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WEU'S ROLE IN  
CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND  
CONFLICT RESOLUTION  
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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# **WEU'S ROLE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SUB- SAHARAN AFRICA**

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## PREFACE

This *Chaillot Paper* represents a foray into a field that is not obviously in the mainstream of WEU's mandate, especially for those who still think that WEU should not stray too far from traditional European tasks. Yet Europe cannot decline the wider, global mission of preventing crises and building stability wherever necessary.

The ideas expressed in this publication result from a joint initiative begun earlier this year by the Institute and the Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisbon. A first seminar, held in the spring in Lisbon, established the basic elements of peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa; a second, in Paris in October, tried to assess the European responses to those challenges. What we consider to be some provisional conclusions are presented here. (It should be mentioned that the EU, NATO and, within the UN, UNIDIR, are also actively engaged in the same process.)

The most challenging consideration is that common activities in Africa can represent another very valuable litmus test for the cohesion and political responsibility of the many countries involved in WEU, in conjunction with others, in undertaking peacekeeping missions in a geographic area where their solidarity cannot be misinterpreted.

**Guido Lenzi**  
**Paris, December 1995**

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
ASAS	Association of Southern African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
FPR	Rwandan Patriotic Front
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OIC	Organisation of the Islamic Conference
OMIB	OAU Mission in Burundi
ONUC	UN Operation in the Congo
ONUMOZ	UN Operation in Mozambique
ONUEN	UN Observer Mission for the Verification of the Electoral Process in Nicaragua
RENAMO	Mozambique National Resistance
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SC	Security Council
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UN-DPKO	UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
UNAMIR	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNASOG	UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group
UNAVEM	UN Angola Verification Mission
UNEF UN	Emergency Force (Middle East)
UNITA	National Union for Total Independence of Angola
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOHAC	UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
UNOMIL	UN Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMUR	UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOSOM	UN Operations in Somalia
UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia

WEU's role in crisis management and conflict resolution in sub-Saharan Africa

## **SHOULD EUROPE HAVE A POLICY ON AFRICA?**

*Alvaro Vasconcelos*<sup>(1)</sup>

There is undoubtedly growing pressure on European states (and not merely the former colonial powers, as in the Cold War days) to intervene militarily in Africa, and to lend political, economic and even military support to the restoration of peace and the transition to democracy. Many European countries, both within the framework of the United Nations and the European Union, and also individually, have indeed responded and been recently engaged in Africa, including militarily. This has been the case even for countries less obviously associated with Africa, such as Germany. New issues are therefore emerging which beg the following question: what are the underlying motives for a positive European response and, consequently, what are the political criteria that should determine European intervention? Should Europe in fact have a policy on Africa, combining comparatively new political and security aspects with the more traditional economic cooperation?

Often referred to as the 'chaotic continent', Africa is associated with disease, famine, masses of refugees fleeing war and drought, tyranny or at best inept governance, weak economies plagued by constant crises and states verging on disintegration. Indeed, this desolate image, coupled with the continent's marginal strategic interest, has led many to think that Africa is a lost continent and not a place where Europe should concentrate its efforts.

Already apparent during the Cold War, the perceived marginal strategic value of Africa has become even more of a fact in the current international situation. Sub-Saharan Africa has in fact lost what unenviable importance it had as a peripheral battleground, literally, for superpower confrontation. When they abandoned global confrontation, the main external actors also lost most of the interest they had in Africa, thus depriving African countries of the possibility of playing off the superpowers' interests one against the other and collecting whatever aid came with alignment. This has left them with Europe as the main available partner in both political and economic terms and, often unavoidably, in military terms as well.

It will take time and much joint effort to set up endogenous capabilities that enable Africa to deal with its own crises. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) mechanism for conflict prevention created in Cairo in 1993 is a step in the right direction. But the OAU is still lacking in structural and financial means.<sup>(2)</sup> Subregional organisations are also faced with another kind of difficulty, namely that they may appear to act as surrogates for regional powers. The mainly Nigerian ECOWAS force, for instance, which was supposed to put an end to Liberia's recurrent civil war, lost all credibility when it was accused of pursuing Nigeria's agenda.<sup>(3)</sup>

Until subregional and all-African bodies have developed appropriate means for crisis management and resolution, including the military means where necessary, Europe will often be looked to as the only possible option when it comes to thwarting an anti-democratic *coup d'état*, protecting a weaker country against powerful neighbours or bringing relief to humanitarian tragedies. Pressure for intervention in such instances will come not only from the African countries concerned but also from the United Nations and public opinion in Europe itself, as was the case with Rwanda, and from the United States. This is partly due to the simple fact that, as William Pfaff has rightly pointed out, Europeans actually know the region much better than Americans.<sup>(4)</sup> Somalia was a sad illustration of this fact.

Especially after having failed (in its own eyes) in Somalia, the United States is determined to become as little involved as possible in Africa, and is quite unwilling to 'take the lead and carry the major share of the burden'.<sup>(5)</sup> Moreover, it is by no means certain that the United States will show enough interest to provide other than political initiative,<sup>(6)</sup> and will be prepared to commit any significant financial or military means to helping build up UN or African capabilities to deal with African crises and engage in military action jointly with Africans when the necessity arises.

The poorest countries on earth, but none of the wealthier or fastest-growing, are in Africa. The rapid growth of population, worsens an overall state of crisis which a mounting foreign debt does nothing to alleviate and which can be illustrated by the negative growth of GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1983-93, down to minus 0.8 per cent.<sup>(7)</sup> Structural adjustment has not helped counter the prevailing negative trends so far. Prolonged, murderous civil wars and humanitarian tragedies have left deep scars, and as a result a number of states are on the verge of disintegration: Somalia and Liberia are cases in point. Genocide in Rwanda was the predictable culmination of one such crisis. The ethnic card tends to be played unashamedly in political struggles for power, so that any hint of the possible acceptance of borders redrawn along ethnic lines would only serve to aggravate destructive tendencies.

This negative picture should, however, be juxtaposed with a number of positive developments. At the end of the 1980s, the wave of democratic transition that swept throughout the world as the Berlin Wall crumbled and fell eventually reached sub-Saharan Africa. Before 1989, 38 out of the 45 countries that make up sub-Saharan Africa were under authoritarian rule. Today, most of them have experienced or are experiencing political transition. In spite of numerous setbacks and the magnitude of difficulties that must be overcome, which the cases of Zaire and Nigeria powerfully illustrate, democracy is still alive and being consolidated in a number of countries. Southern Africa seems to have overcome chaos and disruption. The 'miraculous' transition in South Africa offers real grounds for hope. The political and economic foundations of overall economic and social improvement are being laid. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) was already a successful example of regional cooperation before South Africa joined. Now that it has become a member, SADC's future prospects are bound to improve, especially if South Africa, Angola and Mozambique successfully complete their transition. Europe will thus have a new partner in African and world affairs.

## General European interests

Although no vital security interests of the European Union, or of individual member states, are apparently at stake in sub-Saharan Africa, there are a number of reasons, quite apart from any sense of responsibility they may feel for the present state of affairs in the continent, why the Union and WEU should adopt a common policy on conflict prevention and resolution in Africa. These reasons can be grouped under three broad headings: values, security concerns, and a mixture of national and EU interests linked to Europe's search for a role as a world power.

Firstly, European intervention in sub-Saharan Africa should be consistent with the democratic ideals Europe upholds and has tried to promote in recent years worldwide. The move to democracy in Africa has partly been the result of external pressure, especially from the European Union. Although ineffective in terms of sustaining the transition to democracy, the political conditionality attached to development aid has undoubtedly created an impetus for political liberalisation.<sup>(8)</sup> The democracy movement in sub-Saharan Africa started in Francophone Africa after the late President François Mitterrand declared in La Baule that France was no longer willing to provide assistance to African regimes without their 'accepting evolution towards democracy'.<sup>(9)</sup> Similarly, at the latest Lomé-ACP ministerial meeting, in November 1995, it was reasserted that respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and good governance, were the *essential elements* of the preferential relationship between Europe and its former colonies. The promotion of peace and political liberalisation, and the encouragement of a transition to democracy through the holding of elections, are processes that require consistent support, including military support. Without careful, long-term involvement, however, the result can be a worsening rather than an improvement of the situation, as was the case in the Angolan civil war.<sup>(10)</sup>

In the changed international situation, the spreading of democratic values and consequent prevention of the violation of human rights, in particular when such violation reaches the point that it constitutes a crime against humanity, is in addition of practical value, since they correspond to Europe's vision of a new international order, freed from the constraints of bipolarity. As a consequence of this vision, Europeans cannot remain indifferent to humanitarian disasters (such as the genocide in Rwanda, and the potentially similar situation which is building up in Burundi<sup>(11)</sup>) without losing legitimacy and credibility, and they therefore feel intervention is justified. As Stanley Hoffmann points out, for democratic states, 'the "national interest" has an ethical component'.<sup>(12)</sup>

Secondly, security and stability. Although far from threatening vital interests of the European Union, a number of challenges have been strong enough to justify military intervention by EU member countries in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years. European states are concerned with the safety of their citizens, which has required and will continue to require intervention for their protection or evacuation (Belgian, French and Portuguese nationals in Zaire, for instance). The possibility of a large-scale operation if things went wrong in South Africa was at one point envisaged, to the point of drawing up contingency plans (those living in South Africa entitled to apply for a British passport total 1.2 million and the Portuguese community there is estimated at 500,000-700,000). The concern of these former colonial powers for the

well-being of their citizens living in South Africa largely accounted for their protracted resistance to sanctions imposed on South Africa. They were among the first to take President F.W. de Klerk seriously and advocate the easing and later the lifting of sanctions.

Southern European countries are also concerned over the broader implications of tensions within sub-Saharan Africa, in particular their contagious effects in North Africa (Egypt-Sudan, Libya-chad, Mauritania-Senegal, or even future implications of the Tuareg issue for Algeria). Possible effects on Mauritania, which is a fragile country, are particularly serious due to the state of relations between Algeria and Morocco. Any threat to Mauritania would in turn implicate France, which provides Mauritania with military technical assistance, as it does to Mauritania's neighbours. North African countries may also be indirectly affected by tensions in sub-Saharan Africa, as was for instance the case of Libya and Egypt. In many respects, therefore, the interest of North African countries in the OAU crisis-prevention mechanism is based on self-interest.

Extensive drug-trafficking throughout the continent is often mentioned as a security issue (particularly in Nigeria). It is in fact in the interest of Europeans and Africans to devise appropriate forms of cooperation to deal with a problem that affects them both. Migration is also talked of as a security concern by Europeans. This issue should not be listed under the same heading, however, since in Sub-Saharan Africa it is much more a societal than a security problem, and one which affects Europe only incidentally.

Thirdly, apart from Europe's general interest in stability in Africa, its own economic interests are also at stake in sub-Saharan Africa, as is the efficacy of its economic cooperation. Sub-Saharan Africa (including South Africa) accounts for some 4-5% of EU foreign trade and is an important supplier of raw materials to European countries.<sup>(13)</sup> Africa has an incomparable wealth of resources and immense potential. It is obviously in the European interest to put traditional ties to their best use in helping Africa out of its current crisis so that it eventually becomes an important trade partner. This may happen earlier than expected, at least for certain regions of Africa where steady levels of growth of around 5 per cent are being maintained, and trade is balanced or in surplus.<sup>(14)</sup> Strengthening these emerging markets is also in Europe's interest. French exports to sub-Saharan Africa doubled in the first half of 1995. Then there is South Africa which, beginning in 1990, finally ended its policy of apartheid, and something that not so long before then had seemed impossible without widespread bloodshed became a reality: the transition to majority rule in a truly multiracial society. With South Africa's continuing success of transition and its comeback as a 'normal' partner in the world economy, its potential as a pole of attraction for regional development is becoming fully apparent: a strong élite, a wealth of natural resources, and a comparatively well-developed economic apparatus will be able to be put to full use, following a series of peace and transition processes that began with Namibia and have led to a marked improvement in the regional environment. Leaving trade aside (South Africa's trade with the EU is about a quarter of that of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole) Europe's main interest in South Africa is that it should play the leading role as a catalyst for stability and endogenous development as effectively as possible. EU's action so far (joint action in monitoring elections, help in promoting the success of transition through support of the media and

NGOs, the strengthening of civil society, and help in the design and implementation of 'education for democracy' programmes), including the forthcoming trade and cooperation agreement,<sup>(15)</sup> seem to point in this direction.<sup>(16)</sup> In other words, the European Union is eager to see South Africa take on a prominent regional role and is hoping its successful transition will serve as an example to neighbouring countries, some of which, like Angola, have great economic potential. The EU is also hoping that, now that South Africa has regained its position as a continental power, it will be possible to bolster existing regional cooperation processes such as the SADC and the emerging political organisation created in August 1995 - the Association of Southern African States. Security cooperation, which at present is still being pursued for the most part informally, has now begun to deal with drug trafficking and the arms trade at ministerial level.

The countries of sub-Saharan Africa are profoundly interested in keeping a privileged relationship with Europe, not least because there is a marked absence of other available partners. Europe would do well not to ignore this willingness. Furthermore, unless domestic political and economic reform succeeds, aid will do little to bring sub-Saharan Africa out of the present maelstrom and into the world economy. It is therefore in Europe's interest (if only to ease aid commitments, which EU contributors find it increasingly difficult to agree upon) to do everything in its power to consolidate the process of transition and help reforms to succeed.

Europe should obviously not accept any kind of division of the world, such as that proposed around Haushofer's vertical lines, which would limit Europe's role in world affairs to Africa. But there is unlikely to be European military intervention in Latin America, which is an important European partner, or in Asia, other than in very specific peacekeeping roles. Outside Europe and the Mediterranean, it is in Africa if anywhere that the European Union might conceivably play an international security role. Underlying both its humanitarian intervention and economic cooperation, however, Europe should have a political concept.

### **European public perception of intervention in Africa**

Public interest and support for African issues in European countries varies in degree and scope, largely depending on past experience and present levels of cooperation, which in turn are largely based on the colonial past and in some instances on experience of cooperation with African countries. In addition, significant sections of the élite from African countries have been educated in Europe, and many of them still live there, and many European citizens live in Africa. Elements of both the European population and the immigrant community are therefore sensitive to African issues to the point that they are virtually domestic issues. Consequently, with respect to Africa, European countries may be roughly divided into three groups.

Belgium, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom were the main colonial powers in sub-Saharan Africa. After colonial links were severed, as a rule a policy on bilateral cooperation, including military cooperation, was preserved. Former colonial powers, especially France, tried to maintain a policy of *domaine réservé*. (Since the independence of its former colonies, France has intervened in Africa on many occasions.) Strong institutional ties, together with a multitude of agreements ranging from economic to cultural and even defence and military cooperation accords, link

these countries to their former colonies. French-speaking communities, the Commonwealth and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries which is about to be formally created, are wider forums through which European and African countries together seek, under changed conditions to which an ethical ingredient is gradually being added, to pursue traditional relationships.

