

Chaillot Papers

- 14 -

March 1994

LESSONS OF
YUGOSLAVIA

——— *Nicole Gnesotto* ———

INSTITUT
D'ETUDES
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INSTITUTE
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WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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ISSN 1017-7566

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PREFACE

As a member of the first team of research fellows at this Institute, from 1990 to 1993, Nicole Gnesotto made an invaluable contribution to the Institute's work. After leaving the Institute, she kindly agreed to write a paper on developments in former Yugoslavia. We are glad to publish this essay which, in a stimulating and original way, raises a number of important questions on the lessons to be learnt from the developments in former Yugoslavia and Western policy reactions.

This *chaillot Paper* was, with the exception of two footnotes, completed in December 1993 and therefore does not take into account events that have occurred since that date, although the essence of the paper's arguments remains unchanged by those events.

John Roper
Paris, March 1994

INTRODUCTION: FROM COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO INEQUALITY IN MATTERS OF WAR AND PEACE

More than two years of war and atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, involving nearly twenty million Europeans within a piece of territory only two hours by air from Brussels, reveal first and foremost two obvious facts: for Europe, the end of the Cold War signifies the beginning of real wars; and collective security in Europe simply does not exist.

It is now approaching a century since an assassination in Sarajevo precipitated a world war; today, the destruction of Sarajevo signifies merely the destruction of Sarajevo. For forty years, communist aggression against any European country could have implied nuclear escalation on a world scale; today, a communist leader believes he can swallow up whole regions of states which have been duly recognised by the international community with impunity, or almost so. These two historical references have nothing in common and do not imply any nostalgia for the old order -- whether pre-democratic or post-Yalta. Yet they do on the other hand illustrate the major strategic discontinuity that exists today in Europe, where war zones can be found side by side with areas of peace in relatively watertight compartments. This security differential increases as one travels from the west to the east or south of the continent: London can be considered more secure than Bonn, Paris more than Rome, and both cities more secure than Warsaw, Budapest or Sofia. *A fortiori*, the territory of the United States today enjoys almost total security from the effects of nearly all imaginable regional crises. Moreover, the usual rhetoric on the identity of European and American values and interests, and protestations of pan-European solidarity, take on merely a political character since the strategic reality is, on the contrary, one of disparity and imbalance -- in short, of inequality in matters of war and peace.

It thus took only six months for Slobodan Milosevic to destroy the illusion of the universal collective security system which the Gulf war was considered to have established as an alternative to the Cold War system of opposing blocs. Moreover, why the exemplary value of the United Nations coalition which united all against Saddam Hussein did not extend to the banks of the Danube remains a mystery: clearly Mr Milosevic has not included in his nationalist calculations the deterrent lessons that the Gulf war was considered to have signalled to anyone who in future disrupted the new world order. On the world scale, collective security is thus still an arbitrary system which is real and effective for certain areas of crisis but illusory and impossible for others. In Europe in particular, depending on the degree of optimism displayed towards the continent's future, it may be seen as nothing more than an inaccessible myth or a vague objective for the future.

The foundations for achieving such a system are today absent. If the Yugoslav war is to remain as a salutary example, it will be above all because of the contradictions it has revealed in the post-Cold War world and in Western strategies⁽¹⁾ for ensuring world stability. Lack of agreement on principles and the interpretation of international law, dilemmas within democracies regarding the use of force, the return to national reflexes rather than collective solidarity and the inappropriateness of institutions have

all combined in Yugoslavia to condemn the international community to impotence and ambiguity. For the European Community in particular, which was the first to experience these contradictions, the importance of the issue goes well beyond the bureaucratic battles over its future, its shape or the ultimate objectives of the European Union. The Maastricht process will in all probability be neither weakened nor strengthened by the Yugoslav war. It is also certain that neither will a semblance of pan-European order be rebuilt unless a solidly based security architecture is worked out. The real challenge facing the Europeans concerns the age-old tension between strategic stability and the defence of principles, between order and liberty, between the manageable and the unacceptable.

LESSONS OF A WESTERN ANTI-STRATEGY

There is too much horror and tragedy in the Yugoslav crisis to allow one simply to speak derisively of Western prudence, the cynicism displayed by a few or the general powerlessness to act. Never has the management of a crisis been so open to the criticism, the simple observation, of such flagrant inconsistency and contradiction. When, however, the decision-makers themselves recognise that such criticism is well-founded, while at the same time persisting in the same paradoxical actions until they reach all-too-predictable situations of deadlock, there is a puzzle that neither the blindness of our governments nor the legendary complexity of the Balkans alone can explain. Other analysts have demonstrated perfectly this strategy of gradually increasing involvement in which all the Western democracies found themselves trapped.⁽²⁾ Nor is there any senior political or military official who cannot reasonably demonstrate that 'there was not any good solution to the Yugoslav war.'

Must history therefore conclude that there exist types of conflict in post-communist Europe that are in absolute contradiction with traditional models of armed conflict and absolutely resistant to any just and lasting resolution? Must it be admitted that Western impotence was and remains normal -- not to be condemned nor, it follows, corrected -- in the face of this type of ethno-nationalist conflict? Leaving aside all polemics, awkward questions none the less have to be asked about Western management of the Yugoslav crisis: how was it that the greatest democracies in the world were unable to define any other strategy than that of progressively doing what it had been decided at the beginning not to do, maintaining positions even though it was perfectly well known that the effect of this would be catastrophic, and refusing to do what was known to be necessary?

These contradictions have been the subject of impressive analyses regarding the role of the European Community,⁽³⁾ but are far from being specific to the Twelve. It is useful to recall the main convolutions. Firstly, as far as a political solution was concerned, the initial position (at the Brioni Accords of July 1991) was to keep the Yugoslav Federation in being. Nearly eight months later, following the conference at The Hague and the likely recognition of the Slovene and Croatian Republics, the European Community, followed shortly by the international community, acknowledged the end of the Federation and recognised -- despite the known risks in the case of Macedonia -- the existence of three out of the five new states. Nevertheless, the consequences of such recognition were perfectly predictable and expected. On 10 December 1991, in a letter to the Twelve, the Secretary-General of the United Nations referred again to the risks of the war escalating in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, as Henry Kissinger was later to note, 'The Western democracies, with the best of intentions, made the likely inevitable.'⁽⁴⁾ A similar development took shape in the summer of 1993 regarding Bosnia, when the unitary, confederal solution contained in the Vance-Owen peace plan was *de facto* abandoned in the corridors in Geneva and replaced by the new Owen-Stoltenberg plan, even though all were at pains to maintain its rhetorical legitimacy in law. Second, on the question of principles, the international community kept to its line of refusing to accept *faits accomplis* and the changing of frontiers by force: in summer 1993, however, all were ready to recognise the *fait accompli* of territorial gains made by the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia. In reality the principle can only be saved if the victim

itself assumes the responsibility for its betrayal: is it not from Mr Izetbegovic that salvation is expected to come, through his acceptance of the *fait accompli* and recognition of the legitimacy of the frontier changes imposed by Serb and Croat forces on his republic? Finally, regarding the method, the West chose two approaches, which they have continually repudiated in practice while retaining them in their rhetoric. The first was mediation and impartiality in the conduct of negotiations, which presupposes dialogue with all the parties involved and the refusal to designate an aggressor: but, from November 1991, the first economic sanctions were applied to Serbia-Montenegro, against whom the West was subsequently to invoke chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations,⁽⁵⁾ which is precisely aimed at enforcement, while pretending to maintain its role of mediator and refusing to denounce the aggressor by name. Yet in August 1992, while chairing the London Conference, prime minister John Major recognised that 'We cannot rely on the goodwill of the parties . . . we need pressure.'⁽⁶⁾ In vain. There was also the refusal to intervene militarily ('not to add war to war', in the words of François Mitterrand), which was not to prevent, for example, either the resolution prohibiting overflights of Bosnian airspace (816) or the resolution authorising air operations in support of United Nations troops in Sarajevo and safe areas (836). Through the expedient of humanitarian aid and peacekeeping missions, nearly 24,000 blue helmets⁽⁷⁾ are today deployed in the former Yugoslavia. Numerous analyses have already stressed the paradoxical nature of their role: indirectly, their presence would render any large-scale enforcement operation against Serbia impossible, but it also carries the risk of increasing military involvement, as was the case in Somalia. Moreover, there is no proof that refusing to become involved militarily will not finally result in an obligation to go to war because of a threat to the equilibrium of the Balkans as a whole as a result of the extension of the conflict. In total the West will be able to boast of three successes as a result of the strategy it has followed: the preservation of European unity and cooperation between Russia and the United States, the non-extension of the conflict (as at today) and the protection, through humanitarian aid, of hundreds of thousands of civilians (but with the known contradictions that have ensued). All other objectives have been either forgotten, modified from day to day or saved through rhetorical devices which are hardly convincing even to their authors.

What is true for the Western countries collectively, whether in the framework of NATO or the European Community, is also true for them individually. Great Britain, which showed the greatest concern that it might become enmeshed in peacekeeping operations, has deployed over 2,000 troops in the former Yugoslavia. France, the country most hostile to any anti-Serb policy, has had to face the facts and force the pace on sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs at the United Nations. Apart from a refusal to accept any extension of the conflict in the Balkans, the United States has never defined any coherent policy on the former Yugoslavia, and has found itself obliged to embrace each of its partners' contradictions without helping to resolve any of them.

Why, then? Why and how is it that there has been such inconsistency in Western strategy? After all, nobody can really maintain that there has been a carefully reasoned, well articulated policy of non-intervention in the Balkan crises. If it had been initially decided to adopt such a policy -- and after all it could have been conceived and justified -- it would have been necessary to remain deaf to the clamour of public opinion, deliberately choose abstention, keep to one's word and allow the

situation to follow its course, even to the death of the last combatant. This strategy of abstention was, however, made impossible precisely because of the very contradictions contained in the Yugoslav conflict, the United Nations and in our own Western democracies, just as a strategy of mediation did not stand up to developments in the crisis itself.

