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PEACEKEEPING IN THE SOVIET SUCCESSOR STATES

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

The Institute was very pleased that Dr Roy Allison, one of the leading British scholars in the field of Russian security affairs, accepted its invitation to prepare this *Chaillot Paper*. The issue of crisis management and conflict prevention in post-communist Europe is an issue which has already been addressed by the Institute in earlier *Chaillot Papers*, and this paper takes the discussion further by looking at the problems arising over peacekeeping in the member states of the CIS.

The paper was discussed at a meeting held at the Institute in April 1994; it has been revised by Dr Allison in the light of comments made on that occasion, and reflects events that occurred up to September 1994. We believe it will make a valuable contribution to the discussion of what is currently one of the critical security issues in our continent.

John Roper
Paris, November 1994

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of Russian/CIS `peacekeeping' on the territory of the Soviet successor states has become one of the most controversial elements of the post-Soviet heritage. It is apparent that Russian views on peacekeeping or `peacemaking' (see below) in this region differ significantly from those which have traditionally prevailed in the West, or the United Nations, in terms of the national composition of the forces involved and the nature of measures applied. However, Russian views on the subject have not yet been studied rigorously.

Such study is essential to unravel the current controversy over the `bona fide' character of Russian-led peacekeeping and to judge accusations by a variety of Western commentators that Russia has tended to manipulate certain conflicts for its own political/strategic ends and has used peacekeeping units as an instrument for attaining those ends. The conclusions drawn on this matter by the international community will serve to deny or reinforce current Russian claims for a UN mandate (or separate mandates) for Russian-led peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet Union (FSU).

The outcome has broad implications, since the decision whether to grant some form of UN authorization for Russian-led operations in the FSU has to take into account the effect of such a step for the credibility of established UN international peacekeeping operations beyond the CIS region. Yet at the same time traditional UN principles for peacekeeping missions are themselves under review and the permissible extent of `peace enforcement' in any given operation is open to debate. In these circumstances it may be possible to conceive of a new model of peacekeeping for conflicts in the CIS region.

The main purpose of this paper is to analyse current thinking within the Russian political and military élite concerning current and future peacekeeping operations on the territory of the FSU. The following topics will be examined: current peacekeeping operations within the CIS; Russian military capabilities to actually maintain the peace in this region; the collective CIS dimension of Russian-led peacekeeping activities; Russian views of Western or other UN involvement in peacekeeping in the CIS and the extent of such involvement; the potential link between Russian peacekeeping efforts and nascent neo-imperialist ambitions; and the implications of these matters for the European security environment.

This paper adopts the convenient shorthand description of Russian `peacekeeping' forces and operations in the FSU. In fact, as the paper identifies, such `peacekeeping' covers a wide range of activities, some of which clearly diverge from the traditional United Nations and Western understanding of that term. In fact Russian statesmen use the term *mirotvorcheskiye operatsii*(`peacemaking' or `peace-creating' operations) more frequently in this context than that of *operatsii po poderzhaniyu mira* (operations for the maintenance of peace). The former assertive, even coercive, function may involve a strong element of enforcement. It requires careful examination if Western states are to be consistent in their advocacy of international norms of conduct in conflict management on former Soviet territory.

FORMER AND CURRENT `PEACEKEEPING' OPERATIONS

Military/diplomatic requirements on the ground, rather than preconceived principles, appear to determine the character of the Russian or CIS `peacekeeping' presence in various zones of conflict in the Soviet successor states. The diverse practices and operating procedures of forces designated for peacekeeping by Russia, or by CIS states in collective agreements, have become the basis for Russian and CIS peacekeeping `doctrines' -- to the extent that these have developed. It would be helpful initially, therefore, to analyse the main operations which engage over 16,000 Russian soldiers in peacekeeping/peacemaking, as well as those which involve some 20,000 more Russian troops in `peace support' roles in the Former USSR.(1)

Transdniester/Moldova

The arrangements developed in summer 1992 to dampen down conflict in the Transdniester region in eastern Moldova deserve particular attention since they have been promoted by Russian political and military leaders as a successful precedent for peacekeeping operations elsewhere in the CIS.

In July 1992 the Russian and Moldovan presidents agreed to a package of measures to resolve the Transdniester conflict: negotiating a ceasefire; creating a demarcation corridor between the forces; introducing `neutral' peacekeeping forces; granting `political status' to the left bank of the Dniester; and implementing bilateral negotiations on the removal of the Russian 14th Army from Moldova. CIS heads of state subsequently agreed to deploy a peacekeeping force in eastern Moldova consisting of Ukrainian, Belarussian, Russian and Moldovan troops. However, this plan was displaced by another, promoted by Russian military leaders, for the deployment of `disengagement forces' from Russia, Moldova and Transdniester.

In all, five Russian battalions (2,130 men), three Moldovan battalions (1,200 men) and three `Transdniester' battalions were deployed (the latter from the `Dniester Republic' national guard), though only four of the Russian battalions may remain. The tasks of these forces include monitoring the ceasefire agreement and suppressing its violation by `uncontrolled' armed formations.

This arrangement ended the fighting in the area. But Moldovan accusations soon followed that insurgents of the `Dniester Republic' were permitted to maintain armed units and munitions stockpiles in the disengagement zone. In fact such partiality may be inescapable given the overshadowing presence in the region of the highly politicised Russian 14th Army, which had previously provided military assistance to Russian nationalists in Transdniester. The commander of the 14th Army, General Lebed, has continued to act almost as a proconsul in the region and has openly advocated the incorporation of Transdniester into a greater Russia.

The July 1992 arrangement is certainly preferable to the earlier Russian idea of exclusively using units of the 14th Army as a peacekeeping or `separation' force.(2) But the current disposition of forces is still clearly open to abuse by Russia. Such

abuse would have been limited if an alternative plan, discussed in July 1992, to establish multilateral forces drawn from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria and Romania had been adopted. But Russia was unhappy with the precedent of inviting foreign troops onto the territory of the former USSR. Despite this, the Moldovan government has keenly sought the involvement of international organisations to dilute Russian dominance in the present tripartite agreement.

Georgia/South Ossetia

The second model of peacekeeping operations referred to by Russian leaders is that of South Ossetia, the autonomous region in Georgia. The South Ossetian intention to gain independence from Georgia and to unify with North Ossetia (within the Russian Federation) had led to protracted conflict with Georgian forces.

After strong Russian pressure, an agreement to deploy a peacekeeping force to separate the warring factions was signed in June 1992 by the leaders of Russia, Georgia, and North and South Ossetia. The four parties agreed to provide a battalion each `to monitor the ceasefire, withdraw [supervise the withdrawal of] armed units, dissolve self-defence forces and ensure security in the region'. The joint forces include one Russian airborne regiment of 950 men and three Georgian-Ossetian battalions totalling about 1,100 men, while another 1,000-man Georgian-Ossetian force is held in reserve.

This arrangement has managed to implement the ceasefire quite successfully, despite sporadic violence. The Russian forces are the key element in this task. Yet Russian partiality is less of an issue in this case, since stability in the region has clearly been a Russian interest (given the volatility of the North Caucasus) and since ethnic Russians have not been so much an issue here. However, the conflict will remain merely frozen unless the negotiation process between the Georgian and Ossetian sides is revived.

Georgia/Abkhazia

The conflict which flared up between Abkhazian separatists and the central Georgian authorities in August 1992 engaged intrinsic Russian interests from the outset: ethnic Russians in Abkhazia, Russian army units in the zone of conflict and the stability of the North Caucasian frontiers of the Russian Federation. By autumn 1993 these factors, and Russian influence on Abkhazia, persuaded the Georgian president to endorse the idea of the Russian army playing the central role in a peacekeeping plan for the conflict.

Already in July 1993 a Russian-brokered peacekeeping plan, worked out with UN and CSCE representatives, had been signed by the Georgian and Abkhazian authorities. It provided for a staged demilitarization of the region and for Georgian-Abkhazian-Russian supervisory groups to monitor compliance with the cease-fire regime.[3] The plan required the Russian troops still deployed in Abkhazia to observe strict neutrality. At the same time it was agreed that a limited number of Russian military observers would be stationed along the Gumista river overlooking Sukhumi, the Abkhazian capital. But initially this failed to end Georgian-Abkhaz military clashes and an appeal for UN peacekeeping forces was made by the negotiating parties in December 1993.

Negotiations on this issue were influenced by Georgian suspicions of Russian intentions. In 1992-93 Georgia frequently accused Russian forces of providing military assistance to the Abkhazian insurgents, and the extent to which Russian troops participated in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and their exploitation of the separate civil war in autumn 1993 in western Georgia were unclear.(4) This helps explain the Georgian rejection of a proposal by Russian Defence Minister Grachev in September 1993 to deploy two Russian divisions and one brigade as peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia. The function of these forces, Grachev claimed, would have been to block the opposing forces and disarm them.(5) Even without this level of Russian military commitment, the effect of Russian mediation was to confirm the Georgian defeat and retreat from Abkhazia.

Yet Russian military forces clearly assisted Georgia in autumn 1993 in the efforts by Tbilisi to regain central control of western parts of the state from the insurgency led by supporters of the deposed leader Gamsarkhurdia (a challenge distinct from that of Abkhaz secession). The situation was stabilized through the conclusion of an agreement between the leaders of Russia and the Transcaucasian states, with the consent of Ukraine, empowering Black Sea Fleet marines and Russian units to take under their protection major roads, railways and shipping lines in west Georgia.(6)

This assistance was real but not altruistic. In autumn 1993 it was accompanied by President Shevardnadze's reluctant decisions to bring Georgia into the CIS and to conclude agreements which establish Russian military bases in Georgia (at Tbilisi, Akhalkalaki and Batumi). While Georgian entry into the CIS was decided upon partly for economic reasons, and Russia rejected the notion of a Russian-Georgian alliance against Abkhazia, it appeared overall that Moscow had been manuvring for geopolitical gain through its position as peace-broker and military stabilizer in the region.

The new Russian military agreements with Georgia mean that peacekeeping is not needed as a pretext for introducing military contingents into that state, but Russian participation in peacekeeping efforts can help justify its military presence in Georgia and place Georgia in a position of greater dependence on Russia. During negotiations in spring 1994, Russia agreed to contribute a military contingent to a peacekeeping force stationed along the Inguri River under UN auspices. But the size of the Russian contribution to such a force was not clarified and for various reasons the UN concept ran into problems.

Consequently, in June 1994 Yeltsin decided to offer Russian troops to Abkhazia as part of a `joint CIS peacekeeping force' and the decision was taken to send a 3,000-strong Russian force. The four battalions making up this force (two from the Group of Russian Forces in the Caucasus and two from the territory of Russia) were deployed principally along the River Inguri, separating Georgian and Abkhazian formations. The proclaimed intention is to concentrate the combat material of the conflicting sides in specially allotted regions(7) and to implement a process of demilitarisation throughout the territory of Abkhazia, stage by stage. The United Nations endorsed the Russian-led operation in August and decided to establish a strong UN observer force to monitor it. Such transparency is important, since in the absence of a clear remit for the Russian force, or the presence of units from other regional or CIS states, it will be

difficult to distinguish its role from that of the Russian forces based in Georgia under the recently signed bilateral agreements.

Nagorno-Karabakh

The war over the ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan is the most long-standing of major conflicts on CIS territory. Yet until recently it was not a priority target for Russian-led peacekeeping efforts. This is a consequence of the humiliating withdrawal of former Soviet forces, including the garrison in Nagorno-Karabakh, from Azerbaijani territory, and the difficulty in reaching a compromise between the warring parties. It could also reflect a Russian strategy of `divide and rule' in the region which has undermined the confidence of both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The initial Russian deployment of military observers along the Armenian-Azeri border failed to encourage the implementation of various internationally brokered cease-fire agreements. A more ambitious Russian plan followed to introduce a limited contingent of its peacekeeping forces into Nagorno-Karabakh. This idea was accepted by Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh representatives in November 1993, even though it would strengthen Russia's role in the region.(8) By early 1994 the plan envisaged Russian troops as a `separating force': Russian peacekeeping troops would be deployed in areas around Nagorno-Karabakh from which Armenian forces would then withdraw.

This plan was rejected by the Azerbaijani president, Geidar Aliyev, on the grounds that it would freeze Armenian territorial gains from Azerbaijan. Since spring 1993 Aliyev preferred to accept the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces in Azerbaijan only within the CSCE framework (see later).(9) However, he began to give ground on this issue. Initially, in February 1994 the defence ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh signed a protocol on a troop withdrawal and the creation of mutual security zones controlled by a Joint Staff composed of their representatives (of 250 officers, 69 would be Russian).(10) Russian officials now argued openly that only Russia would in practice provide troops for the disengagement forces (an idea that was anathema to Turkey).

Finally, on 16 May the three local parties agreed in principle to deploy observers, alongside observers from Russia and `possibly' the CIS and CSCE, at 49 posts in a disengagement zone. The observers would be protected be some 1,800 CIS troops, mainly Russians under Russian command. Therefore the principal role in monitoring and enforcing the cease-fire was assigned to the Russian military (displacing the CSCE) since the heads of the observation posts would all be Russian officers.(11) This in turn could be interpreted as a Russian pretext for stationing its troops in Azerbaijan. However, by late 1994 this plan had still not been implemented, and Azerbaijan still favoured a larger CSCE role in the region.

During 1993-94 Azerbaijan has reacted with suspicion and resisted Russian proposals for the redeployment of regular Russian military units in Azerbaijan (perhaps stationed in bases), and has also resisted any agreement on the presence of Russian border troops to guard the state's southern borders. The other Transcaucasian states (and most recently Turkmenistan) have in fact reached such arrangements with Russia

over the defence of their non-CIS borders. Although such border troops are not viewed by Russia as peacekeeping units, this distinction is becoming less clear, as illustrated by the case of Tajikistan.

Tajikistan

By far the largest and most extensive role for Russian peacekeeping operations has been in Tajikistan, both in defence of the government (or at least ethnic Russians) in the civil war raging in the state and for border defence against armed infiltration from Afghanistan. This role has remained highly controversial within Russia itself and it underlies much of the debate examined later in this paper on the mandate and mission of peacekeeping operations.

Russia has tried to characterise its presence in Tajikistan as operating under CIS aegis, but efforts to establish a CIS peacekeeping operation to stabilize the political situation in Tajikistan and restore the integrity of the Tajik-Afghan border have made only faltering progress. These efforts followed an initial request by the Tajik government for military assistance in September 1992.(12) The 201st Motor Rifle Division (MRD), based in Dushanbe, would be brought to full strength, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan would each introduce a battalion and Uzbekistan would contribute a mobile regiment from Uzbekistan. A `strike group' would be formed for use against anti-government forces in Tajikistan and cross-border raids from Afghanistan. But the so-called CIS coalition peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan (commanded first by Colonel-General Pyankov, and since April 1994 by Colonel-General Valeriy Patrikeyev) have been a fig-leaf for the operations of the Russian army and Ministry of Defence.