Germany, Spain and Italy, which also have a colonial past in sub-Saharan Africa, although their presence and the resulting ties were not so lasting, also share an interest in Africa that is visible in the choice of regions where they choose to intervene. (Italian participation in the UN operation in Somalia is an example.) changes in both Africa and Europe account for the fact that countries which had only a residual involvement in Africa are now becoming equally interested.

The Nordic countries and the Netherlands (whose colonies were almost all in Asia) developed an active policy of development cooperation with a strong humanitarian component after independence. In terms of proportion of GDP, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are the main EU donors of Official Aid to Development, which is largely directed to sub-Saharan Africa. Next come The Netherlands, France and Finland, and only in seventh place is there a non-European country, Canada (1993). Central and Eastern European countries also have a certain African expertise, developed during the Cold War days.

Whilst domestic public attention and member states' identifiable interests therefore support the case for selective European military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa, this support may be easily eroded. There are two main objections to the idea of European military involvement in Africa: on the one hand, that it may be used to promote a former colonial power's purely national agenda, and on the other hand, as has often been the case with EU cooperation for development, that it could serve to perpetuate illegitimate regimes. Even when hidden agendas are not an issue, suspicion lingers. Thus, France has been accused of going to the rescue of its own protégés in Rwanda. Moreover, the disastrous operation in Somalia to which Europe has contributed has done little to make military intervention in Africa an attractive idea in certain European Union member states, such as Germany, which was on that occasion one of the countries contributing troops.

### **Is there a trend towards Europeanisation?**

Virtually every member of the European Union has recently been involved in Africa, in peace-keeping missions and humanitarian assistance, in lending some form of support to political transition, including the creation of the unified Mozambican armed forces, or as an aid donor. Between Lomé III (December 1984) and Lomé IV (December 1989), funds committed to EU cooperation increased from ECU8.5 billion to ECU13.3 billion. In spite of growing demands on the European Development Fund budget and European Investment Bank loans and the considerable pressure put on EU aid by requests from both Central and Eastern Europe and North Africa, it will be possible to keep aid to ACP countries at virtually the same level for the next five years.<sup>(17)</sup> Notwithstanding this, at the political level, EU members do not normally coordinate their actions among themselves nor with community action, to the detriment of both its efficacy and its visibility.<sup>(18)</sup>

In security and defence matters, for instance, where the presence of member states has been greater in Africa than in any other region outside Europe, WEU has been conspicuously absent. Lack of coordination among EU member states, coupled with the fact that neither the Council nor the Commission has a policy planning capability of its own, has a crippling effect on the ability of the EU and its members to foresee and prevent crises or put an early end to those which have broken out even in countries which are important in terms of development cooperation and foreign policy. Somalia and Rwanda are two cruel reminders of how lack of coordination among European powers, added to the UN's inability to do any better, can make preventive diplomacy impossible.<sup>(19)</sup> A multilateral European response to African crises, as was sought without success in Rwanda, should be the rule. A number of factors seem to support this thesis, beginning with those which stem from the very logic of European integration.

First, those countries in which the consequences of African crises are felt least cannot remain indifferent to the social and political impact they have on fellow EU members. This is particularly true of Germany, which has come to play a central role in building the European Union. As such, Germany tends to see as European (and therefore as its own) issues which deeply concern other member states (particularly so if the state in question is France).

Second, responding to African crises cannot be left to former colonial powers alone, in spite of the fact that they will still play a prominent role, and this should be set against the wider picture of European political priorities. It should not be forgotten that although former colonial powers are often a crucial part of the solution, they are also sometimes part of the problem. 'Europeanising' African policy is a precondition for removing the 'hidden agenda' syndrome, and thereby broadening public support, making consensus among European partners easier.

Third, when it comes to military intervention, joint security organisations tend to be more easily accepted than European powers acting alone. Security organisations have acquired a greater degree of legitimacy in the mind of the public, on the side of both the contributors and the recipients, not least because multinational efforts demonstrate a certain measure of unselfishness and are less prone to accusations of being driven by neo-colonialist motives. On the other hand, cooperation between the European Union and WEU with subregional organisations in Africa will also help remove suspicion regarding selfish objectives of African regional powers.<sup>(20)</sup>

Fourth, 'Europeanising' national foreign and security policies, including those on sub-Saharan Africa, is a long process that it will not be possible to complete if former colonial powers refuse to put aside the 'backyard' approach. It is indispensable, however, if a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) are to come into being.

South Africa was an obvious exception to the 'backyard' rule, and was a constant preoccupation in European Political Cooperation (EPC). It is worth noting that this was a case where the then EC sought compatibility between its 'declaration-making' policy and its foreign economic policy.

As evidence that traditional attitudes towards 'backyards' might be changing, it is also interesting to note that Portugal proposed a joint action for Mozambique in support of the transition process. Although it was not adopted, the fact remains that Portugal proposed a joint action for a former colony. The motives behind the Portuguese Government's decision were probably related to the fact, blatantly obvious in the case of Angola, that the immense scope and complexity of issues raised by the process of transition in Africa are such that they are best resolved by countries acting together rather than in isolation, particularly in view of countries' widely varying capabilities. EU policies on sub-Saharan Africa should be designed to support the consolidation of a variety of transition processes and prevent crises at the earliest possible stage. Today, difficulties in making the transition to democracy, and crises, have political, economic and military aspects: this is the case in Angola, Rwanda and Burundi. The EU will therefore have to adopt a combined response to meet these challenges, for which it is ideally suited yet ill-prepared.

Until the Maastricht treaty was adopted, European political cooperation remained largely at the 'declaration-making' stage. In contrast, especially through the Lomé agreements dating back to 1975, the European Community has remained by far the main trade and cooperation partner and the major donor of aid to sub-Saharan Africa. Sanctions against Rhodesia, and later South Africa, added a decidedly political ingredient to EPC, however sparingly used. The Treaty on European Union established the principle of coherence between foreign policy and foreign economic policy.

Growing concern for humanitarian issues, and the greater demands put on European countries for military intervention, which not even France was in a position to meet alone, led the European Council, notably after the operation in Rwanda, to take an interest in setting up a conflict prevention mechanism in Africa. Following the meeting in Corfu at which the European position *vis-à-vis* Rwanda was discussed, the European Council addressed the issue in subsequent meetings. An important development would be the adoption of a common position within CFSP on early warning, preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa, and WEU's role in that context, as suggested at the General Affairs Council held in December 1995.<sup>(21)</sup>

In relation to Africa, as in other areas of the world, CFSP has been quite disappointing. Declarations on Africa, however, have not been scarce. In 1994, out of a total of 110 declarations issued, 45 referred to sub-Saharan Africa. Other than the joint action towards South Africa mentioned above, five common positions were adopted between CFSP's creation on 1 November 1993 and December 1995: an arms embargo on Sudan, humanitarian aid to Rwanda and Burundi, support to national reconciliation and reconstruction in Angola, and economic sanctions against Nigeria. As far as security issues are concerned, little progress has been made. Notable exceptions are the joint action adopted on anti-personnel mines, which are a plague in countries such as Angola and Mozambique. The joint action in South Africa was the most relevant of CFSP initiatives in Africa and it established the European Union as a player in its own right.

Fifth, the 'Europeanisation' of efforts to resolve crises in Africa should be seen as particularly important for Britain and France which, as permanent members of the

Security Council, have particular international responsibilities as well as being the EU members with the most significant interests and responsibilities in sub-Saharan Africa. As France did in relation to Rwanda, they may seek European legitimization of any action they undertake so that it does not appear to be neo-colonialist, even if they have no wish to relinquish the prerogatives that go with Security Council membership. The fact that France felt the need to seek European legitimization (at the Corfu European Council in June 1994) despite the UN's prior legitimization of its operation in Rwanda, is symptomatic of a growing trend towards the 'Europeanisation' of France's African policy. The Franco-British initiative taken after the summit held in Chartres in November 1994 with the objective of supporting peacekeeping mechanisms in Africa, both in the OAU and subregional frameworks, should also be seen in this light. The WEU Lisbon Council, in May 1995, stated ministers' 'interest in the initiative taken by France and the United Kingdom'.

Sixth, the European Union will pursue its development cooperation and humanitarian assistance policies in countries verging on political collapse. At the same time, member countries will in some cases provide military assistance without coordination with EU initiatives. This dissipation of effort seems to make no sense. There is certainly a case for member countries coordinating their military cooperation with political and economic cooperation, not only for the sake of consistency but also to manage resources more effectively. If military cooperation is coordinated, it would seem sensible to use an existing organisation for that purpose, namely WEU. The latter should also be associated with joint actions undertaken in any future areas of crisis, something that has not been the case so far. The mounting pressure for intervention by European member states in peacekeeping operations is obliging those members directly concerned, especially after the operation in Rwanda, to pay much greater attention to the issue of military intervention and, when providing aid, to see how a better assessment and conflict prevention capability, as well as policy planning, can be put into place in the EU framework, involving the WEU, to bolster African prevention and rapid deployment mechanisms.

Aside from national motives and military interests, or 'Europeanising' in order to ease political and financial costs, the question of Europe's world role will remain. A politically united Europe will always see Africa, certainly North Africa but also sub-Saharan Africa, as one of its priorities. It is the purpose of this paper to prove that, since Europe will conceivably be compelled to be there for Africa, including militarily, it should be there united, sharing as evenly as possible the burden and the responsibility, and making sure its action abides by the same principles to which Europeans adhere themselves, and is therefore free of any neo-colonialist twist. If this point is taken, then it would seem useful to put forward a number of basic ideas which should be borne in mind in order to develop a common policy or at least a common approach to intervention in Africa:

- former colonial powers should themselves 'Europeanise' their African policies and become more open and collaborative, abandoning the 'backyard' approach;
- all types of operations having a military element should have clear political objectives and be totally in accordance with the promotion of democratic values;

- international legitimacy of a given operation should always be clear; wherever possible a UN mandate should be sought;
- cooperation with the OAU and regional or subregional organisations should always be sought, even if such a cooperation may not be feasible in every case;
- diplomatic efforts and even humanitarian aid cannot be entirely dissociated from the ability to give military assistance;
- although WEU is potentially the appropriate European institution to cooperate or intervene militarily in Africa, such involvement should be preceded by a decision taken within CFSP, which should lay down the guidelines and the mandate;
- EU member states which are not full WEU members could also be involved, since many are in a position to make significant contributions to military operations;
- once a clear mandate has been defined jointly by the member states, those states that do not wish to take part in the action should not stand in the way of those that do, and show their financial, or other, solidarity.

# LESSONS FROM PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, SOMALIA, RWANDA AND LIBERIA

*Winrich Kühne*<sup>(22)</sup>

Africa has a rich history of peacekeeping. In 1956 UNEF,<sup>(23)</sup> which is generally considered to be the first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission, was deployed in the Sinai, bordering on the African continent. In the early 1960s ONUC<sup>(24)</sup> was for a long time the largest peacekeeping mission, and was also quite controversial. Numbering almost 20,000 it was tasked with securing the political stability of the young Congo republic (later renamed Zaire). Its mandate had to be extended to prevent the secession of the mineral-rich province of Katanga. As in Somalia three decades later, it was necessary to authorize the use of limited force. More than a hundred Blue Helmets lost their lives in that difficult operation, however, the mission was successful and the Congo's territorial integrity was safeguarded.

The kinds of peace missions deployed in Africa over four decades have varied considerably, according to the type of conflict to be managed and the task to be accomplished. The majority have been observer missions and traditional peacekeeping missions (UNASOG, UNOMUR, UNAMIR, UNAVEM I, UNOSOM I).<sup>(25)</sup> To these a number of missions must be added, which -- in addition to classical tasks like ceasefire monitoring -- were given a more comprehensive range of civil, political and military functions. UNTAG, UNAVEM II, ONUMOZ and MINURSO<sup>(26)</sup> are examples of such peace missions.

A third category included the so-called enlarged or 'robust' peace missions like ONUC in the 1960s and UNOSOM II in Somalia in the 1990s. In addition to being multifunctional, they were authorized to use force if necessary to implement their mandate or certain elements of it. In three other recent missions, mandated but not conducted by the UN, the use of force was also authorized: the American-led UNITAF<sup>(27)</sup> in Somalia, the French-led Operation TURQUOISE in Rwanda and ECOMOG<sup>(28)</sup> in Liberia under the leadership of Nigeria. However, ECOMOG was not the first African-led peacekeeping mission: in 1979, and again in 1981, a peacekeeping mission, also under the leadership of Nigeria, was sent to Chad. 2,000 Nigerian soldiers, 700 from Zaire and 600 from Senegal participated. The mission was not successful in bringing to an end the civil war in Chad, and Nigeria never recovered its costs.

In the 1990s, the OAU decided to venture into two new peace missions with limited military elements. In the first of these, the OAU Mission in Burundi (OMIB) in support of the peace process, OMIB observers were deployed in the capital Bujumbura and the country's five regions. In Rwanda, from July 1992 onwards, the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) in Rwanda, made up of 50 observers from OAU countries, monitored the ceasefire. In early 1993, it was replaced by an enlarged force, NMOG II, composed of some 130 personnel. In November 1993, NMOG II was integrated into UNAMIR.

Internationally, election observation missions are pertinent in this context, too. They are not merely an instrument for democratization but also an important mechanism for conflict prevention. More than thirty elections have been monitored or observed in Africa by the international community. South Africa, with more than 3,000 election observers, has been the most prominent case. The EU played a major role in this operation, although its overall coordination was in the hands of the UN.

### **Angola and UNAVEM II -- a case of 'failing by economising'**

For more than two decades war was a dominant element in Angolan politics, but finally, in May 1991, this ordeal seemed to come to an end. In Portugal the two main parties of the civil war, the MPLA government and the UNITA opposition, signed the 'Acordos de Paz'. In Resolution 696 (30 May 1991), the UN Security Council (SC) adopted the mandate for UNAVEM II and increased the personnel of UNAVEM I from 70 to about 400 military and police for monitoring the ceasefire and the Angolan police.<sup>(29)</sup> In March 1992, UNAVEM II's mandate was enlarged to include observation of the elections for a new parliament and president in late September 1992.

The design and size of UNAVEM II was heavily influenced by the euphoria over the UN's recent peacekeeping successes in Namibia (UNTAG) and Nicaragua (ONUVEN) as well as the end of the Cold War. It was widely believed that the operation in Angola would be equally straightforward and successful. The fact that in the beginning the parties in conflict seemed to be more or less willing to abide by the ceasefire reinforced this optimism, although there were a number of reasons to be sceptical of its final outcome. Obviously, the dynamics of the conflict in Angola were quite different from those in Namibia and, more important, the size of the population in Angola was about ten times that of Namibia (about 1.3 million). The small number of Blue Helmets and election observers (400 at the time of the elections), indeed ten times less than those of UNTAG, was oddly in contrast with the differences in the size of the population and the country. At the time of the elections, Martti Ahtisaari, who was in charge of UNTAG, had about 8,000 Blue Helmets, police, civil personnel and election observers at his disposal. If these numbers are broken down on a per capita basis, a ratio is obtained of roughly 1:150 in Namibia and 1:16,000 in Angola. These numbers speak for themselves.

