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MILITARY COOPERATION: WHAT STRUCTURE FOR THE FUTURE?

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PREFACE

The end of the Cold War, the development of new political and military structures, the increased involvement of European forces in United Nations operations which may well involve a wider range of functions; all these developments make it necessary to re-examine the range of possible command arrangements for forces coming from various nations. This is what René Van Beveren does in this useful study which surveys the range of approaches to this problem which have been used in the twentieth century, with particular reference to the situation in the Atlantic Alliance and developing patterns of European cooperation.

Colonel René Van Beveren joined the Institute as a Senior Research Fellow at its inception in 1990 on his retirement from the Belgian Army. The Institute hopes that his *Chaillot Paper* will make a useful contribution to this debate.

John Roper
Paris, January 1993

Military cooperation:
what structure for the future?

René Van Beveren

INTRODUCTION

The Atlantic Alliance was created to deter any direct military aggression against its member countries. For forty years the USSR, with its great superiority in conventional forces, was seen as a potential enemy capable of launching a massive attack with very little warning.

Recent events in Eastern Europe, as well as the desire of the governments of several European countries to assert a European security and defence identity within the framework of a European Union linked to Western European Union, have led to an extensive review of the Alliance. Moreover, the search for this European defence identity also implies military cooperation in aspects of defence not covered by the Alliance.

In these conditions, fresh thinking on military cooperation is clearly necessary. This paper considers, firstly, the notions of security and defence policies and looks at examples of military cooperation in a number of alliances formed during this century. It then reviews the present situation and considers the future. Recent political decisions suggest various possible missions for military forces; the present paper examines these and, taking into account past experiences, tries to formulate acceptable forms of cooperation.

The word `defence' can be given a restricted sense as, for example: the object of defence is to assure, at all times, in all circumstances and against all forms of aggression, the security and integrity of national territory, as well as the life of the population.

In this paper, defence is given a much wider sense. The state, in freely pursuing its stated goals, is inevitably in competition - or in conflict in the broad sense of the word - with other states. Its security policy consists of an ensemble of measures which allow it to attain its objectives, possibly after having adapted them to the hostile milieu of international relations. Defence policy is one of its aspects: it is the preparation and the use of military means to attain national objectives. In its broad definition, defence policy is thus not limited to the use of military force to deter, stop or repel any aggression against national territory but also implies the commitment, beyond its frontiers, of military forces to defend universal values, such as human rights or the observance of international law, or national interests. This policy thus consists in the threat of the use, and the use, of military force to impose the will of a state on a hostile entity. It should be added that the United Nations charter imposes limits on the aggressive use of military force.

Within a state the government is responsible for drawing up a defence policy. The military give advice, advising the government of the capabilities and limitations of its armed forces, and propose the best ways of using the forces available and a range of military strategies.

The government nominates a military commander for each theatre of operations in which forces are engaged and assigns to him a mission together with the means necessary for its accomplishment. This commander must - or should - have control of

all the military forces engaged. He conducts the battle within the framework of the plan approved by the government but, since war is a succession of unexpected situations, must have the greatest possible freedom of action.

TRADITIONAL ALLIANCES

Aims

States choose to form alliances in order to impose a common political will on a common enemy or to prevent that enemy from imposing his will on members of the alliance that are too weak to oppose it. The usual features of an alliance are therefore that there is an advantage in membership and a common enemy (real, potential or simply hypothetical) to be faced.

Some alliances have a limited goal of collective self-defence against any direct attack on the territory of their members. In this paper such an alliance is termed a `*self-defence alliance*'.

Other alliances are not limited to self-defence accords or operations but have wider military objectives, including military activities beyond the borders of their member countries. The Maastricht treaty and the Petersberg Declaration of WEU, which are analysed later, contain at least some elements of such alliances. It is probably impossible to find a generally agreed name for these alliances. However, taking into account the terminology used in official declarations and acknowledging, a priori, that alliances of this type formed between western countries respect the United Nations charter in all circumstances, they will be referred to as `*general defence alliances*'.

Forms

An alliance can be based on an agreement, drawn up during peace time, to provide mutual assistance, and specifying the conditions under which it would be given, or it may be concluded as a collective reaction during a conflict. The governments of member countries of such an alliance will often specify the political and military aspects of their cooperation in treaties concluded during the conflict.

Operation

Whatever the aims and forms alliances may have, the way in which they function will have two fundamental characteristics: the way in which political decisions are taken and the way in which military effort is coordinated.

A study of the two world wars (Annexe A), of the military structure of the Atlantic Alliance (Annexe B) and of several military operations since 1945 (Annexe C) suggests that one can define three types of military cooperation within alliances: staff agreements, the placing of military forces under command of a pilot nation and integrated command structures.

Staff agreements

Staff agreements are minimal military coordination measures adopted within an alliance. An intergovernmental accord on the aims of the war is not essential and the different forces remain under national command. The allies involved limit themselves to an agreement on their respective zones of action and consult each other as

necessary before any important military operation (for instance a large-scale offensive).

In 1914 the Belgians, British and French hastily concluded staff agreements. The system worked for over three years in a situation where the front lines were stable.

In 1939-1940 staff agreements were carefully worked out by the same allies. However, the campaign of May-June 1940 was a veritable débâcle for these countries. One of the main reasons for this defeat was the absence of an overall commander of the theatre of operations with clearly defined lines of command to all the military forces involved; in this war of movement, this would have permitted rapid decision-making at all levels.

Several low-intensity humanitarian operations, such as the Franco-Belgian operations in Zaire and Rwanda, have been successfully carried out by alliances in which military cooperation was limited to staff agreements.

The placing of forces under command

When several allied governments agree on the aim of a military operation and on the strategy to be adopted, they may decide to place all the forces in a theatre of operations under a commander from the most powerful of the allies.

The events of World War I showed how an alliance in which cooperation was based on staff agreements developed into one in which forces were placed under an allied commander, but that development was long and difficult. A political directorate was first created in 1917 and then the four principal allies (France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States) set up a Higher War Council, made up from ministers from each of the countries, and a Committee of representatives of the Commanders-in-Chief.

There remained the problem of coordinating operations. The allies were reluctant to accept the idea of a single command. However, the German offensives had created a critical situation at the beginning of 1918 and a breakthrough of the allied front was imminent. The allied governments therefore accepted, on 26 March 1918, that France would be responsible for the conduct of operations; this task was entrusted to General Foch. This new command arrangement held together, in very difficult conditions, up to and during the last assaults by the German armies. Foch then launched the offensive that was to secure victory.

The operation in the Gulf from August 1990 to March 1991 was a typical example of a political and military action led by a pilot nation (the United States) with the political agreement of a large number of states and the relatively limited military support of some of its allies. For the military operations, the allies placed their military formations under the operational control[(1)] of the American commander-in-chief, General Schwarzkopf. The allies were consulted on the overall planning but the military operations as such were led from start to finish by one commander.

Integrated command structures

In December 1941 Franklin D. Roosevelt, the United States President and Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister met in Washington to coordinate the conduct of the war against Germany and decided to assume its political direction jointly. They decided on an original type of command structure: the military forces of each ally would remain grouped, with national chains of command up to the highest level; the supreme commander of the allied expeditionary force would have an integrated staff composed of officers of the two nations. History shows that these decisions contributed in large measure to the ultimate victory.

The Suez operation by Britain and France in late October and early November 1956 was carried out by an alliance formed in August 1956 following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal on 28 July 1956. It was a rare - possibly unique - example of a general defence alliance which had an integrated command structure.

The characteristic features of both staff agreements and integrated command structures can be found in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Conclusions

In practice each form of military cooperation within alliances has advantages and limitations.

Staff agreements enable interventions to be prepared rapidly; with this arrangement the national sovereignty of each ally remains entire; and in peace time staff agreements can be concluded for hypothetical operations. This form of cooperation can, however, only be envisaged for low-intensity operations.

The placing of forces under command can only be envisaged if one nation takes political and military responsibility for the operation and provides a force which has a command structure extending from the commander of the theatre of operations down to the tactical level. The other allies must accept the aim of the operation and will be consulted on the operational plan and the involvement of their forces but, during the course of the operation, must accept any politico-military decisions made by the pilot nation. It seems improbable that governments could conclude agreements on this type of cooperation for hypothetical situations.

