

*Chaillot Papers*

- 30 -

*December 1997*

CONFLICT PREVENTION  
IN THE BALKANS:  
CASE STUDIES OF KOSOVO  
AND THE FYR OF MACEDONIA

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# **CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE BALKANS: CASE STUDIES OF KOSOVO AND THE FYR OF MACEDONIA**

**Sophia Clément**

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ISSN 1017-7566

Published by the Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union and printed in Alençon, France, by the Imprimerie Alençonnaise.

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## **PREFACE**

Concerned as they are by the many crises occurring on their very doorstep, the European public, politicians and analysts seem hardly to recognize other conflicts in Europe that have not happened and need not happen. Crisis prevention and peace-building have been sidelined by conflict management and peacekeeping.

Yet cooperative security, this new task of the international community, is essentially about prevention, and has therefore to do with improving transparency and the predictability of the many factors that characterize today's security equations. In this endeavour, the cooperation of the parties directly involved is indispensable, since the international community can propose but not impose, and even less substitute for them. The simultaneous European trends towards integration and disintegration are not necessarily contradictory: they must be reconciled through the acceptance of diversities and the promotion of interaction, and by the removal of anachronistic psychological barriers and the blurring of national borderlines.

This *Chaillot Paper* by Sophia Clément constitutes recognition of the wisdom and perseverance of politicians and the population in the two cases considered here, who are determined to look beyond the most immediate obstacles to stability. While they can by no means be considered definite success stories, the separate realities of Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia present opportunities for the international community to adopt and maintain a comprehensive approach.

The first draft of this paper was presented at a seminar on conflict prevention in the Balkans in 1996, and subsequently expanded. The purpose of the study is to specify the various roles and responsibilities of local, regional and international actors, which European institutions, including WEU itself, must stimulate and support.

**Guido Lenzi**  
**Paris, December 1997**

## SUMMARY

While the international community has clearly been concerned that conflict in former Yugoslavia should not spread, there have been divergences of perception on how to deal with the instabilities of the region. In particular, the inability of the Europeans to adopt a common attitude has affected their unity at a time when political and security structures in Europe are being modified, and that can even be considered an additional element of instability. The international community's attitudes to conflict prevention in the region are therefore analysed, on the basis of two case studies: the FYR of Macedonia and Kosovo. Both are zones of potential instability. However, while there are some obvious similarities, in terms of conflict prevention they are quite dissimilar: whereas in the FYR of Macedonia conflict prevention has been fairly successful, Kosovo is seen rather as a challenge, a situation in which conflict prevention measures still need to be implemented.

Even though the international community tends not to be interventionist, the costs of inaction are high. Political will is the essential element, and lack of it, rather than a lack of means or a predetermined strategy, is more often the explanation for failure to prevent conflicts. The approach taken here is to consider a range of both non-coercive and coercive measures to be applied before a dispute erupts into conflict, distinguishing between its immediate and underlying causes.

From the political turbulence that followed the FYR of Macedonia's independence, both moderate parties, who make up the ruling coalition, and radical nationalists (Macedonian Slav and ethnic Albanian) have emerged. Until now, the government has criticized nationalist parties and stressed the need for interethnic tolerance. Another concern, however, is stability in the region, which it considers will depend very much on the way the situation evolves in Serbia and Albania. The pre-emptive positioning of UNPREDEP to stabilize the new state was to some extent an example of effective coordination among international bodies, although differences between West European countries meant that the result was due to American initiative.

In Kosovo, the deterioration in interethnic relations is the result of political, economic and social inequalities. The future status of Kosovo, which Serbs see as the cradle of their nation-state, lies at the heart of the problem. It is closely linked to the wider issue of the nature of the future Serbia. In the region, divisions within the Albanian communities on Kosovo's future status are significant and most countries have reservations over Kosovar independence. Although the urgent need to find a solution to the Kosovo question is widely recognized, few preventive measures have been adopted. The European Union, more concerned by Bosnia, has no specific strategy. However, given the extent of differences between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, a certain internationalization of the problem may prove necessary.

In its response to potential conflict in the Balkans, the international community has attached greater importance to national sovereignty and territorial integrity than to the right to self-determination, although the Dayton agreement may have partially legitimated the ethnic or religious separation of communities. While disputes can in the end only be resolved by the parties concerned, security organizations have for their part proved ill-suited to conflict prevention and management, and their members'

positions divergent. What is needed is a framework in which international organizations act in complement to each other, their various capabilities being used as appropriate in the planning and execution of each phase of conflict prevention. In the case of Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia, there are a range of political, economic and military measures that they could consider for both the short and the longer term.

# INTRODUCTION

The changes that have taken place in the Balkans following the end of bipolarity and the dissolution of former Yugoslavia have greatly modified the substance and form of relations in the region. The persistence of the Yugoslav conflict and the security vacuum that has resulted from it have also led European countries and the United States to redefine their policy on the region because of the consequences for the foundations of their security and their defence policies. The difficulty in forming an overall strategy in a changing and unpredictable environment has revealed divergences of perception regarding the way to deal with these new circumstances, which therefore still has to be defined.

These divergences indicate the actual limits of the West's common interests in the region and its ability to implement decisions on the ground. Within the European Union, these multiple approaches, which are also justified by 'special interests', have led to a confusion between objectives and policies implemented that has had consequences for the future geostrategic equilibrium of the Balkans and the reorganization of security on the European continent as a whole, whose concern is to avoid a renewal of hostilities and extension of the conflict to the rest of the region. The European approach must be established in terms of prevention and take account of a number of variables, such as the perceptions and interests of regional actors, and the policies adopted by the international community.<sup>(1)</sup>

This paper analyses the policy of the international community, particularly European security organizations, on conflict prevention in the region, on the basis of two case studies: the FYR of Macedonia and Kosovo. Interdependence at the regional level, geographic nearness to Bosnia and the proximity of regions where the majority of the population are Albanian nevertheless justify a common approach, although that does not signify that internal policy in the two cases is comparable. The choice of conflict prevention measures corresponds to the specific circumstances of each of the two cases, which certain similarities should not obscure. These two cases lie at opposite extremes of the range of conflict prevention - at the lower end (the FYR of Macedonia) and the higher (Kosovo) - which permits a comparative study to be made.

## Internal dynamics

The dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav conflict have highlighted the Albanian question in the Balkans. Ethnic Albanians are spread among three countries, half of them living outside Albania. Left to one side by treaties made at the beginning of the century, they have the feeling that, once again, they have failed to seize their opportunity, this time at the moment when the peoples of former Yugoslavia gained their independence. The Serbian province of Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia thus constitute two zones of potential instability in the Balkans. They are characterized by a *fragile internal equilibrium* resulting from the internal institutional changes that are peculiar to multinational states in the period of transition from communism. The instability of a multiethnic, multicultural or multireligious state or region often stems from divergences regarding the definition of nationality and citizenship, and thus the status of minorities and the status of autonomy. The economic dimension (economic disparities, the link between politics

and economics) is a second factor. The Albanian crisis of early 1997, mounting frustration in Kosovo and radicalization in the FYR of Macedonia are all factors of instability, whose consequences for the region are interpreted in various ways.

These two case studies confront us with similar problematics that enable us to draw lessons regarding the definition of effective conflict-prevention measures. These concern: the status of minorities in multiethnic states; the role of the 'motherland', particularly in cases where there is a minority concentration along the border with it; the choice of institutional arrangements, in so far as political and economic discrimination may incite claims for autonomy to the detriment of other constitutional arrangements; central authorities' fear of reforms, which could call into question the integrity of the state.<sup>(2)</sup>

However, there are numerous *differences* between the two cases. They do not have the same international status: Kosovo had the status of autonomous region in former Yugoslavia, which is not the case for the FYR of Macedonia. The important stabilization efforts and reforms undertaken in the FYR of Macedonia in the political, economic and social sectors, and cooperation with the Albanian minority that participate in the government coalition, contrast with the situation in Kosovo, where there is still a state of emergency and violations of human rights by the Serbian authorities. In Kosovo, 90 per cent of the population are Albanian, according to the latest (1994) international census, whereas it is estimated that the percentage in the FYR of Macedonia is around 23 per cent. Whereas in Kosovo a parallel administration has been established, leading to a *de facto* partition, in the FYR of Macedonia there is a certain amount of cooperation between the majority and the minority, and a stronger common desire to implement reforms. In the FYR of Macedonia, the majority of Albanians want to remain citizens of the Republic, and claim the status of constituent nation, while in Kosovo Albanians have wished, at least until now, to go their own way. Furthermore, 'ethnic delimitation' is non-territorialized in the FYR of Macedonia but based on 'peaceful territorialization' in Kosovo. Finally, whereas the Macedonian problem no longer arises as such, in the sense that independence and consolidation of the state have been achieved, the question of Kosovo, which is linked to the democratization of Serbia, remains. The FYR of Macedonia is therefore an example of conflict prevention that has met with limited success, while Kosovo is seen more as a test of the ability to implement preventive measures. Any postponement of international action could involve risks of greater tension, an eruption and spillover of the crisis, and would make it more difficult to define appropriate conflict prevention measures, especially since the complexity of the problem - due to its many historic, cultural, economic and political aspects - necessarily implies combining existing means to form a true conflict prevention policy.

### **Regional dynamics**

The *similarities* between the two cases arise from the interdependence of the various Albanian communities and between them and the regional situation. Whatever the solution to the Kosovo issue and instability in the FYR of Macedonia may be, the question of a wider 'Albanian world' and its weight in the regional balance of power will remain. Interdependence at the regional level has created a three-sided relationship that includes Bosnia, Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia. A renewal of

hostilities in Bosnia could destabilize Kosovo and spread to other parts of Serbia such as the provinces of Sandjak and Vojvodina, which are in part populated by Muslims. Conversely, an increase in tensions in Kosovo could endanger the peace process in Bosnia and stability in the region as a whole.

The correlation between internal conflicts, their regional dimension and the immediate environment is consequently the second variable that has to be taken into account in any analysis of conflict prevention. The evolution of the situation in Tirana, Athens, Sofia or Ankara will be a determining factor for regional stability, since the policy towards, or even interference in the internal affairs of countries by their neighbours can help fuel a dispute. For Albania, the fate of Albanians in former Yugoslavia is an integral part of the 'Albanian question', and the position taken by the Macedonian and Serbian governments regarding their Albanian minorities is the essential indicator of their bilateral relations. During the Yugoslav conflict, the relations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the FYR of Macedonia with Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey, admittedly for different reasons, went through successive phases of tension and calm. We shall thus examine the perceptions, policies and divergences of countries in the region regarding Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia and, by extension, *regional security* (the regional balance of power, potential territorial changes in the event of conflict and other possible solutions).<sup>(3)</sup> We shall look in particular at the main actors, Serbia and Albania, and examine the evolution of their bilateral relations, the links between Albanian and Serbian communities in former Yugoslavia and their relations with neighbouring countries. However, the *differences* are linked to the geographic position of the motherland and to diverging perceptions that neighbouring countries have of the two cases studied here.

### **Implications for international action**

The consequences of policies adopted by the West, both for the Balkans and for the European security debate, is the third variable in our analysis. Many European countries have feared a conflict that might have triggered secessionist movements throughout the Balkans, and the negative impact of this on regional autonomist claims in Western Europe. The current restructuring of Western political and security organizations and the associated debates have also weakened their cohesion and affected their credibility. The difficulties faced by European partner countries in adopting common positions and implementing their decisions on the ground have had repercussions among countries in the region. The latter, who believe they see in this an attempt to establish spheres of influence, could form alignments and think that their room for manoeuvre is greater than is actually the case, thus increasing divisions and instability in the region.

Apart from a few signs of improvement in the situation, the crisis in Albania, the beginnings of democratization in Serbia, radicalization in Kosovo, interethnic tensions in the FYR of Macedonia and instability in Bosnia are causes for concern. What is at stake, in addition to the causes being defended by the parties involved, is *the ability of the international, and particularly the European, community to adopt a common attitude*, which is not without consequences for the very unity of partners within the various political and military alliances. This makes an assessment of available conflict prevention measures even more essential.

In Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia, the variety of scenarios (concerning the epicentre and intensity of any future conflict) and the absence of a common approach have been major obstacles to a coherent policy, which is in itself an additional element of instability. The stabilization measures adopted by the European Union (reconstruction, a regional approach, conditionality) have been essentially economic rather than political and military. The absence of international infrastructures capable of undertaking conflict prevention is thus the cause and the consequence of divergent interests and the difficulty of reaching a consensus among member states. In this study, the attempt by the European Union to form a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), relations between non-European actors such as the United States and Russia, and possible collective or individual action within international organizations such as the European Union but also Western European Union, the United Nations, OSCE and NATO will therefore be examined.

# CONFLICT PREVENTION: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

## The complexity of the concept

The aim of this paper is not to draw up an inventory of all the various instruments and organizations that could be used to carry out preventive actions but to present a specific approach suited to the case studies in question. It consists in *identifying the circumstances in which effective action could be considered and the means most suited to a given situation*, in order to prevent a conflict breaking out or spreading. The concept does not of course imply an assumption that a conflict will necessarily break out.

Conflict prevention consists of concerted action whose aim is to deter, resolve and/or halt disputes *before* they erupt, that is to say before any escalation of internal or external violence occurs. None the less, for some there are many reasons that relativize the role of conflict prevention and the necessity to have recourse to it. Among these are the absence of a major risk of destabilization at the international level, the sometimes hypothetical nature of predictions that a conflict will break out, non-interference in internal affairs and constraints imposed by reduced defence budgets. Conflict prevention requires accurate knowledge, a precise assessment of the problem and 'mobilization', which are made difficult by the varied nature of interethnic conflicts. The difficulty in distinguishing the possible reasons why a conflict breaks out, given the number and nature of the variables to be taken into account, hampers decisions on the measures to be taken. The way events develop often contradicts predictions. Certain preventive measures sometimes have the opposite effect to that expected, as a result of an incorrect interpretation of the aim of an external intervention, whose short and long-term objectives are generally difficult to identify. Again, to an analysis of the situation there may often correspond not just one, but a number of preventive measures. The means that at first sight seem the most appropriate or have proved effective in other instances may prove unsuited to a given situation in practice.

However, the conflict prevention approach lies at the heart of the preoccupations of the international community, which is less interventionist than in the past. While it is difficult to foresee destabilization, it is on the other hand easier to distinguish its symptoms as a set of distinctive preliminary signs such as repressive measures, the radicalization of political rhetoric or excessive arms purchases.<sup>(4)</sup> Moreover, the majority of the means available to the international community are in reality conflict prevention instruments, even if they are not explicitly described as such. Lastly, the financial and psychological costs of doing nothing, even if they are hard to quantify, are much higher in the long run. The variables in a dispute, both internal and external, are easier to control, and institutionalised dialogue still possible, as they attract less media attention and are less instrumentalized, thus leaving greater room for manoeuvre for compromise, decisions and action. Despite the uncertainties that accompany any conflict resolution measure, it is always possible to define in advance a general strategy for identifying the causes as well as the means to be employed in

any intervention. The need to adapt to each specific case does not imply that having a set of clearly defined rules, principles and mechanisms is an invalid approach.

### **Political will**

Problems of coordination are important, but political will is clearly the determining factor. If the concept of conflict prevention has become a tool that is widely used, its nature and scope are prone to confusion and raise a certain number of problems. The *prevention* of conflicts should not be confused with the *management* of conflicts, during the stage of the outbreak of hostilities and armed confrontation, and the *resolution* of conflicts following the cessation of hostilities. Next, political choice is inherent in conflict prevention. It often implies adopting a position, which excludes the idea of political neutrality; moreover, there is no truly neutral mediation between parties, as the Yugoslav conflict has shown. Lastly, political will is essential in conflict prevention. Its absence within organizations or states responsible for conflict prevention can be attributed to a lack of means, the too high costs or the absence of vital interests.

None the less, far from being an abstract mechanism, conflict prevention is a reflection of the consequences of the actions of governments. Its success thus depends directly on the degree to which the latter are involved, their will and the political choice that is explicitly made. The failure of conflict prevention measures often results more, or at least as much, from the absence of common perceptions, the primacy of special political and economic interests and insufficient political will, as it does from the inadequacy of available conflict prevention mechanisms.<sup>(5)</sup> The determination to act generally results not from a direct attack on a state's vital interests (territorial integrity, economic interests), nor from the first signs of a potential conflict, but rather from the perception of a momentum that is contrary to the interests of international or regional stability.

It is nevertheless necessary to bear in mind the inherent limits of the concept of prevention. The traditional approach, which covers only diplomatic mediation, is limited in that it does not take into account all the various political options, which can go as far as the use of different degrees of force. Conversely, an approach that is too all-embracing, consisting in introducing into the analysis a set of measures such as the setting up of a democratic regime, development aid or even arms control, runs the risk of depriving the concept of any sense, because it would amount to confusing conflict prevention with a state's overall foreign and security policy.

### **A framework for conflict prevention?**

The approach taken in this paper is to consider conflict prevention as *a series of political options ranging from non-coercive to coercive measures - diplomatic, political, economic and military instruments appropriate to the evolution of a dispute before it erupts into conflict*, in the spirit of Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>(6)</sup> These measures taken as a whole correspond to the institution of a period of 'unstable peace' or a 'negative' period (characterized by tension and suspicion between the parties but in which violence is absent or sporadic).<sup>(7)</sup> The instruments chosen include fact-finding and observer missions, diplomatic and economic forms of pressure and the preventive interposition of troops. They therefore also include

'harder' measures such as economic or diplomatic sanctions and the threat of the use of force if there is any escalation of violence. This distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' measures also corresponds to a distinction between types of dispute to which they are applied: those that do not present any risk of armed confrontation, for which soft, long-term measures are more appropriate, and those in which the degree of radicalization and polarization considerably increase the possibility of an escalation of violence, and for which harder and more urgent measures are necessary.<sup>(8)</sup> To put it another way, non-coercive strategies have better chances of success in the early stages of a dispute, whereas coercive strategies are more suited to a situation in which positions have polarized. However, in all disputes a range of measures in the short, medium and long term will generally be appropriate, irrespective of the initial level of intensity.

From the point of view of methodology, a distinction has to be made between regulating elements (immediate causes) and constituent, structural elements (underlying causes). Any adequate conflict prevention strategy thus presupposes, firstly, identification of the *immediate internal causes* of the dispute, which might be grouped in four categories: structural (weakness of the state's authority, ethno-geographic distribution); political (the nature of the political system, interethnic relations, élites); economic and social (particularities, discrimination); and cultural (cultural rights, mutual perceptions).<sup>(9)</sup> Secondly, there must be an evaluation of the *underlying causes* (historical memory and perceptions, relational models) that form the fertile ground in which the immediate causes germinate. Analysis of these causes will make it possible to define *the means to be applied in a conflict resolution approach* (evaluation and perspectives), in other words a model suited to the action.

In terms of timescale, whereas underlying causes are more difficult to modify, or are at least resistant to change, and as such must be seen as requiring long-term approaches, immediate causes can be tackled in the short term. Even if they are to be the subject of distinct measures requiring different degrees of effort, they must none the less be dealt with together. Concentrating only on the immediate causes of a dispute, as often happens, without considering the long-term underlying reasons for it, would amount to condemning medium and long-term conflict prevention measures. That is why preventive measures must not hold up political, economic, social and military measures.

