The United States and European Defence

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Stanley R. Sloan, a private international security policy consultant, began his more than three decades of public service at the Central Intelligence Agency in 1967, serving as NATO and European Community desk officer, member of the US Delegation to Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, and as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. He was employed by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in a variety of analytical and management positions from 1975 to 1999. In April 1999 he retired from his post of CRS Senior Specialist in International Security. His publications include more than two decades of reports for the US Congress on international and European security topics.
The more headway the Europeans make in the setting up of a true European Union defence capability, the more voices are heard in the United States that analyse, question, challenge or fear this new European ambition. Nothing, moreover, could be more natural, given that, in their serious intent, their scope and their unanimity, the decisions taken at Cologne and Helsinki signal a clear departure from the EU’s long tradition of politico-strategic non-existence.

In order to allow an understanding of the full gamut of the detail and logic, but also the contradictions, of these American perceptions, it seemed to us both useful and urgent to invite, for the first time, an American author to contribute to the Chaillot Paper series. And not just any author: Stanley Sloan, by virtue of the various posts he has held in the US administration, but above all because of his acute knowledge of the Congress, is without any doubt one of the most well-informed observers of the strategic community in the United States.

Ranging from the Bush administration to that of President Clinton, from Congress to the major US think tanks, from the military to the most influential columnists, in these pages Stanley Sloan examines and dissects all the current arguments, expectations and anxieties surrounding European defence. Three facts clearly emerge:

- Whatever its ambitions regarding defence, Europe is a worry. Either because the inadequacy of its military expenditure could make it useless for America, or, conversely, because its desire for political autonomy could put the Atlantic Alliance in jeopardy. From those who reproach the Europeans for going too far politically to those who reproach them for doing too little militarily, US commentary on the European Security and Defence Policy is almost always voiced in plaintive mode, rarely that of praise or enthusiasm.
- Most American commentators admittedly say that they genuinely hope for a greater European contribution to the common defence effort. But this is never without misunderstandings or contradictions: expectations concern a bigger military and budgetary effort on Europe’s part, and reservations apply to any increase in political power on the part of the same Europe, as if there were no link between power and influence.
- Despite the different schools of thought that the author describes, one is bound to be struck by the relative homogeneity, indeed the cross-party continuity, in dominant perceptions in the United States regarding ESDP: a policy of ‘yes, but’ in which there nearly always coexist the sacrosanct nature of NATO, a large dose of historical suspicion of France, a deep-seated aversion to the very term European ‘autonomy’ and a certain uneasiness – which is new – regarding recent British and German policies.

These American perceptions undoubtedly call for a European response. Other Chaillot Papers will in the very near future contribute to this debate.

Nicole Gnesotto

Paris, April 2000
SUMMARY

The members of the European Union are attempting to create a substantial, autonomous, collaborative European military capability, including forces and decision-making processes and institutions. Even though the United States has always welcomed the potential of a stronger ‘European pillar’ in the transatlantic Alliance, it has been wary of approaches that would divide the Alliance politically, take resources away from NATO military cooperation, and not yield additional military capabilities to produce more equitable burden-sharing. The US approach could be termed a ‘yes, but’ policy, supporting the European effort but warning of its potential negative consequences.

Official US policy will likely continue to put top priority on ensuring NATO’s continued vitality. Support for developments on the European level will be conditioned by this reality. As long as the United States has vital interests in Europe, and as long as NATO is the main US security connection to the Old Continent, US administrations and the Congress will also want to ensure that any changes in the transatlantic Alliance protect US interests.

Many American observers, including Administration officials, influential non-governmental commentators and members and staff of Congress, support the European Union’s goal of developing a European Security and Defence Policy, in the hope that such cooperation will relieve the United States of security burdens.

But, in any circumstances, future US policy towards ESDP will remain conflicted. American concern about the potential negative consequences of ESDP will increase in direct proportion to the emphasis EU governments put on ‘autonomy’ in describing their ESDP goals. Although the word itself is neutral, it will be read by some in the United States as a direct challenge to US policy goals and leadership roles.

Another important factor in the US attitude towards European defence cooperation will be a persistent suspicion of French motivations. Many American officials and experts still see France as intent on pushing the United States out of Europe, despite frequent and apparently sincere official French statements to the contrary.

The fact that the British government is taking a clear lead on ESDP is both reassuring and distressing to Americans. It is reassuring because they know and trust their British friends, whose instincts regarding transatlantic relations they believe are
almost always compatible with US interests. It is distressing because of the fear that, in order to score points in Europe, Prime Minister Blair may be willing to sacrifice fundamentals of the US-UK relationship. The fact that the German government enthusiastically supports ESDP is also a double-edged sword. On the one hand, a more serious German approach to post-Cold War defence requirements would be welcome, but on the other US interests would suffer if ESDP were to weaken Germany’s strong commitment to NATO.

The United States will look to the governments of the United Kingdom especially, but also those of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and other EU members, to ensure that ESDP does not take on a neo-Gaullist character as it develops. The United States was reassured by the selection of former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana as the first ‘Mr Common Foreign and Security Policy’, but future appointees to the office will be closely scrutinised for their perspectives and tendencies.

Given the fact that it would take a decade or more for Europe to change the actual balance between US and European defence capabilities, the United States will for an extended period likely face a Europe whose foreign and defence policy proclamations and institutions are more developed than its ability to act. This suggests that, irrespective of the long-term outcome, which in itself is vitally important to both the United States and Europe, the near-term and perhaps prolonged transition period will prove challenging, frustrating, and will perhaps see serious friction and possible fractures in the relationship.

The United States will in these circumstances be called on to deploy a sophisticated, nuanced diplomatic strategy toward Europe. US interests would not be served by policies that inclined towards the extremes of either unilateralism or withdrawal (isolationism). The good news is that the American political system, like those of most other democracies, tends to filter out extremes as politicians move from political posturing towards the practical necessities of governance. A President Bush in 2001 might feel the influence of unilateralist tendencies from the conservative wing of the party, and a President Gore might feel some pressure from the neo-isolationist wing of his party. But neither Republican nor Democratic administrations will be able to ignore the national interest’s requirements for a healthy, working transatlantic Alliance.
The United States and European defence

Stanley R. Sloan

INTRODUCTION

The members of the European Union (EU) have embarked on an historic journey that is intended, over the next several years, to produce a common security and defence policy. They say they will back up such a policy with institutions and capabilities designed to permit them to act on behalf of shared security interests, independently of the United States and NATO when necessary.

This initiative, if successful, would fulfil a commitment made by NATO’s founding European members in the late 1940s when they pledged to combine defence efforts to make a substantial European contribution to the Alliance as a counterpart to the efforts of their North American allies. Creating an autonomous, combined European capacity for military action would substantially change the balance and dynamics of the transatlantic Alliance. The proclaimed European goal is to ensure that this is a positive change, giving Europe more responsibility in the transatlantic defence relationship and relieving the United States of some of its current defence burdens. Nevertheless, concerns have been expressed on the American side that the initiative might end up undermining NATO politically while not producing the intended new European military capabilities. In fact, the EU initiative contains the seeds of the most important strategic shift in the Alliance since the end of the Cold War, and perhaps even since the Alliance as we know it took shape in the early 1950s. It has the potential to strengthen the Alliance if managed successfully, and the potential to destroy NATO if it is not.

The Clinton administration has officially endorsed and encouraged the European move, but has cautioned that the process of change should not produce new transatlantic divisions, unnecessarily duplicate NATO efforts or discriminate against NATO countries that are not EU members. The US Senate and House of Representatives have warned against anything that would weaken NATO and have emphasised the need for increased European capabilities, whether organised on a national or multinational level. Private
American analysts, some of whom are leading advisers to Republican candidates for the Presidency, have postulated a variety of perspectives ranging from encouragement to scepticism and even opposition to the development of ‘autonomous’ European defence capabilities.

This paper examines the interaction between current European initiatives and perceptions of those initiatives in the United States. It surveys, from an American perspective, the historical background and context of the current debate and analyses the most important recent developments affecting European defence. It examines American attitudes in some detail, looking at the underlying rationales for and policy implications of several different schools of thought. It then summarises what are likely to be some constants in the US approach to ESDP and discusses policy strategy for the next US administration.
A ‘YES, BUT . . .’ US APPROACH

The end of the Cold War fundamentally altered Europe’s geostrategic setting. In the heady atmosphere of the early 1990s, many thoughtful analysts and officials questioned what NATO’s place might be in a world in which the Warsaw Pact had crumbled, the Soviet Union was withdrawing its forces from Central Europe, and new leaders of former Warsaw Pact nations were already speculating about joining NATO (in February 1990, Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn said he could ‘imagine that, in a few years, Hungary could become a member of NATO’).

Early in 1990, very few observers were willing to talk about NATO opening its membership to former Warsaw Pact states. In fact, a variety of quite different concepts for the future organisation of European security appeared to be competing for official and public approval. Some experts speculated that it might be best to keep the Warsaw Pact in business in order to help organise future security in Europe. Others argued that NATO had outlived its usefulness because there was no longer any threat. Such advocates believed that the then Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, to which all European states, the United States and Canada belonged, could take over responsibility for maintaining peace and security on the continent. Some Europeans and Americans thought the new environment would be the perfect setting for the ‘Europeanisation’ of NATO – transforming Alliance relationships to enhance the role and responsibilities of the European Allies while reducing that of the United States.

The leaders of NATO countries decided they should first address the question of whether or not NATO was needed at all. Instinctively, all the leaders of the time, including the Bush administration in the United States and NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner, seemed to believe that NATO should be preserved. Some officials argued that NATO was more than a military alliance, and was based, in fact, on a community of values that rose above any specific military threat. Others maintained that the Soviet Union remained an alien society which could in the future produce new threats to its neighbours. They saw NATO as an ‘insurance policy’ against a future fire in the European house. Others pointed to new risks and uncertainties that could best be dealt with through NATO’s approach, in which countries work together to handle security problems.

Meeting in London in July 1990, less than nine months after the Berlin Wall had come down, the heads of NATO governments issued the ‘London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance,’ announcing a ‘major
transformation’ of NATO. They offered to join the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states in declaring that they were no longer enemy states and offered both friendship and cooperation to the former adversaries. They set in process a major overhaul of Alliance strategy, aimed at producing a ‘new Strategic Concept’ for the Alliance in the course of 1991.

At the same time, the members of the European Community were working on concepts designed to put new energy into the post-Cold War construction of a united Europe. With these processes of transformation under way, all NATO governments agreed that NATO remained the essential forum for consultation and cooperation among the transatlantic Allies on matters affecting their security and defence commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty. However, it was becoming increasingly accepted that the future vitality of the Alliance would depend on the European Allies assuming added responsibilities in dealing with 21st century security challenges.

Three schools of thought

There has always been a variety of tendencies in the US attitude towards the process of European integration. Public opinion has remained very favourable towards Europe and, in particular, towards European Union members, reflecting deep European roots in American society, perceptions of shared values, and Alliance relationships, among other factors. But the United States has always been schizophrenic about Europe’s role in the world. Throughout the Cold War period, the United States supported the goal of enhanced European economic, political, and defence cooperation. However, the United States had not been forced to confront directly the prospect of European defence cooperation that could actually substitute for what in the past had been done in or through NATO, and which could supplant traditional US-European roles in the Alliance.

Only within the policy élite is there much specific focus on the EU and the European integration process. With some experts and officials, there still is a tendency to support European integration because of the belief that it generally reaffirms American values and benefits US interests. This might be called the ‘traditionalist’ school, located in the centre of the US political spectrum, which envisions a stronger EU as part of a continuing transatlantic community of shared interests and cooperation. The traditionalists largely applauded the results of Maastricht as having given the process of European integration an important push forward. Some among them were disappointed
that a more ‘federal’ outcome was not possible, but on balance they were pleased.