It was quite obvious that the leading powers in the SC were not prepared to stage another 'costly' mission like the one in Namibia. Disagreeing with African states about the size of UNAVEM II, they argued that a thrifty model was feasible, since the peace process in Angola would be mainly in the hands of the Angolans themselves. UNAVEM II would only *observe* and not organize and monitor the elections.<sup>(30)</sup>

The SC's optimism turned out to be misplaced. The history of the failed elections in October 1992 is well known and does not need to be repeated in detail. When it became clear that Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, would not accept defeat at the polls, tension started to build up. Even before the elections, Savimbi had made it clear that he would consider any elections in which he did not turn out to be the victor as fraudulent, and that is exactly how he reacted soon after the election results became known. In Luanda, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola's (MPLA) para-military police rounded up leading members of the National Union for Total

Independence of Angola (UNITA). Some of them were killed. Fighting broke out in other parts of the country. Angola relapsed into a war that was more brutal and destructive than during the period prior to May 1991. In 1993, UNAVEM II was reduced in strength to less than a hundred.

The failure of UNAVEM II was not inevitable. Three major reasons for it can be identified. *Firstly*, the mission was drastically undermanned. The widespread and visible presence of Blue Helmets and election observers is an important psychological factor in restraining warring parties and restoring the population's confidence, as was shown in Namibia, Cambodia and South Africa (with about 5,000 election observers). Instead of being a cost-saving exercise, the undersized UNAVEM II turned out to be a very risky and, in the end, very costly strategy -- in terms of human lives lost in Angola as well as the overall cost to the international community.

*Secondly*, the understaffing of UNAVEM II and the eagerness of the SC to save costs led to further serious miscalculations in the conduct of the mission. In the *Acordos de Paz*, the demobilization of the warring factions' forces and the formation and training of a new, integrated army, as well as police, had been agreed upon as important steps prior to elections. However, these measures were not followed through. In June 1992, only three months before the elections, the Secretary-General (SG) reported to the SC that hardly 13% of government troops and 4% of UNITA troops had been demobilized. Despite this, the SC insisted on holding the elections as scheduled. The result is known. Although the percentage of troops demobilized was increased in the remaining time, it was quite easy for Jonas Savimbi and UNITA to put their troops into action again. Two other preconditions for elections, the raising and training of an army and police, had also been met more on paper than in reality.

*Finally*, Savimbi's failure to accept defeat brought to light a basic problem of conflict resolution by democratization: free, fair and internationally supervised elections are not as straightforward an instrument for conflict resolution as is generally assumed. In societies with a high degree of ethnic, religious or other kinds of division, those who lose elections tend to perceive this as something much more serious than just a defeat at the polling station: it is perceived as a total defeat in the quest for power. Renewing the fight, as Savimbi did, was therefore not such an extravagant option as it may have appeared to Europeans. The failure to secure important preconditions for stable democratization, such as the demobilization of troops and the creation of a new army and police, made this choice an easy one.

Once UNAVEM II had failed, it was not until early 1995 that peace endeavours had a new chance. Following the signature of the Lusaka Protocol by the MPLA Government and UNITA on 20 November 1994, on 8 February 1995 SC Resolution 976 established UNAVEM III. While this protocol builds on the former peace accords, it contains -- as Tony Hodges has pointed -- several major improvements:<sup>(31)</sup>

- *A much larger UN force.* As a result of the lesson learnt with UNAVEM II on the danger of undermanning, UNAVEM III will have about 8,000 personnel (7,000 military, 350 military observers, 260 police observers and civilian staff). When the elections take place, additional election observers will be brought in.

- *The introduction of a new form of power-sharing.* UNITA's participation in government is guaranteed at least for a transitional period, despite its defeat in the September 1992 elections. The spirit of national reconciliation that was so evident in the case of South Africa has been an influential factor. UNITA will get four full ministerial posts, seven deputy ministerial posts and a number of ambassadorships. UNITA has also accepted the post of vice-president. Power-sharing is complemented by the commitment to administrative decentralization and the holding of elections for local officials.
- *Flexibility over the date for holding elections.* No firm date for the elections has been set. The second round of the presidential elections will not be held until the necessary political and material conditions are in place. Nevertheless, the SC expects the mission in Angola to be completed by February 1997.
- *An enhanced mandate for UNAVEM III.* Peacekeepers will be more directly involved in the process of disarming UNITA troops.<sup>(32)</sup>

WEU member states' military participation in UNAVEM III will be very limited, as Hodges has also pointed out. The UK and Portugal provided specialized units (logistics and communications) of several hundred men for a few months, and Romania is providing a battalion. The bulk of the troops, however, come from Brazil, India, Pakistan, Uruguay and Zimbabwe. Individual West European states, together with the EU, will nevertheless be major donors to the peace-building processes of demobilization and reintegration, mine clearance, etc.

### **ONUMOZ in Mozambique -- well manned, well timed, well led and successful**

Mozambique, like Angola, has a history of violence that goes back to its struggle for independence in the 1960s. When the country gained independence in 1975, however, the outlook for peace was brighter than in Angola. The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) had no serious contenders when it took over power from the Portuguese. In the late 1970s, however, threats to peace started to appear. First, the struggle for liberation in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and then the destabilising effects of South Africa's apartheid policy spilled over into the young 'people's republic'. Frelimo had created fertile ground for external troublemakers by alienating considerable parts of the rural population and its traditional leaders. Blinded by ideological zeal, it forced upon them unwanted policies of villagization and collectivization. Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), at that time regarded by most observers as a group of unorganized and ruthless bandits, slowly gained in stature. In the late 1980s it was clear that neither the Frelimo government nor Renamo would be able to decide the conflict by force of arms.

Fernando J. Cardoso has described the main elements of the peace process.<sup>(33)</sup> On 4 October 1992, following an intricate and prolonged process of negotiation, a General Peace Accord was signed in Rome. A non-governmental actor, the Italian Comunità di San Egidio in Rome and its mediator, Don Matteo Zuppi, played a key role in achieving the Accord. The Italian Government, other West European governments (including those of Portugal, Britain, France and Germany) and the United States, as well as regional powers, in particular Zimbabwe, worked well together in supporting the Comunità and pushing the parties to the conflict into a peace agreement.

In December 1992, the SC established ONUMOZ, which was richly endowed with troops and civil personnel -- almost 8,000. There was also no rigid date set for the holding of elections. For once the SC had learned its lesson -- from the disaster in Angola. Of the WEU countries, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands contributed troops, and Austria provided police and military observers. A donor conference held in Rome in December 1992 agreed on financial support for the operations, mainly related to demobilization and humanitarian issues. The elections, scheduled to be held in October 1993, were first postponed to April 1994 and then to October 1994. The cantonment and demobilization of troops in 49 camps was successfully carried out, albeit with a series of delays. Almost 80,000 government and Renamo troops were cantoned and demobilized. UNOMOZ assisted in the recovery of more than 200,000 weapons. In the meantime, the formation of the new *Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique* (FADM) proceeded, with bilateral assistance from France, Italy, Portugal, the UK and Zimbabwe.

However, the implementation of another lesson learned from Angola failed. Despite strong pressure from Western countries, mainly the United States, and from South Africa, Frelimo resisted a pre-electoral pact of national unity and power-sharing similar to the South African model. The elections were held between 27 and 29 October 1994. They confirmed the presidency of Joaquim Alberto Chissano, with 54% of the vote, against 34% for Dhlakama. Control of the parliament went to Frelimo, with a majority of 51.6%, against 44.8% votes for Renamo and 5.1% for the Aliança Democrática coalition. The more than 2,000 international election observers described the elections as free and fair. In February 1995, the last of the more than 7,000 Blue Helmets left the country.

In March 1995, SWP Ebenhausen, together with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung office in New York, organized an international workshop on the successful conclusion of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique. Former Special Representative of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Mr Aldo Ajello from Italy, other leading members of his staff, as well as other distinguished persons in the peace process and high-level representatives of Frelimo and Renamo, took stock of ONUMOZ's successes and shortcomings. The following is a summary of the main points of the findings of that workshop:

- The *Mozambican people's strong desire for peace*, shared by the parties to the conflict, was the basis for success. During the negotiation of the peace treaty in Rome, Renamo and Frelimo had become used to each other, and had learned to work together. The fact that Renamo was elevated to the status of an 'equal partner' in the peace process was important. The Trust Fund (about \$US17 million) for Renamo, established by international donors and administered by ONUMOZ, contributed to this end, and made possible the transformation of Renamo from a military to a political organization. It could to some degree be argued that the peace in Mozambique was 'bought', considering the millions paid not just to the Renamo leadership, but also to the Frelimo government. There is no doubt that this money gave the international community considerable leverage over the warring parties. Angola since 1993, on the contrary, is a telling example of how much the international community's influence is reduced if there is no such dependence. In that case, UNITA, which partly controlled the trade in diamonds

and other commodities, and the MPLA government, which had impressive oil revenues, had sufficient resources at their disposal to continue the war and to defy the will of the international community.

- A *smoothly functioning machinery for 'political management'* of the implementation process was established, and was operated with flexibility. The main commission was the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, in which the Organization of African Unity, France, Italy, Germany, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States participated as members. Subsidiary bodies were the Ceasefire Commission, the Reintegration Commission and the Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force, all of which were chaired by ONUMOZ. This machinery was supplemented by a Technical Unit for Demobilisation and a Reintegration Support Scheme for the resettlement of demobilized soldiers. This unit in particular turned out to be an important innovation.
- The *outstanding role played by Aldo Ajello, the Special Representative of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (SRSG)*, was emphasized throughout. The quality of the personnel leading the peacekeeping mission, a factor that is frequently neglected in the general discussion about models of conflict management and peacekeeping, was a strategic factor in its success.
- In the end, one no less important key to success was the fact that the SRSG made sure that the *international members of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) continued to play an active role in the peace process*, in contrast to peace missions in Angola. The representatives of the international members of the CSC in Maputo, several of whom were members of the UN Security Council, attended weekly meetings with the SRSG, and, when necessary, even more frequently. In addition, regular meetings took place with the African Group, the European Union, the 'like-minded countries' (the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Canada) and occasionally with Japan. This situation meant that the SRSG was the representative not merely of the UN, but of the entire international community, which added extra authority to his mediation with the parties to the conflict.
- One element of the operation which was criticized repeatedly, even by the SRSG himself, was that *ONUMOZ's mandate lacked flexibility* as far as the rules of engagement were concerned. It was also a setback that the *full contingent* of peacekeepers had *only been in place six months after the Peace Accord* was signed. 'Much of the momentum of the Peace Accord was lost and there was some anxiety that fighting might start again.' Serious problems were also encountered in the *level of training* in the various contingents of peacekeepers, and even more so among the police.
- The question remained as to *whether it had been necessary to deploy so many peacekeepers* (over 7,000). Some argued that a large contingent was less valuable than a small team of highly-trained military observers. Others objected that, as far as size was concerned, it was better to be on the safe side. In autumn 1994, the peace process in Angola derailed, not least because of the small number of peacekeepers and observers. At the start of a peace process, it is far more difficult

to assess the danger of a return to violence than after its successful conclusion. It is best to start with larger numbers, and then, if the situation allows, withdraw contingents so as to save money.

- The SRSG and his colleagues stressed that a considerable *tension* existed between the *demands of a peace mission* and the *principles of development policy* (for example, regarding sustainability). In the case of demobilization and reintegration, for example, the peacekeepers needed to use their resources to get quick results in the social and economic fields. This approach was seen as contrary to development policy. Ajello demanded that in such cases, the principles of development policy should take second place.
- Strong *criticism* was directed at the *UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination*(UNOHAC). It was not necessary to place an extra layer of bureaucracy above the NGOs and UN agencies already based in Mozambique, especially not a bureaucracy which carried out its tasks inadequately. A small 'coordination unit' reporting directly to the SRSG, together with an 'advisory committee' of donor country representatives, would have been sufficient and would have worked better.
- Finally, one observation with regard to the *role of the media*. The departure of the successful ONUMOZ Blue Helmets in February 1994 took place almost unnoticed by the international mass media. However, when only a few weeks later the last Blue Helmets of UNOSOM II left Somalia, they got heavy media coverage, in particular television. Failure, violence and bloodshed are news, whereas success and a return to peace and normality are far less so. Not surprisingly, the international public is left with a distorted view of the successes and failures of UN peace operations.

### **UNOSOM II in Somalia -- a case of failed 'third-generation' peacekeeping?**

UNOSOM II signalled the start of the era of 'third-generation' peacekeeping. SC Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993 authorized UNOSOM to use force in implementing its mandate, in particular with regard to maintaining a secure environment and disarming the warring parties and armed bands. The resolution was explicitly based on chapter VII of the UN charter. Resolution 814 had been preceded by Resolution 794 of 3 December 1992, which formed the basis for the American-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) of about 37,000 troops. Both resolutions were unique with regard to the interpretation of Article 39 of the charter. SG Boutros-Ghali pointed out that for the first time in its history the SC had decided to intervene for *exclusively humanitarian, internal* reasons. There was no threat to the security of other states, i.e. a threat to 'international peace and security' as Article 39 was conventionally understood. The desperate situation of millions of Somalis was judged to be in itself a threat to international peace and security. In autumn 1992, the number of Somalis who were dying from hunger had risen to almost half a million. Several humanitarian aid organisations were ringing alarm bells and warning that the number would go up to over one million (of an overall population of roughly 7 million) if decisive action were not taken.

In December 1992, therefore, the international community faced a difficult choice: either it took the risk of military intervention to secure a safe environment for humanitarian aid<sup>(34)</sup> or it accepted becoming the eyewitness (as it was to two years later in Rwanda) of a humanitarian tragedy on a huge scale. Several international efforts to mediate the conflict from 1991 onwards had failed, for one reason or another.

Quickly -- too quickly in the view of the author of this paper -- the international community came to the conclusion that UNOSOM II had failed. There is no need to recall in detail the bloody incidents, in particular the killing of more than 20 Pakistani soldiers on 5 June 1993 and of 18 US Rangers on 3 October, which led to this perception. These incidents, widely reported by the media, obscured a number of UNITAF and UNOSOM II successes.<sup>(35)</sup> By mid-1993, violence had been reduced to a low level in most parts of the country. Deaths from starvation had more or less ended, due to the first massive humanitarian aid shipments and subsequent improved harvests.

A common accusation by journalists and politicians was (and still is) that UNOSOM II had no plan for executing its mission. A thorough reading of SG's report S/25354 of 3 March 1993, on which UNOSOM's mandate was based, only partly bears out this accusation. One may not agree with all the details of this plan and even less with the way it was implemented. General Bruno Loi, for instance, commander of the Italian forces in UNOSOM II, comes to the conclusion that 'The UN took on this operation with incontestably honest intentions, however, with a feeble perception of reality and with considerable deficiencies in its organization and programming.'<sup>(36)</sup> He points out that it is indispensable, in such interventions, to work out clear political projects that conform to local and regional realities without trying to import models which are poorly adapted to the local reality. Roland Marchal is even more outspoken with regard to the role of some top American advisers and UN officials 'who did not know anything about Somali society before 1990, although the Somalis knew a lot on the way to play with the UN and its agencies.'<sup>(37)</sup> A recent Norwegian study on Somalia makes a more systemic point: the logic of UNOSOM II was flawed in that it prepared to 'assist a non-existent centre'.<sup>(38)</sup>

However, to state that there was no plan is misleading. In later reports, the SG therefore with reason pointed out that, although there was little progress in bringing the leaders of the main factions into a meaningful peace agreement at the national level, progress *had* been achieved in building up local and regional political structures, bringing more than 40,000 children back to school, etc. Unfortunately, the mass media showed very little interest in reporting this return to 'normality' in at least some parts of Somalia.