Two approaches are thus possible, each of which has two parts. (1) In the first, the underlying conditions and the immediate causes of a dispute are addressed separately. In the long term, it consists in analysing the basic conditions of a dispute, both structural (systemic) and cultural (psychological), such as historical memories and perceptions, and instances of political, economic and cultural discrimination that predispose to violence, which are generally underestimated by decision-makers, who believe they cannot be changed. This implies a good knowledge of the problem, a strategic vision of the future and efforts adapted to each case.<sup>(10)</sup> In the short term, emergency measures would enable the immediate causes of a conflict, the catalytic factors, at the internal and external levels, such as the behaviour of the population or élites and their security concerns, to be dealt with, without ruling out any pre-established framework of analysis. (2) In the second approach, the internal and external dimensions of the dispute are combined. As internal conflicts inevitably have regional dimensions and implications, prevention measures should also be addressed

to all regional actors. It is only after the causes and the principal actors have been defined at the internal and regional levels that the international community can take appropriate, concrete action. While the agreement of the parties on the ground doubtless plays a role that is determinant and sometimes a prior condition for the success of conflict prevention measures, that does not relieve the international community of its responsibilities in the matter.<sup>(11)</sup>

Thus, an appropriate conceptual framework for regulating the international community's conflict prevention actions ought to take into account the following administrative and institutional measures. (a) At the political level, the setting up of a democratization process (covering institutions, a constitution, the electoral system, human and minority rights, and the media). The effects of these reforms on stability and the strengthening of democracy are none the less the subject of controversy between those in favour of radical measures and those who point to the dangers of destabilization such as the unsuitability of these measures to the nature of the society in question and the political conditions in it. Careful thought is therefore necessary on the time factor, and the duration and areas of application of any democratization measures envisaged. (b) Similar precautions apply in the economic field (privatization, the banking system, budget). (c) It would be difficult to leave out the military dimension (civil-military relations, defence industry, arms control).

These must be accompanied by (d) clearly defined conditions attached to economic and financial aid, both negative (sanctions) and positive ('carrots'). These must at the same time be linked to the implementation of reforms, and the establishment of a link between membership of political, economic and security organizations (EU, WEU, NATO, OSCE and UN). In fact, all the potential of existing prevention means has to be taken into account: instruments and actors that are available, as well as new mechanisms. In the short term, positive sanctions permit the implementation of a series of targeted, 'radical' measures that stabilize fragile, delicately balanced situations, conflict prevention only being effective to the extent that it renders the immediate gains that any party to a conflict might obtain pointless. (e) The common approach to internal restructuring and the regional dimension, given regional interdependence and the role of neighbouring countries, is an additional factor. Particular attention will be paid to the European Union's specific role in conflict prevention in the framework of CFSP, because of both the geographic proximity of the Balkans, which forms an integral part of the European continent, and the consequences that destabilization of the region could have, and the multiplicity of instruments that are available to it.

## THE CASE STUDIES

### The FYR of Macedonia

#### The internal dimension

Since its declaration of independence in 1991, the FYR of Macedonia has experienced a *polarization* and *fragmentation* of the political scene, as well as a gradual *recomposition* of political forces, due to a turbulent period of transition dominated by the implementation of political, economic and social reform, and by tense interethnic relations between Macedonians and Albanians in an unstable regional environment. None the less, since the end of the conflict in Bosnia and the improvement in relations with neighbouring countries, concerns stemming from interethnic relations have supplanted worries over a possible external threat. Two main streams emerge from the plethora of political parties that sprang up after independence, the moderates and the radicals, which cut across Macedonian and Albanian ethnic dividing lines. The moderates make up the ruling coalition, with the Alliance for Macedonia (SM) led by Kiro Gligorov.<sup>(12)</sup> The nationalist stream is made up of two Macedonian Slav parties, the VMRO-DPMNE,<sup>(13)</sup> the most important opposition party that was the largest party in parliament at the time of the 1992 elections and is today in opposition, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).<sup>(14)</sup> On the Albanian side, the most radical is the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA).<sup>(15)</sup> Municipal elections held in November-December 1995 showed the firm hold that the Albanian vote had in the western part of the Republic, with 12 seats going to the PPD, 4 to the PPDA and 4 to independents. They also gave rise to 'unnatural' alliances between the VMRO and some local representatives of the PPD who were attempting to regain votes.<sup>(16)</sup> Thus, the victory of the SDSM (with 52 municipalities out of 124) was accompanied by an increase in the power of the nationalist VMRO (15)<sup>(17)</sup> and DP (13) who, confident after their victory, asked for early elections and a change to the electoral law, as the current two-round majority vote gave them no chance of winning a majority in Parliament.

The two communities are experiencing major political, economic and social imbalances. The difficulty of integrating the Albanian minority and arriving at a consensus among the two communities is raising tensions between them and in part reinforcing *mutual negative perceptions*. A series of events, such as confrontations between the two communities<sup>(18)</sup> and the creation of an Albanian University in Tetovo,<sup>(19)</sup> have already poisoned their mutual relationship. The implementation of reforms, the guarantee of Albanians' essential rights and the passing of a resolution by the parliament in March 1997 on tolerance and cooperation between ethnic groups in practice, according to Albanians, come up against discrimination that some have no hesitation in branding 'apartheid based on nationality'.<sup>(20)</sup> Agreement on teaching in Albanian at the teaching faculty of Skopje, quotas for Albanian students and legislation on the use of the Albanian flag are considered to be inadequate and tardy measures. The Albanians continue to demand the legalization of the University of Tetovo, which is a symbol of their cultural autonomy.<sup>(21)</sup> The incidents of July 1997 concerning the Albanian flag flown by the Albanian mayors of Tetovo and Gostivar, which led to the deaths of three people and revived anti-Albanian slogans, well illustrates how fragile intercommunal relations are.<sup>(22)</sup> On top of that are transfers of arms between the different sectors of the Albanian community, which could intensify

following the crisis in Albania and facilitate a rearming of Macedonian and Kosovar Albanians, particularly their para-military organizations. For its part, the Macedonian government criticizes the Albanians' non-participation and the setting up of 'parallel' structures (schools, universities) that could lead to a Kosovar model.<sup>(23)</sup> The Macedonian nationalist parties see in this an 'Albanianization' of higher education that could threaten the official language, and have organized a series of demonstrations by Macedonian students. As they see it, recognition of the Albanians as a constituent nation would be a first step towards autonomy and then secession. They see a dilution of Macedonian identity in every measure adopted in favour of the Albanians, and a desire to create a 'Greater Albania' in every Albanian claim. However, the FYR of Macedonia remains a successful example of transition, with its programme of privatization and low rate of inflation (around 3 per cent). Nevertheless, a high level of unemployment (30 per cent), falling foreign trade, the precariousness of jobs and pyramid savings management of the type seen in Albania have led to an upsurge of nationalist parties which through their rhetoric add to mutual fears and the radicalization of public opinion. At the demographic level, Macedonian Albanians question the results of the census carried out under international control by the European Union in June-July 1994, which put their number at 443,000 (22.9 per cent). Their own estimate is 40 per cent (around 600,000), which is almost double. The largest Albanian communities are in Tetovo (29.5 per cent), Skopje (25.5 per cent), Gostivar (15.7 per cent) and Kumanovo (10.3 per cent), thus forming a continuous territory bordering Albania and Kosovo/Serbia.<sup>(24)</sup> The importance of demography is growing because of the high birthrate among Albanians and their concentration in the western part of the Republic along the border with the FRY and Albania.

Macedonians and Albanians have diverging initial positions, which results in different approaches and interpretations of possible political solutions. The Albanians focus on three issues: first, the *rights inherited* from former Yugoslavia concerning their status of constituent nation on the same basis as the Slav majority in 'Macedonia as a country of all nations treated equally by the Constitution' They are critical of the fact that they have no preferential treatment compared with the Turks (4 per cent), the Serbs (2 per cent) or the Walachians (2 per cent), whereas they number 22.9 per cent of the total population, even though the Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens. They consider that the minority status conferred upon them by the preamble of the Constitution ('Macedonia is a unitarian state constituted as the national state of the Macedonian people') does not correspond to their numerical importance. Albanians make up a separate nationality, and not a minority. They see a fundamental contradiction between the nature of what they consider as an a priori, multiethnic state and its Constitution, which grants Macedonians of Slav origin the status of sole constituent people;<sup>(25)</sup> second, respect for *fundamental human rights* - the end of discrimination on the basis of nationality, through better access to education, culture and language and recognition of Albanian as an official language alongside Slavo-Macedonian;<sup>(26)</sup> and third, the guarantee of basic *democratic rights*, such as equal voting rights and proportional representation within state institutions.<sup>(27)</sup> Albanians claim that until now they only represent 4 per cent of the police forces and 10 per cent of the work force in state-owned enterprises. These numbers do not correspond to the percentage of Albanians among the population as a whole, or to the high percentage in Albanian-populated areas. Proportional representation has not been respected, especially in Tetovo, which is overwhelmingly Albanian. Meeting with

representatives of the PDPA, NDP, PPD and the FYR of Macedonia, autumn 1995, op. cit.<sup>(28)</sup> The Macedonian nationalist parties have a strictly ethnic view of a 'Macedonian Slav state'. They reject any form of compromise with the Albanians, unlike the moderate parties, who favour integration of the latter as the *sine qua non* condition for the survival of the State in the long term. Although united in the defence of their fundamental rights and in order to obtain the status of constituent nation for Albanians, they are none the less divided on the detail of their participation. Whereas the PPD claims equal rights within the new State, cooperation with central government and the implementation of reforms to this effect, the DPA makes any cooperation with the government subordinate to the prior guarantee of their main claims: Albanian as an official language, proportional representation in state institutions, the legalization of the University of Tetovo, the right to fly the Albanian flag in towns with a majority Albanian population and territorial autonomy for the western province inhabited by Albanians in a federation along Belgian lines, as a stage towards independence.<sup>(29)</sup> Several thousand Walachians and a few Greeks cannot act as a catalyst.<sup>(30)</sup>

These tensions have brought about a change in the respective positions. The VMRO is calling for the government to step down and for new elections to be held, and is reviving slogans in favour of a 'Greater Macedonia' covering the Greek and Bulgarian regions of Macedonia. Radicalization of Macedonian youth would call into question the process of normalization undertaken with neighbouring countries. The radical Albanians for their part tend to assume that because of the weakness of the government their demands will be met. Growing divergences and the radicalization of all parties could destabilize the internal political equilibrium and reinforce centrifugal tendencies.<sup>(31)</sup> That would reduce the room for manoeuvre of the government, which has until now adopted a prudent position by repeating its calls for dialogue and interethnic tolerance, and strongly criticizing the policy of all the nationalist parties. Consequently, the Macedonian and Albanian nationalist parties have a common responsibility regarding developments both inside and outside the FYR of Macedonia.<sup>(32)</sup>

### The regional dimension

For the FYR of Macedonia, the intensification of *equidistant* bilateral relations since 1995 has been aimed at breaking away from the regional isolation of the first hours of independence. The end of the war in Bosnia and common concerns due to tense relations with their respective minority Albanian populations helped their *rapprochement* with the FRY, leading to recognition in April 1996, and confirmed their wish to end regional isolation and diversify their alliances.<sup>(33)</sup> Most neighbouring countries were late in recognizing the new State, refusing, for various reasons, to acknowledge the existence of a Macedonian nation separate from its ethnic (Bulgaria, Greece) or territorial (Serbia) dimension. The existence of the FYR of Macedonia as an independent state made the access of eastern and southern Serbia to the sea more remote and eliminated its border with Greece. For Greece, it broke territorial continuity with its traditional ally Serbia, a regional middle-ranking power and guarantor of the regional balance of power. The late recognition of the FYR of Macedonia by Albania at the height of the period of tension between the FYR of Macedonia and Greece was motivated by support for the status of constituent nation claimed by the Albanian minority.<sup>(34)</sup> Most of the countries in the region nevertheless

ended by recognizing the necessity to have a buffer state, whose implosion or dismemberment would result in a profound reconstruction of the region's landscape, or even generalized conflict.

With Greece, the initial uncertainties of bilateral relations, due as much to memories of a turbulent history as to unfortunate handling of the affair by the Greek political leadership,<sup>(35)</sup> ended with the signature of an interim agreement in September 1995,<sup>(36)</sup> which made possible, the same year, the Republic of Macedonia's membership of the Council of Europe, OSCE and NATO's Partnership for Peace. In both countries political leaders have been conditioned by galvanized public opinion, the exaggerated rhetoric of some nationalist parties and the growing political cost of compromise.<sup>(37)</sup> The intensification of diplomatic and economic links, which puts Greece among the most important investors, is contributing to *rapprochement*.<sup>(38)</sup> Greece, which has the main outlet to the sea in the port of Salonika and is the only Balkan country to be both a member of the European Union and NATO, is seen as a natural strategic ally. For its part, the FYR of Macedonia remains for Greece the best safeguard against fragmentation of the region and the creation of 'Greater' entities, in this case a Greater Albania, on its borders.

In January 1992, Bulgaria was the first country to recognize the State, but not a separate Macedonian nation. Differences over the definition of the Macedonian language, which gave rise to many tensions between the two countries and hampered the signature of bilateral agreements, could be resolved using the dual formula adopted by Greece and the FYR of Macedonia. This approach would allow the tightening of economic, political and cultural ties that have until now been confined simply to good-neighbourly relations.<sup>(39)</sup>

Also among the first to recognize the FYR of Macedonia's independence, in February 1992, Turkey is concerned over the internal situation, particularly because of the presence of a Turkish minority, and supports the country's territorial integrity.<sup>(40)</sup> The military cooperation agreement signed with the FYR of Macedonia in December 1993, guaranteeing its territorial integrity and help with the modernization of the Macedonian Army, is an illustration of this.<sup>(41)</sup> As far as the Macedonian authorities were concerned, good relations with Turkey served as a counterweight to Greece and Serbia at the height of the period of tension, as a means to ease the country's isolation, particularly in the economic and security fields.

Tirana sees the fate of the Albanians in former Yugoslavia and the situation of Albanian minorities in Kosovo/Serbia and the FYR of Macedonia as forming an integral part of the 'Albanian question'. The Macedonian government's policy regarding the Albanian community remains an indicator of relations between the two countries. It is however in Tirana's interests to maintain good relations with the FYR of Macedonia for reasons of both internal politics and regional equilibrium, given the violence of the war in Bosnia and the position taken by the international community, particularly the United States, against any destabilization of the FYR of Macedonia.<sup>(42)</sup> The Albanian government has therefore in general played the role of moderator regarding the Albanian movement's secessionist aspirations, being both anxious to obtain Western political, economic and military support and aware of the inadequacy of the country's means to support an uprising, and even less an armed conflict. In an attempt to increase its influence in the FYR of Macedonia, the Berisha

government however on the one hand officially supported the territorial integrity of the FYR of Macedonia and the process of integrating the Albanian minority, in opposition to a secessionist policy,<sup>(43)</sup> while on the other hand implicitly supporting the radical movement and demands for autonomy. Not wishing to interfere in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries, the new socialist government in Albania is adopting a moderate attitude that is worrying the Albanians of Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia.<sup>(44)</sup> The hypothesis that Albanian forces would intervene alongside the Macedonian Albanians in the event of conflict in Kosovo has little credence among political leaders in the FYR of Macedonia, essentially because of Albania's political, economic and military weakness, even if it has to be recognized that the FYR of Macedonia could become a strategic asset in such a situation.<sup>(45)</sup> Be that as it may, during early 1997 the Albanian crisis weakened the main source of support for the Albanian community on the international scene, at the same time reviving divergences over the policy to adopt.<sup>(46)</sup>

Begun in 1995, the normalizing of the FYR of Macedonia's relations with its neighbours, which were strained during the first years following independence, is diminishing the perception of an external threat. The political, economic and military weakness of most neighbouring countries, and their fear of any calling into question of the process of integration into international organizations makes any political offensive improbable. The crises in Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania have had only an indirect effect on the FYR of Macedonia. Only instability in Bosnia and Kosovo might constitute a serious source of destabilization.

Nevertheless, the possibility of a conflict erupting *in Kosovo* still preoccupies the Macedonian authorities. They are concerned that a *rapprochement* between the various sectors of the Albanian movement, particularly since the end of the Bosnian conflict, might reinforce cross-border relations and lead to an Albanian continuum; they also fear that the influence of Albanian separatist organizations in Kosovo could further radicalize the Macedonian Albanians, although they reject the worst-case scenario of an explosion of conflict and chain reactions. The central authorities consider that the maintenance of stability depends above all on the way the situation develops within Serbia and Albania, and that the question of Kosovo is an internal Serbian matter. The possibility that Belgrade, preoccupied as it is with internal problems, might 'reconquer its southern province' by force, is however excluded. One of Skopje's main concerns for the moment is thus destabilization resulting from transnational movements, a wave of Albanian refugees, arms trafficking and actions by Albanian paramilitary elements in the FYR of Macedonia.<sup>(47)</sup>

#### Evaluation of international action

In the FYR of Macedonia, the international community has given priority to measures such as putting in place interposition forces and using its good offices. The international community's involvement in the FYR of Macedonia was a reaction to its concern to avoid any spillover of the conflict in the Balkans, in response to requests by President Gligorov, with the support of the then US President George Bush, for international guarantees of the country's security.<sup>(48)</sup> The multiplicity and complementarity of preventive measures adopted, together with the coordination that has taken place between the international organizations represented on the ground, make this, to a certain extent, a textbook example of conflict prevention.

In September 1992 the OSCE sent a 'Spillover Monitoring Mission' whose task was monitoring of the border between the FYR of Macedonia and Serbia with a view to preventing any spillover of the conflict in former Yugoslavia. The OSCE mission has a dual mandate: information acquisition (evaluating the degree of stability and recording facts) and good offices/mediation (promoting dialogue between the different ethnic communities and political actors). The monitoring mission is consequently assisted by the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), who is responsible for interethnic relations.<sup>(49)</sup>

In parallel with this, in December 1992 the UN set up UNPREDEP, its first preventive mission. UNPREDEP also has a dual, civil and military, mandate covering traditional peacekeeping tasks related to the social and political situation, under the responsibility of a special United Nations representative, and early warning by means of observation and reporting, and the exercise of good offices, added in March 1994 in order to adapt the mission to the developing internal law and order situation. But it also has an additional deterrent function through its military component, which is American, whose symbolic task was the first involvement of the US Army on the territory of former Yugoslavia.<sup>(50)</sup> The crisis in Albania and growing tensions in Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia have contributed to a renewal of its mandate and the cancellation of a reduction of its strength.<sup>(51)</sup>

Since 1991, the UN International Conference on former Yugoslavia (Peace Implementation Council), in particular the *ad hoc* working group on ethnic and national communities and minorities, has formulated detailed recommendations on relations between the two communities. In the FYR of Macedonia, NGOs also contribute to inter-community dialogue, the development of teaching in the Albanian language and democratization of the media. To begin with the European Union's role was limited, due to disagreement between member countries on the recognition of independence and consequently on the policy adopted by Greece. The EU has since made up for lost time by increasing economic aid in the framework of the PHARE programme and signed an Association Agreement.