A system based on an integrated command structure, of which the first historical example was that involving two major allies during World War II (the other allies having put their forces under command of one or the other of these two), is complex and difficult to set up. In the period 1941-1945 the military results were impressive despite a few internal crises. The system has been in use since 1950 within the Atlantic Alliance; it is described in detail in the following section.

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

The Atlantic Alliance, which is composed of sixteen states located on both sides of the Atlantic, has existed for over forty years. Whether in the future military cooperation is Atlantic or European, within a self-defence or general defence alliance (as defined earlier), it seems that the Atlantic Alliance will still be seen as a reference point and therefore merits detailed examination.

Political structure

The North Atlantic Treaty is certainly a text of major importance. Member countries undertake to give assistance to any ally that is the victim of aggression with the means (including military ones) that they *deem necessary*. However, there are aspects of the security and defence policies of some member countries which fall outside the scope of the Alliance, and these have resulted in, for example, the American intervention in Vietnam, Britain's war in the Falklands and the French operation in chad. Also, the Treaty does not mention the methods of military cooperation to be used to deter or repel a direct attack.

The North Atlantic Council, which is established by the Treaty, meets at the level of heads of state or government, foreign ministers and ambassadors (known as permanent representatives). The Council is the principal political authority of the Alliance. It is not a supranational body: each member takes decisions without any restriction on its sovereignty. Consensus (silent unanimity and the absence of objections) is necessary for all decisions.

In 1950 the Council established an integrated military command structure. France left this structure in 1966 (see section on military strategy below), and from then on the other members continued to form a military strategy and draw up defence plans in a body in which France did not participate: the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) was created, which meets at the level of defence ministers and ambassadors. Consultation on nuclear matters has taken place in another forum, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), whose composition is identical to that of the DPC. Spain does not participate in the integrated military structure but is included in the DPC and NPG.

The Military Committee meets at the level of national chiefs of defence staff twice a year and at the level of military representatives once a week. The Military Committee recommends to the Council and the DPC the measures considered necessary for the common defence. The Committee is not an organ of the integrated military structure: each member receives instructions from his government. Spain is included and the head of France's military mission attends the Committee's meetings.

The DPC defines deterrence strategy and approves operational plans drawn up by the military authorities of the Alliance during peace time and, should the case arise, during times of crisis and war.

Turning to the way in which political decisions are translated into military measures, it should be recalled that, in peace time, NATO has very few forces under command.

The majority of the European and American forces deployed in Europe remain under national command and can be transferred to the operational command or operational control of a NATO commander during a period of tension;[(2)] the decision to make this transfer is taken without any restriction on national sovereignty.

A very limited transfer of authority over forces can be made in order to manage a crisis while avoiding escalation. During the Cold War, for example, it was envisaged that, in the event of a partial mobilisation and the westward movement of a substantial number of Warsaw Pact forces, the Alliance would have been able to deploy forward light forces under the operational command of Allied Command Europe (ACE) while leaving the main body of forces under national command.

In the event of a generalised surprise attack, which would be the absolute crisis situation, military commanders can, with national authority, take measures to prepare their future missions within NATO, and since the North Atlantic Council can be convened at very short notice and has excellent communications with national governments, it can be assumed that the political decisions to transfer authority would be taken very rapidly. It should be added that the hypothesis of a surprise attack was always improbable and is no longer applicable.

The authority transferred to NATO commanders does not extend to *full command*, which includes responsibility for logistics and administration, since that responsibility remains a national one. In assigning forces to NATO, nations place them either under NATO *operational command*, when the commander has authority to employ them as necessary, or under *operational control*, for the accomplishment of specific missions.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and therefore before any enemy attack, the military forces of the Alliance - either under national command or once transferred to the integrated structure - will follow national or Alliance rules of engagement which lay down clearly the circumstances in which they may use their weapons. In a defensive operation, the first decisions to open fire will in reality be very decentralised, selective decisions. The combat units nearest to frontiers and warships will *respond* by returning fire in the event of an attack. At the onset of any aggression, general authority to use conventional weapons in planned operations will be examined by the Council. There is every reason to believe that a consensus would be arrived at rapidly.

The use of nuclear weapons requires a political decision that is of the greatest importance. The Alliance has established consultation procedures and directives governing the possible use of nuclear weapons, and those procedures are rehearsed regularly in the course of exercises. Everything possible has been envisaged to allow non-nuclear weapons members of the Alliance to make their views heard but the decision to use nuclear weapons remains the responsibility of the head of state of nuclear powers.

Military strategy

By its very nature a self-defence alliance adopts a military strategy of deterrence. Until the beginning of the 1960s the Atlantic Alliance's strategy was based on the nuclear deterrence provided by the United States and the threat of massive retaliation. The launching of the *Sputnik* space satellite in 1957 and the development of Soviet

ballistic missile capabilities very quickly made the United States vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attacks. The United States therefore proposed to the allies a strategy of flexible response, which was seen by some Europeans as the beginning of the end of extended deterrence. A long and difficult period of consultation began in 1963. France concluded that only an independent nuclear capability could guarantee its security and, since its concept of conventional operations is closely interwoven with its strategy of using nuclear weapons, decided in 1966 to leave the Alliance's integrated military structure. Following its departure, the strategy incorporating the principle of flexible response was accepted by all the other members and this remained in force until November 1991.

The integrated military command structure

As stated earlier, the integrated military command structure was created in 1950. Annexe B describes the four main elements of that structure when it had been fully developed: the integrated commands, air defence, the integrated formations and the permanent naval forces. It also gives details of the modifications to the integrated structure that are in hand.

The headquarters of the integrated commands, the essential element, are composed of staff officers of the countries which have assigned forces to those commands. At these headquarters, operational plans are drawn up based on the directives of the political authorities, to whom they are submitted for approval. If required, these plans are executed by the assigned forces. The commanders of the two major NATO commands, Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic, have traditionally been Americans.

After a referendum in March 1986 Spain, which had been a member of the Alliance since 1982, decided not to participate in the integrated military structure. It defined military areas in which it would cooperate but these did not include involvement by its land and air forces in any military operation beyond Spain's frontiers. Greece temporarily left the integrated military structure in 1974, rejoining it in 1980.

Those who advocate participation in the integrated structure do so because they see numerous advantages in it; others object that it has disadvantages and the discussion becomes a little confused when it extends to other aspects of transatlantic relations. The arguments for and against are set out below.

Advantages of integration

The integrated structure is the obvious material proof of the transatlantic link and of the common will to oppose any aggression; it therefore has a deterrent value. That much seems incontestable.

If deterrence failed, member states would take the political decision to `activate' the system by transferring authority (to command forces) and thus enable best use to be made of the available forces in the conduct of operations - a major advantage. The two world wars showed clearly the difficulties that alliances encounter when there is no unified command in the theatre of operations.

Advances in the capabilities of weapons systems (for instance the range of missiles, the speed and radius of action of aircraft and helicopters, real-time intelligence acquisition systems), as well as the complex operations necessary to reinforce and reconstitute American forces in Europe, mean that increasingly detailed coordination is necessary at all levels of command.

Membership of the Alliance tends to make the relations between member states more stable. That is indisputable but this stabilising influence is above all the result of permanent political dialogue in the Council. The integrated military structure plays a role in this which is difficult to quantify: it provides the opportunity for tens of thousands of members of the armed forces of member states to know and respect each other better.

The integrated structure probably facilitates crisis management but it is in the first instance the Alliance's political structure which has a stabilising effect on national reactions in time of crisis; the military structure makes possible the rapid execution of joint decisions. It is easier to find practical examples of the first point than the second: Alliance members limited themselves to political consultation during the crises in Czechoslovakia in 1956 and Hungary in 1968, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 and the crisis in Poland in 1981. This consultation in all cases produced coherent reactions but the military structure was not involved. Before Operation DESERT STORM, the time taken to arrive at a political decision regarding the dispatch to Turkey in January 1991 of a number of air force assets belonging to three NATO countries shows what a delicate political problem the use of military means in crisis management can be.