The March 1993 report, however, had one major deficiency. It did not detail how to go about disarming the warring parties and the militias, which was plainly the most difficult part of UNOSOM II's mandate. This had important consequences and contributed to the crude, unguided application of military force, in particular by the American Rangers and Delta Forces (who were not under the command of UNOSOM II). Disarmament and demobilization are, as Angola, Somalia and even more dramatically Bosnia have shown, the Achilles' heel of second and third-generation peacekeeping. And one may argue that UNITAF, with larger and better equipped

forces, under a unified command, was in a better position to fulfil this difficult task than the Blue Helmets of UNOSOM II.

However, one might rightly accuse Boutros-Ghali, as well as his Special Representative Admiral Jonathan Howe and some of his American advisers, of committing a fatal mistake: they did not continue the dialogue with General Mohammed Farah Aideed and his followers, although Robert Oakley and his UNITAF team had urged doing exactly that by keeping lines of communication open with all the warring parties, even if the use of force was threatened or applied. Having failed to attend to this imperative, UNOSOM II singled Aideed out as another manifestation of the 'Evil Empire'. Attempts at impartiality were abandoned. The clever Aideed, already suffering from falling popularity, skilfully turned this lack of UNOSOM II impartiality to his advantage and pinned it down in a bloody confrontation on the streets of Mogadishu, which eroded UNOSOM II's credibility as a peace mission. The fact that the money for a radio station planned to be run by UNOSOM was cut by the UN General Assembly's budgetary committee meant that UNOSOM was unable to counteract Aideed's propaganda and explain its goals and actions to the Somali people directly. This suggests that the lesson learned in Namibia, where the radio station run by UNTAG was an important element in the smooth conduct of the peace process, had not been taken to heart by those in control of the UN's finances.

There are many lessons to be learned from the failure of UNOSOM II, although the debate continues. (In September 1995, the UN assembled a number of UNOSOM's staff as well as experts to make another assessment.) The following are a few of those lessons.

- *Failed Prevention?* About two months after the downfall of President Siad Barre in January 1991, the UN was engaged in Somalia with its humanitarian efforts although the volatile security situation forced the UN to withdraw its personnel over the following months. Together with the OAU, the League of Arab States and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the UN became actively involved in the political aspects of the conflict. On 27 December 1991, SG Javier Pérez de Cuéllar informed the SC that he intended to take an initiative to restore peace in Somalia. This led to the controversial mission of UN Assistant Secretary-General James O.C. Jonah. There are a number of authors, Sahnoun, a former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Somalia being one of them, who are strongly convinced that effective, non-military prevention would have been possible if the UN bureaucracy and the SC had acted in time. The author of this paper is not so convinced: after more than two decades of Siad Barre's rule, Somali society was so run down and tension-ridden that successful prevention without the preventive deployment of troops (as part of an overall package of humanitarian, social, political, etc. measures) is hard to imagine.
- *Use of force and impartiality.* There seems to be a majority opinion today that UNOSOM II is clear proof of the fact that the use of force or the threat of the use of force beyond the limits of individual self-defence in a peace mission will inevitably lead to its failure. This is a one-sided judgement, although there is no denying that the use of force in peacekeeping is a delicate, ambivalent matter. There were several instances in Somalia (as in Bosnia), in which force was used

and helped stabilize the peace process. In other instances, the use of force damaged the peace process. Contrary to what is widely believed, it was not the use of force as such which created doubts about UNOSOM II's impartiality. Even before 5 June, Aideed had sufficient reason to suspect that American advisers, in particular, wanted to isolate him, as Tom Farer, and, later, an independent commission of inquiry, determined.<sup>(39)</sup>

- *Use of force as a substitute for patience and dialogue.* As in Angola, the SC and UNOSOM II's leadership were desperate for a 'quick fix' in Somalia. When this did not happen, the Americans and Boutros-Ghali played the card of military force and thereby ignored a basic lesson with regard to the use of force in conflict management and resolution: only under exceptional conditions can societal conflicts be resolved by military force. Military force can be of value in protecting people, humanitarian missions, etc. and in maintaining a stable environment for a peace process or buying time. However, it is no substitute for time and patience.
- *Command and control.* The manifold deficiencies of UNOSOM II with regard to command and control, and the training and equipment of troops, have been widely discussed and criticized. Rangers and Delta Forces, who were in the forefront in Mogadishu, were outside UNOSOM II's command. This not only worked to the disadvantage of UNOSOM but also to their own disadvantage in the incident on 3 October 1993.
- *Multidimensional, multifunctional planning.* Somalia taught the lesson that in failed states and ethno-social conflict no issue is purely humanitarian or purely military. This fact puts extreme demands on multidimensional, multifunctional planning. The efficient, flexible coordination of military and non-military actors in a peace mission is an imperative. This is at odds with the fact that the military and NGOs have very different 'operational cultures', not to mention the rivalry between many of the humanitarian organizations themselves. The UN's present structure (not least the SC) is not organized and equipped to meet this demand successfully.
- *The lack of an enabling political-diplomatic context.* Unlike UNOMOZ in Mozambique, UNOSOM I and II were not strongly embedded in and tied to a well orchestrated peace process by the regional and global powers. The role of the OAU, Arab League and OIC remained weak and rhetorical.
- *Finally,* the hasty decision to withdraw North American and European troops after the Americans losses of October 1993 teaches a harsh lesson in realism: despite a lot of rhetoric about human and minority rights, in some countries the government and population are not prepared to take the risk of serious loss of life in peace missions to correct the massive violation of human rights if vital national interests are not in danger. The refusal to prevent genocide in Rwanda reinforced this message.

### **Rwanda and UNAMIR -- a missed opportunity for quick reaction**

On 6 April 1994, following the shooting down of a plane at Kigali Airport in Rwanda that resulted in the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, widespread

killing broke out in Kigali and other parts of the country. One of the worst mass killings since the Second World War ran its course. In a mood of bitterness, General Romeo Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR, later wrote: 'The apathy and impotence of the international community to deal with the catastrophe in Rwanda . . . was both shocking and immoral. So much so, in fact, that even today I wonder whether the international community would have reacted more rapidly and even more forcibly if it had been the great mountain gorillas of Rwanda -- an endangered species -- that were being slaughtered instead of human beings.'<sup>(40)</sup> Dallaire is known to have urgently asked his seniors and the SC in New York for a change of mandate and additional troops to restore control in the city of Kigali and prevent the killing from spreading to other parts of the country. This was apparently refused. Instead, Belgian units as well as several hundred Bangladeshi troops left the country. At the request of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR), French troops had already left in December 1993. WEU member states' participation in securing peace in Rwanda had come to almost nothing when the genocide started.

On 20 April 1994, in view of UNAMIR's untenable position, SG Boutros-Ghali proposed three options to the SC: (1) the immediate, massive reinforcement of UNAMIR and a change of its mandate to coerce opposing forces into a ceasefire and stop the killing; (2) the reduction of UNAMIR's strength to about 270, with the limited role of acting as an intermediary between the warring parties, and (3) complete withdrawal. The SC favoured option 2. With all constraints removed, the killing quickly spread to other parts of the country in the following months: there were more deaths in Rwanda in two months than in former Yugoslavia in two years.

UNAMIR's history actually began with UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) on 22 June 1992 when the SC, through Resolution 846, established it on the Ugandan side of the border. Even earlier, the SG had decided to send two military experts to the OAU's Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) in Rwanda. From July 1992 to July 1993 this group, made up of 50 observers from OAU countries, monitored the ceasefire in Rwanda. In early 1993, it was replaced by a 130-strong NMOG II force. In November 1993, after the arrival of General Dallaire and UNAMIR's advance party, NMOG II was integrated into UNAMIR. (The author of this paper has not been able to research the effectiveness of NMOG I and II although this would be an important task with regard to future European support for the OAU and its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, adopted at the 1993 Cairo summit).

On 4 August 1993 peace talks in Arusha (Tanzania) were successfully concluded between the government of Rwanda and the FPR. Fighting between their respective forces had broken out in October 1990 across the border with Uganda. Despite a number of ceasefire agreements thereafter, hostilities had been resumed in early February 1993 (and UNOMUR deployed in July-August 1993). The Arusha Peace Agreement called for democratic government and provided for the establishment of a broadly-based transitional government prior to the elections, in addition to repatriation of refugees and integration of the two sides' armed forces. In the Agreement, the two parties also called for a neutral international force to help implement it. In response, the SC established UNAMIR on 5 October 1993 (Resolution 872). In late October 1993, General Dallaire and his advance party arrived in Kigali.

However, the serious shortcomings of the existing peacekeeping system immediately became apparent and undermined the mission from the outset. In General Dallaire's own words, 'On 5 October the Resolution called for some 2,500 UN personnel and equipment, yet this force had not fully been deployed before late March 1994. To further complicate matters, when some of these contingents did arrive, I was chagrined to discover that they did not even have the minimum equipment necessary to accomplish the assigned tasks. In addition, the composition of the military component of UNAMIR soon revealed a -- heretofore unforeseen -- need for interpreters and translators among its own personnel let alone the Rwandan population. In addition, specialized civilian staffs in legal affairs, human rights and humanitarian activities coordination were never deployed, leaving enormous gaps in the UN's ability to be more pro-active which, in turn, detracted from the UN's overall credibility . . . Finally, the UNAMIR budget had not been approved as late as January 1994 nor was any spending authority given despite the approval of the mission in early October 1993.'<sup>(41)</sup>

This delayed deployment of UNAMIR, with its deficiencies, played into the hands of the warring parties, and, in particular, the way the government of Major-General Habyarimana undermined the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement. Unlike what has been stated with regard to Mozambique, the peace process in Rwanda was already in deep trouble when finally UNAMIR was fully deployed.

Privately, General Dallaire said that he could have stopped the genocide from spreading with his existing contingent if he had received additional equipment (such as armoured vehicles) and an enhanced mandate. Rwanda was an almost ideal case for preventive deployment as described in the SG's *Agenda for Peace*, for the following reasons:

*Firstly*, UNAMIR was a force of more than 2,000, with basic equipment, communications and a headquarters already in place.

*Secondly*, the breakdown of the peace process and the violence that followed the plane crash on 6 April 1994 was not unexpected. The first unmistakable signs of the degeneration to violence had been visible since December 1993. There were reports of new militia units -- formed from the hardline, radical Hutu youth wings, the *Interahamwe* (Those Who Attack Together) and the *Impuzamugbmi* (Those Who Have the Same Goal), who were armed and trained by the army and the presidential guard. Nor was the existence of arms caches and assassination lists a secret.

*Thirdly*, in the beginning the killing was mostly attributable to the presidential guard, the *Interahamwe* and the *Impuzamugbmi*, and *Radio Télévision Libre Mille Collines*, all of which a reinforced UNAMIR would have been able to neutralize. The radio station, with its broadcasting of murderous slogans, played a decisive role in spreading violence beyond Kigali. It had been set up by extremist supporters of President Habyarimana. Again, Dallaire gives a depressing account of the SC's and the international community's unwillingness to undertake decisive steps, although they would have been limited in scope and cost: 'The UN was not given the resources to counter the deliberately inflammatory broadcasts from the nominally independent *Radio Télévision Libre Mille Collines* indirectly controlled by the `interim

government' . . . These broadcasts were first-class examples of hate propaganda reawakening deeply-rooted ethnic hatreds and inciting the Hutu population to take up arms against the Tutsi and the Hutu moderates and to murder them all. The broadcasts also regularly targeted the UNAMIR operation as a whole and certain of its senior officials in particular . . . The UN should have put out counter-broadcasts, which it did during the UNTAC operation in Cambodia, giving the population a clear account of what was actually happening and offering thereby a forum for both sides to express their respective positions to all Rwandans. Yet, no country came forward to offer either jamming or broadcasting assets.<sup>(42)</sup>

The favourable conditions for quick deployment raises the obvious question: Why did the SC not act? The answer is to be found outside Rwanda. It was the recent failure in Somalia -- remember the killings of more than 15 Americans in October 1993 in Mogadishu -- which led the United States Government in particular, but also the other permanent members of the Security Council (with the possible exception of France) to reject any question of changing UNAMIR's mandate and increasing its numbers. The later French Operation TURQUOISE was too overshadowed by previous French support for the Habyarimana Government to be able to dispel this impression.

In a letter in *Le Monde* shortly after the deployment of Operation TURQUOISE, the French Defence Minister, François Léotard, complained to his European counterparts, and in particular the Germans, about how much France felt it had been left alone to deal with Rwanda.<sup>(43)</sup> In his opinion the multinational European Corps has to play a quick reaction role. Michel d'Oléon of the WEU Institute for Security Studies has taken a closer look at WEU member states' activities during the Rwanda crisis.<sup>(44)</sup> For instance, the NMOG of the OAU had received financial support from Belgium, France, Germany, as well as the United States and other African countries. When the crisis reached its climax, Belgium, France and Italy, with American logistic support, evacuated foreign nationals.

In the opinion of d'Oléon, these activities could well have been placed under WEU authority, which would have made the various national actions in Rwanda, as well as the French Operation TURQUOISE, appear less partial,<sup>(45)</sup> in addition to being the type of activities listed in WEU's 1992 Petersberg Declaration. They were not brought under WEU authority due to diverging national interests and perceptions of the crisis. WEU was not then ready to take collective action, although it did raise the issue. Italy and France asked for an extraordinary meeting of the Permanent Council of WEU as a matter of urgency, and meetings were held on 17 and 21 June 1994. In its communiqué published following the second meeting,<sup>(46)</sup> the Council announced its decision to give WEU's support to the efforts of individual member countries by coordinating any contributions they made with regard to the relief of suffering in Rwanda. The WEU Planning Cell was instructed to serve as a point of contact and to provide coordination between the contributing countries and the headquarters controlling the operation.<sup>(47)</sup>

D'Oléon identifies several areas in which action by WEU with regard to Africa can be contemplated,<sup>(48)</sup> for instance:

- it can take over individual member countries' responsibilities for military assistance accords previously signed;

- WEU could develop, in conjunction with the EU, a common plan for the evacuation of members countries' nationals;
- WEU can become involved in supplying equipment and training for African troops, providing transport if necessary to help them contribute troops to UN operations; African units might be sponsored by WEU member states;
- the WEU could also contribute to the establishment of a permanent African intervention force, as suggested by some;
- finally, it would be useful if there were agreement in Europe on a common policy on crisis prevention.

It is not the task of this paper to discuss in detail these proposals and their acceptability to all WEU member states. It aims only to point out that since the Rwandan crisis WEU/EU member states, in particular Britain and France with their joint paper of November 1994, have undertaken a number of steps to assist the OAU and African states in improving their crisis prevention, conflict management and peacekeeping capacities.