In some ways, certain initiatives taken to stabilize the FYR of Macedonia constitute an example of effective coordination between international organizations and the complementarity of preventive measures. That was thus the case with the succession of those nominated to *mediate* between Greece and the FYR of Macedonia, by the European Union (Hans van den Broek), the United Nations (Cyrus Vance, and then Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance as EU and UN mediators) and bilaterally by the United States (Matthew Nimetz). It was also the case with the common wish to *integrate* the latter into the different international institutions (United Nations in April 1993, NATO's Partnership for Peace and the OSCE in 1995, Association Agreement with the EU in 1996), which is both a recognition of the results achieved at the internal level and an additional motivation. The European Union's 'power of attraction' and the desire for membership of international organizations are among the most important. As such, an Association Agreement with the European Union and economic aid have helped encourage continued internal reform, an asset that could be more systematically and effectively used in future.

However, the tensions between Western partners, like the absence of a priori coordination between international organizations in some cases, should be stressed for the benefit of future analyses. Thus, the difficulties that the European partners had in adopting a common position in the CFSP framework (on their attitude to Greece's policy, recognition of the FYR of Macedonia) and the absence of adequate decision-making mechanisms, initially restricted their ability to act and to use all the CFSP mechanisms and left the field open to American diplomacy. It was once again American mediation that, in September 1995, permitted the signature of an interim agreement and the normalization of the FYR of Macedonia's bilateral and multilateral relations. These divergences also prevented the use of WEU's conflict prevention capability in the framework of its Petersberg tasks, leaving the United Nations and the OSCE to act alone. Finally, inter-institutional coordination reveals a certain 'excessive zeal'. Thus, the composition and mandate of the UNPREDEP show a certain duplication of its tasks and those of the OSCE,<sup>(52)</sup> which results from unacknowledged competition between the two organizations. Admittedly, this led to cooperation in practice. It also goes without saying that the proliferation of similar measures adopted in parallel, particularly when these are political actions dealing with the immediate causes of a dispute, can only help check tensions in the short term. Nevertheless, the beneficial long-term effects of such a profusion could be relativized. The absence of a functional sharing of respective tasks may be to the detriment of their rationalization, in other words the 'broadening' of tasks may be detrimental to their deepening. The concentration of each organization on the tasks that it is most suited to carrying out must equally be accompanied by a certain functional complementarity, but that does not mean a strict division of labour.

A posteriori evaluation of preventive measures is something that has to be undertaken circumspectly. It is difficult, even arbitrary, to value their effectiveness, especially when they are still being applied: is peacekeeping the result of external preventive measures, or of local conditions that have determined the nature and effectiveness of international intervention? In other words, can preventive measures in themselves prevent conflict? Is peace the cause or the consequence, or a combination of both, of (internal) regional factors that are independent of (external) international action? Can the experience of the FYR of Macedonia therefore serve as a model for future preventive missions? An examination of preventive measures reveals both advantages and limitations.

There are many *positive* aspects. As regards the international presence: (a) the level and permanence of the international community's support indicate a determination to be involved based on a defined interest; (b) the clear definition of UNPREDEP's mandate and its dual military and civil nature define both its deterrent and persuasive capability. In the range of stages of conflict prevention, UNPREDEP lies midway between anticipatory (*pre-emptive*) initiatives and internal consolidation ('*pre-conflict building*'),<sup>(53)</sup> (c) the *simultaneous* presence of, and close *coordination* between international organizations allows for a division of labour among the political, economic, social and military fields, despite sometimes inevitable cases of duplication; lastly, preventive measures were implemented *sufficiently far in advance* of a potential conflict to allow them to be adapted progressively to the situation on the ground at the bottom end of the scale.

The second positive factor in the evaluation of results concerns the *internal* situation in the FYR of Macedonia. (a) The level of violence was very low. Despite polarization of the political scene, the mobilization of certain radical forces does not seem capable of calling into question the established order and the position of the moderates, while at the same time it remains a preoccupation that strengthens the case for permanent international support. (b) As regards timing, the internal situation, that is, the relatively low level of tension, permitted deployment of the preventive force and its adjustment to developments. (c) Lastly, the agreement of the authorities concerned, which is necessary for any preventive deployment and its maintenance in being, is still unanimous. Thus, to take just a few of the most significant examples, the OSCE and UNPREDEP missions made it possible to check and contain border incidents between Serbia and the FYR of Macedonia in 1992-93 at a time when the border between the two had not yet been clearly demarcated. Internally, they contributed, together with the HCNM, to the suppression of interethnic tensions, particularly in August 1993, February 1995 and again in early 1997.

Preventive measures do however have functional *limits*. To what extent are preventive diplomacy or intervention suited to the nature of new causes of destabilization, which are very diffuse, and what degree of external involvement is necessary for preventive measures to be *credible* and therefore effective? For example, to what extent does the presence of American troops constitute a guarantee against challenges to internal and external security in the event of tension in Kosovo? Lastly, how might the internal situation develop if the international community withdrew?

The effectiveness of preventive measures therefore also depends largely on regional actors' attitudes and political choices. (a) It has to be borne in mind that the absence of any military form of intervention on their part, or a deliberate choice of a policy of moderation, whether in order to avoid the negative consequences of destabilization of the region or because of different foreign policy priorities, is an essential element; that is the case with the policy of non-violence adopted by the Kosovo Albanians, whereas a change of attitude might give rise to doubts on the effectiveness of present preventive measures. (b) Again, some preventive measures may in the end turn out to be inappropriate. This could concern UNPREDEP itself, in particular its military mandate (unsuitability given the nature of the threats, lack of means), if the conflict spilled over,<sup>(54)</sup> despite the American presence, which is judged by some to be more symbolic than effective. (c) Lastly, economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro have aggravated the internal economic crisis, not only in the FRY but equally in neighbouring countries, and cost the FYR of Macedonia over two billion dollars.<sup>(55)</sup>

Evaluation of the various scenarios and appropriate solutions to them cannot omit an analysis of the intrinsic dynamics of regional problems. The appropriateness or otherwise of the means employed results from the perception of security in the countries concerned. The Macedonian government would thus want an extension of UNPREDEP's mandate, which would give it a guarantee against any internal destabilization due to the deterioration of interethnic relations, which Skopje considers to be the only real threat. It has therefore proposed that part of the SFOR be transferred to the FYR of Macedonia when it is withdrawn from Bosnia, and the setting up in Skopje of a NATO training centre in the framework of Partnership for Peace,<sup>(56)</sup> in order to guarantee the stability of the republic. The Albanian minority,

however, sees the international presence as a safeguard against any government policy of repression but rejects any function of protection against the Kosovo Albanians or Albanians proper, or of prevention of free circulation between the FYR of Macedonia and Kosovo. Hence the necessity to avoid any policy that applies different standards to the two communities. Without underestimating the internal dimension, some have however emphasized that the American presence has been more a gesture in the direction of Serbia than assistance to the FYR of Macedonia, a warning signal for Belgrade that entailed minimal military risk.<sup>(57)</sup>

## **Kosovo**

Numerous analysts have on many occasions stressed the risk of a conflict in Kosovo, yet without agreeing on the possibility that it could spread to the FYR of Macedonia, or vice versa. Three scenarios have regularly been put forward: (1) Kosovo as a permanent centre of conflict within Serbia if no acceptable solution is reached, leading to growing dissension between the two communities and the radicalization of both sides; (2) open civil war, if Kosovar Albanians give up the option of a peaceful resolution of their basic claims; (3) spillover to neighbouring countries, especially the FYR of Macedonia. The urgent requirement to find a solution to the Kosovo question is now recognized by the international community.

### The internal dimension

If the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians have *divergent historical perceptions*, each side claiming the primacy of its historic and cultural rights,<sup>(58)</sup> the deterioration in interethnic relations is rather the result of *political, economic and social imbalances* between the two communities. After harsh repression of Albanian demonstrations in the 1960s by the Yugoslav government of the day, Kosovo was given the status of autonomous province in 1969, then autonomous region, under the terms of the 1974 Constitution, and given its own institutions. However, the granting of autonomy immediately created tensions, being considered inadequate by the Albanians and excessive by the Serbs. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was growing dissent as a result of economic difficulties and a large increase in the Albanian population that led to a massive exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins. In 1981, large demonstrations by Albanians aimed at obtaining the status of republic for Kosovo ended, in 1989, in the annulment of the status of autonomy and the *de facto* imposition by the Albanians of direct rule, followed by the proclamation of an 'Independent Republic of Kosovo' in September 1991 following a referendum (in which 90 per cent of the population voted) and the creation of parallel institutions. Repression and violation of human rights, and a military presence, on the Serbian side, and radicalization among the ranks of the Albanians, ended in questioning of Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo and called for compromise as a matter of urgency. Economically, Kosovo is the poorest region of former Yugoslavia, and has one of the highest birth rates in Europe (nearly 3 per cent) and a very traditional social and family pattern. The Albanians challenge Serbia's economic and social discrimination as much as they do its political oppression. The Serbs for their part are concerned about the future of the Serbian population in Kosovo, drawing a parallel with the situation in which Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia found themselves in 1991.

Kosovo's future status, which is the subject of *divergent, antagonistic interpretations*, remains the key to the problem. Albanians see respect for minorities and effective control of the area in which they make up the majority of the population as a right to self-determination that they should be entitled to transform into a right to secession from a State that is mainly Slav and follows a policy of discrimination against them. Considering themselves to be a constituent people of former Yugoslavia under the terms of the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, they maintain that the suspension of their autonomy is illegal and claim independence for Kosovo within the borders recognized by the international community, with the status of neutrality.

The Serbs for their part see Kosovo as the cradle of the Serbian nation-state, which gives the question a strong emotional dimension, and are maintaining an approach to the issue in terms of minority rights in the respect of the national sovereignty of a multiethnic state and the territorial integrity of the Serbian State. Kosovo thus remains an internal matter, which would according to them, exclude a priori the status of wider autonomy or independence.<sup>(59)</sup> The Kosovar Albanians are one of the largest minorities in Serbia that, despite their numbers and geographical concentration, could not claim to be a constituent nation, especially as Kosovo was an autonomous region in socialist Yugoslavia. The status of Albanians in the FRY should thus be examined in terms of individual rights within a multiethnic State rather than the right to self-determination, which would follow from the collective rights of minorities.

The question of Kosovo and the way Serbian perceptions of it evolve forms part of the wider issue of how to accommodate the other minorities in Serbia, and, implicitly, the nature of the future Serbian State. A majority of Serbs now perceive demands for autonomy as a first stage towards secession that would lead to the creation of a Greater Albania on Serbia's doorstep and could precipitate similar claims in Vojvodina and Sandjak by the Hungarian and Muslim minorities respectively.<sup>(60)</sup> In practice, however, it seems hard to establish a direct causal link between Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandjak. The situation in Vojvodina differs from that in Kosovo, while Sandjak is reminiscent of the 'Kosovar model'. In Vojvodina, the representatives of the Hungarian minority have asked for a return to their autonomous status of 1989 identical to that granted to Kosovo in 1974, but the division between the communities is not so great. The representatives of the Hungarian minority, who are more open to dialogue with the Serbian authorities, are not claiming independence but autonomy and a fairer representation in central institutions; neighbouring Hungary has remained relatively discreet, essentially insisting on the need to find solutions within the framework of the Serbian State. In Sandjak, while the Muslims are not asking for independence, they are nevertheless seeking territorial and political autonomy, which was demanded by 98 per cent in a clandestine referendum in 1991. They have also created the beginnings of parallel institutions as in Kosovo. However, since February 1997, repeated requests for autonomy, more balanced representation in state institutions and teaching in the Bosnian language have raised Serbian fears of a questioning of the status of Serbia and the place of Serbs within it.<sup>(61)</sup> Sandjak forms the geographic link with Montenegro, but also with the triangle composed of Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia, and is the strategic passage to the Adriatic. Thus, despite the absence of any direct link between the three regions, a 'common' problem emerges for the Serbian part. In addition to the question of minority rights and the state of relations between the majority and the minority, for Belgrade it is a question of first establishing its view of the way the Serbian State itself should evolve, and the place of

Serbia. The Bosnian Serb factor must also be taken into account, because the fragility of the peace in Bosnia and the existence of contested regions such as Brcko could radicalize the position of some on many other aspects of the 'Serbian question'.

Closer analysis of the internal situation reveals a *changed situation in the FRY*. A *modified regional situation* is the first factor. Confounding certain predictions made in the West, the worst-case scenarios have not come about and the conflict in the Balkans has not been revived in Kosovo although it is considered to be the most unstable region in the peninsula. Neither the attacks claimed by the National Liberation Army of Kosovo nor the policy of settling Serbian refugees from Krajina in Kosovo has had damaging consequences.<sup>(62)</sup> The situation is, however, still delicate because of the deterioration in the political, economic and social conditions, and tensions could result from the return of some 160,000 Kosovar refugees from Western Europe. Despite Serbia's political, economic and military weakness following the Bosnian conflict, the Serbian Army is still significant, unlike that of neighbouring Albania. But continued military repression in Kosovo would have negative repercussions at the international level at a time when Belgrade is working for the reintegration of the FRY into international institutions.

A second significant development is that the *status quo* is increasingly difficult to manage on both sides. On the Serbian side, the exorbitant cost of using force to maintain control (some 35,000 police and 40,000 regular troops of the Serbian Army are stationed in the region) and the increase in the size of the Albanian population in Kosovo<sup>(63)</sup> are detrimental. Moreover, the *status quo* contributes to increased radicalization and divergences among Albanians, undermining unity and the consensus in favour of a pacific policy. Thus growing divisions between Ibrahim Rugova's Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)<sup>(64)</sup> and Adem Demaci's Albanian Parliamentary Party (PPK) reveal increasing impatience and tension, despite their leaders' appeals for unity and their desire to solve the problem peacefully.<sup>(65)</sup> The increasing number of attacks in Kosovo carried out by the 'National Liberation Army of Kosovo' against Serbs and Albanians suspected of cooperating with the central government, divergences over the Agreement on Education signed in summer 1996 by Milosevic and Rugova, and challenges to Ibrahim Rugova's strategy of non-violence are the most significant indications of this. Independence remains the preferred solution, but perceptions of the way to attain it differ. Radical elements within the two movements criticize the step-by-step approach, which they describe as passive, and dependence on the international community, and call for liberation through uprising. The moderate stream, for the most part intellectuals, on the contrary favours negotiation and compromise.<sup>(66)</sup>

Thus the majority of the parties, both Serbian and Albanian, see unwilling to risk an armed conflict, being aware that they would have to pay the consequences in terms of isolation from the international community, with a high cost in human terms for the Albanians and continued ostracism in the case of Serbia. Destabilizing effects could, however, result from transnational phenomena such as an exodus of Albanian refugees, illegal arms transfers or the actions of certain paramilitary elements in Kosovo. During the recent crisis in Albania, the closure of the borders between Serbia, Albania and the FYR of Macedonia was specifically designed to check the entry of Albania insurgents and control border incidents. However, while such measures prevented the massive transfer of arms to Serbia, particularly due to the

difficult terrain, that was not the case with the FYR of Macedonia, which has no natural frontiers and an army numbering only 13,000.<sup>(67)</sup> The Albanians are united when faced with a common threat, and it is highly improbable that any section of the Albanian world would remain indifferent if one of them were subjected to massive repression. Without abandoning their vision of an independent Kosovo in the long term, the Albanians nevertheless realize that their chances of achieving independence are for the moment very small.

The emergence of contradictory, conflicting tendencies within the Serbian political class is another determining factor in the new equation. Two-edged, it could either contribute to reduced room for manoeuvre for leaders who might put forward political solutions to the problem of Kosovo, or alternatively allow outbidding in pursuit of policies that could in turn lead either to a hardening of positions or to real progress.

The role of Slobodan Milosevic is the first factor. In 1989 Kosovo was his hobby-horse. Faced with a loss of legitimacy at home, he could once more instrumentalize the issue, which would make any compromise unlikely, as that could weaken his authority. The Agreement on Education has not been applied, which seems to confirm that it owes its existence more to the desire of the two leaders to consolidate their legitimacy in their own camp than to the setting up of a substantial dialogue. During the political crisis in Serbia at the beginning of 1997, Kosovo was not used for internal political purposes by either Slobodan Milosevic or the opposition, either because of the absence of any strategy on Kosovo or for fear of the internal imbalance that such a re-evaluation could cause.

The second factor is the rise of the opposition, both 'moderate' and ultra-nationalist, and the weakening of Slobodan Milosevic's influence are other important factors. The elections of September-November 1997 have confirmed the erosion of his popularity in favour of the ultra-nationalists.<sup>(68)</sup> In general the problem stems from the forming of an identifiable opposition, discontented public opinion in the widest sense - including the media, police and armed forces - and the development in Montenegro of a moderate tendency that is opposed to Slobodan Milosevic's policy and in favour of equitable power sharing within the Federation. This internal struggle to consolidate power could have consequences for the situation in Kosovo, as rivalries are reflected by turns in conciliatory or intransigent attitudes. Whereas a few months ago any idea of negotiating was officially rejected and foreign mediation seen as interference in Serbia's internal affairs, the rapid development of an internal democratization movement could open the way to new arrangements. The attitude taken by the opposition's leaders, but also their ability to form a common position and practical strategy and policy, will be determining, and could lead the government to define its position on Kosovo and also to begin a process of negotiation. However, the Serbian opposition, although often represented as being uniform in its policy, includes various leanings and was only momentarily unified in its opposition to the present government. Politicking got the better of the 'virtual unity' of the Zajedno 'moderate' coalition, as shown by its implosion in autumn 1997 during the electoral campaign. The alliance of Vuk Draskovic, leader of the Serbian Renewal party and former coalition leader, with Slobodan Milosevic, also underlines how fragile allegiances are and the strong likelihood of reversals on a political stage that is still dominated by Slobodan Milosevic.<sup>(69)</sup> The strong showing by the nationalist parties in the elections also shows that they are still capable of capitalising on the anxieties of a population

that is still affected by the war, internal political rivalries and concern over Serbia's future. The coalition has no precise political and economic programme or coherent foreign policy. Its leaders, including Zoran Djindjic and Vuk Draskovic, who are described as modernist, democrat reformers, were none the less apostles of Serbian nationalism and Greater Serbia at the beginning of the Bosnian conflict;<sup>(70)</sup> their democratic credentials have yet to be proved. All parties making up the opposition share the government's views on the question of minorities, particularly in Kosovo and Sandjak. They have not put forward any alternative solution, which works to the advantage of Milosevic whom it even accuses of making excessive concessions by accepting a return to the status of 1974. Lastly, the opposition fears that if a debate were opened on these questions it would lead to a lowering of their esteem in the eyes of the public.

It remains to be seen whether the positions of certain leaders will change with the support of, or under pressure from, the international community and the possible increase in their power. The danger is that the debate on constitutional principles may become an issue in the struggle for power within Serbia in which the ability to arrive at a compromise will be subordinated to fear of the 'political cost'. If a weakened central government used the Kosovo question to distract attention from domestic problems, discord and the internal political struggle for power in Belgrade could gain the upper hand over the search for a solution.<sup>(71)</sup> The Serbs of Pristina are another important factor: their worry is that a dialogue takes place to their cost, and that political tensions in Belgrade could reduce the guarantees of their security. Within the Serbian Resistance Movement recently formed and led by Momcilo Trajkovic, they are demanding the establishment of a national consensus among Serbs on the Kosovo question.<sup>(72)</sup>

On both sides, however, maximalist positions seem increasingly difficult to maintain, since new, more flexible and realistic propositions are making headway, promoting the beginning of dialogue on the region's future status that was previously unthinkable.