Another tendency, which might be called the ‘domestic interests’ school, sees the EU as part of the answer to the need for the United States to respond more effectively to its internal agenda. This perspective, which has deep roots in the defence burden-sharing debate, supports the goal of the EU taking full responsibility for its own security and assuming progressively larger burdens and international leadership roles. The outcome, according to this view, would reduce US international security burdens and responsibilities. Such observers were mildly disappointed that the Maastricht outcome did not promise any near-term burden relief for the United States. None the less, those adopting this perspective were inclined to seize on the summit’s outcome as further evidence that the United States could move more rapidly towards an exit from the European theatre to return more rapidly to the home front, where domestic problems called out for money and political attention.

A third tendency, which could be called the ‘US security interests’ school, is sceptical of the benefits of European integration for the United States, and is focused more on particular US economic and political interests. This tendency has suggested that the United States must actively defend its interests in the European integration process and should, if necessary, disrupt EU consensus if such consensus might operate against US self-interests. According to this approach, the process of European integration, particularly in the absence of an active Soviet threat against Europe, may have mainly negative consequences for US interests.

In the early 1990s, US policy reflected the influence of all these perspectives. The traditional approach still dominated the rhetoric of US policy, but the desire to escape from overseas burdens became a much more important factor in American politics, and the tendency to look more sceptically at US support for European integration became more influential in the absence of the strong geopolitical requirement to support European union during the Cold War. In a ‘yes, but’ policy environment, the ‘but’ therefore had more emphasis.

‘Don’t gang up on us’

From a contemporary perspective, the historical record of President George Bush’s policy towards European defence is particularly important because many of the Administration’s officials who dealt with the issue (including,
for example, Condoleza Rice, George Bush Jr.’s foreign policy adviser, Robert Zoellick, Peter Rodman, John Bolton, Richard Haass and Paul Wolfowitz) could turn up in key foreign and defence policy positions in a future Republican administration.

The Bush administration was certainly sympathetic to the need for stronger European contributions to the Alliance. The United States also hoped for a peace dividend. But the higher priority for President Bush and his top officials was ensuring continuity in US international leadership, including leadership of NATO. At a time when many experts were questioning whether NATO had any future, Administration officials were suspicious of the moves within the European Union to give the EU a defence dimension. National security adviser Brent Scowcroft was known to be sceptical about French motivations, and his relationship with officials in Paris was strained. In addition, there may have been a concern that bringing defence issues within the purview of the European Commission would open the way for anti-American sentiment present in the Commission to influence the evolution of transatlantic defence ties. The Administration was also concerned that too much European rhetoric and declarations about taking on responsibility for defence would provide ammunition for traditional domestic critics of the US commitment to NATO.

As the United States perceived the increased momentum towards European agreement on a defence identity early in 1991, a number of alarm bells were rung by US officials. US Ambassador to NATO William Taft IV, in speeches delivered in February and March, supported a stronger ‘European pillar’ in the Alliance based on a revival of the Western European Union but cautioned that the European pillar should not relax the central transatlantic bond, should not duplicate current cooperation in NATO, and should not leave out countries that were not members of the European Community. (These themes returned prominently in the Clinton administration’s 1998 warning that the EU should avoid the dreaded ‘three D’s’: duplication, decoupling and discrimination.)

The message was put more bluntly in a closely-held memorandum sent to European governments by Under-Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew in February 1991. According to published reports, the memorandum expressed concern that the United States
might be ‘marginalised’ if greater European cohesion in defence led to the creation of an internal caucus within NATO.¹

Following further warnings issued by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Dobbins on visits to European capitals, and expressions of concern by Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney, the US approach to European defence integration appeared to have settled on five main points: the United States supported the development of common European foreign, security and defence policies; NATO must remain the essential forum for consultation and venue for agreement on all policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the North Atlantic Treaty; NATO should retain its integrated military structure; the United States supports the Europeans’ right to take common military action outside Europe to preserve their interests or ensure the respect of international law; and European members of NATO that do not belong to the EU should not be excluded from European defence policy deliberations.² (These themes were all to emerge again in the Clinton administration’s approach to progress in Europe towards a common European defence policy – plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose?)

Although some of the irritation felt in Europe at the original expression of US concern subsided at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Copenhagen on 6-7 June 1991, substantial ambiguity remained regarding what the United States really wanted from Europe. But, towards the end of 1991, the United States backed away from overt protests about a European defence identity and concentrated on diplomatic efforts to ensure that the definition of that identity that emerged from the NATO summit in Rome and the EU summit in Maastricht, the Netherlands, was consistent with US interests in NATO as the primary European security institution.

NATO’s 1991 new Strategic Concept acknowledged the radical changes that had recently occurred in the world, in Europe in particular. The concept said that NATO’s policies and force posture should be adapted to these changes, but the Allies also reaffirmed some elements of continuity. NATO’s core function, they declared, was to defend its members against attack, and NATO’s integrated command structure and coalition approach to defence remained essential to members’ interests. The transatlantic link between Europe and the United States and Canada remained vital to

²Ibid., pp. 60-1.
NATO’s future relevance. Defence of democracy, human rights and the rule of law still constituted the heart and soul of the Alliance. Allied leaders noted that, even with all the positive changes that had occurred, the world remained a dangerous place, and that NATO cooperation would be essential to help them deal with the remaining risks and uncertainties. They agreed that the North Atlantic Treaty, in addition to providing for collective defence, included a mandate to work together to deal with threats to the security interests of members, not just an attack on one of them.

The Allies established three areas of particular emphasis for future NATO policies. First, they said that, as part of a ‘broader’ approach to security, they would actively seek cooperation and dialogue among all European states, and particularly with their former Warsaw Pact adversaries.

Second, they declared that NATO’s nuclear and non-nuclear military forces would be reduced, and that remaining forces would be restructured to take into account the need to handle crisis management tasks (like the one that later developed in Bosnia) as well as collective defence.

Third, the Allies agreed that the European members of NATO would assume greater responsibility for their own security. Specifically, the NATO leaders judged that ‘The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance.’ At that time, there was absolutely no concept of how this would come about, particularly since the Allies were almost universally focused on how to cut defence expenditures in the light of the reduced threats in order to produce a ‘peace dividend’ for domestic spending programmes. And, in an important footnote to the support for a stronger European pillar, the leaders reiterated that NATO was ‘. . . the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.’

In December 1991, in the wake of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, the members of the European Community signed the Maastricht Treaty, transforming the European Community into the European Union (EU), and setting the goal of establishing a monetary union and a common currency, the Euro. The treaty importantly included, as part of that Union, a commitment to ‘define and implement a common foreign and security policy’ that would eventually include the ‘framing of a common defence

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3Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 7-8 November 1991.
policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.’ The treaty designated the Western European Union as the organisation responsible for implementing defence aspects of the EU’s decisions on foreign and security policy. The WEU members subsequently agreed (in Petersberg, Germany in 1992) that they would use WEU military forces for joint operations in humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, crisis management and peace enforcement – the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks.’

Although the outcomes in Rome and Maastricht appeared to resolve the conceptual differences between the United States and France about the relationship between a European defence identity and the transatlantic Alliance, it may have just concealed them, leaving some difficult issues for later resolution. This became patently clear in the first half of 1992 when the United States issued strong warnings to the German and French governments concerning their plans to create a Franco-German military corps of some 35,000 troops. US officials reportedly expressed reservations about the degree to which the corps would displace NATO as the focus of European defence efforts and undermine domestic support in the United States for a continuing US presence in Europe. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft was said to have sent a ‘strongly worded’ letter to the German government suggesting that the Germans were not taking a strong enough position against what Scowcroft interpreted as French efforts to undermine cooperation in NATO.¹ The controversy reflected continuing differences between the US and French governments about the requirements for the future organisation of European security.

US policy towards European defence has always been set within a broader US concept of its role in the world and the way in which allies relate to that world. During the Bush administration, internal official studies that suggested the United States should establish and sustain unquestioned superpower status raised questions in Europe as well as in the United States. Concern arose when a draft of the US Department of Defence ‘defence guidance’ memorandum was leaked to the press early in 1992. The document’s vision of far-flung US military requirements in the post-Cold War era and defence of a substantial base force of 1.6 million troops on active duty, all designed to ensure that the United States remained the only global superpower, provoked an outcry from a wide variety of observers who saw the draft plan as seriously out of touch with current political and economic realities.

The fact that there was no existing consensus on the US role in the world to serve as political guidance for the DoD’s strategy, even within the Bush administration, was suggested by reports that White House and State Department officials had characterised the draft as ‘a “dumb report” that in no way or shape represents US policy’.\(^5\)

The reaction among the European Allies was that the Pentagon approach seemed to view Europe as a potential adversary rather than ally. For them, the implication was that the United States would endeavour to undermine efforts at closer European unity so as to ensure that no European rival emerged to ‘balance’ the US role in the world.

Following the strong reactions to the leaked draft, a new version was produced that reportedly eliminated most of what the European Allies and other observers found objectionable.\(^6\) None the less, the controversial draft, by framing one clear perspective on the future US role in the world, may have made an important contribution to the ongoing discussion.

Because the American people clearly wanted the United States to focus its energies on economic and social problems at home, the 1992 election campaign produced very little interest in or discussion of the definition of the future US role in the world. President Bill Clinton’s administration came to office against the backdrop of an election in which those voting sent a clear message calling for more attention to be paid to domestic issues, including the still-mounting federal deficit.

**Clinton administration emphasises the ‘yes’**

The Clinton administration wanted to dispel any residual impression that the United States did not want the Europeans to take on more burdens and responsibilities within the Alliance.

At least one of Clinton’s foreign policy advisers (Jenonne Walker, who became Clinton’s ambassador to Prague) had even argued that withdrawal of US forces from Europe would signal US willingness to envision a ‘Europeanisation’ of NATO. Less radical approaches prevailed, however, and in January 1994, at Clinton’s first opportunity for major initiatives on NATO issues, the NATO Brussels summit acknowledged the important role


that a ‘European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)’ could play in the evolving European security system.

The January 1994 NATO summit meeting in Brussels approved the idea, initially proposed by the United States, of creating Combined Joint Task Forces as part of NATO’s integrated command structure. The intent of the CJTF initiative was to provide flexible command arrangements within which groupings of Allied forces could take on a wide variety of missions outside the NATO area. Specifically, the concept sought:

- to give NATO’s force and command structure sufficient flexibility to respond to Alliance security requirements and new missions beyond responses to an attack on a NATO country (the command arrangements for the NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo became examples of this type of CJTF, even though they were not formally designated CJTF operations);
- to facilitate the dual use of NATO forces and command structures for Alliance operations and/or operations run by the Western European Union (WEU), the defence organisation whose membership includes only European countries and which has been chosen as the framework for constructing a ‘European pillar’ in NATO; the purpose was to encourage European nations to undertake missions with forces that are ‘separable but not separate’ from NATO in the context of an emerging European Security and Defence Identity;
- to permit non-NATO partners to join NATO countries in operations, exercises and training as envisioned in the Partnership for Peace programme of cooperation open to all non-NATO European states (this approach has been actively followed in the Bosnia and Kosovo operations).

The Brussels summit hallmark of the Administration’s policy towards Europe yielded multiple references, in the Allied declaration, to the importance of European-level cooperation and the constructive role played by the Western European Union. (The declaration included no fewer than eight references to the WEU, seven references each to the European Security and Defence Identity and European Union, and two each to the Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy goal.)

NATO’s work to implement the January 1994 agreements in principle moved ahead slowly, but remained hampered by different US and French
images of the future. Many French analysts and officials had interpreted the summit outcome as a US vote for ‘Europeanisation’ of the Alliance. In fact, the Administration had not intended to go so far, and only wanted to open the way towards a stronger European role in the Alliance. The perceptual split was suggested by the way each looked at CJTF. The French, and many other Europeans, looked at CJTF as first and foremost a way for the European Allies to engage in more autonomous military actions. The United States saw this as one of the functions of CJTF, but regarded the concept’s first role as making it possible for NATO itself to operate in more flexible formations and combinations.