The first explanation of this is to be found in the particular circumstances. The analysis of any period of transition requires a certain amount of genius if the criteria on which it is based are not to lag a decade behind the march of history. It would seem that that genius was lacking on this occasion. Earlier, it had taken time for the Gorbachev phenomenon to be recognised in Western chancelleries as something other than an umpteenth ruse on the part of Soviet diplomatic reason. A similar time lag between the event and realisation of its significance was seen in the case of Boris Yeltsin's arrival, or again, German unification. That is why the European Community was still in the process of negotiating a series of economic 'sticks' and 'carrots' with the Yugoslav prime minister, Mr Markovic, in the spring and summer of 1991, while the federal consensus collapsed under Slovene and Croat pressure on 23 June. However, the agreement on economic cooperation was not to be denounced by the Twelve until six months later. Will this inappropriate economic approach to a politico-military crisis finally be repeated by a second out-of-step strategy, this time a short-term strategy applied to a major upheaval in Balkan equilibrium? Trapped by circumstances, Yugoslavia also found itself sidelined by concerns over the former Soviet Union and ratification of the Maastricht treaty. A large part of the West's initial attitude to Belgrade is explained by the obsessive fear of any repetition, in the Soviet Union, of the collapse of Yugoslavia, and nobody was prepared to risk sending the Russians the message that Western military intervention was a possibility.⁽⁸⁾ Among the Europeans, the success of the Maastricht treaty was equally an absolute priority, and up until the last moment its signature by Greece was conditional upon the Twelve not recognising Macedonia.⁽⁹⁾

Other reasons are structurally connected with the inadequacies of international law, as codified and imposed by the United Nations, which only recognises (and this is a tautology) inter-nation relations. When, in November 1991, the Community rescinded its agreement on cooperation and trade, it was obliged to deal with Yugoslavia since none of the republics had at that time been recognised, and it required great diplomatic subtlety subsequently to exclude, through 'compensatory measures', all the republics except Serbia-Montenegro. Article 2.7 of the charter of the United Nations, which deals with the non-interference by the United Nations in a state's domestic affairs, paralyses [such action].⁽¹⁰⁾ It explains in part the initial reticence of the United Nations to become too involved in what is not quite a civil war and not yet a war between states. This legal tradition may also account for the eagerness on the part of German diplomacy and the republics themselves to obtain international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia (which was to make it possible to escape from ambiguity and return to recognised state arrangements) and bears witness to their illusions (a recognised state is not necessarily a defended state).

Not that there is anything new about these shortcomings in international law, as the League of Nations discovered to its cost. The timid advances, in particular regarding the right to interfere or the duty to assist, which were tried in the case of the Kurds and then in Somalia, have since proved to be neither easy nor universally agreed. For

various reasons, including the immediate suspicion on the part of Third World countries regarding anything which looks like Western imperialism in disguise, approval of the UN operations in Mogadishu (in December 1992) and humanitarian actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (following the adoption of Resolution 770 of 13 August 1992) was based upon chapter VII (actions with respect to 'threats to the peace'), and not on any right of the international community to intervene on humanitarian grounds.

Equally, everything has already been said about the legal non-existence of minorities, whose case is neither simply one of human rights nor of the right to self-determination. The problem of minorities is in effect a product of the political vacuum which is a direct consequence of this sacrosanct status of nation-states in international law. Insisting that nation-states are the only legitimate actors amounts to either marginalising the rights of minorities or leaving them no choice but to take the plunge and claim their independence. It was precisely that sequence of events which occurred in the former Yugoslavia. When the Badinter Commission reported its conclusions on the question of recognising the republics of the former Federation on 11 January 1992, it based them both on the right of peoples to self-determination (regarding Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and on the civil rights of minorities (in the case of the Serbs in Croatia and Albanians in Kosovo). The right of the former to national independence and international recognition was recognised, albeit conditionally; the latter must wait for the host state to recognise international conventions on human rights and minorities. The Serbs in Croatia and then those in Bosnia were to refuse this logic of the choice facing minorities and demand the equal treatment of all peoples even if in this case their secessionist claim was based on racist concepts which were in absolute contradiction to international law.

It is but a short step from law to principles, and the same sense of inadequacy can be found. The international community has had the unhappy experience of this in the former Yugoslavia and has been reluctant up till now to draw the conclusions from it: together, the Helsinki Final Act and the charter of Paris, solemnly signed in November 1990 are still regarded as the bible of the democratic principles that are supposed to ensure the stability of the new, greater Europe. And yet were not the two main pillars of Helsinki -- the right to self-determination and the territorial integrity of states -- proved contradictory, even incompatible, following the sudden thaw in East-West relations and German unification? The question of the former GDR had, almost alone,⁽¹¹⁾ concentrated attention on, and for forty years justified acceptance of the principles of self-determination within Europe without any contradictions tarnishing its value and justice in the eyes of the West. The fact that at Helsinki in 1973 the USSR obtained a compensating clause on the territorial integrity of states never led the democracies to modify this principle of self-determination to the detriment of the rights of the German people. Better still, German self-determination presupposed the - - admittedly pacific -- disappearance of the GDR and its western frontier, and that is indeed the reason why, at Helsinki, the West only admitted the principle of the inviolability of frontiers and not their intangibility.

Now, no sooner had German unification been obtained and legally recognised than the Western democracies discovered the inconsistency and relativity of self-determination as a principle. The right to self-determination has been recognised in some cases but not in others: the question of self-determination for the Kurds, the

Albanians in Kosovo and the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia is secondary to the issue of the territorial integrity of Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran, for the first, and that of Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia for the others. This is doubtless for excellent reasons to do with imperatives of strategic stability, but with very unequal chances of success, in particular regarding the viability of a Kosovo integrated into Serbia. Once perceived in the West as universal, absolute and unconditional, the Helsinki principles were from then on to prove increasingly arbitrary, selective, and therefore negotiable because of their potential to destabilise. Because it presupposes secession as an aim, the right to self-determination can no longer be at the root of policy in the West, unless the splitting up of the map of Europe into infinitesimally small parts is accepted. However, because it is no longer a matter of regulating relations between states, as it was during the Cold War, but of managing the collapse and partition of existing states, the inviolability and intangibility of frontiers are also proving largely artificial concepts. Disorientated without communism as a reference point, the Western democracies will end up betraying their own principles. The Badinter Commission advocated recognition of Macedonia once it satisfied the conditions of democracy and respect for human rights, and wished to suspend recognition of Croatia, which is suspected of violating the rights of the Serb minority; the European Community, followed shortly by the United States, decided exactly the opposite.

At this stage, the reasons for this impotence stem less from the inadequacies of law, or the contradictions of principles, than from a deep crisis within the democracies themselves. It was already clear that the time governments spend in office was one of their inherent weaknesses. Because their governments are short-lived and can be removed periodically, democracies often lack the courage to embrace policies which reach beyond day-to-day crisis management. This was the case for Yugoslavia, where all the Western democracies -- once they had disabused themselves of the illusion of an overall solution, in 1991 -- abstained from too much long-term global strategy: each knew that, even if it were accepted by all the parties to the conflict, the geographical partition envisaged in the Vance-Owen peace plan would not necessarily hold for more than a generation. Neither was anyone unaware of the ambiguities apparent in the protected areas in Bosnia, which some described as 'Gaza Strips' in Europe; all those dealing with the problem also suspect that sooner or later it will be necessary to decide together what type of Serbia is or is not acceptable in Europe. But management of the crisis in Bosnia is for the moment confined to the crisis itself, where one hopes for the best. There has been only one exception to this short-term strategy: the prohibition of any extension of the conflict to all of the Balkans. This objective which, moreover, was essentially defined and announced by the Americans, who ended up deploying 300 men in Macedonia, today remains the only element of Western global strategy. Below this threshold of what is strategically unacceptable, the democracies are playing things by ear.

In addition to these structural weaknesses of democracies, however, the Yugoslav crisis has also revealed another, moral, crisis, one that is very much less perceptible. To parody a celebrated and only too prophetic novel, it is more a question of a democratic 'confusion des sentiments'⁽¹²⁾ than of the cowardice or abdication so often denounced in the press but which are in reality only the effects. It is true that nothing is simple in the Balkans, that Serbs, Croats and Bosnians have all committed atrocities, and that each had its quota of good reasons to act as it did. But each of the

West European countries has judged the relative guilt of those countries according to its own criteria.

Now there was an opportunity to change the course of events in the Yugoslav crisis that, deliberately or not, the democracies failed to seize: between May and July 1992 the bombardment of Sarajevo and Dubrovnik, the defence of ethnic cleansing by certain Serb leaders, and then the discovery of concentration camps in Bosnia, changed the scale, rationality and nature of the war. In the absence of a common threat or a common security interest, Yugoslavia could at the time have been regarded as a major defence policy issue for the Western democracies. The refusal to allow, in the new European order, the triumph of ethnic cleansing, with its most easily condemnable reminiscences, or a racial nationalism which was both expansionist and 'expulsionist', could have been a sufficiently common element for the West to put together a joint prohibition of barbarism in Europe. That was not the case. The truth of the Yugoslav conflict is that our democracies are in such a state of crisis themselves that they are no longer capable of differentiating between the manageable and the unacceptable, even in the case of Serbia. Not that *realpolitik* has not been a consideration in matters of war and peace -- quite the contrary; but when, in the name of strategic stability, some intend to negotiate, for each crisis, our principles in exchange for our interests -- stability being more crucial than morals -- is it not, *mutatis mutandis*, as a result of a confusion of values of the same order as that which previously led pacifists to proclaim 'better red than dead'? If there is a lesson to be learnt from the failures of Kissinger, is it not that, in the long term, the only *realpolitik* that will succeed is one which is moral, whether applied to Vietnam, Cambodia, Palestine or the former Yugoslavia? Having been unduly virtuous at the outset of the conflict -- refusing to back the national re-drawing of frontiers which were previously internal -- the democracies now run the risk of an ultimate moral indignity, by accepting the *fait accompli* achieved by violent means. Apart from any moral considerations, should not the Western countries have in particular concluded, with a view to their own strategic interests, that a certain level of barbarity was in the long run incompatible with the security of a democratic Europe?

The almost congenital inhibition that democracies have, regarding the use of force, has been known since de Tocqueville.⁽¹³⁾ That inhibition, fuelled by a century of colonial and imperialist bad conscience, was masked in the atomic era by the very abstraction of policies of nuclear deterrence in the face of the Soviet threat. This was in fact a false abstraction, as shown by the pacifist protest movements each time that the embodiment of nuclear strategy became too visible in what are really terrifying weapons systems. But these recurrent episodes in the West, from the neutron bomb to the 'Euromissiles', confirmed *a contrario* the globally anaesthetising effect of nuclear deterrence on the Western democracies: because it was so extreme, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, and therefore force in general, was made very improbable, even unthinkable, by the very success of deterrent strategies. Conversely, today managing crises and non-nuclear risks makes it necessary to accept as normal once again the possible use of punitive, or even preventive force by the democracies themselves. Yet they have become unaccustomed to doing that.