Finally two observations on the case of Rwanda. *Firstly*, although a quick reaction force would have been able to prevent the mass killing, in itself an extremely important goal, it would not have been able to provide a long-term solution to the conflict. Military intervention can contain but cannot eradicate Hutu and Tutsi memories of past domination and killings. Nor can it ease the tension between leanings towards perverted traditionalism and tribalism on the one hand and modernization and democratization on the other hand, which manifested itself in the killing of the moderate, democratic Hutu intelligentsia. Above all, military intervention would not have been able to eliminate the scarcity of land which led many rural Hutus to dread the return of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi refugees. Consistently high birth rates in the past decades have led to over-population in Burundi and Rwanda. There has to be a regional solution to this problem.

*Secondly*, the case of Rwanda raises a question with regard to how humanitarian aid is distributed. Operating from the moral high ground, a position occupied automatically in this kind of activity, humanitarian aid organizations and NGOs have mostly been protected from the criticism which the military has had to suffer. However, a public debate about the misdirection and failure of humanitarian aid has to be conducted, as Alex de Waal and Omaar Rakiya have demanded: `The débâcle of humanitarianism abused in the refugee camps for Rwandans is a striking example of the dangers of humanitarianism unbound. Relief agencies walked straight into the trap, and have ended up feeding a killing machine . . . There is a pressing need for an honest debate on whether international humanitarianism has reached its limits. It is no longer enough for the relief agencies to take the moral high ground and maintain that they did all they could.'<sup>(49)</sup>

## **Liberia and ECOMOG -- the ups and downs of subregional peacekeeping**

In 1990, civil war broke out in Liberia and the government headed by the military dictator Samuel Doe was overthrown. The country fragmented and law and order broke down.<sup>(50)</sup> The war claimed the lives of about 150,000 civilians and displaced many others, both internally and outside Liberia, with some 700,000 refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries. Liberia was *de facto* divided, with the Interim Government of National Unity, headed by President Amos Sawyer, administering Monrovia, the country's capital, and its environs; the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, controlling the majority of the country; and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy, led by Alhaji Kromah, controlling the remaining areas.<sup>(51)</sup>

Some neighbouring countries, in particular Libya, supporting Taylor via Burkina Faso, were involved in the conflict in one way or another. The others, including the dominant regional power, Nigeria, became concerned about the potentially destabilizing effect on the region. Calls to the UN SC, in particular the Americans, with their long-standing special relationship with Liberia, to intervene and re-establish law and order, turned out to be futile. Nigeria and other capitals of the region therefore decided to activate the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its Protocol on Non-Aggression adopted in Dakar in April 1978. This protocol requires the member states of ECOWAS to come to one another's assistance in the event of aggression.

ECOWAS took various initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict in Liberia. In particular, in August 1990 the heads of state and government of its Standing Mediation Committee decided to establish a Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) and in October 1991 brokered the Yamoussoukro IV Accord. This outlined steps to implement the peace plan, including the encampment and disarmament of warring factions under the supervision of an expanded ECOMOG, as well as the establishment of transitional institutions to carry out free and fair elections. ECOMOG's strength was increased to about 12,000, 80% of the troops coming from Nigeria. Charles Taylor, having initially agreed to the West African initiative, later strongly opposed Nigeria's dominance in ECOMOG and its military intervention. ECOMOG quickly had to abandon traditional principles of peacekeeping and resort to the use of force by air, land and sea to crush Taylor. Despite a number of ceasefire and peace agreements (the Geneva Meeting, Cotonou Agreement, Akosombo Agreement, Accra Agreement, etc.), as in Somalia and Bosnia, there was no peace to keep.

The OAU's role in managing the conflict remained marginal. It limited itself to acknowledging ECOMOG and the West African people for having taken action and officially recognizing the Interim Government of President Sawyer at the Abuja Summit in 1991. ECOMOG's main interest was to get the UN and its leading powers involved, not least to minimize the quite substantial financial and military burden on ECOMOG and win legitimacy for its actions. As early as August 1990, SG Pérez de Cuellar had advised the SC to authorize him to support ECOMOG technically and financially. The SC declined. The Americans, busy with Saddam Hussein, were reluctant to get involved. Nor were the three African members of the SC (Ethiopia, Zaire and Ivory Coast) in favour of the SC dealing with the Liberian situation, although they later changed their minds.

However, repeated urgent calls from ECOWAS and leading west African statesmen gradually forced the SC to reconsider its position.<sup>(52)</sup> In the words of James Jonah, 'The difficulties encountered by ECOMOG . . . intensified pressure for an expanded role for the UN in the Liberian conflict. As noted above, both the Cotonou and Abuja summits had decided that a delegation of ECOWAS foreign ministers should come to New York to seek the endorsement of the Security Council for the path being followed by ECOWAS. It was in pursuance of that decision that the Foreign Minister of Benin, as chairman of ECOWAS, requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council.'<sup>(53)</sup> At its meeting of 19 November 1992, the SC unanimously adopted Resolution 788 which, *inter alia*, called for an arms embargo against the warring factions under chapter VII of the UN charter. It also called upon the SG to appoint a Special Representative (SR) who would proceed to review the situation on the ground and report back to the SC.

In July 1993, the parties to the conflict signed the Cotonou Peace Agreement, which laid out a continuum of action, from the ceasefire through disarmament and demobilization to the holding of national elections. In his report to the SC of 4 August, the SG, while recognizing the difficulties ahead, welcomed the Agreement as offering the 'hope that the violent and destructive civil war which has affected Liberia may at long last be brought to an end.' The African press reacted jubilantly to the breakthrough at Cotonou. After many ups and downs it seemed that in Liberia African conflict management and peacekeeping had achieved what the Europeans were far from achieving in Bosnia. That hope turned out to be premature.

On 22 September 1993, SC Resolution 866 established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), with an authorized strength of 303 military observers and a civilian component of more than 100. It was supposed to work closely with ECOMOG in facilitating the implementation of the military aspects of the Cotonou Peace Agreement, ECOMOG having primary responsibility whereas UNOMIL's main role was to monitor the implementation procedures in order to verify their impartiality. An important reason for the detachment of an SR and later on UNOMIL had been Taylor's strong disbelief in ECOMOG's impartiality, due to Nigeria's dominant rule. Other actors shared this mistrust, not least several African countries. Tanzania and Uganda, who heeded ECOWAS' call for additional, non-west African troops and dispatched one battalion each to ECOMOG, also felt more at ease with its activities being monitored by the UN. Zimbabwe declined to send any troops. The Zimbabwean leadership apparently refused to put its troops under the *de facto* command of the highly unpopular Nigerian military dictatorship.

After the Cotonou Agreement and the establishment of UNOMIL, the SG and others praised its cooperation with ECOMOG as a possible showpiece for cooperation between the UN and regional security arrangements in the field of peacekeeping. Unfortunately, this did not come true. Despite UNOMIL's presence, the peace process in Liberia again suffered serious setbacks. In his progress report to the SC on 24 February 1995, the SG noted that two months after the Accra Agreement the Liberian factions had yet to show that they were genuinely committed to the fulfilment of their obligations. One option was therefore the withdrawal of UNOMIL, or a reduction in its strength, in order to send a signal to ECOWAS and the Liberian people that the international community had given up its efforts to help to find a peaceful solution to

the conflict. In the following months UNOMIL's presence was scaled down to less than 30 military observers.

Reacting to this warning shot from the UN, ECOWAS, under the leadership of President Rawlings of Ghana and his Foreign Minister Obed Asamoah, made another effort to bring peace to Liberia. After further consultations, the chairman of ECOWAS and the leaders of the warring parties of Liberia, as well as Chief Tamba Tailor, representing the traditional chiefs, met in Abuja (Nigeria) on 16-19 August 1995. Representatives of the Nigerian Government, the Eminent Person of OAU for Liberia and the SGSR were also present.

The Abuja talks culminated in the signing of the eleventh peace agreement since the beginning of the civil war, amending and supplementing the Cotonou and Akosombo Accords. The SG, in his progress report to the SC of 9 September 1995, was hopeful that this agreement had offered another chance for peace, because during the period leading up to the entry into force of the ceasefire, no major offensive had been undertaken by any faction.<sup>(54)</sup> Indeed, it may be that the warring parties in Liberia have reached the point of exhaustion.

To conclude, I would like to point out three interesting points and lessons for further discussion:

*Firstly*, the SC's handling of ECOMOG gives an interesting insight into the SC's application of Article 53 of the charter, which reads: '. . . no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council . . .' There is little disagreement among international lawyers that this means prior and explicit authorization. Nor is there any denying the fact that ECOMOG, although established as a peacekeeping force, soon started to use considerable force. Olara Otunnu, President of the International Peace Academy in New York, stated, 'It was called peacekeeping, began more like an enforcement measure, then alternated between peacekeeping and enforcement. There was no consent of the Liberian State, because the State had disintegrated.'<sup>(55)</sup> Although in several statements by its President, the SC commended ECOWAS's efforts to promote peace in Liberia, even in Resolution 788 (1992) it did not spell out any authorization for ECOMOG to enforce peace by all means, including military means, although it declared the situation in Liberia a 'threat to the peace' (Article 39). Although it can be argued that from this moment the decision on an arms embargo under chapter VII was sufficient sign of the SC's intended authorization, a number of international lawyers would probably hesitate to follow this line of reasoning. Talking in practical terms, however, the political message of the SC's behaviour is clear: if the leading powers in the SC are loath to involve the UN or themselves in a regional conflict, regional powers and regional arrangements will not have to worry about the stringent application of the authorization clause in Article 53 of the UN charter.

*Secondly*, ECOMOG displayed the ambiguity of a regional security arrangement that is dominated by one regional power. On the one hand, without such a dominant power leadership and the resources needed (in particular military ones) for effective action is unlikely to be forthcoming. On the other hand, the dominant role of Nigeria and its military was a continuous burden for ECOMOG's credibility. ECOMOG never rid itself of the impression it gave of being an instrument of Nigeria's ambition of

regional dominance. In addition, ECOMOG's effectiveness was undermined by the cynical handling by President Babangida (and later Abacha) of long-standing promises by the Nigerian military to lead the country back to civil, democratic government. It did not leave ECOMOG's international and regional legitimacy untouched. The spreading of the 'Nigerian disease', i.e. corruption at all levels, to ECOMOG had an even more disastrous effect. Ruthless looting by Nigerian units destroyed what was left of ECOMOG's credibility among the Liberian people, in particular in Monrovia, where ECOMOG had in its early days been welcomed with relief.

*Thirdly*, although countering Nigerian dominance by establishing UNOMIL was in principle a sound idea, UNOMIL was unfortunately unable to fulfil its intended role. Mackinlay and Alao have pointed out some of the obvious deficiencies.<sup>(56)</sup> Whereas in the Cotonou Agreement it was seemingly clear that ECOMOG's specified activities were to be 'monitored and verified by the United Nations observers', the real allocation of responsibilities for command and control between ECOMOG and UNOMIL was unclear. For instance, 'in the event of UNOMIL's role being challenged or its officers becoming exposed to danger, he [the SRSG] would have to rely on the military support of ECOMOG, a force palpably not under his control or even within his aegis of influence. At the crucial point of interface with ECOMOG Field Commander, Gordon Somers's precedence was unclear . . . Many Liberians saw UNOMIL as being subordinated to ECOMOG. For them the signs were evident in daily events on the streets. They saw UNOMIL vehicles stopped and searched at ECOMOG road blocks. UNOMIL was also required to observe the curfew times and influential Liberians asked, how could UNOMIL be verifying their activities when ECOMOG was free to act without witnesses during the hours of darkness.'<sup>(57)</sup> Some observers believe that Gordon Somers did not have the compelling personality needed to counteract ECOMOG's 'uncooperative' behaviour.

## **Conclusions**

The first conclusion to be drawn for closer African-European cooperation and a role for the WEU in the field of prevention, conflict management and peacekeeping is a paradoxical one: extreme care has to be taken not to draw definite, generalized lessons from one particular case and attempt to apply them to the next case. In several instances this tendency has led the Security Council in the wrong direction, for instance in Angola, where the Council followed the lessons of Namibia, and in Rwanda, where it followed those of Somalia. To a large extent each and every case has to be approached on its own merits. With regard to Africa, Europeans and Americans should keep in mind that this is a continent as diversified in terms of culture, politics, religion, conflict and behaviour as Europe; perhaps even more so.

However, there is quite a comprehensive *checklist of problems and general considerations*, which policy-makers, the military and others should bear in mind when it comes to deciding on and putting together a peace mission, some of which are given below.

- The *appropriate size of missions* remains a difficult question. Undersizing in order to reduce costs may turn out to be not only very risky with regard to success, but also very costly in the end. The better and more cost-effective approach seems to

be to start with relatively large numbers, and then, should the situation allow, withdraw contingents. Highly trained civil and/or military teams may to a certain extent compensate for small numbers; the choice depends on the character of the conflict in question. Training such *integrated teams* of personnel from Africa and Europe (and probably other countries) in advance would certainly be of advantage, in particular with regard to conflict prevention.

- The *timely deployment of personnel* is another difficult problem. Delaying deployment for weeks or even months is one of the worst mistakes made in present-day peace missions. A number of initiatives have addressed this problem, including the UN-DPKO's Standby Forces Register, the Anglo-French paper of November 1994, Canadian proposals on Enhancing the UN's Quick Reaction Capabilities and proposals by the Nordic countries, in particular Denmark. In practice, however, little has been achieved.
- The *expanded role for the police* and their training in conflict management and peacekeeping does not get sufficient attention, although apparently civil and military police are often much more appropriate than combat troops for handling problems in communal conflicts. WEU should add this point to its agenda, together with the question of *radio stations*.
- Peace missions need ongoing, well coordinated, day-to-day *diplomatic support* by the major regional and global powers, as happened in exemplary fashion in Mozambique (and in Cambodia). EU member states and their embassies can play a decisive role; much more can be done.
- The complexity and tenacity of the *interdependence, in peace missions, of humanitarian and social issues* on the one hand *and military aspects* on the other has been constantly underestimated. Careful planning for integrated command and control is required at all levels, from New York down to the theatre of operations. WEU could assume an important coordinating and facilitating role in this field. The Franco-British initiative and the Canadian proposal on Enhancing the UN's Quick Reaction Capability contain proposals worth pursuing.
- The *persistence of violence* has been heavily underestimated in most cases, in particular in Somalia, Angola, Rwanda and Liberia. It has exacerbated the difficult interrelationship between the humanitarian and military aspects of peace missions. There is a lack of understanding of the complicated socio-psychological and socio-economic background of this core problem facing modern peace missions. West Europeans and North Americans living in comparatively safe and comfortable conditions instinctively assume that 'violence does not pay'. However, in economically distressed and socially fragmented countries the fact is that, for quite a number of people, not least the unemployed young, violence and being part of an armed group *does* pay. Seminars with Africans, Europeans and others exploring this problem, organized jointly by the OAU and WEU, should be held regularly.
- The question to what extent peace missions should be mandated *to disarm warring parties* needs equally systematic analysis and conceptualization. Is it a necessary precondition for re-establishing peace in African countries? Is this an

area where a well thought-out operational doctrine on the limited use of force (which was absent in Somalia and, for that matter, Bosnia) is needed?