The intended strength of the joint peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan is about 25,000 men, of whom the overwhelming majority must be from the Russian army. The 201st MRD (now with over 18,000 personnel), along with some other units, has reportedly been `assigned' to the peacekeeping forces. Yet so far only one battalion of this division has been specifically earmarked as a `peacekeeping' unit, despite the broad functions assigned to the division as a whole (such as protecting key installations, patrolling key areas and accompanying relief convoys). This confusion of roles may account for some low Russian estimates of the size of the peacekeeping force or of the 201st MRD itself in Tajikistan.(13)

So long as Tajik leaders remain dependent on Russian peacekeeping or regular forces to contain the spread of regional and clan-based opposition groups and to guarantee the integrity of the border with Afghanistan, Moscow will retain strong political influence in Dushanbe. At the same time, the Uzbek leadership may be using the Russian military presence in the region to seek regional political domination. Russia is left with dilemmas which arise from clan and sub-ethnic divisions. Russia may judge that the essential Uzbek role in helping ensure medium-term political stability in the region makes it desirable to support the pro-Uzbek Khodzhent clan. Yet any such pro-Uzbek bias in peacekeeping would aggravate Russian relations with Kazakhstan. Moreover, the majority of the 201st MRD are ethnic Tajiks from the Kulyab area.

Irrespective of the Uzbek role, for Russian leaders any political gains in Tajikistan are secondary, since their primary objective (one shared by Tajikistan's CIS neighbours)

is to prevent the spread of Tajik instabilities further into former Soviet Central Asia, as well as to protect the Russian diaspora.[14] This `peace-enforcing' and security policy mission is one for which Moscow has called for understanding at least, if not material support, from the international community. However, the broader implications of the Tajik experience for the content of Russian-led peacekeeping elsewhere are still disturbing.

Operations in the Russian Federation

So far the only significant military conflict which has engaged hostile ethnic communities in the Russian Federation has been that between the republics of North Ossetia and Ingushetiya (which are in dispute over the Prigorodny district). A large grouping of Russian forces designated for peacekeeping has been formed since mid-1992 on the territories of both North Ossetia and Ingushetiya. These forces appear to have favoured Ossetians against Ingush militias since their military intervention in November 1992,[15] but Russian spokesmen claim that, in conjunction with Russian Ministry of the Interior (MVD) forces, the Russian formation has successfully disengaged conflicting groups here and enforced a state of emergency. Possibly 1,000 Russian troops continue to perform this function in the region.

Whatever the details of this operation, it is misleading to view it and others which may arise in the Russian Federation (chiefly in the North Caucasus in the near term) as peacekeeping in the same fashion as operations undertaken outside Russia in the FSU. Although Russian MVD commanders customarily refer to their growing experience in `peacekeeping' as a result of involvement in these conflicts in the Russian Federation, this internal mission cannot properly be distinguished from policing or other internal security measures. It certainly is not subject to the constraints which apply to the use of Russian forces abroad. Indeed, the MVD forces have their own training camps and doctrine for operations.

CIS COLLECTIVE PEACEKEEPING FORCES

In most of these case studies of peacekeeping and peace enforcement on former Soviet territory Russia has sought to present the operations undertaken as being in some way CIS-led rather than Russian-led. This reflects a belief that the CIS umbrella could offer greater legitimacy, or at least respectability, to these operations and serve to some extent to spread the financial and military burden borne so far principally by Russia.(16) The notion of `CIS operations' has also included the expression of persistent Russian efforts to create a collective defence identity and some kind of joint military organisational framework within the CIS.

A Treaty on Collective Security was signed by Russia, Armenia and the Central Asian CIS states except Turkmenistan at the Tashkent summit in May 1992. It was accompanied by two decisions: first, to set up CIS forces designed to prevent local conflicts on the external borders of the CIS, and second, to establish collective peacekeeping forces. These decisions were partly the outgrowth of an earlier Russian impulse, even before the collapse of the USSR, to replace regular military forces in regions of inter-ethnic conflict with special-purpose units of MVD troops tasked to resolve such conflicts.(17)

A succession of CIS meetings failed to reach agreement to develop joint forces to prevent local conflicts under the CIS aegis and therefore frustrated the plans by CIS Joint Armed Forces staff officers during 1992-3 to develop peacekeeping forces as the bottom rung of a ladder of escalating intervention (see below on peacekeeping doctrine). The other option raised at the 1992 Tashkent CIS summit, the establishment of collective peacekeeping forces -- in which CIS states assign armed units for peacekeeping -- has also remained unfulfilled. The activities of Russian peacekeeping forces have been governed so far mainly by a series of (formal or informal) bilateral agreements between the states concerned rather than by CIS multilateral treaties. The CIS states, other than Russia, have been very hesitant in their actual commitment to peacekeeping, despite the adoption of fine-sounding resolutions at CIS meetings.

Initially, a CIS summit in Kiev in March 1992 produced an agreement on `Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS', signed by ten of the eleven CIS states. It set out important principles:

- that the decision to use such forces be adopted `only in the event of a request being made by all the conflicting sides, and also on condition that agreement is reached between them on a cessation of fire and other hostile actions before the peacekeeping group is sent';

- that `the peacekeeping group may not be used for participation in combat actions';

- that it should be formed `on a voluntary basis by the states that are party to this agreement, with the exception of the conflicting parties'.(18)

But decisions taken at CIS summits later in 1992 to establish CIS peacekeepers and military observers under the CIS Joint Armed Forces command led to the loss of a number of the original CIS signatories. Indeed, only four Central Asian states,

Moldova, Armenia and Russia signed a protocol at a CIS summit in July 1992 which required each of them to establish and train forces and military observers for peacekeeping operations. It also established a broad operational doctrine which permitted peacekeepers to return fire in self-defence and use force to separate warring parties.

This appeared to be a response to the expansion of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict after the former Soviet army and MVD units were withdrawn from the region. The Russian and Kazakh presidents favoured setting up `interstate restraining forces within the CIS framework in place of the troops that have been withdrawn.'[19] The CIS Bishkek summit in September 1992 proceeded to an agreement that the CIS Joint Armed Forces command would be responsible for the operational command of peacekeeping forces once individual countries had decided to take part in a given action. However, no standing CIS peacekeeping force resulted; the idea fell victim to Russian attempts to reassert central control over CIS armed forces overall, which were rejected by other CIS states in a period of nationalist assertion. In July 1993 the CIS Joint Military Command was downgraded to a `coordinating body' with no command authority.

The conflict in Tajikistan has since late 1993 provided a means for the former Joint CIS Command idea (which transcends the scope of the 1992 Treaty on Collective Security) gradually to revive as pressures have built up for a broader reintegration within the CIS. Russia has simultaneously promoted the CIS as a regional organisation in peacekeeping terms. But this diplomatic campaign and renewed efforts to develop some form of CIS defence alliance should not disguise Russia's continued determination to dominate in peacekeeping operations on the soil of the FSU (whether or not they have a CIS label).

A formal agreement on a `collective' operation in Tajikistan signed in September 1993 obliges Russia and the Central Asian states of the CIS, apart from Turkmenistan, to dispatch military units to the region.[20] In principle the 201st MRD and Uzbek, Kazakh and Kyrgyz battalions are to be operationally subordinated to the Collective Peacekeeping Force (CPF). But in fact the Russian ground troops commander is directly in command of the 201st MRD, while subunits from the other CIS states are under the command of their respective ministries of defence. The CPF possesses neither its own soldiers nor logistic support. Its former commander, Colonel-General Boris Pyankov claimed that `all planned peacekeeping operations are coordinated with the defence ministers of the signatory countries [to the September 1993 agreement] and are implemented only with their approval'. But this claim is rather academic, since only the 201st MRD is fit for combat and, to complicate matters further, a serious internal disagreement has arisen between the CPF commander and the commander of the 201st MRD.[21]

In February 1994 the CIS role was formally extended when nine CIS defence ministers (excluding those from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) signed a document obliging each member state to send peacekeeping troops to Tajikistan.[22] Russia appeared to view this agreement more as a means to gain international approval or legitimacy for peacekeeping operations in the region than as a practical step towards joint military coordination. The non-Russian forces still offer little effective military contribution in Tajikistan, despite the staging of a limited joint Russian-Uzbek-Tajik

military exercise in March 1994 and the promise of more such exercises.[23] An Uzbek battalion of 350 men has been deployed in a rear area of Tajikistan, probably for political ends (in a region where the population is half ethnic Uzbek), and a weak Kyrgyz battalion of 286 men has been stationed in Badakhshan but domestic pressure in Bishkek could force its withdrawal, while the Kazakh battalion of the CPF has failed so far to materialize.[24]

The February CIS agreement on Tajikistan was probably also intended to allay growing worries among a number of CIS states, including Central Asian ones, over the deployment of Russian-only peacekeeping forces in troubled former Soviet republics.[25] Such states are aware that some of the earlier principles for (and constraints on) CIS peacekeeping first promoted in 1992 have been supplanted by new, more assertive principles for Russian peacekeeping operations. A CIS `Permanent Consultative Committee for Peacekeeping Operations' has now been established, but the ability of other CIS states to dilute Russian peacekeeping operations through setting them in a putative CIS framework is not promising. At a meeting of CIS defence ministers in July 1994, the Russian Defence Minister reacted angrily to the refusal of his CIS counterparts to contribute military personnel and funds to peacekeeping operations.

The Council for Collective Security of the CIS agreed, at a CIS summit in Moscow on 15 April 1994, on a protocol sanctioning the use of Russian troops to separate Azeri and Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. The parties to the CIS collective security agreement also agreed in principle to deploy military contingents from their states as peacekeeping forces in Abzhazia if no UN agreement on peacekeeping in this region could be achieved. In practice this has provided Russia with a CIS mandate to deploy locally predominantly Russian peacekeeping units in these two regions.

A real dilution of Russian CIS forces would only follow if Ukraine (although it lies outside the CIS Council for Collective Security) or Belarus (despite its self-imposed restriction on deploying its forces outside its borders) were to offer peacekeeping units for CIS operations. But this is unlikely so long as the promotion of CIS military structures appears to be a vehicle for resuscitating a Russian-dominated `defensive union'. This suspicion of Russian intentions is likely to inhibit any Ukrainian contribution to CIS-mandated peacekeeping efforts even if Kiev becomes more involved in CIS military structures (perhaps through participation in the CIS Defence Ministerial Council) under President Kuchma.

RUSSIAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The scale and content of Russian-led peacekeeping or `peace-enforcing' operations on the territory of the former USSR will be determined to a large degree by the military and military-economic means at the disposal of the Russian Federation. It is necessary, therefore, to analyse the viability of Russian plans to create a new force structure, within which certain units earmarked for peacekeeping duties could be developed.

Russian mobile forces

Russian forces designated for peacekeeping will form part of the state's new Mobile Force structure, even though their training and mission mean that their role should not be viewed simply as an extension of the activities of rapid deployment forces in the spectrum of conflict (despite the views of some Russian officers and earlier CIS General Staff plans).

It is true that in the current transitional period specialised military units (the Airborne and Special Designation (Spetsnaz) forces) and those of the Ministry of the Interior of the former USSR may be used for muscular `peace-enforcing' duties. But these forces are not properly structured for this mission and are in high demand for other tasks.[26] They are better able to provide the core of the new Russian Mobile Force structure.

In autumn 1992, when Moscow took stock of its military inheritance from the Soviet Union, the Russian state found it was left with almost no combat-ready reserves, and what still existed could only be dispatched to trouble spots with difficulty. Since then plans have been developed rapidly.

Overall, the Mobile Forces will total some 100,000 men and be based largely (60%) on airborne troops, but they will include some motor rifle formations, equipped with light weapons, which can be airlifted, naval infantry, military transport aircraft and logistic units. Planned light Mobile Forces of about five division equivalents could in principle be centred on units from the 76th Pskov and 106th Tula Airborne Divisions (ABDs) plus a number of special units.[27]

Initially it was reported that the Mobile Forces might be composed of an Instant Deployment Force (capable of deploying in 3-5 days) and a Rapid Deployment Force (capable of deploying in 30 days, each having a strength of 100,000 to 150,000 men).[28] But a structure capable of a much faster response is now envisaged. In December 1993 Grachev referred to a force on permanent stand-by and able to mobilise in 4-10 hours (an `Immediate Reaction Force'), while the Rapid Deployment Force (as in the NATO concept) should be ready to move within three days.[29]

In terms of deployment, the Volga and Urals Military Districts are becoming the central base for the Mobile Forces, which need to be located in the centre of Russia and capable of being airlifted anywhere there is a threat (though the 76th and 106th ABDs are not centrally located).[30] Russia initially designated a special division in the

Volga Military District for peacekeeping (the 27th MRD redeployed in 1992 from east Germany) and some of its units have already executed missions. The division retains its full combined-arms structure, however, and is subsumed within the new Rapid Reaction element of the Russian Mobile Force structure.(31) More recently, a second division, the 45th MRD (from the Leningrad Military District), has also been assigned to peacekeeping missions. It has been suggested that these two divisions should acquire a new organizational staff structure and greater autonomy for their subunits in peacekeeping missions.(32)

Irrespective of reorganisations in the Volga MD, south Russia (Stavropol-Krasnodar-Rostov-Don) is becoming the main regional base area for the Mobile Forces and for specific peacekeeping forces drawn from them. A grouping of these forces is intended to form a firebreak, since the North Caucasus is viewed as the most dangerous region for the next few years and the most obvious focus for peacekeeping. Consequently the North Caucasus Military District is being reorganised, into a `border-adjacent military district'.(33) Mobile Forces are being established there on the basis of two airborne brigades (which have already been formed), an airborne division, two motor rifle brigades, and several elements of military transport and army aviation.(34) New units and subunits are being set up for the 49th Army based at Krasnodar.

Despite the special emphasis on the North Caucasus, recent reports suggest that compact, mobile units are likely to be formed in all Russian military districts. One is even planned for Western Kaliningrad, which will become a special defence area. Such ambitions raise practical questions. Defence Minister Grachev may well obtain the bulk of the resources he needs to meet the requirements of the Mobile Forces overall. This will probably be done by revitalising the units withdrawn from the Baltics and Germany, and by the construction of new facilities and bases,(35) but peacekeeping demands will eat into the funds available in the defence budget for these larger purposes, and certain key weaknesses in developing the Mobile Forces and their peacekeeping elements remain. Indeed, despite the recent reconstitution of Russia's armed forces, there appears to be a growing, politically dangerous gap between Russian ambitions for peacekeeping and the resources available to perform the tasks envisaged, especially in relation to Tajikistan.

