Chaillot Papers

- 8 -

June 1993

THE SPECIAL FRANCO-GERMAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IN THE 1990s

Peter Schmidt

INSTITUT D'ETUDES DE SECURITE
UNION DE L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE

INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

Chaillot Paper 8

THE SPECIAL FRANCO-GERMAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IN THE 1990s

Peter Schmidt

June 1993

ISSN 1017-7566

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

The Institute was pleased to welcome Peter Schmidt, one of the leading German scholars of European security integration from the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, as a visitor during the early part of 1992. This paper, which was begun while he was with us and completed subsequently, formed the basis for a number of discussions within the Institute and we are now glad to be able to make it available to a wider audience.

The Franco-German relationship has been one of the driving factors in the process of European integration, and Peter Schmidt's perceptive analysis indicates the way that the relationship has operated during the last three years and how it can continue to contribute to security integration in the post-Cold War period. In a very balanced evaluation, he does not hesitate to indicate the potential problems but places these within the wider context of European developments.

John Roper
Paris, June 1993

The special Franco-German security relationship in the 1990s

Peter Schmidt

INTRODUCTION: BETWEEN THE FEAR OF FAILURE AND THE HOPE OF SUCCESS

Michel Tatu once rightly observed[1] that the strangest paradox in the Franco-German treaty of 1963 (the Elysée Treaty) is that the treaty was signed not by two similar or comparable countries, but by two very dissimilar ones. This comment still has some validity today. Sometimes it appears as if the Franco-German relationship is maintained more through anxiety over the possible negative consequences that could result from the failure of the `entente' than by a convergence of political interests and political-cultural rapprochement. The exaggerated symbolism of many Franco-German summits and the fact that major political moves have been undertaken by the French President and the German chancellor without intensive consultation with the ministries concerned, can be regarded more an indication of the remaining divergences than of the many points of convergence.[2]

The postwar East-West confrontation is over. In the ensuing transformation the traditional French notion of `les incertitudes allemandes,' in the sense that Germany might dangerously trade unification for neutrality, has lost all significance. Further, the critical attitude of the Germans towards French military non-integration in NATO has to be re-examined because NATO itself is undergoing change and the EC countries are in the midst of trying to form Political Union including a common security policy.

Both countries are consequently in the process of adapting their views of the world and their position in the international order to the new circumstances. Old assumptions certainly still play a role but are now overlaid by a new definition of national interests. In this period some lack of clarity in the definition of interests is, unavoidable. Nevertheless, the further development of policy on both sides of the Rhine must be based on a clear understanding of the existing problems, the remaining difficulties and identifiable contradictions between the two partners to create a stable basis for future partnership.

Against this background it becomes easier to understand why the debate on the Franco-German axis is confusing to outsiders. On the one hand academics and the political class in France seem to cultivate the fear of a more and more powerful Germany[3] and, on the other hand, the privileged relationship of the two partners is not basically contested. In addition a number of major common initiatives in 1991, especially regarding the further evolution of the European Community, like the Genscher-Dumas initiative of February and the Kohl-Mitterrand `coup' of 14 October 1991 (see Annexe), have made quite far-reaching proposals to include security and defence questions in the envisaged Political Union of Western Europe. And yet rather harsh criticism was heard, like the French excitement about the strong stance of Germany with regard to the early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, or the annoyed German reaction on the French reluctance to recognize all new Republics on the soil of the former Soviet Union.[4] Even in the discussions concerning the future development of the European Community where major common initiatives have been launched, some fragility in the relationship can be observed. For example, the shared goal of a homogeneous Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the

European Union was confronted with a number of unilateral and uncoordinated political manoeuvres on both sides (Germany: the Genscher-Baker plan to create a North Atlantic Cooperation Council with Central and Eastern Europe, Germany urging recognition of Croatia and Slovenia as independent states; France: the demand for a common initiative of the four nuclear powers to address nuclear proliferation problems in Eastern Europe, and the emphasis on the special responsibility of the permanent members of the UN Security Council).

This setting also makes understandable the statement that the Franco-German coupling represents `the engine of Europe.' For when these two countries, despite their traditionally different political `philosophies' and `differences in details' regarding security affairs, agree on a certain policy on Europe significant political changes become feasible.(5)

Against this multifaceted background the following study will examine the *current state of the Franco-German security relationship, its major determinants, identifiable convergences and divergences and its possible evolution.* This analysis will search out the dynamic factors in the relationship, including the impact of the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the only superpower and the shifting power balance between the neighbouring countries. It will analyze the divergences and convergences with regard to the action dimension of security policy--the Gulf War and the Yugoslav civil war, and divergences and convergences in important prospective political areas like European Union and the organization of defence in Western Europe. It will conclude with some reflections on the potential of this special relationship with regard to the development of security policy in Western Europe.

In the search for the dynamic factors influencing the bilateral relationship, an important consideration can be seen in the question `what drives Franco-German cooperation?' or `which factors work in favour or against a special security relationship between the two neighbouring countries?' The subsequent analysis starts with the following more general assumptions:

- The breakdown of the communist power bloc has not only freed the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and forced them to define their own strategic objectives and to reformulate their alliance interests. But also the West European countries had--and still have--to evaluate anew their strategic commitments. For France and Germany new strategic choices and coalitions have become--at least theoretically--feasible.(6) A critical point in the search for an answer to the new situation is the common awareness of risks and challenges, which represents an important stimulus for cooperation. How far can--or cannot--cooperation between the two states be seen as an answer to these risks and challenges (see the first parts of the sections on French and German perceptions, options and choices)? (7)

- Another important factor in the Franco-German relationship is the balance of power between the two states. This element has always played a prominent role in their relations, at least from the French point of view.(8) France was only ready to accept German rearmament in the 1950s on condition that this process took place in a tight political European or Atlantic institutional framework, controlling German power. changes in the power relationship between the two countries therefore represent an

important determinant for further advances in Franco-German relations and determine the search for alternative partners beyond the bilateral relationship in the case of a power shift at the expense of one partner or for strategic cooperation in a more balanced relationship (see the last parts of the sections dealing with the effect of the Gulf and Yugoslav conflicts on the two countries).[9]

- Nevertheless, strategic power considerations reacting to the changing strategic environment and to the shifting power balance between France and Germany are in reality not only the result of theoretical reflections by the major political actors. Politicians and diplomats develop their strategic thinking on a `learning by doing' basis, that is, in undertaking certain actions. This study therefore places the more general strategic reflections in a context where considerations of the theoretical role and status of a nation-state and diplomatic practice become merged and theoretical thinking about `strategic coalitions' is confronted with concrete experience of how certain coalitions work, as in, for example, the Gulf conflict and the Yugoslav civil war (see the chapter on perspectives on divergences and convergences).

- Finally, practical problems and conflicts of aims come to the surface when certain political projects have to be realized (European Union, change of defence structure in Europe)--especially when declaratory policy and theoretical reflections on power and influence have to be transformed into practical and sustainable political solutions, adaptations of political interests occur, and some political options become discernible while others prove to be of limited use (see the section on the future of the relationship).[10]

DYNAMIC FACTORS DRIVING FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION IN SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The breakdown of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the US

as the only superpower and the increased importance of Germany

French perceptions, options and choices

In the 1970s, de Gaulle's dynamic approach to East-West relations, characterised by the vision of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, lost most of its vitality. France became more or less satisfied with the political status quo in Europe where a militarily powerful Soviet Union was balanced by a US-led Atlantic Alliance with a militarily and politically well integrated Federal Republic of Germany.(11) From the French point of view this system not only kept `the Russians out' and `the Germans under control,' but also constituted the precondition for freedom of action for French foreign and security policy, which had a positive impact on French internal stability, i.e. the famous French consensus in defence affairs based on its independent nuclear strategy of the `faible au fort.'(12)

With the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the breaking apart of the Soviet Union, the bipolar international system and with it--as a side effect--the fairly privileged French position in it, came to an end:

- Germany was no longer `squeezed in' between an Atlantic Alliance and a powerful Soviet Union, and it became more and more likely that the Atlantic Alliance which up to then had constrained German power would become a less dense and binding framework for France's eastern neighbour.

- The United States, regarded in France not only as the protector of Europe but also as a strategic political competitor, lost its strategic counterpart and has become the only superpower. France's assessment of the new status of the United States has been inconsistent. On the one hand it is emphasized that America is now the only superpower which still tries to dominate Europe and on the other hand official French voices underline the domestic difficulties and problems of America which would make it difficult--if not impossible--for the United States to maintain its outstanding status in world affairs.

Under these conditions, it was understandable that France reacted rather reluctantly to the changes in the East and especially to the unification of Germany:(13) fundamental choices had to be made. One indication of this hesitation was that France had difficulties becoming, like the United States,(14) an active partner in the German unification process: the whole development was without clearly identifiable immediate political advantages for France with regard to France's position on the international scene. Even the `peace dividend' was, in comparison with that perceived in Germany and the United States, limited in scope: defence expenditure has not

changed much in recent years in France; indeed, the military procurement budget for the next three years has been frozen at the 1992 level.[15]

France did not, however, have much time to define its new national interests, because the international environment was changing without intensive French participation. NATO especially was rapidly reforming its structure.

Since France left NATO's integrated military structure in 1966/67 it has enjoyed, in comparison with Germany, relatively broad freedom of action and a relatively powerful position in international relations. In particular, French strength in relation to Germany was supported by France's traditional special responsibility for Germany, as one of the victorious powers of World War II, its permanent seat in the UN Security Council, and its possession of nuclear weapons. These political circumstances allowed France to collaborate with an economically strong Germany from a position of relative strength and to pursue, for example, its economic interests together with Germany through the European Community (EC) and thereby compete with Japan and the United States (which France was keenly interested in doing). Economically, Germany became an ever-stronger partner who, nevertheless, was very much accustomed to pursuing its interests in multinational frameworks like NATO and the European Community, mostly in a cooperative way, while still burdened in international affairs by Nazi history and the consequences of World War II. These bonds, however, were never regarded by Germany as prisoners' chains from which it should free itself as soon as possible. Rather, Germany found itself more or less comfortable in its `niche of history' and tried to profit from this situation.[16]

In the course of the Eastern political transformation which began in 1989 it became obvious to the French that with regard to the power situation `history worked for the Germans.' Important French assets in this sphere became devalued:

- Through the two-plus-four talks and German unification France lost its status as one of the four victors of World War II with special responsibilities for Germany.

- Although Germany was content under the American nuclear umbrella,[17] France had always seen its own nuclear capability as a power asset with a possible European vocation. But then, due to the rapidly growing readiness of the USSR to withdraw its tactical nuclear capability the French nuclear potential suffered a `déflation nucléaire'.[18] In addition, Germany's scepticism with regard to nuclear weapons made it difficult to accept France's nuclear status as a trump card in the power game.

Even worse, from a French point of view, Germany's power appeared to be increasing:

- The unification of Germany added a region of about 15 million inhabitants to the still flourishing economy of the Federal Republic.

- Politically and culturally Germany was attractive to a number of Eastern and Southern countries.[19]

- In general terms, the new international situation seemed to reward -at least for a certain period--areas in which Germany is traditionally strong: economic competitiveness, social peace, political stability, and a society open to the world.(20)

- More specifically, Germany was courted by the United States with the offer of `partnership in leadership,' and was also quite highly regarded by the Russians.(21)

Searching to balance what was perceived as a significant increase in German power, France was faced with the following basic options:

- to accept the new situation and be satisfied with a secondary role for France in Europe,

- to try to mobilize its own resources for a stronger France,

- to look for major partners other than Germany (the UK, the United States),(22) or

- to offer Germany assistance in the accomplishment of an important German goal: the further development of the European Community.

France preferred the final option for at least three reasons:

- The first option was very difficult to accept: it was inconsistent with the French penchant for *grandeur*, and the second contradicted their experience from the beginning of the 1980s, that a socialist economic *Sonderweg* (special path) for France in a Europe dominated by market economies is almost impossible.

- The third option was hard to accept given the traditional French suspicion of the `Anglo-Saxons'. Historically, France has preferred (except during periods of crisis) a more or less `covert' form of cooperation with the United States,(23) rather than an open fully-fledged coalition (in addition, the United States had just offered `partnership-in-leadership' to the Germans and not to the French). The British have always been regarded as a direct competitor for leadership in Europe as was already apparent in the 1960s during the debate on the accession of the UK to the EEC. The French, furthermore, often suspected that the UK represents an American Trojan horse in Europe.(24)

- France wanted to prevent any `renationalisation' of Germany's security and defence policy by setting the unified Germany in a close-meshed political framework as some kind of substitute for the supposed weakening of the German ties with NATO.

