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THE IMPLICATIONS OF
THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS
FOR WESTERN EUROPE'S
FOREIGN RELATIONS

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and Monika Wohlfeld
Edited by Mathias Jopp*

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INTRODUCTION

Mathias Jopp⁽¹⁾

The Yugoslav crisis, for which the West Europeans have been attempting to find a solution since its outbreak, has become the bloodiest conflict in Europe since the Second World War, a drama for the peoples concerned and a threat to the stability and security of all of the Balkans. But its implications go far beyond sub-regional effects. Posing for over three years now a challenge to the crisis-management ability of the international community, it has influenced the restructuring of post-Cold War security relations and has complicated Western Europe's development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and search for a new role in international affairs. In this paper, scholars from the United States, Russia, Central Europe, Turkey and Egypt analyse their countries' perceptions of Western Europe's handling of the crisis and the actual or potential consequences for relations with the European Union (EU) and Western European Union (WEU). The following is a synopsis of the main points brought out in these case studies, evaluated and complemented by an analysis of West European views and perceptions.

Western Europe's policies: failures but also modest achievements

The EC/EU has a fairly bad image with its external partners, in terms of its response to the Yugoslav crisis. First, none of the countries considered in this paper sees in the EU and its CFSP a credible security actor, many of them even holding Western Europe responsible for the continuation of the crisis. Secondly, and that is in part a consequence of the first reason, most partners of the EU continue to strengthen their ties with *individual* West European powers. This preference for bilateralism, in combination with the remaining divisions within the EU on Yugoslavia, makes it difficult to develop an effective CFSP. Thirdly, the EU is facing a considerable dilemma because of the contradictory demands made by some of its partners. Whereas Russia expects Western Europe to display greater understanding of the Serbian situation, Islamic states like Turkey and Egypt are demanding the opposite: tougher action against the Serbs and much stronger protection of the Bosnian Muslims. Escaping this dilemma through compromises which will not harm relations with either side is a problematic task. The recently proposed peace plan, in which 51 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina is controlled by the Muslim/Croat federation and 49 per cent by the Bosnian Serbs, represents an attempt to strike a difficult balance. The problem is that the plan of 6 July 1994 is somewhat artificial since it has little to do with realities on the ground and does not appear to be backed by any readiness of the five powers that make up the Contact Group to impose a solution.

The present difficulties of the international community in coping with the crisis are not very different from those which Western Europe had to face when it first tried to resolve the Yugoslav problem alone. It is true, however, that West European initiatives met with a series of checks right from the beginning of the crisis. In 1991 it might have been possible to stop further escalation, notably Serbian aggression, without using overwhelming force but, in addition to problems of international law, there was no agreement among the West Europeans on sending a WEU interposition force to Eastern Croatia, as suggested by France and Germany. It was in particular

Britain which, apart from any other objections, did not at that time wish to create a precedent as long as the CFSP and WEU's role in European security had not been defined in the negotiations on the Maastricht treaty, and Germany, when it realised that it would anyway be unable to contribute militarily, quickly withdrew from the proposal.

The West Europeans then chose a more indirect approach towards the crisis, but it took several months to agree on sanctions and a further half year to gather the necessary international support for these in the framework of the UN. Another policy element, the recognition of new entities in a war of secession, proved to be two-edged: whereas in the case of Croatia it can be argued to have contributed to putting an end to the fighting, in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina the war broke out immediately after the recognition of this former Yugoslav republic. Nor did the organisation of a peace conference help much as long as Western Europe was neither able nor willing to exercise enough pressure on the conflicting parties to agree on a negotiated solution and as long as it served as an excuse for postponement for those who still had clear war aims. Finally, playing the role of neutral arbitrator did not work when Western Europe first tried to preserve the Yugoslav state as an entity, in whatever form, and later applied sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. On the whole, Western Europe's responses, which were the product of the varied attitudes and interests of individual countries, were inadequate, its decisions were on many occasions overtaken by events, and action taken either too late or half-hearted.

Nevertheless, Western Europe's record was not entirely negative, since it contributed to the containment of the crisis, mitigated the suffering of many people in Bosnia through the initiation of humanitarian measures and brought about the involvement of other relevant international organisations such as the UN and NATO. In retrospect, Western Europe developed at least a clear minimum strategy: this consisted of a combination of external levers (economic sanctions and the arms embargo), permanent negotiations with the conflicting parties and some interference with their operational freedom of manuvre through the presence of peacekeeping forces. In addition, Western Europe supported the control and enforcement of the 'no-fly' ban over Bosnia-Herzegovina, the establishment of security zones and the selective use of air power.

Trying to persuade Serbia to agree to a political settlement and simultaneously avoid a partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to prevent the emergence of a greater Serbia and a greater Croatia became one of the main guidelines for Western Europe's policies. This was reflected in the successive initiatives and peace plans drawn up or supported by the West Europeans, like the Vance-Owen plan, the Kinkel-Juppé initiative of 8 November 1993, the EU's action plan of 22 November 1993 and the peace plan of the international Contact Group of 6 July 1994. Western Europe also drew some consequences from its failures, as it recognized the difficulties in finding any solution to the crisis without the involvement of the United States and Russia; hence the forming of the Contact Group as proposed by Britain. Last but not least, the EC and WEU provided to some extent workable frameworks which contributed to preventing the return by the major West European actors to classical power or alliance policies towards the Balkans.

All that, however, had only indirect effects on the situation in former Yugoslavia, and did not lead to terminating the war or putting a stop to ethnic cleansing. Moreover, the wider damage caused by Western Europe's handling of the crisis is not insignificant: relations with the United States have been complicated in a period where it was (and still is) in any case difficult to adapt them to the situation after the Cold War; Russia has become a constraining factor for Western Europe's crisis-management diplomacy; Central Europeans have become irritated and less confident in the security dimension of European integration; strain has been put on relations with pro-Western Muslim countries such as Turkey and Egypt. By not acting decisively against Serbian expansionism, Western Europe has appeared to accept the violation of important principles of international relations, in particular that borders cannot be changed by force, and has indirectly encouraged nationalists elsewhere in Europe, notably in Russia, in their ideas of building 'greater' state entities. Finally, Western Europe has lost in credibility as an advocate of human rights and the protection of minorities; hence the accusation by some of its partners that it applies double standards.

Specific Implications

Much as Western Europe is suffering from a very poor image, the contributions to this paper show that the situation is more complex than front pages of international newspapers may suggest. Negative perceptions do matter in international politics, but they do so with varying degrees of relevance, filtered by one's own country's *realpolitik* and other factors which play a role in the international system. In spite of Western Europe's weak performance in attempting to cope with the crisis, most of its partners remain strongly interested in the development of European integration -- either because they want eventually to have a more united and reliable partner, as is the case with the United States, or because they wish one day to join West European institutions, as is the case with Central European countries and Turkey. The only exception may be Russia which, on the one hand, criticises Western Europe's weakness, because this led to the deeper involvement of NATO and the United States in the management of the crisis and, on the other, feels uncomfortable over the process of widening the European Union because it is concerned that it may become marginalised.

No single aspect of the Yugoslav crisis can be identified as having clearly led to a worsening of Europe's foreign relations. Even in European-American relations, which have been the most directly affected, negative and positive effects seem to balance each other. Undeniably, the Yugoslav crisis has led to an extension of NATO's role in European security beyond its traditional scope of activities, has resulted in greater cooperation between WEU and NATO (despite earlier tensions between the two) and facilitated a *rapprochement* between France and the United States. The experience has confirmed that at present Western Europe needs to make use of NATO mechanisms and the support of the United States when confronted with a Yugoslav-type crisis. Americans came to the conclusion that their own interests in shifting responsibilities in security policies to their European allies are best served by supporting the development of a European security and defence identity, including the improvement of the crisis-management ability of the EU and WEU in particular. The proposal for Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) and the agreement reached, during the Alliance's January 1994 summit, on the principle that WEU may use NATO assets, are to be seen in this context.

However, whether the CJTF concept can be implemented successfully and whether it will work in practice is still unclear. The future possibilities offered by better cooperation between WEU and NATO notwithstanding, one basic question remains to be answered: from where would the appropriate and properly trained troops for larger peacekeeping operations come, given that Britain and France are already operating at the limit of their currently available resources, the United States is becoming increasingly reluctant to commit forces, and Germany still has some political and historical constraints? There is also the problem that the performance of the European Union in former Yugoslavia has, in spite of the Clinton administration's favourable attitude towards European integration and its security dimension, confirmed views in Washington that the EU is not yet a reliable partner on questions of foreign or security policy. The United States therefore continues to use NATO and its bilateral ties with European countries as the main channels of consultation, thus leaving the EU to one side.

In the case of Russia, the Yugoslav crisis has served the country's interest to define and obtain its place as a leading power in European security. Indirectly, the crisis provided the occasion for Russia to show its assertiveness and strengthened the position of nationalists and conservatives in the internal power struggle. The fact that NATO has operated in former Yugoslavia, outside its treaty area, could easily be exploited by the anti-Westerners, and this constrained (at least for a while) the government's freedom of manuvre in cooperating with the West. Moreover, the longer the crisis in Western Europe's `backyard' lasts and the deeper the West, notably NATO, becomes involved, the more Russia feels it has legitimate reasons for carrying out so-called peacekeeping activities in its `near abroad'.

Central European countries have closely followed Western Europe's policies throughout the Yugoslav crisis, which has on the whole assisted the reorientation of their foreign policies towards Western Europe. Indirectly, however, Western Europe's failures in former Yugoslavia have contributed to greater scepticism over the prospects of the security and defence dimension of European integration. But in the absence of any effective security arrangement in their region, and because of the realisation that a workable collective security system does not exist, many Central European states have tried to press harder for membership of Western institutions. At the same time, their sense of their own specific national interests has been strengthened, notably in view of the costs and risks involved in associating themselves with Western Europe's crisis management policies. This is in particular true for the Central European neighbours of former Yugoslavia, who are suffering from the effects on their own economies of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, and who feel more than other countries exposed to risks and threats deriving from a militarily powerful Serbia. Some of them are therefore trying to improve their defence capabilities. Measures taken up to now, such as Hungary's improvement of its air force, are well within the limits of the CFE Treaty, but the possibility of an arms race in the Balkans cannot be excluded.

The Yugoslav crisis has certainly encouraged the West, Western Europe in particular, to do more for the security of Central Europe. The initiatives developed so far, such as NATO's Partnership for Peace, the establishment of links between the CFSP mechanism and Central European countries, and the introduction of associate partner

status within WEU have to be seen in that context -- even if they fall still short of these countries' wishes, i.e. the offer of full membership of Western institutions. In addition, the project of a European Stability Pact has been launched, with the intention of helping prevent border and minority problems in Central Europe from deteriorating into conflict. This initiative, rightly or wrongly, has been criticised in many respects, but creating a network of bilateral treaties between Central European countries may well contribute to the general Western policy of projecting stability eastwards. This strategy may, however, collapse if, in the long term, membership of Western institutions is not granted and the West Europeans fail to develop a model of integration which is flexible enough to absorb new members while simultaneously preserving the efficiency of existing decision-making structures.

In the case of relations between Muslim countries and Western Europe, no direct policy impact is discernible in spite of widespread negative perceptions and the correspondingly sharp rhetoric used by some of these states' governments when criticising Western Europe's approach towards the Bosnian problem. This is first of all related to the domestic situation, where the Bosnian drama is successfully used by Islamic fundamentalists in pursuit of their anti-Western policies. As a consequence, radical forces have been strengthened and moderate forces weakened. In Turkey, the Bosnian factor has contributed to sharpening the dispute between Kemalists and Islamists over the model of society and the foreign policy the country should adopt. The same applies to the political struggle between moderates and fundamentalists in Egypt, and in both countries, as well as in other Muslim states, governments feel under mounting pressure to demonstrate the value of their pro-Western policies. Should the internal power balance change -- certainly not only because of Bosnia -- significant reorientation in the foreign policies of some Muslim countries may occur.

Other countries' weaknesses

This paper also shows that most of EU's external partners themselves either do not possess the power or do not have the determination to exercise a decisive influence on the crisis or bring about a quick solution to it. The reasons lie in their lack of internal consensus, instruments or resources, dependence on the West or Western Europe and uncertainty about the appropriate strategy to be adopted towards former Yugoslavia. Yet all the countries have more or less aligned their policies with those of Western Europe by the application of diplomatic efforts, peacekeeping and indirect pressure on the parties to the conflict through economic and political means. Moreover, no country has ever seriously appeared to be really prepared to make peace by force, either because no major national interests have been seen to be at stake, or because the war in former Yugoslavia has not yet been seen as posing a threat to the overall strategic balance in Europe.

The United States was (and still is) in many respects as divided as the EU. To what extent should America become involved in the management of the crisis? Should the concept of selective air strikes be extended and what would then be the consequences? Differences of views on these questions exist between the Administration and Congress, between the State Department and the Pentagon, but even within the State Department and Congress as well as among the wider public. Against that background the United States has upon occasion altered its course within weeks if not days. It has also suffered from a relatively weak position *vis-à-vis* its

European allies, since it has no troops on the ground in Croatia or Bosnia. In view of the growing hesitation of the Clinton administration to send peacekeeping forces into a crisis region, notably if these had to operate under UN command, it has even become doubtful whether America will really be prepared to make ground forces available when it is required for the implementation of a political settlement.

Russia feels torn between on the one hand not jeopardizing its strategic relationship with the West, the United States in particular, and on the other developing a more assertive, less Westernised foreign policy. Economically weak, militarily in decline and preoccupied with its interventions in the south of the CIS, it lacks the resources to have a strong influence on developments in former Yugoslavia. The government is finding it difficult to arrive at a balance between cooperating with the West on Yugoslavia for *realpolitik* interests (in order to secure Russia an influential position in European security) and pursuing a Balkan policy which would weaken the arguments of the pan-Slavists and the nationalists. In addition, the Russian government has various views on Yugoslavia: differences have been seen in the positions of the foreign and defence ministries, but also within the Foreign Ministry itself. Whereas at the time of writing the more moderate Churkin line seems to be predominating, its continued success depends on the extent to which Russia's profile as a mediator and peacemaker can be enhanced.

Central European states lack the resources and feel too dependent on Western Europe to criticize overtly its handling of the Yugoslav crisis or to implement effectively their own policies towards former Yugoslavia. The desire to join West European institutions at some stage is having a clear impact in the sense that Central Europeans tend to avoid anything that could undermine the development of closer links with Western Europe.

Muslim states are also economically, politically and militarily too weak and divided to exercise any strong influence (either as a group or individually) on the international management of the crisis. Even a country like Turkey, which has both strategic interests in the Balkans and the military means to back them, does not wish to risk damaging its relations with West European powers and institutions and the prospect of membership of WEU and the EU. In Egypt it is the prevailing interest in good relations with the West, the United States in particular, which still matters. Most Muslim countries depend on workable economic and political relations with the West, so that they are not interested in a political confrontation or in breaking off relations with Western Europe over Bosnia alone.

Western Europe and its partners: who is right and who is wrong?

The Yugoslav crisis has revealed the great differences that exist in the post-Cold War era between the Americans and the West Europeans in the assessment of a security problem and the ways and means of coping with it. Whereas the Europeans have been preoccupied with the management of the crisis from its beginning, Americans first kept some distance from the problem and then reluctantly followed European policies, as was the case with the recognition of individual Yugoslav republics or grudging attitudes to the Vance-Owen plan. Whereas the Europeans favoured negotiations and humanitarian measures, Americans proposed the 'lift and strike' option. Most West Europeans rejected the Americans' initiative to alter the approach to the crisis. The

British and the French in particular, who have provided the bulk of the UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia, feared that the American proposals would only lead to intensifying the war, increasing Belgrade's involvement and threatening the lives of their UN troops.

One continuing problem throughout 1993 was that the Americans refused to become more actively involved in the diplomatic peace efforts. This angered many West Europeans, who felt that the American proposals only encouraged the Bosnian Muslims and undermined the peacemaking efforts in the Geneva conference. Whereas the Americans considered that the West Europeans were appeasing the Serbs and attempting to achieve a negotiated solution at the expense of the weakest (the Bosnian Muslims), the West Europeans argued that they were doing something practical to save lives in Bosnia.

Another problem has been linked to the involvement of the Americans in the diplomatic process following NATO's Sarajevo ultimatum of 9 February 1994. The United States-brokered federation between the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia, though it reduces the strategic imbalance *vis-à-vis* the Serbian side, includes the risk of formally dividing the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, something the Europeans have always tried to avoid. Even if the Contact Group established some time later, in which the United States participates, has launched one of the most promising peace initiatives since the outbreak of the war, differences with the Americans remain. President Clinton, under pressure from Congress, has set a deadline of 15 October for a UN decision on an exemption of the Bosnian Muslims from the arms embargo should the Bosnian Serbs continue to refuse to accept the Contact Group's peace plan. The French and British resist this and may only reluctantly acquiesce to this option as a final measure to be applied should it become unavoidable. There is no disagreement with the Americans on the need to exercise as much pressure as possible on the Bosnian Serbs, but a consensus has emerged among all WEU and EU countries that lifting the embargo would not contribute to solving the Yugoslav problem. The opposite is feared, and the Europeans' hope is that the present unique situation (in September 1994) in which the West, Russia and even Serbia are all pulling together can be exploited either to make the Bosnian Serbs accept the peace plan or gradually to extinguish the war.

Should the current initiative fail, the American intention to lift the embargo will most of all cause difficulties with the Russians. The Contact Group could fall apart, the West Europeans may in the end agree to the lifting of the embargo but may also withdraw their UN forces. That could lead to an escalation of the armed conflict in Bosnia, and one of the consequences of this could be a worsening of transatlantic relations and an even more difficult situation for the policies of the EU, NATO, WEU and the UN.

Russia criticises Western Europe for its recognition of secessionist Yugoslav republics and for a perceived anti-Serbian bias. Whereas different arguments can be used in support of the EC's policy of recognition (because it allowed international involvement) or against it, Moscow can easily be criticised for its partiality in showing solidarity with Belgrade. Neutrality in crisis management, however, has its clear limits if, most of the time, it is the strongest party to a conflict which violates cease-fire agreements or undermines UN decisions and arrangements. Moscow's

criticism of Western Europe's policies is also difficult to understand, as the West Europeans have since early 1993 in many respects been closer to the Russians than to the Americans. The West Europeans have mostly taken Russian interests into account, either in order not to weaken the domestically challenged Russian leadership or to use Yeltsin's difficult position as an excuse for not doing more themselves.

Russia's foreign policy-makers are also frustrated by Western Europe's security integration, in so far as they had initially expected that it would weaken American influence and reduce NATO's role in European security. When in February and April 1994 NATO began to take a tougher stance *vis-à-vis* the Serbs, old threat perceptions of the Western Alliance were resurrected. That happened in spite of the fact that NATO was operating in accordance with the relevant UNSC decisions and under UN control, a point on which the European allies had insisted. The episode revealed that it was not so much Russia's friendship with Serbia which mattered as its fear of losing influence on the management of the crisis. The establishment of the Contact Group therefore served the double purpose of acknowledging Russian concerns and involving Russia more in Western strategies towards former Yugoslavia. This worked to some extent, since Russia actively backed the Contact Group's peace plan by using its special relationship with Belgrade to induce it to stop supplies to the Bosnian Serbs. But Moscow may remain a difficult partner: it may insist on a lifting of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, something which the West Europeans are only prepared to do gradually and which they resisted in principle until Belgrade was ready to accept international observers for the control of the blockade on the border between Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro.

Central European officials are reluctant to make harsh public commentary on Western Europe's policies on Yugoslavia, but openly criticise Western Europe for having granted Russia too much influence over European security, and for not having drawn the lessons of the crisis and accelerated their access to its institutions. As far as Russia is concerned, it can be argued that respecting the country's relevance does not mean granting it a right of veto over Western action or decisions. On the second argument one can point to the closer links which have been established between West European institutions and Central Europe in order to reduce the security vacuum there. The special status accorded to the Central Europeans by WEU, for example, indicates to the outside world, notably Russia and Serbia, Western Europe's security priorities. That has nothing to do with formally binding commitments, but it indicates that any threatening policy *vis-à-vis* WEU associate partners may have to take the reactions of WEU and probably also NATO into account, since the former is the European pillar of the latter. Indirect security guarantees have also been given to those Central European countries which cooperate with the West on certain crisis-management measures, as for example Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, who are working together with WEU in the organisation of tighter embargo controls on the Danube. That may be seen by these countries as of limited value, but as long as the conflict does not spread and the international community remains deeply involved through diplomatic efforts and peacekeeping, the real risks will be kept to a minimum.