Problem areas and new demands

First, military bases are still lacking in Russia for elements of the new Mobile Forces. For example, the 104th ABD, which was withdrawn to Russia from Gyandzha, Azerbaijan, in February-March 1993, has been without basing facilities and so unable to function as a military entity. For peacekeeping (whether or not benign), this problem is compounded by the uncertain status of military base arrangements in CIS states. It is true that in April 1994 Yeltsin issued a directive for the Russian Foreign Ministry and MOD to negotiate and sign agreements on military bases in CIS states, but the huge costs which Russia would need to bear may lead to the abandonment of this plan.(36)

Secondly, the lack of strategic airlift (much of it lost to Ukraine and Belarus) seriously hampers mobility. It would make it very difficult, for example, to deploy mobile units from the Far East and Siberia to areas of potential conflict in western sectors.(37)

Thirdly, continuing conscription problems for the armed forces as a whole are reflected in undermanning, even in the case of the key 27th MRD. This division has only 8,500 men, a deficit of 2,000), even though it has been earmarked as a basic unit for peacekeeping missions (and was chosen to conduct the postponed joint exercises with the 3rd Infantry Division of the US Army).(38) In general it has been difficult to attract volunteers to specialist peacekeeping subunits, since the salaries offered, which are still low, provide insufficient compensation for the more hazardous duties involved. This problem has been well aired in the Russian military press.(39) In March 1994 it was announced that, in the previous eighteen months, 105 Russian servicemen had been killed in the `near abroad' and almost 200 wounded.(40)

The general erosion and degradation of the military forces overall has not yet been arrested, and continued uncertainty over military budget allocations, which could have grave consequences for the integrity of the armed forces, exacerbates such problems. The limited funds available for peacekeeping activities, which continue to be funded from the central defence budget, means that Russian decisions in this area frequently can only be taken at high levels for budgetary reasons. Cost criteria may explain the view expressed in March 1994 by Deputy Defence Minister Kondratyev (who is responsible for peacekeeping operations) that `a limit be set' on the permitted participation of Russian servicemen in operations in `hot spots'.(41)

The specific weaknesses outlined here should be measured against the growing and perhaps open-ended demands of peacekeeping or peace enforcement in the former CIS. The principal immediate challenge for Russia is the conflict in Tajikistan. In autumn 1993 some 25,000 men were loosely earmarked for peacekeeping there,(42) yet only a fraction of that number have been specially trained. In fact Defence Minister Grachev admitted in February 1994 that Russia had in total only 16,000 troops capable of carrying out peacekeeping operations (whatever their level of training) throughout the territory of the former USSR.(43) Russian mobile reserves remain very limited in number. In autumn 1993 it was estimated by one well-informed analyst that Russia could not put more than 15-20,000 men on the Tajik border unless it mobilised reserves or drafted students into the army (indeed the latter soon took place). But their potential military opponents in Afghanistan would continue to outnumber such a force.(44)

The danger in tying down well trained forces in Tajikistan is obvious at a time when the stability of the Russian Federation itself is being threatened, particularly in the North Caucasus, and requirements here may resemble those of peacekeeping outside Russia's borders. The Russian Border Troops (some 100,000 strong) cannot be relied on effectively to guard the borders of the Russian Federation where this is necessary, since most of Russia's southern borders lack border installations, while the task of keeping order within the Russian Federation can no longer be reliably left to MVD troops and those of the former KGB.

Of some 70,000 Russian MVD troops, 40,000 are largely confined to static duties. Only 30,000 Operational Designation (Opnaz) forces have some mobility and are militarily equipped. Efforts to boost the numerical strength of the MVD troops are hard to fulfil since the shortage of conscripts affects this area also. Therefore, the new Russian military doctrine envisages that Russian armed forces units may be enlisted to

help MVD troops `in localizing and blockading the conflict region, suppressing armed clashes, and separating the conflicting sides and also in defending strategically important installations.' The armed forces may also have to assist the Border Guards in their various missions.[45]

To the extent that tensions in the Russian Federation absorb the capacities of regular military personnel this will constrain and weaken any peacekeeping operations in CIS states, or at least siphon off the units trained for more sophisticated non-combat roles. Such tensions, or political strife in Moscow, would also be likely to diminish the effectiveness of central control of outlying Russian forces despite the best efforts of the Russian Defence Ministry.

PEACEKEEPING IN RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE

Certain characteristic principles that are to be observed in Russian/CIS peacekeeping operations are beginning to emerge, partly as a result of practice on the ground (from which implicit principles may be derived) and partly from the statements of military and political leaders. It may be premature to speak of a Russian or CIS peacekeeping doctrine, but certain doctrinal strands are discernible. Russian military views are particularly influential in the development of such principles.

The military high command as a lobby

The most controversial aspect of any attempt to identify such principles is the contention that they reflect a covert Russian agenda (though one increasingly visible), that they have been devised to promote a combination of military and diplomatic goals for Russia in the `near abroad'. This possibility is examined more fully later, but the influence on Russian peacekeeping `doctrine' of a nationalist-minded military lobby should be addressed at this stage.

This hypothesis is supported first by the claim that there exists a caucus, composed of the highest-ranking Russian military commanders, which is openly engaged in military-political actions in CIS states under the guise of `peacekeeping'. This is not to deny that this caucus of generals may itself be divided over the acceptable extent of military intervention (see below), or that there may be frictions between officers representing the Russian Defence Ministry and those formally attached to CIS structures or the MVD.(46) It could be argued, however, that the members of this powerful military clique have together pressed for an activist military role in the CIS to support Russian minorities and to settle secessionist or ethnically inspired conflicts on terms favourable to Russia.

The May 1992 General Staff draft military doctrine for Russia tried to assign a new role to the armed forces: `the defence of the rights and interests of citizens of Russia and people linked with it ethnically and culturally abroad.'(47) The wording of the document on military doctrine finally adopted in November 1993 significantly refers more narrowly to a danger arising from the `suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states.'(48) None the less, an assumption of a broader Russian commitment to Russian-speaking communities in CIS states is popular among the Russian military élite. While the issue of endangered Russians has not been paramount in the South Ossetian, Abkhaz and arguably even the Tajik conflicts, and has been absent from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it could be a vital factor in various possible future conflicts.

Secondly, the case could be advanced that the Russian Defence Ministry itself appears to view peacekeeping to a significant extent as a means of promoting Russian security interests and legitimising the Russian troop presence in certain of the Soviet successor states. It also provides these troops with an active and immediate function. The Russian Defence Ministry has tended to oppose Western involvement in CIS or Russian peacekeeping operations (see below) and has maintained strong operational

control over the three established peacekeeping operations within former Soviet borders (in South Ossetia and Moldova since mid-1992 and in Tajikistan since December 1992).[49] It seems that in general the Russian Defence Ministry would prefer a free hand and therefore favours as unclear a peacekeeping mandate as possible.

This institutional interest has, however, been camouflaged by statements by the Russian high command, which carefully combine diplomatic and military approaches to peacekeeping. Defence Minister Grachev has only exceptionally let his guard slip to support more belligerent views.[50] Thus in autumn 1993 he claimed that Russian forces in Georgia should maintain strict neutrality and refrain from combat in the regional conflict.[51] Similarly Deputy Defence Minister Colonel-General Boris Gromov has argued that peacekeeping forces only have a chance of success if an agreement exists between the opposing sides, and troops are sent in with their consent. He claims to accept that peace cannot be enforced.[52]

Yet such statements may also reflect some real military anxieties. The trauma of Soviet failure in Afghanistan in the 1980s induces caution over the idea of dispatching troops outside the home country in the absence of a firm political consensus on the policy to be pursued in the conflict -- in current circumstances this applies particularly to Tajikistan. Russian commanders may not be fully convinced by the argument that if the Tajik domino falls the Uzbek one will follow, and so on. Moreover, some officers in the high command are concerned that the participation of the army in peacekeeping operations results in an unnecessary and undesirable politicization of the army. On the basis of their professional instincts, they would prefer to avoid the army being pulled further into such internal political contests.

The Russian military command is probably not united, therefore, in promoting a military-diplomatic campaign under the banner of peacekeeping. It is also important to recognise that a significant and rapidly moving debate has arisen among Russian military commanders on the appropriate training, structure and role for the nascent `peacekeeping forces' in the CIS. This debate may extend to the highest levels and divide Grachev and Deputy Defence Minister Georgi Kondratyev, who associate themselves with one view of peace enforcement, from Chief of General Staff Mikhail Kolesnikov and Deputy Defence Minister Boris Gromov, who may represent an alternative, much more interventionist approach. The debate under way expresses differing underlying principles and doctrinal assumptions. Its outcome will be crucial in determining the character of Russian peacekeeping or peace enforcement in the former USSR.

Training, structure and duties: the dominant view

One view, which should be regarded at least as quasi-official, is associated with the centre for training units in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace support operations which has been established by the Russian Defence Ministry in Totskoye, Volga Military District, on the southern Russian-Kazakhstan border. Here, the 27th Guards Motor Rifle Division (commanded by Major-General Anatoly Sidyakin) is being reconstituted into a peacekeeping division under the supervision of the First Deputy Commander of the Volga MD, Lieutenant-General Anatoly Shapovalov.

Battalion-size task forces from this division have already been operating in South Ossetia and the Transdniester region. So far three battalions with a new organic structure have been formed from the division. They are armed only with light weapons, armoured personnel carriers, and troop transport trucks. They lack artillery, tanks and air defence weapons, but a reserve of artillery, helicopters and aircraft may be formed and used to pursue `illegal armed formations' in support of a peacekeeping battalion.

The battalion troop training programme for peacekeeping forces includes training in establishing contacts between opposing sides in a conflict zone, traffic monitoring, security and communications, operating checkpoints and patrolling. In actual operations, peacekeeping forces are said to be committed to separating hostile sides in a conflict region and to establishing a demilitarized zone.(53)

In contrast to traditional UN peacekeeping practice, however, these Russian `peacekeepers' are ready forcefully to separate the opposing sides before a cease-fire has come into effect. Their duties, as described by Shapovalov, include `the pursuit, apprehension or destruction by fire of groups and individuals who are not following the rules of a given situation'. The impression is that combatants will be pressed very hard by the Russian forces to reach agreements. At the same time the prospects for impartiality in the use of force will be helped by the fact that direct control of peacekeeping forces in a region will be exercised by a Joint Staff composed of representatives from both the Russian Armed Forces and from combatants in the conflict zone.(54)

Training, structure and duties: alternative views

This more official position (at least to date) on the training, structure and duties of Russian peacekeeping forces has been criticised by certain Russian military officers who promote a still more assertive view of the requirements of peacekeeping, or in reality peace enforcement, operations. Such views may find sympathy from key figures such as Generals Boris Gromov and Mikhail Kolesnikov.

For example, Lieutenant-Colonel G. Zhilin of the Volga MD points to the experience of peace enforcement in the Transdniester region, where the carnage in the town of Bendery was ended by the actions of the Russian 14th Army before the formal peacekeeping units were set up. He argues that `surprise, precise, powerful, pre-emptive strikes, as well as the availability of back-up mobile armoured groups, forced the initiators of the military conflict to come to the negotiating table.' Zhilin scorns the decision to set up light peacekeeping battalions which do not have a reserve of artillery and mobile forces. He supports the view of Lieutenant-General Alexander Lebed (the controversial commander of the 14th Army in Moldova) that a readiness for decisive action and absolute superiority in force will deter and break the will of opponents of the `peacekeeping forces'.

This alternative assessment leads to the conclusion that `the men in the blue helmets must have real power': they should be backed by a powerful strike force of long-range artillery groups, combat helicopters and ground attack aircraft, and have a mobile reserve of tactical armoured or mechanized forces. From this perspective a division of peacekeeping forces (as part of the Russian rapid reaction forces) could include 12

separate motor rifle battalions, of which four would be `heavy', that is equipped with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Taking account of additional support elements, this structure is comparable to a US mechanized division.[55]

Russian doctrine on peacekeeping: emerging military principles

The first, less assertive set of views outlined here is currently shaping Russia's nascent doctrine on peacekeeping, but over time the advocates of powerful, less constrained enforcement operations could become more influential.

In this period of flux it is important to consider the formal programme for training Russian units in peacekeeping forces, which has been developed by the Chief Directorate of Combat Training for the ground forces. In the words of Lieutenant-General Shapovalov it is `based on the programme for the UN "blue helmets" and with a regard for our experience in Afghanistan, the Transcaucasus and other "hot" spots.'[56] The problem is that an emphasis on the latter experiences overshadows reference to UN practice. This is implicit in Russia's abandonment of certain broad principles -- guidelines based on UN conduct -- which were contained in the documents on peacekeeping forces adopted at CIS summits in 1992.

In particular Russia now accepts that peacekeeping forces may be introduced into zones where fighting is still taking place; and that the states contributing troops need not be neutral, but may be involved in the conflict (though Russia tends to deny that it is itself a party to such conflicts). We may infer certain other military principles and operational characteristics of Russian peacekeeping or peace enforcement.[57]

The first of these is a readiness to use considerable force (the precondition stressed by Lieutenant-Colonel Zhilin). Russian commanders have sought to ensure that they have preponderant forces available so that they can dominate the local military situation and forcibly separate warring parties. The Russians have also maintained their pre-eminence within multinational peacekeeping forces qualitatively and quantitatively. This has enabled them to control joint commissions established to oversee these operations.

Other characteristics are more encouraging, and indicate that Moscow is mindful of certain international norms and expectations. Thus Russia has resolved that peacekeepers be specially trained professional soldiers. This is shown in the intention to turn the 201st MRD into the first completely professional Russian division. Russia has tried also to maintain an image of operational neutrality for its own forces in peacekeeping activities -- even in Tajikistan, where it is formally present to support the Tajik government.

But such principles are being challenged by the military `opposition', which draws support from earlier plans developed by staff officers of the CIS Joint Armed Forces during 1992-93 (before the Joint Staff was downgraded to a military coordination body in July 1993). These officers (who were largely Russian) had been tasked to plan the structure of joint CIS `forces to prevent local wars', as envisaged by the Tashkent CIS summit in 1992. But in doing this they tended to merge the concept for such forces -- essentially forces for low intensity operations and a variety of internal security missions -- with those appropriate for `peacekeeping'. In other words, `forces

to prevent local conflicts' were assigned a combat role and the peacekeeping mission was integrated into the spectrum of conflict.[58] In this way the `peacekeeping forces' would be fused with the `Immediate Reaction Forces' and, if the escalation of conflict justified this, with the `Rapid Reaction Forces' under development by Russia (as outlined above).