Neither of the two parties is inclined to accept a return to the 1974 status of autonomy, which is considered to be limited by the Albanians and excessive by the Serbs. Some Kosovar leaders have therefore proposed solutions within the FRY. In general, the position adopted by Albanian representatives is to support Kosovar independence with the status of federated republic within a remodelled FRY, in the framework of a confederation of three sovereign states, the status of autonomy now being accepted as a *fait accompli*.<sup>(73)</sup> Some, like Adem Demaci, have suggested the creation of a sort of Balkans federation, midway between claims for independence and the principle of inviolability of borders, as the sole alternative to independence and the only guarantee of stability, thereby opening a debate in the Kosovo Coordination Council on the strategy that should be followed.<sup>(74)</sup> In their view, this solution excludes an institutional *rapprochement* between the Republika Sprska of Bosnia and Serbia, as such an eventuality would risk introducing an imbalance to the Serbs' advantage.

On the Serbian side, some intellectuals, who are in a minority, have put forward alternative solutions, which have by the way been strongly criticized. Apart from Professor Kristic, who has raised the possibility of partitioning Kosovo, the president

of the Serbian Academy of Sciences, Alexandre Despic, by describing Kosovo as 'the most important strategic problem for the future of the Serbian people', in July 1996 suggested the demographic imbalance between the two communities as a reason to propose 'a peaceful, civilized secession', because of the political, economic, military and psychological burden that Kosovo represents for Serbia.<sup>(75)</sup> Among opposition leaders, Vuk Draskovic has stated his support for a high level of autonomy, Zoran Djindjic a form of regionalization and Vojislav Kostunica limited decentralization.<sup>(76)</sup> Moreover, a recent poll revealed the Serbs' wish to attempt a dialogue with the Albanians, which indicates an evolution in public opinion and the importance that the attitude of future leaders in Belgrade could have.<sup>(77)</sup>

The partition of Kosovo remains a difficult solution, although a tempting one, because it would make it possible to bypass the search for a common denominator among Albanians and Serbs, and may in part have been legitimated at the international level by the Dayton agreement. Apart from the insurmountable obstacles to the dividing up of the patrimony, which has been the subject of heated debate in Serbia, it is illusory to imagine that territory could be ceded as a preliminary gesture. *Only an Albania and a Serbia that are politically and economically stable would be able to undertake a dialogue on the question of Kosovo in the context of an overall regional settlement.*

#### The regional dimension

This situation also reveals the divergences between Macedonian Albanians, Kosovars and Albanians proper. Representatives of Albanians are not politically united, and the Coordination Council set up in 1990 to coordinate the policy of the whole Albanian movement has not managed to reach agreement.<sup>(78)</sup> The Macedonian Albanians, benefiting from a more dynamic economic situation, for the most part do not identify with the situation in Kosovo or Albania, and this therefore slows down any secessionist tendency. The growing divisions within the Albanian world, within the LDK, between the latter and Albania, and among the Albanian diaspora on the question of Kosovo's future status are equally significant. Several seats of power seem to have emerged, as if the national entity that is Albania had a cultural pole (Kosovo) and an economic pole (the FYR of Macedonia).

Most countries in the region have reservations over the independence of Kosovo, being concerned about possible chain reactions in the region and the wave of refugees that it could produce, or even the creation of a 'Greater Albania'.

Greece fears that spillover of any conflict could destabilize neighbouring countries. The absence of any preventive strategy by the West towards this 'Pandora's box' has thus for long worried the political classes. The worst scenarios imagined from time to time, particularly at the height of the war in Bosnia, have therefore included the involvement of Albania and Turkey in a conflict, in parallel with a weakening of Serbia.

Albania's stance on Kosovo has evolved since 1991. Tirana's official position, which consisted in keeping atheist, communist Albania separate from Kosovo, has changed to one of support in principle for the unification of the Albanian nation, counting on modifications of the regional balance in favour of Albania.<sup>(79)</sup> Internally, the question of Kosovo and the wish for unification have made it possible to distract attention from

the difficulties of political and economic transition. However, while the Albanian government has recognized Kosovo's independence, *de facto* rather than *de jure*, it is not a priority for Tirana,<sup>(80)</sup> which is too weak economically, politically and militarily, and faced with a period of transition whose outcome cannot be foreseen. Indeed, even if it is critical of the Serbian and Macedonian governments regarding their Albanian minorities, the Albanian government has in the main been more moderate than the Kosovar and Macedonian Albanians.<sup>(81)</sup> As in the FYR of Macedonia, the new Albanian government favours a policy of non-interference and moderation, which is received in different ways by the various tendencies within the Albanian movement in Kosovo and leads to divisions within each of them.<sup>(82)</sup>

#### Evaluation of international action

The preventive measures adopted in the case of Kosovo have been limited, the international community, in particular the European Union, having been more worried about Bosnia than Kosovo. Although it considers that it is in Kosovo that the next conflict could break out in the region, it has not drawn up any specific strategy, restricting itself to a few broad guidelines, essentially amounting to pressure on the Serbs over respect for human rights and minorities, and the necessity to grant autonomy to Kosovo within the Yugoslav Federation. Moreover, the Serbian authorities' rejection of the idea of an international presence, in this instance the OSCE, in a matter that they see as internal, again raises the question of the dependence of any international action on the decision and will of the states concerned.

It was only latterly, out of concern that there could be a chain reaction in the region, that the international community defined an official position. It is opposed to any fragmentation in the region and has promoted a settlement within the new Yugoslav Federation, adopting the following criteria: the FRY's territorial integrity and autonomous status, yet to be defined, for Kosovo. The absence of greater pressure once again shows the predominance of Bosnia, the main Western actors wishing to avoid conflict with the Serbian government, an important player involved in the signature and implementation of peace agreements in Bosnia, which could hamper political and economic reform and the current process of democratization.<sup>(83)</sup>

Recognition of the FRY by some European countries, the fact that the Kosovo question has never been addressed by the Badinter Commission (which recognized the right to self-determination of federal units but not that of the communities within them) and its exclusion from the Dayton peace agreement in order to permit its signature by Milosevic have given the Kosovar Albanian representatives the impression that the international community has applied double standards, no rights similar to those granted to Bosnia (independence and special links with neighbouring Albania) having been granted to them. That has contributed to the polarization, within the Albanian movement, of the radical tendency and those in favour of dialogue.

In September 1992 the OSCE dispatched three long-duration preventive missions, with a mandate to carry out traditional peacekeeping and surveillance, to the zones of potential conflict in the FRY - Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. Like that in the FYR of Macedonia, they had a function of obtaining information (on human rights and the treatment of minorities) and good offices (intercommunity dialogue). After their

withdrawal, which followed the refusal of Serbia to accept any international interference, coordination of the policy to be followed was undertaken by the working group on ethnic and national communities and minorities of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre and the European Union's observer mission. These developments confirm the effectiveness of international coordination for the exchange of information and updating on the situation on the ground, even when there is no mission in place.

However, the context in which the OSCE missions have been set raises several questions and indicates certain limitations. They were deployed despite Serbia's reluctance, which saw them as interference in its internal affairs. They were only accepted by the federal presidency of Milan Panic, having previously been rejected by Slobodan Milosevic on behalf of Serbia. The departure of the former in June 1993 thus also put an end to the OSCE presence.<sup>(84)</sup>

The question of Kosovo has nevertheless remained on the agenda of the OSCE, the United Nations and the European Union. Albeit belatedly, the international community has established a number of principles and guidelines. (a) The Kosovo question must be resolved within the framework of the FRY in order to avoid any change to borders in the region, both as a matter of principle, given the experience of Yugoslavia, and for fear of creating a precedent that would lead to a chain reaction, but equally in order not to weaken the Serbian opposition, which is considerably divided, or the present government, which for the moment is the only partner with whom peace can be negotiated in Bosnia. (b) The Kosovo question will only be resolved by peaceful settlement of differences and dialogue between the two parties. (c) The lifting of the sanctions against Serbia is subject to strict conditions regarding human and minority rights, and resolution of the Kosovo question through the non-discriminatory application of international law. Any internationalization of the problem, whether through an international conference or secret negotiations along Israeli-Palestinian lines, seems out of the question for the moment.<sup>(85)</sup>

The role of the international community and the evolution of the regional situation are of prime importance here. Instruments like conditionality, pressure in the form of positive and/or negative sanctions to promote the process of internal democratization, respect for human rights and settlement of the question of Kosovo within Serbia or the FRY, may prove deciding factors if used wisely.

### **General evaluation**

It can be concluded from the two case studies that the attitude of the other countries in the region, the international community's position and the divergences among the different segments of the Albanian nation regarding the type of policy to adopt and the means to realize it do not yet make it possible to identify the possible outline of a political solution. Divergences between the various Albanian communities and within each of them, and their historic, economic and cultural diversity, have produced several seats of power and therefore different interests. *The political management of differences and the instigation of appropriate preventive measures is thus subordinate to finding a modus vivendi, not only among Serbs and Kosovar Albanians but also among moderate and radical Albanians.*

The most pressing question is to establish the extent to which the Kosovar Albanians will compromise with the central government, where the limits to non-violence lie and how far it will be possible to contain the growing radical tendencies within the Albanian movement so that they accept the different but parallel destinies of different contiguous States and autonomous entities. The attitude of the Serbian government, which is reluctant to change the rules of the game, will also be crucial. An 'internationalization' of the process of resolving the problem could therefore prove necessary, at least through the definition of criteria that are acceptable to the international community, and the policy to adopt, which remove any ambiguity surrounding its attitude.

If the gulf that has appeared between Serbs and Albanians has *de facto* contributed to the creation of a parallel society in Kosovo, such a schism has not occurred in the FYR of Macedonia, where reforms are in hand and where a majority of Albanians seem to be in favour of internal reform. While many analysts reckon that the probability of armed conflict is lower than formerly, trends towards improvement must not be allowed to obscure the fragile nature of government and the recomposition of internal political forces in the FYR of Macedonia, Serbia and Albania.

The end of the war in Bosnia has led to a *rapprochement* between the Macedonian government and certain Serbian parties in the FRY that are worried by a resurgence of Albanian claims, in particular because the Republika Srpska has been given the right to set up links with Serbia, which could be seen as a precedent by the various Albanian communities.

The process of stabilization in the FYR of Macedonia is still fragile, as was shown by the confrontations of July 1997. The consequences of the crisis in Albania, uncertainties over the process of democratization in Serbia, the rise in violence in Kosovo, interethnic tensions in the FYR of Macedonia and the instability of the peace in Bosnia all give cause for concern. The repeated requests for autonomy voiced by the Hungarians of Vojvodina and the Sandjak Muslims are additional sources of tension. The forthcoming elections in Serbia and the FYR of Macedonia could affect the balance of the forces present on the internal political scene in the direction of increased moderation or radicalization. The issues at stake and the international community's resultant responsibilities are considerable. In considering a conflict prevention policy all of these variables must be kept in mind.

## **THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE**

As far as the international community is concerned, the concepts of national sovereignty and territorial integrity take precedence over the right to self-determination, which is interpreted 'very broadly', in particular because of the difficulty in determining the principles to observe when there are many allegiances and positions are difficult to reconcile. It might however be asked whether, and if so to what extent, the Dayton peace agreement may have weakened the credibility of solutions based on the integration of broad multiethnic entities, by partially legitimating the principle of the separation of communities on an ethnic or religious basis, as in Cyprus or Ireland, favouring fragmentation at the very moment that the European Union is taking the path of integration. Lastly, it would seem useful to define which of the available instruments might be adapted to meet existing threats. The various ways of preventing conflict, from demilitarization to international control and military intervention, will be examined. The question of the primacy of political solutions involving a range of long-term concerted actions, including crisis management, conflict resolution and political, economic and cultural development on a regional level, will also be considered.

Analysis of the two case studies shows the specific characteristics and dynamics of each of these disputes. The application of certain conflict-prevention rules cannot disregard particular solutions that are adapted to the nature of each conflict. The interdependence of Kosovo, the FYR of Macedonia and Albania does not hide the fact that resolving the problem of Kosovo is a priority for the prevention of other conflicts in the region.

Intervention by the international community, particularly the Europeans, is becoming even more essential. Yet the European Union still has no coherent strategy for a region that directly and indirectly threatens some of its immediate interests because of geographic proximity and possible political, economic and military consequences, as well as the credibility of the restructuring of the European Union; more than just random policies are consequently required. The European Union has a duty towards the Balkan part of Europe, which must be considered as forming an integral part of the European continent and the current integration process. By looking at the lessons for international politics that can be drawn from the Yugoslav conflict one can evaluate the preventive measures adopted since the beginning of the 1990s in Serbia and the FYR of Macedonia, and make suggestions regarding principles, conditions and means.

### **Evaluation of international involvement in the Balkans**

The conflict in Yugoslavia, although different from the two case studies, in that it is a matter of crisis management rather than conflict prevention, has however brought out the difficulty that the international community has in resolving intrastate conflicts. It has therefore appeared important to look at conflict prevention in Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia in the light of the lessons drawn from the Yugoslav conflict.

Divergences between Western countries constituted the first pitfall in management of the Yugoslav crisis. During the course of the conflict, attempts to define common

interests came up against a renationalization of foreign and security policies (with different approaches to a solution of the conflict through either the maintenance or the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation, support for certain countries, or unilateral actions) and an affirmation of the principle of sovereignty, both of which were harmful to the coordination of policy. The absence of a common evaluation thus had repercussions on the way the conflict developed and magnified differences within existing collective security frameworks, although it is true that the demands of conflict management arose before a CFSP had been worked out and the Maastricht Treaty had been signed in 1992. It was the absence of guidelines and criteria, rather than any lack of knowledge of the region's problems,<sup>(86)</sup> that often led to simplistic analyses and one-dimensional policies whose impact could have been greater had they been decided jointly and in line with a precise strategy accompanied by specific conditions.<sup>(87)</sup>

Persistent disagreement between the countries of the European Union and the United States also largely explain the failure of successive proposals of ways to end the conflict, such as the rejection of plans suggested by the Europeans and/or Americans, or procrastination over the type of policy to adopt and the lengthy decision-making process.<sup>(88)</sup> The Contact Group, whose creation made it easier to work out areas of agreement on Bosnia between Europeans and Americans, with the contribution of Russia, is a new but *ad hoc* instrument of multilateral diplomacy.<sup>(89)</sup> Again, in the face of European inadequacies, the Yugoslav conflict highlighted the ability of the United States to impose decisions in the NATO framework and its determining role as guarantor of credible action. However, the tardy involvement of the United States as a result of internal domestic concerns and the 'Vietnam syndrome' of a majority of the American military and Congress, and the desire of Europeans to take charge of defence questions in Europe, are additional reasons to define a better distribution of Euro-Atlantic responsibilities and tasks.

Secondly, the inappropriateness of the security organizations, the inadequacy of crisis prevention and management mechanisms (operational capabilities, a mandate, decision-making procedures), and the divergent positions of member countries, deprived NATO, the EU and WEU, the United Nations and OSCE, themselves undergoing restructuring, of the institutional and operational capability and political authority necessary to implement an effective policy as from the first phases of the conflict. Neither the European Union, which was only just beginning to redefine the Maastricht Treaty and the detailed arrangements for a Common Foreign and Security Policy, nor Western European Union, which still had no operational capability, were able to intervene. NATO itself, which was conducting an in-depth review of its post-Cold War nature and role, and the UN, tarnished by its ordeals in other international conflicts, hesitated to become involved. As for the OSCE, the blocking of its decision-making process by the Serbian veto, and Russian reservations, prevented intervention by the only European security organization whose primary task is to prevent conflict in Europe: although it includes all European countries, suspension of Serbia's membership and the Conflict Prevention Centre's lack of a specific mandate or operational means hampered, even later, the possibility of action on its part.<sup>(90)</sup> The Western approach has finally helped to legitimate, in the heart of Europe, principles in conflict with the very foundation of the process of integration and enlargement of the European Union: *de facto* territorial partition along ethnic, religious and cultural lines. While the Dayton peace agreement may have allowed the cessation of hostilities and

the beginning of reconstruction, it has nevertheless frozen the situation on the ground: partition by other means is taking place, as shown by the policies followed by the majority of Bosnian leaders, whether Serb, Croat or Muslim.

The OSCE, a European regional organization recognized as such under the terms of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, has successfully adapted some of its structures to post-Cold War conditions. It has opted for flexibility in the main areas of conflict prevention (humanitarian, arms control, human rights) and has developed operational tools free of the constraints of prior consensus (the High Commissioner for National Minorities, long-term observer missions). The Dayton agreement gave it new political legitimacy in accordance with its multifunctional approach, which requires only limited interference (exploratory missions, the supervision of elections, checks on respect for human rights). It can therefore now contribute effectively to early warning preventive measures.<sup>(91)</sup> However, the absence of coercive means limits the extent of its actions, which therefore remain 'soft' measures that depend on compromise between the parties in conflict as much as on international pressure. The OSCE mechanisms are effective only when accompanied by substantial political and/or military power projection by actors such as the European Union or NATO, whose institutional complementarity is essential at certain operational levels. Further, its pan-European structure and very large membership, and the possibility that any member state can veto the adoption of a mandate for a mission, constitute a lack of inflexibility and an obstacle to any effective selective intervention. In this framework, the United Nations remains the favoured organization for the legitimation of the use of force, and has the greatest experience in peacekeeping operations. This division of labour should also permit a closer correlation between, on the one hand, politico-diplomatic actions and international economic aid and, on the other, acceptance by local actors of measures proposed to them.<sup>(92)</sup> NATO has an important deterrent capacity. This coercive dimension is more appropriate for crisis management, following the outbreak of a conflict like that in Bosnia. It is ill-suited to the type of threat encountered in the Balkans, which are 'soft' security issues and would require preventive measures. This explains the reservations of certain countries over its use as a means to enforce Security Council resolutions, or even with an OSCE mandate.<sup>(93)</sup> WEU could consequently acquire a more important role.<sup>(94)</sup> As a forum that brings together the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that are linked to the EU through Association Agreements, it appears to be the organization *par excellence* for dealing with security issues at a regional level. Its capacity as instrument of the European Union, and the strengthening of its operational capabilities, now allow it to conduct operations under a mandate from the UN, OSCE or EU, or from one of the full members of WEU, in the NATO framework in operations carried out by the Europeans or under the aegis of WEU, using CJTF assets or FAWEU (multinational forces that member states make available to WEU). WEU's operations on the Danube and in the Adriatic to impose the international embargo on Yugoslavia and its provision of a police force in Mostar produced modest but encouraging results. However, while the Amsterdam Treaty increases the possibility of joint WEU/EU actions, progress is still slow and the essential problem of flexibility in decision-making has yet to be resolved, which means that there continue to be numerous definitions of a 'Europe of security'. As the Albanian crisis showed recently, withdrawal and inaction prevailed, to the detriment of consensus and joint action, whereas it was typical of possible WEU missions, and was both a political occasion and an operational test for the EU and WEU. Greater cohesion in practice between the

CFSP mechanism and WEU would facilitate requests made by the EU to WEU to carry out military operations out of area. A redefinition in practice by the EU of the role of WEU in conflict prevention or peacekeeping operations as an operational agent of the CFSP would help strengthen the coherence and political credibility of EU preventive action by reinforcing its economic, political and military components and WEU's operational effectiveness.