Muslim countries have formed the strongest negative image of Western Europe, an image of a Europe that is biased against the Bosnian Muslims and indirectly tolerates the killing or expulsion of thousands of Muslims by the Serbs. The main accusation is therefore that Western Europe is pursuing an anti-Islamic policy in the Balkans. Even

if that image may have been somewhat erased by the Contact Group's peace plan and the fact that Egypt and Turkey now contribute over a thousand troops each to UNPROFOR, it is true that Western Europe's policy aims at preserving a multinational Bosnia-Herzegovina and preventing the emergence of a purely Muslim entity in the Balkans. This has nothing to do with religious motives but first and foremost with the political and strategic concerns that Serbia and Croatia may fight a war over the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which could widen the conflict. The second reason is that in the event of a partition of the country between a greater Serbia and, perhaps, a greater Croatia, the Bosnian Muslim state that remained could become more radical in its policies as a consequence of its precarious economic situation and weak military position. Against the argument of anti-Islamism in Western Europe's policies it could also be countered that since the foundation of political cooperation among EC/EU states more than twenty years ago, the European Community has sided with Arab interests on many occasions, notably in the case of Arab-Israeli conflict, has tried to moderate United States and Israeli positions and nowadays strongly supports the peace process in the Middle East, politically but in particular economically.

Conclusions

Western Europe needs to build confidence in the CFSP and to continue to improve relations with its partners in order to increase the unity and effectiveness of the international community in crisis management. There are also some general aspects which should be taken into account in the longer term.

In terms of relations with the Americans, the lessons are fourfold. First, as long as Western Europe's crisis diplomacy has not articulated and developed its military structure, it will have to rely on NATO mechanisms and the support of the United States in crises such as that in Yugoslavia; hence the importance of consulting the Americans and obtaining reassurance about their support as early as possible. Second, West Europeans have to adapt themselves to coping with an America whose foreign and security policy, in contrast to its policies during the Cold War, is less predictable and driven much more by domestic demands and changing definitions of national interests, and which now attaches greater relevance to factors such as cost, risks, the duration of a military operation and public support for it. West Europeans therefore now have the task of trying to convince the Americans, where necessary, to join diplomatic initiatives or to take part in certain operations. Third, there exists the problem of leadership in the Western camp. The Europeans have not shown themselves able to take the lead and manage a Yugoslav-type crisis, nor is the United States any longer always able and willing to provide the necessary leadership. Western strength of action can only be maintained if leadership is exercised jointly by the West Europeans and the Americans; but joint leadership requires greater equality among partners, and, consequently, the West Europeans must move forward with their political unification and the improvement of their own crisis management capability. Fourthly, developing a new culture of burden-sharing and crisis management would not work if the West Europeans were not prepared to carry a greater share of responsibilities or if the Americans only wished to become involved in air operations and expected the Europeans to do the dirty work on the ground. The worst case would certainly be an American return to isolationism. American unwillingness to commit forces to UNPROFOR I and II has already disappointed many Europeans, and United

States readiness in the end to provide the necessary share of troops to keep the peace once a political settlement has been reached may become a test case for transatlantic relations.

With Russia, cooperation only works successfully if the country is offered participation in Western policies in such a way that it feels it is being treated as a major power which has a relevant say on European security problems. This weakens the arguments of the conservatives and nationalists and increases the likelihood of the country's transformation and integration into Western structures. The Contact Group, the recently concluded partnership and cooperation agreement with the EU, and NATO's Partnership for Peace programme, in which Russia now also takes part, are therefore important steps in the right direction. WEU also needs to develop a bilateral relationship with that country, because everything should be done to prevent it from feeling marginalised by Western Europe's enlargement and association strategies. Once the implementation of a Bosnian peace plan is on the agenda -- and NATO should have a large part of the responsibility for this task -- the West should facilitate Russian participation.

Although Western Europe has had failures in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis, its policy of projecting stability towards Central Europe and establishing closer institutional links with countries in the region has up to now proved fairly successful. Further steps need, however, to be taken to strengthen cooperation between Central Europeans and the EU, as well as WEU, in order to make the possibility of membership of Western institutions a realistic prospect. Should it again become necessary to tighten the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, the West Europeans may have to think about offering compensation to the neighbouring countries which would suffer most from such a policy in order to prevent the weakening of the sanctions simply because of economic problems.

Western Europe also has an interest in stability in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and therefore in deepening its relationship with Turkey and establishing a new one with Egypt. Hence, it is necessary to take the concerns of these countries seriously and avoid fuelling their destabilisation through a Bosnian policy which can easily be exploited by radical forces, including Islamic fundamentalists. Bosnia is certainly only one factor in the internal dynamics of Muslim countries, but it is worth trying to reduce its relevance. One of the best ways of doing this would be to avoid any political settlement that was greatly detrimental to the Bosnian Muslims. In addition, encouraging greater involvement of countries like Turkey and Egypt in UNPROFOR could improve Europe's image in spite of Greek anxieties.

The European Union's role will increase in the period after a political settlement, when the reconstruction of Bosnia and other Yugoslav successor states is on the agenda. Offering them economic and technical aid and preferential trade on specific conditions, as well as eventual participation in European integration, may help the development of democracy and guarantee observance of the rule of law and the protection of minorities. What, however, should be the approach to Serbia, given the principle that borders cannot be changed by force? The previous guideline in European policies that aggression should not be rewarded has to be maintained, which implies that the new Serbian entities or some sort of unification of all Serbs cannot become internationally recognized. Another problem is that Serbia will remain a very

strong power in the Balkans, perceived as a potential threat by other countries in the region. It should therefore be made clear that the full normalisation of Serbia's relations with the international community and its participation in the development of European structures will only be possible if it observes international rules of behaviour and accepts arms control measures.

Western Europe's policies should also be oriented towards building self-confidence in the CFSP. That can be done by developing common positions and joint actions on such issues as the strengthening of the CSCE, arms control, arms export controls, supporting the Middle East peace process and taking the lead in the reconstruction of Bosnia, for which the involvement of the EU and WEU in Mostar may serve as an appropriate example. But it is not only the CFSP which needs to be strengthened. WEU's operational capabilities have also to be enhanced so that it is better able to underpin the EU's future crisis-management.

Some may argue that, because of the shift away from formal institutions of the European Union to a special role for leading European powers, as seen in the Contact Group, the CFSP is now only relevant for, at best, dealing with security issues of secondary importance. What is observable in practice, however, is not a complete shift towards classical great power diplomacy and *ad hoc* coalitions of the strongest. Regional organisations like the EU, NATO and WEU continue to play an important role -- either directly under UN auspices for the conduct of certain operations or in support of a coalition of the willing. Therefore, even if the Maastricht vision of a strong and unified Europe has become somewhat remote, step-by-step political and security integration will remain an important task. But as experience shows, it is better to prevent conflicts than to accept the risks associated with the management of a crisis; hence the need to strengthen the planning capacities of the CFSP and develop a joint risk analysis capability. Both are required for the timely development of appropriate strategies which aim at the reduction of conflict potential. Such strategies have also the advantage of helping to avoid strain among the Twelve in periods of crisis. Above all, the main aim of West European policies will be to continue to provide stability for a greater number of countries in Europe through the spread of a network of close cooperation and consultation with the objective of establishing a workable security system based on integration.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

F. Stephen Larrabee⁽²⁾

This essay examines the impact of the Yugoslav crisis on US relations with Europe. The first section reviews the evolution of US policy towards the Yugoslav crisis and the major factors which influenced that policy; the second examines the policy divergences between the United States and its West European allies that were created by the crisis; the third deals with recent US policies and the final one focuses on the broader implications of the crisis for US-European relations.

US policy under Bush and Clinton

US policy in the Yugoslav crisis must be seen against the background of the Cold War. During the Cold War, Yugoslavia was a pawn in the US-Soviet struggle for power in the Balkans.⁽³⁾ The main US goal was to prevent Yugoslavia from falling under Soviet domination. Such a development, US policy-makers believed, would tip the balance of power in the Balkans and increase the pressure on Greece and Turkey, two key NATO allies, as well as reducing Romania's room for manuvre. Hence, support for Yugoslavia's 'unity, independence and territorial integrity' became a fundamental tenet of US policy towards the Balkans.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War changed the geopolitical context in which US policy had to operate and precipitated a major shift in US policy towards Yugoslavia. Once communism in Eastern Europe collapsed and the Soviet Union began to disintegrate, Yugoslavia lost much of its strategic importance for the United States. When the Yugoslav conflict initially broke out in 1990-91, the Bush administration therefore tended to see it primarily as a 'local crisis' which should be handled first and foremost by the Europeans. In particular, American officials underestimated the degree to which nationalism and extremism -- and their potential spillover -- threatened the new post-Cold War security order in Europe.

The low-key US profile was influenced by several factors. Once it became clear that there was no danger of Soviet intervention, the United States relegated the Yugoslav crisis to the back burner -- in part because it was preoccupied with other issues, especially German unification, the unravelling of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War, and in part because there were no obviously good options. Moreover, the Europeans were closer to the conflict and had more leverage -- or so the Bush administration (wrongly) thought.

Second, the US military were reluctant to get deeply involved in the crisis. Many of the top US military officers, including General Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had served in Vietnam. They were loath to get dragged into an unpopular land war without a clear exit strategy, and viewed Yugoslavia as a potential quagmire.⁽⁴⁾

Third, in an election year, George Bush was reluctant to become engaged in a protracted conflict overseas, especially one that might lead to heavy American casualties. This view was widely shared by many of his top political advisers, who were convinced that the American people would not support US military involvement in a war in Yugoslavia.⁽⁵⁾ These factors initially induced the Bush administration to let the European Community (EC) take the lead in managing the crisis. This inclination was reinforced by the EC's own desire to demonstrate that it was the main political and security organization in the new Europe.⁽⁶⁾ As Luxembourg's Foreign Minister Jacques Poos triumphantly -- but prematurely -- announced, this was the 'hour of Europe'. Only when the EC had patently failed to halt the fighting did the United States begin to engage itself heavily in trying to resolve the conflict, but by then it was too late. The conflict had escalated into a major international crisis that threatened to spill over into Western Europe and destabilize the whole Balkan peninsula.

The Bush administration was also hesitant to allow NATO to become heavily involved in the conflict. Yugoslavia was regarded by American officials as 'out of area' and thus not an appropriate field for NATO operations. This hesitance, however, undercut the effectiveness and credibility of US policy and ran counter to America's own argument -- stressed in particular at the November 1991 NATO summit in Rome -- that NATO should be the main organization dealing with security in Europe. It thus raised doubts in the minds of many Europeans about the strength of the US commitment to Europe precisely at a time when the Bush administration was trying to convince its European allies that its commitment to Europe's security remained unchanged despite the end of the Cold War. It also indirectly encouraged the Serbian leadership to believe that they could undertake aggression with impunity.

During the final months of 1992, prompted by fears that the conflict might spill over to other parts of the Balkans, especially Kosovo, the Bush administration adopted a tougher stance towards Serbia. This was reflected, in particular, in President Bush's letter to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic warning that the United States would not tolerate further repression of the rights of the Albanian population in Kosovo and hinting at possible US military action in the case of a spread of the conflict to Kosovo (a pledge later repeated by President Clinton). However, this warning lacked real credibility. Bush was by then a lame duck President. Moreover, it was a unilateral pledge that was not backed by the European allies, and there was little likelihood that the United States would act alone.

The Clinton administration initially came into office committed to a tougher stand towards former Yugoslavia. During the campaign Clinton had criticized Bush's policy as too weak and ineffectual.⁽⁷⁾ Once in office, however, he faced many of the same constraints that had confronted Bush, and found that there were no easy options, especially since, like Bush, he ruled out the commitment of US ground troops.

Several factors shaped the Clinton administration's initial approach to the Yugoslav crisis. The first was Clinton's domestic agenda. Clinton's top priority was domestic reform, especially the revival of the economy and health care. Foreign policy was largely regarded as a distraction from this agenda. This led the Administration to play down the Bosnian crisis, and to minimize US involvement.

Second, the military remained opposed to deepening US military involvement in Bosnia. Powell's retirement removed the most powerful and articulate opponent of intervention. However, the Powell Doctrine remained -- and remains -- alive and well in the Pentagon. Many top-ranking officers had strong doubts that air power could be decisive in Bosnia. They feared that it would inevitably lead to an incremental increase in the US commitment and that the United States would be sucked into an ever-deeper quagmire.

Third, the Administration was internally divided. Many members of the State Department, particularly Secretary of State Warren Christopher and his top aides, favoured a relatively cautious approach, emphasizing negotiation and consensus. Others, such as National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, advocated a tougher policy, backed by a limited use of force, to achieve diplomatic objectives. The lack of unity at the top resulted in policy paralysis and drift, particularly since Clinton tended to leave foreign policy largely in the hands of Christopher.

Fourth, the 'Russian factor' also influenced US policy. Clinton had made support for reform in Russia -- and for President Yeltsin -- one of his top foreign policy priorities. Yeltsin, however, faced strong opposition at home from the nationalists, who demanded a tougher policy in support of the Serbs. Many Clinton advisers feared that deeper US involvement in Bosnia could upset the fragile domestic balance in Moscow and undercut Yeltsin, damaging US-Russian relations and jeopardizing the prospects for long-term integration of a democratic Russia into the West.

A fifth factor was the Administration's strong commitment to multilateralism.⁽⁸⁾ An assertive internationalist and multilateralist agenda had been an important part of the Clinton campaign. At the heart of this multilateralist agenda was the promotion of a revitalized UN, which was seen as allowing the United States to reduce its external commitments and bring them more in harmony with the constrained economic situation at home. It was also regarded as an essential part of a broader strategy to build a new system of collective security in the post-Cold War world, which would reduce the burden on the United States for preserving international order.

The European factor in US policy

The Clinton team came into office with a significantly different view of the US-European relationship from that of their predecessors. The Bush administration had viewed the creation of a European defence identity with scepticism, if not alarm, and as a potential threat to NATO.⁽⁹⁾ The Clinton administration, on the other hand, took a much more relaxed and positive view of the European Union and European defence identity. A stronger European Union was seen as an important asset which would allow the United States to deal with many of the key challenges in the post-Cold War world.

Bosnia became the first testing ground for this new approach. From the outset President Clinton made clear that the United States would not intervene in Bosnia unilaterally but only as part of a coalition. In part, this reflected the Administration's desire to reassure the American people that the United States would not bear the sole, or even the main, military responsibility for any intervention. Unlike the Gulf war,

which had been primarily a US operation with only token allied participation, any use of force in Bosnia would be a genuine coalition effort and have the strong backing and participation of America's European allies. This US policy also reflected a desire to shift more responsibility within the Alliance to the Europeans.

This, however, significantly tied the Administration's hands and made its policy hostage to allied politics and interests. In effect, it made the European allies the ultimate arbitrators and determinants of US policy. No action could be taken without their approval. The Administration's activist rhetoric, moreover, was at odds with its desire to limit American engagement and involvement on the ground. This contradiction sharply undercut the effectiveness of the Administration's policy.

Over the last two years, the conflict in former Yugoslavia has emerged as an increasingly contentious issue within the Alliance. US-European differences with America's European allies have surfaced over six issues in particular:

The shape of the peace plan. The European allies tended to see the Vance-Owen plan, which envisaged a loose federation divided into ten largely ethnically-based cantons, as the best deal that could be reached. The Clinton administration, on the other hand, was reluctant to give the plan strong support because it legitimized Serb gains achieved through 'ethnic cleansing'. Without strong American backing, however, it was clear that the plan could not succeed. The American failure firmly to support the plan created strong resentment in the European Community, and Lord Owen, the EC negotiator, blamed the lack of US support for the plan's ultimate failure. At the same time, his increasingly outspoken criticism of the US position irritated many American policy-makers and accentuated existing differences.

Similar differences arose over the peace plan developed under EC-UN auspices after the collapse of the Vance-Owen plan in the summer of 1993. Washington was reluctant to put pressure on the Bosnian Muslims to accept the peace plan because it believed the plan awarded too much territory to the Serbs. This reluctance was seen by Washington's European allies, especially France and Britain, as encouraging the Bosnian Muslims to fight on in the hope of US help instead of accepting the peace plan. Washington, in turn, saw the Europeans as all too ready to accept 'peace at any price' in order to end the war.⁽¹⁰⁾

Lifting the arms embargo. As part of its new policy, worked out in the spring of 1993, the Clinton administration favoured lifting the arms embargo in order to allow the Muslims to defend themselves. The allies, however, opposed lifting the embargo, arguing that lifting it would only increase the level of violence without fundamentally altering the military balance. Since then pressure to lift the embargo has increased in the US Congress. The Clinton administration has been reluctant to openly espouse lifting the embargo on the grounds that such a move would undermine peace negotiations on Bosnia, erode Alliance solidarity and strain relations with Russia.

Air strikes. In the spring of 1993, the Clinton administration advocated the use of air strikes against the Serbs to halt the siege of Sarajevo. However, the American plan for 'lift and strike', proposed by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher during his trip to Europe in May 1993, was opposed by the allies, especially France and Britain, who feared that it would endanger their peacekeeping troops in Bosnia.⁽¹¹⁾

The allied rejection of the Clinton plan was a strong slap in the face to Clinton and illustrated the deep divergence in approach between the United States and its European allies over Bosnia. Yet some of the blame for the failure of the Christopher mission lay in the Administration's approach to allied consultations. Christopher went to Europe 'in a listening mode'. Instead of forcefully presenting the American preference, he sought to solicit allied views and test the water. Had Christopher been more forceful and insistent in presenting the US position, the allies might have eventually grudgingly agreed to it. Instead, Christopher returned home empty-handed. The European rejection of 'lift and strike' significantly undercut Clinton's credibility, both domestically and internationally, but it also provided a convenient excuse for inaction and allowed the President to put the blame essentially on the allies.

The dispute over 'lift and strike', however, was not just attributable to differences in 'style' or the Administration's 'inexperience' (although the latter clearly played a role). It also reflected different assessments of the risks and interests between the United States and its European allies. The British and French had peacekeeping troops on the ground in Bosnia and feared that any bombing would spark Serb reprisals against them. The United States, by contrast, had no peacekeeping troops on the ground. Indeed, it has consistently refused to introduce ground troops. It was thus far less concerned about reprisals.

In the French case, moreover, there were broader political-military considerations related to NATO's role in out-of-area operations. While France has cooperated closely with NATO regarding peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Paris objected to conducting many of these operations through the NATO integrated command structure. This, French officials feared, would have given the appearance that France was rejoining the military structure of NATO, something it had no intention of doing. Instead, France has argued that such operations should be conducted under a UN mandate and through *ad hoc* mechanisms outside the NATO command structure.⁽¹²⁾

Peacekeeping. The United States has been reluctant -- and remains reluctant -- to put ground troops into Bosnia, fearing that this will inevitably lead to a deeper US entanglement in the conflict. It has also refused to introduce peacekeeping forces *prior* to any negotiated settlement. This has been a major source of tension with the Europeans, especially the French, who have pressed the United States to 'assume their responsibilities' by providing substantial peacekeeping forces.

Sanctions. Differences also emerged in the autumn of 1993 over the question of lifting the sanctions imposed by the UN against Serbia in the spring of 1993. The initial Franco-German plan to lift the sanctions in return for a settlement of the Bosnian conflict was seen in Washington as too narrowly focused and reflecting a European desire for 'peace at any price'. Under American pressure the plan was toughened to make a settlement of the Croat-Serb conflict and an improvement of the situation in Kosovo a precondition for the lifting of the sanctions.

US diplomatic engagement. The rejection of the 'lift and strike' proposal by the Allies in May 1993 led to a shift in the US approach to the peace negotiations. In effect, the United States adopted a policy of 'benign neglect', and decided to let the negotiations in Geneva play themselves out. What had initially been branded a vital American

interest in February 1993 now came to be described as a 'human tragedy' about which the United States could do little.

Washington's policy of benign neglect, however, provoked new strains in relations with both France and Britain, who sought to get the United States to play a more active diplomatic role in the peace process.⁽¹³⁾ The French and British were particularly irked by the American refusal to put greater pressure on the Bosnian Muslims to accept the plans for partition, which they viewed as the main obstacle to a settlement. The United States, in turn, felt that the Europeans' approach smacked of appeasement.

Towards constructive re-engagement

Since the mortar attack on Sarajevo in February 1994, the United States has pursued a more active policy towards the conflict in former Yugoslavia. This has manifested itself on two levels: first, the brokering of a federation agreement between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, announced in March 1994, which was largely due to US initiative and diplomacy, and, second, an active search for a peace settlement in Bosnia within the framework of the Contact Group (France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States).

The key question is whether this new diplomatic activism represents a temporary phenomenon or a renewed commitment to sustained diplomatic engagement in Bosnia. The Clinton administration has yet to develop a coherent, long-term strategy towards the Yugoslav conflict. Instead, it has largely tended to react to events on a day-to-day basis and has only engaged itself actively in the search for a settlement when it has been pushed by the pressure of events to do so.

