inevitably means enhanced funds - would be advisable.

So far, EU funding has focused largely on nuclear safety, with a small amount provided for disarmament efforts through the Joint Action projects. Therefore, an expansion of funding for CTR under the CFSP would be particularly desirable. However, a substantial increase will only be possible in 2006 (the Community budget is already set until that date), and even then, only if the EU recognises CTR as an important priority for its CFSP. To achieve that objective requires ensuring, until 2006, at least a minimum of continuity and visibility in this field by renewing the 1999 Joint Action, maintaining a certain level of funding, and launching some new projects.

Strengthening the Global Partnership: Protecting Againstthe Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (SGP) - Project Introduction

International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC)

Extracted from Protecting against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership, Volume 1: Agenda for Action (Washington, DC: CSIS, January 2003). Used with permission.

The disintegration of the USSR in 1991 raised urgent questions about the ability of its successor states to control a vast weapons of mass destruction (WMD) complex, as well as the weapons themselves. Tens of thousands of Russian nuclear warheads and hundreds of tons of nuclear weapons-usable materials were scattered at dozens of inadequately secured sites. Virtually overnight, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus were left in possession of almost 4,000 nuclear weapons. Over 40,000 tons of chemical weapons (CW) were located at seven major storage sites. The Soviet Union's huge biological weapons (BW) complex comprised perhaps 20 major facilities and several dozen related ones, mainly in Russia but also in other successor states. Faced with desperate economic conditions, tens of thousands of scientists, engineers, technicians, military personnel, and others employed in WMD-related activities posed a proliferation risk.

In response to this enormous threat, the United States, Europe, Canada, and Japan have assisted Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union in reducing strategic nuclear forces and eliminating CW; in securing nuclear and other WMD-related materials, equipment, and technology against theft or seizure; and in addressing concerns about nuclear reactor safety and environmental impact of Soviet-era military programmes.

Much has been accomplished by the U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance programmes (generically known as the 'Nunn-Lugar' programmes for their original sponsors, Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar) and by similar programmes pursued by European and other countries. But after over a decade of effort, the task remaining is huge.

The countries of North America, Europe, and Japan have long recognized that this 'unfinished business' constitutes a threat to their security. But the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States – and the realization that highly organized and resourceful terrorist groups are actively seeking MWD and would have little hesitation to use them – have heightened their awareness of the threat and dramatically increased the urgency of efforts to prevent dangerous weapons, materials, equipment, and technology from falling into the hands of hostile countries or non-state actors.

Those countries increasingly recognize not only that WMD proliferation constitutes a common threat, but also that they must share responsibility for reducing that threat. Threat reduction programmes that had their origin largely in bilateral, U.S.-Russian arms reduction agreements – and that therefore placed the lion's share of the burden on the United States – must now become a central preoccupation of a broad international coalition and strengthened, coordinated effort.

The G-8 Initiative

The leaders of the G-8 countries rose to this challenge at their June 2002 summit meeting in Kananaskis, Canada, by adopting a G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.' They committed their countries 'to prevent[ing] terrorists or those that harbor them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology.' They agreed to raise up to $20 billion over the next 10 years – with half coming from the U.S. and half from the other G-8 countries – to support projects, initially in Russia, to address nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety (including environmental) issues. In addition, the leaders approved guidelines for new or expanded cooperation projects that were designed to overcome impediments that contributing countries had encountered in the past in their dealings with Russia. The G-8 members also invited other countries to join and contribute to the initiative.

By setting ambitious funding targets, addressing obstacles that have hindered cooperation to date, and pledging a multi-year, collaborative international effort, the G-8 Global Partnership has the potential to make a major contribution toward overcoming

the WMD challenge. Whether that vast potential will be realized or squandered, however, depends on the determination of G-8 and other governments to follow through on their commitments - and on whether they have the ingenuity and political will to translate the promising but general framework contained in the Kananaskis G-8 statement into concrete actions.

But the resolve and creativity of governments will not be enough. Achieving adequate support for Global Partnership programmes in the world's leading industrialized democracies will require elected officials to make hard choices among competing priorities, which in turn will require the backing of well-informed citizens. Therefore, if the G-8 and other countries are to forge a truly effective partnership against global WMD threats, parliaments and publics must join governments.