Arguments in favour of integrating forces which are assigned a combat role with those earmarked for peacekeeping or peace enforcement, of removing the essential distinction between these functions, are still alive among some Russian officers. For example, they are reflected in the views of Lieutenant-Colonel Zhilin. Such thinking could become more widespread and begin to influence Russian military planning for crises in the `near abroad' if the expanding and essentially Russian involvement in Tajikistan crosses new military thresholds. This option may be encouraged by current efforts to revive the staff of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.[59]

This fluidity in Russian military thinking makes the idea of even limited joint Russian-American peacekeeping exercises, originally scheduled for July 1994, more sensitive than appears on the surface. The unprecedented command and staff exercises planned for units of the US Army 3rd Mechanized Division and those of the Russian 27th Guards MRD took place in September 1994 at Totskoye in the Volga Military District -- the main Russian training centre for peacekeeping operations. The 27th MRD has been designated for inclusion in the UN's reserve of peacekeeping forces but has little experience of interacting with the peacekeeping forces of other countries. The exercises were aimed inter alia at `working out a single standard of documentation for coalition peacekeeping forces; working out similar approaches to the tactics of peacekeeping forces in the performance of joint tasks.'[60] Although this joint approach was aimed at operations outside the CIS, such as Bosnia, given the Russian debate on peacekeeping requirements in the CIS, Russian officers and deputies may have been reluctant to expose the nature of their peacekeeping training and restructuring to American scrutiny at this sensitive time.

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEKEEPING IN THE CIS REGION

The reluctance of most of the international community to accept the phenomenon of unconstrained Russian or Russian-dominated CIS peacekeeping activities in the Soviet successor states has led to an intensive search during 1993-94 for institutional mechanisms for broader international engagement in CIS conflicts. This effort has been accompanied by strenuous Russian diplomatic lobbying, which shows an awareness in Moscow that unilateral peacekeeping or peace enforcing operations by Russia could freeze the developing partnership with the Western states and seriously damage the international image of the new Russian state.

At the same time, even the more Western-oriented of Russian politicians are under domestic nationalist and military pressure to stabilise CIS frontiers lest they threaten Russian borderlands further, to identify Russian strategic interests in the CIS and to protect Russian-speaking communities from civil strife. These contrary impulses are expressed in Russian attitudes towards the potential roles of outside states and international organisations in the unfolding conflicts in the Soviet successor states.

Increasingly, however, Russian statesmen have emphasised the need to deny or limit such foreign involvement in the CIS region -- an emphasis reinforced by the controversy over NATO air strikes in Bosnia and sustained by the efforts to advance the CIS as a regional organisation. This section considers the potential contribution towards peacekeeping in the FSU of non-CIS states and international bodies against the background of these fluid Russian perspectives.

The Russian diplomatic campaign

Since spring 1993 Russian statesmen have led a diplomatic campaign for international approval and possible assistance (especially financial) for Russian `peacekeeping' activities in the former USSR. In this campaign the Russian Foreign Ministry has tended to project a softer, more conciliatory line than that adopted by Russian military officers on the correct use of peacekeeping forces, arguing that their deployment should comply with international law. This emphasis could be expected of diplomats and may also have reflected Kozyrev's personal interest in international organisations. To some extent Russian diplomats have viewed peacekeeping as an instrument for raising the prestige of Russia, both in the `near abroad' and internationally. But a more self-interested interpretation of peacekeeping has been promoted since autumn 1993 as a new, more nationalist consensus on Russian foreign policy interests has established itself in Moscow.

From the outset the international debate has revolved around the nature and legitimacy of Russian intervention in conflicts in former Soviet states, in particular the limits of unilateral action. Yeltsin's initial call, in March 1993, for `international organisations, including the United Nations, to grant Russia special powers as guarantor of peace and stability in the region of the former USSR' suggests that he was claiming exclusive rights and obligations for Moscow. Certainly the Baltic states

and Ukraine interpreted his appeal as a crude attempt to apply a Monroe Doctrine to cover the successor states, in breach of international legal norms.

International scepticism about regional Russian-led (nominally CIS) peacekeeping operations has reflected in the first place Russia's failure to maintain credible impartiality in the conflicts in question and, secondly, the use of other non-neutral contingents (such as Georgians in Georgia or Moldovans in Moldova). Russian statesmen have failed to take these concerns seriously. In September 1993, speaking before the United Nations, Foreign Minister Kozyrev dismissed the problem posed by such `unconventional methods' and recommended that such methods be employed and also introduced in other conflicts. Proposing a UN mandate for certain operations in the former Soviet Union, during autumn 1993 Kozyrev claimed that `the fact that methods which the United Nations does not normally use are being employed in these conflicts (for example, direct participation by the warring sides themselves in the peacekeeping contingents, and, with their consent, that of neighbouring states) cannot be an argument against mounting such operations under the organisation's flag.'(61)

In the absence so far of such properly constituted CIS forces or of more effective UN assistance (even if this does not extend to the provision of UN contingents -- see below) Kozyrev has maintained that there could be `simply no alternative to Russia's peacekeeping efforts in the former Soviet area'. Russia was filling a `vacuum', for example in Abkhazia, which otherwise `quite different forces might rush to fill'(62) -- an ambiguous reference which indicates strategic considerations as much as the wish to ward off anarchy. However, the Russian commitment to stability in such regions is vitally bound up with its own national interests, on two levels. First, in the form it has taken it tends to uphold a Russian strategic presence and influence. Secondly, it is tied to the specific issue of the Russian ethnic and cultural diaspora.

Irrespective of Russian military-strategic thinking, the presence of communities of ethnic Russians and Russified non-Russians in many of the crisis zones of the former USSR (though significantly not in Nagorno-Karabakh) makes it very difficult in practice for Moscow to maintain a neutral presence (even where such groups are not acknowledged as Russian citizens). This is especially the case at a time of a resurgence of nationalism throughout Russia. Russia, Kozyrev has informed the UN, `has made peacemaking and the protection of human rights, particularly that of national minorities, the priority of its foreign policy, first of all in the territory of the former USSR.'(63) The linkage between peacekeeping and the protection of Russian-speaking minorities is one which threatens the national self-identity of many of the newly independent states.

This perception of a threat is shared both by states which host Russian-led peacekeepers, such as Georgia, and those with disputes over Russian diaspora which have no association with these peacekeeping operations, such as the Baltic states and Ukraine. Such worries have been fuelled since autumn 1993 by an explicit linkage between the use of Russian peacekeeping forces on former Soviet territory and the preservation of Russia's influence in the region. In November 1993, Kozyrev openly rejected the idea of Russia fully withdrawing from `the zones of traditional influence which evolved or, if you like, were won over centuries' and offered the solution of Russia maintaining military bases in conflict zones which could be used for the

conduct of peacekeeping operations.[64] Such thinking exposes the gulf between Russian views on peacekeeping and those of the international community at large.

Russian promotion of the CIS as a `regional structure'

To deflect criticism of Russian unilateralism and the assertion of Russian interests in the FSU, since autumn 1993 Kozyrev has emphasised the need to mobilise bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the CIS framework for peacekeeping tasks. The Tajikistan model, he has suggested, could be extended to the Transcaucasus. The fact that this would also fit in with renewed Russian efforts to create CIS Joint Armed Forces under Russian control has been glossed over. Instead, Russian statesmen have focused their efforts on raising the international standing of the CIS.

Already in March 1993, in a draft declaration to the committee responsible for reviewing the UN charter, Russia argued that regional organisations, such as the CIS, could deal with the new generation of conflicts through peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN. CIS leaders received an appeal to create an effective security system within the structures of the CIS to sustain peace in the entire Eurasian region.[65] Russia mobilised Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan later in a joint appeal to the UN Security Council to give political support to CIS joint peacekeeping forces.[66] In February 1994, in his capacity as chairman of the CIS Council of Foreign Ministers, Kozyrev formally requested that the CIS be granted observer status at the UN.[67] The following month he called for recognition of the CIS as a `regional structure' by European organisations such as the European Union and the CSCE.

The latter request is significant, since the Russian goal is to promote the CIS as a serious regional organisation in peacekeeping terms as defined in chapter VIII of the UN charter. If the CIS were to gain this status it would provide Russia with a channel to gain international legitimacy and support for peacekeeping operations undertaken by the CIS. In August 1994, a representative of the CIS was invited to the UN alongside the representatives of other regional organisations. Although approval of the CIS as a `regional structure' so far has only been given in a tentative way, Russia is increasingly acting as if it had this status and is inclined to equate the CIS with NATO, NACC, WEU and so on. This in turn is used to deny these organisations a role in the FSU and to constrain the deployment of international forces for peacekeeping in this region even under UN or CSCE auspices.

The role of the United States

The United States is unlikely to undertake unilateral peace-keeping initiatives, let alone become militarily involved in the conflicts in the successor states, but Washington developed some interest in the idea of US mediation in the regional disputes on former Soviet territory during summer 1993. The United States can exert influence more indirectly through recognition or rejection of the Russian arrogation of responsibility for peacekeeping operations in the region and by focusing on the required principles of Russian conduct.

This approach is illustrated by a US State Department `non-paper' (Presidential Review Directive 13) circulated in August 1993, which rejected a greater Russian role

in peacekeeping in the former Soviet Union. The draft policy directive insisted that all such peacekeeping efforts should comply fully with the CSCE rules laid down in the July 1992 Helsinki summit -- that is that they should only act with the consent of involved parties, and observe neutrality. It also stipulated that such operations should respect all borders, preserve democratic policies, be of finite duration and remain under strict political control by UN officials in New York.[68] In February 1994 the new US Defence Secretary, William Perry, similarly spoke out against Russian `thoughts of creating spheres of influence or interest' and warned that `If Russian forces operate beyond Russia's borders, they must do so in accord with international law.'[69]

The question of the United States playing a direct role in the conflicts in the successor states is especially sensitive. The August 1993 draft US directive called for greater American involvement in the former Soviet Union and stated that the United States should be prepared to support UN peacekeeping operations in the FSU even if these opposed Russia's interests. However, as clarified by Strobe Talbott, the then special adviser to the US Secretary of State, Washington claimed no formal role in peacekeeping in the former Soviet Union. It would instead continue to lead international efforts to solve conflicts using bodies such as the UN, CSCE and NACC.[70]

It would be counterproductive at this stage for Washington to adopt a more explicitly unilateral approach than that suggested by Talbott, since this would be seized on by Russian nationalist politicians and military commanders and used to intensify anti-Western currents in Russian society. It would certainly be stridently rejected by Moscow, as indicated by a Russian Foreign Ministry statement of 13 August 1993, which bluntly asserted that the United States would not be permitted to become involved in peacekeeping in the region.[71] In fact the United States specified in spring 1994 that American armed forces would not participate in any UN peacekeeping operation in Georgia that might have emerged from the negotiations then under way.[72]

This leaves an American role in developing confidence-building measures with Russia -- an activity encouraged by the agreement by the Russian and American defence ministries to hold a joint US-Russian military peacekeeping exercise.[73] Despite some domestic Russian political opposition, the first Russian-American command and staff exercises, under the codename MIROTVORETS (PEACEKEEPER)-94, were held near Orenburg in the Totskoye region in September 1994. One practical result of the exercises was the preparation of a joint manual for peacekeeping operations.

The role of regional powers

Russia has been equally concerned about the potential involvement of influential regional powers, such as Turkey or Iran, in peacekeeping activities on its southern marches. Moscow would reject the involvement of such states even if they were only to be present as part of a larger international force. In the Russian view such states cannot make up the shortfall of troops for UN or CSCE operations on the territory of the former USSR, since the region is a `zone of Russian interests'. Thus Kozyrev claimed in November 1993 that `the transfer of peacekeeping functions to regional

powers is absolutely unacceptable', since `as soon as we leave these areas, the resultant vacuum will be immediately filled by other forces, possibly not always friendly and maybe even hostile to Russian interests.'(74)

Moscow clearly does not tolerate the idea of regional powers `balancing' the Russian presence in the southern conflict zones. The argument adopted on this issue is based on little more than realpolitik. In this respect Russian statesmen choose to ignore the fact that the security interests of Turkey and Iran are affected by the conflicts close to their northern borders, and that their designs in the region may be far from predatory.

The role of NATO

The option of direct NATO involvement in peacekeeping tasks on former Soviet territory is highly sensitive for Russian diplomats and has been uncompromisingly rejected by Russian military chiefs and nationalist deputies. It may even have prompted Yeltsin's original proposal for Russia to act as a subcontractor of the UN to guarantee stability on former Soviet territory. Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov, first deputy chief (now chief) of the Russian General Staff argued in summer 1992 that the intensification of military conflicts between former Soviet republics could lead to direct intervention by NATO forces.(75)

This scenario was evoked again by Marshal Shaposhnikov the CIS Joint Forces Commander-in-Chief, at the end of 1992. He flatly opposed NATO obtaining, within the CSCE framework, the right to use its armed forces to settle conflicts on the external borders of the CIS.(76) These reactions reflect continued suspicion of NATO's emerging post-Cold War role among many Russian military officers and nationalist deputies. Indeed, one reason why Russian conservatives opposed NATO military intervention under a UN mandate to support peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia appears to have been to avoid establishing a precedent and in this way to preclude the possibility of similar NATO intervention against Russia or on the Russian periphery at some future date.

In fact there are no reasonable grounds to draw such a parallel, whether the scenario is one of NATO operations with or without a UN imprimatur. NATO as a military organisation could not justify intervention in Central Asia or the Transcaucasus to public opinion in its member states. The scenario of NATO being drawn into the Transcaucasus to support Turkish designs or interests (under whatever guise) in the region is not credible in the medium term. It is true that NATO has an interest in the security implications of a disintegration of the Ukrainian state, of military actions on its borders and of direct Ukrainian-Russian military clashes. NATO may have developed some contingency planning for a number of lesser contingencies in Eastern Europe involving Ukraine,(77) but it is most unlikely to intervene directly in a Russian-Ukrainian military clash, regardless of whether this is inadvertent or initiated by some unsolicited intervention by Russian `peacekeeping' forces in Ukraine (such as over Crimea).

None of this prevents practical contributions by NATO towards peacekeeping efforts on former Soviet territory, perhaps through the medium of a draft programme of military cooperation which has been developed between NATO and the Russian Defence Ministry. Joint discussions on the settlement of crises at CIS flashpoints were

held in January 1994. NATO offered assistance to Russian and CIS peacekeeping forces, especially in training specialists as observers. While NATO emphasised that its military units would not be sent to settle conflicts on the peripheries of the former USSR, it could offer `logistical support' (in particular for communications and observation).[78]

The role of NACC and PFP

In addition, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) could act as a vehicle for training Russian peacekeeping forces in the skills which they sorely lack despite the roles they have assumed in CIS states. However, this NACC role is now largely eclipsed by the Partnership for Peace (PFP) scheme. Russia has also sponsored a more extensive role for NACC in peacekeeping, but this initiative is in turn being displaced by Moscow's recent efforts to promote the CIS as a regional structure.