NATO's integrated commands have made considerable efforts in the joint planning of equipment requirements and the allocation of missions to nations. These efforts certainly contribute to interoperability and the standardisation of joint research, development and procurement programmes and stimulate national efforts. Reluctance by national industries to participate and protectionism, however, are still very strong.

Disadvantages of integration

The integrated structure was designed to meet an immediate threat but over the years that threat has changed. In 1959, during a speech to the French Staff College, General de Gaulle declared that because of this, `the integrated system has had its day.' Since 1990 the threat has considerably diminished. Today, the argument is even stronger than in 1959; however, the following remarks can be made on the military aspects:

- As long as the Alliance claims to have a role to play in the areas of deterrence and collective territorial defence, measures will have to be taken to coordinate the actions of military forces in times of crisis and war.

- A minimal solution would be limited to `staff agreements', and history shows their weaknesses. Yet an attack on Western Europe would only be imaginable by an enemy that was capable of conducting highly mobile operations on a wide scale with powerful armoured and mechanised formations and very effective air support. To counter such an attack the forces of around ten nations would be launched on a

narrow front, an operation which would require a centralised command system. Admittedly, a massive attack against Western Europe is now very unlikely.

- The placing of forces under command of a pilot nation is a possible solution. The solution entailing bilateral and multinational agreements with states which are most exposed to the risk of aggression deserves detailed examination: national contingents would be placed under the operational command of pilot nation(s). From a military point of view such a solution has proved its worth, but is it politically acceptable? For example, can a defence of Germany involving military formations from ten or so countries, and indeed three nuclear powers, under German overall command be imagined?

- A compromise solution can, however, be adopted which favours an alliance which has no integrated military structure but is limited to a statement of the political will to create one if the need arises. Yet creating integrated staffs at levels ranging from theatre of operations down to the national contingents of ten countries is a complex operation requiring months of intensive work. Is it conceivable that in a future international situation - analogous to that of 1949 - a clearly perceived threat of aggression would result in the necessary political decisions being taken on the creation (or reactivation) of an integrated structure and time being allowed to do this?

- Lastly, France's special situation does not pose any particular problem from a military point of view, but it would be a mistake to think that such an arrangement could become the general rule. In any case, France is not necessarily in favour of such a generalisation; France does not reject the idea of the integrated structure. An example of this position can be seen in the statement by the French Defence Minister, M. Pierre Joxe, to the National Assembly on 9 June 1992, in which he said: `There is no question of France being in an integrated command' but adding, `in actual military operations, it goes without saying that operational integration is a necessary condition for success. Preparation for that is carried out through agreements which [the staff of] the armed forces make with their counterparts.' That is rigorously correct, and no one questions the fact that the integration of French forces into the NATO command structure during a period of crisis or after a conflict had begun would take place without any significant problem. Moreover, several plans for the intervention of French forces have been worked out in detail and practised during exercises. If the NATO structure did not exist, how could such operational integration be prepared?

The author is convinced that an alliance for self-defence in Europe which had no integrated structure would be of very little value, whatever the type of military cooperation planned during peace time. The remark does not imply any position on the role of the Europeans in the military structure, a problem which will be referred to later.

A second argument against an integrated command structure is that the Alliance's successive strategies have been initiated by the United States, which enables that country to establish its political influence. It exerts pressure on the other member countries to adapt the organisation of their forces to fit in with a more or less imposed strategy. Countries within the integrated military structure thus risk losing their ability to mount operations outside the Alliance. Of course, security and defence are not confined to deterring a direct attack.

Two comments must be made on this argument. First, it is true that France has built its *force de frappe* against the grain of the trends and pressures that exist within the Alliance, which wants to put the emphasis on conventional forces. Secondly, the United Kingdom was able, during the Gulf war and on other occasions, to deploy considerable numbers of troops. Belonging to the integrated structure therefore does not exclude a degree of flexibility.

A third criticism is that the United States has taken the lion's share of the highest command appointments. This was probably logical in the past because of the large American contribution in both conventional and nuclear forces. Today, American officers are at the head of the two Major Commands and one of the three Major Subordinate Commands. This seems excessive, as the Europeans provide 80% of the Alliance's conventional forces. In fact the question of the nationality of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was raised long ago. At the beginning of the 1980s, Henry Kissinger suggested that he should be European. Possibly there is an evolution towards that solution, but it will not be easy to define the rules governing the choice of the incumbent.

The fourth disadvantage is that, in so far as membership of the integrated command structure implies the presence of foreign bases, especially airbases, this risks involving the host nation in a conflict in which it wants no part and which is unconnected with the threat as perceived by the Alliance. This issue is very important and merits detailed analysis, which is outside the scope of this paper. Four remarks are, however, appropriate:

- The risk described above exists but the debate sometimes lacks intellectual rigour. It is, for instance, a contradiction for any country to claim that the presence of American conventional and nuclear forces in Europe is desirable or even essential to NATO defence and at the same time to exclude categorically any deployment of those forces on its soil. Clearly, the presence of foreign armed forces is a manifestation of the Alliance's common will to fight, to strengthen deterrence and to improve the availability of the armed forces, but it entails costs and risks, and some countries often prefer to see the burden borne by others. The risk will assume new proportions, since it is increasingly probable that American units deployed in Europe will be engaged in other regions.

- There have been a few examples of this type of risk: the action of the Americans who apparently, without warning the French Government, in July 1958 used the United States Air Force base in Evreux, France, for an intervention in Lebanon and Jordan following the *coup d'état* in Iraq ; less serious, the diversion by the Americans of the aircraft carrying the terrorist involved in the killings on the *Achille Lauro*, in violation of Italian airspace, in October 1985. On the other hand, during the raid on Libya in April 1986 and the bombing missions during the Gulf war, the sovereignty of European members of the Alliance was respected.

- The existence of an integrated structure does not *necessarily* imply the permanent stationing of combat troops on foreign soil. Of course, some of the personnel of integrated staffs live abroad and the temporary stationing of combat units in allied

countries is essential during exercises, but permanent deployment is not always necessary.

- Some maintain that reciprocity in stationing troops abroad is desirable in order to demonstrate equality among members of an alliance. This seems true, but it should not be forgotten that stationing troops abroad is costly.

Fifth, the integrated headquarters are vast organisations which are costly in personnel and matériel and have large budgets. That is certainly true but during the Cold War concrete proposals to reduce the size of this type of organisation put forward by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe were rejected by various countries for political and military reasons, including the refusal to lose prestigious and operationally important posts. It must be added that the reorganisation in hand includes a reduction in the number of headquarters and, apparently, the number of posts in the remaining headquarters.

The final disadvantage is that integration in the command structure involves accepting a certain automatism in military reaction. This observation must be qualified, however: the automatic nature of reaction is not absolute, since the majority of formations remain under national command and the transfer of authority is a national, sovereign decision. It is, however, true that a government which accepts a military strategy involving a plan for deployment in the event of a crisis and operational plans to be executed in the event of an attack, limits its own freedom of action.

Conclusions

The Atlantic Alliance was born of a crisis situation. Although its intergovernmental political structure requires consensus, important decisions concerning the political structure, military strategy and the integrated military command structure were taken and implemented during the early years of the Alliance. In the 1960s it became difficult to reach agreement on the new deterrent strategy put forward by the United States. This disagreement resulted in France leaving the integrated military structure. Since that time, both France and the other members of the Alliance have exercised imagination and flexibility and have worked out ways in which to cooperate.

The stationing of combat units on the territory of an ally and activities connected with their intensive training represent a considerable burden for the `host nation'. The disadvantages in deploying troops well forward have been borne almost exclusively by the Federal Republic of Germany.

The preparations made by the Alliance in the military field are exclusively limited to self-defence. In the next section the impact of the events of 1990-91 on the Atlantic Alliance will be considered.

THE SITUATION TODAY

The strategic environment

Since 1986, and in particular since 1989, the failure of the Marxist-Leninist system has profoundly changed the facts of European security. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have become potential allies. The Soviet Union no longer exists and the Russian Federation and the other republics find themselves in a disastrous economic situation and are seeking economic cooperation and support from the West. The abortive coup of August 1991 and the events that have resulted from it seem to have strengthened the separatist movements and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a very fragile structure.