German perceptions, options and choices

Germany had a different preoccupation during the turmoil of the late 1980s and the early 1990s: the unification of Germany. Certainly unification was a major German interest, laid down in Germany's constitution. Nevertheless, attaining that goal had became more and more unlikely in the view of most German political actors in the course of the postwar period. Like many political observers and analysts, the German government was rather surprised when this goal suddenly came within reach.(25) Despite Germany's stand on the goal of unification, the division of Germany certainly

had an influence on the German political stance on a number of issues, especially on the famous *Ostpolitik*. Whereas France became more or less satisfied with the status quo in the 1970s, Germany was always latently dissatisfied with the political stalemate in Europe. The hypothetical character of unification certainly allowed room for posturing and unification rhetoric. Nevertheless, despite the vagueness of the unification goal, it was always a strong and widely shared German view that a settlement of the `German question' had to be included in a new order for the *whole of Europe*, which would have both a Western as well as an Eastern dimension. The critical question for German policy was how these two components would interact, and where friction and dilemmas would appear.(26)

The Eastern dimension, like the Western part of this policy, could not be developed at a stroke, but Germany--pushed in this direction by the two plus four-talks--became a strong advocate for the inclusion of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, now CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) in the `Western World.' This was not only a result of a direct link to the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Soviet troops by 1994 from East German soil, but also a reaction to perceived risks and challenges in this region which could spill over to Western Europe. Despite the fact that it was freed from its military `front line' status, and became united and more powerful, Germany still felt that it was vulnerable and rather weak, at least too weak for the great tasks with which it was confronted. In a certain sense the perception was that Germany remained a front line state, no longer in the military sense but in an economic, political and social sense, by being more directly exposed to the disarray in Central and East (and South-Eastern) Europe than the other West European countries. This conviction became dominant after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) characterized by a very loose political structure and major political cleavages among the member states and inside the participating countries. Despite all the foreign talk about the new German `self-assertiveness,' and official declarations that Germany had to carry more responsibilities in international affairs, Bonn continued to believe in the necessity of strong Western bonds within the major Western frameworks, the European Community and NATO, as a precondition to overcoming the problems in Central and Eastern Europe which have been perceived of as on too big a scale to be addressed in a more or less unilateral way.

This preoccupation with Western ties was substantiated by the German interest in embedding all of unified Germany into the Atlantic Alliance, and the readiness to see a `deepening' of the European Community. The latter was indicated by Germany's active role in the two intergovernmental conferences on Economic and Monetary Union and on Political Union.(27)

If Germany was the US's primary partner with regard to policy in the Atlantic Alliance, France was the central player in the European Community. Whereas France concentrated its attention on the `deepening' of the European Community to form a West European power bloc, German interests have been significantly more diversified. For Germany, the question of how to guarantee a stable political, social and economic development in Central and Eastern Europe ranked--in comparison with France--higher on the political agenda. In addition, the Atlantic Alliance as the linchpin with the United States maintained its significance, but is also an alliance in which France traditionally does not invest too much political capital. Germany at least

tries to play an interlocutor's role between France and the United States in the further development of Western security and defence structures.

With regard to the power dimension, *Germany* certainly realized its increased status but at the same time also took on the obvious requirement to form as broad a coalition as possible to overcome the problems in East Germany and in Central and Eastern Europe. Germany certainly felt the paradox that it `est à la fois redoutée pour l'ampleur de ses possibilités et appelée à développer, à montrer sans cesse celles-ci pour répondre aux appels de soutien qui lui sont adressés d'un peu partout.' (it [Germany] is both feared for its great potential and constantly called upon to develop and demonstrate that potential in response to calls for support from all quarters.)[28] Germany also knew that its economy and public finances would be under great pressure.[29]

Germany's understanding of its interests has been guided by the following aims:

- to safeguard German unification by embedding the larger Germany in a framework of ties to Western Europe, but without excluding the Atlantic dimension; and to find a reasonable institutional framework for the whole of Europe;

- to look for *as many partners as possible* for the great task of developing Eastern Germany and Central and Eastern Europe economically and politically (France represents not only an important economic power but is also a central player in the EC). Whereas Germany formerly needed partners to `keep the Russians out' they are keen today to cooperate in order to `help the Russians up';[30]

- to persuade Western powers to include to the greatest extent possible the Central and Eastern European countries in a sustainable security framework (European and Atlantic). Whereas the United States represents the Atlantic dimension, France is considered to be of great importance for the West European contribution to the fulfilment of this task.

Given this view, basically Germany had the following options:

- to accept the American offer of `partnership in leadership,' and strive to widen the European Community to give the countries of Central and Eastern Europe a political (and economic) perspective, while showing a reluctance to `deepen' the European Community, or

- to strengthen and deepen the European Community at the expense of the widening option, in the hope of getting more help from the EC countries for the development of Central and Eastern Europe, which would put the United States in a secondary role.

German policy tried to go both ways, however, with an emphasis on the European Community--deepening option in a Europe of concentric circles.[31] The German engagement in the intergovernmental conferences on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and Political Union (PU) and its readiness to compromise on these has certainly been more important than its commitment to the vision of the so-called Baker-Genscher plan of a `Euro-Atlantic Community that extends east from Vancouver to Vladivostok.'[32]

Because France is a central player in the EC game, German policy had on the one hand to include France as far as possible in the reform of the Atlantic Alliance and, on the other hand, to convince the United States that the development of the European Community was not at the expense of the Atlantic Alliance. This turned out to be a difficult task because the French had traditionally tried to limit the role and functions of the Alliance, especially in the political field, and remained uninterested in taking part in the revised integrated military structure of NATO (although France did not challenge NATO's collective defence role).[33]

It goes without saying that in their bilateral relationship France and Germany do not represent totally opposing interests with regard to the major issues at stake. Nevertheless, the various overall policy priorities certainly rank differently on either side of the Rhine and have been subject to substantial but surmountable conflicts.

THE EFFECT OF MAJOR CONFLICTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP

Germany, under the postwar conditions dictated by history, remained a divided country until 1990. The political and military restrictions set by its allies in WEU and NATO, as well as by its geopolitical position and self-imposed restrictions(34) bound Germany's view of the world to the Central European theatre, with some extension to Eastern Europe and to a strong Atlantic link. To characterize more recent times, it can be noted, for example, `The regular aid to Turkey, a token participation in the Allied Mobile Force, and a rare deployment of naval units to the region such as during the Iran/Iraq Gulf War can hardly be taken as proof of a strategic commitment of a unified security space that connects the central European area to the southern flank.'(35) The naval and air reconnaissance commitment of the German *Bundeswehr* to the surveillance of the UN sanctions against Yugoslavia in the summer of 1992 has not changed things much.

France, bordering both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic and still with strategic commitments beyond Europe in Africa, South America and the Pacific,(36) always maintained a much wider view. None the less, the French ambition to play a `global role' was always in danger of exceeding France's national means.(37)

Due to their different views of the world, Franco-German security talks have frequently appeared less as dialogues than `collective monologues'.(38) For these reasons, France and Germany approached the two major post-Cold War crises--the Gulf conflict and the war in the former Yugoslavia -from different angles:

- For France, the Gulf War was, at the very least, a litmus test of France's strategic ambitions and raised the question whether French `global interests' are backed by adequate political and military resources.

- Germany was forced to consider whether or not it now understands risks, threats and conflicts from places other than Central Europe, its traditional area of security interest, as relevant to Germany's current national security agenda, and also whether it is prepared to play an active diplomatic, financial or even military role in response to these issues.

In addition, both countries had to give at least a partial reply to the question of what roles the different security institutions (UN, NATO, 12/EC, WEU, and CSCE) should play in these crises. By doing so, they added some building blocks to the construction of Europe's future `security architecture'. In addition, their answers to this question will continue to influence the nature of future security relations between the two states themselves.

The Gulf War: different reactions but the same consequences?

The Gulf conflict hit a still-divided Germany during the final stages of the two-plus-four negotiations with the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 led to the retaliation by a US-led coalition

of 28 nations under the auspices of the United Nations, on January 17, 1991. At that time, German policy was still dominated by problems related to unification which occurred on 3 October 1990, and complicated by the question of the ratification of the two-plus-four treaty by a Soviet Union now in disarray[39]and by the fact that Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Germany was not expected to be complete until the end of 1994.[40]

The Gulf conflict was the first important international crisis during the demise of Eastern Communism and the end of East-West antagonism. The German stance and actions at the time of this clash cannot be regarded as a prototype for future German policy in similar crises; none the less, they may give an indication of Germany's problems in adapting to the post-Cold War and post-unification world, and may indicate in what manner Germany will try to adapt to the new circumstances. It is obvious that the course of the Gulf crisis affected German security and defence policy and had repercussions on Franco-German relations, as well. In this difficult and complex situation one important political current in Germany--and probably in the federal government--saw in Franco-German military cooperation an instrument to solve these problems.[41] This solution, however, was limited by legal problems. The only hope was that military cooperation with France, a state functioning as a normal `international actor' without special limitations on its national freedom of action, would change the `mental landscape' in Germany, and thus increase the possibility of changing the constitution.[42] Nevertheless, the lessons drawn from this crisis were quite complex and did not give a clear indication of Germany's future role in world affairs.

The following conclusions on Germany's role in the Gulf crisis can be drawn:

- Despite international criticism of Germany's non-involvement in the military ground and air operations against Iraq, many countries regarded this non-participation in military operations with a kind of relief and some also derived satisfaction from the fact that Germany's absence increased the significance of the contributions by other nations.[43] For its part, Germany learned that its policy on German military involvement in out-of-area contingencies has to be able to deal with conflicting pressures.

- In view of the legacy of German history and the Cold War conditions, German governments have followed a narrow and restricted interpretation of the German constitution. This allowed the employment of German military forces only in reaction to a direct military attack on German territory, or within a system of collective defence to which Germany has transferred sovereign rights.[44] NATO, as a defence alliance for protecting the so-called NATO treaty area[45] was regarded as such a system. It was, however, not NATO that conducted the war against Iraq but a coalition of nations, and a more critical factor in this case--the military operations took place beyond the NATO treaty area.[46] Bonn therefore looked for a way to change this situation. A modification of the constitution would need, however, a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag. This was unlikely because of the rather strong opposition by the Greens and a significant numbers of SPD parliamentarians. So other ways were sought to overcome this impasse. Because NATO was politically barred from out-of-area contingencies (this was mostly due to France in particular, which has opposed an out-of-area role for NATO), the German government prudently used

WEU as a framework for some German minesweeping actions after the Gulf War.[47] One reason for this precaution was a legal one: the WEU treaty recognizes--as the Washington treaty--a limited treaty area: only `Europe' itself.[48] In addition, WEU certainly did not represent a well-established framework of collective defence, necessary according to the government's interpretation of the Basic Law, or *Grundgesetz*, to legitimize the use of German military forces outside Germany or the NATO area.[49] But the Brussels Treaty was certainly useful to demonstrate German willingness to improve in this regard; however, it does not in its current form represent a way out of the legal problem as long as the government adheres to its traditional interpretation of the *Grundgesetz*.

- Germany contributed heavily to the costs of the war, financing allied forces , allowing the United States and United Kingdom to use German bases for mounting military operations, and providing financial aid to countries which had been hurt indirectly by the Iraqi conflict. By 19 February 1991 the German financial contribution to the Gulf effort already amounted to 17,079 billion Deutschmarks.[50] Despite this outstanding financial effort, Germany was castigated for its policy, and often viewed as a free rider. This condemnation was partly due to the fact that the German government masked the magnitude and relevance of its contribution for a certain time for domestic political reasons,[51] but the German authorities learned that even a modest direct military contribution to the war would have left Germany less open to criticism as it sought to help improve the political, economic and military circumstances under which the allied powers prepared and fought the war.[52]

The deployment to Turkey of German elements of the air component of NATO's ACE Mobile Force in response to a Turkish request of 20 December 1990, revealed two additional limitations on German participation, even in the support of a NATO ally:

- The armed forces lacked the flexibility for such contingencies, partly due to the draft system but also to the absence of certain military capabilities such as air transport.[53]

- Some of the German armed forces, accustomed as they were to the principle `Be prepared to fight in order not to fight', were not psychologically ready to engage in a conflict beyond German territory.

The Gulf War reminded the Germans of the contradictions in international expectations regarding German military involvement. On the one side there were many demands that Germany take on its fair share of the risks; on the other, there was some satisfaction that Germany remained in the background. Nevertheless, the idea gained ground in Germany that it is necessary to find a way to take part, in one way or another, at least in UN `blue helmet' operations. The government looked for possible ways to go beyond peacekeeping operations but was bound by the constitutional postwar consensus and `any attempt to ignore the long record of precedents that reflect this interpretation would mean putting the political acceptance of German armed forces as such at risk within the German population as well as in the conscription-based *Bundeswehr*itself.'[54]

This situation raised the question whether Germany was able to cooperate at the same level and as an equal partner with other states, especially with France.

France's situation was in most aspects different from the German situation and the lessons drawn were dissimilar too. For France, the Gulf War was a clear demonstration that it lacked the military resources to play a major role in such a campaign. This lesson was an incentive to look for coalition partners in Europe to make good these shortcomings. The basic features of the French situation were:

- France was not burdened by historical memories of a militaristic past, national legal limitations or a strong anti-interventionist peace movement that placed limitations on the use of its armed forces. Restrictions on taking part in operations have mostly been based on `political' issues, namely, the psychological problem for France of fighting under American command and France's historical relations with a number of Arab countries, which raised the fear of repercussions on French-Arab relations. Any criticism inside the government camp could be countered quite easily by presidential political and legal power. In these matters the French President enjoys substantial freedom of action.