In short, *the institutional complementarity between international organizations signifies not so much an accumulation of means that can be used simultaneously but rather taking advantage of their different functions, not simply because of their individual capabilities but also because these are appropriate to prevention at different stages in the rising intensity of conflicts.* In the case of Yugoslavia, NATO, with its military capability, was the only organization that could credibly have intervened, but it could not make up for the absence of a policy for the management of the transition of the former Yugoslav republics to independence. With hindsight it is acknowledged that once hostilities had begun limited action by NATO could have helped stop the conflict, and in particular could have prevented ethnic cleansing. But it would still have been necessary for these actions to be accompanied by an appropriate politico-military strategy backed by the indispensable unity of the Western countries. Faced with the Yugoslav crisis, the international organizations thus ended up pursuing a policy that was reactive, rather than anticipating events. It became evident that 'compartmentalized management', in which each organization deals with just one aspect of the problem without this amounting to a true division of labour, led to an overlay of duplicated, even contradictory policies, rather than complementarity. Far from producing a solution to the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, it simply contributed to reducing its scope.<sup>(95)</sup> Some think that even the Dayton agreement has only 'created a fragile fabric of tasks given to separate international organizations without providing for a framework to coordinate their activities: NATO for the cessation of armed conflict, the United Nations for the restoration of police forces, the OSCE for organizing elections, the High Representative for reconstruction . . . the Dayton model does not merit reproduction'.<sup>(96)</sup>

The international community seems to favour politico-diplomatic approaches rather than any military option, which leaves much scope for preventive action by the European Union. More than just the questions of Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia, it is the unity and coherence of the European Union that are at stake, for its credibility will inevitably be eroded if there is a persistent inability to define a common position on strategy and listing priorities in South-East Europe. The interdependence of the various factors reduces the margin between low-intensity and high-intensity conflicts. The process of 'recasting' the Balkans depends to a great extent on the goodwill of leaders within the region and the ability of countries outside the region, in particular European countries, to form long-term strategies based on a comprehensive approach. Coherence and coordination of Western policy are necessary conditions for the region's stability and security. The aim of this paper is to suggest a range of means that could contribute to an improvement of the situation in the region, as well as its position in relation to Europe as a whole, rather than to identify abstract, inflexible tools for conflict prevention.

## **Towards a framework for conflict prevention in the Balkans: policies and implementation**

The international community has explicitly recognized that there continues to be a critical situation in certain parts of the Balkans, and that there is a need for preventive measures. Prior identification of the causes of the dispute will determine the options available to the international community, in particular the European Union in cooperation with other international organizations.

The European Union has an important role to play in conflict prevention within the framework of the CFSP. On the one hand there are many reasons why stability in South-East Europe is in the European Union's interests. Any conflict in the region would have a direct and indirect impact on the security of countries in the West, even if it presents no a priori threat to their vital interests (territorial integrity, economic and social stability). The proximity of the area of potential destabilization, the possibility that the conflict could spread and the difficulty in controlling its nature, intensity and extension once it has started constitute a first reason. Certain members of the European Union, such as Greece and Italy, are more directly affected by population movements, waves of refugees or negative economic consequences. The involvement of Greece and Turkey in, or in the margins of a conflict, if only to contain it, would risk transferring Greek-Turkish tensions to another area to the detriment of European Union and Alliance cohesion, at the very moment when efforts are being made to bring about a *rapprochement* between these two countries. A heightening of tensions in Kosovo and spillover into other regions such as Vojvodina and Sandjak, and neighbouring countries such as the FYR of Macedonia and Bosnia, would present the Union with new challenges. Consequently, any destabilization would have a negative effect on the European integration process and security, as the conflict in Bosnia demonstrated. What is more, economic, social and political difficulties (migration and refugees, Mafias, arms transfers and other essentially transnational risks) in this part of Europe would affect the rest of the continent.<sup>(97)</sup>

In addition to interests, the European Union also has a series of comparative advantages that make it one of the most appropriate bodies for implementing 'soft' preventive measures. The Union's power of attraction is one of the main tools at its disposal. The present period of transition and the wish of Central and East European countries to join existing political and security structures presents a unique opportunity for the European Union to participate directly in the current process in order to stamp its own, European identity on it. In this, the Union has a series of instruments: political (Association Agreements, membership, CFSP mechanisms), economic (aid in the framework of the PHARE and TACIS programmes, and customs union) and security (Article J.7 of the Amsterdam Treaty, by which the EU can request WEU to undertake peacekeeping operations, preventive deployment and crisis management). This *momentum of integration*, with its associated political and economic implications, should make it possible to initiate a policy of convergence in the framework of CFSP. The European Union should thus have the opportunity to improve its image and affirm its credibility in both Europe and the United States, particularly since the difficulties encountered in Yugoslavia have allowed the Americans and NATO to reap the political dividends. Moreover, setting a common objective could contribute to consolidation of the CFSP and lead to progress beyond the general proposals contained in the Treaty on European Union and in the direction

of a more practical conflict prevention framework. At a time when a thorough review is being carried out of Euro-American relations and the European Union's determination to be a fully-fledged player on the international scene, there is a unique opportunity for it to make its mark on the political and security development of the European continent. However, this 'reorientation' should be accompanied by the definition of common positions and actions under the terms of Article J.7 of the Amsterdam Treaty and the development of infrastructures and mechanisms that permit the effective attainment of such objectives. The European partner countries will, however, have to set in place more appropriate mechanisms to enable them to reach a consensus (on either the reintegration of the FRY in the OSCE as a means of applying pressure and an instrument of motivation, or on the contrary the maintenance of its suspension as an instrument of conditionality), particularly in times of crisis, and adopting a common position on enlargement of the Union to include all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

As there is no general conflict prevention mechanism, it is difficult to determine appropriate models in advance. The complexity of internal disputes and the obstacles that are inherent in any collective action (the definition of short-term and long-term aims, divergent interests and perceptions of the correct type and extent of involvement and the right to intervene) are the main difficulties in evaluating the preventive measures to adopt, which necessarily vary from case to case. Thus, as the case of the FYR of Macedonia has no endogenous, immediate risks of armed conflict, long-term measures are needed; for the Serbian province of Kosovo, where radicalization and polarization considerably increase the risk that a conflict could break out, more urgent, decisive measures are more appropriate. The *time factor* is an essential element in conflict prevention. It implies a causal distinction that determines the means to be used. Thus, the two case studies could constitute two 'ideal types' that would imply two different models: (1) in the case of independence, which signifies a process of *consolidation* of the state, as in the FYR of Macedonia, the objective of conflict prevention is the long-term *stabilization* of the situation; (2) in the case of the possible granting of *concessions* such as autonomous status, as in Kosovo, preventive measures are aimed above all at the *suspension* of the conflict in the short term. This distinction suggests the use of different means for the day-to-day prevention of conflict.

In what follows, we shall first evaluate possible objectives for the European Union in the FRY and in the FYR of Macedonia and the general principles that apply to any action. We shall then describe the means available, distinguishing between short-term and long-term measures, specifying the conditions corresponding to each stage in their application, while bearing in mind that the definition of what constitute adequate means is influenced by the analysis of the nature and intensity of the conflict, without which measures decided upon could have only limited or even no effectiveness, or even prove counterproductive. The use of means that are unsuited to the nature of a conflict (for instance, short-term measures applied to long-term issues, or 'soft' measures applied to urgent problems) can lead to a distortion or aggravation of the situation on the ground, and the parties in conflict may divert measures whose impact is in any case relative, not to mention the loss of external actors' credibility.

## Principles for determining policies

Policies of preparing action are facilitated by the preparedness of internal actors to favour dialogue, and on their room for manoeuvre, as well as on the will and ability of external actors to accept the required degree and duration of involvement. Moreover, international principles governing secession and autonomy, which are defined very broadly in the Charter of the United Nations and by the OSCE, have not really evolved (on issues such as who decides, by what majority, on which territory and using which borders).

The different levels of escalation and their potential evolution remain an essential factor in the two case studies. In the FYR of Macedonia, most of the political forces present are in favour of integration and reform from within, yet allowing a place for intercommunity dialogue, but political radicalization may gradually limit the existing room for manoeuvre. The international community's support for a continued internal democratic balance is a priority as an element of legitimation if not an additional guarantee of the credibility of reforms undertaken by the government in the face of radicals and 'undecideds', who are preoccupied by the economic and social crisis.

In Kosovo, on the other hand, deep antagonisms and the gulf separating the two communities show the urgent need for dialogue and *rapprochement* which, on both the Albanian and Serbian side, is still dependent on the arrival on the political scene of leaders who are prepared to accept the responsibility to compromise. We have seen that the *status quo* risks becoming no longer controllable, either by the Albanians (because of the radicalization and division of the movement) or by the Serbs (because of demographic imbalance, the military cost and international and internal pressure). Consequently, while a just solution may only be foreseeable in the long term, short-term measures should permit an immediate reduction in tension and the gradual restoration of a climate of confidence (with suspension of the conflict), which are essential for any negotiation to take place yet without prejudging the outcome.

The international community has defined certain general objectives: on the one hand, the control of any desire for self-determination, in order to avoid any haphazard and destabilizing fragmentation at the regional level; on the other, the adoption of measures to protect minorities, as part of an overall view and approach, in both cases, which, although interdependent, are not structurally linked.

Certain guiding principles can thus be identified: the historical variable, which is not determining, can be left to one side; the immediate political, economic and social causes of the dispute justify the use by the European Union of preventive means, which it has, in the short and medium term, in close coordination with other international organizations; on these bases, the future status of Kosovo, which is one of the underlying causes of the dispute, can be the subject of a long-term settlement. The final outcome will still be dependent on the prior re-establishment of confidence between the two communities (using short-term measures), without which the beginnings of dialogue, *rapprochement* and then a solution are hard to imagine. More precisely:

- External actors should not restrict themselves to imposing solutions regarding the protection of minorities, constitutional status (autonomy, partition, independence,

protectorate, federation or confederation), or an innovative solution incorporating a combination of these factors. A forceful policy will often be necessary, even determining. However, it will be all the more likely to work if it obtains, sooner or later, the consent of the parties concerned, and in order to achieve that attempts to take their considerations into account.

- The international community should therefore limit itself to support (*facilitating*), providing good offices/mediation (*mitigation*) and the provision of the expertise and diplomatic instruments needed for the restoration of a minimum of confidence during periods of transition, a necessary condition for any long-term solution.

- Each organization involved in inter-institutional cooperation should act in accordance with its own capabilities, a framework for *coordination* being much more important than a rigid division of labour. Likewise, the choice of and coordination between international organizations will depend on the nature of the dispute, which determines the chosen preventive approach - bottom-up (the regional approach) or top-down (offensive or progressive measures) - as well as its duration.

- Lastly, a combination of political, economic and financial incentives (persuasion) should be arranged as part of a wider regional and/or European scheme (Association Agreements, the possibility of membership), and sanctions applied in the form of negative (deterrence) and positive (motivation) conditionalities. The development of economic relations is a matter of priority in that it cannot wait for an improvement in the political climate, which is a long-term process. Since, however, it is dependent on it, it must be carried out in parallel.

Objectives: in Kosovo

The difficulty in implementing preventive measures such as observer and early warning missions results from the difficult situation on the ground, and from the refusal of local authorities to accept observer missions, exacerbated by the FRY's political isolation, which deprives the international community of numerous ways of acting, indeed of applying pressure. Moreover, by delaying a decision on a clear, medium-term strategy, the European Union risks once again allowing the United States to take priority in what is the European security space.

The situation in Kosovo, which is beyond the preventive stage, calls for rapid measures to suspend the conflict. Short-term and medium-term measures include respect for human and minority rights, and the removal of economic and social disparities.<sup>(98)</sup> The restoration of confidence is the principal objective to be attained in the short term, and the essential condition for any preventive strategy. Finding a solution must involve the promotion of dialogue between the parties in conflict. It is important to develop informal contacts on a strictly bilateral level, which can help regularize intercommunity contacts and dialogue, and might subsequently permit clarification of respective minimal and maximal positions. The unofficial involvement of a third party as part of 'track-two diplomacy' may persuade the parties to negotiate in a 'problem-solving' approach.<sup>(99)</sup> Unlike mediation, this approach does not offer any specific solution but aims to promote a gradual solution put forward by the parties themselves, not by immediate negotiation but by tackling the underlying causes of the dispute (in this instance, Kosovo's status and sovereignty) and listing each party's

concerns in order to work out the details of a mutually acceptable solution. It amounts to 'shuttle diplomacy'.

However, the centralization of power, and therefore decision-making and action, in Serbia, the absence of any credible opposition and the conditioning of the population on questions of minorities and borders following the war in Bosnia, like the acuteness of the problem of Kosovo, make action at state level (governmental and official), in other words 'track-one' diplomacy, more likely. 'Track-two', informal diplomacy is important in that it puts in place accompanying measures like confidence-building, either in advance or in parallel, but has neither the credibility nor the means of applying pressure and the economic, political and military motivation that are essential for effective results. For example, shuttle diplomacy (like that of San Egidio) can make it possible to negotiate the signature of an agreement such as that on education between Milosevic and Rugosa but does not have the range of means of applying pressure that would allow it to influence measures on administrative or constitutional reform. The regional situation, where in Albania and the FYR of Macedonia there are moderate governments, presents a unique opportunity for the Serbian government to take the initiative and begin informal dialogue. This would underline its wish for *rapprochement* and improve its tarnished image, at both the international level and internally. It would be at liberty to choose the presence (or not) of a mediator, either an international organization (EU, OSCE, UN), a country (the United States) or an external personality.

Long-term objectives should aim at removing the underlying causes of conflict, in other words the question of sovereignty and settlement of the legal status of Kosovo. Two necessary conditions have already been mentioned: the mediating role of external actors, the only involved parties that are capable of producing a viable solution, and the need to avoid mutual recrimination in order to permit a constructive discussion of current problems, the different frameworks for conflict resolution and practical policies. There is a range of possibilities lying between minimalist and maximalist positions, between 'non-starters' and 'dream solutions', between secession and total control of a territory. The choice of a framework for conflict resolution will depend on the perceptions of the actors concerned and the way these evolve.

Short-term measures

#### *Political measures*

Respect for minority and human rights and the implementation of the process of internal reform is the first measure to be taken. A *strict conditionality* is attached to all of these measures: respect for *human and minority rights* (both individual and collective) is a minimal prior condition; secondly, the aim of conditionality is internal political and social *democratization* (freedom of the media, free and fair elections) as well as the establishment of contacts with a view to dealing with the Kosovo question. Once again, these measures will only have tangible results in the long term, and it is on the basis of this assumption that a solution must be sought. Lastly, democratization also implies *diversification* of partners. The support of opposition forces should be an alternative. It must, however, be qualified: the absence of a political programme, the nationalist rhetoric of certain opposition parties or leaders and the fragmentation within them that is often momentarily overcome through tactical or even opportunist

alliances, as was the case with the Zajedno coalition in Serbia, make a prior evaluation based on the facts necessary.<sup>(100)</sup>

The *reintegration of the FRY* into international bodies (OSCE, the World Bank, IMF). The FRY's participation in international decision-making and the end of sanctions would constitute: for the Union, a lever and a means of *control* that is much more important than the exclusion of Serbia, which 'could successfully link the issue to Yugoslavia's suspension from CSCE meetings, thus pointing to a conceptually incoherent policy of taking confrontative [*sic*] measures (namely the suspension) while simultaneously demanding cooperation with regard to the Mission's work. The non-participation of the State concerned had thus undermined the very foundation of cooperative security policy'.<sup>(101)</sup> Secondly, it would encourage the process of *democratization*, by creating conditions that favour the emergence of a democratic trend in the internal political scene. The break with Serbia's international isolation would then have positive repercussions on the internal debate, in that it would draw Serbia closer to the democratic procedures in use in international bodies. Lastly, despite the official refusal displayed by the Serbian authorities, their wish to rejoin the international community is still very strong. Doing so would allow them to regain some political credibility, develop economic relations that are necessary for stabilization of the country and fuel the process of internal (re)legitimation of all political forces.

However, the perspective of reintegration should be subject to strict conditionality in order to ensure real conformity between the accomplishment of conditionality criteria and effective reintegration, since too rapid decisions, as happened in Croatia, deprive the international community of the main lever likely to guarantee the success of measures implemented. Thus, in the case of the FRY, reintegration should be made clearly conditional upon respect for minority rights. More specifically, it should first concern an end to repression and secondly application of the agreement on education. Implementation of these measures should give rise to a formal undertaking by the international community to reintegrate the FRY in the OSCE. That presupposes the definition of a common approach by, on the one hand, France, for whom prior reintegration constitutes a determining motivation, and, on the other, Germany and above all the United States, who consider it to be one of the most effective sanctions.

Conditionality should be applied to all the actors present so that it is able to guarantee a real process of dialogue. The international community, in particular the European Union, has at its disposal a series of specific instruments, ranging from economic and financial aid to the establishment of diplomatic representation and then to Association Agreements. The United States opened an Information Centre in Pristina in 1996, and the European Union is on the point of setting up a liaison office,<sup>(102)</sup> which would permit the exchange of information and more practical possibilities for mediation. Moreover, an EU presence would be proof of guaranteed European involvement. Lastly, it could open the way for a gradual return of OSCE exploratory missions and good offices/mediation, and greater EU visibility, thus increasing the opportunities for contacts between the parties. Later, a WEU presence might also be envisaged. It goes without saying that the international community's clear, unambiguous support of respect for human rights cannot be subject to conditionality. However, the opening of a European Union office could be the occasion to mention the necessity to begin an informal dialogue between the two communities as part of confidence-building, not at

the official level but in the framework of track-two diplomacy, by NGOs such as San Egidio. Support for the effective implementation of the agreement on education, through both NGO mediation and pressure from the international community, should be followed by a promise by the Albanians to participate in the electoral process, which could only be to their advantage at the internal level. Inclusion in the Royaumont process of more sensitive questions such as minorities and borders, which are real barriers to regional cooperation, would give the Union a certain control over reforms such as practical internal and cross-border projects.

### *Economic measures*

*Targeted economic aid* and reconstruction programmes: would give the Union a means to apply *pressure* simultaneously on the Serbian authorities, the Kosovo Albanians and the Albanian government. This would enable it to link economic aid to the democratization process, the implementation of internal reforms and respect for human rights, particularly in Kosovo, as well as to work towards reconstruction in Albania. The establishment of a link between the economic and political domains in these three centres that are in the process of transition could prove to be one of the most important points in the process of overture and dialogue on the Kosovo question. Secondly, they would add a wider *economic* dimension: it is illusory to hope that there can be any true internal political democratization without at the same time a re-launch of the Serbian economy. The deep economic crisis is of a structural kind and of such breadth that it could act as a brake on any democratization process. Again, the development of good-neighbourly bilateral relations among countries in the region and multilateral relations, or even a true Balkan market, cannot happen without the participation of Serbia. Not only would this link Serbia to regional partners' development by ending its isolation: it would be beneficial for the process of economic and political reconstruction throughout the region. Such reconstruction of the economic landscape would actually reforge the network of political and economic links between the countries of the region that was interrupted by the war in Yugoslavia. For the European Union, the development of economic links with the Balkan countries would allow it to acquire a market that is important, especially for certain members of the Union that are either neighbours or main investors, such as Germany, Greece and Italy.<sup>(103)</sup> This short-term measure, whose real effects will only be apparent in the long term, justifies the need rapidly to define a development policy.