Then there are the decisions of a military type that have been taken: first, the Soviet decision to bring home all of its troops stationed abroad and then the signature, in November 1990, of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in accordance with which, in the area west of the Ural Mountains, the countries of the CIS will not be able to maintain more than 70% of the number of tanks, aircraft, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces and helicopters that the member countries of the Alliance are permitted to deploy in Western Europe. On 17 July 1992, the CFE Treaty came into force. By mid-October 1992, over 300 inspections had been carried out. At the end of November 1992, all NATO countries, the five Central European states which were formerly members of the Warsaw Pact and the eight republics of the former Soviet Union which lie west of the Urals had ratified the CFE Treaty.

Of course there remain risks if only because of the sheer size of the Russian Federation's human potential and natural resources and the conventional forces stationed east of the Urals, but the military situation has changed radically: the possibility no longer exists that a major conflict will be started by a surprise attack; the time which the governments of the countries of Western Europe have for detecting this and for taking political and military action is very much greater than it was previously. This rosy picture of the security situation in the West has, however, to be qualified, since it is probable that the members of the Alliance will reduce their forces below the ceiling set by the CFE Treaty.

Moreover, the substantial nuclear force that will remain, it is hoped under one command, will be very much larger than the combined nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom, even after the implementation of the START 1 and START 2 Treaties.

The direct threat to Western Europe has thus very much decreased. However, risks of destabilisation caused by nationalist movements in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe exist and events in the former Yugoslavia provide a tragic example of this. In addition, the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein is a reminder to Europeans that their economy is vulnerable and can be threatened by events that occur beyond Europe, in particular in the Middle East.

Atlantic and European reactions

The fundamental changes that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe have obviously produced reactions within the Atlantic Alliance, the European Community and Western European Union. The recent declarations of these three organisations are analysed below.

The Atlantic Alliance

The declarations issued following the meeting of heads of state and government of member countries of the Atlantic Alliance in Rome on 7-8 November 1991, the meetings of foreign ministers in Oslo on 4 June 1992, and in Brussels on 17 December 1992, are of great importance for the security and defence of Europe. From the Rome declaration, three issues are of particular note.

(1) Relations between the United States and Europe. The *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation* speaks of `a strong new transatlantic partnership' and advocates `consultation procedures between the Twelve . . . and the Alliance . . . in order to ensure that the Allies . . . should be adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security.' Elsewhere, the European security and defence identity is recognised even more explicitly: `Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Defence Identity, will also [as well as the integrated military structure] increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defence.' (Paragraph 52 of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept). In a speech to the Royal United Services Institute, London, on 20 February 1992, Mr J. M. Legge, Assistant Secretary General of NATO, who chaired the group that drafted the new strategy agreed that various interpretations could be put on this sentence, ranging from *carte blanche* for the setting up of a separate European structure (of which the Franco-German army corps seems to be the first element) to the fairly mild observation that European cooperation can play an important role by optimising the use of available resources. Mr Legge added that in his opinion the agreement between the Allies went no further than this latter interpretation.

(2) The new strategy. The New Strategic Concept is defined in the document of that name. It replaces the strategy described in the classified NATO document MC 14/3, which incorporated the idea of flexible response and which was never accepted by France. The new strategy has been accepted by all members of the Atlantic Alliance.

The new strategy defines the Alliance's security policy, which is based on dialogue and cooperation with the countries of the East and on the maintenance of a collective defence potential (para. 25). Cooperation is a new element, whereas dialogue and the maintenance of a collective defence potential already figured in the Harmel Report of 1967.

The military strategy proper includes the essential elements of the former flexible response. `The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence' (para. 36). It aims to deter any aggression. The mission of its conventional forces has not changed: `The forces of the Allies must therefore be able to defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an aggressor's advance as far forward as

possible' (para. 36). Nuclear weapons play an essential role. It is true that, in view of the new conventional force ratio, `The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are even more remote.' Because of this the Allies `can therefore significantly reduce their sub-strategic nuclear forces' (para. 57). But, `The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance' (para. 55), and the document further states that `The presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe' (para. 37).

What is `new' in this military strategy concerns the force posture, the deployment plan and, to a certain extent, the integrated military command structure.

The new force posture.

`The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance's military forces . . . will be adapted accordingly to the new strategic environment' (para. 46). In other words the overall size and state of readiness will be reduced and `the maintenance of a comprehensive in-place linear defensive posture in the Central Region will no longer be necessary.'

The deployment plan.

In the Central Region, the idea of defence on a continuous front with eight army corps in line was abandoned. It is now planned that the deployment of forces will be built up over a period of time. The forces will include:

- reaction forces (subdivided into immediate and rapid reaction elements), provided by most member countries, which must be capable of responding to a wide range of eventualities, deterring a limited attack and, if necessary, defending Allied territory against attack (see para. 47 a).

- main defence forces and reinforcing forces, made up of multinational army corps, which can be engaged after the mobilisation of reserves and the reconstitution of American units (see para. 47 b, c, d).

The integrated command structure.

The principles on which the integrated command structure are based remain unchanged. Modifications to it, which are fairly minor, are included in Annexe B.

(3) The Alliance's area of competence. One of the objectives of the New Strategic Concept was to set out the roles for military forces, other than deterrence and the defence of Alliance territory. It does so by stating clearly that `the scope of the Alliance as well as their [the Allies'] rights and obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged' (para. 23). This declaration thus did not provide for any out-of-area armed intervention by the Alliance.

It was stated, however, that military forces can none the less play a modest but non-negligible role in the Alliance's security policy: `They can contribute to dialogue and cooperation throughout Europe by their participation in confidence-building activities,

including those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements' (para. 42).

The Final Communiqué of the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo marked a prudent but undeniable development towards a widening of the Alliance's possible roles. It stipulates that `The Alliance has the capacity to contribute to effective actions by the CSCE in line with its new and increased responsibilities for crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this regard, we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise' (para. 11). The Alliance is examining, `with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, the practical options and modalities by which such support might be provided' (para. 11). Taking this development further, the final communiqué issued on 17 December 1992 following the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, included the statement `We confirm today the preparedness of our Alliance to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security.'

The European Union and Western European Union

The Treaty on European Union, agreed at the conference of the heads of state and government of the Twelve at Maastricht in December 1991, marks a step forward in the process of constructing Europe.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy will cover all areas, including the safeguarding of common values and fundamental interests. The Council will take decisions unanimously on questions of taking military action and will determine which other questions are to be decided by qualified majority.

According to the terms of Title V, Article J of the Treaty, `The common foreign and security policy shall include . . . the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.' The expressions `common defence policy' and `common defence' are not defined in the Treaty but the following definitions are suggested by the author:

- States have a common defence policy when an agreement exists on the aims of the engagement of armed forces. Various measures in preparation for that engagement can be taken, ranging from studies by military staffs to the drawing up of detailed operational plans to meet different contingencies but the engagement itself will be executed through *ad hoc* arrangements.

- For defence to be considered `common', the states concerned must at least have a centralised military structure which is ready to assume command of the armed forces involved in each engagement. This common defence can extend to the procurement of defence equipment and even the permanent integration of units from different nations in one command.

The Treaty continues, `The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.' It adds that the Union respects `the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty', that the policy of the Union `shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States', and that `The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance'. The member states of WEU agreed at the time of the signature of the Maastricht treaty a declaration containing details of the relationship of WEU, as the defence component of the European Union, with the Atlantic Alliance. It states that `The objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.' In addition, they declare that `WEU's operational role will be strengthened by examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means covering in particular:

- WEU planning cell;

- closer military cooperation complementary to the Alliance in particular in the fields of logistics, transport, training and strategic surveillance;

- meetings of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff;

- military units answerable to WEU.'

The member states of WEU, in a second declaration at Maastricht, also invited the three members of the European Community (Denmark, Greece and Ireland) who are not members of WEU to become full members or observers, and invited the European members of the Atlantic Alliance who are not members of the European Community (Iceland, Norway and Turkey) to become associate members of WEU. WEU could thereby enlarge to involve all the European members of the Alliance and the Community, an enlargement which while not essential would be useful for the future establishment of a common defence policy and a common defence. This enlargement was agreed at the ministerial meeting of WEU in Rome on 20 November 1992.