- As a member of the UN Security Council France enjoyed a privileged position and was directly involved in the decision-making process of this body. The Security Council played a decisive role until the beginning of the war and again in its final phase, where the terms on which the war was ended were defined.(55) It is likely that the weight of the UN in world affairs will increase, and France will in years to come benefit even more from its privileged seat on the Security Council. It is ready to defend this asset,(56) whereas Germany has announced its long-term aim of becoming a permanent member of the Security Council.(57)

- At the same time France made plain its impression that the political weight of `the Europeans' was not great enough to balance the American influence. This happened despite the fact that two members of the so-called P5-group--the informal caucus of permanent members of the Security Council--are European countries (France and the United Kingdom). French criticism appeared to be directed not so much against European `under-representation' on the Security Council, but against the major role that the UK played in this affair.(58) Where France gave the supposed European impotence as a reason to strengthen the West European security and defence identity, the real reason appeared to be the rather major role of the UK in the Gulf War due to its continuing special relationship with the United States, which is evident in certain circumstances.(59)

- France announced on 14 September 1990 its Operation *Daguet* and later took part--with some reservations and conditions--in operations. This participation in operations, and especially French readiness to side in an American-led campaign, was widely viewed much more positively than the German policy. From a French point of view, it underlined France's `standing' in world politics.(60) Moreover, the relatively limited number of troops France was able to send to the Gulf,(61) and the technological standards of its equipment (especially the lack of key military capabilities in the field of intelligence, real-time command systems, high-precision artillery and missile capacities, interoperability, anti-missile defence and strategic air transport), gained the attention of decision-makers in Paris, who noted these as the limitations on military operations set by an army based to a great extent on conscription.(62) The Gulf crisis made France conscious of a wide gap between its ambitions and the means at its

disposal. It was, however, clear that many of these deficiencies could not be filled by France on its own.

An important implication of the Gulf War therefore was that `more intense European cooperation is necessary in both the operational and industrial domains'.[63] It was evident for France that Germany held the key to this strategy.

In summary, it can be said that the lessons of the Gulf War have only partially been the same for Germany and France:

- Germany discovered political limits on its scope of action and learned that in certain areas its forces are not well adapted to the new conditions (lack of air transport and the problem of conscription); the Franco-German relationship (and WEU) was prudently used as an instrument to enlarge Germany's freedom of action and to influence its domestic political situation in the direction of greater German involvement in world politics, including military matters.

- France enjoyed greater freedom of action than Germany, but saw its ambitions restricted by quite a number of deficiencies in its force structure, in the quality of its equipment and by a lack of formal political influence by comparison with the UK in certain aspects of this affair. WEU and the evolving European Union--in both of which Germany plays a key role--were increasingly seen in France as instruments which could be used to reduce these shortcomings.

The war in the former Yugoslavia

The breaking apart of the Yugoslav state was the first `post-Cold War' conflict in Europe subject to genuine West European efforts to make peace (12/EC, WEU). It was a crisis and war totally different from the Gulf incident and happened in a dissimilar political context. Nevertheless, like the Gulf crisis, the Yugoslav case probably represents, with regard to French and German behaviour, a challenge which foreshadows the stances the two countries will take in similar events in the future. This is of special importance, because there is reason to believe that the Yugoslav crisis contains some features which will prove to be typical for future conflicts in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: ethnical basis of conflicts, mixture between war and civil war, unclear frontiers etc.

In trying to understand the policies of France and Germany in this crisis and its repercussions on their bilateral relations, it is necessary to realize the specific conditions of this crisis in comparison with the war against Iraq. Compared with the Gulf war, the Yugoslav conflict is characterized by the following general features:

- It started as a secession conflict and not an inter-state war. This raises difficult problems of how to intervene in an intra-state conflict from the point of view of international law and in particular for the UN.[64]

- In contrast to the Gulf case, until the end of 1992 the United States played only a minor role in this crisis;[65] the UN became a relevant actor only at a later stage of the crisis after the efforts of the EC countries had proved to be unsuccessful[66] and no agreement could be found for forming a WEU interposition force.

- The CSCE played a rather limited role, despite the fact that--at least in theory--it is well-suited for such a crisis.(67)

These special conditions were a challenge to Europe to respond. The Yugoslav crisis occurred, like the Gulf War, during a time of political metamorphosis which may have, even more than the above-mentioned factors, influenced a decision about taking the initiative on a West European level. In this case it was not German unification which created a special framework, but the Intergovernmental Conferences of the EC countries which in turn had repercussions on the political attitudes of the EC states involved. The attitude of the 12 was influenced by their position on the future structure of security policy in Western Europe. There are certainly a number of good military arguments against intervention in this conflict. Nevertheless, it may not have been coincidental that two countries with a rather sceptical view of a European defence dimension, Portugal and the UK, voted against a European peacekeeping force, while promoters of such a development, France and Germany, supported consideration of such a force.

Germany experienced three major problems in its policy vis-à-vis Yugoslavia:

- Whereas there was great reluctance in Paris to recognize the republics rebelling against the Belgrade regime, Germany was the most vocal supporter of early recognition of Slovene and Croatian independence. Criticism of the German stance was fairly strong in Paris and raised fears of a vast zone of German influence.(68) Nevertheless, a solution was found on a Franco-German level based on a list of criteria which had to be met. Despite this agreement, Bonn felt it had to present its `special stance' on this issue and announced its recognition of Slovenia and Croatia earlier than the other EC states. This was commented on adversely, for example, by *Le Monde*, as the `retour of la question allemande.'(69) Germany once again found its international policy the object of rather harsh criticism.

- Germany supported sending an interposition force to Yugoslavia, but then became enmeshed in its own constitutional problems. This led to the strange situation of a promoter of a military option being prepared to give logistical support to a force but unable to contribute troops. Despite the argument that German military involvement could unleash Serbian propaganda recalling the Croatian-German coalition in World War II against the Serbians, the German position engendered rather biting criticism in the international media. This situation increased the problems the German government was having with its interpretation of the *Grundgesetz* with regard to the use of its armed forces.(70)

- The German government learned that its opportunities for exerting influence within international organizations are limited in comparison with those of France. Germany tried to play the CSCE card, but the CSCE turned out not to be effective in this case due to the rule of unanimity which included the conflicting parties. The deployment of a peacekeeping force was only possible with the backing of the UN, where France and the UK are permanent members of the Security Council.

- In the framework of the European Community/12, Germany certainly played an important role and was able to persuade its partners to recognize Serbia and Croatia

earlier than they would have in the absence of German pressure. Nevertheless, conditions had already been set for their recognition and Germany could not gain the full political benefit from its action.

The French position was more comfortable:

- France did not, in fact, succeed in its demand for an interposition force under the auspices of WEU,[71] as a pre-emptive step to promote the idea of Political Union. But the transfer of decisions from a European framework to the UN did not reduce French influence because France still had its position of influence in the UN Security Council on which to fall back.[72] It is not by accident that French soldiers represent an important part of the UN peacekeeping force in Yugoslavia.[73]

- The failure of the idea of deploying a WEU force to the crisis area did not harm the new French interest in developing a military dimension of Political Union. One can even argue that the Yugoslav crisis contributed more to the further development of the European Community in the security area than to resolution of the conflict.[74]

Two lessons can be drawn from this crisis:

- Despite the `power image' sometimes attached to German foreign policy, the Yugoslav case demonstrated that Germany's scope of action in security affairs remains rather limited. Under current conditions this is especially the case concerning military operations.

- There was Franco-German consensus for the exploration of a WEU force, but the German side was weakened by constitutional problems and ultimately there was no agreement possible in the wider European framework for sending such a force.

PERSPECTIVES ON DIVERGENCES AND CONVERGENCES

A common goal, but where do security and defence figure

in the `European Union'?

The year 1991 witnessed the merging of two political issues which had been viewed separately until the end of the 1980s: the question of how to develop the European Community and the problem of the further evolution of security and defence policy in Europe. The first was addressed by the Intergovernmental Conferences on Economic and Monetary Union and Political Union and the second was reflected by the continuing process of NATO restructuring and the objective of including security and defence in the move to a Political Union. The wide political debates and negotiations on these questions revealed not only the Franco-German capacity to form a consensus and find a compromise which heavily influences political evolution in these policy areas, but also some traditional differences and new disagreements.

With regard to the development of the European Community there has always been a conceptual difference between Bonn and Paris. The evaluation of the progress in Maastricht has to be seen against this background:

- For *France* `l'Europe unie doit avoir, vis-à-vis de l'extérieur, une personnalité économique et politique; les Etats nations doivent être les fondements de cet ensemble et garde une marge propre d'action. Derrière ces idées se retrouve le double souci de la France de conserver un statut particulier de grande puissance et d'utiliser la Communauté européenne comme point d'appui, comme relais lorsque ses ressources nationales se révèlent insuffisantes.' (united Europe must have, vis-à-vis the rest of the world, an economic and political personality; the nation-states must form the foundation of this whole and retain their own room for manoeuvre. Behind these ideas lies France's double concern to preserve the special status of a great power and to use the European Community as a support, a relay when its own national resources prove inadequate.)[(75)]

- *Germany* has certainly been interested in developing the Community and accepted the thesis that the `deepening' of the European Community has to happen before its `widening' but has always put more emphasis than Paris on three points: a democratically controlled EC system, a communitarian type of decision-making and openness to the greatest extent in the economic area.[(76)] There is a consensus on the general goals but differences regarding the functions and structure of the envisaged Union.

In the security and defence field differences were, until the unification of Germany, more substantial. Despite periodic attempts to form a Franco-German axis in the 1960s (Elysée Treaty) during the Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt era (discussion in Paris on an enlarged sanctuary) and then continued by Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand, leading to the creation of the Franco-German Defence Council, a consensus existed between Bonn and Paris that the development of a

genuine West European security and defence policy or a structure was somewhat illusory.[77] Early efforts in the 1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s to apply a strategy of concentrating on defence issues in the first instance (`defence-first' strategy) before turning to other aspects of West European integration (the Pleven plan, and to a lesser extent the Fouchet plans)[78] failed for two reasons: national reservations about giving up competences at the core of national sovereignty--a problem especially for France, and the widely-shared view that defence has to include the Americans in the broader framework of the Atlantic Alliance--an interest which was particularly strong in Germany, which understandably had to be interested in a strong multinational border defence system. This situation provided a reason--from the point of view of European integration--to replace the `defence-first' with a `defence-last' strategy, as endorsed in many speeches during the 1970s and 1980s, and not to try to develop some genuine European security and defence cooperation inside the Community. Some initiatives undertaken outside the Community have never represented more than what charles Hernu termed a *Café du Commerce* (talking shop) or a fallback structure (`if the Alliance fails') and were never intended to compete with the Atlantic framework (e.g. the Franco-German Defence Council or WEU).[79]

The increasing interrelatedness of EC integration and the question of security and defence has raised a number of important problems, the answers to which have been part and parcel of a comprehensive deal in Maastricht (EC) and Rome (NATO):

- What are the principles on which the future West European political system should be based and, more precisely, which competences should be given to the EC Parliament?

- How should the envisaged Economic and Monetary Union become linked with Political Union and what is a feasible and effective way to give Political Union a greater say in security and defence questions?

- How should the evolution of European integration be related to the process of restructuring the Atlantic Alliance?

Due to some fundamental changes of philosophy in Bonn and Paris a number of important results of the Intergovernmental Conferences on Economic and Monetary Union and Political Union, whose work culminated in the Maastricht Council of December 1991, as well as related parts of NATO's reform announced during the Rome summit in November 1991, were based on a Franco-German compromise: the French side signalled its readiness to allow its security and defence policy and part of its armed forces to become part and parcel of a European defence structure; Germany accepted this view and showed its preparedness to take concrete steps towards a genuine European defence structure.[80]

Despite this Franco-German convergence, a number of points characterized the outcome of Maastricht and Rome which may in both countries become critical in the broader debate on the further development of WEU and the ratification process of the Treaty on European Union:

- The European Council has been established as the outstanding decision-making body. This was in accordance with French Gaullist-inspired interest in an

intergovernmental structure for the European Community, especially in foreign affairs. This point did not therefore give rise to much critical commentary in Paris. Only a few observers cast aspersions by regarding this as an evolution towards an un-Gaullist supranational structure. Political observers in Germany have been somewhat critical because this structure clashed with the traditional German demand for a more communitarian decision-making arrangement. The German government itself, however, might not have been very reluctant to compromise on this point due to its perception that Germany will certainly have a major voice in any decision-making structure. The more negative aspect in the light of traditional German views was that in accepting the French position it supported the idea that the European Community is based more on the nation states and their own democratic structures than on a democratically structured European Community. The result was that the European Parliament did not get a much greater say than before, a point which is quite widely criticized in Germany.

- During the Maastricht negotiations, Germany vigorously demanded that progress in EMU be based on a strong Political Union. And it was this point in the Maastricht compromise which caused dissension in the German public and among political parties, and which in turn has had an adverse effect on the attitudes of the German public with regard to Political Union.(81) In contrast to Paris, where the EMU part of the Maastricht treaty was widely welcome, the debate in Germany emphasized that the regulations and obligations regarding the Political Union are very weak in comparison with the elaborate plan for the evolution of an EMU. In comparison with the EMU issue, there are only a few critical voices being heard on the security function of the European Community/12. Nevertheless, because the Maastricht treaty has to be interpreted as a whole, this point adds to the overall picture and influences the way in which the whole effort is viewed.