The economic dimension, with its potential for spillover into the political domain, must be an essential area where confidence-building measures are taken. There is no doubt that the countries of the region are seeking to develop economic links, principally with the European Union. However, the economic crisis within the Union and the low competitiveness of regional products make the development of such relations difficult. For each of these countries, the Balkan region remains the natural outlet, regarding economic development, in the short and medium term. While many of their products are in competition rather than complementary, Community aid can nevertheless be rationalized by targeting the development of big, interdependent regional projects.

In more practical terms, economic measures would require a growth in investment and economic aid both at the national (Belgrade) and regional (Pristina) level. As we have seen, the gulf, in terms of economic development, between Albanians and Serbs

is one of the main sources of intercommunity tension. It adds to Kosovo's isolation, especially as the development of economic links with an Albania that is in a state of crisis has for the medium term been compromised. Further, sanctions against Belgrade strengthen the Serbian government's unwillingness to compromise and its ability to rally the population against the outside world, while at the same time weakening the intermediate layers of the population, which are the only potential source of change to democratic government in the medium term. The unequal allocation of economic aid in the region also accentuates regional disparities. The European Union's economic aid is to a great extent limited to the programme of economic reconstruction in Bosnia and aid to Albania, while the FRY and Croatia are still excluded from the PHARE programme. Now, the creation of a 'Balkan market' should group together all the countries in the region, and would be difficult to achieve without the FRY. In that sense extending the PHARE programme to include the FRY could be a first step. The distribution of economic aid would however presuppose an identification of actors in order to avoid a repeat of the Bosnian scenario. The allocation of aid to the known, 'identifiable' actors present has in reality contributed to support for factions that have taken part in the conflict, and to the channelling of aid to the war effort and therefore to the dispersion of Community aid. Moreover, most projects have overlooked transfrontier logic (road and rail networks, etc.) that could promote interdependence, indeed solidarity, in the long term. The logic of compartmentalized investment runs the risk of worsening already deep divisions by leading to a competition for resources.

It is in this perspective that the Union's regional approach would constitute the most appropriate framework, as aid programmes would only really have any chance of succeeding if they were included in a regional setting. It would allow a better allocation of aid among the actors and their diversification, as well as rationalization of the implementation of regional projects. It would in addition constitute a conditional measure *par excellence*, as the granting of economic aid could be directly linked to the implementation of internal reforms, both political, that is the democratization of the media and respect for minority rights, and economic, the implementation of projects promoting transfrontier cooperation at the local and regional level. Transformation of the EU's Royaumont process from an essentially bilateral approach to a unique multilateral framework could be proposed. It would also be necessary to find additional funds to allow the development of new projects that should be evaluated at the end of a predetermined period of time. The Royaumont process and the South-east European Cooperation Initiative should be complementary.<sup>(104)</sup> These initiatives should, however, attempt to be complementary by getting away from the 'implicit competition' in which the United States and the Union are engaged in the region, which is increasingly leading to the proliferation and duplication of regional initiatives.

### *Military measures*

Military measures must be undertaken in parallel with political and economic measures. Arms transfers in the region, particularly between the different Albanian communities, and the appearance of armed bands of terrorists, point to the need for arms control in the region. Yet regional approaches, such as Partnership for Peace in the strictly military domain, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in the political domain and the OSCE, which are best able to deal with questions of arms control,

confidence-building measures and civil-military relations, do not include the FRY in their membership. While it is certain that such membership is not on the agenda, the prospect and promise of membership in the future, conditional upon respect for human rights and an end to repression, should not be excluded. It would be an effective motivation in the medium term. It would also reinforce the credibility and effectiveness of these initiatives by allowing them to attack the heart of the problem. It seems pointless to propose multilateral confidence-building measures at the regional level while leaving aside the country where there is a major risk of destabilization, in both political and military terms, and which moreover lies at the heart of the Balkan peninsula. A 'strengthened' Royaumont process would offer an adequate framework for the combining of political, economic and military conditionality. Future incorporation in the OSCE, and a link with regional tables in the Stability Pact, would permit intensification of measures such as transfrontier cooperation, technical and scientific regional cooperation as well as the signature of treaties of good-neighbourliness, and the process of regional disarmament, which promotes the development of targeted projects such as exchanges of military personnel and the definition of arms ceilings.

It is important to emphasize that conditionality must involve a combination of 'carrots' and 'sticks' rather than be based exclusively on sanctions, which prove counterproductive in the short and medium term. Without flexibility and the leverage that motivation constitutes, sanctions reduce room for manoeuvre and make it necessary to opt for a policy of 'all or nothing', and in so doing suppress the means for applying pressure and the international community's gradual control at the various stages of negotiation. Conversely, motivation, when used wisely, enables local actors to justify certain policies in the eyes of local public opinion and to prevent any instrumentalization of attempts to compromise by more radical groupings. Some actors might be tempted to block the process, either in order to prevent a consensus that could cost them dearly on the domestic political scene, or else to put pressure on the international community. Mixed conditionality would also allow the Serbian leaders for example to avoid damaging their internal 'legitimacy', by demonstrating the value of negotiation and cooperation.

#### Long-term measures

In the case of Kosovo, the long-term strategy essentially concerns the political domain and should deal with:

- the freezing of constitutional questions and the opening of a debate on the future status of the FRY should be preconditions for the establishment of confidence-building measures in the short term. The difficulty of the problem and bilateral tensions would lead to the failure of any attempt to negotiate, and perpetuate the current stalemate;
- the reintegration of the FRY in international bodies;
- the constitutional status of the FRY;
- the regional approach and the prospect of association with the European integration movement.

*Maintenance of the status quo.* The situation in Kosovo has not developed into armed conflict as had been predicted in various scenarios. It is less worrying than in some other parts of the European continent, and seems to be under control. Even the crisis in Albania has had no direct effect. However, as has been seen, the Albanians' dissatisfaction with their status within the FRY, continuing human rights abuses and the growing radicalization of part of the Albanian movement make the situation fragile and unstable, and the *status quo* consequently unacceptable.

*The status quo ante.* The disappearance of Yugoslavia and the change in Serbia's status within the FRY has modified the basic elements of the problem for the Albanian community, ruling out any comparison with the 1974 status. What is more, the deterioration of bilateral relations and the war in Bosnia have greatly damaged the little confidence and mutual respect that remained, completely excluding any return to a subordinate, subsidiary status. The Albanians find themselves for the main part alone in facing the Serbians and, if they are to continue to be fellow-travellers, want a status that grants them what might be termed 'minimal equality'. This bilateral relationship between Serbs and Albanians that has emerged is all the more important because for the first time it gives the latter the rank of actor (influencing their future) and no longer 'subject' (that suffers the development of the situation).

*A new configuration.* The following two options constitute terms of reference for a voluntarist definition of the evolution of the Kosovo question.

- *Serbia as an integral Serbian nation-state.* In this case, Serbia is seen as an ethnically pure State from which Albanians are excluded. This perception of the Albanians as a 'foreign body' may eventually contribute to the perception of Kosovo as a burden. The Kosovo Albanians could declare their neutrality, rule out any union with Albania, promote respect for the Serbian minority's rights and obtain the benefit of international guarantees.<sup>(105)</sup>

Independence and autonomy are however considered unacceptable by both parties, the first being rejected by the Serbs and the second by both. Independence, the Albanians' preferred solution, does not however have the support of the international community: it raises a priori problems of definition concerning self-determination and could also lead to a chain reaction, in particular in the FYR of Macedonia, as the evolution of each Albanian community's status is likely to effect that of the others.

Partition does not seem to be a realistic solution, as it is excluded by both the Serbs and the Albanians. Certainly, many border changes have been made since the end of the Cold War, either peacefully, in the case of federations (Germany, Czechoslovakia), or through war (Bosnia). Those who advocate a fair sharing-out overlook the psychological dimension and tend to forget the obstacle that subjective perceptions and national symbolism represent. It is unlikely that there would be a consensus on such a solution, whence the difficulty of imagining a 'velvet divorce' following negotiations. Moreover, the idea of partition based on the right to self-determination on the principle of demography could easily be taken up by the Albanians in the FYR of Macedonia, or elsewhere in the region, at least in the medium term. Lastly, the peaceful redrawing of borders would be difficult in the

Balkans, as the memory of recent conflicts is still too fresh, and the process of democratization not yet sufficiently well rooted.

The question of Kosovo must therefore be posed in a broader regional context. It is in that framework that the concept of Bosnia as a variable comes in. The wish of Serbia to develop specific links with Republika Sprska and bring about a gradual *rapprochement* may affect the choice of Kosovo's future - within Serbia or the FRY - in the direction of greater autonomy or even independence within a federation. That implies the development of links between the Republika Sprska and Serbia itself and the FRY, and *de facto* partition of Bosnia. An extension from the economic to the political domain is hard to imagine, if only because of the absence of a wish for this on the part of those involved and the existence of a strategy of *rapprochement* with the 'motherlands'. However, the question will arise whether, and if so to what extent, a Republika Sprska that is peopled with Serbs and is certainly poorer economically, but nearer, would not be more vital and valued than a Kosovo peopled with Albanians the control of which, for both political and demographic reasons, will be bound to decline.

- *Serbia as a multiethnic, multicultural State.* Analysis of the situation suggests that any approach to the Kosovo question is for the moment bound to remain in the framework of greater autonomy, which is yet to be defined, within a renewed Serbia or a new democratic, decentralized Yugoslavia. Such a solution stems from the necessity to settle the conflict. Firstly, 're-federalization' would include both the principle of autonomy/independence within a federation and that of respect for territorial integrity. It would therefore be presented by Belgrade not as an instrument of secession but as a way of maintaining a balance between the different communities. It corresponds to the right to self-determination excluding secession, in other words a negotiated form of internal secession, that is likely to accommodate ethnic conflicts without any territorial changes. Secondly, it would allow management of the transition until all the optimal conditions for a long-term solution had been met. It would be conditional upon respect for the Albanians' political, economic and cultural rights but also those of the Kosovo Serbs. Such a solution would have the merit of giving time a chance by allowing Serbia to evolve towards greater internal democratization, the only thing that is likely to open up different prospects.

This solution also corresponds to the position taken by the European Union and the international community in general, in that it respects the inviolability of borders and states' territorial integrity, and avoids any chain reaction and destabilization in the region.<sup>(106)</sup> A solution along these lines only has the support of a minority of Serbs and a proportion of Albanians, as was seen earlier. It may however be viewed as an opportunity to be seized, a definite solution or a way to ensure a peaceful transition to more acceptable forms of cohabitation. It implies the definition of a series of principles as a code of conduct: peaceful means for resolving differences, bilateral negotiations, the possibility for a community to achieve self-determination and the acceptance of this definition by all. Above all, it infers respect for human rights, in particular the ending of discrimination and repression.

Autonomy, whatever form it takes, would have to be constitutionally codified. This option therefore raises the question what means would permit a federal model, that is the definition of federal structures and various possible forms of autonomy.

Rethinking the level of autonomy implies rethinking the federation, a solution that in itself constitutes a compromise for both parties and must thus be seen as forming part of an implicit evolutionary process. Several models of federal arrangement have for long existed.<sup>(107)</sup> They nevertheless have certain limits: none of these models functions in an entirely satisfactory way; however, each can be considered a specific case by its geographic situation (proximity, risk) and different international guarantees; these solutions would make it possible to reconcile diametrically opposed positions: the independence advocated by the Albanians on the one hand and the limited autonomy and protection of minorities that the Serbs want on the other.

Objectives: in the FYR of Macedonia

Western strategy regarding the FYR of Macedonia has only been partially defined, particularly by the United States, which has, albeit implicitly, defined its interests and aims in the region: the nature of its presence in Europe, its role within a NATO that engages in crisis prevention and management (Bosnia, the Greek-Turkish dispute, the Middle East).

The Macedonian government's commitment to internal reform, the dialogue with the Albanian minority and the predominance of moderate forces on the political scene cannot, however, hide the radicalization of certain political forces and the growing tension between a part of the Albanian movement and Macedonian public opinion. The details of a new arrangement would include: the position of Albanians in the FYR of Macedonia; support for moderate forces; a continued international presence. Extra measures to deal with possible regional instability (in Albania, Bosnia or Serbia), which could have direct or indirect consequences, will have to be considered.

Short-term measures

#### *Political measures*

Recent economic difficulties (including the failure of the pyramid system) and tensions between the two communities suggest that practical support should be given to the efforts made by the ruling moderate coalition. The deepening of reforms begun in order to assure a fair representation of Albanians within state institutions and guarantee education in the Albanian language should be the subject of immediate but gradual measures so as not to exacerbate intercommunal tensions. The introduction of quotas, or a lowering of the requirements for university entrance could for example be made conditional upon use of Macedonian and the prospect of the introduction, in the medium term, of lessons given in Albanian, all of this forming part of practical scientific and technical assistance (libraries, computer equipment) and training in the PHARE and TACIS programmes. This would form a packet that systematically linked political and economic measures. The international community's presence in the FYR of Macedonia should follow a dual policy, aimed simultaneously at supporting all the moderate forces, who see their room for manoeuvre being reduced, while at the same time keeping up the pressure on the radical forces, whose excesses should be met by a policy of political and economic containment. Pressure on just the moderate forces to apply reforms could actually push them towards a more radical position. Only a balanced approach that includes both positive and negative conditionality would enable the moderate forces to strengthen their position within the FYR of Macedonia.

### *Economic measures*

The nature of economic measures is more complex than in Kosovo. The Albanian community is much richer than in the neighbouring province. However, the reorientation of Albanian investment in the western part alone is a severe blow to the economic sector as a whole. Investment should thus be directed on the one hand towards each community separately concerning funding of local projects (help to free enterprise, construction) and on the other hand towards large-scale projects (infrastructure and the banking sector, such as the development of north-south and east-west road and rail links), taking into account the participation of both communities. A double conditionality on the allocation of projects and funds could thus be established concerning the Macedonian authorities and the Albanian community for joint projects. The complementarity of Community and SECI policies in the development of projects in both the public and private sectors would help rationalize economic aid. Regional structures correspond to the government's wish to intensify economic relations with all of its neighbours on the basis of equidistance. As it is land-locked, the country's economy can in the long term only develop on the basis of increased trade with neighbours.

### *Military measures*

These considerations raise the question of the international presence in the FYR of Macedonia. The normalization of the country's relations with its neighbours means that references made in the last few years to an 'external threat' are no longer appropriate. However, uncertainty over developments in the region and national consensus may justify a continued international presence, and not withdrawal or too large a reduction in its size, which would 'give time a chance' and leave room for manoeuvre for the moderate forces while allowing them to consolidate. The OSCE and United Nations missions could thus also be maintained and in particular develop the civil aspects of their mandate, as the short-term and medium-term problems are essentially domestic. UNPREDEP could continue to monitor borders and guard against spillover. The OSCE could concentrate more on the development of confidence-building measures and intercommunal dialogue. A reduction of UNPREDEP, in particular American troops, does not meet the country's requirement for stability. NATO is unsuitable for dealing with the type of problem found in the FYR of Macedonia (economic and political transition, interethnic relations), which call for measures closer to preventive diplomacy. Likewise, the likelihood of external aggression has diminished and been replaced by internal problems. It was not NATO as an organization that was mobilized for surveillance of the FYR of Macedonia's external borders at the time it was considered that a real threat existed. Despite the Macedonian authorities' wish to see NATO troops on their territory, NATO's operational capabilities are not a priori intended for preventive deployment as such, as Bosnia is a case of crisis management and conflict resolution. On the other hand, a strengthening of the Partnership for Peace ('PfP-plus'), which is a privileged instrument of conflict prevention, might be considered, while at the same time taking into account its readaptation. The crisis in Bosnia has shown the relative impact of the training of military personnel and the necessity to intensify contacts as well as to develop the most appropriate means, if PfP's true aim is to act as a preventive

instrument and not simply as an alternative security framework for the countries that are not included in NATO enlargement.

The continued presence of multinational UN troops, or even their reinforcement by WEU forces, given the enhancement of WEU's peacekeeping capability after Amsterdam and Erfurt, particularly if there is a gradual reduction of American troops, could be a credible alternative.<sup>(108)</sup> Again, WEU as a European forum for dialogue will have to re-examine the detailed arrangements for its cooperation with the FYR of Macedonia following enlargement of the EU to include the three Central European republics and the possible re-evaluation of their status within WEU (regarding the participation of third countries in WEU peacekeeping operations as Petersberg missions for example, or programmes for the exchange of military personnel).

Long-term measures

#### *Political measures*

The question of the Albanians' status within the FYR of Macedonia is part of the process of consolidation of the Macedonian state in the long term and cannot be the subject of prior negotiation. It could be the logical conclusion of a policy of normalization of intercommunal relations in the long term, even if such a prospect is unlikely in practice. More generally, it raises the question of the civil or ethnic definition of the State. A solution might be found by giving greater importance to the civil definition of the Macedonian State. That would amount to strengthening the Albanians' *de facto* status by slightly modifying the preamble to the Constitution to give a broader definition. Reference to a 'nation-state of the Macedonian people' could be modified to read 'a State of Macedonian citizens', which would give the Albanian minority complete equality with the Macedonian population.<sup>(109)</sup> Although inspired by the French model, this solution could however meet fierce opposition from Macedonian nationalist parties like the VMRO or the newly formed LDP, for whom any measure of this type that favours Albanians would imply a dilution of Macedonian identity. But the constitutional status of Albanians could also be denuded of any significance in the event of genuine participation and representation in political and economic life, which can only happen in the perspective of membership of a wider regional framework.

The EU should re-think its policy regarding South-East Europe, particularly concerning the FYR of Macedonia, as it did for Romania and Bulgaria. Without amounting to a prior promise of membership, this measure could form part of an overall approach to conditionality in the longer term.

#### *Military measures*

It is only if there is such a framework in the short and medium term that confidence-building measures such as an increase in the number of Albanian officers in the armed forces, in the PfP framework, or arms control in the OSCE framework, will succeed. If an additional foreign military presence might be controversial, particularly to the Albanian who would perceive it as a move directed against them, a training centre for military personnel in the PfP framework would allow better coordination of civil-military relations, the exchange of personnel and the participation of Albanians.

Again, WEU could consider a re-evaluation of the status of the FYR of Macedonia during a period that remains to be determined. That would permit enlargement of the organization as a forum for dialogue and would be in line with its training function, particularly if an appropriate representation of Albanians was taken into account.

## CONCLUSION

More than a simple requirement, the prevention of conflicts in a region as complex and turbulent as the Balkans is becoming an imperative and must be adapted to each case. The tools available for conflict prevention are inadequate to meet all of the threats of the post-Cold War period, which stem more from societal security issues than from the traditional balance of power problems. The approach needs to be thought out afresh with a view to not only having a wider range of preventive instruments but also to the more effective coordination of all governmental and non-governmental actors that might be involved, in order to avoid any overlap or duplication of effort, which could produce the opposite effect to that desired. But one of the essential factors remains without doubt the clearly declared political will of the international community or individual countries to become involved in conflict prevention and promote the effective implementation of decisions taken.

On the European continent, and still in relation to the two cases studied here, such a re-evaluation is all the more relevant since it goes hand in hand with the process of European integration and the reconstruction of the political, economic and security landscape of the European Union, whose inability to prevent conflicts in its own environment raises questions about the coherence and cohesion of its institutions. It therefore has a pressing interest in conflict prevention.