Kozyrev has proposed that NACC be transformed into a body that is independent of NATO, but closely linked to the CSCE. With its own small secretariat and auxiliary structures NACC could become a `peacekeeping laboratory',[79] but this idea, which has received no Western support, has not been fleshed out, and the Russian view on the potential role of NACC has been in flux. In summer 1993 Kozyrev suggested that a `clear vertical line of political responsibility -- from the UN and CSCE to NACC' be drawn on the question of peacekeeping.[80] Other Russian specialists at the time identified NACC as the body best equipped to actually implement a UN peacekeeping mandate in the Russian geopolitical periphery.[81] By the time NACC met in December 1993, however, Kozyrev's emphasis had shifted. He now envisaged NACC assuming merely a `coordinating role in settling conflicts that arise on the basis of aggressive nationalism' and called on NACC members to support Russia's leadership of peacekeeping operations in the former USSR and to send observers and render `moral-political, diplomatic and material support'.[82] Even this potential role for NACC has been displaced in 1994 by Russian efforts to raise the status of the CIS. Kozyrev now calls on the CSCE to assume the task of coordinating the efforts of NATO, the EU, WEU and the CIS in peacekeeping in Europe.

The PFP military agreement, which Russia finally signed in June 1994, could act as a vehicle for joint NATO-Russian manuvres to prepare for peacekeeping missions. At the least this may help draw some distinction between the formal combat role of Russia's rapid reaction forces and the supplementary task of peacekeeping to which an element of them will be committed. However, senior Russian military officers are unimpressed by Western discussion of peacekeeping definitions. A common view among these officers is that their own experience of peacekeeping to date (based on involvement in low intensity-conflicts both in the Russian Federation and other CIS states) means that they have little to learn from the West.

This attitude may partly explain the Russian failure to take part in the first exercises held in the PFP framework, those held in September 1994 near Poznan, Poland (codenamed `COOPERATION BRIDGE'), which practised the military fulfilment of UN peacekeeping missions. Despite this, Kozyrev now claims that Moscow attaches great importance to the joint training of Russian and NATO peacekeeping forces, as well as to joint planning of peacekeeping operations under UN or CSCE auspices. The

catch is his suggestion that Russia's NATO partners `could take upon themselves part of the expenses of the Russian and CIS peacekeeping operations.'[83]

The role of Western European Union

In the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, WEU declared its readiness to support the implementation of conflict prevention and crisis management measures under UN or CSCE auspices, which would involve peacekeeping activities. It has been correctly observed that this has potentially far-reaching implications for Western involvement in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and conflict prevention in the former Soviet Union.[84]

The assumption of such a role by WEU is likely to be viewed with less trepidation by Russian military officers than would equivalent NATO involvement, although there has been little response to the subject so far in Moscow. WEU countries, including the Central and East European states which in May 1994 acquired WEU `Associate Partner' status, will be keen and critical observers of Russian practice in peacekeeping and enforcement measures in CIS states. Russia may hope to increase European support for selected, limited operations in crisis zones if WEU observers could report back on the activities of Russian forces and if the WEU were to be offered certain other practical tasks alongside the CIS in conflicts affecting at least the more western of the CIS states.

The role of the United Nations: the debate

Russia has extended only a qualified welcome to the involvement of the United Nations in the resolution of conflicts in the Soviet successor states. Kozyrev and other Russian diplomats have viewed the input of international organisations with the standing of the UN and the CSCE as being in itself as a positive factor in principle, facilitating negotiations in the FSU, but since late 1993 this motivation has gradually been overshadowed as the emphasis on Russian national interests in foreign policy planning has come to the fore. This has roused Russian suspicion of the idea of foreign forces (even under a UN flag) on CIS territory. For Russian leaders this leaves a role for the UN in the zones of conflict on former Soviet territory in providing international authorization and sponsorship for Russian or Russian-led CIS peacekeeping operations. But since Russia has begun to argue that UN `permission' is not required for such peacekeeping, the dominant motive may now be to gain UN financial subsidies for these operations.

However, if the mandate Russia seeks were granted, this would be in contradiction to traditional UN peacekeeping operating principles and procedures, in particular those relating to the impartiality of peacekeeping units. As previously analysed, Kozyrev has sought to circumvent this issue. He claims that all peacekeeping operations in the FSU to date comply with the aims and principles of the UN charter and are being conducted at the request of the parties in conflict. He insists that a UN flag should not be denied to these operations just because they involve direct participation by the belligerents themselves and (with the consent of the latter) by neighbouring states in the peacekeeping contingents. In his view, the participation of the UN (and the CSCE) would `guarantee the neutrality of peacekeeping operations',[85] but this has failed to convince UN officials.

Is there a practical alternative to the exclusive use of Russian/CIS peacekeeping forces in former Soviet territory which might help justify a UN umbrella? In autumn 1993 Kozyrev held out the option of involving peacekeepers from the neutral European states, Sweden, Finland and Austria, alongside those from Russia in FSU conflict zones. Russian forces, like the American troops in Somalia, could provide the core of the peacekeepers, provided that auxiliary forces are committed from the neutral states.(86) In fact this was a rather empty offer since Kozyrev was surely aware of the reluctance of these states to assume the controversial commitment involved. Quite apart from the political dimensions of Russian policy, the European neutrals are unwilling to cross the threshold and take part in the kind of peace enforcement Russian troops have engaged in. Partly in response to this, in 1994 the Russian emphasis has shifted to the more limited idea of UN or CSCE observers which can be rapidly directed to conflict zones on former Soviet territory where they `can reinforce the Russian peacekeeping contingent as a third force.'(87)

Kozyrev also advances the practical argument that no alternative exists to Russian peacekeepers, and that the burden will inevitably fall on Russian forces, which could be better trained with UN assistance.(88) This seems reasonable, as does the Russian view that UN political support to bolster even flawed peacekeeping operations is desirable if this helps prevent civil wars from raging out of control. Western states would agree that a Russian-held peace is preferable to no peace in regions where the UN is unable to provide peacekeepers.

However, to provide such Russian peacekeeping efforts with the same authority and mandate as those in other parts of the world would undermine the credibility of these other operations. It would imply sudden and radical changes to the traditional cultivated norms of UN-sponsored international peacekeeping. Not only is the issue of the impartiality and neutrality of the forces engaged at stake: the requirement that peacekeeping forces should be fully multinational is also challenged by the Russian-led model of operations, as is the requirement that they be placed under sole UN command, through local commanders.

In fact, despite controversy about peacekeeping principles, Russia's endeavours to gain a UN mandate for its peacekeeping activities may be driven as much financially as by the wish to earn international approval. Kozyrev has called on the UN to allocate funds to support peacekeeping activities by governments in the former territories of the USSR, especially in Tajikistan, through the establishment of a voluntary fund under the aegis of the UN. This fund would receive contributions from interested governments, international and regional organisations.(89)

Since this fund is unlikely to materialize, Russia will persist with a second financial claim -- that Russian expenditure on Russian/CIS peacekeeping operations in the FSU should be viewed `as a direct proportionate contribution by Russia to the UN budget for peacekeeping operations' globally.(90) Russian military spokesmen argue that Russian peacekeeping expenditure in the CIS should be a substitute for Russia's contributions to UN finances for peacekeeping generally. In 1993 alone, it is claimed, the Russian Defence Ministry spent over 26 billion roubles for peacekeeping purposes.(91)

Overall, however, Russian proposals to the UN have been received sceptically and critically in Western states. The CIS aspect of Russian-led peacekeeping operations in the FSU has not been taken seriously and Russia's ability to remain neutral when participating in peacekeeping forces has been doubted by the United States, among others. This has set back the idea of placing Russian troops in Tajikistan under the control of the UN (or the CSCE). Such doubts have been fuelled by the strong opposition voiced by Ukraine and the Baltic states to the idea of granting Russia a mandate for intervention outside its borders.

It is true that in autumn 1993 Kozyrev secured some support from Britain, when Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd accepted that in reality only Russian forces are in a position to stabilise the southern crisis zones of the FSU. British and Russian officials agreed to work out a set of criteria under which Russian peacekeeping could be covered by an international mandate.(92) But Britain appeared to be interested in UN monitors which would be monitoring the peacekeeping actions of Russian forces, rather than the actions of the conflicting parties -- a role deemed unacceptable by Moscow.

Against this background it is not surprising that the UN itself has ultimately been unconvinced by Russian claims. In autumn 1993 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that troops from Latin American, Africa and Asia, rather than from Russia, should be sent to the former Soviet republics.(93) The following April, after meeting President Yeltsin and Defence Minister Grachev, he gave some ground in accepting the option of Russian forces taking part in peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former USSR under a Russian flag. But at the same time he suggested that `independent peacekeeping operations would be taking place there in close cooperation with Russia, involving UN observers, for example'. The point he reaffirmed was that Russian peacekeeping forces could not simply be transformed into a UN force. The second option was that the Russian forces be drawn into a broader international peacekeeping contingent. But this contingent would need to be fully multinational; Russian servicemen should account for no more than 20-30% of its total number, the remaining 70% being made up of troops from five or six other countries. It would also need to be under sole UN command. Only in these circumstances would the UN be ready to defray the cost of the operation.(94)

So long as Russia fails to meet these criteria it is unlikely to gain the UN mandate it seeks. However, Russian leaders have begun to shrug off this prospect. In April 1994 Defence Minister Grachev stated bluntly that Russian peacekeeping forces in CIS crisis zones could not be replaced by UN subunits, that only UN observers could be present in these zones. He claimed this partly reflected the UN's own unwillingness to become more fully engaged in the CIS, but also reflected the preference of the majority of CIS members for the Russian army as peacekeeper on their territories.(95) This followed a joint statement to the UN by the Russian foreign and defence ministries that they had no need of `permission' from the UN and the CSCE to carry out peacemaking operations in CIS countries.(96) This could presage a more defiant exclusion of non-CIS agencies from these operations.

The role of the United Nations: potential operations

Against this background it is not surprising that the UN's commitment of ground forces in the crises besetting the former Soviet states has so far been minor and confined essentially to Georgia. The first military mission dispatched by the UN to the Soviet successor states was a group of observers established in August 1993 (by Resolution 858) to monitor for six months the Georgian-Abkhazian ceasefire (a force of 88 observers was eventually approved).[97] Russia did not block a larger UN role, but defined it in a way that obtained legitimacy for a Russian presence. In autumn 1993 Kozyrev urged the UN, without success, to send peacekeeping forces to the conflict area and `temporarily' to use the Russian military contingent stationed in Sukhumi for this purpose. This mission was also supported by Georgia and Abkhazia.[98] But in calling for a full-scale UN peacekeeping operation to be launched throughout the Abkhaz region, Georgia hoped that Russian peacekeeping units would be part of a broader international force, accompanied by UN observers.[99]

The decision by the UN Secretary-General in May 1994 not to send UN peacekeeping troops to Georgia reflected disagreements between the Georgian and Abkhaz authorities over where and how such troops should be deployed. This left the option of a CIS peacekeeping contingent that could subsequently become part of a UN presence there, but in practice it precipitated the introduction of CIS-sanctioned Russian peacekeeping forces and left an image of UN weakness. In July 1994, the abandonment of the idea of a more extensive UN peacekeeping role in Georgia was confirmed when the Security Council endorsed Russia's peacekeeping effort there and resolved merely to establish a 136-strong UN observer force to monitor it. This appeared to follow a tacit or more explicit deal, whereby American support for UN endorsement of Russian peacekeeping in Georgia would earn Russian support for the UN overseeing the concurrent American-led mission in Haiti. Russian officials denied the existence of any deal of this kind but were undoubtedly pleased by the precedent of UN support for an essentially Russian-controlled peacekeeping operation.[100]

In the case of Tajikistan, Kozyrev has called for UN observers to be placed on the Tajik borders, and for UN financial support for the Russian-dominated CIS collective peacekeeping forces there.[101] But the military leadership of these forces appears to be opposed to the introduction of UN observers in the region and also appears to reject a proposal by the Russian Foreign Ministry that government and opposition units in Tajikistan be disarmed under the supervision of such observers. This stand can only fuel suspicion over the nature of the CIS peacekeeping operation in this region. Despite such military resistance, a new UN observer force could be established in Tajikistan to monitor an uncertain peace accord reached in September 1994.

The role of the CSCE: the debate

In 1993-94, Russia's campaign to obtain CSCE approval for the peacekeeping operations it has sponsored has paralleled its lobbying to secure UN support. CSCE observers have already been assigned to South Ossetia, Transdniester and Abkhazia. Beyond this limited commitment, Moscow has hoped to take advantage of the fact that, in July 1992, the CSCE was proclaimed a regional agency as defined in chapter VIII of the UN charter and was authorised to carry out peacekeeping operations.

Building on this, Kozyrev has proposed that the CSCE provide the political coordination of peacekeeping missions organized by the CIS, NACC, NATO and WEU but it has been implicit in this proposal that any such missions on former Soviet territory should be organised by the CIS/Russia. Moscow has pressed the CSCE to accept the idea of Russian forces operating in areas of inter-ethnic conflict in the FSU as CSCE peacekeeping forces.

Kozyrev lobbied strongly but unsuccessfully for this objective at the meeting of the CSCE Council in Rome in December 1993.(102) At that meeting, a model of CSCE monitoring of Russian and other CIS peacekeeping was advanced. However, this activity would not involve CSCE forces or even CSCE command and control, but rather some CSCE physical presence (both in Russian regional headquarters and with Russia's troops on the ground) to monitor how the Russians carry out peacekeeping. But even this limited plan would have represented CSCE legitimation of Russian peacekeeping in the FSU, and it was finally rejected at the CSCE Rome meeting. Most Western and Nordic states were close to accepting it but the Baltic states, among others, were fearful of any signs of a `new Yalta' which would assign Russia geopolitical responsibilities over former Soviet territories.

Since that meeting, Russian diplomats have pressed for a looser interpretation of the nature of peacekeeping permitted by CSCE regulations (they prohibit, for example, the use of enforcement measures). In February 1994 the head of the Russian delegation to the CSCE, Vladimir Shustov, called for the introduction of the use of `third party' peacekeeping operations. Such operations would be undertaken, with CSCE sponsorship and funding, by a single state or a group of states belonging to a regional organisation, to act under the CSCE flag but with only limited CSCE involvement. The regional organisation Shustov had in mind was the CIS, and it would be the CIS which would be responsible for any such peacekeeping operation (rather than the CSCE). He suggested that any CSCE monitoring would be qualified, distant and limited in its nature and in some cases might not require a presence on the ground. Overall, he tried to construct an international legal claim that no further UN or CSCE sanction was required to confirm the legality of existing Russian peacekeeping operations.(103)

This claim follows recent Russian assertions that Russia has no legal requirement to seek a UN mandate for these operations. It fully conforms with the new campaign for recognition of the CIS as a `regional structure' for peacekeeping purposes. It represents a more confident and assertive diplomatic stance than that projected by Russia at the time of the Rome CSCE meeting. This was confirmed at a CSCE meeting in Vienna in June 1994 when Russia effectively vetoed a CSCE plan which was an outgrowth of the thinking on CSCE monitoring that had emerged at the previous Rome meeting. Russia rejected the idea of placing Russian activity under the scrutiny of CSCE monitors, and thereby undermined current efforts to provide the CSCE with a role in mediating settlements between combatants.(104) This has left the impression of a growing Russian insistence on the legitimacy of its unilateral initiatives.