The Maastricht compromise should give the European Union a greater role in security and especially the right to request WEU `to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.' With this development, the Union should become the linchpin between the two major assets of Germany and France: the Deutschmark and France's security and defence structure (especially the French `force de dissuasion'), together regarded by France as the nucleus of a common European defence structure.(82) It is interesting that this part of the Maastricht compromise did not evoke much criticism in Germany. Nevertheless, the `Europeanisation' of the Deutschmark is based on a much more detailed plan and timetable than the `Europeanisation' of defence, which remains muddled in a continuing struggle to decide how to link WEU and NATO. In addition, the main part of the French defence asset, the *force de dissuasion* remains under strict national control. The discussion on how to insert it into the European Union has not yet really begun.(83)

Regarding the question of the French position on the further development of the Atlantic Alliance is quite obvious and clear: NATO should become based on a bipolar Euro-American decision-making structure where `the Europeans' form their consensus outside the Atlantic Alliance (which is regarded as an American `enterprise') within the European Union and WEU, introducing their `European position' into the decision-making bodies of the Atlantic Alliance with a `single voice.' In this `bipolar system'(84) the influence of the United States should be

maintained as far as possible and the individual European countries should renounce any `special relationship' with the United States.

Germany, having just recently experienced good German-American relations during the process of unification, reacted (like the UK) more sceptically to this objective, emphasized the political role of the Atlantic Alliance, underlined the main tasks of NATO (crisis prevention and crisis management), and stressed the view that an American presence in Europe remained important not only for military reasons but also for reasons of political stability.(85) This showed that the Atlantic link retained more importance in Germany than in France for a number of reasons:

- Germany's interest in forming as broad a coalition as possible to tackle the wide spectrum of problems in Eastern Europe certainly included the retention of the remaining single superpower. As long as the United States regards the Atlantic Alliance as the rationale for its political and military presence in Europe and it remains unclear whether or not the envisaged bipolar European-Atlantic Alliance will work, Germany will continue to be more cautious than France with regard to any diminution of the Atlantic Alliance's role.

- As a legacy of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact a number of security problems can be identified in Central and Eastern Europe, the solution of which should reasonably include the Americans, especially where the issues of the control of nuclear weapons and proliferation are concerned.(86)

- Germany has suffered significantly from the financial burden of unification and aid to Eastern Europe. The establishment of an alternative European defence system in partial competition to NATO would raise military demands on budgets (or at least reduce the peace dividend) and by this add to German financial problems. In addition, it was self-evident that in case of a major out-of-area contingency acting without the United States is almost impossible. Why not let NATO continue to play a role in Europe?

- NATO and the United States have become attractive in the eyes of the Central and East European countries. By the creation of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) among the 16 NATO members and the former Warsaw Pact countries, a framework for discussion was established which not only satisfied some Central and East European needs but involved the United States in an organized European-American debate regarding these countries.

The package deals in Rome and Maastricht between France and Germany and between France/Germany and the other EC member states have to be seen against this Franco-German background of general agreement on a goal--European Union--and the different conditions set by the partners in the attainment of this objective:

- Germany insisted successfully on French participation in the reformulation of NATO's strategic posture and on French agreement to strengthening the political role of NATO by the establishment of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council,

- France received Germany's (and NATO's) recognition and acceptance of the increasing role of `integrated and multinational European (military) structures'(87)

which had once before raised serious doubts in Washington[88]. In Rome, France was also able to prevent an active role for NATO beyond the so-called NATO treaty area from being adopted.[89] Nevertheless, France has been under pressure to accept a broader role for NATO. France agreed in Oslo that NATO might contribute to blue helmet operations under the auspices of the CSCE, and in Brussels in December 1992 that forces could, on a case by case basis, be made available to the United Nations for peacekeeping operations.[90] The isolated position of France with regard to the question whether NATO should have the option to play an even greater role than envisaged during the Oslo meeting is demonstrated by the fact that NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, in which France is not represented, seems to be ready to go beyond the Oslo compromise.[91]

The organisation of West European defence

Conventional defence

The breakup of the hostile Warsaw Pact and the Communist systems in Central and Eastern Europe and the emergence of democratic states East of Germany eliminated for Western Europe the danger of a large-scale Warsaw Pact attack, making even minor aggression unlikely and exposing Western defences to a fairly diffuse set of risks and challenges. This novel situation had far-reaching implications for NATO's well established defence structure. Until recently, the defence of Western Europe has been characterized by the assignation of the bulk of Germany's armed forces and those of most of the other Alliance partners to NATO military commands working within a framework of a common strategy (flexible response), agreed military plans based on the principle of forward defence, and supported in some integrated functions (like air defence). The obligations and military involvement of the 16 member countries has been handled on a fairly flexible basis. Only France, however, claimed to have an independent military strategy. This policy has led to the non-participation of France in a number of major NATO bodies, especially in the Military Committee, Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group.[92] The French military potential has nevertheless been coordinated with NATO through a number of detailed military contingency plans (Lemnitzer-Ailleret, Ferber-Valentin and other agreements) providing a fairly efficient option for French participation in a second echelon role in a possible conflict in Europe.

Some sort of `deviation' from this structure occurred, however, before the collapse of communism, and later became a sort of nucleus for a new defence structure:

- the Franco-German exercise *Moineau Hardi* in September 1987 demonstrated a greater flexibility on the part of France with regard to the `forward battle' in Germany through the deployment of the newly created *Force d'Action Rapide* (FAR),

- chancellor Kohl proposed the creation of a mixed Franco-German military unit, which--surprisingly to many observers, because France has traditionally been very sceptical of any military integration--was accepted by President Mitterrand.

The subsequently formed Franco-German brigade is characterized by an integrated military staff under alternating command with a few integrated support units. Although this brigade was referred to by chancellor Kohl as the nucleus of a

`European army'[93] and a few other countries showed interest in participating in this effort, the brigade has remained a rather detached part of the overall NATO-dominated defence structure.[94]

In the new political and military circumstances of the early 1990s, it was, in fact, NATO (and not the Franco-German `couple') which began to revise its military strategy, review principles for the defence of the NATO treaty area, discuss new command arrangements and search for a new kind of force structure which would maintain and demonstrate the multinational character of its defence system. A concrete decision had already been made before the final agreement on the Alliance's New Strategic Concept in November 1991 against the background of the principles of flexibility and multinationality already agreed on by NATO's Defence Ministers in May 1991. This decision, which led to the creation of a UK-commanded Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was criticized in Paris because it was made before there was an understanding in NATO on the new strategy: and in Germany, the criticism was that there was no provision for rotation of command.[95] Attention has to be given to the fact that the decision was made to stick to the traditional position that NATO remains restricted to the defence of the `NATO territory', a task which is now of lesser importance. Proposals to make NATO forces available for European or non-European contingencies under UN or CSCE auspices have been viewed with great reservations in Paris.[96]

NATO's importance was even more `threatened' by discussions on the further `deepening' of the European Community during the negotiations on Political Union. There was, due to Franco-German agreements, a growing tendency to include defence in the tasks of the envisaged Political Union.[97] Whereas previously it had been argued that defence questions would only hamper progress towards the deeper integration of the European Community the French President and German chancellor claimed in their initiative of 14 October 1991, that including this policy area in Political Union would help to overcome the difficulties regarding the further development of the European Community.[98] Germany and France even announced that they intended to upgrade the Franco-German brigade and include forces from other WEU member states to construct a so-called Eurocorps. Both countries have announced concrete steps towards implementing the Declaration of the WEU Council in Maastricht to establish a Military Planning Cell and to earmark military units `answerable to WEU'. Under Franco-German pressure WEU members had shown themselves ready to give WEU farther reaching missions than NATO. This occurred with WEU's Petersberg Declaration.[99] It states that military forces of WEU members in the future will be made available to WEU. They can then be used for all missions in the context of the UN charter, in the mutual assistance obligations of Article 5 of the Washington and Brussels treaties, for humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions, combat actions for crisis management, and measures for the establishment of peace.[100] WEU thus decisively expanded its ability to act, in several respects:

- Military actions outside the treaty area are included, unlike former interpretations, the WEU treaty is seen as a legal basis for such actions,[101]

- Missions are not explicitly limited to those under collective security systems in the sense of the UN or a future CSCE as a regional organization as defined by the UN charter,(102)

- The use of forces in the framework of the UN or CSCE is expanded to include all forms of military action,

- Whereas previously the member states had assigned forces to WEU on an *ad hoc* basis, a list of units from all branches of the armed forces which will be made answerable to WEU is now being established on a regular basis.

The motivation behind this basic modification of the approach to a European security and defence policy in Paris and Bonn indicates a certain Franco-German convergence with regard to the underlying model for Western Europe:

- There was an agreement that the envisaged development was part and parcel of the idea to develop the European Community into a `fully-fledged Union.' A consensus has thus been established that the threshold for new member states has to be raised by the inclusion of defence in the spectrum of the Union's tasks.

- The inclusion of security and defence questions into the European Union also meant that Germany accepted that the mechanism for intergovernmental decision-making within the European Community was strengthened at the expense of a more Community-oriented method.

- With this decision not only the Deutschmark but also part of the military potential of both countries can conceivably come in one way or another under the Union's auspices. The envisaged regulations are, however, only partially based on the principle of equality and reciprocity. On the one hand the military headquarters of the Eurocorps will be located on French soil in Strasbourg, indicating that the principles of reciprocity and rotating command demonstrate the equality; on the other hand there is no indication yet that German troops will become stationed in France, which would demonstrate the full application of the reciprocity principle. The greater part of French forces will remain outside integrated structures. German armed forces will be integrated into various structures: NATO, Franco-German cooperation and WEU.(103) Moreover, French nuclear forces are excluded--the discussion about their possible `Europeanisation' has not yet begun.

Beyond the issues of reciprocity and equality there are a number of unresolved legal, military and political problems:

- There are basically two competing military structures evolving which represent, so to say, two different political models for the defence structure of Western Europe: NATO's ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) represents an Atlantic Alliance-based European defence widely supported by European forces but incorporated in the broader military and political structure of the Alliance. The future Franco-German Eurocorps, on the other hand, can be seen as a major step towards the goal of a bipolar Europe-US-Alliance (or the beginning of a fully independent European defence) where European decisions are formed primarily outside the Alliance with the option to speak inside NATO `with one voice.' There are certainly a number of

mechanisms to avoid friction between these two models (double-hatting, transparency, etc.). Nevertheless some sort of duplication will be unavoidable if the `European' forces do not assume tasks different from those of the forces assigned to NATO.

- The operational roles of the new Franco-German Corps raise another difficulty. The decision to create the Corps was taken before there had been an agreement on tasks and roles. This strategy raises a number of problems. In order to avoid duplication, this force should also have an out-of-area role. This task, however, has a number of preconditions: Germany must solve its constitutional problem with regard to out-of-area contingencies, and the legal basis for the out-of-Europe employment of this force has to be clarified. In addition, the French and German forces which are meant to be assigned to this role are not yet structured for this task. In addition, the relationship between this force and NATO/SACEUR needs clarification. On 21 January 1993 France and Germany signed an agreement with SACEUR on the role of the Eurocorps. By this step, on the one hand France is necessarily in closer contact with the military part of NATO. On the other hand Germany, by accepting this model, is partially adapting to the French type of relationship between its armed forces and NATO's military integrated structure.

In summing up all these points it does not seem that most of the above problems can be solved at a stroke within the immediate future. It looks much more like a continuing task where major decisions will have to be made again in the middle of the 1990s when further discussions on the evolution of the European Union are planned.

The problem of nuclear weapons

In the 1970s the traditional German position towards the French strategic nuclear force became more positive. During the years of the French buildup of the Force de Frappe, the Federal Republic saw the force as an unwelcome source of tension within the Alliance. In NATO's 1974 Ottawa Declaration, the French nuclear capability was finally accepted as a contribution to the strengthening of Allied deterrence. At the same time, however, NATO nuclear strategy remained the decisive point of reference for German thinking on deterrence. This was particularly true since, aside from the calculus of deterrence, the French nuclear capability was also an irritant for Germany as it made the difference in status between France and Germany in security and defence policy more prominent.

As a result of the political situation in the 1980s, the French nuclear force developed two functions which changed the German viewpoint. First, the French force was part of the `political-psychological' strategy for the stabilization of the security balance with the Soviet Union by preventing the USSR from being the only continental European nuclear power. It also served as an argument to demonstrate to Germany's own public that not only the American superpower, but also a neighbouring European state considered deterrence with nuclear weapons to be a reasonable thing for itself (and others). At the same time, the *force de dissuasion* gained in importance in the eyes of some observers as part of a proposed European security union serving in a partial replacement function for the reduced nuclear role of the United States in Europe in the event of an American withdrawal of Short-Range and Long-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe.

For all of these different reasons, French `strategic deterrence' was viewed as positive by the governing coalition and even some in the social-democratic opposition at the end of the 1980s. However, it was more difficult to deal with the problems associated with the notion that France should contribute its nuclear forces to a European security union. French views maintained that nuclear disarmament is only possible if a balance in conventional weapons is first achieved.