- The questions of the *limited use of force* and *impartiality* will continue to be of utmost importance for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa because of the persistence of violence in several conflicts. How to fill this doctrinal void is the subject of the on-going controversy on what is called enlarged, robust, second-generation peacekeeping or peace support operations. There is a wide range of literature on the subject.

Finally, two observations with regard to the role of WEU and Euro-African cooperation. *Firstly*, the need for early action and conflict prevention in Africa remains high on the agenda. This is a short-term requirement. Rwanda has not been the last disaster. There is not the slightest hope that, in the military field, the initiatives mentioned above will lead to sizeable, effective African quick reaction capabilities in the next few years.<sup>(58)</sup> (Given South Africa's quick reaction capabilities, even though they are limited, this may be different in southern Africa.) Are WEU Members, the United States and other non-African powers prepared to fill this gap and take over certain responsibilities?

*Secondly*, WEU member states have almost stopped contributing troops to African peacekeeping missions. In 1993, several thousand West European peacekeepers were serving in Africa, above all in Somalia and Mozambique. By autumn 1995 only about fifty were left, most of them serving as military observers in the Western Sahara (MINURSO). The bulk of the non-African peacekeepers are now provided by Asia (Bangladesh, India, Malaysia and Pakistan) and, to a lesser degree, by Latin America (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay). This will continue to be so in the foreseeable future, although European states may show more willingness to send peacekeepers to Africa once NATO's intervention in Bosnia has come to a (successful) conclusion. The notion of *European-African cooperation* may therefore be misleading if understood as overly bilateral. What is really meant is a *triangular* Africa-EU/WEU-UN (representing the Southern countries) relationship or, even more correctly, a *four-sided* relationship, if the substantial role of the United States is taken into account.<sup>(59)</sup> An enhanced WEU role would have to be set in this framework.

# WEU'S ROLE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

*Guido Lenzi*<sup>(60)</sup>

## **Introduction**

The use of military forces has evolved from the primary task of territorial defence. It now includes peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. The body of relevant international law established by the UN charter and developed in Security Council resolutions has provided the necessary legitimacy and political underpinning for this evolution. In addition, practice and experience have refined the process of adjustment of this new aspect of cooperative security, adapting it to specific circumstances.

Fundamentally, whereas the right to individual and collective self-defence and the protection of vital interests is obvious (and inscribed in Article 51 of the charter of the United Nations), any contribution to a multinational military undertaking requires both the appropriate international legitimation and, domestically, the conviction that such collaboration is in the national interest and/or that it is a national responsibility. In so-called 'out-of-area' matters it is therefore imperative that the appropriate interlinking of institutional mechanisms be provided, for both political and operational reasons.

The principle that there is a right and duty to intervene for humanitarian motives, first spelled out in UN Resolution 46/182 of 1992, has evolved to include cases where the consent of the state involved cannot be obtained because of the collapse of its structures and its disappearance as an international entity. Experience, however, has demonstrated that a degree of local cooperation is indispensable for the restoration of peace and social rehabilitation, the latter forming a necessary continuum with the tasks of interposition and peacekeeping.

The combined criteria of efficiency, effectiveness and legitimation must be taken into account in contingency planning for crisis management. To different degrees of approximation, Namibia, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Salvador, Mozambique, South Africa and, albeit much more laboriously, Angola, are proving to be success stories. Others, like Somalia, Yugoslavia and Rwanda will instead go down in history as dramatic experiences. In the bitter aftermath, the question is not 'why was there an international intervention?', but rather 'why did it not prove successful?' The legitimacy of international intervention, under appropriate conditions, is no longer disputed. The way such intervention is carried out has been and may again be.

These are the issues that must therefore be addressed anew, with special regard to the situation in sub-Saharan Africa, on the assumption that the need is most urgent in that region of the world, but also in the expectation of similar contingencies worldwide.

Given the specific characteristics of sub-Saharan African countries (which are based more than elsewhere on ethnic and local allegiances), civil strife, widespread, chronic underdevelopment and humanitarian catastrophes can occur; these often lead to genocide, in a vicious circle of cause and effect. Although outside Europe's immediate strategic periphery, the area continues to be of specific concern to Europe, for reasons

that have been expressed in Alvaro Vasconcelos's chapter, and which extend beyond post-colonial commitments (as demonstrated, for example, by the Italian contribution to the restoration of peace in Mozambique).

The on-going process of consultation among some of the most 'willing and able' European and African countries is still at the stage where an inventory of countries' respective needs and capabilities is being drawn up, on the basis of the OAU Cairo Summit Declaration of 30 June 1993 and the EU-OAU dialogue established after the Essen European Council of December 1994. With the subsequent contributions made by the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan, the process has gathered momentum, and now needs more structured political impetus, involving donor and recipient countries alike.

An incoherent proliferation of Western initiatives should be avoided, and any bilateral or multilateral mission should seek the explicit support of the OAU.<sup>(61)</sup> In any event, the main preoccupation should be to ensure adequate political legitimacy, which is as essential as operational skills for the success of crisis management.

This paper attempts to indicate possible ways forward for both Africa and Europe, in particular suggesting how to establish the most appropriate coalitions of the willing as a contribution to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and ensuing rehabilitation. The process already appears to be the most plausible environment for operational solidarity over WEU's so-called 'Petersberg tasks',<sup>(62)</sup> in which Associate Members, Observers and Associate Partners could also participate (and even Arab countries that are members of the OAU).<sup>(63)</sup>

### **The need for UN legitimacy**

The UN is the only organization that is entitled to authorise the use of force other than for self-defence. Its charter defines its own crisis prevention (chapter VI) and peace-enforcement (chapter VII) mechanisms, and does not exclude recourse to regional organizations (chapter VIII, Articles 48 and 52). Over the years, an intermediate capability for 'peacekeeping' has been developed (which Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld used to call 'chapter VI and 1/2').<sup>(64)</sup>

In this respect, the June 1992 'Agenda for Peace' Report by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali provided the following supplementary considerations:

'The charter deliberately provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies . . . In this regard, the United Nations has recently encouraged a rich variety of complementary efforts. Just as no two regions or situations are the same, so the design of cooperative work and its division of labour must adapt to the realities of each case with flexibility and creativity. In Africa, three different regional groups - the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference - joined efforts with the United Nations regarding Somalia . . . Under the charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs . . . Regional

organizations participating in complementary efforts with the United Nations in joint undertakings would encourage States outside the region to act supportively.'

Resolution 46/182 of 14 April 1992 on 'strengthening the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance' had broken new ground in this direction. Building on Resolutions 43/131 of 1988 and 45/100 of 1991 (on 'humanitarian assistance to the victims of natural catastrophes and other emergency situations') and painstakingly engineered by Ambassador Jan Eliasson,<sup>(65)</sup> it opened a passage in the barrier of absolute national sovereignty. It established that 'each state has the responsibility . . . to take care of the victims of natural disasters or *other emergencies*[emphasis added]'. Arguing that 'the magnitude and duration of many emergencies may be beyond the response capacity of many affected countries', it called on states to 'facilitate the work' of humanitarian assistance. For that purpose, the operational criteria of prevention, preparedness and stand-by capacity, under the coordination of an 'emergency relief coordinator', were spelt out.

The right and duty of collective intervention has thus been implicitly established. Peacekeeping operations have evolved from those in which lightly armed forces acted as a buffer or monitored the observance of agreements to the much more challenging and in many ways vulnerable tasks of protecting humanitarian aid convoys and safe zones, and forcibly imposing the peace. In localised conflicts, where generalised civil strife develops rather than a conflict between clearly identifiable belligerents, taking 'effective collective measures' for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace (as described in Article 1 of the UN charter) requires some involvement of the conflicting parties -- much more so than in a classic state of war. Frustrated in its initial attempts to impose its authority directly, according to chapter VII peace enforcement provisions, the UN is now reverting to a more suitable role of 'legalizer' (through so-called 'enabling resolutions') and provider of preventive measures.

Long before the Agenda for Development was drawn up,<sup>(66)</sup> the Secretary-General of the UN stressed that development aid should take into consideration the underlying causes of conflict, namely political oppression, social injustice and blatant economic disparities, adding that the main emphasis of the work of the UN itself should be on the development and promotion of 'comprehensive frameworks of action to advance economic and social cooperation, as part of an integrated approach to peace-building and collective security.'<sup>(67)</sup>

This development is confirmed by a supplement to the Agenda for Peace,<sup>(68)</sup> which argues that international intervention must extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks and include the promotion of national reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective Government. It added that 'the UN is reluctant to assume responsibility for maintaining law and order, nor can it impose a new political structure or new state institutions. It can only help hostile factions to help themselves and begin to live together again.' On 22 February 1995, a Presidential Statement from the Security Council welcomed 'the Secretary-General's willingness to assist regional organizations and arrangements as appropriate', drawing particular attention to the needs of Africa, and calling for ways and means of improving practical cooperation and coordination.<sup>(69)</sup> Ultimately, in August 1995 Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, with reference to operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, emphasized that 'a peacekeeping force is not a combat force . . . [and] if member states desired peace enforcement, then

a multinational force outside the UN was the best way to manage such an operation.<sup>(70)</sup>

### **African initiatives**

The Secretary-General of the OAU, Salim Ahmed Salim, has repeatedly stressed his conviction that the main responsibility for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa lies first and foremost with African states.

It should also be stressed that, while 40% of UN peacekeeping forces are presently deployed in Africa, African countries themselves have been particularly active in providing troops for the increasing number of UN peacekeeping operations worldwide. Five out of thirty-six UN planning arrangements are with African states (the Central African Republic, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Senegal). This generosity is rewarded (and encouraged) by the financial returns to the state concerned resulting from the difference between the 'per diem' provided by the UN and the salaries actually paid from national army budgets. Conversely, financial reasons supplement political or operational considerations in accounting for the reluctance of African states to operate on their own, without the concurrence of the UN, within multinational formations at a continental or sub-continental level.

Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 1990 OAU summit issued a 'Declaration on the political and socio-economic situation in Africa and the fundamental changes taking place in the world', expressing 'the determination . . . to work together towards the peaceful and speedy resolution of all the conflicts on the continent'. In the same spirit, the following summit agreed the creation (in six stages over 34 years) of an African Economic Community, as a supplementary security factor. A 1994 OAU working group paper,<sup>(71)</sup> spelled out the fact that, while in the past in Africa peacekeeping was considered to be the primary responsibility of the UN, with African organizations concentrating their efforts in the areas of preventive action, diplomacy and peacemaking, 'recent events, especially in Rwanda and Burundi, require that we re-examine [that] assumption . . . and that Africa should be fully prepared to the limits of its ability and with the necessary assistance from the international community, to take on peacekeeping operations on the continent.'

This recognition by the African countries themselves implies that the international community ought to respond by giving every possible assistance to a continent particularly afflicted by adverse conditions.<sup>(72)</sup> After the end of the Cold War, the prevention and containment of crises in Africa may no longer be perceived by Europeans (or by the Africans themselves) as a vital or essential interest. External international legitimacy, combined with domestic political sustainability, is therefore even more essential for collaborative operations in Africa than in any other continent.

Established in 1963 with the main purpose of avoiding disputes over territories whose borders had been drawn by colonial regimes, the OAU has for some years been considering proposals to establish a comprehensive and permanent system, or at least the machinery, for peacemaking and peacekeeping. Article II of the charter of the OAU calls upon member states to 'coordinate and harmonize their general policies [*inter alia*] in defence and security'. It is true that the OAU charter prohibits any interference in the internal affairs of its members, but even the Commission of

Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (of intra-state disputes according to Art. XIX) and the Defence Commission (Art. XX) have remained ineffective.

The very specific requirements of sub-Saharan Africa stem from the fact that, especially after the end of the Cold War, African conflicts are mainly of internal origin and no longer attributable to inter-state rivalry or intervention by former colonial powers. The Cairo summit of June 1993 recognized that 'there have also been certain internal . . . factors and policies which have negatively contributed to the present state of affairs on the continent' (para. 8) and that 'no internal factor has contributed more to the present socio-economic problems in the Continent than the scourge of conflicts in and among our countries' (para. 9).<sup>(73)</sup> Be that as it may, local structural and financial resources are not sufficient to cope with the magnitude of the underlying causes and resulting consequences. Contributions to African crisis management should therefore essentially aim at promoting a sense of democratic participation, responsibility and solidarity, both within and between African states.

In 1992, Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim presented a 'Proposal for resolving conflicts in Africa', obtaining an increased role for himself and the Secretariat, as well as for the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.<sup>(74)</sup> In July 1992, the Dakar summit agreed the establishment of what was subsequently termed an 'African Mechanism Apparatus for Preventing, Managing and Resolving African Crises',<sup>(75)</sup> attributing a right of initiative to the members of the Bureau, with the addition of the outgoing and incoming chairmen, strengthening the role of the Secretary-General and establishing an interim Arbitration Tribunal and a Special Fund.

The seminal Cairo Declaration of 1993 established the following basic principles and provisions:<sup>(76)</sup>

Reaffirmation of the sovereign equality of member states and respect of the borders inherited from colonialism. Prevention as the primary objective, through observation and monitoring missions. The assistance of the UN is tempered by the search for ways and means for national African contributions. The Bureau of the Assembly will constitute the (decision-making) 'Central Organ', and the Secretary-General its operational arm, with supplementary expertise from eminent African personalities; meetings of the Bureau shall be held twice a month at the level of ambassadors, with a quorum of two-thirds of its members, 'generally . . . guided by the principle of consensus.' A special fund will be financed with 5% of the OAU's regular budget and with voluntary contributions (including contributions from outside Africa).

Since 1993, the OAU 'mechanism' has already acted in a variety of ways with respect to the following countries: Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, and between Nigeria and Cameroon. Furthermore, a OAU 'Permanent Committee for the Horn of Africa' has been established for Somalia; and a 'Group of Neighbouring Countries' for Burundi. Consultation has also developed among member countries (in Addis Ababa in 1993 and in Cairo in 1994) to improve the functioning and adherence to the OAU 'mechanism', in order to attract the support of countries outside the continent and benefit from comparable experience. The need for an 'early warning' system and a data bank at the service of those engaged in conflict prevention, as well as joint training programmes and workshops, was

recognized as a priority. Political sanctions and improved functioning of the 'Committee of 20' (for refugees) have also been mentioned.

Subregionally, support has been provided to the initiatives of ECOWAS<sup>(77)</sup> in Liberia and IGADD<sup>(78)</sup> for the Horn of Africa and Sudan, while SADC<sup>(79)</sup> is promoting a pact of non-aggression and mutual defence,<sup>(80)</sup> all of them in the declared conviction that economic development is a consequence of security, and not a precondition. The contribution of South Africa may in this respect eventually provide a catalytic effect.<sup>(81)</sup>

Some Western countries have already contributed individually to the effort made by the OAU, either through the financing of the Special Fund or the provision of materiel and training.<sup>(82)</sup> The question requiring further conceptual analysis and political response, however, concerns the most appropriate way to ensure the external cooperation called for by African states.