The objection will be put forward that the Gulf war was a tangible denial of any such paralysis in the West. That is certainly true, but the war against Iraq was traditional in that it was identified with the sanctioning of an enemy who, if not declared, was at

least unanimously recognised. There has been nothing like that in the case of the former Yugoslavia. No enemy, no just cause has become sufficiently evident. The reluctance to use force has been amplified, even justified in the UN, by the difficulty in personalising the motive. By proclaiming unambiguously that everything was possible in the West's strategy except the resort to force, the democracies thereby removed the very notion of deterrence and deprived themselves of any chance of succeeding: it is pointless to recognise a state without recognising its right to self-defence;⁽¹⁴⁾ it is futile verbally to condemn the violation of frontiers by force if one is not prepared to sanction militarily those responsible; it is illusory to hope to deter potential aggression in Europe or elsewhere if one considers the resort to force to be an ultimate alternative to diplomatic pressure which has failed, and not an essential condition of the credibility of such pressure and its necessary complement.

It will also be objected that the West's impotence and inconsistency -- in particular the hiatus between diplomacy and the use of force -- has its own deterrent effect: the inept handling of the Yugoslav crisis could thus serve as a warning to the world that one cannot rely on the UN and the developed countries to manage all the world's problems, that in future there will be neither a policeman nor the ultimate repairer of all the deadly follies of nations, and that nations will have to behave and rely on themselves rather than embark on warlike ventures in the hope that the UN will sort everything out in the end. This deterrent effect has certainly worked well but has acted against the democracies themselves and the collective security institutions: it is undeniable that the image of the UN, CSCE, NATO, WEU and the EU has been tarnished. The potential victims of ethno-nationalist aggression will also learn this lesson of prudence and self-dependence, but will potential aggressors?

In the end what threatens the European order today is not so much the spectre of ethno-nationalism as the inability of the democracies to define the boundary between the legitimate and the unacceptable. Nobody will ever make peoples live together if they are prepared to die rather than do so. Neither will any law or code prevent nations from basing their sentiment of belonging on a shared history, geography and religion. Neither nationalism nor even identification with a religion are therefore to be condemned a priori; what *is* to be condemned is the resort to violence and racist ideology in order to assure nationalist victory. This distinction does not resolve the dilemma, but had it been made sufficiently early it would not have been necessary for the international community to support the idea of a racial state as a lawful norm for Europe's future. Of course, since the world is not an interconfessional harmony of virtuous democracies, a tension exists between order and freedom, between the concern for strategic stability and respect for the autonomy of peoples. For forty years the balance of nuclear terror covered up that tension in Europe, the philosophy of human rights and the CSCE rightly seeking only to diminish its effects. The end of communism is quite naturally resuscitating this secular conflict between the ethical and the strategic, but by increasing considerably the democracies' room for manoeuvre and freedom of action. Yet they have scarcely tackled it except by becoming stuck in it: humanitarian action has thus come to the rescue of the confusion in Western values. Unlike human rights in the nuclear age, that is not sufficient basis for a policy. A guilty conscience is certainly a tragedy for Europe but it was not the only possible response to Serbia.

LESSONS FROM YUGOSLAVIA FOR THE TWELVE AND THEIR PROPOSED COMMON DEFENCE POLICY

In mid-1990 informal discussions on the political part of the Treaty on European Union began in an international environment whose essential, final transformation seemed to be marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the prospect of German unification. Less than two years later, in February 1992, the treaty was signed in an even more strategically different context: Germany was unified, the Gulf war had taken place, the war of succession in Yugoslavia had intensified and the USSR had disappeared. The preoccupations and divergences of view of those negotiating the Maastricht treaty, particularly Title V, concerning the CFSP, were not necessarily the same as those of today's actors in Europe. Conversely, the recent developments in the European theatre raise dilemmas and problems which would have seemed surrealist to the negotiators of 1990. For example, at that time the debate on European defence was still at the stage of rhetoric and the confrontation of grand visions of Europe's future; possible competition between NATO and WEU rested on a very traditional view of defence policies, in which the use of military force was above all conditional upon a massive threat to vital interests; the very idea of the UN intervening directly in Europe's security problems would have seemed incongruous. Three years later, the relationship between the UN and defence organisations such as NATO or WEU, the ambiguities of crisis management and peacekeeping and the daily protection of the 12,000 European soldiers deployed in the former Yugoslavia have become the daily bread, and the daily tribulation, of Western chancelleries.

Firstly, the Yugoslav crisis will leave a deep impression on the very rationality of a common European security and defence policy. Originally, some defended the idea of an instrumental version of defence organisations, which were considered the response to common, well-defined external threats or constraints: at the European level, these threats were considered either non-existent after 1989, or in any event already covered by NATO. Placing the basis for a common defence outside the Twelve thus allowed them to conclude that it was relatively pointless. For others, this basis was above all political, and inherent in the dynamics of the Community; with or without a common threat, European integration would logically extend to the politico-military sphere, or else become schizophrenic or disappear. The British and French in particular had opposing views on these positions, neither of which, no doubt, will survive the Yugoslav war: Serbia does not represent a common threat for the Twelve, European integration has been marking time since Maastricht and yet the Community and WEU find themselves entangled in the Yugoslav war, managing it without really wholehearted involvement, being present in the former Yugoslavia without really assuming responsibility, finding in it as many reasons for abandoning a CSFP as for building one worthy of the name. It is true that the Yugoslav war is a real one and not simply an exercise in diplomatic style. It is consequently true that, in the face of such constraints, drawing up a CFSP and, *a fortiori*, a common defence is also becoming an operation that involves real risks.

Because, however, these risks remain limited, and different for each of the European partners, the entire relationship between national sovereignty and common defence is

as a result modified. The collective threat from the Soviet Union was for forty years able to create a reflex of common response. Today, faced with partial, different risks, European responses are partial and divergent. The existential danger shared by the EC or NATO countries was federative. The return to relative security works, on the contrary, in the sense of dispersion and division. A certain amount of nationalism, in other words the increase in the part played by national interests in the criteria on which decisions are based, has thus once again become normal in European countries' security policies. Confronted by the Yugoslav crises, the European partners have each reacted according to their own interests, analyses and reflexes. Certainly, the relative cacophony in the West regarding Belgrade -- based on German pressure for early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in December 1991, or Greek vetoes on the recognition of Macedonia -- was and still is deplorable. But to conclude that there was a crisis in intra-European relations would be to go too far. A link really does exist between all the European countries, which, moreover, extends to the United States: a return to national reflexes would be to the detriment of solidarity. If there was a crisis, it was rather that of the democratic ethic as a whole than of Euro-American or intra-European solidarity itself. Once again, the growth of this national ingredient in European security policies is the logical, normal consequence of the ending of the Cold War. Including it as one of the factors to be taken into account when drawing up a common defence policy will thus become a necessity. If only for that reason, it is unlikely that the future organisation of European forces will duplicate that found in NATO. Nevertheless, if a dose of nationalism is acceptable between Europeans, conversely, too many national divergences would be catastrophic. Inter-European relations will have to establish a happy medium between these two extremes. Leaving aside the hypothesis that there will one day be a resurgence of global, collective threats, the common policy will be more a matter of a common European will to act than a contractual automatism, which is improbable, or a common reflex against major common threats, which are non-existent. Consequently, it will be more fragile and uncertain but doubtless also more necessary than ever, if only to avoid the drift to extremes that the juxtaposition of twelve nationalisms would represent.

The second lesson is that the Yugoslav war will not be without consequences for the content and implementation of a common security and defence policy. In reality it has merely confirmed the new priorities for defence policies following the disappearance of the collective threat: a lower degree of urgency for the task of defending national territory, a reduction in the global deterrent role of nuclear weapons and a higher priority on the export of a minimum of stability. This reversal of trends implies both the revision of strategies and a veritable psychological revolution for the totality of European countries, and the traditional roles of defence institutions and national armed forces are directly affected by it. The former, whether NATO or WEU, were designed as alliances for the defence of their member countries. The latter were prepared, structured and planned -- and in the case of the majority integrated under American Supreme Commanders -- with that single mission in view. From now on, however, the policy of preventing or managing external crises prevails over the military prevention of any aggression, whereas the existing defence treaties do not imply any contractual undertaking to engage in common crisis management tasks. With a view to its role as the future Union's military body, WEU has thus been obliged to adapt: in June 1992, at the ministerial council in Petersberg, member countries decided that they would be able, if need be, to carry out peacekeeping operations with the political authority of the CSCE or the UN.⁽¹⁵⁾ This first step also

permitted, as from the following July, the collective contribution of WEU member countries to operations to enforce the embargo decided on by the United Nations against Serbia-Montenegro. However, this adaptation of WEU remains a political act that is conditional upon the consensus of member countries and dealing with crises on a step-by-step basis. It certainly does not imply a permanent undertaking by the Europeans to manage peripheral crises, nor their automatic, collective involvement on behalf of the United Nations.

But the necessary conditions for common military actions are not limited solely by institutional reservations. Faced with operations of the Yugoslav type, each of the Twelve has rediscovered its own particular limitations: the FRG is of course a typical example of a country whose armed forces are hampered by a constitutional constraint, but it is far from being the only country within the future European common defence system that has a problem. Greece, Italy and Turkey, all three of them neighbours of the former Yugoslavia, have for different historical or strategic reasons found themselves denied the possibility of a military presence in Bosnia. By extrapolating these particular cases, therefore, it is doubtful that the FRG, even without any constitutional problem, would have been able to send troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Further, if it were to become established practice for countries bordering a crisis zone not to intervene, a certain number of European countries would in future be almost always incapable of acting. These constraints would of course not hold for enforcement operations as provided for in chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations, but in that case other constraints would take their place: in addition to Germany's reservation, countries which have conscription, in the first instance France, are aware of the limits -- already experienced during the Gulf war -- of a system which greatly reduces the potential number of men who can be mobilised (a maximum of 12,000 in the case of France, for example). In addition to this handicap, in Belgium and the Netherlands it has recently been decided drastically to reduce, or even remove completely, whole sections of the armed forces. In total, and without wishing to carry too far the irony expressed one day by a senior French official who observed that twelve multiplied by zero equals zero, all common European military actions will come up against these quantitative and political limitations. From a detailed examination of the Yugoslav crisis two obvious facts immediately emerge. The first is the imbalance, in terms of resources and risks between, on the one hand, France, Great Britain and Spain and, on the other, the other European countries, and there is good reason to wager that in future these three countries will still shoulder the main part of the burden of military intervention by the Twelve, with all the political consequences that such an imbalance implies. The second obvious fact is that, either together or, *a fortiori*, individually, the Twelve are today still not capable of meeting the military demands of peacekeeping.