The Administration, moreover, remains deeply divided about how to deal with Bosnia. The Serb attacks on Gorazde have intensified the debate in the United States between those who advocate an expansion of air strikes and those, mostly in the Defense Department, who are sceptical about the ability of air power to play a decisive role in Bosnia.⁽¹⁴⁾ Serb compliance with the February ultimatum initially seemed to vindicate the 'limited application of force' school and demonstrate that when faced with a credible threat of the use of force the Serbs would back down. However, the Serb shelling of Gorazde has called this assumption into question and rekindled the debate. Many Pentagon officials doubt that the success of Sarajevo can be extended to protecting other Muslim 'safe havens'. They argue that the situation in Gorazde and other safe havens is quite different from that in Sarajevo and does not lend itself to the use of air power.⁽¹⁵⁾ Many civilian officials, on the other hand, maintain that air power can achieve limited goals and provide important diplomatic leverage. Gorazde, they argue, did not prove that air strikes are ineffective, but rather that too little air power was used.⁽¹⁶⁾

At the same time, the Administration has come under increasing Congressional pressure to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. In June, the House of Representatives voted by a large margin (244-178) to require the Administration to lift the embargo unilaterally. The move was defeated in the Senate by the narrowest of margins -- a 50-50 tie -- only after intensive lobbying by the Administration. Since then, Congressional pressure for lifting the embargo has grown.⁽¹⁷⁾ President Clinton

has been reluctant to lift the embargo unilaterally, fearing that doing so would undercut the force of other Security Council resolutions against Iraq and North Korea, precipitate a crisis with America's NATO allies (who oppose lifting the embargo), and strain relations with Russia. However, in response to growing Congressional pressure, Clinton announced in mid-August that he would set a deadline of late October to ask the United Nations to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unless the Bosnian Serbs accepted the peace plan proposed by the Contact Group.⁽¹⁸⁾ This has bought the Administration a few months' time. But if the Bosnian Serbs have not accepted the peace plan by 15 October, it is likely that the United States will introduce a resolution within the Security Council to terminate the arms embargo. If the Security Council fails to pass the measure, Clinton will probably be forced by Congress to lift the embargo unilaterally.

Implications for the future

The debate over Bosnia illustrates the way in which old-established dividing lines in US politics are becoming blurred as a result of the end of the Cold War. A new fault line is emerging in the American political spectrum between the 'old internationalists', many of whom continue to advocate an agenda based on multilateralism, democracy and collective security, and the 'new nationalists', who espouse a more restrictive use of American power and greater attention on restoring and consolidating America's military and economic strengths, first and foremost at home.⁽¹⁹⁾ To judge by its rhetoric, the Clinton administration remains committed to internationalism. In practice, however, Clinton has been forced by events and domestic pressures to trim his internationalist and multilateralist sails. In recent speeches he has increasingly stressed that the United States cannot be the world's policeman or get involved in every conflict around the world.⁽²⁰⁾ His retreat suggests, not that the United States is moving in an isolationist direction, but rather that in the future the United States will be *more selective and discriminating about the commitment of American resources, especially military power.*

This increasingly cautious approach to the use of American military power abroad has been reflected above all in the shift in the Administration's approach to peacekeeping, in which it has set strict conditions for its willingness to participate in peacekeeping and other multilateral endeavours.⁽²¹⁾ Under the new guidelines contained in Presidential Directive 25, signed in May 1994, US troops will only participate in peacekeeping operations in cases where there is a serious threat to or breach of international security. Even then, the deployment must serve 'US national interests'. The troops must also be part of a multinational force, with a deployment order that provides a clear view of what the objectives of the mission are, how long it will last and what criteria the Administration will use to decide when to bring its forces home. Except in a few limited circumstances, all US forces will be under US command -- not under the command of foreign generals or admirals. The Administration is also committed to working more closely with Congress on peacekeeping operations, notifying lawmakers before deploying US troops in the first place and keeping key House and Senate committees up to date on how the venture is going.

This more restrictive approach to international peacekeeping⁽²²⁾ could affect the Administration's willingness to commit troops to Bosnia if and when a settlement is reached there. Any US dispatch of US peacekeeping troops to Bosnia is likely to

require Congressional approval and be subject to strict conditions, including a firm exit date. Moreover, given the current mood in Congress, such approval can by no means be considered automatic.

A US refusal to send peacekeeping troops to Bosnia would have serious repercussions for transatlantic relations. Without a substantial peacekeeping commitment, the European allies alone are unlikely to provide the troops necessary to ensure a durable settlement. Moreover, the failure of the United States to provide substantial forces would be seen by many in Europe as confirmation that the United States was no longer strongly interested in Europe, and could spark a new effort by the Europeans to build a defence identity independent of NATO and/or lead to a renationalization of European defence policies. Both trends -- particularly the latter -- could precipitate a serious weakening of transatlantic security cooperation.

Yet it is not only the United States that has begun to go sour on international peacekeeping. France, too, has had second thoughts -- as its decision in May 1994 to withdraw over a third of its peacekeeping force in the Balkans underscores. Thus, in the end, the whole approach to peacekeeping may need to be rethought. In the future, a sharper distinction will need to be made between military intervention and peacekeeping. As the experience in Bosnia illustrates, once the Security Council approves military actions, UN mediators and relief workers lose the shield of neutrality and impartiality which is essential to the success of their missions, and the UN becomes engaged in military actions which it is neither politically nor militarily equipped to carry out.

The Yugoslav crisis has also made clear that the EU has a long way to go before it achieves a truly viable Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), let alone a European defence identity. The crisis has highlighted the divergent perceptions and interests not only between the United States and its European allies but within Europe itself. As the crisis unfolded, the European members of the Union each reacted according to their own specific interests and reflexes. The result was a cacophony of voices and policies, reflecting traditional national interests more than a common European policy.⁽²³⁾

To some extent, these divergences were a logical outgrowth of the end of the Cold War. But they also suggest the limitations facing the European Union in working out a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the future, let alone a common defence policy, especially if Germany remains reluctant, for historical and political reasons, to participate militarily in crisis management tasks. In short, the Yugoslav crisis suggests that the EU can play a useful role in crisis management in coordinating diplomatic efforts. However, it is likely to fail when military crisis management is required.

Indeed, if anything, the crisis has reinforced the central importance of the United States -- and NATO -- for the resolution of European security problems. At the same time, it has prompted a significant shift in the American perception of NATO's role, especially in out-of-area conflicts. These conflicts, once regarded as beyond NATO's responsibility, are now seen as legitimate NATO concerns. As the late Secretary-General of NATO Manfred Wörner stressed, the slogan 'out of area or out of business' is out of date.⁽²⁴⁾ With its progressive involvement in Bosnia, especially the air strikes in April 1994, NATO is *de facto* 'out of area'.

Crisis management is now accepted as a key NATO mission. In addition, NATO has begun to develop the mechanisms to carry out this new role. The concept of creating Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), announced at the January 1994 NATO summit, is designed to give NATO the capability to deal better with the new Yugoslav-type threats that NATO may face in the future. In addition, it allows WEU to act alone, drawing on NATO assets, in crises where the United States does not want to participate. This, in turn, reflects the Clinton administration's more flexible attitude towards the European Union and the creation of a European defence identity.

NATO, however, is likely to remain the prime forum for the discussion and implementation of crisis management tasks. WEU lacks the military capabilities to carry out major crisis management operations on its own and is dependent on NATO - especially US -- assets such as strategic lift and intelligence. Thus its role is likely to be that of a 'gap filler' when the United States does not wish to take part directly in military operations rather than a substitute for or rival to NATO.

In the final analysis, however, much will depend on how the CJTF function in practice. Many questions remain as yet unanswered. Who will provide the forces? And how many? What will be the division of labour, etc.? As the Yugoslav crisis has shown, ultimately the problem of crisis management is not a question of military mechanisms but of *political will*. All the mechanisms in the world will not help if the determination to use them is lacking. This has been the basic problem in Yugoslavia from the outset.

Finally, the Yugoslav conflict is likely to have an important impact on bilateral relations with key European allies. Britain's strong reluctance to support the use of force in Bosnia has further weakened the 'special relationship', which has progressively eroded since Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was ousted. Once the ally who could be counted on most to support US policy staunchly, Britain has become a reluctant and uncertain ally in crisis management situations that require the use of force outside the traditional NATO area. If this trend continues, the 'special relationship' is likely to erode still further and Britain may find itself increasingly marginalized.

At the same time, Germany is an uncertain partner in crisis management situations. German inhibitions on the use of combat troops in conflicts beyond Germany's borders have seriously impaired Bonn's ability to play an effective role in Yugoslavia, undermined its credibility with the Western allies, and been a source of irritation for the United States. A failure by Bonn to overcome its current internal inhibitions about the use of force and to contribute to NATO's new conflict management tasks could not only weaken the ability of WEU and NATO to perform these tasks, but damage bilateral relations with the United States as well.

Ironically, the Yugoslav conflict could contribute to a *rapprochement* between the United States and France. Indeed, there has been a visible shift in relations over the last couple of years. Both countries are coming to recognize that they need each other more. With the erosion of the British-American special relationship, and Germany's unwillingness or inability to contribute militarily to Alliance crisis management, the

French role has become more important. Moreover, France is the only allied country besides Britain that has real power projection capabilities.

At the same time, France has slowly come to see that these new crisis management tasks cannot be carried out effectively -- at least in the near term -- without the United States. The issue today, as France has increasingly come to realize, is not whether the United States will dominate Europe, as it once feared, but whether the United States will stay in Europe and make a positive contribution to the resolution of Europe's new security problems. Hence, rather than trying to reduce the US role, France has tried lately to ensure that the United States stays involved in Europe.

This is not to suggest that France will return to the military wing of NATO. This is highly unlikely. But the end of the Cold War is forcing a reassessment of many basic tenets of the Gaullist legacy and opening up new prospects for security cooperation between the United States and France.⁽²⁵⁾ Moreover, the Clinton administration's more forthcoming attitude towards European integration and the development of a European defense identity should make this cooperation easier.

At the same time, important differences exist between Washington and Paris. France, along with Britain and other NATO allies, opposes lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia except as a last resort. Thus, if Washington seeks to lift the embargo unilaterally, this could lead to new strains with Paris as well as other European members of NATO.

France and some other European states (especially Spain) also have reservations about the creation of a Muslim state in the Balkans at a time when they are faced with increasing problems posed by the influx of Muslims from North Africa. Washington, on the other hand, views the creation of a Muslim state in the Balkans largely with indifference and is concerned about the impact of the Bosnian conflict on its wider relations with the Muslim world. So far these differences have not surfaced openly, but they could become a greater source of friction in the future and possibly affect bilateral cooperation.

Indeed, the issue of the 'southern arc' -- particularly how to deal with the spread of Islamic fundamentalism -- is likely to become an increasingly important issue within the Alliance in the future, especially if the crisis in Algeria intensifies and spreads. A failure by the United States and its allies (especially Germany) to take French concerns seriously could provoke new fissures in the Alliance and make France less willing to support the US effort to restructure the Alliance and participate constructively in crisis management tasks in Eastern Europe.

At the same time, the United States and its European allies need to be careful not to precipitate exactly the situation that France and many other European governments wish to avoid. An unjust peace settlement, imposed on the Bosnian Muslims against their will, could reinforce a Muslim national identity that until now has been only weakly felt, and create a 'second Palestine' in the Balkans. Most Bosnian Muslims currently look to Europe and reject Islamic fundamentalism, but if they come to feel abandoned by Europe they could be forced to rely more heavily on radical Islamic states, such as Iran, for support.⁽²⁶⁾

Differences between the United States and its European allies could also emerge over several other issues. One is Kosovo. Both President Bush and President Clinton warned that the United States would not tolerate an intensification of Serb repression in Kosovo. Unrest in Kosovo could spark a crackdown by the Serbs and force the United States to make good on its pledge -- or further lose credibility. However, the United States pledge was a *unilateral* pledge and it is by no means clear that the allies would join in any use of force against Serbia. Indeed, a sharp crackdown by Serbia in Kosovo could precipitate a divisive debate within the alliance on how to respond.

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) could also become a divisive issue within the Alliance. The United States has nearly 500 peacekeeping troops in FYROM. If the Bosnian conflict were to spill over into FYROM -- either directly or as a result of unrest in Kosovo -- US interests would be directly affected and the United States might press for NATO air strikes or allied reinforcements on the ground. Many NATO allies, however, might not be willing to support military involvement in FYROM.

In sum, the Yugoslav crisis raises profound questions about the Alliance's capacity to deal with the new security threats in post-Cold War Europe. The January 1994 summit was an important step forward, but many of the core issues remain unresolved. The proposals for 'Partnership for Peace' and 'Combined Joint Task Forces' represent a minimalist consensus rather than a broad shared strategic vision on the new strategic challenges in Europe and how to address them. Until such a broad shared consensus is achieved, European security is likely to remain fragile.

THE IMPACT ON RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND WESTERN EUROPE

Pavel Baev⁽²⁷⁾

The conflicts and wars in former Yugoslavia have been and are still seen as an issue of second priority for Russian foreign policy. In principle, a detached pragmatic approach could easily justify Russia according even less relevance to the Yugoslav crisis in its foreign policy agenda: the direct economic consequences for Russia are negligible, refugees are not flooding into the country and any spread of the fighting would hardly reach as far as its borders. In fact, however, the Balkans matter much more than such an approach would indicate. While the strength of traditional pro-Serbian and neo-Orthodox sympathies in Russia is often overestimated, their real impact is growing.⁽²⁸⁾ Though perceptions of the Yugoslav crisis are often overshadowed by those of the conflicts in the former USSR, they can well influence political behaviour, because the Balkans are psychologically intertwined with the political struggle in Russia.

While increasingly turning Russia into an inward-looking country, the self-defeating domestic struggle is at the same time strongly influencing the development of its foreign policy in two areas: cooperation with the West and protection of Russian security interests. The Balkans form an essential element in both areas, and act as a catalyst for moving towards a policy that is less cooperative and more self-assertive.

The evolution of Russia's Balkan policy

Russia inherited from the Soviet Union a policy aimed at preserving the Yugoslav Federation, even if the latter was already non-existent when Russia became the leading successor state of the USSR in December 1991. Russian decision-makers had few doubts about recognizing the break-up of another post-communist conglomerate (suspicions regarding Germany's role were to come later). The cessation of fighting in Krajina in January 1992 was nevertheless taken as evidence of stabilization, which was considered to be not only a prerequisite, but also an acceptable substitute for a permanent solution.

Moderate efforts were undertaken to secure for Russia a say in the post-conflict settlement, including the deployment of one battalion (900 troops) as a part of UNPROFOR-1. The escalation of fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina made Russia reluctant to increase its role beyond half-heartedly providing its good offices, thus leaving the initiative and the responsibility for management of the conflict to the EC and the UN. In the internal political debate, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev fiercely advocated taking a firm stand against the Serbian regime, arguing that the binding resolutions passed by the UN Security Council expressed the will of the 'four great democratic powers'.⁽²⁹⁾ This pro-Western line attracted increasing criticism, not only from die-hard communists and recent converts to nationalism, but also from such moderate reformists as Yevgeni Ambartsumov and Vladimir Lukin.⁽³⁰⁾

An indication of gradual departure from a policy of following strictly the EC/EPC policy towards former Yugoslavia was President Yeltsin's statement in January 1993 that 'we are now moving away from the Western emphasis.'⁽³¹⁾ This departure was accompanied by three Russian demands: the lifting of economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro,⁽³²⁾ the prevention of any relaxation of the arms embargo on Bosnia and the introduction of economic sanctions against Croatia (after fighting resumed in Krajina in January 1993). This agenda was incorporated in Russia's 'eight-point proposal' of February 1993, which actually complemented the Vance-Owen plan.

Yeltsin's victory in the April 1993 referendum made possible a return to a policy of close cooperation with Western Europe, including support for harsher economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. However, the tougher stance *vis-à-vis* Serbia proved short-lived.⁽³³⁾ Historical sympathy towards Serbs, 'pan-Slavic' and religious feelings were of very little relevance in the trend towards a pro-Serbian policy. It was more the desire to preserve some influence in the Balkans and secure a prominent position in the new European 'security' architecture which mattered. In other words, it was not ethnic nationalism but rather state nationalism which prompted Russia to side with the Serbs.

Another factor was the involvement of NATO in measures to manage the Yugoslav crisis. Many Russian politicians began to show symptoms of renewed animosity, and this evolution of mindsets was later described by Vladimir Lukin: 'A wave of infantile pro-Americanism brought about its opposite - infantile anti-Americanism.'⁽³⁴⁾ What provoked this reaction was not so much the West's actual involvement (such as enforcement of the naval blockade and no-fly zone), as intensive speculation on Western military intervention, a possibility which was taken much more seriously by the Russian military than by many Western experts.⁽³⁵⁾ The Foreign Ministry recognized the necessity to distance itself from NATO's contingency planning and at the same time Kozyrev tried to preserve the pattern of cooperation by avoiding blocking the Western partners' efforts with an ill-boding Russian *nyet*. He went as far as to propose a joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operation, but this was rebuffed by the Russian General Staff.⁽³⁶⁾

The parliamentary elections in December 1993 effectively lessened this ambiguity. They contributed to the emergence of a consensus of sorts covering several foreign policy issues, including - as far as the Balkans were concerned - the point that NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs were unacceptable. This consensus involved not only the mainstream groupings among the political élite, but a broad spectrum from Gorbachev to Zhirinovskiy, although each of them arrived, from different angles, at the conclusion that the bombing of Serbian forces was unacceptable.⁽³⁷⁾ The Foreign Ministry eagerly embraced this conclusion, even though it was still a certain distance from taking a clear-cut pro-Serbian line.⁽³⁸⁾ Subsequently, Russia's diplomatic Balkan offensive in February 1994 had fairly strong support from both public opinion and the political élite.

Obviously, it was the NATO ultimatum on Sarajevo that gave Russia the opportunity to step in and resume its role as one of the major actors in the Balkans. Russian officials (for understandable reasons) bluntly denied this, insisting that NATO had 'started to use a language which we cannot accept.'⁽³⁹⁾ For many in the West it may

still be an open question: how could it happen that Russia was able to seize the opportunity so incredibly effectively when there was nothing in the records of Russian diplomacy to imply such efficiency? Part of the answer lies in the domestic consensus mentioned earlier, which allowed some resources to be mobilized: Kozyrev could rush from Prague to Cairo to Beijing launching all sorts of initiatives, albeit without any far-reaching results. Another partial answer lies in the perfect delivery of the initiative by Russian special envoy Vitaly Churkin, who did some hard bargaining with the Serbs with a casual elegance `far removed from the cameo image of a plodding and suspicious Soviet diplomat.⁽⁴⁰⁾ A further explanation is the readiness of Russian military leaders to send additional troops to Bosnia - and indeed it was a unique situation in which the arrival of a few hundred Russian peacekeepers could make such a huge difference.⁽⁴¹⁾

But it was premature of Moscow to bask in a political triumph that was expected to re-establish Russia's great power status in world affairs despite its critical economic situation, political muddle and military decline. The escalation of fighting around Gorazde revealed the deficit of resources and political will behind Russia's initiative. Whatever the rationale was for air strikes against Serbian positions, these certainly undermined the narrow basis of Russian mediation. While within Russia the Foreign Ministry took more than a fair share of criticism for feebleness, it also found the conceptual basis of its Balkan policy shattered. Russia was only able to persuade the Serbs to make some concessions which helped them to prevent further `punishment' and save face. So Churkin's new attempt at shuttle diplomacy was less successful than the previous one in the case of Sarajevo, leaving him on the whole utterly disappointed.

Perceptions of EC and NATO performance

Initially, Russia had no objections to letting the EC assume the main responsibility for managing the Balkan conflicts and upgrading its own role in Bosnia from mediation to arbitration during spring 1992. Moscow was well aware that the EC was still primarily concerned with its internal cohesion as it attempted to prepare a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) so crucial to the delicate Maastricht process.⁽⁴²⁾ With this in mind, the Russian Foreign Ministry cautiously refrained from any comments on the EC's role, which was perceived as unfortunately having triggered the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis. As one astute observer pointed out, `few moves by the international community in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis have produced such tragic consequences as the hasty recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁽⁴³⁾

Gradually, it became harder and harder to ignore the criticism which focused on the link between increased intrusiveness and partiality of EC mediation. Following Foreign Minister Kozyrev's visit to all successor states to former Yugoslavia in May 1992, Russia began to argue that its evaluation of the situation was more competent and its positions more balanced than those of EC. Echoing Ambartsumov's view that `Serbia alone should not be held responsible', Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that it was `impossible to determine who is right and who is wrong.⁽⁴⁴⁾ This standpoint took into account Russia's own experience in conflict management in its increasingly violent `near abroad', which had provided plentiful evidence that ethnic conflicts could rapidly turn very nasty. At the same time, many Russian intellectuals began to suspect that the West had abused the role of `honest broker' in order to

pursue its traditional Balkan agenda. These feelings arose primarily as a reaction to reports on the Bosnian conflict in Western mass media, which were perceived as simplistic and often one-sided.