From the German point of view, the French tactical or *préstratégique* nuclear weapons were the most controversial element of French military policy. Since the introduction of the *Pluton* missile in the 1970s, the Federal Republic viewed this element of the French deterrent with scepticism. France, on the other hand, wanted to use just this type of weapon as a symbol of France's contribution to `European deterrence' and as a trump card in the German-French game. One of the reasons for the failure of this attempt to use French nuclear forces as political instruments was France's inability to accept German requests for `participation in planning without physical joint possession.'[104] Helmut Schmidt and Franz-Joseph Strauss at the time even sought a right of veto for Bonn over nuclear weapons which would either be aimed at German targets or launched from German soil.[105] Ten years later, the French president made a concession to this request, but only in the form of a promise to consult in the event of the use of its tactical nuclear weapons.[106] However, Germany was only partially satisfied by this French proposal, since Germany had reservations over the usefulness of tactical nuclear weapons in general.

With regard to the future of French nuclear strategy and the readiness of Germany to go along with cooperative Franco-German or West European solutions, the current political and military situation contains factors which both encourage and restrain cooperation. On the French side, the motives are tending toward cooperation. On the German side, on the other hand, there is scepticism, at least at present.

With some reluctance, France came to the view that the conventional military situation, as one of the parameters for nuclear strategy, has very largely changed.[107] A conventional imbalance in Europe, which according to France had hindered the development of a European nuclear deterrence policy because, it was argued, the US nuclear umbrella was the first priority, no longer exists. At the same time, as a result of massive nuclear arms reductions and the new political situation in Europe, nuclear force has unmistakably lost some value as a `currency of power' in international relations.[108] Paris must take into consideration that the value of the French nuclear force as a trump card in international relations has depreciated. This has a particular impact on the Franco-German relationship, since the *force de dissuasion* had always served to emphasize the difference in status between France and Germany.

Both developments encouraged the view in Paris that it is necessary, for domestic and international reasons, to present the French nuclear capability in a European framework.[109] This `Europeanisation' would take on the task of guaranteeing the continued existence of French nuclear policy while simultaneously preserving the difference between those states which have nuclear weapons and the `have-nots,' inasmuch as this can still be achieved. This goal cannot be attained without the support of Bonn--at least as long as a Franco-British `nuclear entente' has not yet been attained and the vision of France as some sort of `European superpower' remains a

valid goal for French policy. This is a problem for France, since Germans are suspected of considering the nuclear element as being more of a danger than a trump card in security policy.(110)

This was the background to President Mitterrand's policy of opening the discussion concerning a European nuclear doctrine and simultaneously making it easier for partners to accept the offer, most notably Germany, by taking certain steps such as abandoning *Hadès* and placing a conditioned moratorium on nuclear tests.(111) At the same time, France hesitates to go beyond its policy of consultation with its allies in the event of a conflict.(112) This would certainly be hard to justify objectively as long as no real political union with a unified decision-making body exists, on the one hand, and on the other hand, Paris would give up a significant instrument of power.(113) From this point of view, France cannot offer its European allies any great progress at present.(114)

From the *German* standpoint, the situation is more complex. It concerns not only the greater hostility to nuclear issues among the public in Germany, in contrast to France. Rather, the French offer raises the question what use such a debate would have if it eventually leads, say, to the establishment of a (West) European nuclear council, for instance in the framework of WEU. Two aspects are of central importance in this regard. The first is the bilateral German-French (power) relationship. The second aspect concerns the proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

In both cases, the Federal Government must come to the conclusion that an intensive debate on this question, or even an institutional arrangement, is of no great use to Germany for the foreseeable future. In the bilateral relationship with France, such a development would emphasize the difference in status between France and Germany. France would be able to take on a significantly prominent position in an area which has an admittedly diminished role in comparison to the period of the Cold War, but yet continues to be an influential factor. At the same time, there is no absolute need to act, since the nuclear protection afforded by NATO (that is to say the United States) still exists. And, if the new American administration changes dramatically its nuclear policy with regard to Europe, one can argue that France (and the UK) provide a certain nuclear shield just by holding nuclear weapons: the very existence of nuclear weapons in Western Europe should deter potentially hostile states.(115)

With the collapse of the Soviet Union the problem has arisen as to which republics on whose territory former Soviet nuclear weapons are stationed will take on the role of successor to the USSR as nuclear powers. A proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear states is not in the interests of Germany and the West. What impact would a `European nuclear doctrine' have on this development? The Federal Government, which gives this problem particular attention, must proceed from the assumption that a West European nuclear debate tends to emphasize rather than diminish the importance of nuclear weapons. One can presume this would more likely encourage rather than discourage the CIS states in possession of nuclear weapons to retain or even expand their status as nuclear powers.

At the same time, Germany cannot be certain that the number of nuclear weapons states will not increase in the medium term. A greater number of nuclear states

increases the nuclear risk, however. As a result, Germany must have a continued interest in nuclear deterrence.

Notwithstanding this last point, the readiness of Germany for discussion and cooperation in nuclear matters is underdeveloped. The Federal Government did not react to President Mitterrand's offer to consider a European nuclear doctrine. However, this does not preclude the Federal Government from showing its readiness, albeit covertly, to accept the necessity of nuclear weapons for Europe and keep open an option for a (West) European solution. In WEU's Petersberg Declaration of June 1992, the Federal Government agreed that states which seek to join WEU must not only sign the WEU treaty, but all WEU declarations since the Rome Declaration of 1984 as well. In so doing, the Federal Government accepts that the so-called platform of European security interests of WEU of October 1987 remains valid. This includes the affirmation of nuclear deterrence as part of Western defence.(116)

The nuclear question thus remains an open problem in German-French relations. Through the abandonment of the *Hadès* land-based prestrategic weapons system, Franco-German relations have been freed from one burdensome problem. However, the nuclear question reaches beyond the bilateral German-French relationship. A solution to this question under European auspices is only conceivable if Great Britain is part of such a solution. A new Franco-British dialogue has, however, only just begun. No major change is yet apparent.(117) Ultimately the United States must also be included in relevant decisions. Preliminary bilateral Franco-German decisions in this area could tend to hinder rather than foster developments. The conditions for a solution are not yet in sight. In the words of François de Rose, there is still a `nuclear hurdle' in Europe.

THE FUTURE OF THE SPECIAL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

This study has sought to present the major determinants and identifiable convergences and divergences with regard to fundamental changes in security policy in France and Germany in order to arrive at a foundation for the potential for development in this bilateral relationship. In reviewing these results the impression remains that Michel Tatu's comment cited in the introduction is still valid to a certain extent.(118) This is the impression that the most paradoxical point of the Franco-German treaty of 1963 (Elysée Treaty) is that the treaty was signed not by two similar or comparable countries, but by two very dissimilar ones. Nevertheless, France and Germany have exerted considerable influence on security policy developments in Europe. This could be attributed to four factors.

First, both countries entered into the bilateral relationship from `opposing philosophical camps' with regard to the basic security arrangements in Europe. Therefore, when these two countries agreed on new steps towards new security arrangements in Europe, significant political advances became on the one side feasible, and on the other side they raised fears in partner countries of a dominating German-French axis in Europe. In this regard, the reaction to the Franco-German proposal to create a EuroCorps--which would also be available for WEU--was typical. Many WEU member countries criticized this step and declined to join this force. Nevertheless, this Franco-German move demonstrated the readiness of European countries to make military forces `answerable to WEU.'

Second, there was the strategic political assumption that in the new political environment Germany and France must go forward together in order to avoid a conceivable re-nationalisation of security policy, which is quite often judged as a concern on both sides of the Rhine, because this could lead to the re-emergence of old power struggles among the West European nation states. The assumption that NATO will inevitably lose at least some of its cohesion has furthered the view in France that the European framework for the integration of Germany has to be strengthened. In Germany, a concern to pursue a self-conscious `national policy' motivated policy-makers to go in the same direction. Partner countries could hardly oppose this political dynamic strongly because many shared the view that the unified Germany should be integrated in a fairly tight politico-military framework.

Third, in spite of many differences in important questions there was the common objective of a European Union. There have been different ideas as to what this Union should look like. Germany favoured the neo-liberal vision of an democratically structured, federal union very open to Central/Eastern Europe and the United States, whereas France showed a lot of sympathy for the neo-mercantilist concept of a European superpower which should be as autonomous as possible in the security and defence field. The political structure of this new world power should, however, be less based on an integrated and federal arrangement, preferred by Germany, but an intergovernmental method of decision-making. In the economic field, France and Germany have been able to compromise despite opposing basic concepts.(119) The `internal market' is seen in France as an opportunity to create a strong Europe-wide

economy in competition to the Japanese and Americans. For Germany, the internal market in Europe is the fulfilment of the neo-liberal philosophy of a free flow of goods, capital and services. In security and defence affairs, the Maastricht treaty is regarded in the same way: Germany emphasizes the remaining Atlantic link, whereas France is mostly interested in the establishment of a more or less autonomous European structure. As long as the same political steps can elicit these two different interpretations, the Franco-German couple will remain fairly influential in Europe. Each step towards closer cooperation and more integration, however, will make it more difficult to attribute different political concepts to the same political measure.

Fourth is the fact that it is precisely the security and defence policy dimension of German-French relations which has been driven by both heads of state, that is to say `from above,' thus neglecting differences and divergences in the assessments of the security policy situation in Paris and Bonn. By this method of surprise announcements France and Germany have been, on the one hand, able to agree on important measures; on the other hand partner countries have not had enough time to form sustainable `opposing camps.'

One can proceed from the assumption that the first factor (the Franco-German couple as the `motor of Europe') retains some of its validity. Nevertheless, in security and defence issues, partner countries seem to be keen on binding the Franco-German couple into broader frameworks like WEU in order to have a better influence on the further development of the bilateral relationship. Further surprise Franco-German steps may raise even more suspicions among partner countries. It is also obvious that further progress is not possible without the clear consent of other countries: the discussion on a European `nuclear dimension' cannot be held without the British (and the Americans), and debates and decisions on out-of-area issues need early coordination with as many countries as possible. With regard to this function, the Franco-German couple will therefore certainly lose some of its importance.

The relevance of the second factor (preventing re-nationalisation) depends a lot on the further development of the European Community. With the negative Danish referendum on the Maastricht treaty and domestic political problems in the UK, the ratification process of the treaty has run into trouble. An important political parameter for German-French relations is thus endangered. The decisions of the Lisbon and Edinburgh European Councils and WEU's Petersberg Declaration further suggest a new perspective on developments in security and defence policy questions. Whereas until now the main actors on the French and German side presumed that the security and defence policy aspect should become part of the proposed European Union as soon as possible, the two summits point to the probability that the Political Union and defence go their separate ways. In Lisbon, the EC heads of state accelerated the process of opening the Community to major EFTA nations.[120] At the same time the foreign ministers of the WEU states, in their Petersberg Declaration, raised the threshold for accession to WEU. States seeking admission to WEU must not only accept the WEU treaty but also accept all WEU declarations since the 1984 Declaration of Rome. This requires applicants to accept, for example, the so-called WEU Platform of 1987, which includes a strong affirmation of nuclear deterrence. It is not clear that countries such as Switzerland or Sweden will go along with this. It has thus become more likely that the gap between WEU and EC member states will widen rather than narrow in the future. If this development continues, then security

and defence policy would be--in contrast to the original Franco-German vision--decoupled from the European Union. This would grant WEU the status of an alliance organized between states. The German-French tandem would thus lose the integrative energy provided by the EC framework. One can suspect that the problems and divergences in German-French security relations would thus become more difficult to bear than in the framework of a European Union which includes security and defence policy.

Regarding the third factor, the speed with which the French President and the German chancellor have sought to advance the economic and currency union, as well as the development of the security policy dimension of the Maastricht treaty, including WEU, has led to criticism and a lack of political support for such steps, particularly in Germany. The fact that the Maastricht treaty includes what is seen as a clear plan for the `Europeanisation of the Mark' in the context of an economic and currency union, while the area of Political Union, including security and defence policy, is comparatively weakly formulated, has met with loud criticism that Germany is being put at a disadvantage in the European integration process. This concerns on the one hand the question whether the arrangements for the economic and currency union are sensible from a German viewpoint. On the other hand, there is concern that while Germany Europeanises `its Mark,' France retains some trump cards in the domain of security and defence policy. What influence this criticism will have on the continued position of the Federal Republic toward the European Union, cannot be foreseen in detail. However, a backlash is possible.

If these developments occur, in the future Western Europe would have a far more flexible political structure than one would have assumed after the signing of the Maastricht treaty. This may also lead to more flexible coalitions between the states of Western Europe, and involve the United States in important security and defence policy questions to a greater extent than assumed up to now. This may have implications for France as well as Germany, which would make the meaning of the special bilateral relationship less important.(121) The Maastricht treaty provides a special role for the European Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, giving room for wider coalitions.(122) There are indications that the permanent members of the UN Security Council are trying to play this special role, formulated in the Maastricht treaty.(123)

Conversely, should the last two factors, despite the recognizable problems and difficulties, and contrary to the expectations of the author, develop along the lines of French and German optimistic expectations in 1991, then the following conclusions could be drawn. The image of Germany and France as `Europe's motor' was related to a specific political phase in the integration process: the institutional reform of security policy. In the context of a European security policy, in which certain political issues must be addressed with the participation of all European states, German-French bilateralism could prove to be more of a hindrance than a help. Even now the German-French tandem has led to increased criticism and heightened mistrust among European partners.