A third lesson that the Yugoslav crisis has brought out above all, however, is that the decision to resort to military force -- for reasons other than individual or collective self-defence⁽¹⁶⁾ -- can elude the strictly European frameworks and be transferred to the UN. This third consequence is a fundamental one: in the absence of any threat to vital interests, by what right can military forces be mobilised for hazardous interventions abroad if not that of a consensual international authority? Indeed, all the democratic governments have wanted to act in Yugoslavia in response to a UN mandate: firstly, because the UN continues to represent the hope, or the illusion, of new, post-communist international cooperation; secondly, because the authority of the UN

makes it possible to short-circuit or hide any domestic political reticence in each of our countries; and, finally, because this allegiance to the authority of the UN is supposedly stamped with the virtues of example, in particular with Russia in mind, which nobody wishes to see unilaterally using its armed forces to defend the 25 million or so Russians outside Russia. For the first time in its history, the UN has thus managed a grave crisis in continental Europe. This involvement of the UN in European security is not without its consequences for the actual momentum of the Union.

As far as decision-making is concerned, the UN's primacy, in mandating peacekeeping operations, firstly reduces the autonomy of the Twelve that is postulated by the Treaty on European Union. Of course chronologically the UN's intervention in Yugoslavia has resulted from a political decision by the Twelve. Indeed, it was in September 1991, following the conference in The Hague, that the UN Secretary-General accepted the European proposal to include the Yugoslav crisis on the Security Council's agenda. Once the transfer of political authority from Europe to the UN had been made, the Community found itself in a secondary position regarding decisions. The paradox is striking: at the very moment when the Europeans could, via the Union, achieve the status of a player with powers of decision in security matters, a prime opportunity eludes them. Even if tomorrow the Twelve agreed unanimously to go to war with Serbia, they would doubtless not do so without the backing of the United Nations (and the argument applies equally to NATO). In other words, transfer of authority to the UN *de facto* gives three countries which are not members of the Community -- China, Russia and the United States -- as well as the group of non-permanent members of the Security Council, a *droit de regard* on any common decisions on security taken by the Europeans.

At the same time, the UN's primacy in crisis management operations disrupts the equality, in principal, of the twelve members of the Community. Between, on the one hand, Britain and France, who are permanent members of the Security Council, and, on the other, the ten other members, the difference in power is likely to appear increasingly blatant, a source of conflict, unacceptable and incompatible with the Union's common policy. So it was that UN Security Council Resolution 836 on the setting up of security zones in Bosnia gave rise to the makings of a European crisis: negotiated by Britain, France and the United States with the Russians, the so-called Washington accord was rejected by the Germans and then by other members, and it required nothing less than a Mitterrand-Kohl summit in Beaune on 1 June 1993 to get Germany to rally round, followed by the other hesitant European countries. In other words, the UN's involvement could mean more disagreement among the Twelve, resentment on the part of some and less autonomy in decision-making than was originally foreseen.

Three aberrations have also become evident regarding the execution of UN mandates using military means. Firstly, the political link, stated in Article J.4.2 of the Maastricht treaty,⁽¹⁷⁾ between WEU and the Union, is still random: certain decisions by the WEU Council have been directly connected with a request by the European Council, such as that concerning the protection of Mostar; others, however, such as the implementation of the embargo in the Adriatic or reinforcement of the Danube operation (Resolution 820), have been taken quite independently of the European Community and subsequently the European Union, and only with reference to UN

mandates. WEU could therefore decide to offer its services to the UN before or without becoming the body which implements the CFSP. Such use of WEU as an instrument of the UN moreover carries a second risk: the legal transformation of this European defence organisation into a regional agency as defined in chapter VIII of the charter, with all that is implied in Article 53.1⁽¹⁸⁾ on political subordination to the Security Council. Moreover, it has been in order to avert this risk that the member countries of WEU, and of NATO, have until now insisted on justifying their collective actions on behalf of the UN by referring to Article 48.2 of the charter⁽¹⁹⁾ rather than to chapter VIII; but not without considerable debate. Finally, a third aberration has appeared in the very notion of common action: does a collective action imply only political agreement by all, or does it also presuppose the physical participation of all the members of a defence organisation?

Obviously, these consequences of the UN's involvement are not final for the Twelve and WEU. Nobody therefore knows whether the plan arrived at for the management of the former Yugoslavia will serve as a precedent for other possible crises in Europe. Would, for instance, the UN manage a crisis in Moldova? Would it want to, given the reluctance on the part of the Secretary-General, the organisation's poverty, the multiplicity of crises in the Third World and the inability of the UN to manage all of the world's present and future ills? If the UN's involvement in European security proves to be an accident and not the norm for the future, the lessons of the Yugoslav crisis for the Twelve and WEU will have only limited relevance. Thus, the UN reference for the legitimation of the use of military force -- chapter VII of the charter -- is not necessarily the last word: if all the European countries -- in agreement, moreover, with the United States -- agree today on the UN's political responsibility for such legitimation, the debate nevertheless remains latent, below the surface and potential. In particular, in the event of a change in Russia's foreign policy, with for example Moscow's explicit veto of any anti-Serb action, would this blocking of the UN mean that the United States, NATO and WEU were prohibited from carrying out such retributive action? Is the use of military force impossible without the blessing of the UN or without a previously agreed collective defence treaty? Article 51 of the charter, which stipulates that 'Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . .' is in fact interpreted variously by the Twelve. A hint of this appeared in December 1992 when, following a hoax speech to the CSCE by Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev,⁽²⁰⁾ the Europeans demonstrated their divergences, although these have since died down: for Germany in particular, the WEU Secretary-General's words to the effect that WEU could decide to mount a military operation without the blessing of the UN were unacceptable. For other Europeans with different military cultures, the UN's primacy does not imply the UN's exclusiveness in legitimating the use of military force.⁽²¹⁾ The debate quickly ended as it lacked political relevance, but ambiguity none the less remains among the Twelve and could one day, when another crisis arises, degenerate into open controversy.

A final lesson for the Twelve is that intra-European relations have felt the backlash of the Yugoslav crisis. The Franco-German axis held firm during the first months of the conflict: in mid-August 1991, a Franco-German proposal was made for the deployment of a force between Serbs and Croats in Croatia itself, within a WEU framework. This was immediately opposed by the British who, more so than others, know from experience the complexity of military involvement in the Balkans but who

have in particular drawn from Northern Ireland and Cyprus the lesson that great caution has to be exercised in interposition operations; there was also the traditional divergence of view over WEU's role as the embryo European defence organisation. The affair came to an abrupt halt when, on 19 September 1991, the European Council simply asked WEU to draw up plans for a possible peacekeeping operation and turned to the United Nations for the management of the conflict. From October 1991 and the UN's appearance on the scene, the Franco-British axis was, however, to become dominant, and Germany was to go it alone and later to be absent altogether. Indeed, recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was in the first place the occasion for a mini-crisis between Bonn and its European partners⁽²²⁾ between December 1991 and January 1992. This difference on the part of Germany was, moreover, to have lasting effects: in May 1993 US Secretary of State Warren Christopher was again to accuse Germany, through its intransigence over Croatia, of precipitating a widespread war in the former Yugoslavia.⁽²³⁾ However, from January 1992 the FRG adopted rather an attitude of withdrawal and a low diplomatic profile -- in particular because of its internal constitutional debate on Germany's participation in military operations abroad -- to the benefit of Franco-British partnership. Greece then took over the role of troublemaker among the Europeans, firstly through its categorical veto on recognition of Macedonia (even though the latter met the Badinter Commission's criteria to a greater extent than did Croatia) and then through its ambiguous attitude regarding Belgrade: in July 1993 a vice-president of the CSCE Assembly, Ritt Bjerregaard, named Athens as having violated the embargo and asked for its exclusion from the European Community.⁽²⁴⁾

Three conclusions are worth drawing from these intra-European episodes. Firstly, the Twelve, in spite of everything, succeeded in maintaining a relatively united position on Yugoslavia: none of the parties to the conflict was able to play one European country off against another, and this Community cohesion was no doubt beneficial in the face of the risk that the conflict might spread to all of the Balkans, or even to Central Europe as a whole. This success having been stated, it remains of course necessary to assess its value: some will congratulate themselves that the Union's momentum prevailed over national differences, even though these were serious; others will rather be worried that the common denominator of this common European policy was the smallest possible: that of abdication, short-sighted indifference to a conflict that none of the Twelve will ever consider to be a major issue for security and democratic ethics. Yet others will add that, perhaps in spite of initial intentions, the results of the policy followed by the Twelve and the international community as a whole has in the end proved pro-Serb, with all the mixture of historical memories, enhancement of the value of nation-states, mistrust of national minorities, bias towards Christians and dread of a disintegration of the Russian Federation implied by that.

Secondly, the balance of power among the Twelve shifted in favour of the Franco-British partnership once the step towards military action had been taken. It is an irony of history that the two countries most opposed on the very problem of Europe's future development and often the most simplistic in their defence of, respectively, WEU and NATO, often found their positions the closest -- on the ground and in the UN -- in the management of the Yugoslav crisis. If NATO, WEU and rhetoric separate London and Paris, the UN and real wars draw them together. As from autumn 1991, an identity of British and French views appeared on the European front, sometimes even

in opposition to American standpoints: this was the case concerning the questioning of the Vance-Owen peace plan, selective air strikes against Serb positions, and the lifting of the embargo on arms for Bosnia. As a result of their status as permanent members of the UN Security Council, their culture and their tradition as interventionist powers, and the near-global nature of the weaponry at their disposal, France and Britain thus found themselves together in the front line: between them, as at today they provide a third of the troops in UNPROFOR, with 8,700 men out of a total of 24,000. It is doubtless too soon to tell what effect the serious turbulence in the 'special relationship' between the United States and Britain over Yugoslavia will have on London. It also remains to be seen whether the close relationship between Britain and France during times of crisis will rub off on the respective positions of principle held in Paris and London regarding the future of Europe and the Atlantic, in particular the relationship between the Alliance and WEU. Nothing is certain. Finally, it remains to be seen to what extent implementation of the CFSP will in future reflect the old adage that 'Qui risque le plus décide le plus' (he who puts most at risk decides most).

The third conclusion concerns Germany. The Yugoslav crisis has been one whose military management has -- until now -- had to do without major American and German contributions, in other words contributions from two of the countries that are the most vital for European security. Of course German diplomacy did not fail to exploit European uncertainties to insist, at the end of 1991, on the precipitate recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. That initial determination cannot, however, hide the powerful constraints which still inhibit German policy, and thereby the credible affirmation of a common European policy. It is therefore not surprising that the debate on Germany's permanent membership of the UN Security Council coincides increasingly with debates on the development of Europe and the reform of the Atlantic Alliance; indeed, the future ability of the unified Germany, and thus of the European Union, to make decisions and take part in military operations, depends on their outcome.