### **The basic requirements**

The primacy of the UN, which the OAU itself recognises, can only be considered in terms of a superior legitimation, rather than substitution. The scope for a multinational authority to replace temporarily collapsed national institutions has been seriously reduced by the experience of Somalia. Even if the possibility of *ad hoc* bi-national 'pairing' formulas is not excluded, any 'neo-trusteeship' model would be refused.<sup>(83)</sup> The African 'mechanism' should therefore operate with the aim of ensuring that any outside participation occurs with the ostensible superior responsibility of the OAU or the regional organisation concerned, duly mandated by the UN.

Common guidelines and criteria are indispensable to bolster the conflict prevention, early-warning and rapid deployment capabilities of African countries. This is much more urgent than addressing the issue of peace enforcement scenarios. They could all go under the name of 'political and operational interoperability' of European and African contributions in the field of logistics, materiel, training and common exercises, and the provision of diplomatic negotiating skills.

The overall purpose should be not only to contain the consequences of conflict, but to remove its causes, through the establishment of political and institutional conditions that promote cohabitation and tolerance -- in short, good governance and democracy. The ultimate purpose is institution-building and strengthening democratic participation and state prerogatives, an endeavour that leaves little room for substitutions or multilateral neo-protectorates. The right and duty of humanitarian intervention is today widely accepted, and therefore recognized, with its corollary of a use of force that may bypass the nation-state's authority if it proves unable to meet its most fundamental responsibilities. The reinstatement of domestic jurisdiction remains, however, the ultimate purpose, and the restoration of national governing authority an imperative.

In Africa, as elsewhere, a 'peace operations doctrine' is therefore an urgent prerequisite, as a common culture of crisis prevention must spread, particularly in order to achieve the necessary timeliness. The Cairo meeting, in May 1994, of an international panel entrusted with this task, considered, *inter alia*, the Draft NATO

Doctrine for Peace Support Operations of 28 February 1994; using it as a blueprint would be a tall order, given the respective effectiveness of NATO and the OAU, but the overall conceptual framework would not differ much.

The main issue appears to be the definition of the *force majeure* that the 'collective conscience' of the peoples of Africa considers sufficient to waive the principle of non-interference and acquire broad acceptability.<sup>(84)</sup> The mandate of the 'Doctrine Working Group' asserts that the process must be comprehensive, ranging from preventive action to peace-building, and involve the UN, its agencies, the ICRC and NGOs. It must thereby also obtain substantial resources, proper logistics and administration, plus the appropriate intelligence and communications for command and control.

The task of conflict prevention, recognized as the most urgent one, implies, however, a much broader spectrum of actions than the merely logistical, from the provision of good offices, mediation and negotiation to the control of arms trafficking, the resettlement of refugees, demobilisation, democratisation of military structures and civil rehabilitation programmes.

This is the very comprehensive agenda to which any external cooperation and assistance must relate. Some European countries have recognized that it calls for more than a cooperation programme, and must involve a structured partnership equal to those that have been proposed to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and to the Arab countries of North Africa. The relevant consultation among Europeans, within the institutionalized EU/OAU dialogue decided upon at the Essen summit in December 1994, but also in WEU, is under way.

Given the unpredictability of situations, detailed contingency planning is difficult. As with any other possible extra-European contingency, no open-ended commitment could therefore be undertaken by the EU or WEU. Furthermore, for the moment at least, it is hard to conceive full-range autonomous WEU peacekeeping operations in Africa or elsewhere. Yet even the protection and evacuation of foreign nationals would in themselves benefit from cooperative mechanisms established with and through the OAU. Some common operational terms of reference must therefore be established. Even if circumstances suggest a 'bottom-up', case-by-case approach, the process must be sequential, interlinking the various contributions and establishing a 'legitimizing chain' between international organisations, upon which EU common positions or actions may be developed, with WEU ensuring coordination and operational guidance. The resulting indications would then be available for any task force formed by the able and willing, with the political and financial support of the others, all of it within the scope of the CFSP established in Maastricht and under review in the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.

The European Union, together with the Western European Union, could therefore upgrade the level of cooperation with the OAU and the subregional African organisations, at the political-judicial, financial, technical and logistical level, the first two areas being entrusted to the EU and the latter to WEU. The WEU Planning Cell, following appropriate instructions from the Council, could assess the needs in materiel, draw up an inventory of the European resources available and coordinate their delivery.

## Recent initiatives

The process of consultation between the EU/WEU and the OAU should stimulate the production of a declaration (or separate concurrent declarations), rather than a formal agreement which might make the relationship more rigid, stating the respective general principles and criteria in the matter and providing the necessary political underpinning for future collaborative arrangements tailored to specific circumstances. The ultimate purpose should be the establishment not of a continental 'stability pact' or other such collective security arrangement, but rather a cooperative security framework adapted to Africa's specific circumstances.

Preventive activity consists in a broad spectrum of steps to avoid conflicts breaking out, restrain disputes from escalating, and limit their spread. It therefore also requires CBMs, early-warning mechanisms, preventive deployments, demilitarized zones and the like.

In November 1994 a Franco-British paper identified the four phases requiring attention:<sup>(85)</sup> an early warning system; preventive diplomacy; training and the pre-stocking of materiel; and, lastly, the emergency deployment of peacekeeping forces. In all phases the UN/OAU relationship is recognized as paramount, with WEU acting in an ancillary role, to 'mobilize the European support' and to 'coordinate European contributions'.

A UK-Nigerian proposal, produced in April 1995 after wide consultation, and seminars held in Accra, Cairo and Harare, also stressed the need to define separately the general principles of UN/OAU cooperation, early warning, preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping - all essential prerequisites for timely external assistance - supplementing the UN-OAU agreement of 9 October 1990. The document recognises that, while the UN remains the superior authority in the matter, regional or subregional initiatives are opportune, since a bottom-up process allowing for complementary and synergetic roles should make it 'easier for non-African participants to give concrete support'. It will then be for the OAU to decide whether, and if so how, to strengthen its involvement in peacekeeping, taking practical steps on doctrine, training, the preparation of units, equipment and logistics. For any international cooperative venture, led by the countries of Africa themselves, 'the frameworks . . . must be clearly defined and resources sought from outside identified with precision'. (In this proposal, which was presented in a UN context, there was not a word about the EU or WEU).

The stated common objective, in the UK-Nigerian proposal, is the containment, not only of any outright threat to international security, but also of domestic situations which might undermine regional stability and produce humanitarian disasters. Africa's shortcomings are recognized, but so is the fact that the cooperative support of outside contributions will be forthcoming 'to the extent that a practical framework and programmes are developed within the region [emphasis added]' improving the readiness of troop contributors to deploy appropriately equipped forces rapidly and effectively. A number of proposals are therefore listed, to ensure the appropriate :

- doctrine, glossary and standing operating procedures for possible missions, powers and means;
- training (*inter alia* in order to achieve interoperability);
- preparation of units earmarked for UN, OAU or subregional operations;
- equipment and logistics (in particular 'certain types of specialized and heavy equipment');
- dispatch, if invited, of rapid mobile teams to help prepare African contingents;
- possible partnership or pairing agreements, 'in the framework of the UN stand-by agreements or outside them';
- planning, more clearly worked out.

A standing inter-African force with pre-positioned materiel does not seem a viable proposition in the short term, in spite of the preparedness of some countries, like Senegal and Togo, to contribute to it, and the encouragement given by President Mitterrand at the 18th Franco-African summit on 9-10 November 1994 in Biarritz. Such a development could only result from a radical transformation of the OAU's status.<sup>(86)</sup> The Secretary-General of the OAU himself has stressed that the emphasis should initially be on conflict prevention.<sup>(87)</sup> Even if this is only one of the purposes (albeit an essential one), a set of guiding principles will have to be established, in particular in order to achieve a common political evaluation of the issue at stake (based on the available intelligence) and identify the convergent interests that justify intervention.

A Euro-African conference held in Gaborone (Botswana) on 6-7 August 1995 tried to go further in the consideration of specific measures and options. It took note that, for early warning purposes, a database and an operations centre should soon be added to the conflict management centre that was established in Addis Ababa in June 1995, with the assistance of the United States. It promoted a French-sponsored seminar, convened on 14-15 December 1995 in Dakar between states, NGOs and the European Commission to develop 'indicators' for the early detection of subregional conflicts of a political, humanitarian, military, economic and social nature, with an inventory of European and African resources drawn from a wide variety of sources, be they UN agencies, the press or NGOs, systematically collected and analysed. It stressed that preventive diplomacy should also be augmented with fact-finding and observer missions. Preventive military deployments ('like that which the UN has undertaken for the first time in the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia') were instead deemed to be 'for the moment beyond the reach of the OAU'. Individual states should, however, contribute to the formation of a 100-strong OAU preventive observer mission. While external donors could assist for specific projects, regional organisations could act as 'building-blocks' for confidence-building purposes. The training of peacekeepers would remain a national responsibility, while Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe offered the services of their staff colleges.

Regarding the actual preparation of operations, the Gabarone seminar stressed that a key element for the donor community would be the early definition of the mission's requirements. In the field of logistics, strategic lift, communications, basic transport, catering equipment and a water purification capacity, as well as more basic equipment such as tentage, were listed as essential items requiring the participation of UN-sponsored mobile logistic teams. Some standardization of equipment and procedures should also be pursued, in spite of the need to fit force packages or concepts to varied missions in Africa and elsewhere. As for 'external assistance', the seminar recognised the importance of existing bilateral agreements (sanctioning *de facto* pairing arrangements), agreed that WEU provided a further potential channel for the coordination of military assistance by European states (the first such acknowledgement), and took note that the US administration would increase donor coordination.<sup>(88)</sup>

### **An OAU 'mechanism'**

While the EU and WEU prepare themselves for these and other 'out-of-area' contingencies, the criteria for a functioning OAU 'mechanism' are still in the process of being worked out. They must provide for the necessary endogenous political sustainability and operational efficiency of any crisis prevention operation in Africa.<sup>(89)</sup>

The prerequisite appears to be the development of more precise rules of procedure for the 'Central Organ' of the OAU, including the specification of the types of conflict considered to require international intervention, the various international measures applicable, their sequence and the specific ways in which armed forces could be used, including non-African contributions. A more explicit pan-African political consensus would thereby be acquired, along the lines of the OSCE (with which the OAU has had exploratory contacts), gradually and possibly with subregional groupings.<sup>(90)</sup>

The rules of the game would be established at the continental level, even for subregional operations. A common analytical process must be stimulated, using shared intelligence that includes access to a data bank and fact-finding and observer missions, in cooperation with other international organisations, states and NGOs. Short of a continental Security Council, which is as improbable in Africa as it is in Europe, persuasion must be enhanced through preventive contacts and mediation by 'eminent personalities', a method that would seem particularly effective in Africa. Finally, specific agreements should be negotiated with financial organisations such as the Economic Commission for Africa and the Bank for African Development, to produce comprehensive financial enticements to economic development, social reconstruction and civil reconciliation -- in short, 'the peace through development and democracy'.

The enhancement of the capabilities of the 'Central Organ' of the OAU, apart from considerations of political and practical African solidarity, would also ensure that even the humanitarian interventions that may be organised from outside the continent do not result in a continued mortification or marginalisation of African resources, a situation that would be counterproductive. The work in progress should also consist in providing an answer to the other questions still facing WEU (and the EU), namely: will WEU itself wish to act or will it merely wish to coordinate the activities of its

member states (the answer will in fact depend in part on the ability of African organisations to present specific requests or propose formulas for cooperation); how far could WEU's activities be linked to EU joint actions in Africa (the answer to this question will partly result from the IGC revision of the Maastricht treaty, including the EU's CFSP); and could a WEU logistic and infrastructure unit be developed for specific contingencies, supplementing African forces (the answer to that will result as much from the development of NATO's CJTF concept as from an autonomous and commonly-financed infrastructure for WEU)?

### **Provisional conclusions**

Basic European commitments to give assistance to sub-Saharan Africa would be mainly in the financial and logistical fields. At every stage of the process, from early warning to peace enforcement, the EU would have a role to play, and this would include entrusting to WEU the use of military means. The EU could ask WEU to contribute, through its Planning Cell, to identification of the needs, in materiel and equipment, for the various possible options, and define the essential functions of an OAU standing military cell, identify possible African national contingents, assist in determining their force structure, and the means available, their pre-stocking, transport and staff structure. The process should help create, prepare and equip additional regional actors, develop their credibility and stimulate their participation instead of substituting for them. This implies some proactive Euro-African mechanisms.

In short, for Europe the African agenda (an African *policy* would be too ambitious, and unwarranted) should consist in providing specialised assistance for reinforcing the OAU's ability to create a more secure environment. Supplementing the Commission's 'Echo' humanitarian assistance, Europe should also contribute by stimulating, advocating, detecting and supporting African preventive responses well before conflict management becomes necessary. WEU for its part could contribute by assessing needs, giving early-warning guidance, equipment and training.

WEU has already started to identify national forces that are available to it (FAWEU) and is establishing some multinational military formations, such as the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, together with their embryonic command structures. The November 1995 Madrid Ministerial Council endorsed the 'humanitarian task force' proposed by Italy for intervention in the event of natural disasters or other humanitarian emergencies. It could constitute the experimental core structure for other, broader, appropriately mandated operations.

The prerequisite remains the establishment of an adequate military structure, including command and control mechanisms. Only then will it be possible for WEU's Permanent Council to decide if, and at what level of involvement, operational missions may be undertaken, for the foreseeable future necessarily in conjunction with other European security organisations and international bodies.

The involvement of Africans and the coordination of the efforts of the international community have been undertaken so far by the Europeans, who have taken a series of initiatives for conflict prevention. It is now as much up to Europeans as it is to Africans to proceed to the harmonization of their respective policies and capabilities,

if any further progress is to be made towards realising their stated intentions. It may indeed be argued that only after the EU/WEU have taken a more formal stand on the question will the OAU be sufficiently stimulated to put into practice its stated willingness to coordinate at the continental level, and the UN be reassured in providing its superior legitimation.

Apart from its specific purposes, which only circumstances and the consent of states involved will dictate, European preparedness for crisis prevention in sub-Saharan Africa, coordinated by WEU, could in itself provide a demonstration of European political and operational willingness and effectiveness. These 'out-of-area' engagements could in fact be the most appropriate test cases and seedbeds for cohesion and coordination among the many countries related to WEU, in preparation for the broader implications of European security cooperation.

Already, WEU Associate Members, Observers and Associate Partners can contribute to the resolution of crises in Africa alongside the full members, with their previous experience in peacekeeping and cooperation programmes in Africa and elsewhere. In the Kirchberg Declaration of 9 May 1994 the possibility of non-full members being associated with 'Petersberg missions' was reaffirmed.