The fourth characteristic of the Franco-German couple (relationship as a `personal matter' of Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand) makes the further development of Franco-German relations rather dependent on how far these two personalities

maintain their decisive influence on the matter in the future. In France, in the elections for the National Assembly, the French president has lost his socialist majority in parliament. In Germany, it looks as if chancellor Kohl will be able to stay in power until the next elections, in 1994. Nevertheless, a certain uncertainty remains.

An important foundation of the special Franco-German relationship is, however, the French hope that Germany will be able to make certain political, military and financial contributions not only to the defence of France (and Europe) but even more beyond this region. In addition, there are many expectations in France that Germany might contribute to military research and the development of high-technology products. The German situation with regard to these expectations, however, presents problems in several respects. Militarily, Germany's participation depends on the outcome of a difficult domestic constitutional debate with regard to the use of military force `out-of-area.' Germany's financial situation is very difficult. In particular, high expenditure on military or militarily relevant projects can hardly be expected under prevailing conditions. Politically, unification seems likely in the foreseeable future to represent something which prevents Germany from playing a major international role rather than an asset. This might all lead to the view in France that countries with greater freedom of action might be more reasonable partners in security and defence affairs than Germany. A lot will, however, depend on two possible French allies: the UK and the United States. In the British case new attempts are under way to cooperate closer than before;[124] how far the Americans remain a partner for West European countries will become clearer after the first few months of the Clinton administration.

All this leads to the conclusion that there are many expectations which may be disappointed, thus complicating Franco-German relations and eroding the special Franco-German relationship not only from outside but also from inside the relationship in the years to come.

ANNEXE

FIRST FRANCO-GERMAN PROPOSAL

(Dumas-Genscher initiative of 4 February 1991)

COMMON SECURITY POLICY

1. The common foreign and security policy must offer the prospect, in time, of a common European defence.

2. The Atlantic Alliance, which is essential to European security and stability, will benefit from this development. A European security and defence identity will have to be reflected in the development of a European pillar within NATO.

3. A clear organic relationship between Political Union and WEU will be developed progressively in prospect, in time, of the integration of WEU in Political Union. A date for the re-examination of this question could be set for 1996 or 1997.

4. The European Council will define the directives and orientation for the common foreign and security policy in its broadest sense. These will be respected by WEU which, being an integral part of the process of European unification, will be empowered to develop the common security policy for Political Union.

5. WEU will constitute the channel of cooperation between Political Union and NATO.

6. The European Council will be responsible for deciding which aspects of security policy will fall within the scope of the common policy.

Certain examples can already be envisaged:

- the establishment of common European positions contributing to the process of agreement, within NATO, on questions of disarmament and on arms control policy;

- activities, within the United Nations, on disarmament and arms control;

- nuclear non-proliferation questions;

- economic aspects of security, including in particular cooperation in armaments matters and the control of arms exports.

This list is an indication and is not restrictive.

SECOND FRANCO-GERMAN PROPOSAL

(14 October 1991)

TREATY ON POLITICAL UNION

COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

I - ARTICLE . . . OF THE DRAFT POLITICAL UNION TREATY ON THE BASIC OBJECTIVES

"The Union has as its objectives . . .

-. . . . . .

- to assert its identity on the international scene, particularly through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy which in the long term will include a common defence".

II - ARTICLE . . . OF THE DRAFT POLITICAL UNION TREATY ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE

1) The Common foreign and security policy includes all issues relating to the Union's security and defence.

2) The Union's decisions and measures in this sphere may be wholly or partially drawn up and implemented by WEU, which is an integral part of the process of European Union, within this organization's fields of competence and in accordance with the guidelines set by the Union.

3) The Council organizes the relations between the Union and WEU in agreement with the WEU institutions and ensures the progressive preparation of the Union's common security policy.

4) The obligations resulting, for certain member States of the Union, from the Treaties setting up WEU and the Atlantic Alliance are not affected by this chapter's provisions, nor is the specific nature of certain member States' defence policies.

Similarly, this chapter's provisions do not preclude closer cooperation between two or more member States of the Union at bilateral level, in the framework of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance.

5) This article's provisions will be revised on the basis of a report presented by the Council to the European Council at the latest in 1996, in consultation with the competent WEU institutions and in the light of the progress achieved and experience acquired to date.

In accordance with the guidelines set by the European Council, the Council takes the necessary measures for the subsequent progress of the process.

III - DECLARATION OF THE MEMBER STATES ON THE PRIORITY AREAS OF THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

The member States agree that joint action could be taken, in particular, on the following subjects, in accordance with article . . .

- Political and economic relations and cooperation with the Soviet Union,

- Political and economic relations and cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe,

- CSCE process including implementation of the results of the CSCE November 1990 summit in Paris,

- Relations with the United States of America and Canada on the basis of the joint declarations of November 1990,

- Political and economic relations with the Mediterranean area and with the Near and Middle East,

- Policy and cooperation within the United Nations and other international organizations.

- Participation in measures of a humanitarian nature.

As regards article . . ., the following areas are in particular taken into consideration :

- Policy of disarmament and arms control in Europe including confidence-building measures,

- Participation in peace-keeping measures particularly in the United Nations framework,

- Nuclear non-proliferation,

- Economic aspects of security, i.e. cooperation and control of arms exports.

IV - ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE DECLARATION OF THE WEU MEMBER STATES ON ARTICLE . . . ON THE BASIS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN WEU AND THE UNION AND BETWEEN WEU AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

1. WEU objectives

- In accordance with the WEU Treaty, the "Hague Platform" of 1986 and Vianden communiqué of 27 June 1991:

. strengthening of the role of WEU, which is a full part of the European unification process with Union as its goal;

. need to form a genuine European defence and security identity and shoulder increased responsibilities in defence;

. consequently, construction in stages of WEU as a defence component of the Union.

- Invitation addressed to the Community members which also belong to the Alliance with a view to their joining WEU; for those not members of the Alliance, offer of observer status within WEU.

- Consultation of the Commission: it will be informed, in areas falling within its spheres of competence, by the WEU Presidency.

2. Creation of an organic link between WEU and the Union

- Development of a clear organic relationship between WEU and the Union and the operational organization of WEU which acts in accordance with the Union's directives; to this end:

. harmonization of the sequence and duration of the Presidencies;

. synchronization of the sessions and working methods;

. closer cooperation between WEU Secretariat-General and the Council of Ministers on the one hand, and the Council's Secretariat-General and the Union's Council of Ministers on the other; between the WEU parliamentary Assembly and the European Parliament.

. creation of a WEU planning and military coordination group which will in particular be charged with the following missions:

- planning of joint actions including in the event of crises.

- operational planning for cooperation in the event of natural disasters.

- coordination of the study of the needs in every cooperation sphere.

- organization of joint manoeuvres.

. closer military cooperation complementing the Alliance, particularly in the spheres of logistics, transport, training and intelligence.

. strengthened cooperation on arms, with a view to setting up a European arms agency.

. regular meetings of Chiefs of Staff.

. transformation of the WEU Institute into the European Security and Defence Academy.

. As a result of the above measures to strengthen WEU, transfer of the WEU Secretariat-General to Brussels.

. setting-up of military units answerable to WEU.

3. Cooperation between WEU and the Alliance

- The aim is to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance as a whole "by strengthening the role and responsibility of the Europeans and by forming a European pillar within it" (Joint letter of 6 December 1990).

- In accordance with the Alliance's Copenhagen and WEU's Vianden communiqués, establishment of practical provisions ensuring transparency and complementarity between WEU and the Alliance.

- Development of cooperation between the WEU Secretariat- General and that of the Alliance.

- Regular coordination between WEU member States with the aim of achieving a common position on all the essential issues within the Alliance.

- For representation within WEU, finalization of a "two-hat" formula for representatives to the Alliance and to the Community.

- Association with the Alliance countries which are not members of the Alliance by, in particular, organizing consultations as and when their interests are involved.

4. Relations with the other States of Europe, particularly with the States of Central, East and South-East Europe.

(Developments in line with the Copenhagen communiqué for the Alliance and Vianden communiqué for WEU).

N.B. Franco-German military cooperation will be strengthened beyond the existing brigade.

The strengthened Franco-German units could thus become the nucleus of a European corps which could include the forces of other WEU member States. This new structure could also become the model for closer military cooperation between WEU member states.

1. Michel Tatu, `Außenpolitik zwischen Ost und West', in Robert Picht (ed.), *Das Bündnis im Bündnis. Deutsch-französische Beziehungen im internationalen Spannungsfeld* (Berlin: Severin und Siedler, 1982), p. 69.

2. For an overview of the development until the `big change' see André Brigot, Walter Schütze and Peter Schmidt, `Défense, désarmement et politiques à l'Est' (Paris: Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, 1989).

3. For an indication of this mood see in the context of the German early willingness to recognize Croatia and Slovenia see Daniel Vernet, `Le retour de la "question allemande"', in *Le Monde*, 22-23 December 1991, pp. 1 and 4.

4. Hans-Dietrich Genscher showed a readiness to recognize these new republics, together with as many EC member states as possible even if not all EC partners were ready (see report in *The Independent*, 5 January, 1992).

5. See Nicole Gnesotto, `Le dialogue franco-allemand depuis 1954: patience et longueur de temps...', in Karl Kaiser and Pierre Lellouche (eds.) avec la collaboration de Nicole Gnesotto et Ingo Kolboom, *Le couple franco-allemand et la défense de l'Europe* (Paris: IFRI, 1986), pp.11-48.

6. There is currently, for instance, a debate in France about a new kind of relationship with NATO. Germany has had to react to the American offer to become a `partner in leadership'.

7. For this and the following point as a general incentive for cooperation see Fritz W. Scharpf, `Die Politikverflechtungs-Falle: Europäische Integration und deutscher Föderalismus im Vergleich', in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, vol. 26, no. 4 (1985), pp. 342 ff.

8. This dimension can be illustrated by the *bon mot* of the 1950s that the French would like to agree to German rearmament on condition that the future German army should be stronger than the Russian but weaker than the French armed forces. The sensitiveness of this issue can also be verified by the French reluctance to accede to the German plea for an increased number of seats in the European Parliament following German unification. Initially, France rejected this idea, referring to a `historical agreement' at the outset of the European Community that the major countries (France, Italy, Germany and subsequently the UK) should have a balanced representation in EC bodies. More recently, the necessity to find a balance between the German main power asset, the Deutschmark, and the French power asset, the *force de dissuasion*, has been emphasized (see André Brigot, `Les intérêts de sécurité et leurs coûts', in André Brigot, Walter Schütze and Peter Schmidt, *Défense, désarmement et politiques à l'Est* (Paris: Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, 1989), pp. 69-93 and Alain Minc, *La vengeance des nations*(Paris: Grasset, 1990).

9. The underlying thesis is that states which suffer as a result of the developing power of another state try to undertake `balancing operations'. For a detailed theoretical explication see R.M. Emerson, `Power Dependence Relations', in *American Sociological Review*, 1962, pp. 31 ff.

10. In Germany, for instance, certain political schools of thought considered that the CSCE, as a collective security system, should play the decisive role in security affairs in Europe. Following events in the former Yugoslavia, the useful but limited value of the CSCE has become almost universally accepted.

11. See Michael Meimeth, *Frankreichs Entspannungspolitik der 70er Jahre: Zwischen Status quo und friedlichem Weandel. Die Ära Georges Pompidou und Valéry Giscard d'Estaing*(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1990).

12. Michael Harrison rightly emphasised the positive impact of French `national stability', which is partly due to this security and defence policy, on the overall stability of the Alliance. See Michael M. Harrison, *The reluctant Ally. France and Atlantic Security* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

13. See Ingo Kolboom, `Frankreich und das vereinte Deutschland', in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 15-16/1991, pp. 470-475.

14. For US policy during the unification process see Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage. Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), for instance pp. 77-78, and the sceptical remark on French policy in this regard on p. 372.

15. In 1991 French defence expenditure was 101.6 % of its expenditure of
1988, compared with the US: 92.2%, and Germany: 97.3% (derived from NATO figures). For the new French armament procurement plan see the report in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 4 July 1992, p. 3.

16. See Gebhard Schweigler, *Grundlagen der auenpolitischen Orientierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Rahmenbedingungen, Motive, Einstellungen* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1985).

17. The French always overestimated the German potential demand for a French nuclear shield. See the report of a discussion group at the XII Conférence Franco-Allemande, Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 28-30 November 1984 by Kurt Becker, in *Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik*, no. 35 (Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V. und Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg, 1985), p. 101. In addition, the anti-nuclear groups showed no interest in replacing the American nuclear umbrella by a French shield.

18. Marisol Touraine simply remarks (`Nucléaire: l'après dissuasion', in *Libération*, 11 November 1991): `la dissuasion n'est plus l'alpha et l'omega de la puissance internationale.' See also Jérôme Paolini, `La France, l'Europe et la bombe', in *Commentaire*, Summer 1991, pp. 247-255.