Since Maastricht, the proposed Franco-German army corps has taken shape. At La Rochelle on 22 May 1992, President Mitterrand and chancellor Kohl decided to create a corps with a European vocation. It is to consist of a French division, a German division and a Franco-German brigade, and the other members of WEU have been invited to participate in it. This corps will be able to be given missions of collective self-defence (as prescribed in Article 5 of the Brussels and Washington Treaties), peacekeeping or restoring peace and humanitarian actions, and must be operational by 1 October 1995.

At their meeting in Petersberg (Bonn) on 19 June 1992, the ministers of WEU agreed an important declaration in which it was stated that member countries were prepared to make available to WEU military units `from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces' for the following types of task (Part II, para. 2, 4):

- common defence (Article V of the Treaty);

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;

- peacekeeping tasks;

- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

THE FUTURE

At the beginning of this paper definitions were given of self-defence alliances and general defence alliances. In considering the future of European defence, both types of alliance must be included.

The self-defence of Europe

The Atlantic Alliance has a responsibility for Europe's self-defence. It has been seen how the Alliance intends to adapt to the sudden change in the threat. That change - some would say disappearance - raises a fundamental question: will a self-defence alliance still be necessary? It is noted that the reply given at Rome and Oslo has been very prudent and conservative. If the European Union expands to include Central and East European countries, this will raise new questions on the relationship between the defence of this enlarged Union and the Atlantic Alliance. From a military point of view, however, so long as states consider that a common defence is necessary, it would be a grave mistake not to keep the integrated military structure. The earlier discussion in this paper shows why no other method of combining military efforts seems acceptable.

What, in future, will be the role of the Europeans in the integrated military structure? It will be determined by two fundamental factors.

First, there are the political and military decisions to be taken by the United States. As regards political decisions, it is evident that any American administration is subject to contradictory arguments. Some, like Zbigniew Brzezinski, discern within Europe two competing visions of the future: the Franco-German vision, which seeks a Europe that is increasingly federalist, and the British, which prefers to avoid the emergence of a federal Europe that has political and military organs. He considers that `it is the first which deserves the unambiguous support of the United States.'[(3)] This point of view is at variance with the working note circulated in the Pentagon in early March 1992 which expressed concern about the development of any alliance, by friendly countries or others, which could endanger the present position of the United States as the only superpower. This note was disclaimed by a Pentagon spokesman and the final version, distributed in May 1992, stressed the maintenance and expansion of alliances.

On the military side, the United States will have to decide whether they are going to keep forces stationed in Europe. Is their presence still indispensable? Has not the time come to put into practice the idea expressed by President Eisenhower in 1955, when he said, in undiplomatic terms, that `Europe must,as a whole,provide in the long run for its own defence. The United States can move in and, by its psychological, intellectual and material leadership, help to produce arms, units and the confidence that will allow Europe to solve its problems. In the long run, it is not possible - and most certainly not desirable - that Europe should be an occupied (sic) territory defended by legions brought in from abroad, somewhat in the fashion that Rome's territories vainly sought security many hundred years ago.'

Today the European members of NATO can be considered capable of establishing and maintaining a military force that is able to deter or deal with any conventional

aggression. It is, however, certain that the departure of all American forces would require great efforts to be made in, for example, the field of satellite observation and communications. In Rome in November 1991 the Europeans asked for a permanent presence of American troops on the Old Continent. It is difficult to believe that they could change their minds: the decision to withdraw can only be taken by Washington.

A decision to withdraw US forces would pose once more the question of the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence, although planned reductions in the American and Russian stocks of nuclear weapons and the development of British and French nuclear forces suggest that the argument over the nature of the American nuclear presence in Europe is no longer seen in the same terms as in the past.

The *second* factor affecting the role of the Europeans in the integrated structure is the ability of the countries of Western Europe to arrive at a consensus on the arrangements concerning their own defence and in particular the `military units answerable to WEU' referred to in the Maastricht Declaration discussed above.

European military formations exist: the Europeans' contribution to the Alliance's conventional forces deployed in Europe is very much greater than that of the Americans, and there is every reason to believe that the difference will remain or even increase in future. But at the moment WEU - Europe - plays no role in the transfer, during a time of crisis, of these formations to NATO military commands: decisions on this are taken by the individual states.

The Franco-German corps can be considered a first step towards the creation of a European army which will coordinate its missions with the Alliance, as France does at present. It can of course be imagined that a big expansion of these units could occur, the Europeans thereby taking over the integrated structure `from the bottom up'.

However, such an idea presents practical difficulties: since almost all of the military forces of the Alliance's European member countries are already assigned to NATO commands, it seems difficult for them to be transferred to another command. The idea of `double-hatting' has been put forward but such a solution does not seem very attractive. A unit can of course have several `hats' - in other words have several possible missions, such as defence against direct aggression or participation in UN operations. To be under two different commands for the same mission, however, would make planning difficult: simplicity is an important principle in all planning.

A satisfactory solution has been found for the `Eurocorps': on 21 January 1993, SACEUR and the Chiefs of Defence Staff of France and Germany signed an agreement on the employment of this formation within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

General defence

In the foreseeable future, the military forces of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance are likely to be engaged in a variety of general defence missions, which could take various forms: humanitarian aid, the restoring of peace (peace enforcement) or peacekeeping. A peacekeeping mission is only undertaken when all the parties involved agree to it: it is therefore a policing operation, normally carried

out by lightly armed troops who use their arms in self-defence only. Restoring or enforcing peace is a real military operation in which the troops concerned enforce resolutions passed by the UN Security Council. The degree of resistance encountered may vary, but the units involved have a combat mission.

The UN has great experience in peacekeeping operations. It seems that current politico-military procedures (staff agreements with some of the minor aspects of integrated structures) are satisfactory. It should, however, be noted that the UN does not have the equipment necessary to form headquarters on the ground: NATO has provided personnel and equipment for the headquarters of UNPROFOR 2 (UN Protection Force) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The problem of restoring peace is quite different. First, it is something of which the UN has limited experience: the two major operations (Korea and the Gulf war) were delegated to the United States. Also, staff agreements are not suitable for combat operations. It therefore seems that international military cooperation in peace restoration or enforcement missions must necessarily take one of the two other forms suggested by history: placing forces under command or an integrated structure.

Before states can contemplate participation in the various types of cooperative operation, they must have suitable national military forces, which for most of them would mean some reorganisation and would have a major impact on their defence budgets.

Turning now to cooperation at the European (WEU) level, the Petersberg Declaration stipulates that the WEU Planning Cell, which will be fully operational in Brussels by 1 April 1993 under the direction of General Marcello Caltabiano, must establish a list of forces which could be made available to WEU, prepare plans and recommend which headquarters should command operations. The last task seems particularly difficult. The following are possible ways of tackling it:

- The placing of units under command of a pilot nation has in the past proved its effectiveness. Political consensus for such a solution might perhaps be difficult to achieve but, from a military point of view, several national headquarters could be used for the command and control of a peace restoration mission. The headquarters of the French army corps-level *Force d'Action Rapide* is probably the best but not the only example.

- If the method of assigning forces to an existing integrated structure were chosen, the headquarters of the Franco-German corps would be an obvious solution but this headquarters will not be operational until 1995 and Germany still has to resolve the question of missions outside the NATO area. The headquarters of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps would be another solution. Its airmobile division, which consists of Belgian, British, German and Netherlands brigades, would be the spearhead of the corps. The British political and military authorities have already drawn attention to this latter solution.

- It would be possible to create a permanent command structure for general defence missions. This idea was suggested on 4 October 1991 in an Anglo-Italian declaration but seems premature. WEU could of course become the military arm of a general

defence alliance; it can obviously be anticipated - and hoped - that the European Union will one day establish supranational decision-making procedures covering defence issues. If that were the case, Europe would be similar to a unified state and the comments made on the policy of alliances would no longer be applicable. Yet that situation is still far off and political consensus between the states of Europe is in general uncertain for operations other than self-defence. The Gulf war illustrated well the difficulty encountered by friendly or allied countries in reaching agreement, in the early stages of the crisis, on the choice of means to be used to make an aggressor respect international law.