In the second half of 1995, the British government began actively searching for ways to create a European security and defence identity within the framework of the Alliance, and in a fashion that would facilitate France’s return to full military integration. Early in 1996, both the French and British governments proposed what became known as the ‘Deputies proposal.’ NATO forces in Europe have always been commanded by an American officer who occupies the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The British and French suggested that the Deputy SACEUR, traditionally a senior European officer, and other European officers in the NATO command structure, wear WEU command hats as well as their NATO and national command hats. This multiple-hatting procedure would, without duplication of resources and personnel, permit the Western European Union countries to use the NATO command structure to organise and command a military operation under largely European auspices.

The ‘Deputies proposal’ reportedly raised serious issues for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and SACEUR, General George Joulwan. Senior US military commanders were concerned that the WEU hat might weaken the European commitment to the NATO structure and lessen the American commitment to NATO. Other US officials, however, believed that a continued active US role in the Alliance depended on being able to demonstrate to the US Congress and the American public that the European Allies were willing and able to take on greater responsibility for military missions both inside Europe and beyond. The reinvolvement of France in the Alliance, with its willingness and ability to participate in military

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7This concept was developed in a Congressional Research Service report originally prepared for Senator William V. Roth, Jr., (R-Delaware). See: Stanley R. Sloan, ‘NATO’s Future: Beyond Collective Defense’, CRS Report 95-979 S, 15 September 1995, pp. 21-4, 30-2. French officials subsequently acknowledged that the CRS report contributed to what eventually became a British-French initiative. British officials have suggested that London was beginning to think along similar lines when the CRS report appeared.
interventions beyond national borders, was seen as the key to the construction of a meaningful and coordinated European contribution to post-Cold War security concerns.

The spring 1996 session of NATO ministers, scheduled to be held in Berlin, Germany, emerged as the opportunity to tie the loose ends together. In a discussion that spring with a key Administration official responsible for NATO policy, I asked if he would support the Deputies proposal. His answer was: ‘I’ll support it as soon as General Joulwan does.’ Just days prior to the Berlin meeting, the JCS were still resisting the transformation of the Deputy SACEUR position. Senior advisers to the President realised that the time had come for a deal, and the White House overruled the JCS – a step not easily taken by a President whose credentials with the military were so suspect. As a consequence, the 1994 summit goals were transformed at Berlin into a plan to build a European defence pillar inside the NATO Alliance, in spite of objections from the JCS.

In Berlin, NATO foreign ministers agreed to move ahead with implementation of the CJTF concept. In addition, they agreed that an ESDI would be created within the Alliance by making NATO ‘assets and capabilities’ available for future military operations commanded by the Western European Union. Such decisions would be made by consensus on a case-by-case basis. To facilitate such operations, European officers in the NATO structure would, when appropriate, shift from their NATO responsibilities to WEU command positions.

The Allies determined that adaptation of the Alliance should be guided by three fundamental objectives: to ensure the Alliance’s military effectiveness and ability to perform its traditional mission of collective defence while undertaking new military roles; to preserve the transatlantic link, by strengthening NATO as a forum for political consultation and military cooperation; and to support development of an ESDI by creating the possibility for NATO-supported task forces to perform missions under the direction of the WEU nations.

The Berlin ministerial meeting marked a watershed in the development of US policy towards the creation of a more coherent European role in the Alliance. The Administration had clearly gone on the record as supporting a stronger European pillar, but when it came to making significant structural changes in NATO to help bring the concept to fruition, there was profound resistance in the US policy-making community.

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*This point is based on subsequent interviews with US officials involved in the decision.*
Even after Berlin, the question was what military operations the European Allies could actually take on within the framework of the new arrangements. During the intervening years, it has been demonstrated that they do not have the combination of military resources and political will to take on operations like IFOR or SFOR in Bosnia, and the United States provided most of the key resources for the air war against Serbia in 1999. In 1997, when impending chaos in Albania threatened to destabilise South-Eastern Europe, the Europeans were not even able to agree on organising an intervention under the Western European Union, but rather sent in an *ad hoc* coalition force under Italian command. All these experiences have led observers to bemoan the fact that Europe does not have the military capacity required to maintain stability on the borders of EU/WEU member states, to say nothing of the capacity to project force beyond the Balkans.

In June 1997, the EU members, who were in the process of updating and strengthening the Maastricht Treaty, approved the Treaty of Amsterdam. In the area of common defence policy, the Treaty of Amsterdam included a reference to the ‘Petersberg tasks’ and authorised the adoption of EU common strategies. It also created the position of ‘High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy,’ a position that was not filled until September 1999, when former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana took on the job.

**US ‘yes, but’ to the Blair initiative**

In the autumn of 1998, the shape of the discussion on European defence was changed profoundly by British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s decision to make a major push for a European Union role in defence. Blair first tried out his ideas at an EU summit in Pörtschach, Austria, in October 1998, and then reaffirmed his approach on 3 November in a major address to the North Atlantic Assembly’s annual session in Edinburgh, Scotland, Blair’s favourite political territory. Blair bemoaned the fact that Europe’s ability for autonomous military action was so limited, and called for major institutional and resource innovations to make Europe a more equal partner in the transatlantic Alliance.

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9In the course of that session, the Assembly renamed itself the ‘NATO Parliamentary Assembly’ to emphasise its role as the parliamentary component of the transatlantic Alliance.
Traditionally, the United Kingdom had been the most reliable, predictable partner of the United States when it came to dealing with defence issues. The United Kingdom had shared US scepticism regarding initiatives that might create splits between the United States and Europe in the Alliance, particularly those with roots in French neo-Gaullist philosophy. The fact that Blair was moving out in front on this issue produced mixed reactions in the United States.

On the one hand, the United States believed that it still could trust the United Kingdom not to do anything that would hurt the Alliance, and Blair claimed that his goal was to strengthen NATO by improving Europe’s ability to share security burdens in the 21st century. On the other hand, Blair’s initiative sounded ‘too French’ to sceptics, and even those who were hopeful were concerned about the political motive for Blair’s initiative. It was said that Blair wanted to demonstrate commitment to Europe at a time when the United Kingdom was not going to join in the inauguration of the Euro, the EU’s common currency. Questions about the seriousness of the initiative were also raised by the fact that the proposal seemed to come out of nowhere. In discussions with British Foreign Office officials minutes after the Edinburgh speech was delivered, I was told that the initiative until then consisted of the two speeches and that, on their return to London, they would begin putting meat on the bones of the approach.

At the Edinburgh meeting, Blair and British officials got a foretaste of one of the key aspects of American reactions to the initiative. A report released at the meeting by US Senator William V. Roth, Jr. said that ‘The United States should give every possible help and encouragement to the continuing consolidation of European defence efforts. But the United States must not be held accountable for the inability of European states to develop a more coherent European role in the Alliance. It is the responsibility of the European Allies to develop the European Security and Defence Capabilities to give real meaning to a European Security and Defence Identity.’

Any doubts about the serious nature of the Blair initiative were removed when Blair met with President Jacques Chirac at St-Malo in early December 1998. The declaration, named after this French resort, envisioned creation of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with the means and mechanisms to permit the EU nations to act ‘autonomously’, should NATO not decide to act, in some future scenario requiring military action. The French delegation reportedly had lined up support from German Chancellor

Gerhard Schröder prior to the meeting, giving the declaration even more weight. The statement included the following key elements:

- the European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage;
- on the basis of intergovernmental decisions, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises;
- the NATO and WEU collective defence commitments of the EU members must be maintained, obligations to NATO honoured, and the various positions of European states in relation to NATO and otherwise must be respected;
- the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication;
- Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.  

According to US administration officials, in interviews conducted for this report, the Blair initiative was given the benefit of the doubt. The Administration thought that British motivations were solid, even if they remained concerned about those of the French. When the St-Malo statement emerged, however, Administration officials felt that the British had not been 100 per cent transparent about the likely outcome. The Administration’s formal reaction took the traditional form of the ‘yes, but’ approach characterised earlier. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, presenting themes originally developed as an ‘op ed’ piece for publication by National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, formally declared the Administration’s support _but_ cautioned the Europeans against ‘the three D’s’: duplication, decoupling, and discrimination. Secretary Albright emphasised these concerns at the December 1998 ministerial meetings in Brussels, just days after the St-Malo meeting.

According to Albright, the Allies should not duplicate what was already being done effectively in NATO. This would be a waste of defence resources at a time when defence spending in most European nations was in

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11 _Joint declaration on European defence_, issued at the British-French summit, St-Malo, France, 4 December 1998.
decline. More fundamentally, the new European initiative should not in any way ‘decouple’ or ‘de-link’ the United States from Europe in the Alliance, or the European defence efforts from those coordinated through NATO. This could result from a lack of candour and transparency the United States feared might be an intended or unintended consequence of the new European approach. A tendency to ‘gang up on’ the United States, or even its perception on the US side of the Atlantic, could surely spell the end of the Alliance. Finally, Albright insisted that there be no discrimination against NATO Allies who were not members of the European Union. This point applied in particular to Turkey, but also to European Allies Norway, Iceland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, as well as Canada and the United States on the North American side of the Alliance.

The ‘three D’s’ accurately summarised the Administration’s main concerns, and hearkened back to the Bush administration’s earlier warnings in reaction to the Franco-German development of the EUROCORPS. In spite of these footnotes to US support for the initiative, it moved ahead, in parallel with NATO’s conduct of the air campaign over Kosovo intended to wrest the province from Serbian control and allow Kosovo refugees to return to their homes in peace. The campaign, which threatened to cast a dark shadow over NATO’s 50th anniversary summit meeting in Washington, also added impetus to the Blair approach. When the numbers were toted up at the end of the air campaign, the United States had conducted nearly 80 per cent of the sorties. From the US perspective, the fact that the Allies for the most part were not able to contribute to such a high-tech, low casualty campaign suggested the wisdom of the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The DCI, adopted at the Washington summit, was designed to stimulate European defence efforts to help them catch up with the US Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). From the European perspective, it clearly demonstrated Europe’s (undesirable, and perhaps growing) military dependence on the United States, and the need to get together to do something about it.

The Washington summit communiqué, and the Strategic Concept for NATO agreed at the meeting, reflected transatlantic agreement that European defence capabilities needed a serious boost, and that it had to be done in ways consistent with the US ‘three D’s.’ However, in the course of the year, although the St-Malo accord was endorsed by all EU members at meetings in Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999), there were growing rumbles and signs of dissatisfaction on the American side. According to one former Administration official, as the initiative took shape, British officials came to Washington regularly prior to each major stage of negotiations with France and the other EU members to reassure US officials
that they agreed completely with American perspectives. However, the St. Malo outcome and its subsequent implementation at Cologne and Helsinki gave much more emphasis to ‘autonomy’ than the Administration would have liked. This official noted that British reassurances throughout this period were often followed by outcomes that reflected compromises with French positions that were not entirely to the liking of Administration officials, raising concerns about the eventual impact of a ‘European caucus’ on transatlantic cooperation.

On the European side, NATO and government officials were annoyed at the impression left by the ‘three D’s’ that the US superpower was putting too much emphasis on the negative. European experts and officials openly cautioned US State and Defence officials at transatlantic discussions of defence issues not to allow this negative approach to dominate US policy. Former British Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, after succeeding Javier Solana as NATO Secretary General, offered a more positive approach. Addressing the 45th annual session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (formerly the North Atlantic Assembly), Robertson said ‘For my part, I will ensure that ESDI is based on three key principles, the three I’s: improvement in European defence capabilities; inclusiveness and transparency for all Allies, and the indivisibility of transatlantic security, based on shared values [emphasis added].’ Moving from ‘D’s’ to ‘I’s’, Robertson tried to interpret the American concerns in a way that would make the same points but in a fashion less disturbing to the Europeans.

By the end of 1999, the EU had tied a major package together based on the guidelines of the St-Malo statement. Javier Solana had moved from his position of NATO Secretary-General to the post of EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. In addition, it was agreed that Solana would become WEU Secretary-General to help pave the way for implementation of the decision confirmed at Cologne to merge the WEU within the EU.