Strengthening the Global Partnership Project

Non-governmental organizations can play an important role in building the necessary support for cooperative threat reduction. For the past year, fifteen (now seventeen) policy research institutions in the U.S., Canada, Japan, Russia, and other European countries have joined together in an unprecedented effort – funded by the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Carnegie Corporation of New York – to produce a comprehensive assessment of national and multilateral threat reduction programmes, to raise public awareness of them, to outline an actionable agenda for future threat reduction programmes, and to strengthen the political consensus in favor of those programmes in our respective countries. This consortium of 'think tanks' strongly supports the G-8 Global Partnership adopted at the Kananaskis summit. Indeed, since Kananaskis, this consortium decided to call the project 'Strengthening the Global Partnership'. Much of the work since the summit has been devoted to considering how the Global Partnership can best be implemented.

We have produced a four-volume report that evaluates cooperative threat reduction efforts to date and chart a course for the future. Volume 1 outlines the group's principal findings and recommendations. Volume 2 contains analyses of each of the main functional areas of threat reduction, including fissile materials, chemical and biological weapons, weapons dismantlement, export controls, and 'brain drain.' Volume 3 is a collection of

reports written from the perspective of the 'contributors,' including European states, the European Union, Canada, Japan, and the United States. Finally, Volume 4 reports on Russian experiences with past and ongoing programmes and perspectives on the future.

Key Findings of the Report

One of the report's main findings is that the relationship between contributing countries and Russia in the threat reduction effort should be transformed from patronage to partnership. Although the contributing governments have not intended their assistance efforts to embody the negative features typically associated with donor-recipient relationships, Moscow has often perceived threat reduction assistance in that light – and clearly that must change. That means treating Russia not as a dependent client but as an equal partner who must be fully integrated into the design and operation of specific projects as well as the planning and guidance of the overall effort.

With this more central role for Russia comes greater responsibilities, both for increasing its own financial contribution and for removing impediments that have long plagued threat reduction programmes with Moscow (e.g., bureaucratic obstacles, inadequate transparency and access to work sites, resistance to providing tax exemptions and liability protections). In a number of cases, the failure to resolve these problems has meant that contributing states have been unable to proceed with projects for which funds had already been made available. The Kananaskis 'guidelines' were designed to remove these impediments. Unless Moscow acts decisively to support the Global Partnership and to meet the requirements of the guidelines, contributing governments will be reluctant to authorize the release of additional resources.

In terms of funding priorities, the report concurs with the 'priority concerns' identified in the G-8 statement – namely, destruction of chemical weapons, disposition of fissile materials, dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, and employment of former weapons personnel. At the same time, in view of the growing dimensions of the worldwide proliferation and terrorist threat, programmes aimed at preventing terrorists and hostile states from acquiring WMD or their ingredients deserve the highest priority.

We believe, moreover, that the varied expertise, geography, and interests of contributing states will influence the particular projects to which they choose to devote their own energy and resources. Given the magnitude and diversity of the challenge, this inclination of different governments to focus on different objectives should not be a problem, as long as all critical objectives receive adequate support. Indeed, the overall effort will often benefit from a conscious division of labor, with some partners pursuing projects that others might be unwilling or unable to pursue.

However, with projects carried out largely on a bilateral basis between contributors and recipients and with contributing countries often setting their own priorities, there is a compelling need for effective coordination. A good first step was the creation of a G-8 Senior Officials Group charged with overseeing the Kananaskis agreement and ensuring that its commitments are fulfilled. The Group should meet regularly and invite representatives of contributing non-G-8 governments to participate. But coordination within governments will be just as important as coordination among governments. High-level coordinators or coordination mechanisms are required in Russia and in contributing governments and multilateral institutions to overcome bureaucratic obstacles, promote well-integrated national or institutional efforts, and provide authoritative points of contact.

Another finding of our group was that, given improving economic conditions in Russia, emphasis should increasingly be placed on self-sustaining solutions to the WMD problem so that external assistance for threat reduction in Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union can be substantially reduced by the end of the decade and eventually phased out. This will require various tools, including commercialization, retraining, and retirement, to help downsize Russia's vast WMD infrastructure without increasing proliferation risks. It will also require preparing Russia to become capable on its own, after assistance has ended, of ensuring security at WMD-related facilities that will remain after downsizing.