Like the Yugoslav war itself, conclusions can at this stage be only contradictory and the future of a European defence uncertain. The more instabilities multiply on the periphery of Europe, the more the Europeans are likely to be prudent and minimalist in their common approach to the risks they are prepared to run and the price they are willing to pay, nationalist in the order of priority they allocate to their security interests, and inclined to pass to 'others' the responsibility for the management of crises in Europe. What is at risk is no more nor less than the very existence of Europe, if in the final analysis the division of tasks is such that the major risks (nuclear war, Russia) remain the prerogative of the United States and NATO, and lesser risks the common burden of the international community, in other words of nobody. But at the same time, the more the 'others' prove to be uncertain (like the United States) or impotent (the United Nations), the more national differences among the Twelve will approach breaking point, at a time when the unilateral use of force is illegalised (and in any event technically improbable), and the more the reflex action will be, in spite of everything, to maintain among the Twelve a minimum common approach in security issues. In this sense, the Yugoslav experience has not led to the abandonment of the objective of a common European policy: it has had the opposite effect.

In practice this common policy, even though it is minimal, will have to be adapted, beginning with its architecture. The prospect of the enlargement of the Community to

include four of the EFTA countries, three of which have traditionally been 'neutral', added to the lessons from the Yugoslav crisis, cannot but argue in favour of a new geometry for decision-making and action. There is already a difference between the progress made in the institutional Europe and that made in the Europe that is concerned with real defence issues. The contrast -- seen in almost all of the operations in the former Yugoslavia -- between the political consensus arrived at among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, then among the Twelve and the nine WEU countries, and the preparedness on the part of four or five European countries individually to take military risks, can only become greater as membership of the enlarged European Community becomes even less identical with that of WEU. What will then be the most efficient body for decision-making on common security and defence issues -- the European Council or WEU? This variable geometry makes the rapid fusion of WEU and the Union unlikely and, what is more, undesirable. Necessary though this flexibility is, it should not constitute an end in itself, or it would rob Europe's development of its overall political objective, and in particular its military dimension. The difficulty will in future therefore be to combine, by means of bridges and mechanisms for close consultation, the Union's cohesion and political solidarity on European security issues, on the one hand, and the flexibility necessary to permit rapid, appropriate and effective military operations on the other.

The second area where changes will be necessary is the organisation of European defence itself, both in terms of its relations with NATO and in matters of national sovereignty. How can the demands of common action be reconciled with those of sovereignty, given that the rule of consensus in decision-making, like the notion of military integration, is paradoxical in that it is less effective in obliging states to do things they do not wish to do (as there is a right to veto) than it is in preventing some of them (WEU? France? Britain?) from acting when they want to, including taking military action?

Lastly, there is no doubt that, confronted with the Yugoslav war for more than two years, the European Community, like the other Western institutions, has scarcely succeeded in pacifying the region, nor in producing a global solution for the future stability of the Balkans. This simple statement is still used to cover many ulterior motives: some see in it an extra reason to abandon the very idea of European political ambitions, whereas others prefer to keep that aim intact while playing the game of apportioning blame so as to drown collective responsibility under a flood of scapegoats. Now, this failure extends well beyond the risks entailed in the CFSP. It does not seem attributable either to the complexity of the Balkans, or to some absurdity inherent in the proposed European Union, or to institutional shortcomings, or, finally, to the chance timing of events which has led some to remark that the Yugoslav crisis occurred too soon for a Europe that was still too much in its infancy. More simply, the reality is still that the Europeans and, going further, the Western democracies as a whole, have never considered the Yugoslav crisis to be a priority security interest for them. As long as the conflict is confined to the territory of the republics that are at war today, the European Community and the West as a whole will consider that it can live with the situation. Militarily and strategically, the argument is -- and remains -- a sound one. At the political level, on the other hand, it was a dangerous illusion for the Community to think it possible to flirt with, or in the final analysis to guarantee the idea of a south European order based on ethnic separation and the single-race state. This discrepancy suggests that the aim of a

common European defence, of which some⁽²⁵⁾ have said that this was a debate 'entirely political and only incidentally a question of security', will not be unduly curtailed by the failure in Yugoslavia. It also implies, however, that this project of a common European defence is likely, for a long time to come, to flounder, albeit with much panache, in institutional and bureaucratic quarrels, for want of confidence or awareness of the democratic values that are to be defended.

LESSONS FOR SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Europe/United States: continental drift

The Yugoslav war was not the occasion for an overt, resounding crisis in Euro-American relations. In a more insidious way, almost imperceptibly, it remains rather the symbol of a slow, progressive dissociation of the security interests of the Europeans and the United States, in the absence of any major, collective threat to their survival. To quote John Newhouse's excellent comment, in a reference to the former Yugoslavia, 'Europeans and Americans have been talking without really communicating.'⁽²⁶⁾ The real problem regarding the future of Euro-American relations will therefore be the evaluation of the extent to which such dissociation will still be compatible with maintaining a transatlantic security contract or will be prejudicial to the survival of the Alliance itself.

As seen from Europe, faced with the Yugoslav conflict American diplomacy was in general characterised by inconsistency during the Bush-Baker period, and incoherence during the first months of the Clinton administration.⁽²⁷⁾ Indeed, until summer 1992, the Bush presidency refused to consider Yugoslavia as one of the United States's security interests. The diplomatic initiatives undertaken by the European Community were welcomed to the extent that the crisis was still seen as a European disturbance to be resolved in the first instance by the Europeans. Washington of course sometimes disagreed with the Europeans' actions, and let it be known: in December 1991 the Bush administration tried to prevent recognition by the Europeans -- led by the Germans -- of Croatia and Bosnia; in summer 1992 competition between WEU and NATO for the implementation of the embargo in the Adriatic and the military protection of humanitarian convoys was in full swing. However these episodes did not change the line followed until then by the United States, that management of the crisis should be delegated to the Europeans, even if they did not always pursue that policy without ulterior motives: if the Europeans became bogged down this would at least have the virtue of showing, by default, that even after Maastricht American leadership was necessary. On 19 May 1992, US State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler again affirmed that she was 'not aware of' any American security interest at stake in Yugoslavia,⁽²⁸⁾ and asked, at a moment when the bombardment of Sarajevo was being broadcast on television: 'where is it written that the United States has to be the world's policeman?'⁽²⁹⁾ During the final months of the Bush administration, however, there was a change, in the direction of a more interventionist American policy, but domestic considerations (public reaction to the CNN television pictures, the State Department's disclosures of ethnic cleansing and the election campaign which showed an apparently more resolute Clinton) formed an essential reason for this. It was only very belatedly, in November 1992, that the United States spelt out -- in particular regarding the Serbs -- what it regarded as unacceptable: an extension of the conflict to Kosovo -- with the inherent risk of further troubling the Greek-Turkish relationship -- would affect American security interests in Europe and must therefore be prohibited.

The Clinton presidency has inherited this two-sided policy of abstention and containment, but has only remained true to the second aspect: in June 1993, some 300 American soldiers were deployed, as a preventive measure, to Macedonia.⁽³⁰⁾

Abstention, for its part, was replaced by the incoherence of an unpredictable alternation between diplomatic-military initiatives and the former indifference, between `refus des solutions européennes au nom des principes et des intérêts bosniaques et acceptation au nom des réalités et des alliés.'⁽³¹⁾ The Administration began by making a virulent -- and, moreover, often justified -- criticism of the Vance-Owen peace plan, which merely served to irritate the Europeans by its failure to propose any alternative policy. President Clinton found himself wedged between advisers in favour of intervention and a military that was fiercely opposed to any direct American involvement. The outcome was a series of spectacular proposals -- including selective air strikes and a lifting of the embargo on arms for Bosnia -- which were no sooner worked out than they were abandoned in the face of European misgivings: the United States came round to the Vance-Owen plan on 10 February 1993;⁽³²⁾ Warren Christopher's tour of Europe in May in order to sell the `lift and strike' option will remain for many European governments a new and typical example of the American leadership's weakness, or deliberate abdication. At each of these stages, however, divergences between Americans and Europeans were to centre less on the substance of the crisis itself than on the practical military consequences of the various options: the British and French were concerned for the safety of their troops on the ground in the event of selective air strikes against Serb positions; they also feared that a lifting of the embargo against Bosnia would lead to an increase in the level of violence and the rapid destabilisation of neighbouring countries. There was a greater difference in the tactics to be adopted than in overall strategies for the Balkans, which were non-existent in both the United States and Europe. More recently, there seems to have been a growing convergence of American and European views. Thus, in July 1993 the United States intimated that it could deploy 25,000 men for the implementation of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan if it was accepted by all parties. Yet this rhetorical availability runs counter to the American military's reservations and all of the policy followed by Washington since the beginning of the conflict. Consequently, there is considerable uncertainty over Washington's final decisions.

NATO - WEU - UN

In relation to the institutional debate on security architecture and the NATO-WEU relationship, many lessons can be drawn from the experience of Yugoslavia. First, Americans and Europeans have experienced -- together or successively -- the limits of military intervention in these new types of ethno-nationalist conflict. Since they all refused to take sides and designate an aggressor as the enemy, the Western democracies were reduced to taking militarily undefined and politically ambiguous half-measures whose effect was first and foremost to cause the military to dig their heels in: more so than any others, and often rightly so, the military prefer all or nothing and are loath to put their forces at risk in operations that lack clearly defined objectives; more than all others, the American military under Colin Powell⁽³³⁾ have systematically refused to allow their men to operate under the control of political bodies that are fluctuating, imprecise and still developing; the Vietnam syndrome has played its part to the full. But these limitations on the use of force are also a function of the development of public opinion in democracies, which pushes governments towards military intervention as a result of the sight of unbearable pictures of the suffering inflicted upon civilians; public support is likely to be immediately withdrawn if military intervention results in many more unbearable pictures of the funerals of their own soldiers.

War and peacekeeping are thus quite evidently distinct activities, with different rules and their own logic: do they also require different institutions? There is no doubt that the debate on the relationship between NATO and WEU has been and still is very much affected by the Yugoslav crisis. It seems that for the future two criteria will be decisive for the organisation of security in Europe: on the one hand the participation, or not, of the Americans, and on the other the distinction between war and crisis management.