19. See, for instance, the article by Laurent Carroué, in *Le Monde diplomatique*, January 1992 about the danger that heavy German investments in Eastern countries may lead to Germany hegemony in Europe, and the assessment by Wolfgang Ashold and Ingo Kolboom, in `Frankreich und das vereinte Deutschland. Ein Rückblick nach vorn', in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 7/1992, pp. 179-186, that the `nightmares of the past' are not yet over.

20. It is, therefore, not without a certain relief, that *La Tribune* writes, reflecting the difficult economic situation in Eastern Germany and the danger of strikes there, `L'homo Germanicus Economicus responsable et consensuel décrit complaisamment par certains n'existe pas . . . La réunification de l'Allemagne a bouleversé l'harmonie.' (31 January/1 February 1992, p. 1).

21. For the fear which still exists of a dominant German role in Eastern Europe, see for instance Pierre M. Gallois, `Les changements stratégiques dans le monde : A la charnière des siècles, de bouleversements en turbulences', *Défense Nationale*, June 1992, pp. 23-26.

22. Traditionally, France tried several times to develop a special relationship with the Soviet Union. The new Russia suffered, however, from too many domestic troubles to become a reasonable partner for France.

23. See, for instance, Richard Ullman, `The Covert French Connection', in *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1989, pp. 3-33. See also the French difficulty to speak openly over the American offer to help French military forces in Dien Bien Phu with massive air support and financial aid (see the article of a diplomatic actor of those days, Frédéric Dupon, `L'aide américaine en Indochine', in *Le Figaro*, 10 March 1992, p. 2).

24. For the UK's dependence on the US, especially in the nuclear-strategic field, see John Roper, `Nuclear policies: different approaches to similar objectives', in Yves Boyer, Pierre Lellouche and John Roper (eds.), *Franco-British defence co-operation. A new entente cordiale?* (London: Routledge, 1989); French version: *Pour une nouvelle entente cordiale. La relance de l'alliance franco-britannique en matière de sécurité* (Paris: IFRI, 1988), pp. 22-27. For the very recent change of UK policy in this regard see Trevor Taylor, `The future of West European Defence Cooperation - United Kingdom positions', in Peter Schmidt (ed.), *In the midst of change - Approaches to West European Security and Defence Cooperation* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), pp. 137-157.

25. See the German government's famous `ten points' of 1989 regarding the future coming together of the two parts of Germany, which were based on a step-by-step approach to unification.

26. See Werner Link, `Die außenpolitische Staatsräson des Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in Manfred Funke (ed.), *Demokratie und Diktatur* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1987), pp. 400-416.

27. This policy is in line with Adenauer's suspicion that Germany would not be able to pursue a rather reasonable, independent, international policy. In an interview in *Le Figaro* (20 May 1992, pp. 6-7), Helmut Kohl explicitly refers to Konrad Adenauer in this regard by saying: `Quand j'étais jeune, j'ai beaucoup appris d'Adenauer. Il disait: "Dans le passé, nous Allemands, avons été les imposteurs de l'Europe. Maintenant nous devons afficher un profil bas."'

28. Alfred Grosser, `L'Allemagne élargie dans l'Europe élargie', in *Politique Etrangère*, 4/1991, p. 831.

29. See *Monatsbereiche der Deutschen Bundesbank*, vol. 44, no. 12, 1992, pp. 23-28.

30. Including the Central European states.

31. See Michael Mertes and Norbert J. Prill, `Der verhängnisvolle Irrtum eines Entweder-Oder. Eine Vision für Europa', in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19 July 1989, p. 8 and Joachim Bitterlich, `La politique communautaire et occidentale de Bonn: un examen de passage pour l'Allemagne unie?', in *Politique Étrangère*, 4/1991, pp. 833-847.

32. Press Communiqué on the Baker-Genscher joint statement, 3 October 1991.

33. For Germany's role of interlocutor between France and the US see K. Peter Stratmann, `The Future of West European Security and Defence Cooperation - German Perspectives', in Peter Schmidt (ed.), *In the midst of change - Approaches to West European Security and Defence Cooperation* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), pp. 31-63.

34. See Hans-Peter Schwarz's thesis of 1984 that the basic German approach to international affairs is characterized by a shift from `obsession of power' (*Machtbesessenheit*) to the `obliviousness of power' (*Machtvergessenheit*), in *Die gezähmten Deutschen: Von der Machtbesessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985).

35. Harald Müller, `Germany', in Mathias Jopp, Reinhardt Rummel and Peter Schmidt, *Integration and Security in Western Europe. Inside the European Pillar* (Boulder, CO: Westview Special Studies in International Security, 1991), p. 172.

36. *The Military Balance* 1992-1993 (London: Brassey's for the IISS) reports that France maintains forces in Antilles-Guyana (8,200), the Indian Ocean (3,400), New Caledonia (3,700), Polynesia (4,000), Central African Republic (1,200), chad (750), Djibouti (4,000), Gabon (500), Rwanda (200), Côte d'Ivoire (500), Senegal (1,200), Turkey (150). In addition, France makes a large contribution to United Nations operations (see for instance *Le Monde*, 12 December 1992, p.3) in South Lebanon (441 troops), Yugoslavia (4,800) and Cambodia (1,435).

37. See Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, `French Strategic Options in the 1990s', *Adelphi Paper* 260 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1991), pp. 13-15.

38. See Peter Schmidt, `Deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit in der Sicherheits- und Verteidingungspolitik, Teil II. Entwicklung, Probleme und Perspektiven der militärischen Zusammenarbeit' (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 1987), pp. 46-47.

39. The Supreme Soviet only ratified this treaty on 4 March 1991.

40. For an in-depth analysis of the German conduct in the Gulf crisis see Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher, `Germany and the Iraq conflict', in Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper (eds.), *Western Europe and the Gulf* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1992), pp. 39-69.

41. See the initiative of the spokesman of the Christian Democrats in the Bundestag for foreign affairs, Karl Lamers together with the Socialist member of the European Parliament Gérard Fuchs (see Karl Lamers, `Eine Sicherheits-Union - Möglichkeiten und Grenzen. Zu einer deutsch-französischen Parlamentarier-Initiative', in *Dokumente*, vol. 47, February 1991, pp. 17-22).

42. There are two other options: to change the WEU treaty which, however, is not envisaged at least until 1995/96, or to transfer respective sovereignty rights to the European Union which did not take place in Maastricht. For a rarely shared view that the Maastricht treaty is already forcing Germany to overcome its domestic limitations with regard to the use of military force, see Karl Lamers, `Von deutscher Drückebergerei', in *Der Spiegel*, no. 12/1992, pp. 22-23.

43. For the French case see the study by David Yost, `France and the Persian Gulf War: Political-Military Lessons Learned', unpublished paper, December 1991, where many examples of French pride in demonstrating France's `international rank' may be found.

44. The two decisive articles in the German constitution are Article 24 (1) and (2) and Article 87 a (2). The first article opens up the possibility of transferring sovereign powers to a collective security system, `as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world.' Article 87 a restricts the possible use of German forces only to `defence'.

45. Article 6 of the NATO treaty says: `For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: - on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, . . . , on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; - on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.'

46. There is some confusion in the public debate on the question of the so-called treaty area. The central point is that it has to be seen in close relation with the mutual assistance clause in the Washington Treaty. The treaty area is that part of their territory and the North Atlantic where the Alliance members have accepted special obligations to support any Alliance party which is attacked.

47. The war ended with a cease-fire on 25 February 1991. Mine clearance operations in the north of the Persian Gulf started at 19 April 1991. In these postwar operations German ships sided Italian, UK, French, Belgian and Netherlands ships (see Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur, `The Gulf crisis - lessons for Western European Union', Assembly of Western European Union, Document 1268, 13 May 1991, p. 16).

48. Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty says: `If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting

Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.'

49. The German government therefore at the beginning legitimized the deployment of a mine clearance task force as a `humanitarian action' and emphasized that the task force would be placed under national command. See the government declaration made by Heinrich Vogel on 6 March 1991, documented in *Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, no. 3/1991, p. 40.

50. See Auswärtiges Amt (ed.), `Deutsche Auenpolitik 1990/91. Auf dem Weg zu einer Europäischen Friedensordnung. Eine Dokumentation', Bonn 1991, pp. 350-351.

51. See Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becker, `Germany and the Iraq conflict', op. cit., p. 51.

52. See the implicit criticism of Germany in the WEU Assembly Report by Mr de Hoop Scheffer, `The Gulf crisis - lessons for Western European Union', p. 5: `Europe was confronted with risks in the Mediterranean area which had not been forecast and should show the same solidarity with Mediterranean countries as hitherto with the Federal Republic of Germany on the Central Front.'

53. Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becker remind us of the `bizarre attempt' to hire a commercially operated Soviet-manned Antonov airlifter to transport German military equipment to Turkey (in `Germany and the Iraq conflict', op. cit., p. 59). See also the results of the new *Wehrstrukturkommission* of the government (Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg (eds.), *Bundeswehr und europäische Sicherheitsordnung. Abschlubericht der Unabhängigen Kommission für die künftigen Aufgaben der Bundeswehr* (Bonn and Berlin: Bouvier, 1991), pp. 28-37).

54. Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher, `Germany and the Iraq conflict', op. cit., p. 61.

55. See Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom, `The United Nations and the Gulf war, 1990-1991: Back to the future?', *RIIA Discussion Papers*, 38, 1992.

56. For a number of reasons the position of France in the Security Council might be threatened in the near future: the legitimacy of the Western permanent members of the Security Council is based on their status as victorious powers of World War II. The postwar period has, however, gone; the objective of developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) among the EC member states has implications for France's freedom of action in this body, too. Nevertheless, it might be very difficult to obtain the two-thirds majority in the General Assembly and the consent of all permanent members of the UN Security Council that would be required to change the current practice.

57. Germany does not want to take the initiative to become a permanent member of the Security Council. Nevertheless, it has shown its readiness, if a reform of the Security Council becomes feasible, to join this `club'.

58. See Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom, `The United Nations and the Gulf war', op. cit. pp. 13-14.

59. The British tried to establish some Franco-British understanding on the subject but without success. On the evening John Major visited Paris, President Mitterrand made his famous last-minute peace initiative without informing his British counterpart.

60. See François Heisbourg, `France and the Gulf crisis', in Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper (eds.), *Western Europe and the Gulf*, op. cit., p. 18.

61. For a detailed list of French involvement, which consisted of 14,663 men, see Philippe de Gaulle, `Avis présenté au nom de la commission des Affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1992 considéré comme adopté par l'Assemblé nationale aux termes de l'Article 49, Alinéa 3, de la Constitution', Tome IV, Défense, Section Forces terrestres, Sénat, no. 95, Annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 19 novembre 1991, p. 73.

62. See `Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des Affaires étrangère, de la défense ete des forces armée (1) en application de l'article 22, premier alinéa, du Règlement, sur quelques enseignements immédiats de la crise du Golfe quant aux exigences nouvelles en matière de défense', by MM. Jean Lecanuet, Président, Michel Alloncle, Philippe de Gaulle, Jacques Genton, Max Lejeune, Xavier de Villepin, Albert Voilquin, no. 303, Sénat, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1990-1991, Annexe au proces-verbal de la séance du 25 avril 1991.

63. Rapport d'Information, no. 303, Sénat, op. cit., p. 144.

64. This is not the place to go into details with regard to this difficult question. It is, however, necessary to say that the UN intervention in the Iraqi case (rescue and humanitarian operation to assist the Kurds) was unusual since it constituted intervention in the internal affairs of a state. This practice, however, does not seem to be generally accepted and is not based on clear regulations.

65. This led the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, Jacques F. Poos, to state that this is `the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans.' (*Financial Times*, 1 July 1991). Nevertheless, on 3 July 1991 the United States proposed that the US and the EEC suspend their assistance to Yugoslavia and impose an embargo on arms sales. The United States has played an important part in UN Security Council consideration of this matter. The new Clinton administration is, however, more involved, as has been seen in the air dropping of supplies by US aircraft in eastern Bosnia during March 1993.

66. On 25 September 1991 the UN Security Council decreed an embargo on supplies of arms to Yugoslavia. However, some members of the UN opposed the sending of an emergency force to Yugoslavia because they did not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of member states. None the less in April 1992 the UN sent an `interposition' force to Yugoslavia.

67. The CSCE consultive mechanism for unusual military activities was activated on 27 June 1991 and the demand to end hostilities was formulated on 2 July 1991. For a detailed analysis of the involvement of the CSCE see Heinz Vetschera, `Die KSZE-

Krisenmechanismen und ihre Einsatz in der Jugoslawien-Krise, in *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, 5/1991, p. 410.

68. *The Independent* of 6 July 1991 reported a comment by French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, that there was a danger of some republics falling under `foreign influence', which was interpreted as a reference to Germany.

69. Daniel Vernet, `Le retour de la "question allemande"', in *Le Monde*, 22/23 December 1991, pp. 1 and 4. See also Alain Gresh, `L'Europe à l'épreuve de la crise yougoslave', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, January 1992, p. 3.

70. In March 1993 the governmental coalition (CDU/CSU, FDP) tried to involve the Federal Constitutional Court to obtain an authoritative decision on the constitutional debate on whether German soldiers are allowed to take part in the AWACS mission over the former Yugoslavia.