A Summary of the Project's Recommendations

On the basis of these principal findings, our group adopted a concrete set of recommendations, which are summarized briefly just below and discussed in more detail later in Volume 1.

Sustaining Political Momentum. The Global Partnership should be a key theme at future G-8 and other high-level bilateral and multilateral meetings. Large, immediate contributions to high profile, cash starved projects such as chemical weapons destruction and nuclear submarine dismantlement could help keep political and public attention focused on the initiative. As G-8 Chair in 2003, France should press others to make new contributions to the Global Partnership so that pledges will reach the $20 billion mark by the time of the Evian Summit in June 2003. Looking ahead, the partners should agree on specific milestones that could be achieved in key programmes before the 2006 G-8 summit in Moscow. Annual reports should be issued by the outgoing G-8 chair on progress achieved.

Meeting Funding Requirements. National commitments by G-8 members will be the largest source of new funding, especially in the near term. Several members have already pledged new funds, and others must be urged to follow suit. Although fixed budgets until 2006 mean prospects for increased funding by the EU are limited in the near term, EU spending on threat reduction could increase substantially in the latter half of the decade. To help meet the Kananaskis target, holders of Soviet-era and Russian debt may wish to waive debt payments in exchange for additional threat reduction expenditures by Moscow, which could be deposited into a multilateral fund controlled by Russia and its partners. G-8 members should also approach non-G-8 countries, especially in Europe, to contribute to and participate in the Global Partnership. As a means of encouraging its partners to exceed their $10 billion share of the $20 billion target, the United States should treat its planned contribution of $10 billion over the next decade as a floor, not a ceiling.

Organizing for Success. The newly created G-8 Senior Officials Group should be a mechanism for genuine multilateral coordination, not just information exchanges, and should allow representatives of non-G-8 countries to participate. It should report progress and problems to G-8 leaders and receive annual guidance from them. In Russia, the appointment of Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Alexei L. Kudrin to coordinate all national threat reduction efforts is a welcome step. In addition, Russia's capacity to

absorb assistance – in terms of qualified personnel and bureaucratic structures – should be upgraded. Within contributing states and the EU, senior coordinators or coordinating mechanisms should be established to ensure that threat reduction efforts are well integrated.

Clearing Away Implementation Roadblocks. To remove obstacles that have inhibited cooperation and could discourage contributors from making new commitments, the Russian Duma should ratify the U.S.-Russian Umbrella Agreement that governs conditions for U.S.-Russian programmes as soon as possible. Then, consistent with the 'guidelines' agreed at Kananaskis, Moscow should promptly conclude comparable arrangements with other contributing governments and entities (e.g., the EU) or, alternatively, consider adopting a federal law dealing with threat reduction assistance that would provide the necessary exemptions and protections to all contributors. In general, contributing states and Russia should review existing legislation applicable to threat reduction programmes with a view to modifying provisions that have hindered those programmes (e.g., U.S. certification requirements that blocked expenditures for several months in 2002; the Russian Law on State Secrets, which has precluded the necessary transparency and access).

Managing a Multifaceted Nuclear Agenda. In addition to continuing the U.S. effort to help dismantle former Soviet strategic nuclear delivery systems, the United States – and the United Kingdom and France where appropriate – should assist Russia in accelerating the consolidation of its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons at a reduced number of secure storage sites. In this effort, all parties concerned, not just Russia, should provide greater transparency on the numbers and locations of nuclear weapons in Europe, and partners should offer to help Russia accelerate the reduction of tactical weapons. In the area of materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A), a new European-sponsored programme could help complete security upgrades at civilian sites currently covered by the U.S. programme, allowing the United States to concentrate more on military facilities. Contributing countries in Europe and North America, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), should also undertake a programme under which excess highly -enriched uranium (HEU)

would be removed from vulnerable sites in the former Soviet Union, any remaining HEU would be secured, and HEU-fueled reactors would be shut down or converted to operate with low-enriched fuel. Moreover, ongoing efforts to render bomb-grade nuclear materials no longer usable in nuclear weapons should be accelerated by doubling the blend-down rate for HEU and by funding the construction of facilities needed to convert Russian plutonium into mixed-oxide fuel for burning in civilian reactors. Finally, to head off serious proliferation and environmental risks, Russia, Europe, and Japan should work together to dismantle Russian general-purpose nuclear submarines and manage the safe and environmentally sound disposition of their reactors, fuel, and radioactive wastes.