Consequently, Russia supported enlargement of the negotiation framework at the London Conference in August 1992, which was intended to 'relieve' the EC of the burden of sole responsibility. Moscow proposed dividing up the mediation work, concentrating EC efforts on the Croats and Muslims and making Russia responsible for the Serbs. This manoeuvre took into account a certain parallelism of interests in avoiding intrusive interventions which allowed the EC countries to justify their passivity by reference to Russia's objections and gave Kozyrev face-saving opportunities to refer to 'covert veto' blocking Western 'interventionism'. It was in early May 1993 that Russia played the most elegant round in this game, siding with France and the UK against the United States - hence the US retreat from military options, perhaps with sincere relief. But this success also marked a failure. Russia was not quick enough to realise that its interest in the slow development of the CFSP and its non-expansion into the military sphere also had a negative aspect: the weakness of the CFSP resulted in NATO assuming a more active role in the Bosnian conflict management, which inevitably challenged all *realpolitik* considerations in Moscow.

As seen by many politicians and decision-makers in Moscow, the Alliance's involvement in the Balkans was directly linked to plans for its enlargement. Yeltsin's unexpected and inexplicably benevolent attitude to the idea of NATO's formal expansion (which was spelled out in Warsaw in August 1993), together with certain misjudgments pronounced too loudly in expert circles in the West, therefore led to a serious crisis in the fledgling cooperation between NATO and Russia.⁽⁴⁵⁾ The opposition within Russia to NATO's eastward enlargement became an important element of the foreign policy consensus in Russia mentioned earlier.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Against that background, the Partnership for Peace proposal was perhaps the best possible compromise for easing tension between Russia and its Western partners, but as far as the Balkans were concerned it did not alter the perception that NATO was seeking to push Russia out of the region.

Behind this perception yet another may be discerned, one that is much more firmly based if only because it has existed for many years: that NATO is more than the combination of its member states. The Alliance's political and operational structures are still seen as having an existence of their own. The point that 'no similar mechanism exists or is really imaginable for bringing NATO members to an agreement as to whether a war such as Bosnia's merited common action',⁽⁴⁷⁾ fed old threat perceptions in Russia. It was evident at least that the Alliance's well-tried internal consultation procedures left Moscow with few opportunities to exploit the discord in the West. Moreover, many politicians in Moscow arrived at the conclusion that the United States, France and the UK were obviously outmanuvring Russia in the UN, leaving it no chance to use its veto in the Security Council. As the option of air strikes came to the fore in early 1994, Moscow unfortunately started to insist on two mutually incompatible points: that it should be consulted and that the air strikes were unacceptable as such. The legal basis for both claims looked rather shaky, and the ultimatum of 10 February left little doubt that NATO intended to act, albeit in line with UNSC Resolution 836, disregarding Moscow's second thoughts.⁽⁴⁸⁾

Celebrating its diplomatic victory in Sarajevo later that month, Moscow was quick to point out that NATO was actually applying pressure without a policy, and recalled some of the arguments from the deadlocked debates in the West on military intervention.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Vitaly Churkin went public several times, declaring that Russia had saved NATO's prestige and warning that air strikes would have 'cast a very dark shadow over our relationship.'⁽⁵⁰⁾ The Alliance, he suggested, should draw serious lessons from this episode. However, the air strikes then carried out against Serbian positions around Gorazde in April 1994 provided the evidence that the Western partners declined to take advice from Moscow.

Bitter reactions across the spectrum of Russia's political élite went beyond anger at not having been consulted. For Zhirinovsky and other extremists it was the perfect excuse for a hysterical attack on Foreign Minister Kozyrev; for many moderate politicians it was a testimony to obstructiveness by the West in general and NATO in particular.⁽⁵¹⁾ It seemed that NATO's action, following the failure of the leading powers to agree on a consistent policy, had undermined Russia's position. What in fact was achieved was the final evidence of failure of burden-sharing by Russia and the West in the Balkans. Nevertheless, angry, disappointed Russian policy-makers were able to deny that they had not had the stomach to bear their share of the burden - and to justify low-profile participation in the new 'contact group' (composed of Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States) created in London in late April 1994.

The escalation of NATO's intervention in April 1994 seemed to be a logical consequence of the criticism by many Western experts that the resolution of the February crisis had only consolidated Russia's sphere of influence in the Balkans and prevented the Alliance from proving its relevance.⁽⁵²⁾ Another indication of doubts concerning further cooperation with Russia was the cool reaction to President Yeltsin's proposal for a special summit on Bosnia. Later in April this idea received a more favourable Western response, but by that time it looked more like an attempt to limit the damage done to relations with Russia.

Fairly low expectations on Western readiness to engage in real cooperation regarding the Balkans, and an obvious deficit of political resolve and military ability partially explain Russia's low profile in the new 'contact group'. Another important factor which will set certain limits on the development of a joint Russian-Western policy in former Yugoslavia is Russia's role in conflict management in the former USSR.

Implications for conflict management in the CIS

The continuing development of Russia's peace-making policy in certain areas of the FSU is a source of major concern in the West, and there are good reasons to assume that the Balkan experience is a factor in this process. In retrospect, the year 1992 saw the development of an amazing gap between Russia's foreign policy and military operations in the 'near abroad'. While in the field of foreign policy attempts were made to introduce the norms of international relations, force was used as the main instrument of conflict management. As a result of military initiatives, policy-makers in Moscow found themselves involved in at least three large-scale peace-making enterprises (in Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia) that all followed one pattern: Russian troops supported secession, while a cessation of violence was

achieved through ethnic cleansing.⁽⁵³⁾ Consequently, in late 1992 the Russian General Staff was faced with a deficit of élite forces suitable for rapid deployment - hence its opposition to proposals to increase Russia's contribution to UNPROFOR.⁽⁵⁴⁾

In early 1993 President Yeltsin, obsessed with the struggle with the Parliament, decided against any attempts to restore effective political control over the Army, preferring to introduce a concept legitimizing the peace-making pattern. An 'export version' of such a concept was elaborated in September 1993 in Foreign Minister Kozyrev's speech to the UN General Assembly. The core idea concerned Russia's 'special rights and responsibilities' for conflict management in the geopolitical area of the former USSR.⁽⁵⁵⁾ The UN and CSCE were expected to provide formal legitimacy and financial support to forthcoming interventions.

It was the Balkan experience which was seen as allowing Russia to claim legitimacy for its own interventions because of two key arguments: first, no one else intended or was able to shoulder the burden; second, Russia was not violating any international norms. Its support for secessions makes the second argument vulnerable, but Russia could indeed point to the precedents created by UN peacekeeping operations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Several concerned neighbours of Russia found this logic less than totally convincing and obstructed Kozyrev's manuvres at the CSCE meeting in Rome in December 1993. However, this did not stop Moscow from pretending that enough had been done to justify its chosen course. Russia's frustration with the failure of international organizations to provide legitimation and financial support to its peace-making efforts in principle was bluntly expressed in the joint statement from the Russian Foreign and Defence Ministries issued after the visit of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in April 1994.⁽⁵⁶⁾ Paradoxically, the increase of self-assertive rhetoric goes hand in hand with a sharp decline of Russia's military capabilities, so that neo-imperialism remains an ambition rather than an effective policy. The Balkans are one of the few places where it is possible to add some substance to Russia's declared policies as a big power. It is for this reason that Russia has not even tried to strike a bargain with NATO in which it would have the freedom to act in the 'near abroad' and in exchange NATO would have *carte blanche* in Bosnia-Herzegovina (which would then by definition become part of NATO's 'near abroad'). Some experts, speculating on circumstantial evidences and overlooking the real *limits* of Russia's peace-making activities in the southern part of the former Soviet Union, assume that Moscow is interested in a continuation of the Balkan wars so as to keep NATO attention away from Russia's peace-making enterprises.⁽⁵⁷⁾ This interpretation is hardly any more realistic than the suspicion of some Russian traditionalists that there is a parallel between the cataclysms in former Yugoslavia and those in the former Soviet Union, Bosnia being a sort of 'testing ground' for future NATO intervention in Russia's near abroad.⁽⁵⁸⁾

Another element in the comparison between former Yugoslavia and the former USSR is nationalism. The strongest public justification for the new Russian interventionism is protection of ethnic Russians in the 'near abroad'; Zhirinovskiy and his like are trying to extend this argument so as to cover the Serbs. Their logic postulates that the 'enemy' is taking offence: Germany is backing its historical clients the Croats; America, for geopolitical reasons, supports the Bosnian Muslims; and the Croats and Bosnian Muslims are now uniting in an anti-Serbian federation.⁽⁵⁹⁾ Such logic has the disadvantage of leading directly to a confrontation with the Islamic world. Seeking to

avoid this, Russia is concentrating its efforts on improving relations with Turkey, and the recent agreement on military cooperation indicates the seriousness of its intent. Consideration is also being given to possible complications over the Islamic factor within Russia itself. Foreign Minister Kozyrev has been at pains to explain that the Bosnian Muslims are also Slavs, that Muslims serve in the ranks of 'Russbat' in UNPROFOR, etc.

In general, the ineffective and therefore open-ended Western involvement in the Balkans has increased Russia's inclination to go its own way with conflict management in the 'near abroad'. This happened despite the fact that the gap between Moscow's aspirations and its declining military capabilities is widening.

Perspectives of Russia's policy towards Western Europe

During 1992 and 1993, Russia received ambiguous signals from the West as to cooperation in the Balkans: on the one hand President Yeltsin's weak position at home was taken into account by Western leaders, whereas on the other it was used by the West as a pretext for being unable to do more; similarly, when Moscow was invited to become more actively involved in the management of the Yugoslav crisis, its proposals met with a lukewarm reception. Mixed reactions also followed Russia's breakthrough initiative (the deployment of forces to Bosnia) in February 1994: while British Prime Minister John Major rushed to Moscow to confirm Western endorsement, the United States launched a 'compensating' initiative on Croat-Muslim *rapprochement*, and NATO air strikes undermined Russia's expectations of obtaining for itself a prominent place in the Balkans.

When NATO finally crossed the watershed between threats and strikes, it came as a complete surprise to Russian policy-makers and indeed caused an unprecedented strain in the newly-born partnership with the West.⁽⁶⁰⁾ On sober reflection, Moscow had already concluded that it was not interested in confronting NATO -- least of all on Bosnia -- and reluctantly supported the Gorazde ultimatum issued in Brussels on 22 April 1994. But apart from that, very serious damage has already been inflicted on the Partnership for Peace programme, which had been the subject of intensive debate.⁽⁶¹⁾ The favourable opinion in the Russian government on PFP had seemed much more solid than the opposing voices in the Parliament -- but when NATO actually used force in Bosnia-Herzegovina it was seen as providing very strong evidence that the Alliance could in future use the Partnership for Peace programme for marginalising Russia and penetrating its 'sphere of influence'.⁽⁶²⁾ When Defence Minister Pavel Grachev openly subscribed to this argument it became clear that the relations between Russia and the Atlantic Alliance had entered a very difficult phase.⁽⁶³⁾ And when he finally visited Brussels in late May, it was against the background of events in Gorazde that he demanded a 'special relationship' in order to give Russia an implicit veto on NATO actions.

As far as the European Union is concerned, it is possible to trace the first indication of disappointment in the bilateral relationship back to President Yeltsin's visit to Brussels in December 1993, which failed to meet Russian expectations despite being labelled 'historical'. The main source of this disappointment was certainly related to economic problems: the EU was as reluctant to open its market to the few Russian products that are competitive as it was (and still is) unenthusiastic to invest in Russia's

disorganized economy. Indeed, Moscow found it much more effective to negotiate the servicing of its debt with Germany and deal directly with France on the uranium trade, while cherishing an ambition to join the G-7.

While Russia's attitude towards the CFSP was always ambiguous or, rather supportive only to the extent that it could contribute to a weakening of NATO, the Balkan wars permit a conclusion to be drawn on the EU's ability to implement any coherent and meaningful security policy.⁽⁶⁴⁾ The logic followed by one keen and inventive French analyst in arguing that 'the Yugoslav experience has not led to the abandonment of the objective of a common European policy: it has had the opposite effect',⁽⁶⁵⁾ remains foreign to Russian experts who are eager to call the CFSP's failure by its name.

Nowadays many of those involved in European policy-making in Moscow would subscribe to the argument that the failure of the CFSP is actually beneficial to Russia's interests. US withdrawal from Europe is perceived as the basic trend and the erosion of NATO may be an inevitable consequence. In these circumstances, Russia certainly is not interested in seeing a gradual delegation of NATO's functions and responsibilities to WEU. While it seems quite feasible both to establish some special relationship with NATO and prevent its eastward enlargement, in the case of WEU the former looks questionable and the latter perhaps impossible in view of the associate partnership status for Central Europeans already introduced.⁽⁶⁶⁾ The option preferred by Moscow is a flexible combination of several loose security structures under the overall umbrella of the CSCE.

This perspective perhaps explains Russia's attitude towards the Pact on Stability in Europe, which was first seen as a dangerous attempt to isolate Russia. When it was modified so that Russia could be a party to it, this attitude changed to indifference,⁽⁶⁷⁾ on account of both the lukewarm support for the 'Balladur project' in the UK and several other EU member states, and less than enthusiastic feelings in the Central European states.⁽⁶⁸⁾ With this in mind, Russia reluctantly agreed that it would take part in the preparation of the Pact. However, if the Pact led to a new relationship of substance between Western and Central Europe, a reassessment might perhaps be made in Moscow, in which the Pact may again be seen as an instrument for building European security around the European Union and thus marginalising Russia.

Neither EU membership in the foreseeable future nor an equal partnership is considered feasible, and a peripheral position is hardly acceptable to Russia. Even now it is clear that the Russian leadership has placed the emphasis on bilateral relations with key actors like the United States, France, Germany and the UK (as mentioned in Yeltsin's proposal for a summit) and put a lower priority on relations with the EU. Certainly, a particular type of cooperation with the EU, notably in the economic field, still looks attractive to Russia, but since the Union is so preoccupied with enlargement, which is clearly defining the final frontier of the 'real' Europe, Moscow is retreating to its second option. That implies a strategic choice: the traditional European great-power game, which is presumed in Russia to involve less risks than dealing primarily with the EU and its integration policies, which appear discriminatory and divisive.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN WESTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

Monika Wohlfeld⁽⁶⁹⁾

When the system of the *Pax Sovietica* disintegrated and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation collapsed in 1991, the countries of Central Europe (defined by the Western European Union to include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) entered a security limbo from which they are yet to emerge. The Yugoslav crisis is for Central Europe therefore both an issue of direct strategic concern (at least for the neighbours of former Yugoslavia) and a test case of Western resolve and/or ability to deal with the region's actual or potential problems. The Central European debate on Western involvement in former Yugoslavia has been part of a wider discussion about the future of the region's security in the post-Cold War era. Consequently, the Yugoslav crisis must be assumed to have implications for relations between Central and Western Europe.

It has been suggested that the experience of Western involvement in the Balkans has taught Central Europeans that 'there is no NATO, no Europe, and no reliance on American help.'⁽⁷⁰⁾ Indeed, the Balkan crisis has been an undeniably sobering experience for Central Europeans. The issues at stake, however, are more complicated, and the implications not as clear-cut as this statement suggests. The fact that all Central European countries, rightly or wrongly, emphasise that the Yugoslav case has limited applicability to their own situations provides an indication of the problems involved when trying to draw parallels.

Nevertheless, there are discernible changes in Central European behaviour and policies, caused by the Yugoslav crisis. This paper first describes Central European Balkan policies as reactions to Western initiatives in former Yugoslavia. Second, it delineates the consequences of foreign policy lessons learned by Central Europe in the course of the Balkan crisis. Finally, it considers the implications of these lessons for future relations between Central and Western Europe.

Central European policies towards former Yugoslavia

In the case of the Yugoslav crisis, Central European countries themselves have rarely adopted a proactive approach. Their policies have generally been reflections of measures introduced by international organisations. The UN, NATO, WEU and the EU found themselves gradually drawn into the conflict and their policies have correspondingly moved from 'the lowest common denominator' measures to increasingly controversial initiatives. Mediation of solutions to the crisis and peacekeeping have been the international community's two responses which have been accepted by Central Europeans relatively undisputed. Interventionist military measures, on the other hand, have caused political controversy in Central Europe, with some of the countries in the region considering them as inflammatory, and others regarding them as pacifying.

Central Europeans have argued that, initially, Western governments were preoccupied with other items on their crowded policy agenda and failed to recognise the implications of the Yugoslav crisis. Once Western mediation began, Central Europeans saw its efforts as hampered by the EU's failure to give firm backing and display unity on basic principles, and they interpreted this as a return to old rivalries in Western Europe. Their dismay with the lack of a unified West European position on the Yugoslav crisis was further intensified during what was perceived as a German-EC wrangle over the recognition of former Yugoslav republics.

This, however, does not imply that Central European countries have in any way been in accord with each other on this issue. Although all Central European governments followed West European decisions on recognition,⁽⁷¹⁾ the matter divided them along a spectrum of views ranging from the position that the Yugoslav conflict was a domestic one, solutions to which could only be found by means of mediation and diplomacy, to an 'interventionist' approach. Where they found themselves on this spectrum depended -- at least to some degree -- on both their physical distance from the conflict and the nature of their own security problems. Closer cooperation between Western governments later in the crisis was welcomed by Central Europeans. However, incidents such as Greece's refusal to recognise the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and its embargo on this republic again damaged the EU's image considerably.

Particularly in the early stages of the Balkan conflict, lack of American involvement was seen by Central Europeans as an explanation for the West Europeans' slow response. Consequently, the increasing political engagement of the United States was greeted by them with relief. The US-brokered agreements between Muslims and Croats of 1 and 18 March 1994 (the so-called Washington Agreements) were hailed by all Central European states and, with cautious optimism, considered to be a viable model for solving the Balkan crisis.⁽⁷²⁾

The UN decision to deploy peacekeeping forces in Croatia, and later in Bosnia, was applauded by Central European governments. Where their own participation was concerned, Central European countries neighbouring former Yugoslavia stated repeatedly that they could not become involved directly in the management of the crisis.⁽⁷³⁾ The Baltic republics did not at the time have the capability to send peacekeeping units, but since the end of 1993 they have been jointly training a so-called 'Baltic battalion' which is to be made available for peacekeeping. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have units in the Balkans and, responding to a call by the UN Secretary-General, have now committed themselves to increasing their presence in former Yugoslavia. For these countries, participation in peacekeeping activities in former Yugoslavia has been a means of demonstrating to the international community their willingness to contribute, as well as a way of pursuing integration with other countries' forces,⁽⁷⁴⁾ rather than highly effective way of dealing with crisis situations.⁽⁷⁵⁾

Most Central European countries have since an early stage in the crisis maintained that no solution to the conflict could be found without the participation of Russia. However, the Russian Sarajevo initiative of February 1994 was received cautiously due to concerns that Russia was aiming at re-establishing its influence in this part of the world. Many Central Europeans, particularly the Baltic republics, see in the

presence of Russian peacekeepers in the Balkans a complicating factor. They are concerned that while the United States is in the process of reducing its presence in Europe, and Western Europe is forgetting notions of justice, Russia is beginning to see itself as the arbiter in the region. For most Central European countries, Russian involvement is acceptable only in conjunction with a strong US role.

The UN decision in September 1991 to impose an arms embargo on former Yugoslavia was received with mixed emotions in Central Europe.⁽⁷⁶⁾ However, following the decision, all the Central European countries, especially former Yugoslavia's neighbours, spoke out in favour of retaining it, as they feared a spread of the conflict. The problem is that support for the arms embargo is likely to erode as the prospects for a viable solution to the conflict recede.

The Central European countries initially also decided to support the international community's resolution to impose sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro. The degree of backing varied according to the extent to which these measures could hurt their own country's economy. Countries suffering substantial economic damage as a result of sanctions⁽⁷⁷⁾ requested, unsuccessfully, indirect compensation by the international community and all of Serbia's neighbours now want a reassessment of the sanctions policy in the light of the stalled peace process.⁽⁷⁸⁾

A much more controversial issue has been military intervention, even the threat of air strikes in the form of an ultimatum. Here again, the countries in question have not had a common position. Romania has regretted any use of force. Bulgaria's politicians have by and large considered the cooperation between Russia and NATO in the case of Sarajevo as an example of how to avert potential conflicts in Europe,⁽⁷⁹⁾ but simultaneously some have expressed concern that the threat of air strikes may cause chain reactions and further instability.⁽⁸⁰⁾ The Czech government has been split on the question of intervention, with Premier Vaclav Klaus opposed to external interference, and President Vaclav Havel calling for decisive action. The Czech Foreign Ministry, as well as the governments of the Baltic republics, Slovakia and Poland were quick to express support for NATO air strikes, considering the decision to be a somewhat belated confirmation of the credibility of UN attempts to settle the situation in former Yugoslavia peacefully.