Uncertainty over United States participation has become much more pronounced than previously. American interest in a given European security problem is indeed neither automatic nor systematic but rather haphazard, variable with time and in intensity, and above all largely unpredictable. Yet this uncertainty should not be seen as either a 'betrayal' or a symptom of crisis in transatlantic solidarity. No treaty requires the United States to play the role of Europe's policeman. Even if some Europeans regret that it is so, the United States' room for manoeuvre in defining its security interests has increased, and it would be absurd to reproach the United States with allowing domestic factors to play too large a role in its decision-making when for the Europeans it has become normal to include these along with other factors. In the present volatile state of strategic affairs in Europe, there appear to be three scenarios which could directly affect American security interests and lead to United States involvement: Russia's military involvement in an area of crisis; the introduction of nuclear elements into a European crisis; and the risk of intervention of a member of NATO in a war in Europe. Washington's position regarding Belgrade changed, in autumn 1992, largely because of the third criterion and the risk of the conflict spreading to Greece or Turkey. As for the rest, it is probable that the United States will manifest more benevolence than formerly towards European bodies and European actions that are likely to restore stability in regional areas of unrest.

This interest in seeing the Europeans take a greater share of responsibility is, however, accompanied by a number of reservations, or perhaps ambiguities, in what today appears to be the American position. The first concerns Washington's association with European decision-making processes on security issues. Having been very wide in scope in 1991, when Washington wished to make NATO the 'essential forum' for any decisions in this area,⁽³⁴⁾ the American demand was subsequently reduced to the military aspects of crisis management: the European Community therefore bilaterally informed Washington of events in Yugoslavia during the first months of the conflict without Mr Baker challenging this approach; more recently, following the universally recognised primacy of the United Nations in the drawing up of peacekeeping mandates, this American political demand has been further softened, Washington being *de facto* and *de jure* a party -- often the essential party -- to all the Security Council's decisions. On the other hand, at the military level the United States is still reluctant to accept European autonomy in decision-making.⁽³⁵⁾ In addition to its political impact in terms of the visibility and survivability of NATO, the WEU-NATO quarrel over the implementation of United Nations resolutions is, on the American side, also to do with a wish to have ultimate control over any European failures. Indeed, one interpretation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and Articles IV and V of the modified Brussels Treaty implies the involvement of the United States, even against its will: in a hypothetical case where European forces were facing defeat and an escalation of aggression, they could call on the United States to come to their

rescue. Washington, however, is not inclined, either politically or militarily, to assume the role of provider of a WEU reserve force. Even if it were not present on the ground in a military operation, the United States would want to maintain political and military, if not absolute, control over European forces.

A second ambiguity surrounds the actual notion of American participation: if a decision by the United States is uncertain and variable according to the type of crisis and the rate at which it develops, the Euro-American relationship itself will become uncertain and NATO's role more doubtful than in the past. Regarding the American attitude *vis-à-vis* the former Yugoslavia, it is difficult for the Europeans to know whether it is a question of `du résultat de l'indécision et de la division qui règnent à Washington, d'une adaptation à un monde multipolaire, ou des débuts d'un nouvel isolationisme qui d'admettrait d'engagement que sélectif et provisoire, sans pour autant abandonner une rhétorique universaliste et dynamique.⁽³⁶⁾ It is in particular unlikely that the extent of American military involvement comes down to an easily quantifiable all or nothing: in fact, in the former Yugoslavia the United States is providing a significant part of the air forces enforcing Security Council resolutions.

The second criterion affecting the reorganisation of European security is the distinction between war and peacekeeping. An essential quality of crisis management is that it is now introducing a split in the traditionally collective nature of defence policy in the West. To the extent that Article 5 of the NATO treaty and Article V of the WEU treaty only deal with common defence against an external attack, each of the allies' involvement in a crisis management operation is in the first place a matter of national, *ad hoc* assessment. The fact that this participation could from now on be à la carte raises three questions concerning the traditional functioning of the defence organisations, be it NATO or WEU as the future defence component of the European Union. Firstly, the notion of military integration itself is the subject of debate: are the established, permanently integrated headquarters, with unified chains of command -- from the tactical level up to the highest level of command -- suited to the management of crises that are selective, partial and politically limited in space, their objective and their intensity? In August 1992, the placing of elements of a NATO headquarters (NORTHAG) at the disposal of UNPROFOR was only possible by rearranging its structure, excluding the Germans and including French, Egyptians and Ukrainians in particular: the automaticity implied a priori in the notion of military integration for collective defence itself thus no longer works in crisis management situations. Some will emphasise the fact that, in this particular instance, integration was not an obstacle to effectiveness, the experience having shown that the structure can be quite easily adapted to new circumstances; others, on the other hand, will conclude that it is pointless to maintain a traditional integrated structure that is not suited to the needs of crisis management, and that more flexible military structures that can be adapted to various circumstances are more pertinent. Another example is the debate surrounding the participation of Turkish aircraft in enforcement of Resolution 816, which prohibited overflights of Bosnian airspace: because of political sensibilities, some countries would have liked to keep the Turkish aircraft in reserve in Turkey, but the military command responsible for the operation (AFSOUTH) applied normal mobilisation procedures for Turkish forces, and the aircraft were transferred to Italy as an operational reserve. As for the unified chain of command, nobody challenges the fact that it is indispensable in the event of total war in a theatre of operations on the European scale. For operations as limited as enforcement of a naval embargo in

the Adriatic, or the air operations over the former Yugoslavia, however, the relevance of SHAPE appears more open to discussion; the subordinate levels of AFSOUTH or even 5 ATAF in this case could suffice.

A second problem that is inherent in crisis management is the adaptability of existing structures to include forces from countries that are not members of the military organisations. For instance, how would Russian peacekeeping forces be incorporated?⁽³⁷⁾ Again, the traditionally neutral Scandinavian countries have always been major contributors of contingents to UN peacekeeping, not to mention the possible participation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.⁽³⁸⁾ Lastly, France's contribution is far from negligible: on average, France has become the leading contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, with around 10,000 men, and in any event the prime contributor to UNPROFOR, with about 6,200 men assigned as at today out of a total of 24,000 blue helmets from 34 countries. Are command structures designed for a major conflict and involving a predetermined number of allies who have participated in them for decades more suitable for incorporating new participants than *ad hoc* structures created for particular operations and likely to accede to their requests for shared responsibility?

The third question is fundamental, since it concerns the link between the political authorities mandating a peacekeeping operation and the military authorities responsible for carrying it out. Unlike operations in general war, peacekeeping requires much more permanent and systematic political control of military operations in real time, in particular regarding the detailed management of the relative strengths of rival factions or in the application of limited and partial mandates under chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations, such as are included in Resolutions 816 and 836. When drawing lessons from the Gulf war, Xavier Perez de Cuellar deplored the way the United Nations was left to one side once the anti-Iraq military coalition's operations had begun: ` . . . there is no United Nations control of the operations, no United Nations flag, (blue) beret, or any engagement of the Military Staff Committee . . . The Council, which has authorised all this, (is informed) only after the military activities have taken place.⁽³⁹⁾ More recently, in Somalia, attacks by American helicopters on the headquarters of General Aidid created serious difficulties for the Italian contingent, illustrating the necessity for closer coordination between national headquarters and United Nations representatives in the definition of missions and targets.

These uncertainties over American military involvement in European crises, added to the new military and political requirements of crisis management, supplant to a great extent the problems in the WEU-NATO relationship. In a way, the debate on the use of forces answerable to WEU for the implementation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty has simultaneously died down. After the mutual suspicion that marked the proposal and the creation of a Franco-German corps in May 1992, the conditions governing the use of that formation under the command of SACEUR, proposed by France and Germany, seem to have put an end to the debate:⁽⁴⁰⁾ for implementation of Article 5, it seems that NATO must in effect remain the authority for decision-making, planning and the use of American and European forces, with the well-known conditions in the case of France and Spain. For the French in particular, NATO's primary, essential mission is not questioned, even if WEU's Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 includes, in the list of possible missions that could be given to forces

answerable to WEU, 'contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.'

Nothing, on the other hand, has been finalised for instances where NATO and WEU are called upon to play a role in peacekeeping missions in peripheral crises. Of course, both organisations have unanimously authorised themselves to execute UN and CSCE mandates.⁽⁴¹⁾ Both have been or are involved in the Yugoslav crisis: firstly, WEU participated collectively in surveillance of the embargo in the Adriatic (beginning in July 1992) before combining its fleet with a similar NATO fleet on 8 June 1993. It was also as a collective institution that, beginning in May 1993, WEU began a police and customs operation on the Danube in response to Resolution 820, which strengthened the embargo of Serbia and Montenegro. It was also WEU which, in autumn 1991, proposed options for the first UN peacekeeping operation (UNPROFOR I),⁽⁴²⁾ and these plans were in the end adopted by the United Nations in preference to those of NATO, which were considered unsuited, because of their scope, to the political specificity and aims of the operation. For its part, NATO took on three tasks in the former Yugoslavia: the coordination of maritime operations in the Adriatic, beginning in June 1993; the implementation, since April 1993, of Resolution 816 prohibiting overflying of Bosnian airspace, an operation involving American, British, French, Netherlands and Turkish aircraft; and, in implementation of Resolution 836 of 4 June 1993, the provision of protective air power 'in case of attack against UNPROFOR in the performance of its overall mandate.'⁽⁴³⁾ The debate on this state of affairs (the division of responsibilities between WEU and NATO), however, has not gone away.

The first question posed in the debate concerns the role of institutions in crisis management where there is no American military participation. The Yugoslav war is, by the way, the first example since 1945 of a conflict in continental Europe in which the risk that European soldiers may suffer fatalities is not matched by a similar risk for American troops.⁽⁴⁴⁾ European countries provide half of UNPROFOR's forces, with 12,900 blue helmets coming from the countries of the European Union.⁽⁴⁵⁾ A priori, the simplest method would be to share power in proportion to the risks assumed: if, in a given theatre of operations, it is only the Europeans who are taking the risks, it will be difficult to accept that they do not assume the command, control and conduct of operations. It would also be logical for European defence organisations, in this case WEU, to take on military missions in their entirety when the United States decides not to participate in them. 'Clearly there are contingencies where Europe will need a capacity to do something military, but where the US, without being strongly opposed, will not feel its own interests sufficiently engaged to be willing to commit troops.'⁽⁴⁶⁾ *A contrario*, a substantial presence of American forces -- going well beyond the simple provision of satellite-based intelligence or logistic support -- would make it less abnormal for NATO to take the lead in such an operation. After all, what is NATO if not WEU plus the United States and Canada, or, conversely, what is WEU if not NATO without a North American presence?