- Another acceptable solution would be the creation of an *ad hoc* command structure, during a crisis situation, by allies who had decided to participate. Creating such a structure would of course take time. If, for example, six states provided a brigade each, it would probably be necessary to create headquarters at both division and corps level. Each level of command would have its own organic supporting units (such as artillery, engineers and combat helicopters) as well as logistic support, which is particularly difficult to organise for international operations and for which specially adapted structures would be required.

There are thus several possibilities but there are also many difficulties and the Planning Cell will have a difficult task. The Cell will at the same time have to study how military formations from WEU member countries can cooperate with those of other countries, in particular the United States, in peace restoration missions. The preparation of this military cooperation should be as flexible as possible. The exploration of all possible types of cooperation between the WEU Planning Cell and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) will be essential but in addition close contact will have to be established with American organisations which have a similar role, such as US Army Europe and US Central Command.

Conclusions

Collective self-defence

The members of the Alliance have decided not to change fundamentally the existing military basis for collective defence which the integrated military structure represents.

It is impossible to foresee how, in the long term, this structure will adapt to, first, the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, second, American policy and, third, the determination of the countries of the European Union to operate, at their level, a defence policy and even a common defence. In the medium term, solutions for incorporating formations such as the Franco-German `Eurocorps' seem to be taking form: the agreement which has been reached between the Chiefs of the French and German Defence Staffs and SACEUR for the future relations between this corps and NATO may indicate that this is not an insoluble problem.

Other military tasks

Three remarks can be made on cooperation for other possible military tasks:

- It is very improbable that Western countries would launch a major operation which was not in accordance with the UN charter.

- The United Nations has proved its effectiveness in organising and controlling peacekeeping missions by combining, for these very low-intensity operations, staff agreements with participating states and an *ad hoc* integrated structure created for each separate case.

- In order to restore peace, in Korea and the Gulf the United Nations entrusted the United States with responsibility for military operations. If in the future the member countries of WEU (or the European Union) wish to play a collective role in this field, they will have to resolve the problem of military cooperation. There seem to be two effective solutions: the conduct of operations by a headquarters of a pilot nation, or by an existing European integrated headquarters. The third solution, of waiting until the political decision by certain countries to commit forces has been taken and then forming an *ad hoc* headquarters, would be possible but would require considerable time.

ANNEXE A

MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE TWO WORLD WARS

FOUR EXAMPLES OF COOPERATION

Improvised staff agreements between Belgium, France and the United Kingdom (August 1914).

In August 1914 German forces violated Belgian neutrality. A *de facto* alliance was created between France, the United Kingdom and Belgium. There had been no preparation but from the start there was a certain amount of coordination between the British Expeditionary Force and the French Army. King Albert I refused General Joffre's sensible proposal that he withdraw his forces in the direction of the French forces and the Belgian Army fell back on Antwerp. After the Germans were halted on the Marne a continuous front consisting of French, British and Belgian forces was created, extending from the Swiss border to the river Yser in Belgium.

For nearly four years the allies waged a war without having a clearly defined objective. Political cooperation was very limited: a Franco-British conference was held in London on 27 December 1916 and a second held in Rome on 5-7 January 1917, with the participation of the Italians and representatives of Russia. The results were modest and a unified military command was not assured. Each army fought within its own sector and received orders from its national authorities. Military cooperation was at first restricted to specific operations, limited in time and space, such as the participation of 2,000 British marines in the operation to evacuate Antwerp carried out by Belgian forces in October 1914. Cooperation was subsequently extended: in April 1917 the French general Nivelle, commanding two French armies and a British army, launched major offensives which ended twenty days later having gained a few kilometres of ground at a cost of 80,000 casualties.

The evolution towards general political coordination and a unified military command (1917-1918)

A military crisis in Italy - Italy went to war with Austria in 1915 - resulted in great changes in the course of the war.

On 24 October 1917 German and Austrian forces broke through the Italian front near Caporetto. After falling back a hundred kilometres, the Italian troops regrouped behind the river Piave on 10 November 1917. Later, eleven British and French divisions came to Italy's assistance. General Foch led, without having direct command, all the forces on the Italian front: seven French divisions, four British divisions and the Italian armies.

The scale of political and military coordination was then increased: the Higher War Council, made up of ministers representing the governments of the four main allies (France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States),[(4)] and the Committee of representatives of the Commanders-in-Chief, met every month.

There remained the question of a unified command proposed by the United States. France and Italy hesitated over this proposal and the United Kingdom found it unacceptable. It has to be said that the `Nivelle experience' had had a very negative effect.

However, a slow evolution began, with the forming of a general reserve, but events were to impose a unified command: the German offensives of March 1918 broke through the allied line. The allied governments decided, at the Conference of Doullens on 26 March 1918, to entrust the coordination of `the action of allied forces on the western front' to General Foch and, on 3 April 1918, he was given charge of `the strategic direction of military operations.' The precise form of words used matters little: Foch was the commander-in-chief. This new command arrangement held together, in very difficult conditions, up to the last assaults by the German armies. Foch then launched the offensive that was to secure victory.

Staff agreements between Belgium, France and the United Kingdom in 1939. Operations in May-June 1940.

In September 1939, following the invasion of Poland, France and the United Kingdom declared war on Germany, in accordance with their treaties with Poland. Belgium, a neutral state, was obliged to deploy its armies on its eastern and southern borders, and asked France and the United Kingdom to carry out a combined operation to counter any violation of its eastern border. Military staff agreements - in reality accords between the governments - were then arrived at. An overall, detailed plan was drawn up in which three defensive positions were envisaged -from west to east, the line of the river Escaut then the border between France and Belgium; the line Antwerp-Louvain-Namur then the river Meuse; Antwerp-Liège-Namur and then the Meuse. In each case boundaries between the national forces were indicated, with the Belgians in the north, the British in the centre and the French in the south. A planned rate of advance of the French and British forces in Belgium was worked out in detail. The three forces remained under national command. Before the German offensive began there was no meeting of the generals leading the operation, but after the attack of 10 May 1940 considerable efforts were made to coordinate operations: the commanders-in-chief (the French general Georges,[5] King Leopold III,[6] and General Pownall, the representative of the British general Gort[7]) met for the first time on 12 May. General Georges, representing General Gamelin,[8] decided to defend the line Antwerp-Louvain-Namur-the Meuse. He behaved as the commander of the northern theatre of operations and his decision was accepted by the allies without demur. The will to fight together thus made it possible to overcome the disadvantage of not having any unified command structure.

The breakthrough at Sedan on 13 May 1940 and the rapid German advance westwards and then north to Boulogne and Calais called for immediate high-level reaction. On 16 May General Billotte, a subordinate of General Georges and commander of 1 Army Group, decided to fall back to a position on the line Antwerp-the Escaut-French border and asked King Leopold III `to be so good as to order his troops to withdraw in liaison with the British Expeditionary Force.' As a staff decision and procedure this was logical: it was merely common sense that the commander of 1 Army Group should give orders to the Belgians and British.

But this fragile command system, arrived at empirically, soon collapsed after 16 May. A meeting of considerable importance at Ypres showed how ineffectual such a system was. The new `generalissimo', General Weygand, General Gamelin's successor, was anxious to see the British and Belgian commanders on the ground. A rendezvous was arranged in Ypres where General Weygand was to meet King Leopold III at 1500 hours on 21 May. However, separated from his staff for many hours, the general was not kept informed of the situation; he wished to re-establish a continuous line from the Yser to the French border, unaware that the Germans were already in Abbeville and that the allied disposition was split in two. He did not succeed in seeing General Gort who, arriving at 1900 hours, was coordinating the planning of future operations with General Billotte. In this critical situation there was thus no leader; the French Commander-in-Chief attempted in vain to meet his allies and contented himself with vague promises, which were not kept, to execute his overall operational plan.

It has been asserted that this military inefficiency was only a superficial phenomenon, and that the real causes of the confusion were political in nature. It is true that King Leopold III wished to avoid civilian casualties, which he considered pointless; Churchill was convinced for his part that `the first battle would be lost' and wanted to hold onto his trump card (fighter aircraft) to defend Great Britain; and the French government wished to continue the fight on French soil with the involvement of all the allied forces. In addition, the unwillingness to fight, in certain units, made any analysis of the decisions emanating from higher command derisory. No historian would claim that the military command (or coordination) structure was the principal cause of the débâcle of May-June 1940 but it was undeniably unsuited to such a war.