In Helsinki, the EU members declared their determination ‘to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.’ They noted that the process ‘will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.’ However, they agreed on a series of substantial steps required to implement their political commitment, including:
to establish by 2003 a corps-size intervention force of up to 60,000 persons from EU member state armed forces capable of deploying within 60 days and being sustained for at least one year;
• to create new political and military bodies to allow the European Council to provide political guidance and strategic direction to joint military operations;
• to develop modalities for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the ‘needs’ of all EU Member States (particularly the fact that four EU members – Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden – are not NATO members);
• to make ‘appropriate’ arrangements to allow non-EU European NATO members and others to contribute to EU military crisis management;
• to establish a non-military crisis management mechanism to improve coordination of EU and member state political, economic and other non-military instruments in ways that might mitigate the need to resort to the use of force or make military actions more effective when they become necessary.

The decisions taken in St-Malo, Cologne and Helsinki were all designed to take into account the concerns expressed by the United States and other non-EU Allies. In fact, the United States was the invisible guest at the table of each of these meetings. This initial process could be seen as a test case for the future. The only way an EU defence pillar can reside successfully within the transatlantic Alliance would be if all future decisions, like those of 1998 and 1999, take US interests and attitudes fully into account. If the EU actions undermine US support for and commitment to the transatlantic Alliance, they will perhaps please some Europeans but would be viewed by most as a foreign and defence policy disaster. The way in which the EU members go about attempting to create a European Security and Defence Policy will therefore be influenced in no small way by their perception of what the United States wants, and what it is likely to do in response to specific EU developments.
US ATTITUDES AND INFLUENTIAL VOICES

When the ESDP issue is addressed in the United States, it is approached against a varied and complex background. Nobody comes to the table with a tabula rasa. Some American perspectives can be explained by divergent but valid historical interpretations or by individual experiences. Inclinations towards optimism or pessimism result in different outlooks. Political inclinations and affiliations have an effect. Assumptions about the US role in the world and positions on allocation of available US resources are influential.

The role of history

Most Americans remember NATO as it was throughout the Cold War. That NATO was one in which the United States carried the biggest burdens, paid the highest price, and wielded the most influence, one in which the European Allies largely sought to avoid burdens and relied increasingly on US military leadership and capabilities. Many Americans are sensitive to the fact that the United States and France have had different visions of how best to run the Alliance.

Most Americans are, however, not aware of the fact that, in the beginning, the United States and France had one vision in common (even if they disagreed about many other issues). That vision was of an alliance that required commitment and resources from both sides; an alliance that incorporated a balance of US and European efforts and responsibilities. Many are therefore not particularly sensitive to the fact that the alliance the European Allies today are trying to shape for the future has something very basic in common with the original goals for the Alliance.

Given that policy in this area is largely shaped by élites, personal experiences are important. For those who served in the Bush administration through some difficult times with France on Alliance issues, there may be a strong predisposition to mistrust the French and therefore to be suspicious of motivations for the current ESDP initiative.

Optimism versus pessimism

It is also a basic fact that some experts/officials tend towards optimistic assessments of future developments while others tend to look more at the
potential disadvantages. For some, it is simply a personal inclination. For others, their profession or current position may require or have trained them to prepare for the ‘worst case.’ Policy-makers must possess a degree of optimism to believe that they can develop policies that will shape future events. Others, however, particularly those responsible for implementing those policies, including the military, may tend first to see all the obstacles in the way of a successful outcome.

In the case of ESDP, for example, an optimist might judge that, as Europe becomes more self-reliant militarily, and as European nations assume greater responsibility for defending European interests, the more global a perspective they will take towards security requirements. A more cautious (albeit not necessarily more accurate) view would judge that the current tendency of European nations to look at their security requirements through a regionally-focused prism will simply become the modus operandi of their collective efforts in ESDP. Even worse, a more pessimistic outlook could even posit that a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach will dominate, with ESDP enshrining the most narrow of EU interpretations of security requirements.

Using the same analytical framework, an optimist might be inclined to hope that all the new commitments made by the European Allies will reverse the decline in European resources committed to defence and produce important burden-sharing gains for the United States over the longer term. A more pessimistic view would project current trends into the future. From this perspective, the Europeans will not be prepared to follow up words with action. The process of developing a defence policy will not be matched by military capabilities sufficient to make that policy helpful. In this pessimistic scenario, the development of autonomous institutions and procedures will simply undermine NATO without producing any net benefits for security of the Alliance.

**Political perspectives and affiliations**

Particularly in a national election year, but also in general (since politics never seems to take a holiday), political alignments and commitments can play a role. This is undoubtedly true as the United States comes to the end of the second term of a Democratic administration which has been truly despised by many among opposition Republicans. Especially with regard to foreign and defence policy, Republican elected officials and aspirants to
office are inclined to look with initial scepticism on any policies that are developed by the Clinton administration.

With regard to ESDP, the well-known Bush administration scepticism about ESDP’s precursor policies, and the fact that the Clinton administration reversed that approach, make current US policy automatically suspect to many Republican experts. Some may believe that ineffective presidential weakness has opened the door for the European temptation to seek autonomy, and that only more effective White House global and European leadership (under a Republican President) can undo the damage of the past eight years.

**World views**

A factor that cuts across party lines is the question of what role the United States should play in the 21st century world. There are those in both major political parties who believe that the United States has no choice but to assume the mantle of global leadership that fell on its shoulders at the end of the Cold War. These political centrists might disagree on exactly how to pursue this role, but would not differ on the fact that the United States is ‘indispensable’ to the stability of the international system. This perspective also acknowledges that the United States cannot do everything, and so effective allies and alliances are absolutely critical to US interests. This approach could be called the ‘US leads with allies’ model.

On either side of this centrist perspective there are diverging views. In a view found largely on the Republican right in what could be called the ‘do it our way’ school, there are those who believe that the United States should pursue its global role with only minimal reference to the views of other nations or the role of international institutions and multilateral cooperation.

In a contrary perspective found largely on the Democratic left, in what might be called the ‘you do it’ school, some argue for a much more minimalist US global leadership role, allowing the nation to tend to its domestic problems while allies and others take care of their own security problems. Some of Democratic presidential contender Bill Bradley’s support apparently came from those holding this view.

The centrist perspective sees a potentially important place for European contributions in alliance with the United States. From this point of view, how Europe organises its defence role is less important than the quality and quantity of the contribution, and the fact that it is effectively synchronised with US efforts. Some in the ‘do it our way’ school are inclined to see ESDP
as a threat to US pursuit of its national objectives overseas; others may simply see it as unlikely to challenge US primacy. The ‘you do it’ school clearly hopes that European efforts will allow the United States, in effect, to take European security for granted and devote far fewer budget dollars to its Europe-related military role.

The most important US perspective on ESDP in the short term is that of the Clinton administration. However, other voices are also important and could influence US policy in the longer term. Members of Congress have gone on record, articulating their views on the relationship between ESDP and US interests. In addition, supporters of ESDP and critics outside government have added their voices, each with their own hopes and concerns. These views, taken together, and in the context of past US policy and experience, constitute the foundation on which future US policy will be constructed. Already there is an initial strategic disconnect indicated by the American reactions. Most American commentators refer to ESDI as their source of concern when they should be talking about ESDP. ESDI did not give rise to much alarm in the United States because it was defined fully within the framework of the Alliance. ESDP, defined as autonomous from NATO and within the EU framework, is what most US commentators find alarming even if they refer to it as ‘ESDI.’

The Clinton administration’s approach

Strobe Talbott, US Deputy Secretary of State, has been a key player on ESDP policy in the closing years of the Clinton administration. Sometimes operating behind the scenes in his role as adviser to Secretary of State Albright, and more recently as the Administration’s lead spokesman on the issue, Talbott has played a major role in shaping the way the Clinton administration’s policy is portrayed in the press and perceived in Europe.

Late in 1999, the Administration moved away from the negative emphasis that the ‘three D’s’ approach had imparted to policy and cast its statements in more positive tones, trying to emphasise the ‘yes’ in what remains a ‘yes, but’ policy. In spite of the change in emphasis, the concerns about duplication, decoupling and discrimination have remained. Speaking before a gathering of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London on 7
October 1999, Talbott said that he wanted to reiterate ‘a clear, unambiguous statement of American policy. It’s a policy of support; the US is for ESDI.’

According to Talbott, the United States will ask two questions about ESDI: will it work, and will it help keep the Alliance together? Talbott, without referring directly to ESDP, makes the important distinction between the essence of ESDI and ESDP by noting that the current progress towards a stronger European pillar in the Alliance began in NATO and should stay on its original track. Talbott cautioned:

‘We would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO.’

Talbott went on to note the importance of ensuring that non-EU European Allies would have the opportunity to participate in European-led military operations. Most importantly, he declared that even when ‘ESDI is a reality,’ the United States would prefer that all NATO Allies act together whenever possible.

The essential point of Talbott’s remarks was that, at Berlin in 1996, the United States had supported development of a European pillar within NATO. It assumed that this agreement would be carried forward. Now, following St-Malo and subsequent elaboration of the St-Malo statement at Cologne, it appeared that something different was being created – something that might not in the long run serve Alliance interests. With this approach, the Administration signalled its continuing support for ESDI, as it had been nurtured and developed in the NATO framework, and its concern about ESDP, which seemed to be undermining the work that NATO had accomplished on ESDI, putting more emphasis on European ‘autonomy’ and less on Atlantic ‘alliance.’

By the time of the NATO December 1999 ministerial meetings, Talbott – representing the United States at the session because the Secretary of State was engaged in sensitive Syrian-Israeli negotiations back home in West Virginia – accepted Secretary-General Robertson’s ‘three I’s’ (indivisibility, improvement of capabilities and inclusiveness) as a replacement for the US

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‘three D’s.’ He welcomed the EU Helsinki summit outcome as ‘several steps in the right direction.’ He called for links of ‘transparency and cooperation’ between the EU and NATO, arguing that Allies ‘who live on this side of the Atlantic [in Europe] deserve special status in the EU’s security and defence deliberations’. Because crises on the Continent could escalate and become Article 5 cases, they are ready to contribute national and NATO assets to EU-led operations, and they are ‘both willing and able to contribute to European security in their own right.’

Talbott, both in London and Brussels, made another key point of the American position: Europe must develop the military capabilities to give true meaning to any common approach they develop. US Secretary of Defence William Cohen put it bluntly on several occasions. In an article published in the wake of the EU Helsinki summit, Secretary Cohen acknowledged that the Europeans would be able to improve their military capabilities through better use of their resources. However, at the end of the day, according to Cohen, ‘... allies will have to spend more on defence, if they are to measure up to NATO’s military requirements and establish a European Security and Defence Identity that is separable but not separate from NATO.’

Beneath the surface of an apparently consistent Administration policy, there are differences of emphasis and approach between Administration officials and agencies. According to Washington sources, the State Department has generally taken the most sceptical line about ESDP – something that might have been suggested by Talbott’s important role in articulating the Administration’s concerns. The National Security Council has reportedly been more sanguine, although National Security Adviser Sandy Berger is known to be more sceptical than his deputy, James Steinberg, who has spent much of his career analysing US-European relations and apparently feels relatively comfortable about the European enterprise.

At the Pentagon, there continues to be a gap between the civilian and military sides of the house. Civilian officials have been attempting to downplay the negative reactions to ESDP while emphasising how important it is for the European Allies to produce real military capabilities. Civilian DoD officials try to be ‘alert but relaxed’ about ESDP. They have put a high

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priority on helping the European Allies find ways to make better use of available defence resources in support of both NATO and ESDP goals. On the Joint Chiefs of Staff side, there is apparently residual suspicion of the whole operation and of French motivations behind it. The main JCS concern is that NATO’s integrated command structure, and the Alliance itself, will be undermined by a European initiative that they see as likely to distract the Europeans from more important goals.