71. On 30 September 1991, an *ad hoc* group submitted four options open to WEU to intervene militarily in Yugoslavia. The options ranged from 2-3,000 to 20,000 military personnel. France endorsed the second option. See Assembly of WEU, 37th Ordinary Session (Second Part), Document 1294, 27 November 1991, Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur, on the operational arrangements for WEU in the Yugoslav crisis, p. 10.

72. On 16 September 1991 it was President Mitterrand in particular who wished the UN Security Council to consider the matter.

73. The French involvement is about 2,000 out of about 14,000 and is the biggest national contribution.

74. See Christian Deubner, `Die EG und Jugoslawiens Bürgerkrieg', (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, unpublished paper, October 1991), pp. 13-14.

75. Moreau Defarges, `L'Allemagne et l'avenir de l'unification européenne', in *Politique étrangère*, 4/1991, p. 850.

76. See Moreau Defarges, `L'Allemagne et l'avenir de l'unification européenne', op. cit., pp. 852-853, and Hugo Dicke, `Das wirtschaftliche Gewicht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ein Aktivum der transatlantischen Sicherheitsgemeinschaft?', in Dieter Mahncke (ed.), *Amerikaner in Deutschland. Grundlagen und Bedingungen der transatlantischen Sicherheit* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991), pp. 221-258.

77. François Mitterrand: `The idea of Europe is inseparable from the idea of defence. Today, however, the only defence option is the Atlantic Alliance.' *Réflexions sur la politique extérieure de la France* (Paris: Librairie Arthène Fayard, 1987), p. 101.

78. For the different strategies to include security and defence questions in the European Community see Reinhardt Rummel and Peter Schmidt, `West European Integration and Security Cooperation. Converging and Diverging Trends', in Mathias Jopp, Reinhardt Rummel and Peter Schmidt (eds.), *Integration and Security in Western Europe* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), pp. 17-20.

79. In addition, European Political Cooperation (EPC) dealt with a limited number of issues such as the Middle East conflict and the CSCE. See Mathias Jopp and Wolfgang Wessels, `Institutional Frameworks for Security Cooperation in Western Europe: Developments and Options', in Mathias Jopp, Reinhardt Rummel and Peter Schmidt (eds.), *Integration and Security in Western Europe. Inside the European Pillar* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), pp. 63-67.

80. For the evolution of the different proposals in the preparation of the NATO summit in Rome (November 1991) and the European Council summit in Maastricht (December 1991) see Peter Schmidt, `The evolution of European security structures. Master Plan or Trial and Error?', in David Haglund (ed.), *International governance* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993).

81. See Joachim Bitterlich, `La politique communautaire et occidentale de Bonn: un examen de passage pour l'Allemagne unie?', in *Politique Etrangère*, 4/1991, pp. 833-847.

82. See François Mitterrand, *Réflexions sur la politique extérieure de la France* (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1987), pp. 16-17. More recently, the necessity to find a balance between Germany's main asset, the Deutschmark, and the French trump card, the *force de dissuasion*, has been emphasized (see André Brigot, Les intérêts de sécurité et leurs coûts, in André Brigot, Walter Schütze and Peter Schmidt, *Défense, désarmement et politiques à l'Est* (Paris: Fondations pour les études de défense nationale, 1989), pp. 69-93 and Alain Minc, *La vengeance des nations*(Paris: Grasset, 1990).

83. See speeches by the British Secretary of State for Defence Malcolm Rifkind and General François Mermet during a colloquium in Paris on 29 September-1 October 1992 organised by the French Ministry of Defence. Proceedings are published in *Un nouveau débat stratégique* (Paris: La Documentation française, for the Ministry of Defence, 1993).

84. The head of the planning staff of the Quai d'Orsay, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, speaks of the `balance of interdependences' between Europe and the United States in `Sicherheit und Verteidigung in Europa. Es geht nicht nur um Organisationen, sondern auch um Grundsatzfragen', in *Dokumente*, 2/1992, p. 123.

85. See the declaration by chancellor Helmut Kohl in the Bundestag on 6 November 1991 (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 434/91) and Ulrich Weisser, *NATO ohne Feindbild* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1993), pp. 211-213.

86. See Dieter Mahncke, `Europäische Sicherheit und die Rolle der Amerikaner', in Dieter Mahncke (ed.), *Amerikaner in Deutschland. Grundlagen und Bedingungen der transatlantischen Beziehungen* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991), pp. 565-571.

87. See paragraph 52 of the New Strategic Concept (NATO Press Communique S-1(91)85, 7 November 1991, p. 14).

88. For the American attitude towards these developments see Diego Ruiz Palmer, `The Future of West European Security and Defence Cooperation - A United States Perspective', in Peter Schmidt (ed.), *In the midst of change - Approaches to West European Security and Defence Cooperation* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), pp. 159-185.

89. France in particular rejected proposals to give NATO the possibility to play a role as the defence arm of the UN or a future further developed CSCE (see *Le Figaro*, 9/10 November 1991).

90. Communiqué of the ministerial conference of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo on 4 June 1992, Item 11 and communiqué of NATO Ministerial Council, Brussels, 17 December 1992, point 4.

91. In the diplomatic language of the Communique of Gleneagles: `In our discussions we therefore agreed on the need to intensify ongoing practical work within the Alliance, so that NATO is better prepared to respond to the international community when required for this purpose, and we agreed to review progress at our December Defence Planning Committee meeting. We also propose to discuss peacekeeping issues at the next meeting of Defence Ministers with our cooperation partners.' (NATO Press Service, Press Communique M-NPG-2 (92) 83, 21 October 1992).

92. For a detailed description of France's involvement in the NATO structure see Frédéric Bozo, *La France et l'OTAN. De la guerre froide au nouvel ordre européen* (Paris: Masson, 1991).

93. Mitterrand, however, called it merely an `educational' brigade.

94. For Germany, it was in those days important to participate in this brigade with a military unit which was not earmarked for NATO. For an evaluation of the brigade from a German point of view see Dominik von Wolff Metternich, `The Franco-German Brigade: A German perspective', in *The RUSI Journal*, Autumn 1991, pp. 44-48.

95. See `Britische Dominanz bei NATO-Eingreiftruppe. NATO-Streitkräftestruktur mit Fragezeichen, in *IAP-Dienst*, no. 11, 14 June 1991.

96. Nevertheless, NATO's Rome declaration mentioned that individual member countries could `be called upon to global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions.' (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, op.cit., p. 11).

97. Compare first and second Franco-German proposals given in Annexe.

98. See second Franco-German proposal.

99. See the Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, no. 68, 23 June 1992, pp. 649-655.

100. See Items II, 3 and II, 4 of the Petersberg Declaration.

101. Ursel Hoppe outlines the former German interpretation of the WEU treaty in: `The Western European Union', in Mathias Jopp, Reinhardt Rummel and Peter Schmidt (eds.), *Integration and Security in Western Europe. Inside the European Pillar* (Boulder/San Francisco, Oxford: Westview, 1991), pp. 275-277.

102. In Article 52 (1) of the UN charter, regional agreements or institutions are not excluded. Furthermore, Article 53 (1) states: `The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council . . .' Therefore according to the UN charter, if the CSCE played the role of a regional organization in accordance with the results of the Helsinki meeting, the critical question of `enforcement measures' could only be addressed on the basis of a Security Council decision.

103. Nevertheless, Germany will get some sort of a General Staff. This is one of the consequences of the Two-Plus-Four treaty, which places German forces in the former GDR under German command. See Thomas-Durell Young, `Bundeswehr Plans for a National Command and Control Structure', *SSI Special Report*, 24 March 1992.

104. Heinz Brill, `Frankreichs taktisch-nukleares Waffensystem Pluton. Ein Wehrgeographisches Problem', *Wehrkunde*, vol. 24, no. 9, September 1975, p. 446.

105. Ibid.

106. See the Franco-German declaration documented in *Europa-Archiv* 9/1986, pp. D 235-237.

107. France for a long time, in comparison with Germany, emphasized that the former Soviet Union still remained a danger for Western Europe.

108. For an in-depth analysis of the diminishing importance of nuclear weapons, see Patrick J. Garrity, `The Depreciation of Nuclear Weapons in International Politics: Possibilities, Limits, Uncertainties', *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 14, no. 4, December 1991, pp. 463-514.

109. François Fillon, for instance, proposes a European Nuclear Consultation Group in the framework of the WEU in `Nuclear deterrence and enlargement', in op. cit. in note 83.

110. See Serge Grouard and Patrice van Ackere, `Pour une dissuasion européenne', *Libération*, 18 March 1992, p. 6.

111. See the speech by the French president, 10 January 1992.

112. See the `Projet de discours du secrétaire d'Etat à la défense au colloque de l'IRIS', 29 January 1992 (p. 12): `Quant à une dissuasion partagée, il apparait très difficile de partager la décision nucléaire avec d'autres Etats, quand il n'existe pas d'union politique homogène et d'autorité politique commune.' (As concerns a shared

deterrence, it seems very difficult to share the nuclear decision with other states when a homogeneous political union does not exist, nor a common political authority.)

113. See Dominique David, `Nucléaire: un autre âge', *Libération*, 28 January 1992, p. 5: `L'ombre de l'atome demeure, qui détermine l'espace dans lequel nous pouvons penser l'utilisation de nos forces classiques. Si cette ombre disparaissait, nous serions renvoyés aux vieux enchaînements de la course aux armements, à la ruine financière, à l'inévitable dépendance vis-à-vis des Etats Unis, maîtres du développement technique dans ce domaine, *in fine* à l'impuissance.' (The shadow of the atom is fading, which determines the extent to which we can think about the use of our conventional forces. If this shadow were to disappear, we would be returned to the old sequence of arms race, financial ruin, the inevitable dependence on the United States, masters of technical development in this domain, and *in fine*, powerlessness.) See also Pierre Lellouche, `Le post-nucléaire est arrivé', in *Le Figaro*, 22 July 1992, p. 5.

114. See the speech by Defence Minister Joxe in September 1992 (op. cit. in note 83), in which he said that France only can imagine `une concertation multilatérale sur les conditions de mise en oeuvre des moyens nucléaires sur un élargissement de la garantie nucléaire. Il est nécessaire que s'engage à ce sujet un dialogue entre Européens.' (multilateral agreement on the conditions of use of nuclear means [and] on a widening of the nuclear guarantee). Quoted in *Le Monde*, 30 September 1992, p. 26.)

115. This interpretation is implicit in General Fricaud-chagnaud's notion of a `dissuasion par constat' (in `Une nouvelle formulation du concept de sécurité europénne', *Défense Nationale*, November 1990, pp. 61-68). For an in-depth analysis of the French nuclear debate see Hans-Georg Ehrhart, `Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EG und die Nuklearwaffenfrage' in Oliver Thränert (ed.), *Die EG auf dem Weg zu einer Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik* (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, August 1992), pp. 47-62.

116. For a brief analysis of the content and background of The Hague platform of October 1987 see Edward Mortimer, `European Security after the Cold War', *Adelphi Paper* 271 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1992), p. 57. With regard to nuclear deterrence, the declaration states: `To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk.' (Part II, 2 of the platform).

117. See the speech by the British Secretary of State for Defence, Malcolm Rifkind, in Paris on 29 September 1992 (op. cit. in note 83).

118. This is also the basic conclusion of David Haglund's thorough study on Franco-German security relations entitled *Alliance within the Alliance? Franco-German Military Cooperation and the European Pillar of Defense* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991).

119. For an in-depth analysis of this compromise see Volker Schneider and Raymund Werle, `Vom Regime zum korporativen Akteur. Zur institutionellen Dynamik der

Europäischen Gemeinschaft', in Beate Kohler-Koch (ed.), *Regime in den internationalen Beziehungen* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989), pp. 424-429.

120. See European Council in Lisbon 26/27 June 1992, `Conclusions of the Presidency', in *Europe*, no. 5760 (new series), 28 June 1992, p. 5: `The European Council considers that the EEA agreement has paved the way for opening enlargement negotiations with a view to an early conclusion with EFTA countries seeking membership of the European Union. It invites the institutions to speed up preparatory work needed to ensure rapid progress including the preparation before the European Council in Edinburgh of the Union's general negotiation framework.'

121. The French politician (now prime minister) Edouard Balladur, writing in *Le Figaro*, 3 February 1991, p. 6, in an article entitled `La France et le nouvel ordre planétaire', gives an excellent prescription of the type of flexible national foreign policy in Europe for France. It is my impression that this approach will likely become the guideline for major West European states.

122. Article J.4 (4) of the Maastricht treaty puts this special position as follows: `Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, withour prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations charter.' See *Treaty on European Union* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992).

123. Recent attempts of the two permanent European members of the UN Security Council, together with the US, to form a coalition to establish a `no-fly' zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as some steps taken by this `coalition' with regard to problems with Iraq, indicate some tendency in this direction. Nevertheless, the European members of the Security Council looked for the support of all EC countries (see the report on the EC meeting of 12 September 1992 in *The Sunday Times*, 13 September 1992).

124. Général François Mermet again demands British-French cooperation to develop a long-range air-to-ground missile in `Elargir la dissuasion', in op. cit. in note 83.