Diminishing the Biological Weapons Threat. An urgent task is to increase the security of pathogen collections at Russian and other former Soviet civilian facilities. In addition, to allay long-standing concerns about access and openness at key military installations of the former Soviet biological weapons (BW) complex, personnel and facilities from Russia's Ministry of Defence and their counterparts in the United States and Europe should be integrated into threat reduction efforts (including in combating bio-terrorism). Europeans should also work with the United States in finding sustainable ways to engage former Soviet research, development, and production capability to promote accelerated development and production of drugs, vaccines and innovative medical technologies. These efforts should be integrated into health care systems as well as toward protecting civilian populations against BW attacks. Cooperation with Russian former BW entities should also include facilities currently under the supervision of nonmilitary entities, including the Ministries of Agriculture, Health, and RAO Biopreparat.

Securing and Destroying Chemical Weapons. With Russia's CW destruction programme now benefiting from capable leadership and significant financial support from Moscow, there is a pressing need for stepped up external assistance to help Russia destroy its huge CW stocks by the final 2012 deadline set by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). A sensible division of labor would make the United States primarily responsible for funding an expanded destruction facility at Shchuch'ye and the Europeans

responsible for a large facility at Kambarka. Pending destruction, the security of CW stocks should be ensured. To do its part, the U.S. government will need permanent authority to waive current legislative restrictions, which have produced lengthy delays in destroying CW.

Fostering Sustainable Threat Reduction. To consolidate and downsize Russia's WMD infrastructure in a manner sustainable for Russia and without heightening WMD proliferation risks, the United States and Europe should expand programmes (such as the U.S. Initiative for Proliferation Prevention, European and U.S. initiatives focused on nuclear cities, the International Science and Technology Center Partners programme, and some TACIS programmes) aimed at providing self-sustaining commercial and other civilian opportunities for former weapons scientists and institutions. Russian entrepreneurs and Western corporate enterprises should become an integral part of this effort and be considered not only targets for assistance but also potential consumers of and investors in technology. The Russian government should adopt (e.g., tax credits) that would make it attractive for Russian businesses to hire former weapon scientists and workers, especially for the 'closed nuclear cities'. As part of their mandates, assistance programmes should include facilitating retirement, retraining, and resettlement of WMD personnel, both former weapon scientists and specialized military officers. Preparing Russia to maintain high levels of security at WMD facilities after external assistance is reduced requires that efforts be pursued now to help Russia produce the necessary equipment indigenously, to train the necessary personnel, and to instill a culture of security in all personnel working at such facilities. In addition, the Russian government should create incentives for Russian facility managers to devote the necessary resources and attention to maintaining high levels of security.

Bolstering National Export Controls and Border Security. The effective export control and border security systems of the European states, Canada, and Japan put them in a strong position to supplement existing U.S. assistance efforts in this area. These countries should work with Russia and other states of the former USSR – a significant number of which have weak export controls and porous borders with one another – in the training and equipping of customs services, in improving internal-compliance mech-

anisms and information-sharing at the level of enterprises, in developing tools to control 'intangible' transfers of proliferation-sensitive information, and in automating licensing systems. Key contributing countries should cooperate with Russia and other NIS countries to develop a strategic plan that evaluates the export control and border security systems in the region, identifies needs and priorities, develops a set of best practices, and establishes a division of labor for assisting regional states to strengthen their capabilities.

The Challenge Ahead

The international community faces no greater challenge in the twenty-first century than stopping the proliferation of WMD to states and dangerous sub-national groups. The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which was launched in Kananaskis, is a major step toward meeting this challenge. But without the continuous, high-level attention of governments as well as the sustained support of legislatures and public opinion, the opportunities created by the G-8 summit agreement may be lost. Our non-governmental organizations can play an important role in mobilizing the necessary support for international threat reduction efforts. In the period ahead, we are determined to work actively with each other and within our respective societies to ensure that the funding targets set at Kananaskis are met or exceeded, that these additional resources are put to their most effective use, and that the ambitious goals of the Global Partnership are fully realized.