Yet such a sharing of tasks is only apparently straightforward, for at least two reasons. Firstly, WEU as a practical military organisation simply does not exist. Certainly, great progress has been made since Maastricht and Petersberg, with the creation of a Planning Cell in Brussels, the holding of regular meetings of Chiefs of Defence Staff, and member states making available to WEU existing military forces and

headquarters. But these innovations do not create, or not yet, a military tool that is immediately available and operational. In theory there are two possible solutions. The first would consist in creating this European military tool, but there would be the obvious risk of a costly, pointless and dangerous duplication of NATO assets. The second solution would be for WEU to 'borrow' directly from NATO the means necessary for the accomplishment of a European mission: just as NATO and WEU can provide a service for the United Nations if requested, NATO could act as a reservoir of forces, whose composition would vary according to the need, for military operations in the management of crises by the Europeans. Was it not, after all, this philosophy of rendering service that NATO, perhaps involuntarily, adopted when it put one of its headquarters (NORTHAG) at the disposal of UNPROFOR, which was itself commanded by a French general, in the summer of 1992? This prospect of the Atlantic organisation being used in modular fashion, an idea put forward by France in particular, is not yet accepted by all: despite noticeable developments in September 1993, NATO's leaders and the American administration are cautious at the idea of a NATO 'à la carte', depending on European requirements, and at the implied possibility that the political responsibility and the implementation of some aspect of the integrated military structure could be transferred from SACEUR to European authority.⁽⁴⁷⁾

The second reason why a sharing of tasks is not simple has to do with the level of American participation in the management of European crises: as has been seen, with rare exceptions such participation will probably not be a matter of all or nothing. In the former Yugoslavia, for instance, the United States does not participate permanently in the combined naval operation (SHARP GUARD) to enforce the embargo in the Adriatic, but makes the major contribution to air operations, in the implementation of both Resolution 816, which prohibits the overflight of Bosnia, and Resolution 836, concerning air cover of UNPROFOR while carrying out its mandate.⁽⁴⁸⁾ United States forces are, as at today, not involved in UNPROFOR's land operations (leaving aside the Americans deployed as a preventive measure in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), but here again the situation is not without uncertainties: on 10 February 1993, for example, Warren Christopher hinted that there could be 'an American military participation' to ensure that the Vance-Owen accord was 'applied and guaranteed';⁽⁴⁹⁾ on 20 April 1993, this proposal to make available American troops was publicly abandoned. Again, it is said that the new peace plan put forward in Geneva in the summer of 1993 could, if it were accepted by the three parties to the conflict, lead to the deployment on the ground of 25,000 Americans to assist in ensuring its observance. So what exactly will the position be regarding the provision of American ground forces?

What this all amounts to is that the WEU/NATO debate is still open, and potentially contentious. Three lessons can already be drawn from current experience in the former Yugoslavia. First, the responsibility of NATO commands (5 ATAF and AFSOUTH) for air operations has been seen to be and will unquestionably remain inevitable, because missions of this type are mounted extremely rapidly, because integration will always be necessary for carrying out such missions,⁽⁵⁰⁾ and because the Americans are in this particular case the major contributors. Second, for naval operations to enforce the embargo, which involve a majority of European ships, the command arrangement finally chosen in June 1993 appears on the other hand to be questionable: was it really necessary to refer back to SHAPE and an Adriatic

Committee, via COMNAVSOUTH and CINCSOUTH, to coordinate the operations of European ships, when the Gulf war had demonstrated WEU's ability to carry out this type of mission? It is in this area that ideology and political inflexibility have been most marked: the NATO authorities refused to accept the high visibility of a joint WEU/NATO command that the Italian commander COMNAVSOUTH, who is also responsible for the WEU naval force, would have symbolised, only accepting NATO's political visibility, and that at the highest level. Third, land operations are also likely to be contentious. This type of operation, conducted in the midst of the civil population, with rival armed factions operating, where troops from (at present) 34 countries are collaborating, in which American participation is uncertain, and whose objectives are politically limited, ambiguous and require extremely delicate management, implies a priori a command structure that is perfectly adapted to working under these constraints. Of course, if the Americans were in fact to deploy 25,000 of the 50,000 troops considered necessary to implement the peace plan, NATO's involvement would appear more justified. This NATO responsibility on the ground in Bosnia would not, however, be the last word: for land operations the link between military forces executing the operation and the United Nations as the political authority appears, more than elsewhere, inescapable, as does the necessity to adapt command arrangements to the number of countries participating, whether or not they are members of existing alliances.

Consequently, the relationship between the United Nations and defence institutions forms an integral part of the internal debate between NATO and WEU. The dialogue between the United Nations and national military command has always been difficult (it was difficult in the Gulf and Somalia), but it is even more complicated once the United Nations delegates the conduct of military operations, not to a country (such as the United States), but to an international organisation (NATO or WEU): the problem is reflected at the very core of relations between military commands and political authorities. 'Le défaut majeur de l'Alliance tient à l'autonomie excessive de son commandement militaire et au trop faible contrôle politique sous lequel il opère.' This analysis by a senior French official⁽⁵¹⁾ explains in particular the initial controversy raised in March 1993 by the plan for the possible deployment of a NATO force to implement the Vance-Owen peace plan: the United States wanted SACEUR, an American commander, to have full authority over the operation, whereas the French would have wished the entire force to be placed under the direct command of the United Nations. The debate came to an abrupt end when the Vance-Owen plan was dropped, but was to reappear with the implementation of Resolutions 816 and 836 a few months later. There is the greatest reluctance among military authorities regarding political interference in the conduct of operations. The memory of President Johnson's procrastination at the time of the first American bombing in Vietnam has left its mark. Interference between several chains of command -- national, multinational or United Nations -- is seen by military authorities as potentially disastrous. However, American blunders in Somalia and the Yugoslav war have already made a number of modifications necessary on both sides. Firstly, within NATO, for all peacekeeping missions in which NATO is involved, France now participates, officially since April 1993, in the Military Committee, with the same voting rights as any of its partners. This committee, however, only has the power to make proposals (regarding command, the definition of missions and the planning of operations). For the implementation of Resolution 836, therefore, the Military Committee transmitted to the North Atlantic Council, which is the Alliance's highest political authority,

'operational options for air strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina', and the Council finally approved these on 9 August 1993. Secondly, between NATO and WEU, the procedures finally adopted for the implementation of Resolution 836 make compromise possible: in a letter dated 4 August 1993, the Secretary-General of the United Nations insisted on NATO actions to implement resolutions being carried out under the authority of the Security Council in support of UNPROFOR in the accomplishment of its overall mandate. Relayed by France within the North Atlantic Council, this position was finally accepted by NATO on 9 August: 'the Council agrees with the position of the UN Secretary-General that the first use of air power in the theatre shall be authorized by him. With respect to NATO, the NAC shall be the political authority that will decide on the conduct of air strikes, which will be carried out in coordination with the UN.'⁽⁵²⁾ The operational options will have been previously worked out jointly by the Military Committee and UNPROFOR, in particular to ensure the necessary link between air operations and the situation as it develops on the ground. The American Admiral Mike Boorda, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), is thus responsible for the operation, French officers providing the liaison with General Cot, commanding UNPROFOR. If the Owen-Stoltenberg plan for Bosnia came into force, such adapting to political control would be even more necessary, but would the Americans, if they had 25,000 troops deployed on the ground, agree to sharing the responsibility which they could have, via SACEUR, with a representative of the United Nations Secretary-General?

These institutional episodes have at least the merit that they sound the death knell on the notion that there can be a single, simple model for the European security architecture. The only rule that possibly emerges from the Yugoslav experience concerns the sharing of tasks at a very early stage. If only because it is directly concerned, the European Union should have and maintain the power to take initiatives aimed at overall political solutions to turbulence in Europe. Because it represents today the only embryo, the only ideal of consensual international order, the United Nations for its part remains the only body that can legitimate intervention in the various post-communist crises: precarious and unsatisfactory though it may be, resort to the United Nations is for the moment still preferable to unilateral, uncontrolled or arbitrary interventionism. Lastly, because they have the ability to mobilise military resources, the Western defence organisations such as NATO and WEU will for their part be increasingly charged with executing United Nations mandates. Beyond this general division of labour, less than perfect *ad hoc* solutions and institutional compromises are for a long time likely to be commonplace. Moreover, it is certainly not this institutional competition between NATO and WEU that causes or explains the West's impotence when faced with the Yugoslav war. The weakness, squabbles, indeed the pointlessness of the institutions merely reflect the differences between member states, their passivity or their respective uncertainties. On the American side the question has two aspects: can the United States maintain and exercise a certain degree of leadership in Europe even though it does not take the risk of physical involvement in the management of real crises alongside the Europeans? And can NATO survive and regenerate following the end of the Cold War if it remains uninvolved or impotent when faced with crises of the Yugoslav type; conversely, what, in the absence of America, is NATO if not Europe? These questions are largely shared on the European side, in addition to two more specific concerns: what responsibility is Europe to assume in the management of essentially European crises and, conversely, can Europe choose to have no responsibility? In the shorter term,

how can the continent be stabilised, *inter alia* through the use of military means, while two of the major contributors to European security -- the United States and Germany -- are for one reason or another excluded?

CONCLUSION: TO HAVE DONE WITH YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia has presented the international community with all possible types of armed conflict and commitment. Civil wars, wars of secession, inter-state wars and wars of territorial conquest have combined on the ground to justify the successive or simultaneous recourse to traditional peacekeeping operations (in Croatia) and humanitarian intervention (Bosnia), mixed with a dash of peace enforcement (Serbia), an attempt at prevention (Macedonia) and a systematic pretence of impartiality. If, however, neutrality was a sensible policy for small states in the former East-West order -- where it was exercised in a marginal way in the shadow of two completely antagonistic nuclear super-blocs -- it would pose much more of a problem if it were to become the dominant strategy of the great powers in a largely anarchic European system.

In general, can neutrality be considered a possible policy for the future at a time when the debate on the enlargement of Western institutions -- NATO, WEU and the European Union -- is becoming equally fundamental? Will membership of these institutions be opened by chance to any European country unconditionally, even -- in addition to strategic, geographic and economic criteria -- without imposing the condition of democratic 'normalisation'? To a great extent this question overlaps the other question arising from the Yugoslav war, that of effective preventive diplomacy, in other words the pacification of Europe through the progressive integration of all countries. Much progress towards this has already been made, including the prospect of enlargement of the European Union to include six countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Forum of Consultation set up by WEU with nine of these countries, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, in which the NATO countries cooperate with former members of the Warsaw Pact and the ex-USSR.⁽⁵³⁾ Of course, a priori the full integration of the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe into all of the Western political, economic and security structures should serve both an educational and a stabilising function for the new members and ensure better collective control over any nationalist, or other, backsliding on their part. However, at the moment the obstacles seem to outweigh the immediate advantages of such integration: the Twelve are not ready to assume, without a period of transition, the financial and economic costs of the rapid admission of new European democracies still in the process of development; nor are the NATO countries from now on prepared to involve themselves in the collective defence of unstable states bordering the ex-USSR. Some, then, will consider the maintaining of an East-West divide irresponsible, in view of the multiple risks of destabilisation that threaten the still fragile Eastern democracies. Others, conversely, will judge a headlong acceleration of reconciliation in Europe to be impossible without running the risk of destabilising our own democracies. The minimal consensus that nevertheless exists, that there should be increased links, dialogue, cooperation, consultation and other mechanisms of association, in any event demonstrates that Western countries' strategic preoccupations are not in this case separable from the attention they pay to democratic principles.