The most interesting case has been Hungary, which, having previously allowed NATO's AWACS aircraft to operate in its air space, withdrew this permission temporarily because of the Sarajevo ultimatum. Jeszenszky saw the threat of air strikes in Gorazde as furthering peace, but emphasised that Hungary's indirect involvement in controlling the no-fly zone in Bosnia had to be kept separate from NATO actions in Sarajevo and Gorazde.⁽⁸¹⁾ Despite its wish to please NATO, Hungary is reluctant to support a policy of bombing military positions of the Bosnian Serbs. It considers such action as potentially leading to an influx of refugees⁽⁸²⁾ and causing a threat to Hungarian minorities in Vojvodina. The Hungarian government has, informally and unsuccessfully, requested security guarantees and help with minority issues from WEU and the EC/EU, organisations with which it cooperated closely in the Balkans, as well as from NATO. After the January 1994 NATO summit, Hungary decided that the presence of AWACS aircraft in its airspace had no 'double meaning', but that its interests would be better served if it distanced itself from the NATO ultimatum.⁽⁸³⁾ That decision was made despite WEU's implicit

security guarantees given earlier in connection with the organisation of tighter embargo controls on the Danube.⁽⁸⁴⁾

Thus, initially, as it still seemed possible that a quick solution to the Yugoslav crisis could be found by the international community, most Central European states were inclined to follow Western measures almost unconditionally. Two factors explain this phenomenon. First, desperate to be accepted as part of the Western security community, Central Europeans have pursued an apparently common strategy towards the crisis that is based more on their resolve to follow decisions made by international bodies than on sound notions of national interests. Second, Central European countries have felt that they have not yet found their place within the international system, so that they could not afford to develop their own policies in relation to the conflict. As the West was gradually drawn into the conflict, and began to pursue more interventionist policies, Central European support for specific policies adopted by the international community began to vary considerably from country to country, and from measure to measure as a reflection of domestic concerns. It is obvious that the countries considered collectively as Central Europe, although united by their post-communist legacies, have different geostrategic concerns, interests, and historical sensitivities. Thus, the process of defining national interests in the region will invariably result in divergent policy positions.

Implications for Central European approaches

to European and Atlantic institutions

Did the Yugoslav crisis lead Central Europeans to believe that 'there is no NATO, and no Europe'? Although adjustments in their approaches to Western institutions are noticeable, one could hardly describe them as a sea-change in attitudes. In Central Europeans' eyes, the various organisations' reputations suffered different degrees of bruising in former Yugoslavia.

The precedent of UN involvement in Europe, combined with the lack of formal security guarantees in Central Europe, means that it is first of all the UN which is responsible for military crisis management in the Central European region. While the legitimacy of the UN is not questioned, this situation is clearly unsatisfactory to Central Europeans. There was a slight change towards a more favourable attitude after NATO was used to back up UN resolutions, for example in the case of control of the no-fly zone, as well as the Sarajevo and Gorazde ultimatums. However, the case of Gorazde has also exposed the difficulty of coordinating NATO and the UN in crisis situations.

In the opinion of Central Europeans, NATO has won the crisis management 'popularity contest'. It has demonstrated its viability over European institutions because of the perceived importance of US leadership, quicker decision-making and the organisation's military capability. The fact that European and North Atlantic organisations are operating in former Yugoslavia under a UN mandate, which could give Russia a right of veto over what NATO, WEU or the EU does, makes close cooperation between the West and Russia vital for Central Europeans. At the same time, the idea of a condominium of Russia and the West jointly 'protecting' Central Europe is unacceptable to countries in the region. The NATO Partnership for Peace

initiative, while welcomed by Central Europeans as a step in the right direction, falls short of their hopes for security guarantees and/or NATO membership. NATO's discussion with Russia regarding its status within the initiative has had the result of reviving and strengthening Central Europeans' misgivings over such an arrangement.

WEU has suffered from a lack of visibility in the Balkans and has been perceived as suitable for less demanding tasks such as implementing sanctions, a function which it is believed to have executed well. Perceived WEU-NATO rivalry over the Adriatic naval patrol from mid-1992 was seen as a dangerous development, as Central Europeans are concerned about any duplication of, or clashes with, NATO efforts. WEU is considered interesting mainly because of its Maastricht link to both NATO and the EU, and it is thus that its May 1994 offer of Associate Partnership to Central European countries has been welcomed by governments in the region.

The EU is perceived as the definitive loser in this organisational contest and even its mediating role has been implicitly called into question by Central Europeans when observing recent American and Russian efforts. Because of the EU's lack of dedicated military capabilities, and its slow decision-making mechanisms, it is not regarded by Central Europeans as able to deal with areas that are already destabilised and conflict-ridden. Central Europeans see the EU and WEU as fora for consultation on security matters, and hence as requiring coordination with NATO, as well as the United States and Russia. Nevertheless, the EU still promises the opportunity to stabilise economies, and therefore EU membership continues to be sought after by Central European governments. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the former Polish Foreign Minister, has argued that the EU is even more important to Central Europe than it is to its member countries.⁽⁸⁵⁾ Hungary and Poland have recently filed formal applications for EU membership,⁽⁸⁶⁾ but it is not clear whether the timing has been in any way inspired by the Balkan crisis.

For Central Europeans, West European countries' problems in finding common approaches to the Balkan crisis have underlined the point that it is not always appropriate to deal directly with the EU. Internal divisions within the EU encourage them, as external partners, to concentrate on individual countries in Western Europe. That should not necessarily be seen to imply that Central Europeans consciously prefer an EU of an intergovernmental type over one with a federal structure, although some Central European leaders stress that former communist states should not lose their newly-found identity in the process of integration.⁽⁸⁷⁾ Rather, it appears that current attempts to establish relations with individual countries are not based on a clear idea of the future shape of the Union but on the fact that, as a result of the re-nationalisation of West European policies, some individual EU countries are more responsive than the organisation as a whole to Central European concerns.

Whether as a result of the Yugoslav crisis or not, Central European governments have decided that the most effective method is to become members of Western institutions first and then to participate in adjusting rules and operating procedures that have been exposed during the Yugoslav crisis as inadequate. Simultaneously, Central Europeans have come to believe that the existence of actual structures for collective action alone is less important than the presence of a common will to use them. That reasoning extends to the proposed Pact on Stability in Europe. It is argued that Europe needs a

debate about how to speed up and enforce decisions made within the framework of existing structures; it does not require yet another security conference.

The initial Balladur proposal which foresaw the possibility of changing borders, has been severely criticised by Central European countries, particularly those with substantial minorities within their borders. Later, the modified version of the proposal, based on the principle of inviolability of borders, met with sceptical acceptance. Because the plan is backed by the EU, all the countries took part in the conference -- but without enthusiasm.

Before the initial meeting on the Stability Pact in Paris on 26-27 May 1994, Central Europeans frequently criticised the plan because they considered it vague, based on inadequate provisions of international law and, most importantly, because it concentrated solely on Central and East European potential sources of conflict, even though numerous West European countries face similar ethnic or secessionist problems.⁽⁸⁸⁾ Some of these concerns were taken into account in the drafting of the Paris conference's final document. Nevertheless, while the Pact's objective was embraced, its method was criticised indirectly by representatives of Central European governments who argued that the best way of solving the region's problems was the strengthening of political and economic structures. Hungary voiced concern that the Pact attempted to solve minority issues without consulting representatives of minority groups. Any such idea, however, was reportedly rejected by Romania.⁽⁸⁹⁾ The belief was expressed by Central Europeans that the Pact could enhance work on bilateral agreements, but that it could not necessarily be expected to solve all the issues it tackled.⁽⁹⁰⁾ All Central European countries reason that European integration with a strong Atlantic component is a better answer to the region's problems than the bilateral treaties proposed by the Balladur plan. They are furthermore concerned that the Pact could duplicate the existing efforts of other organisations. Thus, the discussion surrounding the Pact implies that in future Western preventive diplomacy measures in Central Europe can be expected to be supported by the region's countries if they are seen as a helpful component in the process of greater participation in European integration.

Regional implications

It is sometimes suggested that the Yugoslav crisis has had the positive effect of teaching East and Central Europeans that they must manage their regional affairs carefully, because no one is prepared to solve their conflicts for them. It appears, however, that, while true, this statement is part of a more complicated set of perceptions. On the one hand, the public in Central European countries is aware both that 'if the West and the world cannot stop this war, perhaps they could not stop other wars that may break out in the Balkans or in east central Europe generally',⁽⁹¹⁾ and that extreme nationalist policies lead to international isolation. On the other hand, as a result of the incoherence of Western attempts at conflict management, there is an underlying perception that countries which pursue policies of conflict are rewarded with special attention by the West. While this is not a common perception, it is one that should not be overlooked by West European decision-makers.

Western Europe's hesitant involvement in former Yugoslavia is interpreted by Central Europeans as being largely the result of confusion over western strategic interests in

the Balkans in particular, and in Central and Eastern Europe in general. This situation affects Central Europe's sense of security. As a result of perceived threats to their security stemming from the Yugoslav conflict, combined with lack of Western security guarantees, some Central European countries have moved to strengthen their national defences. Hungary has sought to modernise its air force and air defence systems. Former Minister of Defence Fier suggested that despite the shrinking of financial resources, the capability to react to unexpected challenges had to be preserved.⁽⁹²⁾ In 1993, Hungary accepted 28 MiG fighters from Russia in partial repayment of trade debts. Shortly after, Slovakia accepted a similar settlement,⁽⁹³⁾ and Bulgaria is considering a comparable solution. These arms transfers do not affect the countries' CFE limits. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that 'while the Hungarian-Russian arms deal does not jeopardise the regional balance of forces, the potential for an arms race in the area exists'.⁽⁹⁴⁾ Lack of arms control measures in the Balkans may make this problem a significant one in the future.

The Yugoslav crisis has not had the effect of consolidating the Central European countries as a group. Indeed, the lack of coordination and agreement among Central European states regarding their Balkan policies shows that there is no such thing as a Central European 'basket'. Some Central European countries' foreign policy priorities are no longer based entirely on support for Western schemes in the Balkans, but are beginning to take into account the risks involved in following them. In particular, countries neighbouring on former Yugoslavia now disagree with the Western powers over issues such as sanctions or peacekeeping.⁽⁹⁵⁾ Simultaneously, a change in some Central European governments' attitudes towards Serbia is noticeable. Efforts to improve relations with Serbia are partially explicable by the slow realisation, particularly among neighbouring countries, that they will have to live with a powerful Serbia after the conflict is over.

Domestic implications

The Yugoslav conflict caused subtle changes in the domestic political climate of some Central European countries. Mainly left-wing but also right-wing forces now perceive an imbalance between the costs and the benefits of following Western policies regarding the Balkan conflict. Capitalising mainly on public dissatisfaction with domestic issues, but also helped by the events in former Yugoslavia, socialist forces were successful in the May/June 1994 elections in Hungary. A similar development appears possible in Bulgaria. Furthermore, anti-Western feelings, based on a growing sense of unrequited affection,⁽⁹⁶⁾ may prepare the ground for populism, and thus possibly cooler attitudes towards integration in Western organisations. This effect could be aggravated by the economic consequences of sanctions, which are quite strong for countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia. Nikolay Slatinsky warns for example that 'as the price of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro also becomes too great, Bulgaria would be seriously destabilised and would become yet another seat of tension in the Balkans'.⁽⁹⁷⁾ However, the overall implications of these domestic changes for Central European foreign policies may perhaps only become visible in the long term.⁽⁹⁸⁾

Conclusions

How has the Yugoslav crisis affected Central Europe's relations with the EU and WEU? Central Europeans assess West European involvement in the former Yugoslavia so far as delayed and largely inadequate.⁽⁹⁹⁾ They attribute this to the Western organisations' failure to cope with the crisis, resulting from disagreement among the leading powers, lack of proven mechanisms for coordination between European and Atlantic structures, as well as a general lack of commitment to the region. Nevertheless, they have chosen to pursue reactive policies, essentially following decisions made by international organisations in which they hope to become members. These measures have not proven that they can provide solutions to the problem, but have instead begun to cause, for example, economic destabilisation (as result of sanctions) in the neighbouring Central European countries. In response, Central Europeans have begun to emphasise domestic interests, and some have even moved to nationalise their defences.

However, one should not overstate the current significance of the Yugoslav case for Central European relations with the EU and WEU. Firstly, the question of West European involvement in the Balkans is but one issue currently being pondered in the context of the Central European security debate. Secondly, Central European administrations are aware that there is at present no alternative to becoming integrated into Western institutions and organisations. Consequently, the region's countries continue to pursue a 'catch-all' strategy, believing that membership in any of the organisations will provide either security or economic development, or both. Central Europeans have concluded from the Yugoslav case that no new organisations are necessary, but that the existing ones' operating procedures must be adjusted. Thus, currently, no dramatic short-term impact on Central European foreign policies is noticeable. Nevertheless, there is a growing reluctance blindly to follow Western initiatives and there are also changes under way in the domestic political equilibrium which could in the long term affect these countries' foreign policies.

The predominance of national concerns in Central European policies will face European organisations with tough decisions regarding differentiating between the various Central European countries. In this context it is worth noting that since neither Central nor Western Europe appears able to present a united approach, the various Central European countries may in the future focus more on the improvement of relations with individual West European states. In the longer term this may make the development of a EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as set out by the Maastricht treaty, more difficult.

Analysis of Central European policies on former Yugoslavia leads to the impression that the region's countries want it 'both ways' - to be a viable partner for Western organisations, but to limit the risks involved in this partnership. Countries neighbouring on former Yugoslavia are not enthusiastic about 'soft' measures such as sanctions because of their economic impact, and resist 'hard' measures, such as military intervention. The Baltic states and countries of the northern tier of Central Europe hope for a Western show of commitment to the Central European region through bolder action in former Yugoslavia, while other Central Europeans are, at least in their official declarations, less supportive of means other than diplomatic. However, confusing as these policies seem at first glance, they are rooted in Central

European countries' feeling of insecurity caused by a lack of security guarantees. Western organisations have given only implicit guarantees to countries surrounding former Yugoslavia (and have not so far had to back them up with deeds). Growing Central European reluctance to go along with the West's initiatives can therefore be interpreted as a response to the weakness of half-hearted plans to expand Western institutions to the East.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

For Central Europe, the issue of security guarantees is of great significance. In this context, the Balkan crisis has confirmed that the EU cannot provide security guarantees, although it has a useful economic role to play. Thus, the EU is seen as having a role to perform in helping to reconstruct the Balkans when the Yugoslav conflict is over.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ In return for costly compliance with Western measures, Central European countries neighbouring on former Yugoslavia may ask to be compensated in two ways: by being granted preferential treatment by the EU when the rebuilding of former Yugoslavia is on the agenda, and by being given improved status within the EU, WEU and/or NATO. Thus, having shared the risks and costs of crisis management measures will strengthen Central European pressure to become more integrated into Western institutions.

Any spillover of the conflict, caused either by massive Western intervention followed by, for example, a wave of refugees, or attempts to pursue more isolationist policies on the part of Western powers, would immediately increase pressure from Central European countries for membership of relevant Western organisations. In any case, if membership is not granted in the long run, it may cause some or all of them to turn away from a Western orientation of their foreign policies. Thus, the only scenario in former Yugoslavia which promises to leave Central-West European relations relatively intact is one in which united and concerted diplomatic effort under the auspices of the UN and backed up by 'sticks' provided by NATO and 'carrots' dispensed by the EU leads to an early political settlement of the crisis.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE

Duygu Bazolu Sezer⁽¹⁰²⁾

Turkish interests in the Balkans

Turkey has been deeply concerned about the evolving situation in the Balkans in general and about the fate of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular since the process of the unravelling of Yugoslavia formally began in 1991.

Three quite easily identifiable considerations have defined the nature and scope of the attention paid by Turkey to the region: first, Turkey is a Balkan country geographically, historically and culturally. Therefore, it has a legitimate interest in the regional power configuration as well as the nature of the political regimes that prevail in the region. Second, the Balkans constitute a strategic link between Turkey and Western Europe. The latter occupies a central position in the whole gamut of political, economic, security and cultural links Turkey has formed with the outside world since its foundation in 1923 on the basis of Western-inspired Kemalist principles. Currently, roughly two and a half million Turkish citizens live in Western Europe, which accounts for more than half of Turkey's foreign trade. Turkey clearly cannot afford to be cut off from these relationships or from access to West European markets. Third, there is a powerful sense of affinity between Turks of Turkey and some peoples in the Balkans -- ethnic Turkish minorities, Bosnian Muslims, Albanians and now Macedonians, who form part of the legacy of Turkish rule in the Balkans, which stretched roughly from the fourteenth to the early twentieth century.⁽¹⁰³⁾

If the Balkans are of such vital importance for long-term Turkish interests in Europe, it follows, then, that Turkey would be sensitive to any major changes in the political and military status quo in the region that might threaten those interests. That, briefly is the geopolitical dimension of Turkish interests.

The human dimension is an equally powerful consideration. According to the then Deputy Prime Minister Erdal nönü, there are two million people of Turkish ethnicity in the Balkans and seven million Muslims.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ Their kin and friends in Turkey, most of whose ancestors migrated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as Ottoman power receded from the Balkans, form a significant body in Turkish state and society (official estimates of Turkish citizens of Bosnian origin vary between two and four million). It is the numerous family ties, and not 'Islam', that draw many a Turk and Bosnian ('Boshnak') towards each other. Put differently, the perception in the external world that the Turks' concern for Bosnian Muslims emanates from their shared religion fails to explain the full dynamics of the relationship.

In order to appreciate the extent of popular pressure on the Turkish government on the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is important to understand the role of the psychodynamics generated by these extensive bonds of kinship and lively historical images. Turks entertain a highly sentimental view of non-Turkish Muslims, like the Albanians and Bosnians, who converted to Islam during the period of Ottoman rule. Originally

belonging to the Bogomil sect, Bosnians are known to have converted to Islam soon after the Turkish conquest in the late fifteenth century in order to escape further persecution by their intolerant Christian co-religionists.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ Numerous Slav Muslims served in the Ottoman government at the height of its power. Some, like the celebrated Sokollu Mehmet Pasha, of Serbian origin, held the post of Grand Vizier. Against this background, Bosnian leaders have argued the case for Turkey's historical responsibility in their approaches to Turkey for support in their recent struggle.

Turkish concerns also rest on a deeper, more fundamental political and strategic consideration: the potential for long-term instability and conflict in the Balkans and Eastern Europe if the drive for a greater Serbia were allowed to prevail. Turkey believes that the goal of a Greater Serbia implies a forcible change in political borders to make them correspond to ethnic borders. Assuming that Serbian claims to large portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia were conceded under the principle of ethnic self-determination, who could guarantee that the next flash point would not be the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)? Would Greece not like to have its share of FYROM, and would this not also prompt Bulgaria into action? Who, then, could hold back Albanians from arguing a similar case for Kosovo? What guarantees would there be that ultra-nationalism would not catch on in Hungary, forcing it to press for a Greater Hungary? The dangers inherent in the ideology of a Greater Serbia pursued by Belgrade, in the grip of a communist-nationalist regime, bring to mind other threat scenarios, not only in the Balkans but in other regions inhabited by a rich mosaic of ethnically diverse peoples. Its success could send strong but ultimately catastrophic signals to, for instance, potential ultra-nationalists in many parts of the former Soviet Union, endangering peace and stability throughout Eurasia.

In as much as the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been at the centre of Turkey's immediate concerns, the long-term implications of the dynamics unleashed by the crisis in former Yugoslavia for regional peace and stability at large form the fundamental element of Turkish security thinking about the Balkans in the post-Cold War era. No other Islamic country would be affected as directly and immediately by any major geopolitical and demographic change in the Balkans as Turkey. But, in dealing with its concerns, Turkey is not isolated: through various links with other countries and international institutions, it is in a special position to try to influence the management of the Yugoslav crisis. Turkey is the only Muslim country which shares with the United States and West European countries membership of NATO, still the leading security organisation in Europe. As an associate member of Western European Union (WEU), it has access to another European platform where its point of view can be elaborated. Its membership of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) allows Turkey to act as an interlocutor between, on the one hand, NATO and WEU, and on the other, the Islamic countries, which have by and large advocated opposing views and policies on the question of Bosnia.