However, in a turbulent region like the Balkans, the European Union can only act as a mediator, primacy in decision-making and action falling to the actors directly concerned. As the perception that there is an advantage in compromising has to come from the local level, preventive measures will have to be accompanied by strong incentives to comply. As already seen, the European Union has a palette of mechanisms in the economic, political and social domains that allow preventive measures to be implemented that would tend both to prevent conflicts from breaking out and stop them from spreading; whence the necessity to apply sanctions and conditionalities simultaneously. It is only once the majority of local actors, both at the governmental level and among the public, perceive that more will be gained by cooperation than by pursuing a conflict, that preventive measures will be able to attain their true objective.

Integration into European institutions and the regional approach are the two main levers at the disposal of the European Union, the provider *par excellence* of 'carrots' in all countries of the region. It will be difficult to speak of European 'integration' if all of South-East Europe has not in one way or another been brought on board. The process of European integration proposed by the European Council at Copenhagen in 1993 and the regional cooperation in the framework of the process of stability and good-neighbourliness initiated at Royaumont in 1995 as a conditionality measure for countries left outside the enlargement process could otherwise end in failure.<sup>(110)</sup> In themselves true conflict-prevention measures, they will ultimately be factors of political stability and economic development involving a market of over 150 million people, with direct consequences for the European Union. The interdependence of political and economic problems, and the possible spillover of conflicts, also suggest an overall approach, and this should contribute to the creation of a feeling of a 'security space' within which countries would share responsibility for their common

destiny. The importance of borders would be relativized as part of gradual regionalization, as it would be for Europe as a whole, to which countries in the region would progressively be able to become associated. In the same way, greater freedom of trade at the regional level and increased interdependence would relativize the concept of autonomy. This perception, which is already old, is mentioned from time to time by some of the region's leaders. This implies firstly a series of practical measures: an agreement at the regional level on the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity, which should stimulate the adoption of bilateral and multilateral measures; assertion of the principle on the non-use of force in the settlement of differences; partial demilitarization, although desirable, appears unlikely to be achieved given the lack of confidence and instability in the region, which tend to produce the opposite effect. If demilitarization happens, it will be a consequence rather than a prior measure and is thus a long-term goal. Controlling the flow of arms is on the other hand necessary and could lead to practical measures for limiting arms transfers in the region. An extension of the CFE Treaty to all of the Balkans might be a possibility. The OSCE's capacity for arms control and prevention or mediation could be extended to integrate local police forces. Their complete replacement, which is sometimes suggested, would be difficult as it would constitute an infringement of State sovereignty. On the other hand, the possibility of reducing their numbers and employing them under the control of United Nations or OSCE civil police and observers should not be excluded.

A rationalization of existing regional approaches would be useful. The plethora of initiatives, which sometimes leads to the overlapping or duplication of measures, or even competition between countries, acts to the detriment of a coherent overall approach. In the same way, the priority given to economic measures, without any parallel development of political and military ones, may prove fruitless, especially if it is limited, as in the case of the SECI, to the development of private financial investment. In the military field, Partnership for Peace is intended to be an alternative to NATO enlargement, from which the Balkans are excluded. As it stands, it is not an adequate security instrument. Its results are limited in the field of 're-education' of the armed forces and police, as in the case of the crisis in Albania. A strengthened Partnership for Peace for all of the region might therefore be envisaged. The experience of reconstruction in Western Europe after the Second World War underlines the necessity for economic reconstruction to proceed at the same time as political reform in the creation of regional structures so as to allow the development of growth and cooperation in the economic field. Political and economic aspects thus form the two 'pillars' of successful reconstruction.

Examination of the European Union's regional initiative also reveals the absence of any clearly defined vision of an overall strategy for the Balkan region. The 'regional approach' is limited to the countries of former Yugoslavia involved in the Bosnian conflict, with the possibility for neighbouring countries like Albania and the FYR of Macedonia to be associated, and deals only with economic issues. The prospect of joining European institutions itself constitutes one of the most important conflict-prevention measures. While there can be no systematic membership unless the relevant criteria are met, it does permit the beginning of a dynamic movement by fixing a goal to be attained by the countries concerned that could become a one-way process.

1. See Michael E. Brown. 'The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict', in *The Internal Dimensions of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), pp. 571-601. In examining the causes of conflict, the author shows that immediate factors are more important than chance circumstances, the primacy of the role of élites over explanations given to the general public and external forces over exclusively internal causes, and the importance of understanding their mutual interaction, and therefore of considering them in an overall framework of analysis. While it is acknowledged that there is no 'international community' that can be identified as a single, unified actor, the expression will be used frequently in this paper for convenience to indicate international groupings whose composition can be deduced from the context.

2. Andrew C. Janos. 'Continuity and Change in Eastern Europe: Strategies of Post-Communist Politics', *East European Politics and Societies*, vol.8, no.1, Winter 1994, pp. 1-31, esp. p. 7. Benjamin Most, Harvey Starr and Randolph M. Siverson, 'The logic and Study of the Diffusion of International Conflict', in Midlarsky (ed.), *Handbook of War Studies* (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 111-139. Alicia Levine, 'Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Conflict', in Michael E. Brown (ed.), *The Internal Dimensions of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), pp. 311-40, esp. p. 312.

3. It is important to 'dissect the different motivations that neighbouring states have in these situations', which range from 'comparatively benign interventions aimed at relieving humanitarian suffering and restoring regional peace and security; defensive interventions aimed at safeguarding national security interests; protective interventions designed to shield ethnic brethren who are being persecuted; opportunistic meddling designed to further political, economic, or military interests; and opportunistic invasions. Of course many interventions are driven by a combination of considerations, and states always try to characterize their actions in benign terms, regardless of their true motivations.' Michael E. Brown, op. cit., pp. 25-6.

4. For a plea in favour of conflict prevention, see Michael S. Lund, 'Underrating Preventive Diplomacy', *Foreign Affairs*, July-August 1995, pp. 160-3.

5. Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts - A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 28-9.

6. Article 33, para.1 of Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates that 'The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice.'

7. Michael S. Lund, op. cit. in note 5, p. 37.

8. In *An Agenda for Peace*, preventive diplomacy is defined by the Secretary-General of the United Nations as action 'to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur . . . Preventive diplomacy requires measures to create

confidence; it needs early warning based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding; it may also involve preventing deployment and, in some situations, demilitarized zones.' Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (New York: United Nations, 1992).

9. Michael E. Brown, op. cit. in note 2, p. 28.

10. In practical terms, a catalogue of instruments to be used in the long term would include the following: the security dimension and in particular arms control (their sale, transfer, control through notification and international monitoring); negative perceptions in the political, economic and cultural fields (democratic institutions, that is institutional reforms introducing a federal system and the principle of local autonomy at a level to be determined in each case); proportional representation in all state institutions (power-sharing) is not favoured in these cases, as rigidity in apportioning as a function of pre-established quotas encourages more than it reduces ethnic divisions, and consequent demographic imbalance generally leads to tensions in the medium and long term; respect for human rights and their inclusion in the constitution as one of the foundations of the state; lastly, economic reforms, information campaigns and above all control of the media have an essential place. Michael E. Brown, 'Internal Conflict and International Action', op. cit. in note 1, pp. 603-27.

11. Ibid.

12. This in turn is made up of the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM), the Socialist Party of Macedonia (SPM), and Abdurahman Aliti's Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP). The Liberal Party (LP), which was in the coalition, has been in opposition since February 1996, when a crisis broke out between the two main parties in the governing coalition, the SDSM and the LP over monetary policy, privatization and accusations of corruption.

13. Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian Unity, created in June 1990. Heir of the historical IMRO, a terrorist group whose aim was the autonomy of (geographic) Macedonia within the Ottoman Empire, it advocates the establishment of a 'Greater Macedonia' that includes Bulgarian and Greek Macedonian territory. Christophe Chiclet, 'Dix peuples et quatre voisins pour un seul territoire', *Le Journal de Genève*, 7 August 1992. Duncan Perry, 'Politics in the Republic of Macedonia: Issues and Parties', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 23, 4 June 1993, pp. 31-7, esp. p. 34. *SWB EE/2921 A/12*, 17 May 1997.

14. Led by Petar Gosev, it emerged from the split of the Democratic Party (DP) and its merger with the former Liberal Party (which has since become the DPM).

15. This resulted from the split of the Party of Democratic Prosperity of Albanians (PPDA) of Arben Xhaferi and Menduh Thaci, and its union with the People's Democratic Party (NDP) of Ilija Halimi. Initially this led to the split of the Albanian movement, in February 1994, into a moderate faction, the PDP, and a radical group, the PPDA, as a result of the dissatisfaction of a section of the Albanian movement

with the slow pace of reforms and what it described as the PPD's compromising attitude towards the central government to the detriment of Albanian demands. Founded by Nevzat Halili in 1990 and numbering 100,000, the PPD was the first Albanian political party in the FYR of Macedonia. The PPDA (subsequently the DPA) led by Arber Xhaferi and Menduh Thaci, is based in Tetovo. At the first elections in 1990 Albanian parties obtained 23 seats out of 120, compared with 19 in 1995 - 9 PPD, 4 PPDA, 4 NPD and 2 independent. In the 1994 elections, the PPD obtained 10 seats, the PPDA 4, PDP 2 and independents 3, resulting in a weakening of the Albanian movement. *War Report* no. 3/4, 1994. Branko Geroski, 'Post-Election Jockeying', *Balkan Report*, December/January 1995, p. 11.

16. Such tactical alliances between the VMRO-DPMNE and the PPD therefore appeared in Skopje, Gostivar and Tetovo. They show the danger of such changes of direction by the PPD, as the presence of the latter is essential to internal political equilibrium, as a counterweight to Slav. nationalist parties such as the VMRO-DPMNE, the DP and the MAAK. Vera Georgievska, 'Tough Guys Can Dance', *War Report*, May 1995. Mike O'Connors, 'Is Macedonia Next for the Ethnic Pyre?', *International Herald Tribune*, 21 March 1997. Denis Hautin-Guiraut, 'En Macédoine, la communauté albanaise, mal intégrée, se radicalise', *Le Monde*, 21 March 1997.

17. Those voting for the VMRO are found in particular among the younger age groups. The party's youth union is well established, with 12,000 members spread among 40 towns and having 350 local organizations. 'Opposition leader says country facing economic collapse', *SWB* EE/2912 A/8, 7 May 1997.

18. The 'Bit Pazar' episode in early November 1992 between local police forces and the population resulted in the death of three Macedonian Albanians and one Macedonian Slav; the arrests, and subsequent trials in July and November 1993, of five Albanian members of the ruling coalition accused of fomenting a *coup d'état* backed by a so-called All-Albanian Army (AAA), a paramilitary force of 21,000 men, which planned to overthrow the government in order to create a Republic of Illirida, as a base for a 'greater Albania'. The extradition from Kosovo by national police forces on 26 December of Albanians who in 1990 had advocated an independent Republic of Kosovo led to strong protest from Kosovar Albanians and from Albania.

19. The University, which was opened in December 1996 following a decision by the local Assembly in Tetovo and banned by the central authorities, is supported by all the Albanian parties, including PDP moderates and by Kosovar Albanians, and recognized by Tirana. The teaching staff, which originates from the universities of Tirana and Pristina, as the Macedonian authorities see it, is a hotbed of Albanian separatism. *SWB*, 19, 21 and 31 January 1995. *OMRI News Digest*. ODD 1, 2 January 1995.

20. Kim Mehmeti, 'Disappearing Democracy', *War Report*, May 1996.

21. For a 'Declaration on the University of Tetovo' see 'Albanian mayors declare support for Tetovo university', *SWB* EE/2933 A/9, 31 May 1997. 'Flying of Albanian flag disturbing interethnic ties', *SWB* EE/2913 A/8, 8 May 1997. 'Albanians not satisfied with government position', *SWB* EE/2945 A/7, 14 June 1997.

22. 'Macedonia - Rising Ghosts', *The Economist*, 26 July 1997.
23. Duncan Perry, 'On the Road to Stability - or Destruction?', *Transition*, 25 August 1995.
24. The principle of holding a census seems to be a crucial question that countries in the West should examine, and it raises the question of interpretation of the level of cooptation that should be guaranteed. Fabian Schmidt, 'From National Consensus to Pluralism', *Transition*, 29 March 1995, pp. 26-30.
25. 'Mazowiecki report', *Documents d'Actualités Internationales*, New York, 10 February 1993, no. 8, 15 April 1993, pp. 156-9.
26. Article 7 of the Constitution declares Macedonian as the only official language and provides for an increase in teaching in Albanian in secondary education. Macedonian Albanians claim that the right to education at all levels granted by the Copenhagen Document of 1990 is not respected, as only 15 to 20 per cent of Albanians continue their studies beyond primary school. Teaching in Albanian is only provided where Albanian students form a majority, thus limiting it to Gostivar and Tetovo. *Documents d'Actualités Internationales*, no. 8, 15 April 1993, pp.156-9, esp. p. 158. Hugh Poulton, 'The Republic of Macedonia After UN Recognition', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 23, 4 June 1993, pp. 22-30.
27. Despite a significant increase in recent years, only 4 per cent of posts in the police and 10 per cent in state administration are currently filled by ethnic Albanians.
28. The electoral law and the provisions of the law on nationality of November 1995 contribute to the low number of Albanian parliamentarians. In nine electoral constituencies, the law on citizenship evidently prevents 183,000 Albanians from voting. While it grants dual citizenship to residents from the former Yugoslav republics without restriction on their travel abroad or civil rights, it makes the acquisition of nationality conditional on fifteen years' residence and a place of birth in the Republic. While initially aimed at Muslim Bosnian and Serbian emigration, the law also concerns numerous Macedonian Albanian seasonal workers or *émigrés* who emigrated to Germany or to the United States. Lastly, on 1 December 1994 the parliament of the FYR of Macedonia passed a law proposed by Albanian parliamentarians on the official status of the Albanian language for administrative use. Stefan Troebst, 'Macedonia: Powder Keg Defused?', *RFE/RL*, vol.3, no. 4, 24 January 1994. See also *SWB*, 3 December 94. Paskal Milo, 'L'Albanie et les Albanais de l'ex-Yougoslavie', (interview with Olivier Durand), *Cahiers d'Histoire Immédiate*, no. 4, Autumn 1993, pp. 95-8.
29. All the Albanian parties put forward a unified policy in the context of the Conference on Former Yugoslavia or on major issues such as the University of Tetovo. There are however divergences on other questions, like the law on citizenship and secondary education (quotas for Albanians, or the issue of an Albanian language section in the pedagogical University of Skopje), or recognition of the FRY. Sophia Clément, 'The Former Republic of Yugoslavia/FYROM: The Apparent Stability', *Southeast European Yearbook 1994-95*, ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy), pp. 345-71. Teuta Arifi, 'Political Pluralism in Skopje',

*War Report*, July-August 1995, p. 42. Daut Dauti, 'Cooperation or Cooptation?', *War Report*, May 1996. Branko Geroski, 'Aliti's Advance', *War Report*, May 1996.

30. Romanies - who numbered 56,000 according in the 1994 census - tend to identify with the dominant local community, thus declaring themselves Muslim Albanians in the west, Muslim Turks in the east and orthodox Macedonians in the centre of the country. The Macedonian Serbs' ultimate goal is the guarantee of their basic ethnic rights, i.e. fair representation in state institutions and better education. Numbering only 44,160 in the 1991 census and 39,000 in that of 1994, they question these figures, estimating their number to be 200-250,000. According to central government, their numbers have fallen along with the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army. For the Serbian point of view, see interviews with the president of the Association of Serbs and Montenegrins of the FYR of Macedonia, Nebojsa Tomovic, and the leader of the Serbian PD of the FYR of Macedonia, Dragisa Miletic. See also interview with the former president of the Association of Serbs and Montenegrins of the FYR of Macedonia, Mr Despotovic. *AFP* (AR 31), November 1992. *Tanjug*, 16/17 November 1994, and *AFP*, 8 December 1993, for figures.

31. Robert W. Mickey and Adam Smith Poulton. 'The Macedonian Miracle? Albanian-Macedonian Relations', quoted in Hugh Poulton, 'Albanian-Macedonian Relations: Confrontation or Cooperation?', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 42, 22 October 1993.

32. The PDP must maintain its popular base, yet without becoming isolated at a time when the PDPA is attempting to attract a part of the Albanian electorate. Daut Dauti. 'Rallying to Tetovo's Ivory Tower', *Balkan War Report*, February 1995, pp . 9-10. Macedonian Albanians warn that they could abstain, boycott or withdraw. *MIC News Letter*, 12 January 1995. 'President urges interethnic tolerance', *SWB EE/2874 A/12*, 22 March 1997.

33. Relations with the European Union have also developed. in the FYR of Macedonia, the EU's macro-financial aid comes on top of funds from the PHARE programme (which provided ECU90 million in 'critical aid' between 1992 and 1995, and ECU24.8 million in 1996). The financial protocol of the cooperation agreement signed in April 1997 provides for an additional grant of ECU20 million. The FRY has also benefited from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Stefan Krause and Stan Markotich, 'Rump Yugoslavia and Macedonia Deal the Cards of Mutual Recognition', *Transition*, 31 May 1996. 'Foreign Minister pleased with ties with Yugoslavia', *SWB EE/2902 A/9*, 25 April 1997.

34. *OMRI news Digest*, ODD 114, 13 June 1994.

35. Fear of expansionist sentiments regarding the Greek province of Macedonia, evoked by some Macedonian nationalist parties , and the perception of a usurping of Greek culture, history and identity, led the Greek government to ask for modification of the constitution and symbols of the new State as a precondition to recognition, and then to declaration of a trade embargo in February 1994. Controversial articles in the Constitution (Articles 3 and 49) concerning implicit territorial claims, had been modified in 1992 and President Gligorov on several occasions reiterated the

inviolability of the border between the two countries. For Greece's leaders, the preamble to the Constitution, which establishes a continuity between the Khrushchev Republic (proclaimed in 1903, after the revolt of Ilinden against the Ottomans that aimed at 'liberating' the entire geographic region of Macedonia) and the Yugoslavian Anti-fascist Council during World War II, as well as the confusion over historical heritage between the State and the region of Macedonia, divided for the most part between Greece (51 per cent) and Bulgaria (20 per cent), have constituted implicit claims. Evangelos Kofos, *The Vision of Greater Macedonia-Remarks on FYR of Macedonia, New School Textbooks*, Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, Salonika, 1994, p. 34.

36. The question of the name apart, the agreement covers the 'three conditions' (constitution, borders and symbols). It provides for the recognition of the FYR of Macedonia by Greece, the establishment of diplomatic relations, the lifting of the Greek embargo and the modification of the FYR of Macedonia's flag, which was voted by an overwhelming majority of the Macedonian parliament. Negotiations over the name are continuing under the aegis of the United Nations.

37. Sophia Clément, *op. cit.* in note 28.

38. 'Newspaper says Greek minister's visit has enormous significance', *SWB EE/2874 A/12*, 22 March 1997. 'President and Foreign Minister hold talks in New York', *SWB EE/3036 A/16*, 29 September 1997.

39. 'Macedonia seeking modus vivendi with Bulgaria over language dispute', *SWB EE/2863 A/10*, 10 March 1997.

40. 'Turkish Foreign Minister on importance of protecting Macedonian sovereignty', *SWB EE/3023 A/6*, 13 September 1997.

41. 'Turkish General delivers military aid', *SWB EE/2871 A/8*, 19 March 1997.

42. Louis Zanga, 'Albania afraid of War over Kosovo', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 20 January 1992, pp. 20-3.

43. *ORBIS*, vol. 37, no. 2, Spring 1993, p. 267.