Partner Organisations in the Consortium

- Canada-Centre for Security and Defence Studies, Carleton University
- European Union-EU Institute for Security Studies
- Finland-Finnish Institute of International Affairs**
- France-Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
- Germany-Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
- International-Stockholm International Peace Research Insti tute
- International-International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Italy-Landau Network-Centro Volta/Union Scienziati Per II Disarmo
- Japan-Japan Institute for International Affairs
- Netherlands-Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'
- Norway-Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
- Russia-PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia
- Russia-Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)
- Spain-Real Institute Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos
- Sweden-The Swedish Institute of Intenational Affairs
- United Kingdom-Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London
- Untied States-Center for Strategic and International Studies

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** indicates a partner organization joining the project in February 2003

Abbreviations

AIDA	Agreement with Russia on assistance in the dismantling of Russian nuclear weapons
BA	Biological Agents
BW	Biological Weapons/Warfare
BWB	Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung (German Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement)
BWC	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
BWD	Biological Weapons Destruction
CERN	European Centre for Particle Physics/Nuclear Research
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CNR	Committee of Natural Resources
CONOP	Committee on Non-Proliferation
CTR	Cooperative Threat Reduction
CW	Chemical Weapons/Warfare
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
CWD	Chemical Weapons Destruction
DG	Directorate-General
EC	European Commission
EMS	Environmental Monitoring System
ESA	EURATOM Supply Agency
ESO	EURATOM Safeguards Office
EU	European Union
EUJA	EU Joint Action
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FSU	Former Soviet Union
G-8	Group of Eight leading industrialised nations
GAN	Gosatomnadzor, Russian Nuclear Safety Authority
GT MHR	Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor
HEU	Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ISTC	International Science and Technology Centre
JA	Joint Action
JRC	Joint Research Centre
LTA	Lead Test Assembly
LWR	Light-Water Reactor
MOX	Mixed OXide fuel
MPC&A	Material Protection, Control and Accountancy
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD)
NIS	Newly Independent States
NPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NNWS	Non-Nuclear Weapons State
NWS	Nuclear Weapons State
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
Pu	Plutonium
RAA	Russian Ammunition Agency
RAO	Unified Energy System of Russia (joint stock company)
SEA	Single European Act
SG/HR	Secretary-General/High Representative
SSAC	State System of Accounting and Control
TACIS	Technical Assistance to the CIS
U	Uranium
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
W-Pu	Weapons-grade Plutonium

About the authors

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Chaillot Papers

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During the last year, the Institute has participated in a consortium of policy research organisations in the United States, Europe, Russia and Asia that aims to strengthen the G-8's 'Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction' initiative. The consortium, led by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, Washington, DC), seeks to support and promote cooperative threat reduction (CTR) activities. To account for, secure and dismantle WMD-related materials and infrastructures in the former Soviet Union is essential in the fight against proliferation in general and in the struggle to prevent terrorist groups in particular from gaining control of the most dangerous materials.

In January 2003, the consortium published a major assessment that defines gaps in existing CTR programmes, recommends future priorities, and proposes coordination mechanisms that will improve the effectiveness of further efforts. This Chaillot Paper contains the chapter on the EU's CTR activities, together with a summary of the overall assessment.

This analysis of the EU's CTR activities assesses first the threat as seen from Europe and explains how the EU has become an actor in this field. It then presents the legal and institutional framework in which CTR programmes are embedded and discusses a number of projects in detail. It concludes with a look towards the future, including policy recommendations.

The main conclusion of this *Chaillot Paper* is that the EU has made an important contribution, both through the Commission's Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS) programme and the EU's Joint Action on non-proliferation and disarmament in Russia. Moreover, the possible combination of first- and second-pillar instruments gives the EU a unique capacity to develop a comprehensive approach and to create positive spillover effects between various programmes.

However, the EU could do much better: a cross-pillar strategy to exploit fully potential synergies still needs to be defined. Moreover, EU funding has largely focused on the Commission's nuclear safety activities, with a very small amount provided for disarmament efforts under the CFSP. A substantial increase in funding for CFSP projects will be possible only in 2006, when the next Community budget cycle begins. However, the EU should in the meantime prepare the ground by recognising CTR as a major priority for its CFSP and by improving the interaction between the relevant bodies.

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