December 1941: the Roosevelt-Churchill agreements. Military aspects of the integrated command structure.

At the end of December 1941 and two weeks after Pearl Harbor, the United States President, Roosevelt, and the British Prime Minister, Churchill, met in Washington and took decisions of the greatest importance:

- Germany being the principal enemy, its defeat was the key to total victory;

- the economic resources and military forces of the two nations had to be combined under a single command structure i.e. the integrated[(9)] chiefs of staff under the leadership of Roosevelt and Churchill.

Having defined structures for the overall conduct of the war, the American president and the British prime minister decided on the command structures for the various operational theatres, in particular Europe:

- the military forces of the two major allies would retain national chains of command up to the highest level possible (army group);

- each theatre of operations would come under the responsibility of a single commander, who would have an integrated staff;

- the military formations of the other allies (mainly the French) would come under the command of British or American army groups.

At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 a Briton, Lieutenant-General Morgan, was appointed Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), although the commander himself was not designated. Churchill and Roosevelt hesitated between Marshall, Eisenhower and Montgomery. At the end of 1943 they finally chose General Eisenhower as Commander-in-Chief.

The integrated staff of the allied expeditionary force (SHAEF) completed the planning of Operation OVERLORD begun by COSSAC and launched the Normandy landings. The command included a British army group, two American army groups, an airborne force consisting of American and British divisions, the naval expeditionary force and all allied air forces except the strategic forces, which had bombing missions in Germany.

COMMENT

These historical examples show how an improvised type of collaboration in 1914, and one consisting of `staff agreements' set up in 1940, led to a single command system at the level of theatre of operations. In World War II the theatre commander in Europe had an integrated staff and national formations under command.

It may be useful at this stage to say something about the difference between integrated command structures and the placing of forces under command.

Bringing forces *under command* is only workable with a `pilot' nation that has a military structure extending from theatre level down to the tactical level. The political and military freedom of action of a nation placing its formations or units under command is reduced. Naturally, the government of the nation concerned can, prior to operations, impose restrictions on the use of its forces. Certain aspects of military command, such as man management, military discipline and logistics, remain a national responsibility. Certainly a government can, during the course of operations, draw the attention of the commander to matters of purely national concern, as General de Gaulle did at the beginning of 1945 when SHAEF was planning a withdrawal in the Vosges involving the evacuation of Strasbourg, which had been liberated by the French Army. It is, however, true that putting units under command is difficult to accept in the case of states that have committed large forces to the defence of national vital interests. During the First World War the French government and staff proposed - with irrefutable military arguments to support them - that Belgian and American divisions should come under French command, taking orders from French army corps commanders, but it was impossible to convince the Belgians. The Americans, whose first troops to arrive in France were shared between French formations, regrouped as soon as possible to form the First American Army.

The role of pilot nation played by France was eventually recognised by the other allies during the crisis of March 1918 and the coordination of operations was entrusted to General Foch.

During the Second World War the United States and the United Kingdom engaged very large forces in the European theatre of operations (Sicily, Italy and then France). In conditions such as these the setting up of integrated military structures seems both politically and militarily preferable to having a pilot nation.

ANNEXE B

THE MILITARY STRUCTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

The development of NATO's military structure began in 1950. This annexe first describes the structure as it was in 1991 (with its integrated command structure, air defence system, its two integrated formations and three permanent naval forces), and then the reorganisation now in hand.

THE MILITARY STRUCTURE IN 1991

The integrated commands

The staffs of the integrated commands consist of officers of the countries which have assigned forces. At the headquarters of each command, operational plans based on the directives of the Military Committee are drawn up and submitted via this committee to the political authorities for approval. If need be these plans are executed by the forces `transferred' to the command.

In 1991, the area covered by the Alliance was divided among three Major Commands:

Europe (ACE)

Atlantic (ACLANT)

channel (ACchaN)

Each of these included several Major Subordinate Commands. In war time Allied Command Europe (ACE) had operational command over almost all of the assigned land and air forces and an important part of the naval forces (those in the Mediterranean).

The commands directly subordinated to ACE were:

AFNORTH Allied Forces Northern Europe

AFCENT Allied Forces Central Europe

AFSOUTH Allied Forces Southern Europe

UKAIR United Kingdom Air Forces

AMF Allied Command Europe Mobile Force

NAEWF NATO Airborne Early Warning Force

The multinational nature of the land and air forces has been most evident within AFCENT. The AFCENT structure included formations from seven NATO countries: Belgium, Canada, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. Eight national army corps - three German, two American, one

Belgian, one British and one Netherlands - formed two multinational army groups, NORTHAG and CENTAG. The Canadian brigade was kept as an army group reserve or passed under operational command of an American corps. The air elements were grouped in two Allied Tactical Air Forces.

In the northern and southern regions defence did not have such an obvious multinational aspect, although the reinforcement of national forces was either planned (for instance the sending of a Portuguese brigade to Italy) or practised during exercises (the reinforcement of Norway). In southern Europe the most important evidence of cooperation within the Alliance was seen in the bilateral agreements between a number of countries and the United States .

All the integrated headquarters are connected by a complex permanent communications system which is operated by the military personnel of several nations.

Air Defence

NATO attaches great importance to air defence. Prior to 1991 it was estimated that the Soviet Union had the means to launch a massive air attack without warning. Any land offensive would be preceded by air operations. Procedures for transferring authority of air assets are lengthy, which is unacceptable since reactions must be immediate. An integrated air defence system has been in constant evolution since 1962. Originally it consisted of 18 ground-based radars linked by a communications system that was constantly improved. In 1973 the integrated air defence system included about a hundred sites (command and control, radars, airbases with fighter aircraft, air defence missiles) and, since 1986, 18 E-3A (AWACS - Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft equipped with powerful early warning radars have been added to the system. Air defence demands a considerable financial effort, in addition to pilots, radar and missile operators and a command, control and communications system, all available 24 hours a day.

In the event of violation of the Alliance's airspace, therefore, Allied Command Europe has both the means and the delegated authority to localise and identify the intrusion and if necessary riposte with force. France and NATO's air defence organisations are permanently linked for the exchange of data but Paris does not place assets such as aircraft and missiles at the disposal of NATO. On the other hand, France is a member of the NATO Air Defence Committee (NADC), which studies the long-term aspects of air defence.

Two integrated formations

Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, a brigade-sized formation of some 5,000 men and made up of land and air units from eight NATO countries, is air transportable and can be sent anywhere in the European Command as a demonstration of Alliance solidarity. It also has its own air support element, which can be committed separately, as was the case in Turkey in January 1991. It has a small, permanently formed, multinational headquarters, its constituent units remaining under national command until transferred to AMF, which can be done very quickly.

The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have created an amphibious force of marines which can be used for operations in northern Europe.

Three permanent naval forces

Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) consists of ten destroyers and frigates. Part of the Atlantic Command, it is permanently available, and participating nations assure continuity by periodically relieving units according to national plans.

Standing Naval Force channel (STANAVFORchaN) is a similar force but consisting of mine countermeasures vessels operating in the channel and the southern North Sea.

Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED - which has since become Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED)) was not permanently in being but capable of being assembled at short notice.

THE CURRENT REORGANISATION OF THE MILITARY STRUCTURE

The new structure has been adapted to the new situation in Europe, following the events of 1989, 1990 and 1991 in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact and the former USSR. On 29 May 1991 NATO's Defence Planning Committee defined the new force structure, which includes immediate reaction and rapid reaction forces, main defence forces and augmentation forces. The present Allied Command Europe Mobile Force forms the basis of the immediate reaction forces and an army corps, which will have a multinational staff and have a British commander, will form the land component of the rapid reaction force.