44. 'Ethnic Albanian leader asks Albania to "stand up" for Albanians', *SWB EE/3037 A/6*, September 1997.

45. Bob Furlong, 'Powder Keg of the Balkans', *International Defence Review*, vol. 26, no. 5, May 1993, pp. 364-8.

46. 'Kosovo Albanian official says unstable Albania a serious blow', *SWB EE/2870 A/9*, 18 March 1997. *SWB EE/2869 A/12*, 17 March 1997. *SWB EE/2876 A/9* 25 March 1997. *Le Monde*, 16 March 1997.

47. 'Armed Albanian groups try to cross border into Macedonia', *SWB EE/2923 A/9*, 20 May 1997. 'Great concern over Albanians illegally crossing the border', *SWB EE/2923 A/9*, 20 May 1997.

48. The departure of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), the absence of any significant defence structure at the local level and the embryo character of the national army, which has a peacetime strength of 10,400, prompted the request for an international presence. In time of war, the country can call on 100,000 lightly armed reservists, mostly conscripts, a few tanks and 65 pilots, but has no aircraft, other armoured vehicles or helicopters. The ethnic composition of the armed forces is not representative of the country's population: only 2.8 per cent are Albanians and 1.5 to 2 per cent Serbs. A police force of about 7,500, who come under the Ministry of the Interior, whose budget is much greater than that of the army, can be used to augment the army, illustrating the priority accorded to internal security. External defence is moreover undertaken by foreign countries and security institutions. See *The Military Balance 1996-1997* (Oxford: OUP for the IISS), p. 93.

49. Heinz Vetschera, 'Cooperative Security in the OSCE Framework - Confidence-Building Measures, Emergency Mechanisms and CFSP', in Erich Reiter (ed.), *Europas Sicherheitspolitik im Globalen Rahmen* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1997).

50. Its mandate is 'to monitor borders between Albania and FRY, to report any development that could undermine confidence and stability or threaten its territory'. The task of the civilian police is to monitor political, economic and social conditions (surveillance of the activities of local border police, to lower interethnic tensions and supervise elections in conjunction with other organizations). It has a strength of 1,500 (556 from the Nordic contingent NORDBAT, 540 US soldiers, 49 military observers and UN civilian police). In November 1994 the United States signed a military cooperation agreement that covers the training of officers in American military institutions and the supply of communications technology. Iso Rusi, 'Tensions Up and Troops In', *Balkan War Report*, no. 174, December 1993, p. 86. Bob Furlong, op. cit. in note 44, p. 366. *Tanjug News Agency*, 16 January 1995.

51. United Nations Security Council S/1997/365, 12 May 1997.

52. A report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in December 1992 requested the deployment of a prevention force in the FYR of Macedonia, following a request by President Gligorov. This was followed by Resolution 795 of December 1992 authorising the deployment of UNPROFOR which became independent and renamed UNPREDEP in March 1995. 'Peacekeeping missions may involve . . . uncovering the facts of a conflict; monitoring of border or buffer zones . . . verification of agreed-upon force disengagements or withdrawals; supervision of the disarming and demobilization of local forces; maintenance of security conditions essential to the conduct of elections . . .', W.J. Durch (ed.), 'Introduction', *The Evolution of Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St Martin's, 1993), p. 3.

53. Alice Ackerman and Antonia Pala, 'From Peacekeeping to Preventive Deployment: a Study of the United Nations in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', *European Security Dialogue*, vol. 5, no. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 83-97, esp. p. 94.

54. Brigitte Sauerwein, 'Can crisis be nipped in the bud?', *International Defence Review*, vol. 26, no. 5, May 1993, pp. 355-6.

55. And may have justified the 'tolerant' attitude of the international community towards violations of the embargo by the latter.

56. 'Macedonia offers area as training centre for NATO - Skopje daily', *SWB EE/2948 A/9*, 10 June 1997.

57. NUPI Research Report no. 174, December 1993, p. 86. Some maintain that the prime objective of the American presence is to limit the influence of Russia, the first major power to have recognized the FYR of Macedonia and established diplomatic relations, in November 1994. *Tanjug*, 22 November 1994. Interview between the Defence Minister of the Republic of Macedonia, Blagoj Handjiski, and the Russian diplomat Yuri Trushin, *Tanjug*, 20 January 1995. Allen Lynch and Reneo Lucik, 'Russian Foreign Policy and the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia', *RFE/RL Research Report*, no. 41, 15 October 1993, pp. 25-32.

58. Kosovo has a surface area of 10,690 km and a population of about 1,900,000, 90 per cent of whom are Muslim Albanians and 10 per cent Serbs. The Albanians trace their origins back to the Illyrians, who occupied the Balkans long before the Slavs. For the Serbs, Kosovo is the historical cradle of the Serbian nation (the victory of the Ottomans at the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389 saw the end of Serbian independence) and the political centre of the medieval Nemanja empire. It was attached to Serbia in 1912 following the Balkan wars and then to successive Yugoslav entities.

59. French National Assembly, Foreign Affairs Committee, Rapport d'Information sur la mission effectuée au Kosovo, no. 2937, 1992, p. 14.

60. In Vojvodina 54 per cent of the population are Serbs and 22 per cent Hungarian according to the 1991 census. This composition has altered in the last five years with the departure of many Hungarian and Croats and the arrival of around 300,000 Serbian refugees from Croatia and Bosnia. In 1990 the region lost the autonomous status acquired, as in Kosovo, in 1974. Sandjak is 50 per cent Muslim. The Serbs are concerned that links could develop between Kosovo and Bosnia, both of which have a Muslim population.

61. Eight political parties and thirteen organizations, among them Serbian, Hungarian and Croatian parties, have signed a document on the territorial, political and cultural autonomy of Vojvodina and Sandjak. In it, they ask that the FRY does not remain an artificial State kept in being by force and in which minorities do not have basic rights. They also subscribe to possible constitutional amendments that would give them a status similar to that of Montenegro. 'Party grouping demands autonomy', *SWB EE/2864 A/12*, 11 March 1997. 'Sandjak party leader against army service for young Muslims', *SWB EE/2896 A/4*, 18 April 1997. 'Hungarian intellectuals want interim minority council', *SWB EE/2923 A/7*, 20 May 1997. See also Matthias Rüb, 'Von Milosevic geschaffenes Kunstgebilde', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 February 1997.

62. Andrew Marshall, 'Balkan Powder Keg Ready to Explode', *The Independent*, 8 July 1996.

63. With a birthrate (around 3 per cent) that is the highest in the Balkans, the Albanian population in Kosovo is bound to rise rapidly, modifying the democratic balance, not only in Serbia but also in the FRY.

64. Formed in December 1989, the LDK has around 70,000 members under the leadership of I. Rugova.

65. Baton Haxhiu, 'The Kosovo Problem', *Eurobalkans*, no. 25, Winter 1996/97. President of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK), the second largest after the LDK since December 1996 and I. Rugova's main opponent, Adem Demaci favours a strong policy towards Serbia. 'Ethnic Albanian party considers new strategy', *SWB EE/2928 A/12*, 26 May 1997. 'Albanian party leader warns on "extremist reactions" ', *SWB EE/3028 A/9*, 19 September 1997.

66. I. Rugova points out that Kosovar independence would not imply unification with Albania. Fehmi Agani, deputy leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo and former rector of the university of Pristina, also favours this approach, although he advocates a more polemical approach and would like to see a strengthening of Kosovo's institutions, especially parliament. Bujar Bukoshi, Prime Minister in exile of the self-proclaimed Republic, says, on the other hand, that 'Kosovo's policy must not only rely upon the foreign factor but should organize its own defence', while many members of the government in exile resigned in 1997 as a protest against his policies. Skenda Sherifi, 'Regard sur le Kosovo - chronique d'une amnésie volontaire', *Nouvelle Alternative*, no. 18, Autumn 1993, pp. 45-9. Bujar Bukoshi, 'Kosovo in a Virtual State of Occupation: no More, no Less', *Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, vol. 15, no. 1-2, January-July 1994, pp. 54-9. Interview of Bujar Bukoshi in Swiss-Albanian weekly *Zeri. Transition*, 15 March 1995, pp. 48-9. *SWB EE/2459 A/11*, 13 November 1995. *SWB EE/2460 A/7*, 9 January 1996. 'Ethnic Albanians call for independence at Vienna talks', *SWB EE/2901 A/10*, 24 April 1997.

67. ' "Huge amounts" of weapons said to enter Macedonia from Albania', *SWB EE/3024 A/17*, 15 September 1997.

68. Vojislav Seselj's party gained most votes (49.18 per cent), ahead of the socialist party (48.02 per cent). The same happened in Montenegro, where his ally Momir Bulatic, an advocate of close links with Serbia, lost some of his support to the present Prime Minister, Milo Djukanovic.

69. Sophia Clément and Aliénor Benoît, 'Vers une opposition en Serbie?', *Relations Internationales et Stratégiques*, IRIS, December 1997.

70. Fabian Schmidt, 'Protests in Serbia Raise Hopes of Reconciliation in Kosovo', *Transition*, 7 March 1997, pp. 16-18.

71. The removal of the mayor of Belgrade, Zoran Djindjic, the repression of demonstrations in Kosovo and Belgrade and the takeover of control of the media

could be simply the first indications of this. *Agence Europe*, no. 7071, 3 October 1997.

72. 'Kosovo Serbs see Albanian elections as "call for conflict" ', *SWB EE/2913 A/8*, 8 May 1997.

73. See the joint document issued following the meeting between Albanians and the Serbian opposition in New York in April 1997. This stipulates that the Kosovo question must be the subject of a mutual agreement as part of a dialogue held without preliminary conditions. 'Ethnic Albanians to demand independence in New York talks', *SWB EE/2861 A/7*, 7 March 1997. 'Serbian-Albanian dialogue on Kosovo concludes', *SWB EE/2891 A/9*, 12 April 1997. 'Junior Serbian Coalition party assesses New York talks on Kosovo', *SWB EE/2897 A/9*, 19 April 1997. 'Kosovo Albanian party leader praises New York talks with Serbian', *SWB EE/2907 A/8*, 1 May 1997.

74. Kosovo would have the status of republic like Serbia and Montenegro, in the framework of a new Yugoslav federation to be called 'Balkania'. Denis Hautin-Guiraut, 'Serbes d'un côté et Albanais de l'autre', *Le Monde*, 13 February 1997. Fabian Schmidt, 'Protests in Serbia Raise Hopes for Reconciliation in Kosovo', *Transition*, 7 March 1997, pp. 16-17. 'Ethnic Albanian leader outlines plan for Balkan federation', *SWB EE/2878 A/8*, 27 March 1997. 'Kosovo Albanian party leader favours cooperation between parties', *SWB EE/2908 A/9*, 2 May 1997.

75. Andrew Marshall, 'Balkan Powder Keg Ready to Explode', *The Independent*, 8 July 1996.

76. Dusan Janjic, 'Towards Dialogue, or Division?', *War Report*, May 1996, no. 41, pp. 34-5.

77. 47.93 per cent of those polled favoured a peaceful settlement, 9.09 per cent territorial division, 13.22 per cent a resort to arms and 5.79 per cent some other solution; 23.97 per cent were undecided. 'Most Serbs favour dialogue with Kosovo Albanians, poll shows', *SWB EE/2903 A/13*, 26 April 1997.

78. Created in October 1991, it aimed at coordinating the political parties from former Yugoslav Republics or autonomous regions such as the FYR of Macedonia, Kosovo/Serbia and Montenegro and defining a common stance in order to solve the Albanian national question in Yugoslavia. It first proposed the possibility of all-Albanian unification although it also envisaged other possible solutions. This initially more flexible approach was due to the broad range of interests it had to encompass in order to present a common platform and be able to claim a coordinated policy, as its claims against the Macedonian Slavs had points in common with those of the Kosovar Albanians. The common platform consisted in criticism of the Yugoslav and Macedonian Constitutions, the legitimation of Kosovo's independence, and the granting to the Albanians of the FYR of Macedonia the status of a constituent people, redefining the Republic of Macedonia as a national State of Macedonian Slavs and Albanians, a State of its citizens.

79. Louis Zanga, op. cit. in note 41. Robert Austin, 'What Albania adds to the Balkan Stew', *ORBIS*, Spring 1993, pp. 259-76.

80. Patrick Moore, 'The Albanian Question in Former Yugoslavia', *RFE/RL Research Report*, April 1993, p. 13. Gabriel Jandot, 'L'Albanie et les Yougoslaves - images et ruptures', *La Nouvelle Alternative*, no 8, Autumn 1993, pp. 51-9, esp. p. 56.

81. Olivier Deslondes, 'Albanie: la transition manquée', *Politique Internationale*, vol. 69, Summer 1995, pp. 209-27, esp. p. 224.

82. 'Rift in ethnic Albanian party over attitude to new Albanian government', *SWB EE/3003 A/11*, 21 August 1997. 'Kosovo leader meets foreign minister', *SWB EE/3026 B/2*, 17 September 1997. 'President hopes for peaceful resolution', *SWB EE/3027 B/2*, 18 September 1997. 'Former foreign minister criticizes Milo over relations with Belgrade', *SWB EE/3035 B/1*, 27 September 1997.

83. 'Dutch ambassador visits Pristina, explains EU policy', *SWB EE/2942 A/7*, 11 June 1997.

84. Victor-Yves Ghebali, *L'OSCE dans l'Europe post-communiste, 1990-1996* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1996), p. 741.

85. See the conclusions of the EU General Affairs Council of 15 September 1997, *Agence Europe*, no. 7059, 17 September 1997 and the Contact Group's communiqué of 24 September 1997.

86. In 1991 the European Union took the initiative to impose the arms embargo decided on in UN Resolution 713, and trade restrictions, and supplied the largest military contingent (mainly from Belgium, France and the United Kingdom) to UNPROFOR. WEU successfully conducted operations to enforce the embargo, together with NATO in the Adriatic and independently on the Danube.

87. Nicole Gnesotto, 'Lessons of Yugoslavia', *Chaillot Paper* 14 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, March 1994), pp. 14-26. Bertrand de Largentaye, 'Leçons de l'imbroglio en ex-Yougoslavie', speech given at the A. Borschette Conference Centre, Brussels, 28 February 1997.

88. The European countries favoured the principle of stability achieved through regional disarmament measures and negotiation (maintenance of the arms embargo, and lifting of sanctions in exchange for a settlement of the conflict), while in 1994 the United States opted for a more radical policy of regional stability through the re-balancing of power by rearming the Muslim-Croat Federation (with a lifting of the embargo on Bosnian Muslim arms, rearmament in the framework of the 'Train and Equip' programme and limited air strikes against the Serbs). Jane Sharp and Michael Clarke, 'Making Dayton Work: the Future of the Bosnian Peace Process', Centre for Defence Studies, 4 December 1996; paper presented at the workshop 'The future of the peace process in Bosnia: what form of consolidation, and for which Bosnia?' held at the Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 20 January 1997. Espen Barth Eide, 'Implementing Dayton', seminar 'Balkan-Nordic Forum: Security, Cooperation and Integration' organized by the Romanian Institute of International Affairs, Bucharest, 5 and 8 June 1997.

89. Francine Boidevaux, *Une diplomatie informelle pour l'Europe - le Groupe de Contact Bosnie*, Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense, Paris, 1997.
90. Gabriel Munuera, 'Preventing armed conflict in Europe: lessons from recent experience', *Chaillot Paper* 15/16 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, June 1994), p. 66.
91. Victor-Yves Ghebali, *L'OSCE dans l'Europe post-communiste, 1990-1996* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1996), p. 741.
92. Vincent Ramelot and Eric Remacle, 'L'OSCE et les conflits en Europe', *Les dossiers du GRIP*, 7-8, 1995, p. 136; Heinz Vetschera, op. cit. in note 48.
93. For an analysis of this question, see Alyson Bailes, 'Europe's Defence Challenge', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 1, January/February 1997.
94. WEU Assembly document 1548, 'The future role of WEU', presented on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr Liapis, rapporteur.
95. Michael E. Brown, 'Introduction', op. cit. in note 1, pp. 10-11.
96. See, *inter alia*, Willem van Eekelen (Rapporteur), 'Stability in the Balkans: a Role for Mutually Reinforcing Institutions', North Atlantic Assembly, Sub-Committee on Civilian Security and Cooperation, AP 86 CC/CSC (97)1, 4 April 1997, p. 1. The distribution of tasks among international organizations in the absence of a framework for coordinating their activities, as happened in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, is not a desirable solution. A clear division of labour is thus a delusion. The author emphasises the problems of duplication and the difficulty of coordination between the different institutions in both the reconstruction programmes and between civilian and military tasks.
97. Reinhardt Rummel, 'Common Foreign and Security Policy and Conflict Prevention', Report, *International Alert*, May 1996. See also Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Preventing Violent Conflict* (Stockholm, 1997).
98. Barnett Rubin (ed.), 'Towards Comprehensive Peace in Southeast Europe', Centre for Preventive action, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1996. See also Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Preventing Violent Conflict* (Stockholm, 1997).
99. 'Track-two diplomacy' tackles conflict resolution by way of unofficial contacts and interaction between parties at non-governmental level. 'US Foreign Policy Agenda: American Perspectives for Conflict Resolution', *USIA Electronic Journal*, vol. 1, no. 19, December 1996.
100. Sophia Clément and Aliénor Benoît, op. cit. in note 68.
101. Heinz Vetschera, op. cit. in note 48, p. 261.
102. *Agence Europe*, no. 7072, 4 October 1997.

103. The level of trade between small and medium-sized businesses and former Yugoslavia is particularly indicative of the opening up of certain sectors of the economy. In Greece, for example, the majority of trade between the border regions of Macedonia and Thrace was with former Yugoslavia, as their industrial sector was entirely oriented towards the north, which was naturally seen as their 'backyard'.

104. The American-inspired SECI is based on the allocation of private funds and concerns economic (infrastructure, energy) and environmental projects. SECI Agenda Meeting, Geneva, 15 October 1997.

105. Alexis Heraclides 'The Kosovo Conflict and its Resolution: in Pursuit of Ariadne's Thread', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 28, no. 3, September 1997. See also Gazmend Pula, 'Modalities for Self-Determination. The case of Kosovo as a Structural Issue for Lasting Stability in the Balkans', *Sudeuropa*, vol. 45, no. 4/5, 1996, pp. 380-410.

106. 'Unfinished Peace' - Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996, p. 197.

107. These are: extended autonomy (Alto Adige - South Tyrol - for example); autonomy in concert with other autonomies, such as those of Vojvodina and Kosovo (the Spanish model); power sharing in an integral, consociational model (as in Cyprus in the early 1960s); a federal system, in which Kosovo would be one of three - or more - constituent republics alongside Serbia and Montenegro (Belgium); an asymmetric federal system in which the smallest units such as Kosovo and Vojvodina would have special status (Swiss Federation); an asymmetric system in which one unit would have superior rights (Quebec, Tatarstan).

108. Assembly of Western European Union, report on 'Europe's role in the prevention and management of crises in the Balkans', Document 1589, 5 November 1997.

109. See also Gabriel Munuera, *op. cit.* in note 89, p. 4.

110. See the Declaration of the Copenhagen Summit, *Europe*, document no. 1844/45, 24 June 1993, the Memorandum on the Stability Pact in Europe, *Europe*, 1846, 26 June 1997, and the Declaration on the process of stability and good-neighbourliness, Royaumont, 13 December 1995, *PIC*, 14 December 1995.