The role of the CSCE: potential operations

These recent diplomatic clashes do not create an optimistic atmosphere for actual CSCE engagement in peacekeeping activities in the CIS region. Yet the CSCE does provide a potential framework for the settlement of conflicts in the former Soviet states, and such indirect efforts still impact on Russian/CIS peacekeeping activities already attempted in specific regions. This is indicated by the plan developed by the CSCE permanent mission to Moldova for settling the Transdniester conflict, which was endorsed by the Rome CSCE meeting in December 1993. The implementation of this plan would enhance the credibility of Russian-led peacekeeping efforts in the region as a whole, since it obliges the complete and unconditional withdrawal from Moldova of the undoubtedly partisan Russian 14th Army. In August 1994 Russia and Moldova finalised an agreement which provided for the withdrawal of the 14th Army within three years. However, the implementation of this agreement remains in doubt. This has prompted the American UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright to explore ways in which the international community could encourage the departure of the 14th Army.

CSCE initiatives have been more active towards the five-year conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, but they have been frustrated by two factors. First, it has been particularly difficult to achieve an effective cease-fire between the warring parties -- a precondition for the deployment of any peacekeeping units under the aegis of the CSCE. Secondly, despite Kozyrev's earlier endorsement of armed CSCE peacekeeping forces for the region,[(105)] recent Russian efforts to take the lead in mediation of the conflict are serving to marginalise CSCE mediation efforts (although, as noted above, Russian diplomats are also seeking to develop ways for the CSCE to provide a cover for CIS activity).

Since autumn 1993, Russia has implied that CSCE efforts for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are ineffective because the CSCE lacks the means to enforce any cease-fire agreement, whereas Russian forces could fill this gap.[(106)] This is reflected in the 16 May 1994 agreement between the defence ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the head of the armed forces of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, chaired by Russian Defence Minister Grachev. Under its terms, Russia is ready to deploy its own peacekeeping forces, under the aegis of the CIS, to monitor a cease-fire agreement. Since it is planned that all the heads of observation posts will be Russian officers, the agreement would thwart the earlier CSCE proposal that international (not Russian/CIS) observers monitor the activities of the peacekeepers as well as those of the combatants. This CSCE idea stemmed from growing suspicions about the motives of Russian military policy in the region as a whole and ultimately this will need to be addressed.

RUSSIAN `NEO-IMPERIALISM' UNDER THE GUISE OF PEACEKEEPING?

It is evident from this analysis that the international community is unlikely to grant Russia the unequivocal mandate it has sought whether from the UN or CSCE, for Russian-dominated peacekeeping operations on former Soviet territory. So far a separate mandate tied to a specific Russian/CIS operation has been offered by the United Nations only in the case of Georgia/Abkhazia. This caution is inspired by a recognition that it is unavoidable that Russia will pursue its own interests in dealing with local or regional conflicts on its peripheries. However, in itself this behaviour is only natural and not reprehensible (even if it does not conform with the principle of impartiality in peacekeeping efforts). The greater concern among Western and CIS states is the possibility that in defining Russian military-security and economic interests in the `near abroad', Russian leaders may be tempted by revanchism or a softer form of neo-imperialism and that peacekeeping may become an instrument of coercion in the conduct of such a policy.(107)

This possibility means that careful attention must be paid to the changing definition of Russian interests. What is meant specifically by Russian claims, since spring 1993, that the former Soviet republics lie in a `zone of interest and special responsibility' for Russia? What kind of `special powers' does Russia expect the international community to confer on it to deal with conflicts in the FSU? To what extent do these claims reflect Russian military expectations in the near abroad?

The formal rationale for Russia's call for special powers in the FSU is based on the following points: that discrimination against Russian-speakers living outside the Russian Federation imposes on Russia the duty to protect them; that it is in Russia that many thousands of those who suffer from bloody inter-ethnic strike place their hopes; that the conflicts on the Russian peripheries threaten `fires in Russia's own house'; and that the international community is still veering away from active participation in peacekeeping efforts on former Soviet territory.(108)

These claims strongly influence the internal Russian debate on the need to engage in peacekeeping in the `near abroad' and are not unreasonable as such, although the emphasis on beleaguered Russians is hardly appropriate for most of the regional conflicts where Russian-led peacekeeping operations have been established so far. But in practice such claims may be used to justify a form of Russian intervention which only freezes the conflict concerned and establishes Russia as indispensable in any solution of that conflict. A key question is whether this outcome, which provides Russia with strong leverage on the state or states involved, and the various Russians claims for intervention in the first place, provide the pretext and inducement for Russia to pursue a broader strategic agenda? Could Russian peacekeeping forces even develop into occupation forces under certain conditions?

In fact the Russian military command clearly does identify certain military-strategic state interests outside Russian borders for which a system of forward basing and military agreements with many of the erstwhile Soviet republics would be desirable. This was implied, for example, by Defence Minister Grachev's admission that `the

Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and the area where our troops are stationed [in Batumi and Gudauta] is a strategically important area for the Russian army', and that Russia `must take every measure to ensure that our troops remain there otherwise we will lose the Black Sea.'[109] This kind of thinking forms the backcloth to the Russian-Georgian agreement for Russian military bases to remain in Georgia, at a time when Russian `peacekeepers' were vitally needed to bolster Georgia militarily.[110] The secondary bases linked to the Batumi base, which will be located in Sukhumi, Poti and Gudauta, will enable Russia to control the whole of the Georgian Black Sea coast.

Similarly, there is some evidence that Russian efforts to mediate and provide peacekeepers in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been accompanied by requests for the return of regular Russian troops (a division of airborne troops) to Azerbaijan. The 127th division, which remains in Armenia, is expected to assume the role of a Russian base (in this case with apparent Armenian support). Overall, Russia plans to maintain a grouping of 23,000 servicemen in the Transcaucasus. Even the Baltic states may not be excluded from such ambitions on basing. In January 1994 Kozyrev went so far as to stress the need to maintain a Russian military presence in this region -- to the outrage of Baltic leaders -- and described the idea of a complete military withdrawal as `an extreme approach'.[111]

As previously observed, in autumn 1993 Kozyrev first suggested openly that Russian military bases be maintained in conflict zones in the FSU so that they could be used for the conduct of peacekeeping operations.[112] By February 1994 the Russian Chief of General Staff, Mikhail Kolesnikov, revealed that Moscow expected to sign bilateral agreements permitting Russia to establish about thirty military bases on the territory of other CIS states. He claimed that nearly all of these states were considering allowing Russia to set up military bases, though none would be created in Ukraine or the Baltic states.[113] The intention to create this network of bases was confirmed by a presidential order at the beginning of April 1994.

This prospect of forward basing -- perhaps on long-term lease arrangements -- raises a vital question: do Russia's leaders accept the borders of the Russian Federation as the national frontier (notwithstanding all the manifest difficulties of constructing an effective border regime on the Russian periphery in the near-term)? Or is a concept of `extended Russian borders' coinciding with former Soviet borders -- a natural accompaniment to `neo-imperialist' impulses -- now influencing official thinking in Moscow? If the latter is the case then assertive Russian peacekeeping in its `near abroad' (including border protection, which anyway contravenes accepted peacekeeping practice) clearly poses a challenge to the sovereignty of Russia's neighbours and to international norms.

This worrying possibility is indicated by a reported internal briefing by Defence Minister Grachev in September 1993 which revealed that a decision had been taken in the Russian Security Council not to pull back to Russia's borders, but to maintain old Soviet borders, especially in Central Asia and perhaps the Transcaucasus.[114] Such a decision is consistent with Yeltsin's description of the Tajik border as `in essence the border of Russia'. This definition could be extended to cover the outer borders of other CIS states, although Russia also plans to create a state border on the northern Caucasus as a second line of protection.[115]

The foundation for an extended border system is a memorandum `On cooperation on the protection of external state borders' signed in December 1993 by Russia and all the Central Asian CIS states.[116] The deployment of `CIS border guards' in Central Asia was confirmed at a CIS summit in April 1994, and Yeltsin referred to the possibility of similar agreements with Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia and Georgia, which could put Russian troops back on the borders of Turkey, Poland, Slovakia and Romania under CIS auspices. He even suggested putting Russian troops between Moldova and Romania.[117]

It is true that the option of establishing an effective new Russian border defence regime would take years and pose a great financial challenge. However, given the strategic concerns of Russian military leaders and the growth of nationalist irredentism linked to the Russian diaspora, current plans on the `outer' borders could bolster a policy of neo-imperialism in the states of the former USSR. This possibility makes the idea floated by a senior Russian diplomat of creating a rapid deployment force to protect the rights of Russian-speaking people outside the Russian Federation particularly worrying.[118] It is just this kind of concept that blurs the uncertain distinction between the role and structure of Russia's new Mobile Forces and that of the forces earmarked for peacekeeping. This has broader, unsettling implications for European security.

IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND PRINCIPLES FOR PEACEKEEPING

The Russian-led peacekeeping operations analysed in this paper vary considerably in their characteristics and location in the diverse regions of the former USSR. For geopolitical reasons their implications for European security also vary widely. The most prominent of these operations, that in Tajikistan, has for obvious geostrategic reasons had little direct impact on European security. The same could be said of potential future conflict in Kyrgyzstan based on clan rivalry, which could attract Russian military intervention. Russian efforts to manage the Tajik conflict have also been less closely scrutinized, and measured against looser standards, than peacekeeping further west, since European states have broadly accepted that any failure to dampen down the Tajik civil war or control Tajik borders would threaten stability in other CIS Central Asian states. On the other hand, the scenario of Russian peacekeepers becoming drawn into future separatist violence in northern Kazakhstan should be viewed by European leaders with considerable alarm, since this could lead to major long-term tensions between the two largest CIS states, both of which have nuclear weapons on their soil.

Despite the remoteness of Tajikistan, however, the Russian predisposition to blur the distinction between combat and `peacekeeping' missions in the definition of forces for the Tajik conflict may be a dangerous precedent. In the context of Russian efforts to revive the idea of a CIS defence alliance, this raises further concerns for European FSU states that are worried about the possibility of finding themselves the object of unwanted Russian `peacekeeping' operations in the future.

Conflicts in the Transcaucasian region are more likely to impinge on European security but are also much closer to the immediate security concerns of Russia. Military developments within and adjacent to the North Caucasian Military District are viewed by Moscow as critical to the stability of the Russian Federation and a necessary focus of peacekeeping efforts. Yet this region will continue to generate conflicts. To the extent that they destabilise the southern borders, they could escalate to involve Iran or a NATO state -- Turkey. The threat of such an escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict into a large-scale regional war has already been discussed by Russian military officers.(119) One informed Russian analyst has even postulated a scenario leading to the outbreak of a Caucasian war that would draw Russia and Turkey into direct military conflict.(120) Russia's current determination to use its peacekeeping forces as the military broker in conflicts in the region at the expense of international mediation efforts may stabilize conditions in the short term but may also lock Russia into unresolved conflicts which could spill over FSU borders in the future.

But it is the potential use of Russian peacekeeping forces on the borders of or within the European CIS states which most clearly challenges European security. The nightmare scenario evoked by one Russian specialist is that of `mobile formations of the Russian army participating in peacemaking operations' not only in Central Asia and the North Caucasus but also, `in north-eastern Estonia, in some oblasts of eastern Ukraine, in the Crimea.'(121) This may not be such a far-fetched scenario, given the

idea floated recently by a senior Russian diplomat (Sergei Krylov) of creating a special rapid deployment force to protect Russian-speakers outside the Russian Federation.

Such intervention in the Baltic states, which is unlikely in the near-term or medium-term, would not only nullify Russian involvement in the PFP scheme but would signal the end of Russia's strategic partnership, or even cooperation, with Western and Central European states. The Baltic states have unambiguously remained outside all Russian-led plans for pooling the military structures of the FSU, and no CIS cover could be used to justify proposals for the reintroduction of Russian military units into their territories, whether in response to ethnically related instability (such as in the eastern regions of Estonia) or for other purposes. Yet Baltic leaders and their Polish counterparts remain suspicious of the substantial regular Russian forces in the Kaliningrad region.

The special Western commitment to the Baltic states, compared with non-European CIS states, was shown by the outcry in spring 1994 following the suggestion that Yeltsin's list of future Russian bases in the FSU might include one in Latvia. In fact the Russian military command appears to draw a line at the idea of Russian-led peacekeeping in the Baltic States. Despite this, Baltic leaders remain ready to veto CSCE proposals legitimising Russian unilateral peace enforcement measures in the CIS. They have also agreed to create their own joint Baltic peacekeeping battalion by the end of 1995, which will be trained with assistance from the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom. This distances them further from any CIS plans for peacekeeping.

The scenario of Russian leaders projecting `peacekeeping' forces into Ukraine, though still unlikely, is acutely worrying to Western leaders in security policy terms, and would create serious policy dilemmas. The assumption by most Western onlookers is likely to be that Russian or CIS peacekeepers would exacerbate rather than dampen down civil strife in Ukraine. At one level, Western concerns would centre around the risks of conflict in Ukraine spilling over into Eastern/Central Europe as a result of any military and political maelstrom in Ukraine, perhaps fuelled by nationalist resistance to the Russian presence from western Ukraine. The example of Bosnia, where civil conflict has not spilled over to Western Europe, may, however, prove reassuring in this respect. At a more fundamental level, European leaders would fear the possibility of Russian leaders seeking control over the Ukrainian military infrastructure, which would remove Ukraine as a security buffer between Russia and Eastern/Central Europe and advance Russian forces westward again.

The pretext for any such Russian intervention would most likely be pro-Russian separatism in Ukraine, fuelled by growing political/economic centrifugal currents in the state. If Crimean separatism or economic chaos in eastern Ukraine were to result in violent clashes, and local Ukrainian military forces were divided or paralysed, then pressure in Moscow to deploy Russian peacekeepers, perhaps in the form of strong mobile forces, could quickly mount. Russia could try to justify such an intervention on the grounds that instability in Ukraine should be contained, but any such action would be likely to give rise to a feeling in Western public opinion of betrayalby Russia (even if Western commitments to Ukraine have so far been muted).

Even if Russian peacekeeping in Ukraine were to follow a collapse of central authority in that state (rather than precipitate it) its effect would be to polarise Europe and put great pressure on NATO to offer East/Central European states full NATO membership. However, so long as the latter states remain outside NATO, centrifugal or regional currents in Ukraine will represent less of an incentive for Russian military leaders to intervene in Ukraine for broader strategic reasons (though concern for Russian-speakers or border instabilities might still propel them towards such intervention). If the acceptance of new NATO members means that NATO borders approach the former USSR's borders, then the Russian incentive to exploit `peacekeeping' as a means to establish military bases in Ukraine (in addition to the thirty bases currently planned in the southern CIS states) in order to ensure a buffer zone will be greatly enhanced. Over time, however, military interaction through the PFP scheme should make Russian military leaders less likely to think automatically in terms of such military countermeasures.