Professional military officers tend to be practical. ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’, is a rule of thumb for many of them. From their perspective, neither NATO nor its integrated command structure is broken, and ‘fixing’ them could, at a minimum, undermine their effectiveness. Military leaders in the United States, as in other countries, look in particular for capabilities and the will to use them, and are not particularly impressed by unsupported rhetoric. Until ESDP produces capabilities that would not have otherwise existed, the US military will remain sceptical about the added value of ESDP. Their scepticism will be qualified, however, by the hope that the European Allies will take defence requirements more seriously and spend the money necessary to relieve the United States of some of its overseas defence burdens. Professional military officers, more than anyone else, are sensitive to the fact that US military forces have in recent years been stretched to their limit by the great variety of post-Cold War peace operations. They know that the United States and its overburdened military forces need help.

In spite of such differences in approach, the Administration has maintained a fairly coherent line. As one journalist has described it, the Administration ‘praises European efforts in official public statements but then briefs journalists about the risks of Europe’s going it alone’.16 At the same time, Members of Congress have been even more forceful than the Administration in warning the Europeans about the dangers of a divisive approach.

Congressional perspectives

The Congress, of course, is seldom of one mind about anything. However, on the ESDP issue it has expressed itself with at least the appearance of a consensual approach. Until 1999, very little attention was paid to the development of a more coherent European role in the Alliance. During the

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Senate’s consideration of NATO enlargement, the main focus in this regard was on whether or not the NATO Allies would fairly share the burden of NATO enlargement with the United States – a traditional burden-sharing perspective. However, the ratification by the Senate by an overwhelming majority made clear the Senate’s view that the European Allies should develop and maintain military capabilities to deploy forces rapidly over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States. The Senate did not suggest how the Allies should accomplish this goal, but made it clear that its focus was on capabilities, not on methodologies. The same theme appeared in Senator Roth’s North Atlantic Assembly report on NATO in late 1998. The report concluded that ‘The European Allies must develop the military capabilities to give real meaning to a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI).’

Following St-Malo and Cologne, however, Members began to focus on the new European initiative which, from their perspective, spoke alarmingly of an ‘autonomous’ European military capability. The House Committee on International Relations held hearings focused on ‘European Common Foreign, Defence and Security Policies – Their Implications for the US and the Atlantic Alliance.’ Questioning by the committee Chairman Benjamin Gilman and by the panel’s leading European expert, Representative Douglas Bereuter, suggested a profound scepticism about what the Europeans were up to. Gilman asked witnesses whether US policy should be to stop development of ESDI, and commented that the debate in Europe seemed to be putting Alliance unity in jeopardy. Representative Bereuter expressed more pointed views. He argued that there was no need for a separate European entity inside or outside of NATO, and that a European caucus within the Alliance would impede it. Bereuter claimed that duplication and decoupling were very likely if a European pillar was established, and that pillar would be a militarily weak one given the European proclivity to cut defence spending. According to one witness before the committee, Professor Simon Serfaty, ‘The body language and type of question did confirm that the majority in the House is very concerned.’

On 2 November 1999, by a vote of 278-133, the House passed Resolution 59, offered by Representative Bereuter, expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States remained committed to NATO. When

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17Roth, op. cit., p. XIV.
the measure was submitted earlier in the year, prior to the NATO Washington summit, its main thrust was to suggest congressional support for NATO. When approved in November, however, it had been amended to reflect congressional concern about ESDP.

The resolution affirmed that US ‘membership in NATO remains a vital national security interest of the United States’ and that ‘NATO should remain the core security organisation of the evolving Euro-Atlantic architecture . . .’ The text declared that ‘maintaining collective defence’ should remain NATO’s ‘core function,’ but that the Alliance should ‘identify crisis management operations outside the NATO treaty area, based on case-by-case consensual Alliance decisions.’ Focusing on the importance of military capabilities, and supporting the goals of NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative, the resolution said that:

‘The Alliance should make clear commitments to remedy shortfalls in areas such as logistics, command, control, communications, intelligence, ground surveillance, readiness, deployability, mobility, sustainability, survivability, armaments cooperation, and effective engagement, including early progress in the NATO force structure review.’

Then came the indications of congressional concern. The resolution affirmed the importance of ‘equitable sharing of contributions to the NATO common budgets and overall defence expenditure and capability-building.’ In paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the ‘resolve’ section of the act, the House provided a succinct perspective on ESDP:

‘(7) the Alliance should welcome efforts by members of the European Union (EU) to strengthen their military capabilities and enhance their role within the Alliance through the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI);

(8) the key to a vibrant and more influential ESDI is the improvement of European military capabilities that will strengthen the Alliance;

(9) in order to preserve the solidarity and effectiveness that has been achieved within the Alliance over the last 50 years, it is essential that security arrangements elaborated under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) complement, rather than duplicate NATO efforts and institutions and be linked to, rather than decoupled from NATO structures, and provide for full and active involvement of all European
Allies rather than discriminating against European Allies that are not members of the EU;’

Even though the resolution was approved by a substantial margin, the composition and arguments of the opponents are interesting and revealing of some minority perspectives on transatlantic security issues. Opposition was led by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, a conservative Republican from California, who emphasised that, as a speech writer for Ronald Reagan during the Cold War, he was ‘one of NATO’s biggest boosters.’ Mr Rohrabacher’s main argument was against the resolution’s strong affirmation of support for NATO. He argued that the end of the Cold War required a fundamental look at US interests, and that ‘NATO actually undermines America’s ability to deal with the number one threat to world peace [China] which, as I say, is on the other side of the planet from Europe.’ In addition, he argued that the United States was subsidising security for rich Europeans and getting involved in conflicts like those in Bosnia and Kosovo that the European should have handled. According to Mr Rohrabacher, if the United States could divert the ‘$10-20 billion’ it spends on NATO every year, it could have a missile defence system in five to ten years.

The other opponents of the resolution who spoke during the debate reflected a mix of political orientations and concerns. One member, Rep. Tom Campbell, a Democrat from California, opposed the resolution because he thought it would reinforce the tendency for the President to use NATO as a way of using force internationally without reference to congressional war powers. Mr Campbell had urged the House to oppose the NATO intervention in Kosovo and had brought an unsuccessful legal case against US involvement. During the debate, he argued that the resolution would be ‘open to the misinterpretation as a ratification, admittedly post hoc ratification, of the use of force under the NATO aegis . . .’

Representative Roscoe Bartlett, a conservative Republican from Maryland, argued that the resolution, particularly its support for NATO enlargement, would feed Russian paranoia. Rep. Jerrold Nadler, a liberal Democrat from New York agreed, maintaining that ‘The expansion of NATO is a direct provocation to all segments of Russia’s political spectrum.’

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19 The text of the floor debate can be found in the *Congressional Record – House*, 2 November 1999, pp. 11213-8.
In other words, the opposition was based largely on issues other than the question of how the ESDP would affect NATO – which was the issue that concerned the resolution’s sponsors, Mr Bereuter and Chairman Gilman. In any case, the vote produced a bipartisan majority in favour and a bipartisan minority in opposition, and, in the end, the majority made clear its desire that NATO be strengthened, not weakened, by ESDP. The result should be improved European military capabilities, and that no NATO ally should face discrimination in the process.

For its part, the United States Senate passed, by unanimous consent, a comparable resolution on 8 November 1999. Senate Resolution 208 was proposed by Senator William V. Roth, Jr., one of the Senate’s strongest NATO supporters, and co-sponsored by a bipartisan group including Senators Lugar, Biden, Kyl, Hagel, Smith (of Oregon), Lieberman and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms. Senate Resolution 208 focused even more specifically on the relationship between NATO and ESDP. ²⁰

Like House Resolution 59, the Senate’s bill gave strong support to US membership of NATO, NATO’s role as the ‘only military alliance with both real defence capabilities and a transatlantic membership’ that ‘promotes a uniquely transatlantic perspective and approach to issues concerning the security of North America and Europe.’ ²¹ When the resolution was submitted to the Senate on October 28, 1999, co-sponsor Senator Joseph Biden, Democrat of Delaware, explained his perspective on the issue:

‘Let me say up front that I believe that ESDI – if it is developed in proper coordination with NATO – can serve the national interest of the United States by becoming a valuable vehicle for strengthening the European military contribution to NATO. Put another way, ESDI, if handled correctly, can at long last create more equitable burden-sharing between our European NATO allies and the United States.’ ²²

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²⁰ The resolution’s formal preamble reads: ‘Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding United States policy toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union, in light of the Alliance’s April 1999 Washington Summit and the European Union’s June 1999 Cologne Summit.’

²¹ The Senate’s consideration of the resolution and the text of the measure can be found in the Congressional Record – Senate, 8 November 1999, pp. S14334-5.

²² Senator Biden’s presentation is found in the Congressional Record – Senate, 28 October 1999, pp. S13430-1.
Senator Biden cautioned, however, that the European approach should not take the place of NATO as the instrument of first resort: ‘. . . in order for ESDI to accomplish both the goals of the European Union and of NATO, it must be clearly designed in a way that gives NATO the “right of first refusal” on non-Article 5 missions.’ For his part, Senator Roth, in a press release issued the same day, emphasised that ‘As the EU embarks upon a new role in security affairs it must be sure that it does not collide with the primacy that NATO has and continues to exercise in transatlantic security affairs.’

The resolution as originally presented had some language that was sure to be taken with some offence in Europe, suggesting that NATO would ‘assign’ tasks to Europe that it did not want to take on. That language was fixed by an amendment offered by Senator Carl Levin, a liberal Democrat from Michigan and one of the Senate’s leading defence experts. Senator Levin commented that his changes were intended to remove ‘the connotation that somehow the European Union is subservient to NATO’ or that ‘the United States is dictating to an organisation of sovereign states.’ Levin concluded by observing ‘. . . the United States Congress for years has urged Europe to play a greater role in its own defence and to bear more of the collective security burden in NATO. I, for one, can take yes for an answer.’

Senator Levin’s amendment was accepted and the resolution was agreed by the Senate without further discussion.

The Senate’s resolution was very frank about its concerns – most of which paralleled issues that the Clinton administration had been raising for over a year. After noting the efforts that NATO had made to build an ESDI within the Alliance, and the continued belief that NATO should remain ‘the primary institution through which European and North American allies address security issues of transatlantic concern,’ the resolution made the Senate’s perspective crystal clear, saying it is the sense of the Senate that:

‘(1) on matters of trans-Atlantic concern, the European Union should make clear that it would undertake an autonomous mission through the European Security and Defence Identity only after the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation had declined to undertake that mission;

(2) improved European military capabilities, not new institutions outside of the Alliance, are the key to a vibrant and more influential European Security and Defence Identity within NATO;
(3) failure of the European allies of the United States to achieve the goals established through the Defence Capabilities Initiative would weaken support for the Alliance in the United States;

(4) the President, Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defence should fully use their offices to encourage the NATO allies of the United States to commit the resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high-intensity conflicts, thus making them effective partners of the United States in supporting mutual interests;

(5) the European Union should implement its Cologne Summit decisions concerning its Common Foreign and Security Policy in a manner that will ensure that non-WEU NATO allies, including Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the United States, will not be discriminated against, but will be fully involved when the European Union addresses issues affecting their security interests;

(6) the European Union’s implementation of the Cologne Summit decisions should not promote a strategic perspective on transatlantic security issues that conflicts with that promoted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation;

(7) the European Union’s implementation of its Cologne Summit decisions should not promote unnecessary duplication of the resources and capabilities provided by NATO; and

(8) the European Union’s implementation of its Cologne Summit decisions should not promote a decline in the military resources that the European allies contribute to NATO, but should instead promote the complete fulfillment of their respective force commitments to the Alliance.’