Turkish policy towards the crisis in former Yugoslavia

Turkish positions and policies towards the crisis in former Yugoslavia went through two stages. Originally, Turkey adopted a low-key stance, favouring the continuation of the *status quo*, but with certain changes if the constituent republics so desired. It was genuinely concerned not to precipitate the crisis by acts that could be construed as interfering in former Yugoslavia's federal composition.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ Once disintegration

ensued and seemed irreversible, and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina -- a duly recognised member of the United Nations -- became the victim of Serbian aggression, the Turkish position changed.

Turkey extended diplomatic recognition to Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 February 1992, in the belief that their integration into the international community was a prerequisite for successfully re-establishing peace and stability in the region threatened, above all, by expansionist Serbian ethnic nationalism. The new policies were designed to attain three immediate and interrelated objectives:⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ to bring an end to the bloodshed in Bosnia-Herzegovina; to preserve its independence and territorial integrity; and to prevent the escalation of the war into a broader regional war engulfing Kosovo, Albania, FYROM, the Sandjak and Vojvodina.

Turkish positions hardened as Bosnian Muslims, outgunned, were subjected to intense suffering and large losses of territory to the Serbs. On 7 August 1992, Turkey elaborated the details of an Action Plan to be implemented by the United Nations Security Council. It called for a series of non-military measures and, in the event that these failed to stop Serbian aggression, proposed more decisive measures: the selective lifting of the United Nations arms embargo to allow the Bosnian Muslims to obtain from the outside the means to defend themselves, and, ultimately, limited military engagement by the international community in order to enforce the United Nations sanctions and strike selected military targets on the Serbian side.

Turkey has also consistently shunned the option of the unilateral use of force - despite pressure by domestic opposition.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ Speculation outside Turkey that it intended to exploit the conflict in Bosnia through a show or use of force has apparently failed to read the mind of the key decision-makers correctly. A highly visible bilateral and multilateral diplomatic track has decidedly been the preference in order to mobilise a more resolute stand to contain Serbian expansionism by the international community.

The Turkish Government has persistently declared that peacemaking in Bosnia-Herzegovina falls within the sphere of responsibility of the United Nations Security Council, and that Turkey would make a military contribution to any enforcement action only as part of a mandated international effort. In this spirit, in April 1993 Turkey joined the UN-authorized NATO operation to enforce the seven-month old 'no-fly' zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina and also in February and April 1994 supported NATO's activities to protect Sarajevo and Gorazde. After lengthy negotiations, the UN and Turkey agreed in principle on a contingent of 2,700 Turkish peacekeeping troops in total to serve in UNPROFOR in Bosnia, starting with the deployment of 1,500 men in late June 1994.

Turkey feels that the Washington Agreement of 18 March 1994, between Muslims and Croats is a positive first step towards a comprehensive political settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because it holds out the promise of restoring the multi-ethnic nature of the country. In contrast, the so-called Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg peace plans were premised on the ethnic and geographical partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For almost a year Turkey had been actively encouraging a Muslim-Croat dialogue. Prime Minister Franjo Tudjman of Croatia paid a visit to Turkey in April 1993. Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin was present as witness at the

signing of the Sarajevo Joint Declaration, of 12 November 1993, between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, on the cessation of the fighting between Muslim and Croat forces in Bosnia. Hence, the philosophy and the political bargaining behind the Washington Agreement had been actively supported by Turkey for nearly a year before it finally came into being. Obviously, it was the weight of the United States that led to the successful culmination of these behind-the scene efforts.

Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

A major venue for Turkish multilateral diplomacy on the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been the OIC, a 52-member forum for Islamic solidarity among African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries. Its membership includes almost one third of the members of the UN, which allows it to act in the UN as a pressure group on the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Special visits by teams of OIC members to several major EU capitals have also been undertaken.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾

At the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the OIC Foreign Ministers (OICFM) held at Istanbul on 17-18 June 1992, to discuss for the first time the question of Bosnia, a nine-member Contact Group (OICCG) was formed to speak for the OIC at the UN. At the time Turkey was the chairman of the OICFM; its term expired in April 1993. Currently Pakistan, also a temporary member of the UN Security Council, chairs the OICFM, making it possible for the OIC to have a voice in the decision-making organ of the world body.

Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan and Turkey have been among the most active members of the OICCG, even if the reasons that motivate each one of these states to take a broader interest in the Yugoslav crisis, notably the drama in Bosnia-Herzegovina, differ widely. However, two issues have been in the forefront of the overall strategy that the OIC has pursued regarding the Bosnian crisis: the repeal of the arms embargo against the Muslim-dominated Bosnian government and the use of force under chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations to stop Serbian aggression. Needless to say, these are the very critical questions on which Western Europe has adopted a diametrically opposed stance. After the OIC meetings in Istanbul, New York (September 1992) and Karachi (April 1993), the Special OIC Ministerial Meeting in Islamabad (12-13 July 1993), which was attended by the UN Secretary-General, expressed opposition to any plan that would partition and dismember the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. An ambitious Action Plan was drawn up to be submitted to the UN for expeditious implementation. Seven Islamic countries offered to contribute peacekeeping troops to UNPROFOR⁽¹¹⁰⁾ and at the OIC Contact Group meeting in New York (27 September 1993) the OIC reaffirmed its wish for an early deployment of troops from OIC member states to protect the 'safe areas'.

At the OIC meeting in Geneva (17 January 1994), ministers renewed their call for air strikes and issued a veiled threat of economic sanctions against countries backing a partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ministers warned that unless NATO implemented its commitment, made at the Alliance summit, to use air strikes against Serbian positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they would call on the international community to help the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina exercise the 'inherent right of individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN charter.'

At the OIC Emergency Session in New York (27 April 1994), the foreign ministers declared that UNSC Resolution 713 (1991) did not apply to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that the arms embargo being maintained against this republic as well was illegal, unjust and in direct contradiction of Article 51 of the UN charter. They promised to table a resolution in the Security Council proclaiming that Bosnia-Herzegovina did not fall under the arms embargo.

The results of this high-profile diplomatic activity conducted under the umbrella of Islamic solidarity cannot be called a success. Many in the OIC hold the strength of Western Europe's influence primarily responsible for the prolongation of the crisis and for the consolidation of Serbian power at the expense of the Bosnian Muslims. Leading Islamic countries also seem to have concluded that future prospects for their relations with Western Europe need not be affected by the failure of the latter to protect the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, officially, most Islamic countries refrain from any further activities beyond OIC statements in order to avoid real political confrontation with Western Europe. In many cases this attitude reflects a realisation of the particular country's own weaknesses as well as those of the OIC as a collectivity. Many acknowledge that they are confronted with internal problems of greater urgency, that they cannot afford to risk their political and economic relations with major Western countries, and that they lack power projection capabilities. In short, Islamic countries do not seem to be considering a reorientation of their relations with Western Europe on the basis of their disappointment with the former's Bosnian policies. Needless to say, this should be a valid assumption so long as the current leadership of these countries remains in power.

Turkish perceptions of West European/EU policies

towards the Yugoslav crisis

Turkish perceptions are related primarily to the crisis and war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The sense of urgency with which the government has followed the developments there and the ensuing diplomatic activism, the public appeal by the Bosnian government and Muslim leadership for Turkish support, detailed coverage by the national and international media of the suffering of the Bosnian Muslims, and the skilful offensive by the Islamist Welfare Party in domestic politics to outpace the mainstream parties on a pro-Bosnian stance -- these together have contributed to the mobilisation of public opinion.

Turkish perceptions can be analysed at the levels of the élite and the general public. The élite level comprises roughly three categories: realist-pragmatists, moralists and anti-Western ideologues.

The *group of realist-pragmatists* is identified as such because of its informed, analytical and responsible approach to world politics and its keen awareness of *realpolitik* considerations in and for the Balkans. It consists primarily of members of the establishment and circles close to it. Realist-pragmatists make a careful distinction between the various international actors collectively known as 'the West'. They feel that, broadly speaking, the United States and Western Europe/EU have behaved separately towards this first post-Cold War crisis in Europe. They believe that the end

of the Cold War has led the two transatlantic partners of nearly half a century to seek a redefinition of their respective roles and responsibilities for European security.

Encouraged by the calculated American preference, that of the Bush administration in particular, to leave management of the crisis to Europe, the EU, up to the end of 1993, assumed the role of primary manager of the crisis in former Yugoslavia. The potential power of the EU's leading role was seen as magnified by the permanent membership of Great Britain and France in the United Nations Security Council. Other arguments in the realist-pragmatist perspective are related to the weakness of the CSCE machinery, which had indirectly helped bolster the image of the EU as the primary actor, and the fact that, until early 1994, the United States in effect stood on the sidelines. Moreover, under the Clinton administration the latter vacillated between shifting positions on America's interests, objectives and proposed methods of crisis management in Bosnia, reflecting a general lack of direction in America's post-Cold War foreign policy priorities.

However, realist-pragmatists are convinced that Western Europe has not been able to manage the crisis effectively, for the following reasons: Western Europe was caught unprepared to cope with the first post-Cold War crisis, which erupted at a time when it was absorbed with the immense task of making the transition to the post-Cold War era. Despite the launching of the CFSP, several countries within the Twelve have been motivated more by their respective national interests than by collective goals, occasionally giving the impression that they have pursued competitive and frequently opposing priorities and goals. This apparent lack of unanimity has resulted in the EU's opting for the least risky strategies in crisis management. Realist-pragmatists are also aware of the fact that other security institutions, namely NATO, WEU, the CSCE and the United Nations, were similarly not ready for a challenge of this type, since the nature of the threat to European security from the Yugoslav crisis could not be defined unequivocally. The crisis has taken place in a region historically known for its violent and entangled inter-ethnic and interstate dynamics. The complexity of its numerous ingredients has contributed to the difficulty of devising swift and effective measures to manage the crisis. The very confusion about how to define the Bosnian war -- as interstate, civil war, tribal war or religious war -- is seen by realist-pragmatists as clear evidence of the conceptual hurdles encountered in coming to grips with the nature of the Yugoslav crisis.

On the other hand, this group is critical of the EC/EU having confined its activities to the diplomatic and humanitarian domains. The EC/EU desisted from serious consideration of the military option - except belatedly at the time of the two NATO ultimatums, in February and April 1994 - even in the face of ample evidence that the Serbs had used the diplomatic track as a stalling tactic to advance on the ground. West European countries shunned the military option because they were not willing to risk a long and costly war in Bosnia in order to save Muslim people from massacre.

In short, realist-pragmatists think that the EC/EU lacks the political will to assume military risks in cases where no clearly identifiable, supreme economic and strategic interests are at stake, as was the case in the Kuwait crisis. They also hold the view that this lack of determination has little to do with capability. While the EU and WEU do not possess an autonomous intervention capability, the fact that all members of WEU and all but one member of the EU are members of NATO has offered them the

opportunity in principle to invoke the NATO machinery, even if both organisations time and again objected to the use of force by NATO -- until the February ultimatum. There is considerable cynicism on this point. Many realist-pragmatists speculate that the EU would not have abstained had the victims been Christians in the midst of a Muslim world. Besides, had the EC agreed to the selective lifting of the arms embargo to allow Bosnian Muslims to defend themselves, so a well-trying argument goes, the question of EC or NATO intervention to stop Serbian aggression might not even have had to be raised.

The *group of moralists* comprises the great majority of the informed and attentive public with potential power to influence policy, i.e. leaders of political parties, especially those in the opposition, parliamentarians, prominent columnists and commentators in the media, universities, professional organisations and other interest groups which regularly follow world affairs. Mostly educated and urbane, these people are `appalled at the destruction of an independent country, its culture and the plight of its people.⁽¹¹¹⁾

It is not so much the Muslim identity of the victims but the perceived disregard for the principles of international and humanitarian law and respect for human rights which has created much resentment among the attentive Turkish public against Western Europe in its role as the principal crisis manager in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moralists seem to be very sceptical of the deeper motives held by West Europeans, who are seen as having sacrificed principles of international morality in order to implement a type of nineteenth century spheres-of-influence policy. The country perceived to have played the determining role in this policy is the United Kingdom (notably in the persons of Lord Carrington and Lord Owen), followed by France, in order to counterbalance the expanding German influence to the east of Western Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic. A partitioned Bosnia in which the Bosnian Muslims had to live in insecure, isolated enclaves (key elements of the Vance-Owen plan), which would make room for a greater Serbia, would serve these ends. Such perceived ulterior motives are viewed with a powerful sense of moral indignation.

The moralists also find unacceptable the argument that a selective lifting of the arms embargo would escalate the intensity of the fighting. Depriving the Bosnian Muslims of legitimate means of self-defence in full awareness that Serbs by contrast were heavily armed, is seen as signalling to the Serbs a go-ahead for the execution of their plans. The result has been the massacre of thousands of Muslims and the rape of many of their women. According to the moralists, the number of victims has reached an intolerable level, thus weakening the West European argument that the level of violence is kept low by maintaining the arms embargo. Finally, there is also frustration with countries that are proud of having developed a political culture of tolerance and human rights; this leads the moralists to accuse Western Europe of applying double standards.

The *group of ideological anti-Westerners* consists of people organised around an Islamist-world view and their political organisation, the Islamist Welfare Party. For a better understanding of the views of this group, a quotation from Professor Necmeddin Erbakan, the leader of the Welfare Party (WP) may be helpful: `Bosnia-Herzegovina became an independent country of 5 million people governed by the Muslims. In a short time the Serbs and Croats massacred 250,000 Muslims just

because they were Muslims. 50,000 innocent women were raped. Two million people were forced to leave their country. The genocide in Bosnia is probably the second biggest one in history after the West's genocide at Andalusia. The Germans saved the Croats. Unfortunately, Turkey behaved almost like a spectator in the tragedy of Bosnia. In fact, by simply saying that "everything that needs to be done has been done", Turkey implicitly reassured the Serbs against (Western) intervention, and, indirectly encouraged them to massacre the Muslims . . . As disclosed in the letter by British Prime Minister Major to Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs Douglas Hurd, the goal of the West is the elimination of Bosnian Muslims.⁽¹¹²⁾

Islamist views can be found in the press, the business world, and recently in the bureaucracy and the universities' theology faculties. The Islamists have successfully used the Bosnian war to discredit 'the West'. It should be noted that 'the West' is seen and presented as a monolith with no special distinction made of Western Europe. On the contrary, the Welfare Party is known to have been quite restrained in its position, towards Germany in particular, in order to avoid possible complications in its extensive operations among Turkish workers in that country.

The Islamists have also used the Bosnian war to discredit Turkey's Western-inspired and Western-oriented socio-political regime. Necmeddin Erbakan has made the tragedy of Bosnia the centrepiece of his list of accusations against the government, implicitly charging that it had left the case of the Bosnian Muslims in the hands of Western-dominated institutions like the UN, NATO and CSCE.

The Welfare Party has been a marginal political force since its foundation twenty-five years ago. Over a long period its share of the national vote stood at roughly 10 per cent. However, its success at the nation-wide local elections on 27 March 1994 created some panic among the modernist-secularists because it emerged as the third largest party. It captured over one-third of the municipalities, including Istanbul and Ankara and, less than two weeks after this victory, Islamist mobs staged anti-Western demonstrations in Istanbul and Ankara in response to the alleged use of chemical weapons by Serbs against the Bosnian Muslims of Gorazde. Other activities are also conducted and sold to the wider public as a demonstration of Islamic solidarity. For instance, it has been quoted by the press and WP officials that around \$2 billion were raised in 1993 to help Bosnian Muslims; most of the donations apparently came from Turkish workers in Germany.

In short, the Islamists, like the moralists, seem to be playing a critical role in shaping the attitudes of the general public towards the West. In order to appreciate that this is a new socio-political phenomenon, it is important to remember that Turkey is one of the few Muslim countries where anti-Westernism has never been part and parcel of the world view or the political orientation of the population. It had played a role only sporadically around special issues, such as the Cyprus conflict, and more systematically by the radical left in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, however, the psychology of the masses has come under different influences from different directions. More and more forces in the external environment and domestic politics have recently joined hands to carry to the Turkish masses the message that they should not only reclaim their original pure Muslim identity, but that they belong to the politico-cultural universe of Islam, which the West is set to destroy. Against the backdrop of these efforts, the unhappy fate of Bosnian Muslims has offered the most

opportune evidence in support of the Islamist political élite's conspiratorial theories about the West.

With the exception of the Cyprus conflict (which occupies a truly special position in the Turkish psyche), no other foreign policy issue has aroused such intense emotion among the Turkish *general public*, since the end of the Second World War, as the Bosnian question. The occupation of Afghanistan, for example, caused waves of protest in the Arab world, culminating in the dispatch of thousands of volunteers to fight the 'Godless Communists'. Not so in Turkey. The Bosnian question, in contrast, has struck a deeply emotional chord for all the reasons discussed at the beginning of the paper.

Extensive media coverage, especially the images seen in the electronic media, and the power of those formers of public opinion who have been classified here as moralists and anti-Western ideologues, have all helped to consolidate the spontaneous concern among the wider public about the fate of Bosnian Muslims, and to implant firmer and deeper scepticism about the West. Accordingly, one can suppose that the man in the street holds views that represent a crude simplification of those articulated by opinion-makers and opinion-leaders. He appears to believe that the West in general, and Western Europe in particular, has encouraged the destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Serbia in order to eliminate a Muslim country from the midst of Europe.

Future prospects for Turkey's relations with Western Europe

The potential impact on Turkish foreign policy of the inability and/or unwillingness of Western Europe to act as an effective crisis manager in Bosnia-Herzegovina appears to have been kept within bounds. The official establishment seems determined to keep strained relations with Western Europe on the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina separate from Turkey's fundamental foreign policy objectives and orientation.

Turkish officials maintain that Turkey made its basic choice of using the West as a model for its internal organisation and lifestyle, as well as foreign policy, at the time of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who, seventy years ago, began the task of building a modern country. They feel that the Eurocentric world view needs to be safeguarded against tensions generated by foreign policy challenges such as the questions of Cyprus and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The prevailing attitude seems to be a mixture of subtle resignation -- but not defeat -- and sharpened determination to 'stay with Europe despite Europe'.

Accordingly, so long as the balance of domestic forces continues to favour the modernist/modernisers, the Turkish commitment to integration with Europe is likely to remain powerful even if the prospects of the EU admitting Turkey as a full member are clearly seen to be remote. This basic commitment applies to Turkey's views about WEU too. The general public is not knowledgeable about WEU. It is NATO which continues to monopolise the public's attention as Turkey's real security partner. Even though the long-lasting passive stance of NATO *vis-à-vis* the Bosnian tragedy discredited it in the view of the Turkish public, NATO ultimatums to stop the Serbian strangulation of Sarajevo and later Gorazde have done much to restore its prestige.

The political élite seems to believe that, while the Maastricht treaty has given much greater prominence to WEU, this institution is still in a process of evolution as a security entity, politically and in terms of capabilities. The basic problem with WEU is its uncertain future or, to put it differently, the question of the nature and scope of its role and function as a security institution. Viewed from the more immediate time frame, the Yugoslav crisis has demonstrated the limited political and military power base of WEU, preventing it from playing an effective peacekeeping and/or peacemaking role. NATO, in contrast, continues to be the only viable security institution in Europe. While its performance on the question of non-Article 5 contingencies like the Bosnian crisis has fallen short of expectations, NATO stands out as the only truly credible institution for collective self-defence.

On the other hand, the decision-makers' view of the future prospects of Turkey's relations with Western Europe is complicated by important tensions or constraints. The primary sources of these tensions are, first, the effective exclusion of Turkey from European integration and, second, Turkey's ambiguous status within WEU as an associate member. Needless to say, these tensions have a life of their own irrespective of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

Given these systemic obstacles, Turkey appears to be trying to square the circle by persisting on a foreign policy orientation that is not given due recognition by the West Europeans. In other words, the official Turkish goal to join West European institutions as a full member appears unrealistic and untenable in the face of the unwillingness of the EU to admit Turkey as a member. Therefore, Turkish decision-makers have to struggle hard to defend their position against the domestic cynicism about Turkey-EU relations that is pervasive in the country. The Turkish public feels humiliated at what it considers third-class treatment of Turkey by Western Europe, and the war in Bosnia has added a new dimension to this perception. The misery which has befallen Bosnian Muslims -- for which West European diplomacy is seen as being primarily responsible, for the reasons discussed earlier -- has, while attracting intense sympathy for the victims, reinforced the sense of humiliation suffered by the 'Europeans', i.e. the major powers of Europe.

This negative public image of Western Europe represents a major obstacle in relations between government decision-makers and the Grand National Assembly, the Turkish parliament. As has been mentioned previously, the balance of political forces in the parliament and in the country at large still favours the modernists. Yet, that balance has been shifting towards an improved position of the traditionalist-Islamists and nationalists in more subtle ways than poll results seem to indicate.