In another respect Russia's perceived peacekeeping requirements (and the wish to retain the option for future larger-scale peace enforcement) jeopardise a key pillar of the post-Soviet European security infrastructure. Specifically, peacekeeping ambitions and the creation of the new Mobile Forces in the North Caucasus are the factors behind Russian insistence that the sub-limits for the flank regions of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty be revised. Russia is seeking to exclude its units assigned to peacekeeping, both in the North Caucasus and elsewhere, from the count for levels of treaty-limited equipment. Defence Minister Grachev has argued, for example, that to include in this count the Leningrad Military District's 45th MRD, which is being fully prepared for peacekeeping duties, would weaken the Russian flank areas (as defined by the CFE Treaty) in an alarming way.[(122)] The effort to redefine the treaty in this way may undermine the implementation of this crucial treaty but is consistent with current Russian plans to establish military bases outside Russian borders to assist putative peacekeeping operations.

Russian diplomacy vis-à-vis the CFE Treaty, like Russia's growing reluctance to accept the involvement of the forces of international bodies in CIS conflicts, except perhaps as observers, is calculated to prevent future Russian options being closed off. Moscow is seeking greater freedom of action in a CIS that is steadily integrating. At the April 1994 CIS summit, Defence Minister Grachev described the strategic future as `a united armed force of the Commonwealth states and the creation of a defensive union.' Since then, Yeltsin has envisaged a CIS military structure `similar to NATO', although Russia is likely to seek dominance in any military system that emerges. The underlying problem for Russia is that its desire to become the guarantor of security for the CIS region, particularly if accompanied by a concept of forward defence for this region, is inconsistent with current Russian economic weakness.

This raises the danger of renewed imperial overstretch, which would undermine the overall Russian economic reform process and add to political volatility in Moscow and the regions. This would impinge on European security more broadly. The current Russian military budget is heavily committed to maintaining defence enterprises, and in the medium term financial resources and trained personnel for peacekeeping or peace enforcement will remain limited. In practice this will constrain any temptations by the Russian high command substantially to increase the scale of such operations outside Russia, as in the case of the above scenarios for Ukraine, whatever the

outcome of the current debates on military doctrine and peace enforcement. Pressures within the Russian Federation, and the expansion of internal conflicts, will also be important constraints on operations in other CIS states, but the gap between ambitions and capabilities may only be fully realised in Moscow after some disastrous Russian démarche, which could send shock waves through Europe.

If Russian leaders actually commit themselves to some form of neo-imperialist policy through assertive peacekeeping and a policy of divide and rule in the former Soviet states, many of these states in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus will probably be unable to avoid compromising their sovereignty in important areas of foreign and military policy decision-making. Equally, it could be argued that, without the heavy hand of Russian military assistance in some peacekeeping or peace enforcement role, the sovereignty of certain of these southern states would anyway be fatally undermined by the ethnic conflicts on their territories (as the case of Georgia in autumn 1993 suggests). It is not in the interests of Russia or of other European states that such states be permitted to fragment, or for their southern borders to dissolve in internecine strife, but this commonality of interests still does not provide a rationale for Western leaders to condone Russian efforts to transform these states into Russian protectorates.

Peacekeeping principles

It remains vital for Western leaders and the officials of international institutions to continue to engage Russian leaders in discussions about the reasonable limits of Russian military conduct in other CIS states, and about the desirability of adhering to principles of peacekeeping or peace enforcement which will command broad international support. This remains true even if in practice the material and financial assistance of Western states or international agencies to the maintenance of these operations in the CIS has remained marginal so far.

This does not mean that Russian-led operations should be condemned simply because they do not comply with the modus operandi of past UN peacekeeping actions. Nor should the assumption be made that Russian-led peacekeeping outside the UN/CSCE framework (a framework which calls for sole UN command, with mixed contingents, etc.) will necessarily take the form of some kind of neo-imperialism, even if this is one possible outcome, as indicated above. A serious multilateral debate about such `non-traditional' peacekeeping is a precondition for Russia to gain international recognition and approval for its efforts if and when these are deserved. Such debate should be prompted by recognition that the old international legal framework for peacekeeping is not necessarily appropriate for the conflicts of the CIS region.[(123)] In current conditions it would be helpful in fact to examine how far the tripartite model of peacekeeping (Russia plus other regional parties) that has been applied in South Ossetia or Transdniester has made a positive contribution.

Of course the serious problems that accompany Russian involvement in such peacekeeping activities, which are amply set out in this paper, should not be downplayed. A consistent Russian policy of divide and rule would be inconsistent with efforts to reconcile conflicts. Nor can Russian claims to have an exclusive sphere of interest throughout the CIS region be accepted. But it is difficult to imagine a security policy framework to tackle CIS conflicts which excludes Russia. From the

perspective of Western states or international non-CIS bodies this makes it necessary to view the possibilities for effective cooperation with Russia over these conflicts on a case-by-case basis. For example, in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ways could be found to merge the Russian and CSCE (Minsk process) efforts.

Similarly, Russian attempts to gain a UN mandate should be approached on a case-by-case basis. It is inconceivable in reality for the UN to accord Russia a carte blanche mandate for CIS operations as a whole, and this no longer seems to be a practical Russian diplomatic goal. It is logical instead for Russian claims to be considered for specific regions and operations, and in some cases Russia could seek UN or CSCE approval for different stages of any complicated or protracted operation, but the chances of receiving such international approval will depend on compliance with certain basic principles, even if not necessarily with all of those in the canon of traditional peacekeeping.

At the end of 1993 British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev agreed on the following underlying principles for Russian or CIS peacekeeping operations: `strict respect for the sovereignty of the countries involved; an invitation from the government concerned, and the consent of the parties to the conflict; commitment to a parallel political peace process; a clear mandate setting out the role of the peacekeeping forces (which should, wherever possible, be multinational in character); and an exit strategy for the peacekeeping forces.'[(124)] These remain a good starting point in examining options for peacekeeping in the CIS region, especially if they are supported by a process of monitoring by non-CIS, CSCE or UN representatives.

In the meantime, Western statesmen should not accept the loose Russian characterisation of `peacekeeping' referred to in this section without the most careful scrutiny of Russian operational conduct in each given case. This suggests the following conclusion:

1. There undoubtedly exist genuine Russian interests in quelling conflict and consolidating cease-fires in neighbouring CIS states. In practical terms some of these conflicts may eventually be amenable to and soluble under UN-mandated and CSCE-monitored Russian/CIS peacekeeping operations which comply with the principles outlined above. In such cases Western support, including financial support, could be offered on a selective basis for these operations. This should be made conditional on the continued Russian/CIS commitment to the broad principles which frame the peacekeeping mission, and also on compliance with an additional agreed code on the conduct of peacekeeping on the ground.

2. In the cases of other conflicts, however, it may be apparent that Russia is intent on pursuing strong political or strategic interests in the region, which suggests that the outcome of any Russian/CIS peacekeeping operations would be the consolidation of Russian dominance in the internal and external affairs of vulnerable regional states. In these cases Western support for Russian actions should clearly be withheld and diplomatic leverage applied on Moscow to conduct a more impartial policy consistent with CSCE and other international norms.

In practice the distinction between these two cases will be difficult to draw, and Russia's motives, like the role of its armed forces, will always be mixed, but the UN and CSCE are entitled to approve complicated or sensitive operations stage by stage to test compliance and gauge changes in Russian or CIS policy.

It is true that since spring 1994 Russian spokesmen have adopted a more assertive line in claiming that they have no need of a UN or CSCE mandate or additional international approval for the peacekeeping operations they lead on CIS territory. Moscow claims that the CIS as a regional structure can provide the necessary international legal authority for peacekeeping. Despite this defiant position, the burden of increasing peacekeeping demands in the CIS region, Russia's wish to become a responsible partner within a `political' G-8 and its continued emphasis on the need for interlocking institutions to bolster security in the Eurasian region, all suggest that Moscow will continue to pay serious attention to UN and CSCE views on peacekeeping.

1. Before the Russian announcement in June 1994 that it would send a 3,000-man peacekeeping force to Abkhazia, Deputy Defence Minister Georgi Kondratyev claimed that over 16,000 Russian troops were performing peacekeeping tasks; *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 February 1994.

This section of the paper does not analyse the much publicized cases of the `internal' use of Soviet forces (regular, Ministry of Interior and paramilitary) in the late Gorbachev period in the non-Russian republics, chiefly in Baku, Tbilisi and Vilnius, although some limited lessons may have been drawn from these interventions for subsequent Russian peacekeeping operations. The limits of the paper also prevent an examination of the role of those Cossack units which have been integrated into Russian regular forces and border troops to police border regions, such as in the Far East.

2. See Resolution of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies in *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 11 April 1992.

3. See report in Itar-Tass Moscow, World Service 27 July 1993, in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. Former USSR* (henceforth SU), 1753 B/4-5.

4. There is evidence that the Russian army did indeed render assistance to Abkhaz military formations during 1992-93. This was not denied by Foreign Minister Kozyrev when questioned closely in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 24 November 1993.

5. See report of this proposal in *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 September 1993.

6. On this agreement see *Izvestiya*, 5 November 1993; *Sevodnya*, 9 October 1993. Potentially it had a broader, extra-Russian dimension since Azerbaijan considered the possibility of sending military contingents to Georgia under its terms.

7. See V. Litovkin, *Izvestiya*, 23 June 1994.

8. See report by D. Yuryev in *Sevodnya*, 9 October 1993.

9. See E. Fuller `Russia, Turkey, Iran and the Karabakh mediation process', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 8, 25 February 1994, pp. 32-6.

10. See interview of Deputy Defence Minister Georgi Kondratyev, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 1 March 1994.

11. See E. Fuller, `The Karabakh mediation process: Grachev versus the CSCE?', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 23, 10 June 1994.

12. For discussion of this at the Bishkek CIS summit see `Itogi vstrechi v Bishkeke', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 10 October 1992.

13. The Defence Committee of the Russian State Duma claimed in March 1994 that a division of only 5,982 men is in Tajikistan. Report by Yelena Tregubova in *Sevodnya*, 1 March 1994.

14. For a broad assessment of Russian objectives dilemmas in peacekeeping in Tajikistan see the article by I. Rotar in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 20 November 1993,

15. See, for example, Peter Jarman, `Ethnic cleansing in the Northern Caucasus', *Moscow News*, 6, February 11-17, 1994, p. 13.

16. This may be optimistic, especially if Russia continues its efforts to control any such operations. However, such control does not necessarily preclude the financial burden being spread. The 16 May 1994 agreement to establish a peacekeeping operation for Nagorno-Karabakh stipulates that Russia will contribute only a token 1% of the costs.

17. The intention to create such `rapid action' troubleshooting units, formed of internal troops, was announced by USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Viktor Barannikov in November 1991; see Tass World Service, 6 November 1991, in SU/1224 B/2. This was preceded by a decree by Yeltsin to form `inter-republican special-purpose units for participation in resolving inter-ethnic conflicts'; see *Sovetskaya rossiya*, 14 December 1990.

18. `Agreement on groups of military observers and collective peacekeeping forces in the Commonwealth of Independent States', signed on 20 March 1992; Itar-Tass World Service, 23 March 1992, in SU/1339 C2/2-3.

19. As related by Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan; interview in *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 5 March 1992.

20. `Agreement on collective peacemaking forces and joint measures on the material and technical supply', in *Military News Bulletin*, 10, October 1993, pp. 1-2.

21. See reports in *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 21 December 1993; *Krasnaya zvezda*, 24 December 1993. Pyankov's views are explicit in the interviews `My obyazany utverdit' mir v Tadzhikistane', *Krasnaya zvezda*, 9 November 1993 and in *Pravda*, 18 January 1994. The current commander of the 201st Division is Colonel Yuri Naumov.

22. *RFE/RL News Brief*, vol. 3, no. 10, 1994.

23. See article by Y. Golotyuk in *Sevodnya*, 29 March 1994.

24. See article by Boris Vinogradov in *Izvestiya*, 3 March 1994.

25. Kazakh President Nazarbayev explicitly opposed this option during a visit to Britain in March 1994. As reported in *Financial Times*, 23 March 1994.

26. The problem is illustrated by the fact that in January 1990 a partial mobilization had to be carried out in the Northern Caucasian Military District for the rather limited operation in Baku.

27. Another structure suggested by the Airborne Forces commander envisages mobile forces, for immediate response purposes, of two airborne divisions, three airborne

brigades, several helicopter regiments from ground forces army aviation, three marine infantry battalions and some air defence and communications units.

28. For detailed proposals for the structure of these forces see ibid., and S. Ovsienko, `Sily bystrogo reagirovaniya', *Rossiyskie vesti*, 5 March 1993.

29. This structure was predicted as early as July 1993 by the Airborne Troops commander, Colonel-General Ye. Podkolzin, in *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 31 July 1993. See also Colonel O. Vladykin, `Mobil'nye sily rossii', *Krasnaya zvezda*, 18 December 1992.

30. See interview of Chief of General Staff Colonel-General Mikhail Kolesnikov, in *Armiya*, no. 9, 1993, pp. 25-8.

31. For a full breakdown of the distribution of units which could be used as the basis of the Russian Mobile Forces, see Colonel O. Vladykin, `Mobil'nye sily Rossii', *Krasnaya zvezda*, 18 December 1992.

32. Article by Deputy Defence Minister Kondratyev, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 February 1994.

33. See Yeltsin's edict of 15 March 1993 on the reform of the Russian military in the North Caucasus, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 18 March 1993.

34. Statement by Grachev reported by Interfax, 2 March 1993, in SU/1628 C1/1. Although next month Grachev reported that five additional Motor Rifle brigades, rather than two, had been attached to the district; interfax, Moscow 16 April 1993, in SU/1668 C1/4.

35. P. Baev, `Russia's rapid reaction forces: politics and pitfalls', *Bulletin of Arms Control*, 9, February 1993, pp. 15-16.

36. See article by P. Felgengauer in *Sevodnya*, 8 April 1994.

37. For an analysis of the Russian need for a programme for the development of its military transport aviation see `Uderzhitsya li "Ruslan" v nebesakh?', *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 December 1993.

38. P. Baev, `Russia's armed forces: spontaneous demobilisation?', *Bulletin of Arms Control*, no. 13, February 1994, p. 11.

39. See, for example, article by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Kutishchev in *Voyennyy vestnik*, 7 July 1993, pp. 16-17.

40. Statement by Deputy Defence Minister Kondratyev, Russia TV channel, 22 March 1994, in SU/1954 S1/3.

41. Statement in the Russian State Duma during discussions on the draft federal law on peacekeeping, in *Sevodnya*, 17 March 1994.