The resolution not only carried forward the main thrust of Clinton administration policy but also reflected concerns that Senator Roth had raised in the autumn of 1998 concerning the need for ESDI to focus more on capabilities than on institutional architecture. Even with Senator Levin’s amendment, however, it had more of an edge than the Administration was
putting on its public statements. And, when the EU leaders met in Helsinki, they pointedly did not accept the resolution’s warning that the EU should only take on an autonomous mission after NATO had declined to undertake that mission. The debate on this point is somewhat academic for the time being, but could become more critical in the future. If the European Allies were to sit down in the European Council and decide to take a specific military action autonomously before NATO’s North Atlantic Council had decided whether or not to engage the entire Alliance, the Senate’s fears about the potential decoupling effects of ESDP could turn out to have been well-founded.

Non-governmental élite views

The US reaction to ESDP is made up of the official governmental reaction, already discussed in some detail; the congressional attitude; and attitudes in the American élite, including advisers to contending presidential candidates. The concerns and scepticism, explicit and implicit, expressed in the congressional attitude towards ESDP, are supported by articulate and respected observers outside the government.

Perhaps the most critical of all such observers has been John R. Bolton, a Senior Vice President of the American Enterprise Institute – a traditional institute home for former (and possibly future) Republican appointed government officials. Bolton, in testimony before the House Committee on International Relations and in an article published in the *Washington Times*, argues that NATO has been put at risk by the European initiative. Bolton’s starting point is that the process of ‘deepening’ European integration today, and particularly in the security area, is not fundamentally in the US interest. According to Bolton’s congressional testimony, the United States needs to recognise that the goal of aligning ‘the foreign and defence policies of the EU’s members into one shared and uniform policy is at times motivated either by a desire to distance themselves from US influence, or in some cases by openly anti-American intentions’ (testimony, p. 2). He believes that ESDP cannot in any way be ‘entirely consistent with

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and supportive of the Atlantic Alliance . . .’, and that it would likely mean ‘the end of NATO as we know it as a military organisation, a fragmentation of trans-Atlantic political cooperation, and could quite possibly spill over into harmful economic conflict as well (testimony, p. 2).’

With regard to future policy, Bolton argues that ‘if the United States fails to take decisive action during the next administration, there is every possibility that within 10 years, NATO will lose its military rationale and its domestic political support here.’ (Washington Times) To avoid this outcome, Bolton suggests two ‘central policy lines.’ According to his analysis, ‘NATO should be strengthened as the West’s principal politico-military vehicle worldwide.’ (testimony, p. 13) The United States should pursue allied agreement on using NATO as their main means of intervention beyond national borders. Bolton also argues that the United States should continue to try to convince the Europeans to pursue common defence objectives, like development of national and theatre missile defences. According to Bolton, ‘Properly explained, missile defence can be a unifying rather than a divisive force in NATO’s future (testimony, p. 14).’ In parallel with this approach to defence, Bolton suggests a second line of policy, arguing that the United States, Western Europe and Central/Eastern Europe should pursue increased economic integration on a transatlantic basis.

This highly critical approach does not represent in its extreme the opinions found across the range of Republican analysts, even though it might serve as a ‘worst case’ possibility for many of them.

An extensive analysis of US-European relations was published in mid-1999 by Peter Rodman, a ranking official in the George Bush administration, offering a detailed critique of the ESDP initiative on which he subsequently drew in congressional testimony and in an article in the Wall Street Journal. Rodman approaches the issue as a concerned Republican Atlanticist. Like Bolton, he places a big part of the blame on the European reaction to the alignment of international forces in the post-Cold War period. According to Rodman, while most Americans are quite comfortable with the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, the circumstance

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makes many Europeans very uncomfortable. The Europeans, in this view, ‘rather than joyfully falling in step behind our global leadership . . . are looking for ways to counter our predominance (testimony, p. 1).’ Rodman sees this European perspective as a prime motivation for the Maastricht Treaty, the St-Malo statement, and related meetings and decisions.

Rodman does not conclude that the development of ESDP is necessarily bad for the United States and the Alliance. Rather, he acknowledges that the United States has historically lobbied the European Allies to take on more of the NATO defence burden, and has encouraged them ‘to coordinate their efforts to maximise the effectiveness of those efforts.’ But, as he told Members of Congress, Rodman now believes the key issue is ‘whether the form that this new EU enterprise is taking will enhance or complicate the unity of the Atlantic Alliance (testimony p. 2).’

Rodman’s analysis also takes note of the fact that virtually all European officials involved in the initiative say that it is intended to strengthen the transatlantic Alliance. But he too evokes concern that perhaps not all the European motivations are compatible with US interests. In particular, Rodman is troubled by the fact that French President Jacques Chirac always tends to emphasise the autonomy of the new undertaking rather than its integration within a transatlantic framework. Rodman told Members of Congress that:

‘This EU effort to construct a separate European defence identity comes three years after NATO adapted its own procedures to recognise and promote a European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance framework. At its ministerial meeting in Berlin in June 1996, the Atlantic allies created new mechanisms whereby the European members of NATO could act on their own, with NATO’s blessing and a presumption of being able to use NATO assets. The new EU procedure, in contrast (at least in some Europeans’ minds), will enable Europe to dispense with the Americans, “if it wishes.” That seems to be, indeed, its whole point (testimony, p.3).’

Rodman’s conclusion is one to which many Republicans and Democrats could subscribe, and he points out that his concerns are shared by many of the most outspoken American ‘Atlanticists.’ He argues that ‘. . . if it is done right, the European project can be beneficial to the West, by bolstering Europe’s strength and self-confidence and enhancing its contribution to common tasks. On the other hand, if it is done wrong, it can do serious harm. Everything depends on how it is done . . . (testimony, p.4).’
Meanwhile, taking a more positive route, the well-respected former Bush administration senior official Robert Zoellick, frequently mentioned as a likely senior appointment in a future Bush Jr. administration, has criticised the Clinton administration for the negative tone of its approach to ESDP. Zoellick (and his co-author, Georgetown University professor Charles Kupchan) has opined that ‘the Clinton administration’s defensiveness is understandable as habit, but it is ultimately short-sighted. It could produce the very transatlantic rift it is seeking to avoid.’ Zoellick sees the Alliance endangered more by weak European defence efforts than by improved ones. Instead of finding NATO threatened by a potential shift of influence within the Alliance, Zoellick is ready to accept that ‘If Europe matches its rhetoric with action and moves beyond decades of dependence, America should accord Europe a voice commensurate with its new station.’

For its November 1999 hearings, the House Committee on International Relations also invited two speakers it contemplated would be less critical of Clinton administration policy and more supportive of ESDP. One of these two, Robert E. Hunter, served as Permanent Representative to NATO from 1993-98 and was deeply involved in the development of US policy in this period in which the ESDP issue has its contemporary roots. According to Hunter, the United States ‘should welcome European efforts’ to develop greater coherence in the area of defence. The important point, Hunter says, is that the Europeans are doing ‘something the United States has long urged them to do . . .’ The process ‘advances European integration; it helps to underpin European spending on defence; it is an added incentive to modernise military forces; and it can enable our European allies to shoulder a larger share of the common transatlantic defence burden . . .’

Hunter argues that, while the concerns expressed by the Administration and others are legitimate, there is no cause for alarm. The Europeans will not be able in the near term to turn this process into anything that could challenge the United States, and the bigger problem is that they will make insufficient progress towards helping the United States by taking on a bigger share of security burdens.

When the day comes that the Europeans are able to assume a larger security role, according to Hunter, ‘there will be a shift in the relative

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influence on decisions exercised by the US as opposed to the European allies.’ But he remains confident that ‘the price of such diminished influence can be exaggerated’, and therefore:

‘We should thus have confidence that a functioning European Strategic and Defence Identity, pursued as an element of an evolving EU Common Foreign and Defence Policy, will indeed promote our interests in Europe, strengthen the bonds of alliance, and help to insure the indispensable US congressional and public support for NATO on which the Alliance vitally depends.’

In a subsequent article, another former Clinton administration official, Ivo Daalder, who served on the Administration’s National Security Council staff, shared Hunter’s fundamental optimism, warning against allowing ESDP to become a major issue in US-European relations. According to Daalder, ‘Washington’s suspicions [about ESDP motivations] are not only exaggerated; they’re fundamentally misplaced. Europe’s problem today, as Kosovo underscored, is not its potential future strength. On the contrary, it is Europe’s actual political and military weakness [that is the problem].’

Professor Simon Serfaty presented a similar theme in his statement to the House Committee on International Relations. Serfaty argued that US-European shared interests and commonly held values make it imperative for the United States to remain involved in European security: ‘With US interests now too significant to be left to others, a disengagement has become neither possible nor meaningful.’ He acknowledges that transatlantic differences stand in the way of a ‘genuine transatlantic community,’ but notes that differences among European states also block a ‘genuinely united and “finished” Europe.’

‘Don’t panic’ is Serfaty’s message. His elegant statement to the committee concludes: ‘Entering a new century, our main fear about Europe should be that of a Europe that is weak and divided, and our main hope should be for a Europe that does become stronger and more united.’

Finally, what one might call ‘the CATO school perspective’ should be mentioned as the most significant minority US perspective on the ESDP

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issue. The CATO Institute is well-known within the Washington Beltway as a source of unorthodox perspectives on foreign and defence policy, as well as on other national issues. On foreign and defence issues the institute perspective, which calls for a much-reduced US role overseas, tends to appeal to a somewhat surprising combination of very conservative Republicans and left-liberal Democrats. This combination was evident early in 2000 when liberal columnist William Pfaff congratulated US conservative presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan for his willingness to question continued US support for NATO and reluctance to ‘leave Europe to the Europeans.’

The CATO school position was articulated late in 1999 by one of their leading experts on Europe, Jonathan Clarke (a transplanted former British diplomat). Clarke says it is good news that the Europeans ‘are getting serious about their scandalous military underperformance.’ The bad news, however, is that ‘while European rhetoric is on the right track, European defence spending is tending in the diametrically opposite direction.’ According to the CATO analysis, Clinton administration policy towards the war in Bosnia was designed to show the Europeans that the United States was still in charge of the European security game. In this view,

‘The American assertiveness reduces Europe’s incentive to take charge of its own affairs. The Europeans calculate that, even if they put together the means to settle crises such as Bosnia, the United States will second-guess and undermine them. Their sensible conclusion is not to bother with such things but to get on with improving their economies.’

The consequence, according to Clarke, is that the United States ends up holding the security bag – making the big decisions but also paying the major share. His recommendation is that the United States signal Europe to go ahead with an autonomous approach by launching ‘a new drawdown of US troops in Europe.’