Irrespective of their various political philosophies and identities, however, Turks may be converging, at an emotional level, on a very simple but elementary point: the need to preserve national pride. Turks' sense of national pride seems to have been playing a greatly enhanced role recently in the public debate on relations with Western Europe. It seems possible that injured national pride might inspire a search for complex coalitions among the proponents of all kinds of seemingly incompatible political ideologies, e.g. Westernisation, European integration, Islamism, traditionalism, nationalism -- especially within parliament with a view to winning domestic constituencies. In short, despite the government's resolute efforts to stay on course in its basic political and security orientation towards Western Europe, the domestic

tensions discussed above might ultimately overwhelm official Turkish resolve and undermine the basis of support for a pro-Western policy if left in the present state of limbo.

The simplest but starkest lesson of the Balkan crisis has been that war has not become obsolete, that force prevails, and that collective security organisations like the United Nations continue to be ineffective agents of national security. The erosion of faith in collective security organisations is qualified, however, by the fact that these organisations can perform the tasks expected of them if there is a consensus among the great powers to act. Therefore, peace and stability in today's international system continue to demand responsible leadership by the great powers. Irrespective of this problem, Turkey believes that peacekeeping has become a very important aspect of crisis management in the post-Cold War era, hence its efforts to improve its ability to make important contributions. This has already resulted in the fact that Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir of the Turkish Armed Forces served as the Force Commander of UNOSOM II's command structure (with 300 Turkish peacekeepers taking part in this UN force) and that Turkish peacekeeping forces have also been invited by the UN to serve in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The future of Turkey-EU relations is a question that deserves much thought, goodwill and patience on both sides. As regards Bosnia, things seem simpler and of more immediate salience. The following steps could help the EU recover some of its erstwhile prestige in the eyes of the Turkish public: the EU should extend firm and clear support to the Croat-Muslim federation, encourage Bosnian Serbs to join it or to live together with it in a state entity, and provide generous aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina for its recovery and reconstruction. The EU could invite Turkey, the only major regional actor that has supported the cause of the Bosnian Muslims from the time of Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence, formally to take part in the international 'contact group' in order to enhance the legitimacy of the decisions of this group by making its composition more balanced. The EU could also resolutely back the International Tribunal established by the United Nations Security Council on 23 May 1993 to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in former Yugoslavia, and support the Turkish candidate for election to the tribunal if and when a vacancy among its eleven members occurs in the future.

THE IMPACT ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC WORLD AND WESTERN EUROPE

Ali Hillal Dessouki⁽¹¹³⁾

With the exception of the Palestine question, probably no other issue has mobilised Muslim sentiments and emotions as much as the fate of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Television coverage of events has brought pictures of Muslims' miseries there to millions of Muslims all over the world, and this has created a negative, hostile attitude towards those perceived as responsible for the prolongation of the tragedy. The objective of this paper is to analyse basic Islamic views and perceptions of events in Bosnia and reflect on their probable impact on the future of relations between the Islamic world and Western Europe.

Two methodological caveats are in order at the outset. The first relates to the extent to which the Islamic world can be considered as a unified actor. The more than fifty Islamic states, defined as those having populations with a Muslim majority, belong to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Islamic political ideas and movements have demonstrated their character as a transnational, trans-state phenomenon capable of exercising influence in a number of Islamic states. The Muslim Brothers society in the 1940s and the contemporary Islamic fundamentalist movements are just two cases in point. It remains true, however, that Islamic states constitute an amorphous entity. They differ in almost all aspects of their economic and political organisation and thus have different national interests and foreign policy orientations. Their reactions to the Bosnian tragedy have been multiple and diverse, and have varied from the symbolic verbal (political statements, declarations of solidarity) to popular expressions of Islamic brotherhood (such as fund-raising campaigns or humanitarian aid) and perceptions of threats to political values and/or national interests.

The other caveat relates to the importance of distinguishing between governmental and popular reactions: in many instances, governments' positions are not a true reflection of the intensity of popular feelings. With the exception of rich oil-producing states, most Islamic countries belong to the 'South' as broadly defined. They are societies that have ceased to advance. Their economies are characterised by a failure to develop and their politics by lack of democratic structures and a crisis of legitimacy. As a result, they abound with political protest movements that are usually termed Islamic fundamentalist in the West. These groups are involved in a multitude of activities, from political agitation and mobilisation of popular feeling to assassinations and the use of organised violence. Their influence varies from being a moral call for authenticity or a cry of the dispossessed to a credible challenge to ruling regimes and the holders of power. Thus, many Islamic governments find themselves caught between friendship towards Europe (and the United States), which constrains their ability to adopt strongly critical positions, and mounting domestic pressure to support the Bosnian Muslims.

Having these two caveats in mind it is possible to argue that though the Muslim world does not constitute a unified actor in international politics, Muslim peoples constitute

a sort of 'psychological human entity' and are mobilisable around a number of symbolic issues such as Palestine, Afghanistan and Bosnia. The mobilisation of Islamic sentiment in many instances creates internal political pressures which governments cannot ignore. In this context, Muslim perceptions and views of the European role in managing the Yugoslav crisis are generally expressed in the form of criticism, anger and condemnation. A prevailing popular feeling is that a solution of the Bosnian problem will be achieved at the expense of the Bosnian Muslims,⁽¹¹⁴⁾ and that instead of condemning the aggressor, European states are using their influence to force the weak to make more concessions.⁽¹¹⁵⁾

We can thus distinguish two lines of thinking and justification. The first involves criticism of European states' positions as lacking in coordination. The second involves a condemnation of Europe's ambiguous policy as evidence of a perceived long-standing European hostility towards Islam. I have called the first 'the instrumental argument' since its adherents refer to problems of policy-making and formulation of joint policy objectives due to European states' different national interests. The second is called 'the conspiracy argument' to refer to those views which interpret European reactions from the perspective of the victims' religion.

The instrumental argument

In this view, criticism of Europe's policy is based on tactical and analytical considerations. It is found primarily in official statements by most Islamic countries as well as in the declarations of the OIC. One focus, in this view, is intra-European differences on how to deal with the crisis in former Yugoslavia. A second focus is Europe's lack of political determination, which is explained by the absence of any EU member's vital national interests in the case of former Yugoslavia.

These views are reflected in the statements of many officials. For instance, Amr Moussa, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, has described the efforts of European mediators as lacking in credibility and taken the view that they would not lead to a resolution of the conflict.⁽¹¹⁶⁾ Ambassador Raof Ghoniem, Former Egyptian Ambassador to Bonn till 1993 and now Assistant to the Foreign Minister for European Affairs, has emphasised Europe's 'political failure' in handling the Yugoslav crisis, attributing this failure to the absence of appropriate European institutions capable of dealing with the new problems of post-Cold War Europe. He has also referred to the differences between European states' national interests, which have led to indecision and underlined Europe's double standards on the issue of human rights: Europe, which talks loudly about the need to respect human rights, is in his view ignoring one of the most dangerous violations of human rights in modern history. European advice to Third World countries on human rights would not command any credibility or seriousness unless Europe upheld human rights in Bosnia, he maintains.⁽¹¹⁷⁾

The joint communiqué issued by the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and Turkey in February 1994 also referred to the tragic violations of human rights at the heart of a continent which prides itself on its commitment to these rights.⁽¹¹⁸⁾

Political commentators of all persuasions in Egypt have reflected similar sentiments. For instance, Ibrahim Nafi', editor of *Al-Ahram*, the semi-official Egyptian daily

newspaper, has pointed out that Europe was fully aware of the tragedies and violations of human rights in Bosnia, and its failure to intervene represented a crime by omission. Said Sonbol, a Christian writing in the daily *Al-Akhbar*, has said that the Bosnia tragedy has unmasked the ugly face of the big powers because there was little difference between Serbian crimes against Muslims and Nazi crimes against Europeans.

It is interesting to analyse Muslim political reactions to various positions of countries in Europe. Greece, Romania and Russia are perceived as outright allies of Serbia. On the other hand small European states such as Belgium and Austria have been perceived more favourably as neutral and more understanding of the Muslims' just cause.⁽¹¹⁹⁾ This is perhaps because these states have not intervened actively in the crisis and have therefore not taken any controversial positions. The same is true of Germany, whose policy has been described in one statement issued by a solidarity committee in support of Bosnia as 'the most honorable of any European country.'⁽¹²⁰⁾ The authors of such a statement must however be unaware of the political and historical constraints which limit German involvement in crisis management. It is ironical that the role of the United Kingdom and France is viewed in a negative way: European states which have done little other than give verbal support for the Bosnians enjoy a positive image in the eyes of Muslim observers, while those which have sent troops to establish a truce and provide humanitarian aid are criticised.

The conspiracy argument

This argument is upheld primarily by persons of religious persuasion. Its point of departure is the fact that the victims are Muslims. The argument has various shades, from the simple statement 'If the Bosnians were Christians or Jews, things would have been different' to the more ideological belief in a 'historical enmity of Europe towards Islam'.

The leading official religious figure in Egypt, Sheikh Al-Azhar, has emphasised the failure of the EC/EU to decide on the issue and related it to religious fanaticism and racial discrimination. Another official religious figure in Egypt, the Secretary-General of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, has noticed that Muslims are usually victimised everywhere -- in Burma, the Philippines, Somalia and Bosnia. The Mufti of Syria, in a Bulletin published by the Committee for Humanitarian Help of Egypt's Medical Association, described the situation in Bosnia as 'a crusade against Muslims in Europe' that unmasks Western claims regarding human rights and religious freedom.

Newspapers in the Gulf have also expressed anger and disdain towards Europe's indecisive position and have seen the Serbian aggression as 'a conspiracy against Islam'. Pictures of the devastation in Sarajevo were prominently shown on television around the region, creating strong feelings against any continuing Serbian aggression.⁽¹²¹⁾ Reflecting such sentiments in the Gulf region, Kuwaiti newspapers have referred to Europe's hostility to Islam. A European bias against Islam and Muslims has been identified and it has been demanded that Saudi Arabia - being the largest country in the region - should ask the UN Security Council to give further consideration to the Islamic dimension of the crisis.⁽¹²²⁾

More explicit manifestations of the argument of conspiracy against Muslims are widely found among militant Islamic groups, which relate Europe's Bosnian policy to long-standing enmity towards Islam. In a book by Mohamed Moro, an Islamic fundamentalist writer in Egypt, the author argues that the situation in Bosnia reflects 'a civilisational conflict' and 'a conflict between right and wrong', forces of right being represented by Islam and forces of evil represented by Western civilisation. Europe's objective is to eradicate Islam from the continent. If the West manages to achieve this, it will turn against Muslims in other parts of the world. The target is not Bosnia-Herzegovina but Islam in Europe. The outlook for Muslims in Europe is gloomy and there are many manifestations, the author argues, to substantiate this view. One manifestation was the obliteration of the Islamic cultural identity in Bulgaria. Another was the pauperization of Muslims in Albania so that they became an easy victim of Christian missionary activities. The Kosovo region will be the scene of the coming confrontation. The cleansing of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be seen in this broader context, the author argues.⁽¹²³⁾

Another Islamic author reminds his readers that the tragedy of Bosnia-Herzegovina is not the first of its kind in the history of Islam. It was preceded by disasters inflicted on Muslims by the Tartars and the crusaders. Other tragic events cited include the fall of Granada and the persecution of Muslims in India and Israel.⁽¹²⁴⁾

'Conspiratorial' views are systematically found in fundamentalist publications. They are part of a world view which is based on the inevitable conflict between Islam and other religions. The crusades, the fall of Andalusia, colonialism, Zionism and communism are all different manifestations of such irreconcilable conflict. These views are essentially ideological; those who hold them place all wars between Muslims and non-Muslims over the centuries within a single context and offer one interpretation for all of them: European enmity towards Islam and Muslims. But why is there this enmity? Some Islamic writers refer to history: at the time of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims invaded Europe and reached the gates of Vienna. Others point to the legacy of the crusades. A third group refers to Islam as representing a moral and spiritual power in the face of decaying Western materialistic civilisation.

Policy implications

If existing ruling regimes and policies in Islamic states were to continue, Europe would not have much reason to worry about its future relations with the Islamic world. Islamic states are mostly weak and divided. Such regimes depend on European help and assistance and do not have much political influence to exercise. The situation, however, remains unstable and open to change, given the domestic crises faced by present regimes in Muslim countries. There are at least three broad areas of policy implications in this regard.

Firstly, the continuing situation in Bosnia is creating an environment that is conducive to the spread of negative perceptions towards Western Europe. Militant Islamic groups have skilfully used the tragedy to cultivate anti-Western and anti-European feelings. European hesitancy and indecisiveness have been exploited to reinforce the image of a Western Europe that does not care much about the fate, let alone human rights, of thousands of Bosnian Muslims. One major argument is that of double

standards; commentators contrast Europe's reaction to Serbian aggression with its policy towards Iraq or Libya.

Against the background of this political climate, in many Islamic countries, especially the rich Gulf states, fund-raising campaigns have been organised in support of the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Islamic countries that enjoy political pluralism, such as Egypt, solidarity committees have been established, which organise press conferences and public meetings on Bosnia.

In August 1993, a delegation representing the committee of solidarity with the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina (controlled by members of the Muslim Brothers Society) managed to meet the French Ambassador in Cairo. The meeting ended on a sour note because of the language used in a letter addressed to the French President, which was deemed unacceptable by the French Ambassador. The letter attacked France's 'shameful' policy and accused French soldiers serving in the UN peacekeeping force of bias against Muslims.⁽¹²⁵⁾ Some months later, the French initiative of January 1994 was described as 'unethical', since it attempted to persuade the United States to put pressure on certain countries to stop supplying arms to Muslims in Bosnia.⁽¹²⁶⁾ British and French statements about withdrawing their forces in the event of danger to their lives, or if a political settlement of the crisis was not reached soon, were interpreted as an 'open invitation to Serbian militias to impose their will by force.'⁽¹²⁷⁾

Secondly, fundamentalist Islamic groups are using the Bosnian tragedy for domestic political purpose. Their objective is twofold: to mobilise more popular support in their struggle for political power and to embarrass moderate ruling regimes by demonstrating their inability to defend 'Muslim Brothers'. The prevalence of these feelings is likely to strengthen militant groups and further weaken moderate ruling regimes. This might explain the policy of Islamic states individually and collectively (through the OIC) to declare their support for the cause of Muslims in Bosnia. The OIC, for example, has established a committee in the UN to follow the issue and coordinate Islamic diplomatic efforts. However, the position of Islamic states has been anything but strong. No one is ready to challenge the UN Security Council resolutions in public but all at least ask for a removal of the arms embargo, and countries like Pakistan and Egypt have offered considerable contributions to the UN peacekeeping force.

Criticism of Islamic states' weak position towards the tragedy is not confined to militant Islamic groups or the like, but is reflected in the print media by a broader sector of political commentators. For instance, Mostafa Amin, the most influential daily columnist in Egypt, has demanded that all Islamic states arm Bosnian soldiers and smuggle weapons to them, warning that, were the present situation to continue, Islamic states would fall one after the other. Mohamed Asfour, a liberal writer, has condemned Islamic states which have not severed diplomatic links with Serbia. Another commentator, Salama A. Salama, has requested Egypt to withdraw its forces from Bosnia. Egypt should not be party to a 'European conspiracy' on Bosnia that was evident if one compared European and other Western reactions to the tragedy in Bosnia with their firm stand against Iraq.⁽¹²⁸⁾ The Lebanese newspaper *Al-Hayat* has also criticised the weak position taken by Islamic governments.

Negative images and perceptions of Europe, are also well served by references in Western publications to the 'clash of civilisations', the 'green peril' and the Islamic 'threat'. These are translated and disseminated by militant Islamic circles as confirmation of their belief in the long-standing conflict between Europe and Islam. European indecisiveness over the Bosnian tragedy is given as material evidence of that conviction.

A third implication relates to the image of Europe as a credible political and security partner. For many, Europe appears unable to make up its mind or to act decisively at times of crisis. The image is one of a Europe that is a weak power which depends heavily on the United States. This is likely to have a wider impact on Europe's role in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It has already been reported in some Arab newspapers, for example, that Saudi Arabia's decision to purchase American rather than European aircraft was a sign of dissatisfaction with Europe. Some commentators argue that Russia and the United States are gaining from European weakness.⁽¹²⁹⁾ Europe had recognised its inability to resolve the Yugoslav problem; it needs Russia to put pressure on Serbia and the United States to entice the Muslims.

On the other hand, all these perceptions must be assessed in the larger context of European-Islamic relations. Relations between states and regions are not unidirectional, nor are they built around a single issue. Thus, however intense Muslim feelings towards Europe's handling of the Bosnian crisis may be, these feelings are not the only, or the most important determinant of relations between Europe and Muslim countries. Europe has multifaceted relations with many Islamic states. For a while, there was a working Euro-Arab dialogue, and European positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict have been perceived as reasonable and more understanding of Arab views compared with those of the Americans. French policies towards Iraq and Iran are also seen as a moderating factor in Muslim-European relations. Thus, both negative and positive perceptions of European policies tend to balance each other. They are not static but rather changeable. Many individual Muslims may have contradictory, coexisting perceptions. For instance, given the history of encounters between Europe and Islamic peoples, Europe is seen in an ambivalent way. It is a model of development and democracy to be emulated yet at the same time a source of military threat and colonial expansion to be resisted. These two types of perception exist simultaneously and each one can be mobilised by certain events.

While it cannot be concluded that Europe's handling of the Bosnian crisis is in itself a primary factor in the weakening of moderate regimes in Islamic states, or that it constrains their ability to cooperate with European states, it remains true that the Bosnian drama has generated certain strong anti-European sentiments among the population in Muslim countries, especially within circles related to Islamic groups. Even undemocratic governments have to take notice of these pressures and, at least verbally, react to them. Since a possible destabilisation of important countries such as Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia is not in Western Europe's interest, a European initiative to include more Muslim troops in UN forces, or a call to lift the arms embargo after or in connection with a settlement, would help a lot.

Finally, the West European position on Bosnia has generated a negative image *par excellence*. For some, it has recalled certain colonial legacies and revived long-standing animosities. For others it presents a conundrum: how can West European

countries, which cherish principles of international law and human rights, tolerate the tragic situation in Bosnia? Images, however, do change and develop in different directions. The long-term implications will depend a lot on how the Bosnian tragedy is brought to an end. A more active European role in reaching a political settlement that is acceptable to the Bosnian government would help change Europe's image. Efforts made towards Bosnia's reconstruction and economic development will be crucial in this process. Beyond the question of Bosnia, the continuation of active European support for the Middle East peace process, the provision of technical and economic assistance to the newly established Palestinian authority, and the improvement of preferential trade and cooperation agreements with key Islamic states will be of equal importance.

1. Research fellow at the Institute for Security Studies of WEU.
2. Senior Staff Member, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica.
3. For a detailed discussion, see F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Washington, Moscow, and the Balkans: Strategic Retreat or Re-engagement?', in F. Stephen Larrabee, *The Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security After the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1994), pp. 201-218.
4. See Barton Gellman, 'Defense Planners Making Case Against Intervention in Yugoslavia', *Washington Post*, 13 June 1992; Barton Gellman, 'Military Uneasy at Balkan Commitment', *Ibid*, 2 July 1992; Colin Powell, 'Why Generals Get Nervous', *New York Times*, 8 October 1992. Also Michael Gordon, 'Powell Delivers Resounding No on Use of Limited Force in Bosnia', *New York Times*, 28 September 1992.
5. Several key advisers, such as National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State (later Secretary of State) Lawrence Eagleburger had served in Yugoslavia, and had first-hand experience with the depth and complexity of ethnic conflicts there. This experience reinforced their general belief that the United States should avoid getting deeply entangled in the Yugoslav conflict.
6. See James B. Steinberg, *The Role of European Institutions in Security After the Cold War: Some Lessons From Yugoslavia* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, N-3445-FF, 1992).
7. Gwen Ifill, 'Clinton Takes Aggressive Stance on Role of U.S. in Bosnia Conflict', *New York Times*, 10 August 1992.
8. See Ronald D. Asmus, 'The Rise or Fall of Multilateralism: America's New Foreign Policy and What it Means for Europe', a paper delivered at a conference on 'Security in Europe After the Cold War: What Role for International Institutions', sponsored by the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 10-11 December 1993. See also his *The New U.S. Strategic Debate* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-240-A, 1993).
9. For background, see James B. Steinberg, *An Ever Closer Union: European Integration and its Implications for the Future of U.S.-European Relations* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4177-A, 1993), pp. 50-67. Also Scott A. Harris, James B. Steinberg, *European Defense and the Future of Transatlantic Cooperation* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-276-USDP, 1993), especially pp. 43-4.
10. See Steven Greenhouse, 'U.S. Rejects French Proposal to Impose a Peace in Bosnia', *New York Times*, 12 May 1994. Also, Thomas W. Lippman, 'U.S., France Continue Jousting on Bosnia Policy', *Washington Post*, 12 May 1994.
11. Elaine Sciolino, 'Christopher Fails to Obtain Europe's Backing on Bosnia', *New York Times*, 7 May 1993.
12. See G. Trangis, 'Ni splendide isolement, ni réintégration', *Le Monde*, 14 July 1993. G. Trangis is the pseudonym of a very senior French official.