42. Lieutenant-General Boris Pyankov on Mayak Radio, 29 September 1993, in SU/1808 S1/4. It is necessary to keep in mind also that the call to assign large numbers of troops for peacekeeping and the military emphasis on peacekeeping requirements may also be used as an attempt by Russian military leaders to reverse cuts in the overall military budget.

43. Reuters report of Grachev on 4 February in *RFE/RL News Briefs*, 7-11 February 1994. In March Deputy Defence Minister Kondratyev set the number of Russian peacekeepers at 16,500; *Sevodnya*, 17 March 1994.

44. P. Felgengauer in *Sevodnya*, 13 August 1993. At the same time the collective peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan have a significant arsenal at their disposal. In January 1994, according to Pyankov, this included up to 2,000 tanks, 350 infantry fighting vehicles, 350 artillery pieces, aviation and helicopters (see *Rossiya*, no. 4, 26 January 1994-1 February 1994, p. 5; in JPRS-UMA-94-009, 4 March 1994, p. 20).

45. As set down in the new Russian military doctrine, `Osnovnye polozheniya voennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii', in *Izvestiya*, 18 November 1993.

46. This clique includes Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, Deputy Defence Minister Boris Gromov (a former commander of Russian forces in Afghanistan who now is responsible for Russian troops abroad and CIS activities), Deputy Defence Minister Colonel-General Georgi Kondratyev (the commander currently responsible for peacekeeping operations; he commanded Russian peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia after initially taking part in the introduction of peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia), Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Lebed (the 14th Army commander in Moldova), and Colonel-General Viktor Sorokin (who headed the task force of Russian troops in Abkhazia during November 1992-March 1993). For short biographies of these generals see *Moscow News*, 14, 9 April 1993. For a profile of Sorokin see *Krasnaya zvezda*, 20 March 1993.

47. `Osnovy voennoy doktriny Rossii', *Voennaya mysl'*, May 1992, special issue, pp. 4 and 7.

48. `Osnovye polozheniya voennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii', *Izvestiya*, 18 November 1993.

49. See J. Green, `The peacekeeping doctrines of the CIS', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 5, no. 4, April 1993, pp. 158-9.

50. For example, after an attack on a Russian-held border post by Tajik rebels and Afghan *Mujaheddin*, Grachev promised to develop adequate measures `to restrain the enemy and inflict such destruction on him that nobody will dare lift up their hand against the Russian people again.' Ostankino channel 1 TV, 16 July 1993, in SU/1744 C2/1.

51. In article by V. Urban, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 September 1993.

52. Interview in *Krasnaya zvezda*, 27 November 1993.

53. These objectives are similar to the actual practice of peacekeeping in the North Caucasus. Lieutenant-Colonel Viktor Shirinsky, deputy commander of the peacekeeping contingent there describes its duties as follows: confiscating illegal weapons; locating and destroying `bandit groups'; developing a `security zone' where peacekeepers are directly responsible for the security of the local population; escorting convoys carrying food and other products; and maintaining a curfew in one town. *Syn rodiny*, 40, 1993, p. 1; cited in *Former Soviet Union Fifteen Nations: Policy and Security*, February 1994, p. 38.

54. See interview of Volga MD First Deputy Commander, Lieutenant-General A. Shapovalov, in *Voyennyy vestnik*, 22 March 1993, pp. 2-5. See assessment of this also in Major M. Davis, `Russian "peacemaking operations": an issue of national security?', `Pink Paper', 20 September 1993, distributed by Special Adviser for Central and East European Affairs, Office of NATO Secretary-General.

55. Lieutenant-Colonel G. Zhilin in *Voyennyy vestnik*, no. 9, September 1993, pp. 17-19.

56. *Voyennyy vestnik*, 22 March 1993, p. 5.

57. See the excellent analysis by J. Green, `The peacekeeping doctrines of the CIS', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 5, no. 4, April 1993, pp. 156-9. This is drawn from the longer assessment `Russia's "peacekeeping doctrine"; The CIS, Russia and the General Staff', unpublished paper, NATO - SHAPE, Brussels, February 1993.

58. This strain of thinking in the CIS General Staff is noted by Green in `The peacekeeping doctrines of the CIS', p. 158.

59. In April 1994 the first commander of the collective peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan, Colonel-General Boris Pyankov, was appointed deputy commander of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. His special experience confirms the link between peacekeeping efforts and larger plans for developing joint CIS military forces.

60. Interview of first deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian land forces, Colonel-General Eduard Vorobyev, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 5 March 1994.

61. Speech by Kozyrev to the UN General Assembly on 28 September 1993, as reported by S. Crow, `Russia asserts its strategic agenda', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 50, 17 December 1993, p. 4; although these points are not evident in the report of the speech by Itar-Tass, Moscow, 28 September 1993, in SU/1807 B/3-4. They are explicit, however, in Kozyrev's article `OON: trevogi i nadezhdy mira', in *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 30 October 1993.

62. *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 30 October 1993.

63. Speech on 29 September 1993, Itar-Tass, Moscow, 28 September, in SU/1807 B/3.

64. Interview in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 24 November 1993.

65. Appeal by Yeltsin on 17 March 1993, in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 18 March 1993.

66. Document circulated in UN Headquarters on 2 November 1993; reported by Itar-Tass, Moscow, 3 November, in SU/1848 A1/1.

67. Request made to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on 3 February 1994. See Itar-Tass report, 3 February 1994, in SU/1914 B/3.

68. `US to intervene in ex-Soviet Union', *The Guardian*, 6 August 1993.

69. `Russia warned to respect borders', *Financial Times*, 7 February 1994.

70. Peter van Ham, `Ukraine, Russia and European security: implications for Western policy', *Chaillot Paper* 13 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, February 1994), pp. 39-40. See report in *Washington Times*, 20 August 1993.

71. Crow, `Russia asserts its strategic agenda'. p. 5; statement by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin in *RFE/RL News Brief*, 16-20 August 1993.

72. Discussions between presidents Clinton and Shevardnadze on 7 March 1994; Itar-Tass, Moscow, 8 March 1994, in SU/1942 F/5.

73. See `Amerikanskaya i rossiyskaya divizii provedut sovmestnye ucheniya', *Izvestiya*, 9 September 1993.

74. Interview in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 24 November 1993.

75. Kolesnikov claimed that this could be under the pretext of guaranteeing `international control' over the nuclear potential of the former USSR; see *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 1 August 1992. He was first deputy chief of the Russian General Staff at the time he made this statement.

76. *Krasnaya zvezda*, 23 June 1992.

77. The Ukrainian scholar D. Tabachnik maintains that West European military experts consider Ukraine to occupy a central place in practically all possible armed conflicts in Europe. To illustrate this he provides details of four principal scenarios (with sub-scenarios) of conflict in Eastern Europe and the European part of Russia developed by NATO analysts. According to most of these scenarios NATO armed forces or structures become involved in the conflicts at one stage or another. See *Golos Ukrainy*, 21 April 1992, p. 6.

78. As reported in Itar-Tass (World Service), Moscow, 28 January 1994, in SU/1909 S1/1. See also `NATO protyagivaet ruku druzhby rossii', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 30 January 1994.

79. Speech in Krakow, 23 February 1994; *Sevodnya*, 25 February 1994. See also the assessment of the NATO-NACC relationship by D. Gornostayev in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 4 December 1993.

80. See A. Kozyrev, `Partnerstvo v utverzhdenii mira', *Sevodnya*, 6 July 1993.

81. Dmitriy Trenin in *Novoye vremya*, 24, June 1993, pp. 8-12. This role is made possible, he notes, since NACC `encompasses all the main powers, it includes all the states which are actually threatened by the current instability' and `it obtains support from the powerful NATO infrastructure.'

82. Kozyrev speaking at the 3 December 1993 meeting of NACC foreign ministers at NATO headquarters. Itar-Tass report, in *RFE/RL News Briefs*, 6-10 December 1993.

83. Article by Kozyrev on the strategy of Russia's partnership with NATO, *Rossiyskiye vesti*, 17 August 1994.

84. WEU Luxembourg Declaration approved by WEU Council of Ministers on 22 November 1993; see van Ham, op. cit. in note 70, p. 56.

85. See, for example, interview of Kozyrev, `OON: trevogi i nadezhdy mira', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 30 October 1993.

86. See, for example, interview in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 24 November 1993.

87. A. Kozyrev, `Rossiyskoe mirotvorchestvo: legkikh resheniy ne byvaet, *Novoe vremya*, 4, 1994, p. 20.

88. Interview in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 24 November 1993.

89. This was proposed by Kozyrev on 27 October 1993 during a visit to London and elaborated by the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin on Radio Moscow World Service, 3 November 1993, in SU/1844 B/7.

90. See Deputy Defence Minister Georgiy Kondratyev in *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 February 1994.

91. Kondratyev in *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 June 1994.

92. See `Britain to study UN role for Russian peacekeepers', *The Daily Telegraph*, 29 October 1993. The main principles involved are outlined in the joint article by Douglas Hurd and Andrei Kozyrev in *Izvestiya*, 14 December 1993.

93. See report `Rossiyskie voyska ne poluchat golubykh kasok dlya mirotvorcheskikh operatsiy v blizhnem zarubezh'e', *Izvestiya*, 28 October 1993.

94. NTV, Moscow, television interview of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Foreign Minister Kozyrev, 3 April 1994, in SU/1963 B/9-10.

95. Interview on Russia's Radio, 15 April 1994, in SU/1975 S1/3.

96. Joint statement on 4 April 1994. See Itar-Tass, Moscow, 5 April 1994, in SU/1971 B/5-6; *Krasnaya zvezda*, 1 April 1994.

97. This followed an appeal by the Georgian president Shevardnadze and a Security Council meeting on 24 August 1993. As reported by Georgian Radio, 28 July 1993, in SU/1755 B/9; and Itar-Tass World Service, 25 August 1993, in SU/1781 A1/2.

98. See article in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 22 September 1993. The appeal to the UN was made formal on 1 December; see article by N. Roslova, *Sevodnya*, 3 December 1993. In fact in March 1994 the option of sending such a UN force was ruled out by the UN Secretary-General pending `substantial progress' on a political settlement in the region.

99. See letter from Georgia to UN Security Council on 27 January 1994; Itar-Tass, Moscow, 28 January 1994, in SU/1911 F/5.

100. See Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, `Russia reserved about new peacekeeping operations', *Moscow News*, no. 34, 26 August-1 September 1994, p. 4.

101. See article by Kozyrev in *Izvestiya*, 4 August 1993.

102. The idea was opposed by Ukraine, Estonia, other former Soviet republics, the East European countries, Turkey and some Western states such as Canada and Norway. For a Russian assessment of the CSCE debate on this issue see *Izvestiya*, 3 December 1993.

103. Text of Sustov's statement at the information meeting of the Permanent Committee of the CSCE on 14 February 1994 in Vienna. As cited in S. Crow, `Russia promotes the CIS as an international organization', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, vol. 3, no. 11, 18 March 1994, pp. 35-6.

104. See `Russia insists on solo intervention', *The Guardian*, 25 June 1994.

105. Already in March 1992, at a meeting of CSCE foreign ministers, Kozyrev proposed the creation of armed CSCE peacekeeping forces to settle the conflict around this region. At that time he did not even rule out the use of some NATO military infrastructure, primarily airfields, in the implementation of peace missions. See report by M. Yusin in *Izvestiya*, 27 March 1992.

106. See Fuller, `Russia, Turkey, Iran and the Karabakh mediation process', pp. 32-3.

107. The views of the Russian specialist Sergei Karaganov (Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe, Moscow) in the Foreign Ministry's journal *Diplomaticheskiy vestnik* were interpreted as an early elaboration of this kind of policy, whereby `Russia must begin to fulfil her traditional role again in the areas of the former Soviet empire, of cajoling the local leaders and, if necessary, sending in the troops'; Estonian Radio, Tallinn, 8 March 1993, in SU/1635 A2/2.

108. These points were made, for example, following Yeltsin's renowned speech at the Civic Union forum calling for special powers for Russia in the FSU. See report by V. Nadein in *Izvestiya*, 4 March 1993.

109. As cited in SU/1622 C1/6, 25 February 1993.

110. The agreement was negotiated in autumn 1993 but finally concluded in February 1994. It also provides for Russian border troops to be deployed as border guards on the Georgian frontier with Turkey. See *Krasnaya zvezda*, 4 February 1994. The Russian MOD will command the Russian military units in Georgia (via the Commander of the Transcaucasian Group of Forces). According to some reports the Russian MOD will even control the military actions of the Georgian MOD; see Iberia news agency, Tbilisi, 2 March 1994, in SU/1940 S1/2.

111. Statement by Kozyrev on 13 January 1994 in speech to Russian ambassadors to the CIS and Baltic states, as reported in Itar-Tass (World Service), Moscow, 18 January 1994, in SU/1900 B/4; *Financial Times*, 14 January 1994; *RFE/Rl News Briefs*, 10-21 January 1994, p. 3. For the reactions of the foreign ministries of the Baltic states see SU/1901 S2/4-5.

112. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 24 November 1994. This idea is consistent with the terms of the new Russian military doctrine, which confirm that Russian forces may be based outside its territory jointly with the forces of other (implicitly CIS) states or as Russian groupings; see *Izvestiya*, 18 November 1993.

113. Statement on 28 February 1994, in *RFE/RL News Briefs*, vol. 3, no. 10, 1994.

114. Reported by P. Felgengauer in `Starye granitsy i "novye" bazy', *Sevodnya*, 16 September 1993.

115. See interview of Colonel-General Andrey Nikolayev, commander of the Russian border troops, in *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 20 January 1994.

116. See `Interesy Rossii v blizhnem zarubezh'e: gde sevodnya vozvodit' granitsu?', *Krasnaya zvezda*, 2 March 1994. This also analyses the current border regimes of most of the CIS states and Russian responsibilities for these borders.

117. *The Guardian*, 19 April 1994.

118. An idea proposed by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Krylov on 3 December 1993. Itar-Tass report in *RFE/RL News Briefs*, 6-10 December 1993, p. 2. So far this has not been endorsed as official policy.

119. See, for example, Lieutenant-Colonel K. Petrov, in *Krasnaya zvezda*, 19 January 1994.

120. P. Felgengauer in *Sevodnya*, 4 January 1994.

121. Ibid.

122. See report on discussion between Defence Minister Grachev and the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on 4 April 1994, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 5 April 1994.

123. For example, the assumption of first generation peacekeeping was that it would occur *between* states rather than as commonly now *within* states. It assumed that neutral states but not great powers would engage in peacekeeping, whereas the expectation now is for great powers to commit themselves to peacekeeping.

124. Joint article published simultaneously in *Izvestiya* and *Financial Times*, 14 December 1993.