This position draws on a combination of traditional American isolationism, a belief that US interests are better served by devoting resources and political attention to domestic problems, and rejection of what

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33 Jonathan Clarke, ‘US Is the Enabler to Europe’s Dependency Defense: The EU’s plan for its own military force won’t fly, as long as the US calls the shots and pays for that privilege’, *Los Angeles Times*, 20 December 1999, p. B-7.
these analysts see as an American choice of a hegemonic role in the international system. These are powerful themes, and are attractive to some Members of Congress, but are unlikely to be reflected in this extreme form in the mainstream policies of the next US administration.
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES: HOPES AND CONCERNS

US hopes for ESDP

Drawing on this survey of contemporary attitudes, what ‘hopes’ does the United States have for European implementation of an ESDP? Because US policy tends to be built around the centre of the American political spectrum, the hopes should be seen as growing largely out of the ‘United States leads with allies’ world view discussed earlier. However, the other influences considered above come into play as well. From this perspective, the United States hopes that ESDP:

- will relieve the United States of some defence burdens in Europe. Already, since the end of the Cold War and the dramatic decline in the offensive capabilities of Russian forces, US defence planning has reduced the resources devoted to defending against a major assault on our European Allies. The savings that the United States would realise from the goals currently set by the members of the EU would largely come with regard to smaller-scale conflicts or peacekeeping requirements on European territory that in the future might be handled by the EU members with few or no US forces. Even though Europe might not have the capability to take on the full range of ‘Petersberg tasks’ for several years to come, a serious European effort to develop and fund new capabilities could eventually be factored into US defence planning, reducing resources required for the most likely European contingencies;

- will provide additional capabilities for responses to security concerns beyond Europe. On the US side, it is hoped (albeit not taken for granted) that once Europe has more autonomous defence capabilities, it will also be more willing to use those capabilities for peacekeeping or peace enforcement beyond Europe. The Europeans have shown sensitivity to the fact that most serious security challenges in the near future are likely to emerge from the south, in the Mediterranean region, in Africa and the Middle East. Even though many European countries have been reluctant to support military operations beyond Europe, both Britain and France, which are leading the ESDP initiative, have an established tradition of involvement in security challenges that emerge beyond Europe. It is hoped that the more global security perspective of these two allies will rub off on others, and that Europe’s efforts will be marked by growth away from lowest-common denominator perspectives on security;
will enhance European appreciation of new threats to security including those emanating from the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ‘traditional’ terrorism, cyber-terrorism, and ethnic/racial/religious conflicts. Current NATO discussions, like those that preceded the April 1999 Washington summit, usually find US officials emphasising the security threats that originate beyond Europe, and the European Allies cautioning against NATO involvement in such issues. The United States has made progress in developing dialogue and even processes that put more focus on such issues. The most recent accomplishment was the Washington summit agreement to establish the new Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre in NATO. One US hope for ESDP is that, by taking on more security responsibilities, the Allies will be forced to acknowledge the necessity of framing their security concerns and policies in the broader global context, even if they do not aspire to take autonomous responsibility for dealing with such challenges. A broader European perspective on security requirements, and better capabilities for force projection and sustainability in a high-tech combat environment, would make European Allies more valuable to the United States in operations beyond Europe even if they are conducted under the auspices of ad hoc coalitions, which seems most likely in any case;

will diminish European resentment of US dominance in the Alliance. Over time, as the process of developing military policies and security objectives through the EU evolves, it is hoped that greater European self-reliance and responsibility will reduce European resentment of current US dominance in the Alliance. This hope obviously implies that, as the Europeans bring more resources to the NATO table, they will gain influence and leadership in the NATO decision-making process. When difficult decisions must be taken, a successful EU-NATO relationship would give alliance decisions greater political credibility and support than ones perceived as dominated by US analyses and interests;

will remove the final barriers to French reintegration into NATO’s command structure. Even though most practical issues concerning France’s collaboration with NATO’s command structure have been successfully handled in the Bosnia and Kosovo operations, France’s presence outside the NATO command structure creates awkward arrangements and requires ad hoc measures for every new operation. In addition, if the United States openly welcomes and supports the ESDP process, it would be appropriate for France to recognise US willingness to
accept a more balanced Alliance by demonstrating its own commitment to the Alliance by full and unqualified participation in the NATO system;

- will force European neutral states to acknowledge their responsibility for security and remove barriers to their making fully-fledged contributions, including acceptance of NATO membership. The fact that Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden are in the EU, and will participate in developing the ESDP, but are not members of NATO, creates a number of potential problems. It is hoped that as these former neutral states (the rationale for their neutrality having disappeared with the end of the Cold War and, in the case of Ireland, with progress towards peace in Northern Ireland) participate in developing ESDP, they will realise that their role as a full contributor to EU security policies removes any rationale for not seeking NATO membership;

- will strengthen NATO. The essential thing from an American perspective is the hope that ESDP will, in fact, strengthen NATO, both politically and militarily. An Alliance in which the United States confronts self-confident allies with no chip on their shoulder which are willing and able to contribute to European and transatlantic security should be a better Alliance for US interests.

**US concerns about ESDP**

Controversy, like bad news, travels fast and makes good headlines. It should therefore be no surprise that US concerns about the damage that a new and untested ESDP could do to an old and reliable relationship, NATO, have been expressed in extensive detail by US officials and commentators. The fact that US concerns about ESDP appear more prominent than its aspirations should not be interpreted as indicative of opposition to ESDP, even though there is a minority US perspective that opposes, or is at least sceptical about, the creation of an ‘autonomous’ European military capacity. Even solid American supporters of ESDP have ‘concerns.’ As one former Clinton administration official put it, every time the Administration tried to say something generally positive about ESDP while including the necessary cautionary notes, the press would always emphasise whatever followed the ‘but’ in the statement. Putting all these ‘buts’ together, there is concern in the United States that ESDP:
will produce rhetoric, promises and institutions but no additional capabilities. Talk is cheap, and it is possible to look at the history of Europeans’ efforts to coordinate their defence efforts and to see a lot of talk but little action. Today, the talk has become even more grand, making the political intent appear even more serious. However, most European governments continue to reduce spending on defence and, overall, continue to fall further behind the United States in deployed military capabilities for force projection, intervention, and high-tech warfare. Seen from the United States, new European defence capabilities would be more helpful to US interests than new institutions to coordinate European defence policies. This point was hammered home early in February 2000 at the annual Wehrkunde Conference in Munich, Germany. US Secretary of Defence Cohen, supported by a bipartisan chorus of US Senators, asked European officials and experts ‘Where are the resources to match the rhetoric?’ As British Secretary of State for Defence Geoff Hoon has observed, ‘You don’t need to be in America very long before you find someone – might be a taxi driver or it could just as well be a senator – saying that whenever there’s trouble it’s always the Americans who have to carry the lion’s share of the heavy lifting.’ The concern is that this reality will continue;

will lead European nations to duplicate NATO (US) systems rather than rely on the United States to make such systems available to them when needed, as earlier agreed. The June 1996 Berlin agreement that future European-led military operations could be given access to NATO (mainly US) assets was intended to allow European Allies to avoid spending limited defence resources on capabilities that would likely be available from the United States in any case. The European decision to create ‘autonomous’ military capabilities suggests that their concept of avoiding ‘unnecessary duplication’ may cost them much more than would the assumptions built into the Berlin agreement;

will defeat the purpose of NATO’s efforts throughout the 1990s to build a European Security and Defence Identity within the framework of the Alliance. The United States made a serious effort in the mid-1990s to respond to the European desire to take on more responsibility for defence and to give the process of European integration a meaningful security component. Until now, the ESDP initiative appears designed to bypass the

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35 Champion, op. cit.
mechanisms and principles established between NATO and WEU, and to replace them with arrangements that are more likely to create separate and even competing EU and NATO decision-making processes and commitments;

- will create artificial divisions and distinctions among NATO Allies, undermining NATO’s political cohesion. Perhaps even more important than duplicating US/NATO capabilities at a time when EU countries are not increasing spending on defence is the risk that ESDP and the demands of its institutional creations will encourage ‘we/they’ distinctions between Europeans and the United States, and even among European members of NATO. In spite of all the declarations on behalf of transparency and cooperation, there are likely to be EU governments and officials who seek to promote the EU’s or their own standing by distinguishing European from American or ‘NATO’ positions. The United States and the European Allies share a wide range of common interests and values, but they are not always identical and are not always pursued identically. NATO’s ‘golden rule of consultation’ does not eliminate such differences but provides a setting in which differing approaches can be compromised or at least accommodated. The dynamic of the new arrangements may impose subtle barriers to communication and compromise that do not exist today;

- will lead some EU officials to pressure candidates for EU membership to support an EU ‘line’ in the EU/NATO relationship. Already there are reports that diplomats of some EU member states have pressured the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to support EU rather than US positions on the NATO/EU relationship. If EU members continue with such a destructive differentiation strategy, US officials will become increasingly concerned that the real goal of some EU members is to divide NATO into European and American components rather than to strengthen the Alliance;

- will become a neo-Gaullist means for Europe to differentiate its foreign policies from that of the United States. There remains a potent residue of suspicion in Washington about France’s intentions and likely behaviour. Particularly with the United Kingdom as strongly committed to ESDP as it has become, there is a danger that it will become increasingly enmeshed in an anti-American device manipulated by French neo-Gaullists. In addition, successful French guidance of ESDP down an anti-American road could pull Germany in the same direction, undermining the close relationship that the United States and Germany developed during the Cold War and the post-Cold War transition period;
will be used by some European countries to join forces with Russia and China in working against ‘US hegemony’. Very little irritates US officials and experts more than European officials singing along with a chorus of Russian, Chinese and some third world commentators against ‘US hegemony.’ Some past examples that raised hackles in Washington have included French President Chirac joining the Chinese, in a communiqué at the end of his state visit to Beijing in May 1997, in praising the virtues of a ‘multipolar world’ – thin cover for criticism of US hegemony. In June 1997, on a state visit to Moscow, Chirac failed to dispute Russian President Yeltsin’s view of a Europe organised between Russia, France, and other members of the European Union. This recalled all too clearly old Soviet proposals for a ‘European house’ that excluded the United States. More recently, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s national security adviser, Michael Steiner, accused the United States of exploiting its superpower position with regard to the selection of a new head of the International Monetary Fund. Even though US observers know that the United States enters the 21st century in a hegemonic position, most Americans do not aspire to a hegemonic role in the world, even if US officials appear to enjoy a hegemonic posture from time to time. If ESDP were to become a European platform for criticism of the US world role, it would probably spell the beginning of the end for the transatlantic Alliance;

will place new roadblocks in NATO’s way by strengthening European resistance to NATO actions that are not blessed by a UN mandate. During 1998, as the NATO Allies were preparing the text of a new Strategic Concept, one of the most difficult issues was the question of whether or not NATO’s use of force required a mandate from the United Nations. That issue became academic when the Allies decided they had to intervene in Kosovo, with or without a mandate. It was clear that a UN mandate would be blocked by Russia and/or China, and so the Allies initiated a bombing campaign against Serbia without UN Security Council blessing. Prior to Kosovo, European Allies were divided on the issue in principle, but all preferred that NATO have a UN mandate in hand before acting. The United States shared that preference, but thought it absolutely necessary to keep open the possibility of acting even if a UN mandate could not be obtained. The concern now is that European-level defence cooperation will tend to mean the systematic requirement for a UN mandate for EU operations, and that will effectively block future NATO actions as well;
will include a European ‘regional’ perspective on security, spreading a
minimalist security perspective from certain EU states to the entire
membership. A generalisation popular among some American experts is
that the United States has a global security perspective while Europe has a
regional outlook. Even though France and the United Kingdom clearly
have security visions that go beyond Europe’s borders, Germany and
some other European nations do not, or at least limit such visions to the
use of non-military instruments of national and European influence. There
is a concern that the most narrow perspective will become dominant at the
European level if ESDP proceeds largely along ‘lowest common
denominator’ lines, as some fear;
will lead resources and political energy to be spent on enhancing the
credibility of the EU’s military efforts while allowing real security needs
to go uncovered. Among Washington defence experts and officials the
real and urgent need is for the Allies to take seriously the Defence
Capabilities Initiative (DCI) agreed at the Washington summit and
intended to help European Allies catch up and keep up with the US
capabilities for force projection and sustainability in a modern hi-tech
military environment. The concern is that ESDP and its related activities
will be a distraction from the DCI focus on enhancing capabilities, and
that developing new institutions and processes will substitute for putting
political energy into getting necessary domestic support for new defence
resources;
will convince US leaders and members of Congress that the United States
is no longer needed or wanted as a security partner in Europe. During the
Cold War, European Allies occasionally expressed the concern that if they
did too much for their own defence the United States would decide it was
no longer needed in Europe and pull out. For those who believe that the
Alliance is still vitally important for US interests, there is a concern that
the appearance of greater European self-reliance (even before it becomes a
fact) might lead US political leaders and Members of Congress to
conclude that NATO and US military involvement in Europe were no
longer necessary. Representative Douglas Bereuter warns: ‘It needs to be
clear to our European Allies that the creation of competing institutions in
Europe that detract from NATO’s capabilities and solidarity would
endanger public and congressional support for its commitment to the
North Atlantic alliance.’