13. See Elaine Sciolino, 'U.S. Rejects Plea to Act in Bosnia', *New York Times*, 25 January 1994. Also William Drozdiak, 'U.S. Rejects French Plea for Tougher Bosnia Action', *Washington Post*, 25 January 1993.

14. See, for instance, the article by General Bernard Trainor (retired), 'Gorazde Cease Fire is Irrelevant', *New York Times*, 27 April 1993.

15. See Michael Gordon, 'U.S. Officials Debate Policy to Halt Serbs', *New York Times*, 6 April 1994.

16. See in particular the article by former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann, 'The Balkan Imperative', *Washington Post*, 24 April 1994.

17. On 11 August 1994, the Senate voted 58-42 to approve an amendment sponsored by Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole (Republican, Kansas) and Joseph Lieberman (Democrat, Connecticut) that would order the President to lift the arms embargo unilaterally by 15 November 1994. At the same time, the Senate also voted to approve a conflicting amendment sponsored by Sam Nunn (Democrat, Georgia) and Senate Majority Leader, George Mitchell (Democrat, Maine), which called on the President to lift the embargo if the Bosnian Serbs have not approved the peace plan by 31 October.

18. Steven Greenhouse, 'October deadline is cited to end Bosnian embargo', *New York Times*, 12 August 1994. Also Norman Kempster, 'Clinton to urge end of Bosnian embargo', *Los Angeles Times*, 12 August 1994.

19. See Alan Tonelson, 'Beyond Left and Right', *The National Interest*, Winter, 1993/94, pp. 3-17. Also Ronald D. Asmus, 'The new US strategic debate,' p. 17.

20. In a speech at the US Naval Academy at the end of May 1994, for instance, Clinton told the Academy graduates, 'We cannot solve every outburst of civil strife or militant nationalism by sending in our forces. We cannot turn away from them. But our interests are not sufficiently at stake in so many of them to justify a commitment of our forces.' See David Lauter, 'Clinton takes offensive on Bosnia, assails critics' "Simplistic ideas", *Los Angeles Times*, 26 May 1994.

21. See Elaine Sciolino, 'New U.S. Peacekeeping Policy Deemphasizes Role of the UN', *New York Times*, 6 May 1994. Also Doyle McManus and Art Pine, 'Administration Assessing Hard Lessons of Somalia', *Los Angeles Times*, 25 March 1994.

22. The new, more restrictive approach to peacekeeping was underscored by the Administration's initial refusal to authorize the immediate dispatch of 5,500 peacekeeping troops to Rwanda. The Administration later agreed to the dispatch of peacekeeping troops -- but only after its initial concerns had been alleviated. See Douglas Jehl, 'U.S. Is Showing a New Caution on Peacekeeping Missions', *New York Times*, 7 May 1994.

23. See Nicole Gnesotto, 'The Lessons of Yugoslavia', *Chaillot Paper* 14 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, March 1994), p. 15.

24. See in particular his speech to the annual conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'NATO's Role in a changing Europe', *Adelphi Paper* 284 (London: Brassey's for the IISS), pp. 97-104. The term 'out of area' is, in fact, no longer used in most NATO discussions, which reflects NATO's expanded mandate.

25. For a detailed discussion, see F. Stephen Larrabee, *East European Security After the Cold War* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-254-USDP, 1994), chapter 7, especially pp. 146-151. Also Philip H. Gordon, *French Security Policy After the Cold War* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-4229, 1992) especially pp. 47-51. For a French view, see Pierre Lellouche, 'France in Search of Security', *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1993, pp. 122-131.

26. The Iranian delivery of a large shipment of arms to Bosnia in May 1994 highlights the dangers in this regard. The delivery was an important coup for Iranian radicals. It not only advanced Iran's position in the Muslim world, but upstaged more moderate Muslim states such as Turkey and Pakistan, who have sought to play by the international rules. See Graham Fuller, 'Iran's Coup in Europe', *Washington Post*, 15 May 1994.

27. Head of Section, Institute of Europe, Moscow.

28. See Allen Lynch and Reneo Lukic, 'Russian foreign policy and the wars in the former Yugoslavia', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 15 October 1993.

29. Andrei Kozyrev, 'Transfiguration or Kafkaesque metamorphosis?', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 20 August 1992.

30. They drafted the Supreme Soviet's resolutions on the attitude of the Russian Federation towards the Yugoslav Crisis (December 1992) and on the Yugoslav Conflict (February 1993). As early as June 1992, Ambartsumov, chairing the hearings of the Parliamentary Committee on International Affairs criticised Kozyrev's anti-Serbian line. See *Izvestia*, 29 June 1993.

31. *ITAR-TASS*, 30 January 1993.

32. Ludmilla Telen had already argued at the end of 1992: 'By all appearances, due to various reasons, Russia has acted too rashly in pledging her unconditional support for the UN sanctions.' See *Moscow News*, no. 48, 1992.

33. Sergei Karaganov offered a plausible explanation: 'Almost nobody is interested in Serbia here, but the opposition is playing it up to make things difficult for the administration, and the administration has to bow to that.' See *Financial Times*, 20 April 1993.

34. Vladimir Lukin in the *Washington Post*, 3 April 1994.

35. See as an example Michael Dewar, 'Intervention in Bosnia -- the case against', *The World Today*, February 1993.
36. See John Lough, 'Constraints on Russian responses to the Yugoslav crisis', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 1993.
37. See Suzanne Crow, 'Russia asserts its strategic agenda', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 17 December 1993; 'Russia reaches out', *The Economist*, 26 February 1993. For Gorbachev's views see his article 'NATO's ultimatum was the worst possible solution for the Bosnian crisis', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 22 February 1994.
38. See Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, 'Whether to bomb in Bosnia?', *Moscow News*, no. 4, 1994. For Kozyrev's rebuttal of an 'ultimatum' from Zhirinovskiy, see *Izvestia*, 26 January 1994.
39. Vitaly Churkin, 'How the war was averted', *Moscow News*, no. 8, 1994.
40. Edward Mortimer, 'UN looks to Churkin's diplomacy', *Financial Times*, 13 April 1994.
41. This becomes evident just by comparing the headlines in *Izvestia* (22 February) 'Arrival of Russian paratroopers eased tensions in Sarajevo' and in *The Independent* (19 February) 'How the Russians stole a march on the West to give "peace" to Sarajevo.'
42. Konstantin Kirjukhin and Alexander Lukin made the point that 'the Serbs were *de factos* sacrificed to European unity.' See *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 26 August 1992.
43. Predrag Simic, 'Civil War in Yugoslavia: from local conflict to European crisis', in Armand Clesse & Andrei Kortunov (eds.), 'The Political and Strategic Implications of the State Crisis in Central and Eastern Europe', *IEIS*, Luxembourg, 1993, p. 214. As Håkan Wiberg noted, the very date of the recognition -- 6 April, which was the 51st anniversary of the German attack and bombardment of Belgrade -- did tremendous harm. See his 'Divided States and divided nations as a security problem -- the case of Yugoslavia', Working Papers, Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen, 1992, no. 14, p. 52.
44. As cited by Lynch & Lukic, *op. cit.*, p. 31. See also Marie-Janine Calic, 'The Serbian Question in International Politics', *Aussenpolitik*, no. 2, 1994, p. 150.
45. The article by Ronald Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee 'Building a new NATO' (*Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1993) certainly played a relevant role in this context.
46. See Sergei Karaganov, 'NATO's expansion leads to Russia's isolation', *Moscow News*, no. 38, 17 September 1993.
47. *The Economist*, 26 February 1994, p. 21.

48. See Misha Glenny, 'Hope for Bosnia', *The New York Review of Books*, 7 April 1994, pp. 6-7.
49. See as an example of the complexity of the Western debate, Dan Smith, 'Real Intervention, Unreal Debate', *War Report*, February/March 1993.
50. *Izvestia*, 26 February 1994.
51. See Yevgeni Ambartsumov, 'The echo of bombings in Bosnia', *Moskovskie Novosti*, no. 15, 1994.
52. For an example, see Jonathan Eyal, 'Letting Russia Draw the Line', *The Independent*, 21 February 1994.
53. For more elaborate analysis see Pavel Baev, 'Peacekeeping as a challenge to European borders', *Security Dialogue*, June 1993, pp. 137-150.
54. Restructuring of mobile forces and less demand due to cessation of fighting in several 'hot spots' allowed the General Staff to lift its objections in early 1994. See Pavel Baev, 'Russia's Rapid Reaction Forces: politics and pitfalls', *Bulletin of Arms Control*, no. 9, February 1993.
55. See Roy Allison, 'Peacekeeping in the Soviet successor states', forthcoming *Chaillot Paper*.
56. See *Rossiiskie Vesti*, 5 April 1994.
57. See Frederick Bonnart, 'Bosnia: an emerging Russian view might want war to go on', *International Herald Tribune*, 20 April 1994.
58. See Suzanne Crow, 'Russia adopts a more active policy', *RFE/RL Research Report*, no. 12, 19 March 1993; Susan Richards, 'There's more to It than Slav fellow feeling', *The Independent*, 20 February 1994.
59. See Yevgeni Fadeev, 'The Bosnian Triangle', *Pravda*, 18 March 1994.
60. Shock is a plausible explanation for such bizarre statements as that of Deputy Prime Minister Shakhrai -- that NATO air strikes were aimed at the positions of Russian reformists. See *RFE/RL News Brief*, 11-15 April 1994.
61. For a condensed 'Yes' argument see Sergei Karaganov, 'We should be first at the NATO's door', *Izvestia*, 24 February 1994.
62. Andranik Migranyan, one of the most vociferous advocates of 'great-powerness', presented 'No' arguments on PFP with a view to NATO's involvement in Bosnia in his article 'Why join if it is better not to?', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 15 March 1994. See also Viacheslav Nikonov, 'Partnership for NATO', *Moscow News*, no. 14, 1994.
63. See 'A tantrum postponed', *The Economist*, 16 April 1994.

64. Even Vitaly Churkin allowed himself a dose of scepticism. See the interview with him under the headline 'Negotiations as a goal in itself' in *Moscow News*, no. 1, 1994.

65. Nicole Gnesotto, 'Lessons of Yugoslavia', *Chaillot Paper* 14 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, March 1994), p. 24.

66. See Kirchberg Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers, 9 May 1994.

67. It is not even mentioned in an attempt by Foreign Minister Kozyrev to introduce a new Russian concept for all-European partnership. See *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 2 March 1994.

68. See Annika Savill, 'The Good, the Bad and the French', *The Independent*, 26 May 1994.

69. Researcher, Department of War Studies, King's College, London.

70. 'Gorazdes Fall bedruekt alle postkommunistischen Staaten', *Die Welt*, 19 April 1994.

71. The Baltic republics and Czechoslovakia in particular, which relied on international recognition themselves, perceived the EC's delay in recognition of Yugoslav republics as an obstacle to finding an end to the crisis. Countries struggling with minority problems within their borders have adopted a critical attitude, portraying recognition as a costly 'blunder'.

72. For Romanian reaction, see *BBC SWB EE*, 4 and 21 March 1994; for Slovak reaction, see *BBC SWB EE*, 12 March 1994; for the Hungarian response, see Jeszenszky's statement in *BBC SWB EE*, 4 March 1994. Other governments responded in a similar manner.

73. For a discussion of positions of neighbouring countries, see Andrey Georgiev and Emil Tzenkov, 'The wars in former Yugoslavia and their impact on Bulgaria and Romania', *Center for the Study of Democracy*, Sofia, March 1993. In response to the UNSC decision to send Turkish peacekeepers to Bosnia's UNPROFOR, Bulgaria's president sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General protesting against the participation of Balkan countries in these operations. *BBC SWB EE*, 14 April 1994, *Rzeczpospolita* 25 March 1994.

74. See Monika Wohlfeld, 'Poland's peacekeeping contribution in former Yugoslavia: a step towards NATO membership', proceedings of the International Conference on Armed Conflicts in the Balkans and European Security, Ljubljana, April 1993. The January 1994 NATO Partnership for Peace initiative further emphasised the importance of peacekeeping cooperation.

75. See 'Security for Europe Project: Final Report', *Brown University*, December 1993, p. 41.

76. This was partly due to moral concerns and partly to the fact that some of the Central European countries saw themselves in a difficult position where arms purchases were concerned.

77. In addition to the repercussions of sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro, Central European countries continue to feel the effects of similar measures imposed by the international community on Libya and Iraq.

78. For Romanian and Hungarian reactions, see *BBC SWB EE*, 6 April 1994; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5 April and 19 May 1994; *The Wall Street Journal*, 25 February 1994.

79. See *BBC SWB EE*, 11 March 1994.

80. See *BBC SWB EE*, 14 April 1994; *BBC SWB EE*, 2 March 1994. Bulgaria's National Assembly Committee on National Security chairman Nikolay Slatinsky criticised the threat of air strikes in the case of Sarajevo, fearing further instability and risks for the safety of the Bulgarian minority in eastern Serbia. *BBC SWB EE*, 14 April 1994. There have also been demonstrations in Bulgaria protesting against the NATO decision on possible air strikes and disagreeing with Bulgarian foreign policy. *BBC SWB EE*, 23 February 1994.

81. See *BBC SWB EE*, 13 April 1994.

82. Bosnian refugees in Hungary are partly funded by the UN, but the financial burden on the country is still considerable.

83. Unlike 1992, currently 'Hungarians who feel a danger from Serbia do *not* have confidence that the West would act to protect Hungary', *Security for Europe Project*, Final Report, p. 19.

84. The Communiqué of the WEU Forum of Consultation at Ministerial level in Rome on 20 May 1993, where WEU and Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania had agreed to cooperate on making the embargo on the Danube more effective, mentions that 'Ministers . . . agreed that, were any country to suffer from aggressive action as a consequence of their support for UN-mandated operations, this would be a matter of direct concern to the international community'.

85. See *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 8-9 January 1994.

86. Hungary applied for EU membership on 1 April, and Poland applied on 7 April 1994.

87. Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus said recently that, while his government is interested in integration, it does not want a European union. See 'Sifting through the past in search of an identity', *International Herald Tribune*, 25 May 1994.

88. Countries without minority problems, particularly the Czech Republic, Poland and even Bulgaria, saw the plan as largely irrelevant. The Baltic countries were afraid that the conference could work against their interests and wanted to see a discussion of the

legal and economic issues related to the Soviet occupation as part of the negotiations, but have viewed the proposal with interest, because it put them on an equal footing with other Central European countries.

89. See 'Europeans' security talks expose broad differences', *International Herald Tribune*, 27 May 1994.

90. See *BBC SWB EE*, 30 May and 1 June 1994.

91. Security for Europe Project, p. 26.

92. *BBC SWB EE*, 13 April 1994.

93. See 'Eastern Europe caught up in new arms race', *The Financial Times*, 12 January 1994; *BBC SWB EE*, 17 February 1994.

94. Alfred A. Reisch, 'Hungary acquires MiG-29s from Russia', *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol. 2, no. 33, 20 August 1993, p. 49.

95. For Hungary's resistance as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council against attempts to stiffen sanctions, see Jonathan Sunley, 'Hungarian Struggles With East Europe's Security Vacuum', *The Wall Street Journal*, 25 February 1994.

96. See for example F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Russia and the Balkans: toward re-engagement?', paper presented at the conference 'Russia in Europe: Emerging Security Agenda', Moscow, 11-13 March 1994.

97. Nikolay Slatinsky, 'Euroatlantic security: One Viewpoint from Bulgaria', *North Atlantic Assembly Defence and Security Committee*, October 1993, p. 7.

98. Security for Europe Project, p. 26.

99. See for example the address by former Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka to the Council of Europe, 13 May 1993.

100. See Jonathan Sunley, op. cit.

101. See H. E. Sergiu Celac, 'Romania, Central Europe and the Balkans', speech to the European Atlantic Group, House of Commons, 30 November 1993.

102. Professor of International Relations, Institute of Economics and Social Sciences, Bilkent University, Ankara.

103. For official views, see Prime Minister Süleyman Demiral, 'Turkey and the New World Order' (in Turkish), text of statement at the Press Conference, 11 December 1991, Ankara, p. 11; T. C. Dileri Bakanlg (Turkish Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), text of speech by Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin before the Turkish Grand National Assembly during the budget debate for Fiscal Year 1992, (in Turkish), 19 March 1992, Ankara, p. 15; United Nations Security Council, letter dated 14 August 1992 from Ambassador Mustafa Akin, Permanent Delegation of Turkey to the United

Nations, addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/C 24 446, 4 August 1992.

104. Turkish Grand National Assembly (referred to hereafter as TGNA), *Journal of Minutes* (in Turkish), vol. 16, 94th Session, Extraordinary Session on the Question of Cyprus and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 25 August 1992, Ankara, p. 92.

105. As the Ottomans did not pursue forcible methods of conversion, the adoption of Islam by the Bogomils and others was an act of free choice. L. S. Stavriano, *The Balkans Since 1453* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 89-90.

106. Interview with Burhan Ekinçi, Turkish Ambassador to Belgrade in 1991-92, *Milliyet*(Istanbul daily), 15-17 June 1993.

107. See the Government's statement by Deputy Prime Minister Erdal nönü at the TGNA's Extraordinary Session on Cyprus and Bosnia-Herzegovina, TGNA, *Journal of Minutes*, op. cit., pp. 88-101; statement by Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin at the 47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 25 September 1992, New York; statement by Ambassador Mustafa Akin, Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations, before the United Nations Security Council, 13 November 1992, New York, and his press statement on Security Council Resolution 787 of 16 November 1992, New York; statements by Mr Tahsin Burcuolu, Turkish chargé d'Affaires to the United Nations, at the Security Council on the Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 19 April 1993 and 29 June 1993; statement by Ambassador Inal Batu, Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations, at the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, New York, 4 June 1993.

108. For the pressure from the opposition, see *TGNA Journal of Minutes*, Extraordinary Session . . . op. cit., pp. 36-50; *TGNA Journal of Minutes*, 55th Session, op. cit., pp. 340-50.

109. See Kenneth Katzman, Julie Kim, and Carol Magdalovitz, 'Bosnia-Herzegovina: support from Islamic countries', *CRS Report for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 19 June 1993, p. 2.

110. Bangladesh 1,220 personnel (one mechanized infantry battalion); Iran one complete division up to 10,000 personnel (including medical and engineering units); Malaysia 1,500 personnel (one mechanized regimental group); Pakistan 3,000 personnel (including two mechanized units); Palestine 1,000 personnel (including medical and engineering units); Tunisia 1,000 personnel (one battalion); Turkey up to a brigade.

111. Katzman et. al., op. cit., p. 2.

112. Genel Bakan Prof. Dr Necmeddin Erbakan'n Aç Konumas, Refah Partisi Dördüncü Büyük Kongre (The Opening Speech by Professor Dr Necmeddin Erbakan, Leader of the Welfare Party, at the Fourth Grand Congress of the Party, Ankara, October 1993), pp. 71-2.

113. Dean, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University.

114. ⁰See for example *Al-Ahram*, 31 December 1993.
115. ⁰*Al-Ahram*, 22 December 1993.
116. ⁰*Al-Ahram*, 18 July 1993.
117. ⁰*Al-Anbaa*, 9 March 1994.
118. ⁰*Al-Ahram*, 8 February 1994.
119. ⁰*Al-Ahram*, 18 January 1994.
120. ⁰*Al-Ahram Weekly*, 5 August 1993.
121. ⁰See also in this context, 'Gulf Muslims angry over Sarajevo death', *Reuters*, 6 February 1994.
122. ⁰*Al-Siyassa*, 27 November 1993.
123. ⁰Mohamed Moro, *In Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Cairo, 1992).
124. ⁰Mohamed Qutb, *Lessons from Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Cairo, 1994).
125. ⁰*Al-Ahram Weekly*, 5 August 1993.
126. ⁰*Al-Hayat*, 28 January 1994.
127. ⁰*Al-Ahram*, 16 January 1994.
128. ⁰See Salama A. Salama's comment in *Al-Ahram*, 16 July 1992.
129. ⁰For example, in *Al-Wafd*, 25 February 1994 and *Al-Anba'*, 18 February 1994.