Sub-Saharan Africa is an area for Petersberg missions: it would not necessarily involve the transatlantic Alliance, nor would it risk being misinterpreted in Moscow, Washington or anywhere else, while contributing to a global affirmation of the European Security and Defence Identity.<sup>(91)</sup>

Finally, the relevant initiatives undertaken by Arab members of the OAU, (notably Egypt, the main promoter of the Cairo Declaration of 1993),<sup>(92)</sup> represent an important demonstration of international solidarity at a continental level, between countries and regions with different national characteristics. They thereby also constitute a most opportune instrument for promoting an internationalist, multilateral mentality in nations that might otherwise risk falling prey to domestic, inward-looking attitudes and their extremist, fundamentalist offspring. Therefore, while not seeing themselves as future beneficiaries of the OAU peacekeeping mechanism, Arab countries in Africa would benefit in other ways from the implications of such solidarity. The resulting Euro-Arab crisis prevention initiatives for sub-Saharan Africa (with the common planning and training they imply) could therefore also represent the first steps towards improved Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the field of security.

These prospects indicate some of the wider-ranging benefits that could derive from multilateral cooperation in crisis prevention and peacekeeping, in Africa and elsewhere.

1. Alvaro Vasconcelos is Director of the Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisbon.
2. See Jennifer Parmelee, 'Conflict-resolution Efforts are Hampered by Lack of Resources', *Africa Recovery*, April-September 1994.
3. In 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) set up a Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that was composed very largely of Nigerian troops (80%, according to the IISS).
4. For a discussion of the reasons why 'Europe must go back into Africa', see William Pfaff, 'A New Colonialism?', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 2-6.
5. Strategic assessment 1995, 'US Security challenges in Transition', Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, 1995.
6. Such as the conferences held in Washington in May 1995 and in Brussels in January 1996 at the initiative of the State Department to bring together major donor countries, including Australia, Canada and Japan, in addition to European countries, to coordinate international assistance to peacekeeping in Africa.
7. The UN Population Fund estimates the annual rate of population growth in Africa until the end of the century as 3%, exactly twice that in Asia over the same period (the figure for Asia is 1.5%, for Latin America 1.3% and for Europe 0.1%).
8. For a discussion of the significance of political conditionality in current democratisation processes, see Mark Robinson, 'Aid, Democracy and Political Conditionality in Sub-Saharan Africa', *The European Journal of Development Research*, vol. 5 (1993), no. 1, pp. 85-99.
9. The La Baule conference of heads of state of French-speaking African countries was held in June 1990.
10. For a detailed analysis of the peace process leading to the Angolan elections and the subsequent aggravation of the civil war, see Moisés Venâncio, 'The United Nations, Peace and Transition: Lessons from Angola', *Lumiar Paper*, no. 3 (Lisbon: IEEI, September 1994).
11. The potentially disastrous situation in Burundi led the UN Secretary-General to appeal, in January 1996, for the urgent deployment of military means in order to avoid what many observers think will be another hideous carnage.
12. Stanley Hoffman, 'The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention', *Survival*, vol. 37, no. 4, Winter 1995-96.
13. According to Eurostat, in the period 1989-93, oil and diamonds accounted for over a third of total EU imports from ACP countries.
14. Figures quoted by M. Jacques Godfrain, French Minister for Overseas Cooperation, on the eve of a meeting with the signatories to the Lomé Convention, to

stress his conviction that 'Africa is on the way to becoming the dragon of the 21st century', *International Herald Tribune*, 3 November 1995.

15. According to *Agence Europe* of 8 December 1995, it is expected that a bilateral trade and cooperation agreement between the EU and South Africa that is about to be concluded will be signed during the early stages of the Italian presidency of the EU (January-June 1996).

16. The text of the agreement specifically mentions both facilitating South Africa's insertion into the world economy and the interest of both parties in bolstering regional cooperation in Southern Africa.

17. The eighth European Development Fund (EDF), to be used over the next five years, has increased aid to ACP countries by approximately 18% (from ECU10.9 billion to ECU13.3 billion), to Central and Eastern Europe by around 30% and to the southern Mediterranean by some 115%.

18. See Alvaro Vasconcelos, 'Does CFSP really make a difference?', paper presented at the European College/TEPSA conference held in Bruges in June 1995.

19. For a comprehensive analysis of the failure of preventive diplomacy in sub-Saharan Africa, see Roland Marchal, 'The case of Somalia' and Michel d'Oléon, 'A missed opportunity for WEU', papers presented at the Workshop on Crisis Management and Peace Building in Africa: the Role of WEU and its Member States, Lisbon, 6-7 June 1995.

20. This idea was put forward by John Roper in 'Western European Union and Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa', unpublished paper, December 1995.

21. See *Agence Europe*, 6 December 1995.

22. <sup>0</sup>Winrich Kühne is a member of the directorate of Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, Germany.

23. <sup>0</sup>United Nations Emergency Force (Middle East).

24. <sup>0</sup>UN Operation in the Congo.

25. <sup>0</sup>UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group; UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda; UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda; UN Angola Verification Mission; UN Operations in Somalia.

26. <sup>0</sup>UN Transition Assistance Group [in Namibia]; UN Operation in Mozambique; UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.

27. <sup>0</sup>United Task Force.

28. <sup>0</sup>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group.

29. <sup>0</sup>In UNAVEM I, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola had been monitored.

30. <sup>0</sup>See the controversy, between Ahtisaari and Chester A. Crocker on the one hand and Paul Szasc and Winrich Kühne on the other, over the necessary size of peace missions in Heribert Weiland/Matthew Braham (eds.), *The Namibian Peace Process. Implications and Lessons for the Future* (Freiburg/Breisgau: Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut, 1994).

31. <sup>0</sup>Tony Hodges, Angola Case Study for the Workshop on Crisis Management and Peace Building in Africa: The Role of the WEU and its Member States, Lisbon, 6-7 June 1995.

32. <sup>0</sup>For a case study of disarmament in peacekeeping see Jeremy Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe* (New York and Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995).

33. <sup>0</sup>Fernando Jorge Cardoso, Mozambique Case Study, Lisbon Workshop.

34. <sup>0</sup>In contrast to what is often suggested now, there was considerable debate about the risks of such a military intervention. For instance, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff under the chairmanship of General Powell did not like this kind of unconventional use of military power at all.

35. <sup>0</sup>A thorough study of the success of UNITAF and the difficulties UNOSOM II ran into would have to point out the different scope of the mandates they were given by the SC. UNITAF's mandate was merely to 'establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia' (Resolution 794, para. 10), i.e. its purpose was to end starvation and fighting in Somalia. UNSOM II was given a number of additional tasks, all of them extremely demanding, such as the economic rehabilitation of Somalia, repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, political reconciliation, through broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, and the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country, re-establishment of the Somali police, removal of mines, etc. (Resolution 814, para. 4 a-g). Paras. 56-88 of the Secretary-General's Report of 3 March 1993 contained additional tasks.

36. <sup>0</sup>General Bruno Loi, Somalia Case Study, Lisbon Workshop.

37. <sup>0</sup>Roland Marchal, Somalia Case Study, Lisbon Workshop.

38. <sup>0</sup>Jarat Chopra, Age Eknes and Toralv Nordbo, 'Fighting for Hope in Somalia', NUPI Report no. 6, 1995, Oslo, p. 5.

39. <sup>0</sup>See Tom Farer, 'From Warlord to Peacelord -- Like it or not, the West needs to enlist Aideed', in *The Washington Post*, 12 September 1993; Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to SC Resolution 885 (1993), S/1994/653, 1 June 1994.

40. <sup>0</sup>Quoted from the draft of General Dallaire's article for *Vanguard Magazine*, 26 January 1995, p. 1.
41. <sup>0</sup>General Romeo Dallaire, 'Rwanda: From Peace Agreement to Genocide in less than 12 Months', manuscript, p. 7.
42. <sup>0</sup>Ibid., p. 14.
43. <sup>0</sup>*Le Monde*, 5 July 1994.
44. <sup>0</sup>'Rwanda: Western European Union's missed opportunities', Rwanda Case Study, Lisbon Workshop.
45. <sup>0</sup>d'Oléon.
46. <sup>0</sup>WEU press release, 21 June 1994.
47. <sup>0</sup>d'Oléon.
48. <sup>0</sup>d'Oléon.
49. <sup>0</sup>Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, 'Humanitarian Agencies Attempt Too Much and Achieve Too Little', *International Herald Tribune*, 19 December 1994, p. 6.
50. <sup>0</sup>For those who are interested in a deeper insight into the root causes and dynamics of the conflict in Liberia, I very much recommend the article by Stephen Ellis, the former editor of *Africa Confidential*, 'Liberia 1989-1994 -- A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence', *African Affairs*, 94 (1995), pp. 165-97.
51. <sup>0</sup>For more details see 'Information Notes on United Nations Peace-Keeping' (New York: United Nations, February 1995), p. 173.
52. <sup>0</sup>Ibid., p. 174.
53. <sup>0</sup>James O. C. Jonah, 'ECOMOG: A Successful Example of Peacemaking and Peacekeeping by a Regional Organization in the Third World', in Winrich Kühne (ed.), *Blauhelme in einer turbulenten Welt - Beiträge internationaler Experten zur Fortentwicklung des Völkerrechts und der Vereinten Nationen (Blue Helmets in a turbulent World - contributions of international experts on the development of international law and the United Nations)* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993), p. 321.
54. <sup>0</sup>S/1995/781, 9 September 1995.
55. <sup>0</sup>Quoted from the Singapore Symposium 'The changing Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping', 13-15 March 1991, p. 64.
56. <sup>0</sup>John Mackinlay and Abiodun Alao, 'Liberia 1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL Response to a Complex Emergency' (to be published by the United Nations University in its occasion Paper series).

57. <sup>0</sup>Ibid.

58. <sup>0</sup>The British initiative proposes *inter alia* the creation of UN logistics basing centres in Africa; UN Rapid Mobile Logistics Teams; Subregional Peacekeeping Support Centres, etc.

59. <sup>0</sup>At a meeting of officials from Europe, Africa and the United States held in Washington in summer 1995, this seems to have been more or less the joint understanding.

60. Guido Lenzi is Director of the Institute for Security Studies of WEU.

61. Which deplored the fact that the UN-supported French Operation TURQUOISE in Rwanda did not do so.

62. In its Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, the WEU Council of Ministers stated that forces from member states could be used for 'humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.'

63. Quite active in the process in Africa, they want to appear more as contributors rather than potential beneficiaries of it.

64. For details of the interaction between the UN and WEU, see the Report of the Defence Committee of the Assembly of WEU submitted on 19 May 1993 by its vice-chairman, Mrs Baarveld-Schlaman, entitled 'United Nations operations -- interaction with WEU'. The issue has also been examined in detail by Luisa Vierucci in 'WEU: a regional partner of the UN?', *Chaillot Paper* 12 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, December 1993).

65. Who was given the dubious reward of the even more demanding appointment of Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Assistance.

66. Report by the UN Secretary-General A/48/935 of 6 May 1994.

67. See the recommendations in the Secretary-General's Report A/49/665 of 11 November 1994 supplementing his report of 26 June 1992 on 'Enhancing international cooperation for development: the role of the UN system.'

68. Document 5/1995/1 of 25 January 1995.

69. S/PRST/1995/9.

70. See 'Ways to Improve the United Nations', the *Washington Post*, 17 August 1995.

71. 'Report of the Panel on Peace Operations Doctrine for Africa', The Cairo Consultation on the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Cairo, 7-11 May 1994.

72. According to the World Bank, Africa's share of world GDP, which has recently been declining by 2% per year, is only 1.7%. At the last ACP Lomé IV ministerial meeting, in November 1995, strict conditions were laid down concerning good governance, structural stability and the reduction of military expenditure.

73. According to the former head of state of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, 'Africa at independence and after was, and still is, confronted with problems of structure and leadership . . . The major responsibility for our present impasse must be placed squarely on the shoulders of our leaders. All too often they have been inadequate, unimaginative, self-serving and even less than upright in their approach to the issue of governance in Africa . . . This inadequacy of leadership was exacerbated by a very weak infrastructural base . . . They saw the world through the binoculars of either the East or the West', in *Security Dialogue*, vol. 24, no. 2, June 1993. Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji of the Nigerian Foreign Ministry adds that 'the inability of the OAU to deal with African conflicts *no longer managed by the major powers* for their own ideological reasons has made urgent the creation of an effective response conflict resolution mechanism, especially since the fear of subversion of one state by another, which made such provisions unthinkable at the inception of the OAU, has largely subsided.' Ibid.

74. Comprising 11 annually elected members, out of the total 53, rotating according to the principle of subregional representation.

75. The OAU conflict prevention section presently consists of just two officials and its early warning databank is entrusted to one consultant.

76. Adopted with reservations from Sudan and Eritrea, which would then have faced the possibility of an intervention by the standing inter-African force that was being called for.

77. Economic Community of West African States. ECOWAS was, and at the time of writing still is quite active, albeit not conclusively effective, in cooperating with the UN in the Liberian crisis, within the so-called ECOMOG mission, whose backbone, financially and operationally, is, however, uncomfortably Nigerian.

78. Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development.

79. The Southern African Development Co-ordination Committee, created in 1980 to make the countries of the subregion independent from South Africa, which was replaced in August 1992 by the Southern Africa Development Community, for the opposite purpose.

80. The Association of Southern African States (ASAS) was created in August 1995 from the ashes of the former Frontline States along the lines of the attempt made in 1977 by the seven francophone countries of western Africa.

81. See, for example, Frank Land, 'South Africa and the "Agenda for Peace"', in *South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa*, Institute for Defence Policy, 1995.

82. The United States with a \$1.5 million project, Sweden with *ad hoc* seminars for officials of the 'mechanism'.

83. France, for example, has 8 defence agreements and 25 technical accords with African countries; but would not Paris rather have recourse increasingly to a broader sharing of responsibility, having intervened bilaterally 19 times in Africa since 1990?

84. See the paper presented by Professor Maurice Kamto at the Cairo meeting entitled 'Le mécanisme de l'OUA pour la prévention, la gestion et le règlement des conflits : l'esquisse d'un nouvel instrument régional pour la paix et la sécurité en Afrique.'

85. The two countries, which are permanent members of the UN Security Council, have thus reasserted their commitment to global responsibilities. They recently promoted a joint initiative to send a WEU team of military experts to Africa to give advice and assess needs, which was mentioned by the incoming British Presidency of WEU at the WEU Council of Ministers, Madrid, 14 November 1995.

86. See Christine Philippe, 'Une force africaine d'intervention', *Défense nationale*, November 1995.

87. Speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 16 May 1995.

88. As a result of a US initiative, a conference for donors took place in Brussels on 8-9 January 1996. It included participants from Australia, Canada and Japan, and considered aspects of the OAU and also the building up of a subregional capacity.

89. For the following considerations I am indebted to Professor Kamto's paper cited in note 25; see also OAU's 'Règlement des conflits en Afrique : cadres d'action', 1993.

90. In May 1991, in Kampala, a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa was held along the lines of the CSCE, but 'with African realism', according to Obasanjo; see note 14.

91. The Observers who do not seek integration in NATO might wish to participate, for instance with the Nordic standby peacekeeping forces.

92. See 'L'Égypte et le mécanisme de règlement des litiges inter-africains', published by the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Egypt in 1995.