International Herald Tribune, 6 March 2000, p. 8.
will increase transatlantic trade and industrial tensions by supporting
development of a ‘fortress Europe’ mentality in defence procurement. This
is an area where the United States can take much of the blame for the lack
historically of a ‘two-way street’ in transatlantic armaments trade. ESDP
does not necessarily require that Europe increase protectionism or
favouritism for its own defence industries. Lagging far behind American
defence firms in adjusting to post-Cold War market conditions, the
necessary mergers and consolidations are finally beginning to rationalise
the European defence industrial base. The next logical step is for
rationalisation of the transatlantic industrial base through a variety of
means. This next step must be facilitated by governments, and both the
United States and the EU members will have to make Alliance solidarity
and cooperation a high priority to overcome existing barriers to
transatlantic armaments cooperation. An EU that puts a higher priority on
developing ESDP could easily put new obstacles in the way of Alliance
cooporation in armaments, and particularly in the way of purchasing US
systems. The first difficult test case faces British Prime Minister Tony
Blair. The United Kingdom must decide whether to buy a medium-range
air-to-air missile from the US Raytheon Corporation or the European
Meteor from a European joint venture. Choosing the American system
could kill the Meteor project and undermine Prime Minister Blair’s claim
to be Europe’s defence leader. \(^{37}\) Blair may decide that Meteor is an
important investment in ESDP, but the American concern is that putting
money into this expensive system rather than buying an American-
developed upgrade would be a waste of scarce resources. This model, if
followed for future purchases, would impose a double cost on US interests –
lost sales for US manufacturers and wasted European resources for
defence;

will steal away Europe’s best military and diplomatic officials to work on
developing European-level institutions, diminishing the quality of those
assigned to NATO positions and tasks (or will simply overload officials
with European and NATO responsibilities to the detriment of their NATO-
related jobs). Each NATO government has a limit on the number of
officials it can afford to engage in the defence policy business. Already,
many of these officials are overburdened with meeting schedules at
national, European and NATO levels. A proliferation of ESDP-related
activities will likely reduce the time national officials spend tending to
NATO business; a higher political priority on EU rather than NATO

\(^{37}\)Champion, op. cit.
defence activities will drain the best talent away from NATO affairs, weakening NATO’s capabilities.

Such ‘concerns’ have already been expressed by a variety of American officials and experts. In some cases the concerns are accepted by European governments as serious issues and they have already attempted to address them in the design of the ESDP initiative. Most of the concerns, however, cannot be put to rest in the near term. It is the way in which ESDP evolves that will determine the impact on transatlantic relations, and so management of the issue will be a continuing challenge for US and European officials for years to come.
FUTURE US POLICY

Al Gore is now assured of being the Democratic Party’s candidate for President, and George W. Bush will be the Republican Party’s standard-bearer. Barring unforeseen developments, the next US administration’s foreign policy will reflect substantial continuity, particularly towards Europe. Neither candidate holds radical or extreme views about the US-European relationship. Both are committed to keeping NATO strong. Both are advised, on balance, by foreign policy centrists. President Bush or Gore would none the less undoubtedly want to put his own stamp on US foreign policy. Bush in particular would do so by trying to emphasise his leadership credibility compared with that of a discredited President Clinton.

President Gore’s approach would be more subtle, given the fact that he has played a substantial role in the Clinton administration’s foreign policy. Gore would nevertheless want to demonstrate that he was in charge. His acknowledged expertise in foreign and defence policy matters might incline him to engage more personally in shaping policy details as well as overall strategy.

One way to assess the next Administration’s policy towards ESDP, particularly with a Bush administration, will be to examine the views of those nominated early in 2001 to fill key foreign policy and defence positions. Bush would presumably rely more heavily on expert advisers and officials, given his much more limited experience in and knowledge of US foreign policy.

Because many of the leading Republican experts have spoken out on ESDP, it is likely that senior Bush administration officials will follow a predictable line regarding ESDP policy. For the most part, they advocate support for ESDP while calling on effective US leadership to ensure that NATO remains the centre of a European security system and is responsive to US interests.38

In current circumstances, US foreign policy in general, and policy toward ESDP in particular, will not likely be a significant issue in the election campaign. External developments, however, could affect this projection. For example, open conflict in Kosovo, with the loss of American lives or disagreements between the United States and European governments over policies in the Balkans, could force both candidates to take positions on the

US military role in Europe and US-European burden-sharing. The most prominent foreign policy issue in the presidential campaign debate, however, will be the question of who would most effectively lead the United States in an increasingly complex and still-conflicted international system.

Irrespective of who takes the presidential oath next January, it appears that official US policy will continue to put top priority on ensuring the vitality of NATO. Support for developments on the European level will be conditioned by this reality. As long as the United States has vital interests in Europe – which without doubt will be for the foreseeable future – and as long as NATO is the main US security connection to the Old Continent, US administrations and the Congress will want to ensure that any changes in the transatlantic Alliance protect US interests and preserve NATO’s good health.

Some American observers, including Administration officials, non-governmental commentators, congressional staff and Members of Congress, will support the European Union’s goal of developing a European Security and Defence Policy in the hope that such cooperation will relieve the United States of security burdens. This inclination will be fed by European rhetoric that makes it appear that Europe can go it alone without intensive cooperation with the United States.

Future US policy towards ESDP will in any circumstances remain conflicted. The ‘yes, but’ characterisation of the US attitude will likely remain appropriate. It could shift to a less sceptical ‘yes, if’ approach if ESDP is seen as developing along lines consistent with US interests. An unequivocal ‘yes, yes’ policy seems a very unlikely prospect, given the many variables at work in the US-European equation. American concerns about the potential negative consequences of ESDP will increase in direct proportion to the emphasis EU governments put on ‘autonomy’ when describing what they hope to accomplish in ESDP. The word itself, although objectively neutral, will continue to be read by some in the United States as a direct challenge to US policy goals and leadership roles.

Another important factor in the US attitude towards European defence cooperation will be the persistent suspicion of French motivations. Many American officials and experts still see France as intent on pushing the United States out of Europe, in spite of the frequent and apparently sincere official French statements to the contrary. Perhaps the most important key to

39Thanks are due to the US Atlantic Council’s Christopher Makins for suggesting the possibility of a more relaxed ‘yes, if’ approach, even though there still appears to be a lot of ‘but’ in the US attitude.
an effective synthesis of European defence cooperation and transatlantic cooperation will be the ability of French and American leaders to overcome mutual misperceptions and develop pragmatic formulas for cooperation.

The fact that the British government is taking a clear lead on ESDP is both reassuring and distressing to Americans. It is reassuring because the United States knows and trusts its British friends, and believe that their instincts regarding transatlantic relations are almost always compatible with US interests. It is distressing because of the fear that, in order to score points in Europe, Prime Minister Blair may be willing to sacrifice fundamentals of the US-UK relationship. The fact that the German government enthusiastically supports ESDP is also a double-edged sword. On the one hand, a more serious German approach to post-Cold War defence requirements would be welcome. On the other hand, US interests would suffer if ESDP were to weaken Germany’s strong commitment to NATO.

The United States will look to the governments of the United Kingdom especially, but also those of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and other EU members, to ensure that ESDP does not take on a neo-Gaullist character as it develops. The United States was reassured by the selection of NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana as the first ‘Mr Common Foreign and Security Policy,’ but future appointees to the office will be scrutinised for their perspectives and tendencies. The United States will not depend on individuals in key positions to ensure that ESDP does not split the Alliance. It will want to establish institutions and processes that will lock the European effort into a transatlantic framework.

These conditions do not, however, necessarily provide a complete guide to US policy. As we can already observe in the current debate, the extremes of the US position range from those who see strong (perhaps even unilateralist) US leadership as the best way to maintain the US position in Europe, to others who see a diminished US role as the means to minimise US burdens and responsibilities overseas. These two extremes and the many potential variations in between could yield a wide variety of policy positions.

Given the fact that it will take a decade or more for Europe to change the actual relationship between US and European capabilities, the United States will for an extended period of time likely face a Europe whose foreign and defence policy proclamations and institutions are more developed than its ability to act. This suggests that, irrespective of the long-term outcome, which in itself is vitally important to both the United States and Europe, the near term and perhaps prolonged transition period will prove challenging, frustrating, and will perhaps be the source of serious friction and possible fractures in the relationship.
In these circumstances the United States will be called on to deploy a sophisticated, nuanced diplomatic strategy towards Europe. US interests would not be served by policies that inclined towards the extremes of unilateralism on one side or withdrawal (isolationism) on the other. The good news is that the American political system, like those of most other democracies, tends to filter out extremes as politicians move from political posturing towards the practical necessities of governance. A Republican President in 2001 might feel the influence of unilateralist tendencies from the conservative wing of the party, and a Democratic president might feel some pressure from the neo-isolationist wing of his party. But neither Democratic nor Republican administrations will be able to ignore the national interest’s requirement for a healthy, working transatlantic Alliance.

This suggests a list of fairly straightforward guidelines from which the next Administration might benefit:

- The starting point for policy should be support for European efforts to increase their contributions to security in and beyond Europe. The essential point for many Americans will remain whether or not European-level efforts produce more substantive and visible contributions to international security requirements rather than to the growing number of acronyms and bureaucratic arrangements.
- The United States should make it clear on a continuing basis what interests it has in Europe’s development of ESDP. US officials should take every opportunity, but primarily in private and diplomatic channels, to say that the United States assumes the European Allies will take into account the need for ESDP to strengthen transatlantic and trans-European bonds politically, economically and militarily. For the foreseeable future, a ‘yes, but’, or perhaps a somewhat less sceptical ‘yes, if’, approach, deployed with nuance and sophistication, will remain the most appropriate vehicle for reflecting the variety of US interests in its security relationship with Europe.
- The United States should discourage EU members from making a strong distinction between EU and NATO positions on security issues in their contacts with potential new NATO and EU members. Instead, the United States should try to keep the focus of discussions on the compatibility of NATO membership and active ESDP involvement.
- In addition, the United States should avoid creating circumstances that force Germany to ‘choose’ between US and French positions. Germany has traditionally been uncomfortably squeezed between the requirements
of its relationship with the United States and those of its ties to France. Just as with aspiring members of the two organisations, US policy towards Germany should emphasise the importance of developing compatible and cooperative NATO-EU relations.

- The United States should continue to emphasise the critical importance of transparency, supported by the Alliance’s ‘golden rule’ of early and open consultations at all levels of the relationship. The first test of transparency will be the willingness of the members of the EU to set up regular and reliable links between ESDP’s new political and military institutions and those of NATO.

- For its part, the United States needs to be equally attentive to the ‘golden rule’ and to avoid surprises for its European partners. The attention must be reciprocal.

- The United States should stick to its preference for a more coherent European role inside the Alliance even if an ‘autonomous’ EU decision-making process guides that role.

- The United States should continue the process of handing over Balkan operations to the European members of NATO, but should insist that the operations remain within a NATO frame of reference under predominantly European leadership to demonstrate that a European pillar need not be constructed outside the Alliance to allow Europe more room for authority and leadership in security policy. The more the United States can effectively share burdens and responsibilities within NATO, the less likely the European Allies will seek an ESDP alternative to the NATO framework for operations.

- In the difficult area of transatlantic military industrial relations, the US administration and Congress should try even harder to get out of the way of what should come naturally in relationships among defence producers and suppliers on both sides of the Atlantic. The natural course will include both competition (which is important to stimulate innovation and control costs) and cooperation (to achieve economies of scale).

- Finally, if the United States wishes to avoid becoming a ‘global cop without a posse’, it should place a high priority on developing and deploying military systems that are compatible with those of its NATO allies. The United States must continue to encourage the European allies to buy and/or build military systems appropriate for the modern battlefield. At the same time, the United States should ensure that all of its decisions to develop and acquire new military systems are examined for
their potential impact on the ability of the United States to fight in coalition with its Allies.

A truly united Europe is not likely to emerge for many years – perhaps not for many decades. Unless and until the members of the European Union have achieved something approaching political union, a European Security and Defence Policy will remain an intergovernmental exercise, subject to the wide range of perceptions of national interest that exist among current and potential EU members. However, the ground that is now being laid by EU nations will bring about real as well as perceived changes in the transatlantic Alliance. The United States will, without doubt, try to ensure that these changes strengthen transatlantic ties and benefit both US and European security interests. Washington will expect no less from the Europeans.