Since May 1991, NATO has indicated that the following changes will take place:

- One Major Command, Allied Command channel, will disappear, its area in future forming part of AFNORTHWEST, a new subordinate command (see below);

- Allied Command Europe will maintain the subordinate commands, but AFNORTH will become AFNORTHWEST, to include Great Britain, Norway and the maritime area between these two countries. Consequently, AFCENT will extend further north to include Denmark. This new geographic limit seems more rational than the former but problems arise concerning responsibility for the Baltic Approaches;

- the headquarters of AFCENT's two army groups will disappear. AFCENT will have two subordinate commands: Land Forces Central Europe and Air Forces Central Europe;

- whereas in the 1991 organisation AFCENT included eight national army corps, after the reorganisation it will have under command a further corps, LANDJUT, made up of Danish and German divisions. However, of the eight existing corps, an American corps will disappear. The British corps will form the basis of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps; this force will comprise three divisions (two British divisions and a multinational (BE, GE, NL and UK) airmobile division), to which a fourth division, composed of Greek, Italian and Turk formations, can be added as a reinforcement. Of the six other corps, five will become `multinational' - brigades or divisions from one or more allied countries will be assigned to them. The staff of some of these corps could be integrated, while others remain national but include liaison cells from allied countries. The last of the existing AFCENT corps, a German corps, will be deployed in the new, eastern *Länder*, with a headquarters in Potsdam, but will not for the time being form part of AFCENT.

COMMENT

Following the reorganisation, integration will extend down to the level of corps headquarters for three reasons:

- the requirement for it is implied in the new strategic concept, which involves keeping forces at different states of readiness;

- in the case of Belgium and the Netherlands, `multinationality' at army corps level is inevitable, given the reduction of their forces available to the Alliance;

- the planned `exchange' of a division between the American and German corps is essentially due to political considerations.

The reorganisation is fairly modest when compared with the 50% reduction in combat troops available. The number of army corps may be further reduced by one or even two, since the Belgian and Dutch participation will most probably be limited to one division each in the near future.

The division of commands between the member countries has changed relatively little following the reorganisation: NATO's two remaining major commanders are American and the three subordinate commanders in Europe are, as before, American, British and German.

ANNEXE C

OTHER FORMS OF MILITARY COOPERATION SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

INTRODUCTION

The brief look at the history of the two world wars suggests that there are three different forms of military cooperation:

- staff agreements;

- the placing of military formations under command of a pilot nation;

- integrated command structures (with headquarters staffed by officers from several allied nations).

Similar methods are adopted for coordinating operations outside alliance territory. This annexe includes examples of each method and examines military cooperation in peacekeeping operations carried out by United Nations `blue helmets'.

STAFF AGREEMENTS

The operation in Zaire's Shaba province in 1978 is an example of an improvised action based on incomplete staff agreements. On 11 May 1978 a force of 4,000 poorly-armed men of the Congo National Liberation Front (FLNC) entered Kolwezi, a mining town in the province of Shaba (formerly Katanga), having met little resistance from the Zairean army. The 2,500 foreign nationals living in Kolwezi felt threatened.

Following an appeal by President Mobutu, Britain, France, Belgium and the United States after consultation agreed on the mounting, on 19 May, of a Franco-Belgian operation, with American support, to evacuate 2,000 Europeans by air. The political goals were divergent: the Belgians wanted merely a humanitarian evacuation, whereas the French seemed to want to re-establish order, which implied that their troops would remain in place longer. In the end no clear directive was given by Paris or Brussels to coordinate the action of the two military formations on the ground. None the less the operation was successful, although it must be said that the FLNC put up little resistance.

There were operations of a similar type in Rwanda in 1990 and Kinshasa (Zaire) in 1991. It seems possible that this type of operation will assume greater importance in future both within and outside Europe.

FORCES UNDER COMMAND

The operation in the Gulf from August 1990 to March 1991 was a typical example of a political and military action led by a pilot nation (the United States) with the political agreement of a large number of states and the relatively limited military support of some of its allies.

Political agreement was expressed in successive Security Council resolutions, in particular in Resolution 678, of 29 November 1990, which authorised member states cooperating with the Kuwaiti government to use all means necessary against Iraq if it had not implemented Resolution 660 (which demanded that Iraq immediately withdraw its forces from Kuwait) by 15 January 1991. Resolution 678 can be considered a firm basis and clear political objective for an allied military offensive after 15 January 1991.

For the military operations themselves, the Pentagon very quickly chose the strategy of overwhelming superiority. The operational plan was drawn up by an American staff. The allies were consulted for the definition of their missions but from start to finish General Schwarzkopf, as theatre commander, led all the forces placed under his operational control in all operations.

INTEGRATED STRUCTURES

The Suez operation by Britain and France in late October and early November 1956 was an example of an operation outside the territory of the countries concerned in which an integrated military structure was set up. The idea of a combined operation arose following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal on 28 July 1956. At the beginning of the month of August an integrated Franco-British headquarters was established in Malta with the British General Keightley as its commander and the French Admiral Barjot as deputy commander. All staff divisions were composed of officers from both countries. On 29 October 1956 Israeli formations advanced in the Sinai Desert. On 30 October Britain and France presented an ultimatum calling on Israel and Egypt to cease operations and withdraw their forces to 10 miles on either side of the canal (which in fact meant an Egyptian withdrawal, since the Israelis were over 100 km from the canal), an ultimatum accepted by Israel but rejected by Egypt. On 31 October French and British aircraft destroyed the Egyptian air force, an action condemned by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 4 November. Despite this, on 5 November the allies launched airborne and amphibious operations but the following day, following political pressure, the two governments called a halt to their operations. For technical reasons, for instance the provision of transport, but in particular for political reasons, such as hesitation and a divergence of view between the two allies, military preparation was too slow but once launched the operation met little resistance; it was a military success but a political disaster.

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS[(10)]

There were eighteen United Nations peacekeeping operations between 1948 and 1989. Such operations are only carried out if all the parties involved in a conflict agree and are prepared to stop fighting. The Blue Helmets are as a rule lightly armed and only use their weapons in self-defence.

Operations in the Congo from 1960 to 1964 were the most important, not only in terms of the numbers of troops involved, which reached 19,828 in July 1961, but also in terms of the complexity of the mission: to help the fledgling government maintain law and order, to oppose segregation movements and to ensure the withdrawal of all

mercenary forces. During the operation, 195 Blue Helmets were killed in action or accidents.

UN operations have some of the characteristics found in the `staff agreements' type of military cooperation, but also some of those seen in the `integrated structures' variety. On the other hand, any notion of there being a pilot nation is avoided. The emphasis is laid on participation by a large number of countries, each providing a relatively small contingent. It has to be said that Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, which began in December 1992, has provided an alternative model.

Cooperation in such operations is based on staff agreements, in that the deployment of forces is preceded by detailed discussion, between the participating countries and the UN Secretary-General, who has political responsibility for the operation, on the missions and area of responsibility of the military force made available to the UN.

The Secretary-General has a Field Operations Division which provides support for the operation, including the financial side and certain logistic aspects such as transport to the zone of operations, accommodation and non-national supplies, including rations and fuel.

Command of a UN operation in the field is exercised by a Force Commander, who is responsible to the Secretary-General. This commander has an international staff, consisting of officers from all the countries taking part in the operation, and the chain of command which he designates may include intermediate levels between his headquarters and national contingents. This type of operation thus has the characteristics of an integrated structure.

1. The terms `operational command' and `operational control' are discussed in the section on the political structure of the Atlantic Alliance.

2. The forces of NATO member countries are of three types:

- *assigned forces* are those whose main mission is within the integrated military structure;

- *earmarked forces* are those which have a national mission but which may, after accomplishment of that mission, be assigned to a NATO commander (for example, forces responsible for covering the mobilisation of troops);

- *other forces*, which it is not intended to assign to a NATO commander (such as those responsible for the protection of national territory outside the combat zone).

3. *Libération*, 10 December 1991.

4. American troops began to arrive in France on 26 June 1917. By the end of that year they were arriving at the front at the rate of 30,000 a month.

5. Commanding the French armies deployed to the north of Switzerland - the major part of French metropolitan troops.

6. Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Army.

7. Commanding the British Expeditionary Force.

8. Commanding the French armies.

9. An integrated staff is defined here as one composed of officers of different nations.

10. See, for instance, *The Blue Helmets*, Second Edition (United Nations, 1990).