Coming back to Yugoslavia, it will firstly be recalled that the West's policy of neutrality was far from being adopted immediately: in the first six months of the

crisis, in 1991, American, British and French diplomacy was fairly pro-Serb, whereas Germany was more susceptible to Slovene and Croatian claims. (During his electoral campaign and in the first days of his presidency, Bill Clinton for his part gave the impression of being rather more sensitive to Bosnian interests). It was only during a second phase, from the moment that the United Nations appeared on the scene, that mediation and dialogue with all the parties to the conflict became the official line followed by all Western countries.

Some will therefore suspect that this neutrality is merely a facade that conceals a widely shared pro-Serb sentiment: Ambassador Wynaendts, remarking on the events, between November 1991 and February 1992, surrounding the decision by the United Nations to create UNPROFOR, shows for example the ambiguity in the positions adopted by Cyrus Vance in adopting the proposals of Milosevic rather than those of Tudjman and Izetbegovic on the zones in which blue helmets could or could not be deployed.⁽⁵⁴⁾ Others, on the other hand, will defend the choice of neutrality as being the only possible and desirable option for the West, whose intentions have always been honourable and good, even if Western countries recognise that, paradoxically, the consequence of their impartiality was often to favour the strong rather than the weak. Indeed, there is no doubt that the deployment of UNPROFOR I troops in Croatia froze Serbian territorial conquests and prevented the return of Croatian refugees to occupied zones. It is also true that the embargo on arms to the former Yugoslavia had the effect of increasing the Serbian forces' military and industrial superiority. As for contradictions in humanitarian aid, of which it has been said that it allowed Bosnian victims to die on a full stomach, these have been described and explained by civilian operators in Bosnia, doctors or members of NGOs, as being largely a function of the stubbornness of political authorities in adhering to their policy of neutrality.

Hell, as everybody knows, is indeed paved with good intentions. In reality, if Western neutrality, aside from its declared intentions, has proved so perverse in its practical application, would it not be reasonable to conclude that this initial choice was neither possible nor adequate? Can the democracies remain neutral in these types of conflicts -- towards the combatants, but above all towards the values that they convey or claim to uphold? In the case of Yugoslavia, in the absence of any agreement on the principles to be defended, the relative power of individual Western countries played a decisive role in 'orienting' Western neutrality in the direction of strategic considerations. If such an attitude were to prove the precedent for European strategy in the future, this would be an omen of an arbitrary European order, based on the proposition that might is right and only tempered by a concern to maintain regional and global strategic balance. Such an order could in fact be viable: if it were punctuated by a good dose of humanitarian aid, in pursuing it the democracies would lose nothing more than their pretence at having solutions to all problems. If, on the other hand, a situation so reminiscent of the Congress of Vienna -- and its consequences -- appeared to be contrary to the interests of the democracies themselves, the experience of Yugoslavia should surely rank among the errors to be avoided in future, or as an exception.

The answers to all the other questions that have become inevitable after two years of war in Yugoslavia depend on that fundamental choice. The reform of the United Nations, including its ability to intervene in European crises, the role of existing

security institutions, the future orientation of the Euro-Atlantic contract and the development of a European policy on preventive diplomacy will all depend on whether the West resigns itself to arbitrary policies based on relative strengths, or attempts to reconcile strategic criteria with the defence of Western values. For the Twelve in particular, the responsibility to make this decision is all the more overwhelming since they can no longer take refuge behind American leadership or the availability of the United Nations. A Europe along Swiss lines would need systematic American intervention but, after Yugoslavia, that possibility at least has disappeared. Certainly, in terms of practical results, a European policy that refused, a priori, to choose a strategic rather than a democratic order would also create ambiguity, approximation, imperfection and dissatisfaction. All compromise is bitter: the Twelve will certainly not invent a regime for the protection of minorities and the defence of states that is ideal, definitive, clear and unquestionable. At the very least, they will avoid ratifying a future European order that is based once more on resentment and the thirst for revenge.

1. See Frédéric Bozo, 'Organisations de sécurité et insécurité en Europe', *Politique Etrangère* no. 2, 1993.
2. See Henry Wynaendts, *L'engrenage* (Paris: Denoel, 1993); Hans Stark, *Les Balkans, le retour de la guerre en Europe* (Paris: IFRI-Dunod, 1993).
3. See the excellent study by Catherine Guicherd, 'L'heure de l'Europe, premières leçons du conflit yougoslave', *Cahiers du Crest*, no. 10, March 1993.
4. *International Herald Tribune*, 21 September 1992.
5. See Resolutions 770 (18 August 1992), 816 (31 March 1993) and 836 (4 June 1993).
6. Quoted in John Newhouse, 'No exit, no entrance', *New Yorker*, 28 June 1993, p. 45.
7. The source of all figures quoted in this paper is the French Ministry of Defence, August 1993.
8. See James Steinberg, 'The role of European institutions after the cold war, some lessons from Yugoslavia.' RAND note 3445 FF.
9. For details of Greece's attitude, see 'The diplomatic round', John Newhouse, *New Yorker*, 18 August 1992, pp. 67-8.
10. 'Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under chapter VII.'
11. Northern Ireland and Gibraltar also raised problems.
12. *Verwirrung der Gefühle* by Stefan Zweig, published in English as *Conflicts*.
13. For a full treatment of this question, see Pierre Hassner, 'Plaidoyer pour les interventions ambiguës', in *Commentaire*, no. 61, printemps 1993.
14. Ambassador Wynaendts thus considers that Resolution 713 placing an embargo on arms destined for Yugoslavia has deprived Bosnia of the right to self-defence postulated in Article 51 of the charter of the United Nations. See op. cit. in note 3, p. 101.
15. Similar developments occurred in NATO in June and December 1992.
16. Which Article 51 of the charter of the United Nations legitimates.
17. 'The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implementations.'

18. '. . . no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.'

19. 'Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.'

20. This consisted of a parody of what could be a new, nationalist line of Russian diplomacy involving, for example, Russia's use of the veto in the United Nations.

21. The clarification on this point made by the British government during the Gulf war will be recalled.

22. For details of this controversy, see John Newhouse, 'The diplomatic round', op. cit. in note 10, pp. 64-7.

23. 'The Germans bear a particular responsibility for having persuaded the EC to act like them', in *Le Monde*, 19 June 1993.

24. Reported in *Le Monde*, 8 July 1993.

25. Michael Brenner, 'Les Etats-Unis et la crise yougoslave', *Politique étrangère*, 2/92.

26. In 'No exit, no entrance', *New Yorker*, 28 June 1993.

27. For an account of American procrastination since June 1990, see also James Goodby, 'Peacekeeping in the New Europe', *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1992.

28. Quoted in 'The diplomatic round', op. cit. in note 10, p. 68.

29. Margaret Tutwiler, quoted in *Le Monde*, 25 May 1992.

30. In addition to the 700 or so Scandinavian peacekeepers already in Macedonia.

31. '. . . a refusal of European solutions on the grounds of principle and Bosnian interests and acceptance on the grounds of realities and [America's] allies.' Pierre Hassner, 'Les impuissances de la Communauté internationale', in *Vukovar . . . Sarajevo* (Paris: Esprit, 1993), p. 99.

32. 'It is time for the United States to become actively and directly involved in the Vance-Owen negotiations', Warren Christopher, press conference reported in *Le Monde*, 12 February 1993.

33. 'I am not one of those who believes that a few well-chosen bombs will take care of a thousand years of history. They won't.' *Wall Street Journal*, 13 August 1993.

34. See para. 22 of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept, adopted in Rome on 7 November 1991.

35. See also the debate on the European Corps.
36. 'the result of the uncertainty and division that reign in Washington, the process of adapting to a multipolar world, or the beginnings of a new isolationism that admits only selective and provisional involvement, while not abandoning universalist, dynamic rhetoric.' Pierre Hassner, op. cit., p. 101.
37. In spring 1993 the participation of Russian and American troops in the implementation of the Vance-Owen peace plan was envisaged. 900 Russian blue helmets are already assigned to UNPROFOR.
38. 950 Polish, 360 Ukrainian and 500 Czech troops are already participating in UNPROFOR.
39. 'United Nations operations - interaction with WEU', WEU Assembly document 1366, 19 May 1993, para. 75.
40. This agreement was signed on 21 January 1993.
41. In Petersberg in June 1992 in the case of WEU, and in Oslo in July 1992 and Brussels in December 1992 in the case of NATO.
42. On 30 September 1991 WEU's *ad hoc* group put forward four options for intervention. The WEU Ministerial Council of 18 November of that year decided to 'make available to the United Nations details of the contingency planning work already done by WEU experts.'
43. North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, 10 June 1993.
44. Regretfully, by August 1993 there had been 40 fatalities among UNPROFOR troops, including 15 French.
45. 6,200 French, 2,400 British, 1,306 Danish, 1,080 Dutch, 995 Spanish and 808 Belgian.
46. Edward Mortimer, *Financial Times*, 14 July 1993.
47. The discussions following the decisions taken at the NATO summit of January 1994 on Combined Joint Task Forces and other NATO assets should help to clarify this. See also note 53.
48. Operation DENY FLIGHT involves 67 American, 31 French, 26 British, 18 Dutch and 18 Turkish aircraft.
49. In *Le Monde*, 12 February 1993. In the *International Herald Tribune* of 12 March 1993, Michael Gordon reported Pentagon plans to contribute an American division.
50. It is for this reason that France has not left the air defence side of the integrated military structure.

51. 'The major fault of the Alliance lies in the excessive autonomy of its military command structure and the too weak political control under which it operates.' G. Trangis (pseudonym of a very senior French official), in 'Ni splendide isolement, ni réintégration', *Le Monde*, 14 July 1993.

52. North Atlantic Council, press release (93)52, 9 August 1993.

53. This has been added to by the decision on a Partnership for Peace taken at the NATO summit of January 1994.

54. For details of conversations and negotiations between these protagonists see *L'engrenage*, op. cit., pp. 136-43 ff.